42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred, even when the employee felt its effects at other worksites.

Ausler v. Wallace · filed 2021-01-04(f)(3)

But, after reviewing Ausler’s allegations as a whole, he does not allege that specific discriminatory actions occurred at one remote worksite or another that would outweigh the tenor of his allegations – that, while the discriminatory conduct may ... have been felt by Ausler at various jobsites, the alleged conduct emanated from his employer’s headquarters in Round Rock.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue in a district merely because relevant employment records can be accessed electronically from there.

Walker v. Wheeler · filed 2021-02-18(f)(3)

Under the statute’s second prong, venue is proper in “the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... And in any event, that records are accessible through an electronic database from a district does not mean they are “maintained and administered” there.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the exclusive venue rules for Title VII claims and, through incorporation, ADA claims.

WEAVER v. WALGREEN COMPANY · filed 2021-02-23(f)(3)

This venue provision is considered to be “exclusive,” rendering the general venue statute inapplicable to Title VII and ADA cases. ... As such, venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is improper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions, including where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the plaintiff would have worked but for that practice.

Gonzalez v. Apttus Corporation · filed 2021-03-10(f)(3)

Under both Title VII’s and the general venue provisions, this District is not a proper venue for this action, because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in San Mateo, California, and she does not allege that Defendant resides in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions, including venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the plaintiff would have worked but for that practice.

Roe v. City of New York · filed 2021-03-12(f)(3)

Under both Title VII’s and the general venue provisions, this District is not a proper venue for this action, because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in San Mateo, California, and she does not allege that Defendant resides in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not place venue where an intermittent employee waits between deployments when the alleged unlawful decisions were made elsewhere.

SEBUNYA v. MAYORKAS · filed 2021-03-18(f)(3)

Under this factual scenario, it is clear to the Court that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not contemplate that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are properly venued in the location where he spent his time in non- pay status waiting for his next deployment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

(PS)Jones v. BergElectric Inc. · filed 2021-04-02(f)(3)

Under Title VII’s venue provision, the case originally could have been filed in the Eastern District, where Plaintiff alleges the unlawful employment practice occurred and where the relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in a district tied to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice.

Robinson v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2021-04-06(f)(3)

Title VII includes its own specific venue provision, which states that a claim may be filed in (1) any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) the district where the employment records relevant to the unlawful practice are maintained and administered; or (3) the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) specifies judicial districts for Title VII venue, not divisions within a district.

Jones v. Mar-Mal, Inc. · filed 2021-04-19(f)(3)

Notably, both § 1391(b) and § 2000e-5(f)(3) refer to judicial districts; neither reference divisional districts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked but for that practice.

Vaughan v. Capital City Protective Services, II LLC · filed 2021-04-22(f)(3)

Construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Vaughan, the Court finds that the District is a proper venue under the first and third prongs of the venue provisions of Title VII and denies Capital City’s motion to transfer venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred.

Xiong, Brian v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2021-05-06(f)(3)

While the second and third provisions contemplate “the judicial district” in which records are kept or the plaintiff would have worked, the first provision authorizes an action to proceed in “any judicial district” in the entire state “in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets a special venue rule for Title VII claims that can control venue when a complaint includes other claims.

ENGERT v. RAIMONDO · filed 2021-05-20(f)(3)

Under either approach, however, I conclude that the Title VII venue provision controls here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim in a district where the alleged employment discrimination occurred.

Roker v. Twentieth Century Fox · filed 2021-06-09(f)(3)

Venue for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims is proper under section 2000e-5(f)(3), in the Western District of Tennessee, where Plaintiff worked, and his employment discrimination claims arose.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for covered employment discrimination claims to specified districts; personal hardship does not make another district a proper venue.

Milowski v. Wolf · filed 2021-07-21(f)(3)

Here, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia. ... Any potential hardship Milowski faces cannot make venue in the District of Columbia proper.

Title VII’s venue provision does not allow a plaintiff to establish venue using allegations that have not been administratively exhausted.

Fleming v. Johnson · filed 2021-07-26(f)(3)

For all these reasons, Fleming’s failure to administratively exhaust the issues related to Brown’s Ferry precludes the court from finding that the alleged discrimination Fleming suffered at Brown’s Ferry is sufficient for him to bring this lawsuit in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits transfer of a Title VII action to the district of the respondent’s principal office even when the respondent can be found in another district.

Laber v. United States Department of Defense · filed 2021-08-03(f)(3)

Although the Title VII venue statute provides that the location of the principal office of the defendant is available only if the defendant cannot be found within another district, that restriction is not applicable when the court considers transferring the action under §§ 1404 and 1406.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the judicial district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Jane Doe 1 v. Jetblue Airways Corporation · filed 2021-08-03(f)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Here, the assault, which created the hostile work environment and led to the gender and sex discrimination that Plaintiffs allegedly experienced, took place in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, venue is proper in the District of Puerto Rico.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be brought in a district where any of the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred.

Terry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2021-08-12(f)(3)

But Hawai‘i is still a proper venue because at least some of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Terry occurred in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in a district where some of the alleged unlawful employment conduct occurred.

Terry v. Barr · filed 2021-08-12(f)(3)

Whether warranted or retaliatory, those reference checks were clearly given by FDC Honolulu personnel, presumably from the District of Hawai‘i. Thus, it is clear some of the alleged unlawful conduct occurred within this District and venue here, pursuant to Title VII, is proper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for Title VII claims based on where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, where the plaintiff would have worked, or, in specified circumstances, where the respondent has its principal office.

Campbell v. Almost Home Restaurant · filed 2021-08-13(f)(3)

Plaintiff does not allege that the unlawful employment practices occurred in New York, that the relevant employment records are maintained or administered in New York, or that he would have worked in New York but for the unlawful employment practices, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for a Title VII claim to districts connected to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, the place the plaintiff would have worked, or, in specified circumstances, the respondent’s principal office.

Campbell v. XR Foods · filed 2021-09-21(f)(3)

Although Plaintiff asserts that he now resides in New York, New York, he does not allege that the unlawful employment practices occurred in New York, that the relevant employment records are maintained or administered in New York, or that he would have worked in New York but for the unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII hiring suit in the district where the applicant would have worked, and permits transfer there when the suit was filed elsewhere.

Patel v. Wilke · filed 2021-09-22(f)(3)

Based on the Plaintiffs request to not be forced to “file again,” Plaintiff's pro se status, and the fact that Plaintiff filed in New Mexico in good faith without knowledge that the forum was improper, the Court will transfer the case rather than dismiss on the basis of improper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue in Title VII actions; ordinary venue provisions do not apply.

Lynn-Pryor v. Department of Defense Education Activity · filed 2021-09-27(f)(3)

Ordinary venue provisions do not apply in Title VII cases.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or in the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for that practice.

Kumar v. ElectrifAi, LLC · filed 2021-09-28(f)(3)

Venue is proper in the Southern District of New York under the first and third prongs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA employment discrimination suit in a district where the alleged unlawful practice occurred or where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Anderson v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-09-29(f)(3)

The court recognizes that venue is proper in the Western District of Missouri under at least the first two options of the venue provision: the alleged unlawful employment practice happened in Missouri and, as defendant acknowledges, it maintains plaintiff’s employment records there. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in a district where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the employee would have worked.

Elshamy v. Cable News Network · filed 2021-09-30(f)(3)

Although Plaintiff asserts that he now resides in Queens County, New York, he does not allege that the unlawful employment practices occurred in New York, that the relevant employment records are maintained or administered in New York, or that he would have worked in New York but for the unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for Title VII claims based on where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the plaintiff would have worked; if the respondent is found in none of those districts, venue lies where it has its principal office.

Campbell v. XR Foods · filed 2021-10-08(f)(3)

Although Plaintiff asserts that he now resides in New York, New York, he does not allege that the unlawful employment practices occurred in New York, that the relevant employment records are maintained or administered in New York, or that he would have worked in New York but for the unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Ross v. Dept. of the Army, US Army Reserve · filed 2021-10-12(f)(3)

Venue for a Title VII action lies, however, in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims and limits where those claims may be brought.

Doyle v. The Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2021-10-15(f)(3)

Where, as here, plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act (ECF 16 at 2), venue is determined by Title VII’s venue provision, 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiff has not adequately established that venue is proper in the District of Maryland as to her claims under the Rehabilitation Act or Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Richards v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation · filed 2021-10-22(f)(3)

Because claims under Title VII can be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, all federal district courts within the State of New York – including the Eastern District of New York and this court – are proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue in a Title VII action.

APONTE v. MCCARTHY · filed 2021-11-05(f)(3)

Still, plaintiff’s place of residence is not one of the criteria set in § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Jadallah v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2021-11-10(f)(3)

With respect to Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII and the ADA, because Plaintiff alleges that she worked at a school in Brooklyn, was terminated from that position, and was not rehired at another school in Brooklyn, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for those claims. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides the exclusive venues for Title VII employment discrimination actions.

White v. Secretary Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2021-11-23(f)(3)

This clause provides “the exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination actions.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal district court in a state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Purvey v. Allied Universal · filed 2021-11-29(f)(3)

Venue for a Title VII action lies in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The ADA also incorporates by reference Title VII’s venue provision for claims brought under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Martinez v. Bloomberg, LP, 740 F.3d 211, 228 (2d Cir. 2014). Thus, although Plaintiff’s claims arise from her employment in Manhattan, venue of her Title VII and ADA claims would be proper in any federal district court within the State of New York.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Graham v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2021-12-06(f)(3)

With respect to Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII and the ADA, because Plaintiff alleges that he works at BHSLT, in Brooklyn, and that the defendants have discriminated and retaliated against him while he has worked at that school, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for those claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims in a district tied to the alleged unlawful employment practice, the relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice.

Troster v. Barr · filed 2021-12-10(f)(3)

Accordingly, per the first prong of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is improper in the District of Columbia because the “unlawful employment practice” occurred not here, but in Quantico, Virginia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims based on where the alleged employment practice occurred, where relevant records are kept, or where the employee would have worked.

Harris v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-12-15(f)(3)

The venue provision in Title VII also governs venue for Rehabilitation Act claims. ... Venue is improper in the District of Maryland. Importantly, Plaintiff does not allege any employment connection to Maryland. Plaintiff did not work in Maryland, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s claim that agency records are not maintained in Maryland, and, had she not been removed, Plaintiff’s duty station would not have been in Maryland. None of the bases for venue are satisfied here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue to districts connected to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked; if the defendant is in none of those districts, venue may lie where it has its principal office.

DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-20656 · filed 2021-12-21(f)(3)

Venue under Title VII is only proper in the judicial district where: (1) the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered; or (3) the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). If the defendant is not within any of these judicial districts, venue may be proper in the judicial district where the respondent has its principal office. Id. Based on these criteria, venue does not properly lie for the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the District of Puerto Rico.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for ADA and Rehabilitation Act employment claims to districts tied to the alleged practice, employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked, with the defendant’s principal office available if none of those districts applies.

Fort v. Wilkie · filed 2021-12-21(f)(3)

Venue under Title VII is only proper in the judicial district where: (1) the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered; or (3) the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). If the defendant is not within any of these judicial districts, venue may be proper in the judicial district where the respondent has its principal office. Id. Based on these criteria, venue does not properly lie for the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the District of Puerto Rico.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked, and permits venue in the respondent’s principal-office district only when the other statutory bases are unavailable.

Saxton v. McDonough · filed 2022-01-14(f)(3)

Venue is therefore proper in the Middle District of North Carolina under the first and third bases provided in Title VII, but not in this district. And, because venue exists elsewhere, Plaintiff cannot rely on Title VII’s fourth basis for venue—the judicial district where Defendant is located—because that option is only available when the statute’s other bases are inadequate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Reid v. Exelon Corporation LLC · filed 2022-01-31(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that he worked in New York State, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for his Title VII, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Ross v. Dept. of the Army, US Army Reserve · filed 2022-01-31(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that he worked in New York State, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for his Title VII, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts connected to the alleged practice, relevant employment records, or the place the employee would have worked, with a fallback for the respondent’s principal office.

Laber v. Austin · filed 2022-01-26(f)(3)

An action under Title VII: may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Here, the alleged unlawful employment practices took place in Springfield, Virginia, where the NGA has its headquarters and where Plaintiff would have worked had he received the promotion. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 2–5. Plaintiff’s claim that the Eastern District of Missouri is the proper venue relies on an unsupported allegation that his NGA employment records currently are maintained and administered at Arnold, Missouri. Id. at 2. However, Defendant contradicted this allegation with Exhibit 1, which declares that Plaintiff’s records are stored either in Virginia, on the cloud, or with the Office of Personnel Management. Doc. [5-1] at 2. Although the burden is on a defendant to show the venue is improper, Ortho Solutions, LC v. Sanchez, 4:19-cv-1307-HEA, 2019 WL 2450966, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2019) (citing United States v. Orshek, 164 F.2d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1947)), the evidence Defendant presented clearly refutes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding records storage. Therefore, the Eastern District of Missouri is not a proper venue for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where an allegedly unlawful employment decision was made, even if its effects were felt elsewhere.

Warner v. Surefox Consulting LLC · filed 2022-02-22(f)(3)

Warner is not required to show that she felt the effects of the decisions in California if she can establish the decisions were made in this state.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue by judicial district, so its venue rule does not distinguish between divisions within the same district.

Ramirez v. Plains All American GP, LLC · filed 2022-03-01(f)(3)

It is inapposite that the Pecos Division is distinct from the Midland Division, for Title VII’s venue statute concerns only districts, as opposed to divisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained, or where the employer has its principal office for transfer purposes.

Roco v. American Airlines Inc · filed 2022-03-04(f)(3)

Plaintiff could have brought her Title VII claims in the Fort Worth Division because it is where (1) the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) the relevant employment records are maintained and administered, and (3) Defendant has its principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides the exclusive venue rules for Title VII employment discrimination claims.

Jefferies v. United Parcel Service · filed 2022-03-07(f)(3)

Title VII's venue provisions are exclusive. ... Venue does not properly lie in the District of Delaware.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Wan v. DeJoy · filed 2022-03-16(f)(3)

Venue for an action under Title VII or the ADA is proper in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” Plaintiff’s employment in Queens County was in the State of New York and therefore venue for these claims is proper in any judicial district in New York, including this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Rioux v. United States of America · filed 2022-03-22(f)(3)

It is also clear that because all the alleged events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in New Hampshire, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire is a proper venue for all of Plaintiff’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 109, 1391(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for ADA and Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination claims, including when an ADEA claim is brought with them.

Westfall v. Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy · filed 2022-03-31(f)(3)

The Court therefore applies § 2000e-5(f)(3) to determine whether venue lies in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to the districts specified by its four prongs.

Ash v. Buttigieg · filed 2022-04-15(f)(3)

Venue is not proper in the District under § 2000e-5(f)(3)’s first prong because the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred in Oklahoma City.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) makes venue improper for a Title VII claim in a district with no alleged connection to the employment practice or the plaintiff’s work.

Ally v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2022-04-22(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district, that a substantial part of the events of omissions giving rise to his claims arose in this district, or that he was employed in this district, venue is not proper in this court under Section 1391(b) or Title VII’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be filed in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Bascom v. The Brookdale University Hospital and Medical Center · filed 2022-05-02(f)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). This District is therefore a proper venue for an action brought under Title VII regarding events that occurred in Brooklyn.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims and requires the chosen district to satisfy one of its listed grounds.

Allen v. McCarthy · filed 2022-05-24(f)(3)

However, Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Middle District of Tennessee does not satisfy any of the venue rules set forth in Section 2000e–5(f)(3). ... Thus, having fully considered Plaintiff’s objections, the Court concludes that they are without merit, and that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted and approved.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Screening, LLC · filed 2022-06-15(f)(3)

The parties do not dispute that the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred in Louisiana. Therefore, venue is proper in any district within Louisiana, including the Eastern District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows a Title VII case filed in a proper venue to be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Van Cleave v. University of the South, The · filed 2022-06-13(f)(3)

As with the general venue statute found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, cases filed under Section 2000e-5(f)(3) are subject to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) determines Title VII venue by the location of the relevant workplace and employment records, even when a military installation spans state lines.

Milner v. Wormuth · filed 2022-07-12(f)(3)

And that provision makes no exceptions for federal districts or military installations; it speaks in terms that respect rather than erase state and district lines.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination claims, and a plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish venue.

Kiddey v. Transport Security Administration · filed 2022-08-19(f)(3)

A plaintiff’s residence in the judicial district, however, does not satisfy the venue requirements of § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim in the district where the employee worked, including from a permanent home office.

Franey v. American Battery Solutions Inc. · filed 2022-09-15(f)(3)

The fact that the plaintiff worked out of her home office, as opposed to the defendants’ office, is of no consequence to the Title VII venue analysis.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts tied to the alleged practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Standifer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. · filed 2022-10-04(f)(3)

Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies none of the bases for venue under § 2000e–5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII suit where the alleged practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice, with a principal-office fallback.

Meyers v. Autodesk Inc · filed 2022-10-07(f)(3)

Under Title VII, venue is proper in any judicial district where (1) the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred, (2) relevant employment records are kept, or (3) the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an action in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; its venue rule also applies to Title I ADA claims.

Niles v. New York City Human Resources Administration · filed 2022-10-11(f)(3)

Under the relevant venue provision, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue when any one of its four grounds is satisfied; its principal-office ground applies only if the employer cannot be sued in a district covered by the first three grounds.

Elmore v. Pietrusiak · filed 2022-10-13(f)(3)

Per the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is proper if any one of its four prongs is satisfied. However, the fourth prong requires both that defendant’s “principal office” be located in the district, and that “the putative employer cannot be brought before the court” in any of the districts that would be proper under the first three prongs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Barbour v. Northwell Health · filed 2022-10-13(f)(3)

Venue for a Title VII action lies in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within the State of New York, the Southern District of New York is a proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district of the respondent’s principal office when the respondent is not found in a district covered by the first three venue options.

Martens v. Del Toro · filed 2022-10-18(f)(3)

But venue is proper in Virginia under the fourth option: the Secretary of the Navy’s principal office “is located at the Pentagon, which is in Virginia.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal district court in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Steele v. USPS · filed 2022-10-25(f)(3)

Under Title VII and the ADA’s venue provisions, this Court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Hines v. NHL · filed 2022-10-27(f)(3)

Venue for a Title VII action lies in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within the State of New York, the Southern District of New York is a proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue based on where the responsible agency maintains and administers the relevant employment records.

Dimas, Jr. v. Garland · filed 2022-11-15(f)(3)

The salient question for section 2000e-5(f)(3) is where the responsible agency––here, the DEA––“maintain[s]” and “administer[s]” the records pertaining to the plaintiff.

For a transfer under § 1404, § 2000e-5(f)(3) allows a Title VII action to be brought in the district where relevant employment records are maintained and administered or where the respondent has its principal office.

Coleman v. Mayorkas · filed 2022-11-18(f)(3)

Here, Plaintiff could have brought her Title VII claim in the District of Columbia because it is where the relevant employment records are maintained and administered, and where DHS has its principal office. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district within the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Sung v. DeJoy · filed 2022-12-09(f)(3)

Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within the State of New York, the Southern District of New York and every other federal district court within the State of New York are proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the ADA, and Rehabilitation Act.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an employment discrimination action in any federal judicial district in the state where the unlawful practice allegedly occurred.

Hogan v. Mahabir · filed 2022-12-14(f)(3)

Under the relevant venue provision, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for this action, based on Plaintiff’s allegations that: (1) the discriminatory conduct occurred at JFK airport, which is in Queens County; (2) Plaintiff’s employment records are maintained by DNATA in Queens County and/or in the UAE; and (3) Plaintiff would have worked in Queens County but for the alleged discriminatory practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Brown v. Rensselaer County Jail · filed 2022-12-15(f)(3)

With respect to Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, because Plaintiff alleges that she worked at Rensselaer County Jail, in Rensselaer County, New York, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for those claims. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the districts where a Title VII claim may be brought.

Trivedi v. General Electric Company · filed 2022-12-19(f)(3)

Thus, it appears that the alleged unlawful employment practice(s) and the events that give rise to her claims took place in Boston, Massachusetts. Accordingly, this court does not appear to be a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action to be brought where the alleged discriminatory acts occurred.

Carrera v. Garland · filed 2023-01-06(f)(3)

Beginning with Dr. Dixon’s action, because the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in the Fort Worth Division, her action could have been brought there initially. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the alleged discriminatory acts occurred.

Dixon v. Garland · filed 2023-01-06(f)(3)

Beginning with Dr. Dixon’s action, because the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in the Fort Worth Division, her action could have been brought there initially. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions and permits suit in districts tied to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, or where the aggrieved person would have worked.

Jackson v. Auto Club Services, Inc. · filed 2023-01-10(f)(3)

As to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) governs the appropriate venue, which states: ... Under the express language of Title VII’s venue provision, ACS is subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. For these reasons, Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal is inappropriate.

Title VII’s venue provision does not permit suit in a district merely because an applicant felt the effects there of a hiring decision made elsewhere.

Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-02-16(f)(3)

Hill’s interpretation of Title VII’s venue provision stretches it far beyond its intended reach. Accordingly, because the Court concludes that the alleged discriminatory conduct did not occur in this district, MLS’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) is granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets special venue requirements for Title VII claims; a court may dismiss a claim when none of its venue grounds supports the chosen district.

Jaiyeola v. Rivian · filed 2023-02-21(f)(3)

Discrimination claims brought under Title VII are subject to special venue requirements, rather than governed by the general federal venue statute. ... Jaiyeola has not demonstrated that venue is proper in the Northern District of California for his Title VII claim under any prong of Title VII’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act employment claims based on where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the employee would have worked.

Redding v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-03-27(f)(3)

Under these provisions, venue is appropriate in: (1) “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Redding has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that venue is proper in the District of Columbia under any of these provisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act and ADA employment discrimination claims; a plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish venue.

Aytes v. McWilliams · filed 2023-03-27(f)(3)

Instead, as her causes of action arise under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the venue provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), apply to her claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any district in the state where the alleged practice occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Jaswal v. Gosch · filed 2023-04-03(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that the events giving rise to her claims of discrimination occurred within any federal judicial district within the State of New York; or that she would have worked, but for the alleged discrimination, within this federal judicial district; or that the relevant records are maintained or administrated within this federal judicial district; this court is not a proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination actions to districts connected to the alleged practice, relevant records, or expected work, or, if the respondent is not found in those districts, its principal office.

FERRARI v. BUTTIGIEG · filed 2023-04-20(f)(3)

The Court holds that 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is the more appropriate vehicle for transfer because venue is inappropriate in the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination actions and requires a connection between the district and the alleged discrimination.

Ferrari v. US Department of Transportation · filed 2023-04-20(f)(3)

The Court holds that 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is the more appropriate vehicle for transfer because venue is inappropriate in the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA or Rehabilitation Act employment claim in any federal district within the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Warwick v. Schultz · filed 2023-06-27(f)(3)

Under this venue provision, this court and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, based on Plaintiff’s allegations that his employer is located in Tompkins County and therefore: (1) the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred in the State of New York, likely in Tompkins County; (2) his employment records are located in Tompkins County; and (3) Plaintiff would have worked in Tompkins County but for the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for ADA employment claims and identifies the districts where a plaintiff may file suit.

Blaskowski v. Minnesota, State of · filed 2023-07-06(f)(3)

Venue for claims under the ADA is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Based on plaintiff’s cryptic complaint, venue is proper only in the District of Minnesota.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA employment claim in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

King v. Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service · filed 2023-06-30(f)(3)

Here, the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred in Texas, so the Court is a proper venue for the ADA claims, in addition to the other claims Plaintiffs bring as outlined above.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Lawson v. 5 Pointz · filed 2023-07-24(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that his former employer is located in Long Island City, Queens County, New York, and that the events that are the bases for his claims, including his termination, occurred there also, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for his claims under Title VII. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits suit where employment records relevant to the alleged discrimination are maintained and administered.

Fleming v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 2023-07-17(f)(3)

But the statute permits suit in the district housing “the employment records relevant to such practice”—i.e., relevant to discrimination in employment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title I ADA employment claim in any federal district within the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Nielsen v. High Sierra Pools, Inc. · filed 2023-08-03(f)(3)

Under this venue provision, this court and every other federal district court within the State of New York are proper venues for Plaintiff’s ADA claim, based on Plaintiff’s allegations that his employer is located in Monroe County and therefore: (1) the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred in the State of New York, likely in Monroe County; (2) Plaintiff’s employment records are located in Monroe County; and (3) Plaintiff would have worked in Monroe County but for the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in the judicial district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Madson v. Case · filed 2023-08-01(f)(3)

Plaintiff alleges he was employed at Aon’s Chicago office, which is located with the Northern District of Illinois. Thus, venue for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be brought in the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims; a claim filed in an improper district may be dismissed without prejudice to filing in a proper district.

Jaiyeola v. Rivian · filed 2023-08-01(f)(3)

Jaiyeola’s Title VII claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-filing in a district where venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) but WITH PREJUDICE to re-filing in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for Title VII claims based on where the alleged practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained, or where the person would have worked, and treats the respondent’s principal office as an available district for transfer.

Laber v. United States Department of Defense · filed 2023-08-03(f)(3)

Defendant’s principal office is within that District, making it a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under § 2000e–5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions instead of the general federal venue statute.

Podell v. Whitworth · filed 2023-07-31(f)(3)

Given that the Title VII exclusive venue provision applies in this case, not the § 1391 provision, Plaintiff’s reliance on § 1391 is without merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for Title VII civil actions based on where the alleged discrimination occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the claimant would have worked, with a fallback for the respondent’s principal office.

Miller v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2023-11-20(f)(3)

The Court also notes that Plaintiff has failed to establish venue in the District of Columbia. ... Here, assuming arguendo that plaintiff’s claims are cognizable, they do not belong in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets mandatory venue options for Title VII actions.

DINKINS v. MAYORKAS · filed 2023-11-27(f)(3)

As none of the mandatory venue options in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) permit venue for this matter in the District of New Jersey, this is not the proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for an ADA claim in the district where the employer made the challenged accommodation decision.

Morris v. ARTA Travel · filed 2023-11-30(f)(3)

The Eastern District of Texas is the proper venue under the first prong of § 2000e-5(f)(3).

For ADA claims, § 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue where the employer made the challenged employment decision, rather than where the employee learned of it.

Lognion v. Stallion Oilfield Services Ltd · filed 2023-11-20(f)(3)

The statute states venue is proper where the unlawful practice was committed, not where the employee was when he learned about it. Since the decisions to demote and terminate Lognion were made in Texas, Texas is where the alleged wrongful conduct was committed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Woods v. Louisiana Special School District · filed 2023-12-04(f)(3)

With respect to plaintiff’s Title VII claims, venue is proper both in this Court and in the Middle District of Louisiana since both districts are in “the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.

Norris v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2023-12-05(f)(3)

The Court therefore finds that it is proper to transfer all Plaintiffs’ claims in both actions to the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a), 1404(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in a judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Bradley v. Cardona · filed 2023-12-07(f)(3)

Under Title VII, venue is proper in any of the following: (1) “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) “the judicial district in which the [relevant] employment records . . . are maintained and administered,” or (3) “the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” ... Based on this evidence, the “commonsense” conclusion is that venue is proper in the Northern District of Georgia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims, including where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Webb v. Baker · filed 2023-12-05(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant resides in this District or that events giving rise to her claims occurred in the State of New York, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the defendant’s principal-office district only if the defendant is not found in a district covered by its first three venue grounds.

Liu v. Becerra · filed 2023-12-12(f)(3)

But the Court can only consider venue where the defendant’s principal office is located if the defendant is not found within a judicial district identified in the first three prongs of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which is not the case here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Laduke v. New York State Office of Mental Healthet al · filed 2024-01-05(f)(3)

Thus, a plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act can be brought in any district court in the State where the unlawful employment action allegedly occurred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII action where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice.

Quinn v. Austin · filed 2024-01-12(f)(3)

Accordingly, venue is improper in the Western District of Washington. Because the allegedly unlawful employment practices occurred in Boston, the District of Massachusetts is the appropriate venue for this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or relevant employment records are maintained.

Krien v. Honeywell International Inc. · filed 2023-11-29(f)(3)

First, venue is proper in the Western District of North Carolina. The alleged unlawful employment practice was committed there, and the relevant employment records are alleged to be maintained there. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (venue proper in judicial district where “the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” “the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or “the aggrieved person would have worked but for the unlawful employment practice”).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not permit Title VII venue based solely on the plaintiff’s residence.

Merrill v. Garland · filed 2024-01-31(f)(3)

Although Plaintiff resides in the Southern District of Georgia, where this suit is brought, Title VII does not provide for venue in his place of residence.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)’s residual venue provision does not apply when the first three venue provisions identify districts where the defendant can be found.

Redding v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-03-11(f)(3)

Here, the residual cause is not triggered because the first three prongs of § 2000e-5(f)(3) point to venue in specific districts—just not the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)’s special venue rules govern Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination claims.

Hammack v. Becerra · filed 2024-03-15(f)(3)

Claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by Title VII's special venue provision, found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a discrimination case brought under 5 U.S.C. § 7702 to be brought in the judicial district where the respondent has its principal office.

Mitchell v. MSPB · filed 2024-03-26(f)(3)

We conclude that transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (providing that discrimination cases brought pursuant to 5 ... U.S.C. § 7702 “may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.”).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII claim where the alleged practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the employee would have worked; the respondent’s principal office is an additional venue if the respondent is absent from those districts.

Anthony v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27(f)(3)

The Eastern District of Michigan is not the proper venue for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. Under Title VII, venue is proper in any judicial district in which (1) “the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed”; (2) “the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered”; or (3) “the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). But “if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.” Id. Here, the Eastern District of Michigan is the improper venue for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims under any of the four possible venues.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Beaver v. Siemens Healthineers, AG · filed 2024-03-28(f)(3)

Moreover, Title VII, under which Ms. Beaver’s action is brought, provides plaintiffs several choices of venue: any federal district court in the State in which the unlawful employment practice allegedly took place, “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Observing no dispute from Siemens that Ms. Beaver worked remotely from her home in Michigan, the Court agrees with Ms. Beaver’s reasoning that the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division is the proper venue to accept transfer.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice was committed, not merely where the employee’s work supported others.

Wilson v. Garland · filed 2024-03-31(f)(3)

But the statute provides for venue in the District where the unlawful practices were “committed,” not in any District that her work supported.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Williams v. Amazon · filed 2024-04-04(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that he worked in an Amazon facility located in Brooklyn, Kings County, New York, and that the events that are the bases for his claims, including his termination, occurred there, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for his claims under Title VII. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice or where relevant employment records are maintained.

Webster, Sr. v. Austin · filed 2024-04-17(f)(3)

The Court agrees with Defendants that Title VII’s statutory venue factors weigh strongly in favor of proper venue lying in the Eastern District of Virginia, not the District of Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA employment claim in a judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful practice occurred or in the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for that practice.

Lewis v. Affiliated Enterprise Solutions, LLC · filed 2024-04-17(f)(3)

ADA claims are subject to special venue provisions, which, as relevant here, allow for “an action [to be] brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed” or “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the defendant’s principal office only when the defendant cannot be found in a district covered by its first three venue grounds.

Hakeem v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-05-23(f)(3)

Finally, the plaintiff cannot rely on Title VII’s residual venue provision to establish venue in the District of Columbia. ... As the Court’s analysis of Title VII’s first three venue provisions reveals, see supra Sections III.A.1–3, the plaintiff could properly assert venue in other judicial districts, including the Eastern District of Virginia. Thus, the Court need not analyze whether the District of Columbia is a proper venue under the residual provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for ADA employment claims and requires the plaintiff to establish one of its listed grounds for bringing suit in the chosen district.

Williams v. Apple Inc. · filed 2024-05-27(f)(3)

From what has been presented, the Court has no basis from which to infer that the alleged “unlawful employment practice” occurred in the District of Columbia. Nor has Williams alleged that she would have worked in the District of Columbia but for the “alleged unlawful employment practice.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for ADA actions and directs them to a district connected to the alleged discrimination, relevant records, or the defendant’s principal location.

Rollins v. Greene-Campbell · filed 2024-05-24(f)(3)

“Title VII's venueprovision ‘limit[s] venue to the judicial district concerned with the alleged discrimination,’” Id. (quoting Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), and therefore, such an action must be brought in the judicial district in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, where the records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the defendant is principally located, see 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e–5(f)(3). Here, the wrongdoing was allegedly committed in Tennessee, the defendant also appears to be located there, and as pleaded, this action bears no connection to this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained and administered, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice.

Pham v. Garland · filed 2024-07-23(f)(3)

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) directs that Title VII claims may be brought either in the judicial district (1)where the unlawful employment practice allegedly took place; (2) where the employment records relevant to the unlawful practice are maintained and administered; or (3) where the plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim in a district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Mitchell v. Perdido Trucking · filed 2024-08-07(f)(3)

Although Perdido argues that this action was filed in the wrong venue, Perdido concedes that “but for the alleged unlawful employment practice Plaintiff . . . would have worked in both the Southern District of Alabama and the Southern District of Mississippi.” [11], p. 3. This satisfies the third way that venue can be shown under the Title VII venue provision. So venue is proper in the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and Perdido’s Motion is denied on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be brought in the district where the person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Hargrove v. ABM Industries Inc. · filed 2024-08-12(f)(3)

Venue of Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims is proper, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), in the Northern District of Florida, based on the location of the proposed employment in Chipley, Florida.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any district in the state where the employee worked.

Naveda v. Post Office at 250-10 Northern Blvd. · filed 2024-08-12(f)(3)

Venue of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is proper, under Section 2000e-5(f)(3), in any district in the State where she worked.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Gamble v. United States Postal Service (MAG2) · filed 2024-08-09(f)(3)

Accordingly, the District of Connecticut is a proper venue under the third prong of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), in addition to the Middle District of Alabama.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where a person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Gamble v. DeJoy · filed 2024-08-09(f)(3)

Accordingly, the District of Connecticut is a proper venue under the third prong of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), in addition to the Middle District of Alabama.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish Title VII venue where an employee travels for work if the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred elsewhere.

Rivera v. U.S. Department of Defense · filed 2024-08-21(f)(3)

Mr. Rivera cannot rely on the first prong of Section 2000e-5(f)(3) to establish venue in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Nehemiah v. Opm · filed 2024-09-17(f)(3)

We agree with the Director that transfer to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, where it appears Mr. Nehemiah would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue based on the location of an unlawful employment practice where the challenged employment decisions and actions occurred.

Blue v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2024-09-24(f)(3)

The Court concludes that the decisions and actions concerning the allegedly discriminatory employment practice occurred in the Northern District of Texas, not in the Southern District of Ohio. Venue is improper here under the first three prongs of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for Title VII claims based on where the alleged practice occurred, where relevant records are kept, or where the employee would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Watkins v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2024-09-30(f)(3)

The Court further notes that Watkins fails to allege facts sufficient to establish venue. For purposes of Title VII, venue is proper: [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, [4] but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Watkins’s complaint lists a Virginia address for the defendant- agency, see Dkt. 11 at 1, but does not otherwise address venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permitted the EEOC to bring this Title VII action in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sheetz, Inc. · filed 2024-10-04(f)(3)

EEOC does not dispute,3 and the court is satisfied, that the instant case could have been brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in that district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) did not place venue for this Title VII claim in Arkansas.

Phillips v. Harford Community College · filed 2024-10-22(f)(3)

For these reasons, Arkansas is not the proper venue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) did not make venue for this Title VII claim proper in the district where it was filed.

Cobb v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2024-10-24(f)(3)

It is therefore clear from the face of the complaint that venue is not proper in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the defendant’s principal office only when the defendant cannot be found in a district available under its first three venue grounds.

Bell v. Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2024-10-25(f)(3)

Under Section 2000e-5(f)(3)’s “residual prong,” venue is proper in a defendant’s principal place of business only if the defendant cannot be found in any other district where venue is appropriate under the first three prongs of Section 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in any judicial district of the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Robinson v. Kings County Hospital Center Health & Hospitals · filed 2024-10-18(f)(3)

Venue of Plaintiff’s ADA claim is proper in any district in New ... York, including the Eastern District of New York, because New York is the State where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) bases principal-office venue on the office’s location, not its mailing address.

Gamon v. Austin · filed 2024-11-14(f)(3)

But the Secretary’s mailing address is not his “principal office.” That is located in Arlington, Virginia, at the Pentagon.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained and administered, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Pilling v. Austin · filed 2024-11-26(f)(3)

For Title VII claims, venue is proper in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Plaintiff does not make any connection to the District of Columbia under any of these provisions, nor is any apparent from her pleadings.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Jeschke v. Five Below, Inc. · filed 2024-11-27(f)(3)

Under Title VII’s venue provision, Section 2000e-5(f)(3), this court and every other federal district court within the State of New York are proper venues for Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, based on Plaintiff’s allegations that his employer is located in Broome County and therefore: (1) the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred in the State of New York, likely in Broome County; (2) Plaintiff’s employment records are located in Broome County; and (3) Plaintiff would have worked in Broome County but for the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue in a district merely because employment records can be accessed there.

Hildebrand v. United States Department of Defense · filed 2024-12-09(f)(3)

That the records may be accessed in this district is not enough to establish venue here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the relevant employment records are maintained.

Shackleford v. Opm · filed 2024-12-11(f)(3)

Because Ms. Shackleford asserted discrimination before the Board and wishes to continue to pursue those claims, we transfer to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, where it appears Ms. Shack- leford’s relevant employment records may be maintained. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Braden v. Robbins · filed 2024-12-18(f)(3)

Here, it appears that venue is proper in the Northern District of Mississippi because all the allegations in Braden’s complaint occurred within that district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the respondent’s principal-office district only if the respondent is not found in a district covered by its other venue grounds.

Viup v. Garland · filed 2024-12-19(f)(3)

Although Defendant’s principal office is in the District of Columbia, that provision applies only “if the respondent is not found within any . . . district,” that otherwise qualifies under § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows a Title VII plaintiff to establish venue under any one of its first three venue grounds.

Thomas v. EOTech, LLC · filed 2024-12-27(f)(3)

The use of “or” to separate the second and third prongs of the provision clearly establishes that satisfying any of the three prongs is sufficient alone to establish venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)’s would-have-worked venue provision points to an employee’s principal workplace; travel to another district for work does not make that district a proper venue.

PROSSEDA v. THE WINDHAM GROUP · filed 2025-01-08(f)(3)

Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim that she “would have worked in New Jersey but for her termination” does not satisfy the venue requirements of Section 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) specifies where a Title VII employment discrimination claim may be filed.

O'Kroley v. GNC Holdings LLC · filed 2025-01-08(f)(3)

Because nothing in the submission suggests that the alleged unlawful employment practices took place in the State of New York, or that all of the defendants reside in the State of New York, venue is not proper in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a discrimination case to be filed where the employment action occurred, where relevant records are kept, or where the employee would have worked but for the challenged action.

Evans v. USPS · filed 2025-01-14(f)(3)

Under the circumstances, we find it appropriate to transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, which appears to be the location of the employment action and records and where Ms. Evans would have worked but for the personnel action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Lewis v. Mavis Tire and Auto Corp · filed 2025-03-21(f)(3)

It is clear, however, that the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and every other federal district court within the State of Florida, is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims because the alleged discrimination that Plaintiff experienced, including his termination from employment, occurred within the Southern District of Florida.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Yoon v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(f)(3)

All of these facts lead the Court to conclude that this district is an improper venue for this suit because, absent the alleged unlawful conduct, Yoon would have remained working in Illinois.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Breedlove v. McDonough · filed 2025-04-04(f)(3)

As Breedlove puts it, South Carolina is “the judicial district in which all of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ECF No. 18 at 7. Venue is accordingly proper under the first prong of Title VII’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII case in multiple locations; it does not establish that a challenged employment action occurred in only one place.

HABIB v. AQUASCAPE DESIGNS, INC. · filed 2025-04-09(f)(3)

In its initial motion, it offers little more than the provision in Title VII that discusses venue, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), but as mentioned above that statute merely provides for venue in multiple locations; if anything, that might indicate that termination (and perhaps the prior mistreatment) occurs in several places at once.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the employee would have worked but for the practice.

Glines v. Department of Defense · filed 2025-04-25(f)(3)

Under Title VII, venue is appropriate (1) where the “employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) in “the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practices are maintained and administered,” or (3) in “the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1). ... In conclusion, because Plaintiff fails to meet the relevant criteria for venue in this district, and because Plaintiff requests transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia if venue is proper there, ... the court will order the case transferred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in the district where the claimant would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Rafi v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2025-04-25(f)(3)

Venue of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is therefore proper under Section 2000e-5(f)(3) in the District of Massachusetts.