42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) makes venue improper for a Title VII action unless the district satisfies one of its listed venue requirements.

Spencer v. Rumsfeld · filed 2002-01-28(f)(3)

If the plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction that does not satisfy one of the venue requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is improper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue rules for Title VII actions but does not prevent transfer for convenience and in the interests of justice.

Ayala-Branch v. Tad Telecom, Inc. · filed 2002-04-26(f)(3)

Although Title VII contains its own statutory venue provisions, an action brought under the federal employment discrimination laws is still subject to transfer in order to maximize the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue under the “would have worked” prong in the district of the employee’s principal place of work.

James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. · filed 2002-07-31(f)(3)

As reasoned before, the use of the article “the” rather than “a” strongly suggests that the statutory requirement refers to the aggrieved individual’s principal place of work, and not any district in which the individual’s work might take him.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the venue rules for Title VII actions, including suits against federal agencies.

Amirmokri v. Abraham · filed 2002-08-30(f)(3)

The Court agrees with the defendant that in actions brought under Title VII, venue must be determined according to the statute’s special venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)’s venue factors guide transfer decisions and favor districts directly connected to the parties, events, or evidence.

In Re Horseshoe Entertainment · filed 2002-09-10(f)(3)

In this case those special venue factors clearly indicate that Congress thought employment discrimination controversies should be litigated in judicial districts that had direct and immediate connection with the parties, the events and the evidence bearing on their controversy.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a proper venue for a Title VII action.

Benton v. England · filed 2002-09-17(f)(3)

However, plaintiffs place of residence is not one of the three options for venue provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Maryland is therefore not an appropriate venue for the claims that Plaintiff has brought under Title VII and the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not permit Title VII venue solely where management control is exercised.

Darby v. U.S. Department of Energy · filed 2002-11-04(f)(3)

The Title VII venue statute, however, does not authorize venue based on the location where management control is exercised.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be brought where the alleged discrimination occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged discrimination.

Breland v. ATC Vancom, Inc. · filed 2002-12-04(f)(3)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that Title VII claims “may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice____ ” In the present case, the alleged discrimination occurred in Cobb County, Georgia. Georgia is where plaintiff worked and would have remained working, but for the alleged discriminatory discharge. Moreover all pertinent employment records are maintained in Georgia. Therefore, the proper venue for the action is Georgia.

Each named plaintiff in a Title VII class action must independently satisfy the section’s venue requirements.

Quarles v. General Investment & Development Co. · filed 2003-03-10(f)(3)

It is therefore logical that plaintiffs who are named as representatives of a class action be required to satisfy the venue requirements of the statute because they are the parties who have brought themselves before the court and are the persons over whom the court must have jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) makes the location of relevant employment records a venue factor that courts should weigh when considering a transfer.

In Re: Horseshoe · filed 2003-07-31(f)(3)

Where relevant employment records are maintained and administered is expressly stated as a venue factor in the special venue statute and should be weighed by a District Court in evaluating the “interest of justice” aspect of the motion to transfer.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA employment discrimination action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful practice occurred.

Beavers v. Express Jet Holdings, Inc. · filed 2005-12-08(f)(3)

Defendant’s motion itself avers that the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred in Texas, and — given the special venue provisions applicable to ADA cases — this fact alone is sufficient to establish- venue in any district of the state, including this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the districts where a Title VII claim may be filed based on the alleged practice, employment records, or where the employee would have worked; the respondent’s principal office is an option only if the respondent cannot be found in those districts.

Varma v. Gutierrez · filed 2006-03-21(f)(3)

Finally, resort to the final provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) is unnecessary, as the Director of the USPTO can be found in the Eastern District of Virginia, where this action could have been filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the respondent’s principal office only if the respondent cannot be found in a district covered by its first three venue provisions.

Buesgens v. Coates · filed 2006-05-09(f)(3)

The statute itself provides that this fourth prong is available only “if the respondent is not found within any such district” covered by one of the three preceding prongs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the exclusive venues for Title VII employment discrimination claims.

Charles A. Pinson, Jr. v. Rumsfeld · filed 2006-05-18(f)(3)

Moreover, because Title VII claims are governed by § 2000e-5(f)(3), and these venue provisions set forth the exclusive venues for Title VII claims, the proper venue for Pinson’s other claims is irrelevant to this inquiry.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts connected to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked, with a further option for the respondent’s principal office.

Ware v. Ball Plastic Container Corp. · filed 2006-06-02(f)(3)

Venue is improper in the State of Delaware because the employment discrimination took place in New Jersey, the employment records are kept in New Jersey, and plaintiff never has applied to work for the defendant in Delaware. Moreover, defendant does not have any offices in Delaware. The plain language of the Title VII provision does not permit the District of Delaware as a proper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Orr v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-27(f)(3)

... this Court finds that the District of Puerto Rico is a proper venue for the adjudication of this matter under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), as Puerto Rico is where the plaintiff “would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(3); see Darby v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 277 (D.D.C.2002).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Rauch v. Chertoff · filed 2006-09-06(f)(3)

Indeed, there is no question that plaintiff could have originally brought this action in the Eastern District of Louisiana under Title 42 of the United States Code § 2000e-5(f)(3), which specifically provides venue, inter alia, “in the judicial district in whieh the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” or “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where an employee worked and felt the effects of an alleged discriminatory denial of promotion.

Tamashiro v. Harvey · filed 2006-09-19(f)(3)

The Court finds that the District of Hawaii is one of the venues where the “unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” satisfying Title VIPs specific venue provision found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). As alleged, Plaintiff suffered the effects of the employment decision in Hawaii, where she worked at the time Defendant decided not to promote her.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions based on the location of the alleged practice, relevant employment records, or where the employee would have worked.

JACKSON-SPELLS v. Rumsfeld · filed 2006-10-30(f)(3)

In this case, there is no basis under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) for venue in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims in place of the general venue provisions.

Kenney v. NKC of America · filed 2006-12-12(f)(3)

This specific venue provision, and not general venue provisions, applies to Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where an employee would have worked but for the alleged discrimination.

Kriesch v. Johanns · filed 2007-01-05(f)(3)

Plaintiff argues that these claims satisfy two of Title VII’s five possible venue tests. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The Court agrees and declines to transfer the case to district court in Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Johnson v. Lumenos, Inc. · filed 2007-01-11(f)(3)

Here, all of the alleged acts underlying the suit took place in the Eastern District of Virginia, Compl. ¶ 3, Def.’s Mot. at 3, and the parties do not dispute that the records relevant to the plaintiffs employment are located in that district, Def.’s Mot. at 3. Therefore, venue in the Eastern District of Virginia is proper pursuant to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII action in districts connected to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, where the plaintiff would have worked, or, in specified circumstances, the respondent’s principal office.

Kenney v. Millennium Rail, Inc. · filed 2007-03-28(f)(3)

For example, nothing indicates that M r. Kenney’s employment records are maintained or administered in Oklahoma, nor does M r. Kenney claim that he would have worked there, but for an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) supplies the venue rules for Rehabilitation Act claims.

Beaird v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-19(f)(3)

The proper venue for litigating a Rehabilitation Act claim is determined by the special venue provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in any district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, while its employment records and would-have-worked grounds permit venue only in the corresponding district.

Harley v. Chao · filed 2007-08-07(f)(3)

Venue is thus improper in the Middle District of North Carolina under each of the bases for venue provided in § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where decisions concerning the challenged employment practice occurred.

Hunter v. Johanns · filed 2007-08-20(f)(3)

Chott’s review of Hunter’s employment records and approval of Anderson’s proposed suspension both took place in the District. These actions, as decisions concerning Hunter’s employment, support venue here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not permit venue at an agency’s headquarters when the agency can be found in the district where the alleged discrimination occurred.

Sulton v. Peters · filed 2008-02-01(f)(3)

Finally, even though plaintiff is correct that the FAA’s headquarters is located in Washington, DC, plaintiff cannot support venue in this district under the fourth basis in the statute either.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged discrimination occurred; in a failure-to-promote case, the selection decision and related alleged discriminatory conduct can establish that location.

Pendleton v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-13(f)(3)

Because Pendleton contends that McLaughlin engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory behavior when he selected Huggins to be a panel member for the candidate interviews, skewed the selection process against Pendleton, failed to consider Pendleton’s successful completion of priority investigations, and when he retaliated against Pendleton based on his knowledge of Pendleton’s protected activity, the Court’s venue determination is supported by the fact that the final selection decisions were made in the District of Columbia but is not dependent on that fact alone. Based on the combination of these facts, Pendleton has met his burden of showing that venue properly lies in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a disparate impact claim where the challenged system of subjective decisionmaking was initiated.

Turnley v. Banc of America Investment Services, Inc. · filed 2008-09-17(f)(3)

The logical implication of this passage, of course, is that the relevant practice is “committed” where the “undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking” is initiated. Thus, for purposes of Title VII’s special venue provision, the inquiry focuses first on whether the plaintiff has adequately pled the existence of such a practice in the first instance, and second, on whether the defendant’s challenge undermines the facts alleged in support of plaintiffs choice of venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Reynolds v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-13(f)(3)

Since the (1) alleged discrimination happened in the workplace, (2) plaintiff did and still does work in Pennsylvania, and (3) venue is proper in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice” allegedly occurred, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, even if the alleged misconduct occurred elsewhere.

Peikin v. Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. · filed 2008-08-21(f)(3)

The Court thus finds that this District meets § 2000e-5(f)(3)’s venue requirements for Plaintiffs Title VII claim, and that venue in this matter was not improperly laid in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives Title VII plaintiffs a choice of venues and renders a conflicting forum-selection clause unenforceable.

Smith v. Kyphon, Inc. · filed 2008-09-22(f)(3)

This Court finds the reasoning in Thomas to be persuasive and reaches the same conclusion: that the forum-selection clause here, by requiring Smith to bring suit in California rather than in Tennessee, where she worked and allegedly suffered discrimination and harassment on the basis of her gender, is unenforceable based on the forum provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which embodies a public policy determination that Title VII plaintiffs should have a choice of where to bring suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII action in a district tied to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or the employee’s workplace, or, in specified circumstances, the respondent’s principal office.

Tildon v. Alexander · filed 2008-11-24(f)(3)

The proper forum for adjudication of employment claims is determined by reference to Title VIPs venue provision. ... There is no allegation that relevant employment records are maintained or administered in the District of Columbia, that plaintiff worked or would have worked for the NSA in the District of Columbia, or that NSA maintains its principal office in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII employment claim in a district tied to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or the employee’s would-be workplace, with a principal-office option if the respondent is not found in those districts.

Tawwaab v. VIRGINIA LINEN SERVICE, INC. · filed 2009-02-01(f)(3)

There is no allegation that any unlawful employment practice was committed in the District of Columbia, that relevant employment records are maintained or administered in the District of Columbia, that the plaintiff worked or would have worked for Virginia Linen Service, Inc. in the District of Columbia, or that the company maintains its principal office in the District of Columbia. ... Based on the current record, it appears that venue is appropriate in the District of Maryland, not in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits Title VII venue where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Kloeckner v. Chao · filed 2009-05-15(f)(3)

Here the unlawful practice alleged by the plaintiff not only occurred in the Eastern District of Missouri, but it is the location where Kloeckner's employment records are, in large part, maintained. In addition, but for the unlawful practice alleged, the plaintiff would have worked in the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not support venue based on where an employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice unless the employee alleges that she would have worked in that district.

Walden v. Locke · filed 2009-06-26(f)(3)

The third basis in § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not support venue in this district because Walden makes no allegations that she would have worked in this district but for the alleged unlawful employment practices. Therefore, venue is not appropriate in the District of Columbia for Walden’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts tied to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, or where the employee would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Walden v. Gutierrez · filed 2009-06-26(f)(3)

Venue is not proper for Title VII claims if a plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction that does not satisfy one of the venue requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue for a Title VII action in a district tied to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, or where the employee would have worked.

Kidd v. Vilsack · filed 2009-07-14(f)(3)

Accordingly, because the employment practices at issue in this case were committed in Arlington, Virginia, which is also the jurisdiction in which plaintiff would have continued to work had he received a promotion, and because the relevant employment records are maintained outside the District, venue is improper here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue based on employment records only in the judicial district containing the complete set of relevant records.

James v. VERIZON SERVICES CORP. · filed 2009-08-03(f)(3)

First, Congress explicitly limited venue under the second prong to the one judicial district in which the complete set of relevant employment records is located.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue based on employment records where they are maintained and administered, not wherever they can be accessed.

Khalil v. L-3 COMMUNICATIONS TITAN GROUP · filed 2009-09-21(f)(3)

However, the statutory venue provision does not provide for venue wherever records could be accessed, but rather where they are “maintained and administered.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions and permits suit in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Milanes v. Holder · filed 2009-10-21(f)(3)

The Complaint alleges conduct that was almost entirely based in Puerto Rico, and while venue is technically proper in this Court under § 2000e-5(f)(3), the interests of justice dictate transfer to that district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make the location of an Equal Employment Opportunity appeal a basis for venue in a Title VII action.

Haley v. Astrue · filed 2009-11-05(f)(3)

Indeed, the sole mention of the District of Columbia in the complaint is the site of Haley’s Equal Employment Opportunity appeal. ... But this fact is not part of Title VII’s venue inquiry.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Noisette v. Paulson · filed 2010-03-12(f)(3)

Thus, under the first prong of Title VII’s venue provision, venue is proper in the District of Columbia on Counts I and II only.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions; alleged retaliation occurs where the employer makes the retaliatory decision, rather than where an employee awaits a call.

Pritchett v. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 2010-05-28(f)(3)

Title VII includes its own venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which supersedes the general venue provision of § 1391. ... The decision to act in a retaliatory manner would have been made by Paschall at Paschall’s location in Murray, Kentucky. Plaintiff cannot rely upon her retaliation claim to create venue in Alabama under Title VII. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving that venue is proper in the Middle District of Alabama.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment action.

Arroyo-Pérez v. Demir Group International · filed 2010-08-13(f)(3)

Plaintiff would have continued working in the District of Puerto Rico, but for the alleged employment discrimination. Thus, plaintiff has met the Title VII venue provisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue in Title VII actions instead of the general venue statute.

Foley v. Holder · filed 2010-10-05(f)(3)

In a Title VII action, venue is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) rather than the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged discrimination occurred.

Langford v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 30 · filed 2011-02-16(f)(3)

Accordingly, because the Complaint alleges discriminatory acts that occurred in the State of New York, venue of plaintiffs claims lies in the Southern District, even though the alleged acts took place in the Eastern District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue where copies of employment records were sent solely to process a discrimination complaint.

Crowley v. Holder · filed 2011-02-13(f)(3)

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that the records are now in the District of Columbia, having been transferred there as a result of her complaint. The fact that copies may have been sent to DOJ for use in addressing or processing her complaint does not confer venue, as many courts have held.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to specified districts tied to the alleged discrimination, employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked, with a principal-office option if the defendant is not found in those districts.

Ebron v. Department of the Army · filed 2011-02-23(f)(3)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), all claims brought under Title VII must be filed in the judicial district where (1) the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or (3) the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... The plaintiff fails to establish that the District of Columbia is the proper venue under any basis set forth in the Title VII venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked but for that practice.

Pubentz v. Holder · filed 2011-05-19(f)(3)

Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois because, at all relevant times, Pubentz worked and the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct occurred in the Northern District of Illinois. Further, this Court can reasonably infer from the allegations of the complaint that, but for the unlawful employment practice, Pubentz would have been working in Chicago.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the respondent’s principal office only if the respondent cannot be found in a district covered by its first three venue provisions.

Williams v. GEICO CORP. · filed 2011-06-20(f)(3)

Because GEICO can be found in a judicial district described by the first three provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3), the Court need not consider the fourth venue provision of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where relevant employment records are maintained and administered when the action is filed; copies elsewhere do not establish venue.

Ellis-Smith v. Secretary of the Army · filed 2011-06-22(f)(3)

Yet the statute refers to where the records “are maintained and administered.” § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff herself admits that, at the time of the filing of this action, this was in Europe, not the District of Columbia. Even if copies of those records might be maintained here, that does not confer venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue based on employment records where they are currently maintained and administered; copies kept elsewhere do not establish venue.

Smith v. Department of the Army · filed 2011-06-22(f)(3)

Yet the statute refers to where the records “are maintained and administered.” § 2000e- 5(f)(3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff herself admits that, at the time of the filing of this action, this was in Europe, not the District of Columbia. Even if copies of those records might be maintained here, that does not confer venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue based solely on the plaintiff’s residence or the defendant’s involvement in interstate commerce.

Lance v. Wilson · filed 2011-09-09(f)(3)

Neither plaintiffs current residence in the District of Columbia, ... nor defendant’s alleged involvement in interstate commerce, ... establishes venue in this district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives Title VII plaintiffs a choice of venues, and a forum selection clause may be unenforceable when it frustrates the public policy favoring local civil rights litigation.

Sepanski v. Janiking, Inc. · filed 2011-09-30(f)(3)

Because this Court finds that enforcing the forum selection clause would frustrate a strong public policy of the forum state, it need not consider whether enforcement would also effectively deny Plaintiff his day in court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the districts where a Title VII employment discrimination claim may be filed and allows venue at the defendant’s principal office only when the defendant cannot be found in the other specified districts.

Hoskins v. Napolitano · filed 2012-01-31(f)(3)

Because this district does not satisfy any of the bases for venue provided by § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is not appropriate in the District of Columbia for Hoskins' Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue where copies of employment records are sent only to process a discrimination complaint.

Crowley v. Holder · filed 2012-02-13(f)(3)

The fact that copies may have been sent to DOJ for use in addressing or processing her complaint does not confer venue, as many courts have held.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the plaintiff would have worked but for it.

Foote v. Chu · filed 2012-05-07(f)(3)

The venue provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) indicates that ... In this case, the Plaintiff does not dispute that “the unlawful unemployment practice is alleged to have been committed” in the District of New Mexico, or that but for the alleged conduct, Plaintiff would have worked in New Mexico. Therefore, under Title VII Plaintiff could have ... brought suit in the District of New Mexico, and the Court may now look to whether the private and public factors demonstrate that a transfer is warranted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the respondent’s principal office only if the respondent cannot be found in a district identified by the provision’s other venue grounds.

McLaughlin v. Holder · filed 2012-05-25(f)(3)

Venue, then, is improper in this district, and the fourth basis under the special venue statute is unavailable to McLaughlin since the Department of Justice is found within the district where the unlawful acts allegedly were committed and the relevant records are maintained.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a judicial district within the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Schoendorf v. RTH Mechanical Contractors · filed 2012-05-31(f)(3)

Title VII has its own venue provision to the effect that an action claiming a violation of the statute "may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(3), which in this case is Maine.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts connected to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or the place the plaintiff would have worked, with a further option based on the respondent’s principal office.

Shahin v. Geithner · filed 2012-06-11(f)(3)

Thus, venue is not proper in this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim where the alleged discriminatory employment decisions and actions occurred.

Corbett v. Jennifer · filed 2012-08-29(f)(3)

Because it is undisputed that such decisions and actions did not occur in the District of Columbia, plaintiff cannot properly lay venue for her Title VII action here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Cole v. Boeing Inc. · filed 2012-11-01(f)(3)

Venue is proper in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because the District of Columbia is where the retaliatory acts were allegedly committed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act claims, and its principal-office provision is unavailable when venue is proper in a district where the alleged discrimination occurred or employment records are held.

Slaby v. Holder · filed 2012-11-04(f)(3)

Since venue properly belongs in the Eastern District of Virginia, where the alleged incidents occurred and where the plaintiff’s records are held, the plaintiff may not invoke the residual provision to establish venue in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the Eastern District of Virginia is the proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides a specific venue rule for Title VII claims that displaces the general venue rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Allen v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2013-02-20(f)(3)

Title VII contains a specific venue provision that displaces the general venue provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the venue rules for Title VII claims and supersedes the general federal venue statute.

Herbert v. Sebelius · filed 2013-02-25(f)(3)

Venue in Title VII cases is not set by the general venue statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather by the venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits suit in the respondent’s principal-office district only if the respondent cannot be found in a district covered by its other venue provisions.

Crowley v. Napolitano · filed 2013-02-27(f)(3)

This provision, which concerns the respondent’s principal office, only applies if Defendant cannot be found in New York, which is not the case here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits suit in the district of the respondent’s principal office only if the respondent cannot be found in a district covered by the first three venue grounds.

Johnson v. Deloitte Services, LLP · filed 2013-04-15(f)(3)

The statute only authorizes suit in the district where the respondent has its principal office if respondent is not found within any of the districts where venue is proper under the other three prongs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)'s venue rule, incorporated into ADA claims, places suit where the alleged unlawful practice occurred or the relevant records are maintained and administered.

Flores v. University of Wisconsin - Madison · filed 2013-05-10(f)(3)

Regardless, an ADA claim is properly brought in the judicial district where the alleged unlawful practice occurred or where the relevant records are maintained and administered, which appears in this case to be a federal district court in Wisconsin.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at a defendant’s principal office only if the defendant cannot be brought before a court in any of the districts specified earlier in the provision.

Abou-Hussein v. Mabus · filed 2013-07-17(f)(3)

Because the Secretary could have been brought before the courts in the districts where the alleged discrimination occurred under the first provision of § 2000e-5(f)(3), the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the provision permitting suit in the district where the defendant has his principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where material events underlying a Title VII claim occurred, even if the final termination decision occurred elsewhere.

Jones v. Panetta · filed 2013-07-30(f)(3)

Weighing the “balance of allegedly discriminatory events, including plaintiff’s actual termination and every instance of alleged workplace discrimination,” Middlebrooks, 2005 WL 3213956, at *3, this Court is persuaded that venue is proper in D.C. under the first prong of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim where the alleged discrimination occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the employee would have worked.

Demery v. McHugh · filed 2013-08-07(f)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that venue is not proper in the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) but would be proper in the Eastern District of Virginia or the District of Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits Title VII venue to where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the employee would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Bond v. atsi/jacksonville Job Corps Center · filed 2013-09-19(f)(3)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff may bring suit only: (1) where "the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed," (2) where "the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered," or (3) where "the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(3). Unfortunately for plaintiff venue is improper in D.C. because all of the sexual harassment and adverse employment acts that plaintiff described in her complaint and which form the basis of this action took place in Florida. Moreover, plaintiff does not assert that any relevant employment records are kept in D.C., or that she would have worked in D.C. but for the alleged discrimination. Therefore, venue is improper under Title VII’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII actions to districts tied to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, or where the claimant would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Fierce v. Sebelius · filed 2013-11-14(f)(3)

A Title VII action may be properly brought (1) “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... In this case, the only jurisdiction in which Plaintiff’s claim could have been brought is the District of Maryland, and that is where the case shall be transferred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the defendant has its principal office only when venue is unavailable under its first three options.

Valerino v. Holder · filed 2013-12-13(f)(3)

But, because venue would have been appropriate in the Eastern District of Virginia under any of the first three prongs of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), plaintiff cannot avail herself of the residual provision permitting suit where the defendant has its principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where records relevant to the alleged unlawful employment practice are maintained and administered.

Reynolds v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2014-01-21(f)(3)

In his opposition to the government’s motion, Mr. Reynolds avers that the address listed for BOP on the NPDB report is in the District of Columbia; presumably, records regarding the report are maintained in the District as well. Venue is proper in this district and the government’s motion on this point is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; adjudication of an EEO complaint in another district does not establish venue there when no unlawful employment practice is alleged in that district.

Taylor v. Veterans Affairs Administration · filed 2014-01-31(f)(3)

Hence, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia based on the first statutory category of venue; rather, it is proper in the Western District of Louisiana.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked but for it.

Stout v. Napolitano · filed 2014-02-24(f)(3)

Under these undisputed facts, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia, but is proper in the District of New Jersey, where some of the alleged misconduct occurred, or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where Plaintiff was terminated and where she would have worked but for the allegedly discriminatory conduct.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) requires a Title VII claim to satisfy its specific venue rules even when related claims have proper venue in the district.

Martin v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2014-02-24(f)(3)

Thus, regardless of any common nucleus of facts or considerations of judicial economy, pendent venue cannot be applied to Martin’s Title VII claim; rather, that claim must satisfy the conditions of the Title VII venue provision.

Title VII venue is proper where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; the location of a later EEO decision does not establish venue.

Taylor v. Shinseki · filed 2014-01-31(f)(3)

But the venue statute speaks of "unlawful employment practices," and Taylor has not alleged that any conduct amounting to an unlawful employment practice-she does not complain of irregularities in the adjudication process-occurred in this district. See § 2000e-5(f)(3). Hence, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia based on the first statutory category of venue; rather, it is proper in the Western District of Louisiana.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue based on speculation that the plaintiff would have occasionally worked in the district.

Thomas v. Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc. · filed 2014-05-15(f)(3)

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege any fact that would make venue proper in the District of Columbia under Title VII and to rebut defendants’ claim that it is not.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the alleged employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the employee would have worked.

Gardner v. Mabus · filed 2014-06-20(f)(3)

A Title VII action may be properly brought (1) “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Venue for both the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims is thus proper in Virginia, not here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) makes venue improper where none of Title VII’s listed venue grounds applies.

Parker v. US Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2014-06-27(f)(3)

Consequently, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia under any of the Title VII venue provisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, determined by the location of the decisions and actions directly bearing on the claim.

Calobrisi v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. · filed 2014-07-23(f)(3)

Because Calobrisi has failed to put forth evidence showing that the decision to demote her occurred in D.C., venue under Title VII does not lie in this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, including where the discriminatory hiring decisions were made.

Vasser v. Shinseki · filed 2014-11-04(f)(3)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred in the District of Columbia, which makes venue for Vasser’s Title VII claim proper in this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits Title VII venue to the districts listed in the statute; a case filed elsewhere must be dismissed or transferred to a proper district.

Kuklinski v. United States Department of the Treasury · filed 2014-11-18(f)(3)

If a plaintiff brings suit in a district that does not satisfy at least one of the venue requirements listed in Section 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is improper and a court must dismiss the case or, in the interest of justice, transfer the case to a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, but does not give the plaintiff’s choice of forum extra deference against transfer under § 1404.

Coleman v. Trican Well Service · filed 2015-02-27(f)(3)

Moreover, Title VII’s special venue provision makes a specific reference to § 1404, thus confirming its applicability in Title VII actions. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs choice of forum, in the context of Fifth Circuit precedent, is not entitled to greater deference merely because Plaintiff brings a civil rights complaint.

Under § 2000e-5(f)(3), the employment-records venue prong looks to where the master set of relevant employment records is maintained and administered, rather than where EEO investigation files are kept.

Abraham v. Burwell · filed 2015-06-08(f)(3)

In this case, the records retained in the District were only those pertaining to the EEO investigation; the master set of Plaintiff’s employment records, conversely, is maintained and administered in Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Broussard v. LLC. · filed 2015-10-02(f)(3)

Here, Title VII unambiguously provides for venue in any district court in Louisiana.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the respondent’s principal office only when venue is unavailable under its first three bases.

Ellis v. Gruenberg · filed 2015-12-18(f)(3)

However, Defendant is correct that Title VII’s fourth basis for venue is residual and considered only when venue is not possible under the first three Title VII venue provisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in a district where some alleged unlawful employment conduct occurred, even if it was not a substantial portion of the conduct.

Louis v. Hagel · filed 2016-04-01(f)(3)

Moreover, the Title VII venue statute does not limit venue to those jurisdictions where a “substantial” portion of the unlawful acts took place.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions based on where the alleged discrimination occurred, where relevant employment records are kept, or where the employee would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Webster v. Potter · filed 2016-05-04(f)(3)

Applying the Title VII provision, the court finds that Webster has not met his burden of establishing proper venue in the District of Columbia. It is undisputed that none of the incidents about which Webster complains occurred here, none of Webster’s employment records are located here, and Webster would not have worked here in the absence of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where a substantial part of the decisions and actions concerning the challenged employment practices occurred.

Hamilton v. Transportation Security Administration · filed 2016-10-11(f)(3)

Thus a “substantial part” of the decisions and actions pertaining to the employment practices at issue in this case occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia, not in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims and also applies to Rehabilitation Act employment claims.

Prescott-Harris v. McHugh · filed 2016-12-12(f)(3)

Rehabilitation Act claims are subject to the same venue provisions as Title VII claims. ... A commonsense approach to venue requires the Court to sever and transfer Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Carter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Avci v. Brennan · filed 2017-02-07(f)(3)

As a threshold matter, the Court concludes that S.D.N.Y. is a proper venue because the alleged conduct occurred in the State of New York.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue in Title VII cases against federal employers to districts connected to the alleged practice, relevant employment records, expected workplace, or, if none applies, the respondent’s principal office.

Webster v. Carter · filed 2017-08-22(f)(3)

Venue in Title VII cases against federal employers is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(3). ... Based upon all four criteria, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, the District of Maryland, and the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for federal employment disability discrimination actions through 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1).

Smith v. Shulkin · filed 2017-11-16(f)(3)

In actions alleging that federal agencies have unlawfully discriminated in employment on the basis of disability, venue is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides permissive venue options that do not override a valid forum-selection clause.

Dey v. Innodata, Inc. · filed 2018-01-22(f)(3)

In the absence of this forum-selection clause, Dey would undoubtedly be entitled to file this case in the Northern District of Illinois, but the forum-selection clause is superior to the permissive statutory venue provision set forth under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows venue where the alleged employment practice occurred or the employee would have worked; venue at the respondent’s principal office is available only if the respondent cannot be found in a district covered by the first three prongs.

Braun v. U.S. Department of the Interior · filed 2018-02-13(f)(3)

Under the plain language of § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue under the first and third prongs is proper in the District of New Mexico, the place where Braun was employed during the alleged misconduct. And because DOI can be found in New Mexico, it is plain that the fourth, residual prong of the statute does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in the district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, even if the remaining time there was short.

Belcastro v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2018-04-19(f)(3)

Therefore, but for his termination, Belcastro would have continued to work in the Eastern District of Virginia (albeit for only a relatively short period of time). Accordingly, venue is proper in both the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims to districts connected to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or the employee’s expected workplace, with a principal-office option only when the respondent cannot be found in those districts.

Daniels v. Shulkin · filed 2018-05-22(f)(3)

The Court finds that venue in this case is not proper in the District of Columbia under the Title VII venue provision, but rather is proper in the Central District of Illinois.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the judicial district where the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC · filed 2018-09-12(f)(3)

[A]n action [brought under this subchapter] may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. ... Here, Plaintiff would have presumably continued to work from her home in Rochester, New York had she not been terminated (by her account, for her complaints of discrimination). Accordingly, venue is proper in the Western District of New York, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue at the defendant’s principal office only when none of its first three venue grounds applies.

Beckford v. Esper · filed 2018-10-03(f)(3)

As none of the first three prongs applies, the Court turns to the fourth – namely, the district in which Defendant has his principal office. ... As Beckford now acknowledges, the Eastern District of Virginia is the proper venue to hear her claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) requires Title VII claims to satisfy its venue conditions even when related claims are properly venued in the same district.

Southerland v. Soc, LLC. · filed 2019-01-16(f)(3)

Southerland cannot and does not dispute that, under this provision, venue is improper in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows a Title VII action in the district of the respondent’s principal office when its first three venue provisions do not apply.

Coley v. Esper · filed 2019-02-14(f)(3)

Since the first three venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) do not apply in this matter, the fallback provision of § 2000e-5(f)(3) that the “action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office” becomes operative.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an ADA employment claim in the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Moland v. Explosive Countermeasures International, Inc. · filed 2019-05-21(f)(3)

The proper venue for ADA claims is determined by Title VII’s special venue provision. ... Taking all inferences in Moland’s favor, the Court finds that he has plausibly alleged at this stage that he could have worked at the Kennedy Center in the District of Columbia had his request for an accommodation been granted. ... The Court therefore finds that Moland’s ADA failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliatory termination claims are properly venued.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in a venue where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the employee would have worked.

Clark v. American Airlines · filed 2019-07-09(f)(3)

Here, Plaintiff could have brought her Title VII claim in the Fort Worth Division because it is where (1) the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) the relevant employment records are maintained and administered, (3) she would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, and (4) Defendant has its principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) specifies where Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims may be brought.

Edley v. Berryhill · filed 2019-07-18(f)(3)

The Court agrees with the defendant that “[t]he District of Columbia is an improper venue for [the] [p]laintiff’s Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims,” Def.’s Mem. at 5, because none of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) authorizes venue in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for an ADA employment claim where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the claimant would have worked.

Lotief v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System · filed 2019-07-31(f)(3)

All of the requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) are satisfied by venue the Western District of Louisiana; thus, venue in the Western District for Lotief’s ADA claim is also proper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to the districts specified by its four statutory bases.

Chin-Young v. Mattis · filed 2019-09-06(f)(3)

The District of Columbia does not satisfy any of these four bases for venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) lets a Title VII plaintiff sue in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, and the plaintiff’s choice of venue weighs against transfer.

Sardeye v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP · filed 2019-09-10(f)(3)

Title VII’s broad venue provision allows plaintiffs to bring suit “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” among other places. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). This provision “embodies a public policy determination that Title VII plaintiffs should have a choice of where to bring suit.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in any judicial district of the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred, giving plaintiffs broad latitude in choosing a district within that state.

Sadat v. State University of New York Upstate Medical University · filed 2019-09-19(f)(3)

The Court reaches that conclusion based in part on the fact that Congress granted greater discretion with respect to the choice of venue to plaintiffs suing under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act than it did under the general venue statute. Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, venue is proper “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) requires a Title VII plaintiff to establish venue under one of its specified grounds.

Grubb v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2019-11-08(f)(3)

Accordingly, Grubb must show venue is proper under one of the prongs of § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the exclusive venue rules for Title VII employment discrimination actions; a plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish venue.

Rodriguez-Aragones v. Pompeo · filed 2019-11-19(f)(3)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s contention that the “claims [in his Complaint] arise from events which occurred while the Plaintiff lived in Providence, Rhode Island,” even if it were true, would not satisfy any of the provisions for venue in § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Coleman v. FEMA · filed 2019-11-25(f)(3)

Here, Plaintiff could have brought her Title VII claim in the District of Columbia because it is where (1) the unlawful employment decisions are alleged to have been committed, (2) the relevant employment records are maintained and administered, and (3) Defendant has its principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to the districts specified in its venue provision; a plaintiff’s convenience does not make another district proper.

Kroll v. Wilkie · filed 2019-12-19(f)(3)

However, none of Plaintiff’s specific arguments change the fact that, on the record before the Court, Indiana does not qualify as a venue under any of Title VII’s venue statute’s provisions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or in the district where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Nicholas v. Mobile Infirmary Association (CONSENT) · filed 2020-01-10(f)(3)

Defendant MIMC, referencing Title VII’s special venue provision, correctly asserts that the Southern District “is in the State where the claimed unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred, is the judicial district where the employment records are maintained and administered, and is the district where the Plaintiff worked.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs where a Title VII action may be filed.

Deshpande v. Methodist Hospital of Southern California · filed 2020-01-27(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the employee would have worked; when work spans multiple regions, the employee’s home office may identify that district.

Cannon v. Communication Components Inc · filed 2020-01-28(f)(3)

If a single district is to be considered “the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked,” it should be the Eastern District of Washington where Plaintiff’s home office is located. Regardless, the Western District of Washington is not an appropriate venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not permit venue based on a Kentucky mailing address when the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, and expected workplace are all in Tennessee.

Bruce v. Esper · filed 2020-01-31(f)(3)

The Court agrees with Esper that the allegations took place in Tennessee and therefore, the first provision does not apply. ... Therefore, the second provision does not apply. ... Therefore, this provision does not apply. ... This Court is not the proper venue to hear Bruce’s claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs where a Title VII employment discrimination action may be filed.

McCray v. GNL · filed 2020-02-21(f)(3)

Under both Title VII’s venue provision and the general venue provision, this District is not a proper venue for this action because (1) the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, and (2) Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows Title VII venue in any district of the state where the alleged practice occurred, the district holding relevant employment records, or the district where the plaintiff would have worked, with a principal-office fallback.

Watts v. SMP Automotive · filed 2020-03-24(f)(3)

Regarding the relevant factors: 1) the alleged Title VII violation occurred in the Northern District of Alabama; 2) the employment records pertaining to the alleged Title VII violation are maintained in the Northern District of Alabama; and 3) plaintiff would have worked in the Northern District of Alabama had there been no Title VII violation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a judicial district where an unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred, even if substantial conduct also occurred elsewhere.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Plains Pipeline, L.P. · filed 2020-03-25(f)(3)

Even if Defendants’ alleged unlawful employment practices substantially occurred in the Western District of Texas, that does not mean venue is improper in the District of New Mexico. The Title VII venue provision is clear: “actions may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices in the District of New Mexico and provided uncontradicted evidence showing as such. The Court, therefore, finds that venue is proper in the District of New Mexico under the Title VII venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make the plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

Swank v. Wolfe · filed 2020-05-04(f)(3)

But where a plaintiff resides does not have a bearing on where venue is proper under Title VII's venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims, including venue in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

YELVERTON v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS · filed 2020-05-08(f)(3)

Despite the fact neither party addresses venue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(3), the Court finds it controlling as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a proper venue for a Title VII action.

Wheeler v. Azar · filed 2020-05-14(f)(3)

It appears Wheeler filed the action in Maryland because he resides here, but that is not a proper basis for venue under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits where a Title VII action may be brought based on the location of the alleged practice, relevant employment records, expected work, or the respondent’s principal office.

Douglas v. Sentel Corporation · filed 2020-05-20(f)(3)

Title VII contains a special venue provision that is distinct from the general venue statute. ... The Second Amended Complaint’s factual allegations do not establish that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia for plaintiff's Title VII claims against defendant ISS.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides mandatory venue rules for Title VII claims, including when they are brought with other claims.

Fitten v. Wormuth · filed 2020-05-26(f)(3)

Plaintiff’s § 1391 argument is rejected because the Title VII venue provision is mandatory, see Kim, 2014 WL 1580614, at *2, and the provision applies even when other claims are asserted together with a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts connected to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked, with venue at the defendants’ principal office if they are not found in those districts.

Saunders v. San Juan Construction Company · filed 2020-06-08(f)(3)

The Court notes that Title VII’s venue provision provides an independent reason why this action must be dismissed or transferred, given § 2000e–5(f)(3) lays venue only in a district: (i) where the unlawful employment practice was committed (Colorado and Marshall Islands); (ii) where the employment records relevant to that practice are maintained and administered (unclear, although possibly Colorado); or (iii) in the district where Plaintiff would have worked but for the employment practice (Marshall Islands); but if the Defendants are not found within any of those districts, then where they have their principal office (Colorado).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII and ADA claims in place of the general venue statute.

Morningstar v. Kroger Company · filed 2020-06-25(f)(3)

Title VII’s venue provision displaces the general venue provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and applies to ADA cases as well. In re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429, 432, (5th Cir. 2002). Under the provision, venue is proper “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice….” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Rivas v. WMATA · filed 2020-07-13(f)(3)

Thus, based on the email exchange and the WMATA job posting, the Court concludes that Rivas has made a prima facie showing that venue is proper in the District of Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions, and a conclusory assertion of improper venue does not warrant dismissal when venue is plausible.

Simon v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2020-08-07(f)(3)

As for Title VII, Defendants have advanced no argument explaining why venue is improper under Title VII’s venue provision, they have simply quoted the statute and asserted that venue is not proper. ... Without any contrary facts from Defendants, the Court will not assume venue is improper based on a bare conclusory statement, especially given that it seems plausible that venue is proper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims in place of the general venue statute.

Jane Doe 1 v. Jetblue Airways Corporation · filed 2020-08-11(f)(3)

Venue in a Title VII claim is not determined by the general venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather is strictly governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the alleged employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the employee would have worked.

Karsten v. McDougall & Sons · filed 2020-08-18(f)(3)

Additionally, venue for a Title VII claim is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which provides that “[s]uch an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” ... All of the alleged employment actions in this case occurred in the Eastern District of Washington, the employment records are kept in that district, and plaintiff would have worked in that district but for the unlawful employment practices she claims defendant committed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in any federal judicial district of a state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Knope v. Michigan Nurses Association · filed 2020-08-24(f)(3)

Importantly, the special venue statute makes no distinction between districts within a state, but rather applies venue statewide – indeed “any judicial district” in the state.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for an ADA claim in the district where an employee worked and felt the effects of an alleged discriminatory termination.

Grubb v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2020-08-27(f)(3)

Thus, Grubb felt the effects of the termination in Montana and venue is proper here under the first basis of Title VII’s special venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Escander v. McCarthy · filed 2020-09-16(f)(3)

But this district is improper under the venue provisions of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Escander does not allege that any unlawful employment practice occurred here, nor is this the judicial district in which Escander would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make venue proper where an EEO office holds duplicate records to process a complaint, even if records were purged from the employee’s official file.

O'Meara v. Wormuth · filed 2020-09-17(f)(3)

Any purging of records in O’Meara’s official employment file, see Bolls Decl. ¶ 8, does not transform the duplicate EEO file into a “master set” of employment records such that the EEO office has been tasked with “manag[ing] the affairs of” or “direct[ing] or superintend[ing] the execution” or “use” of O’Meara’s employment records.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where relevant employment records are maintained and administered; duplicate records kept for EEO processing do not establish venue.

O'Meara v. Esper · filed 2020-09-17(f)(3)

But duplicate records are “insufficient to satisfy Title VII’s second venue provision.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked but for that practice.

Manigault-Speaks v. United States Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-09-21(f)(3)

The Northern District of Georgia satisfies both categories (1) and (3) of Title VII’s venue provision and is the appropriate forum to hear her claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the employee would have worked but for it.

Linzy v. Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (LEAD) · filed 2020-10-22(f)(3)

The first and third options both allow Linzy’s suit to be brought in the Middle District of Alabama.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows venue where the employee would have principally worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

RAD v. COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS INC. · filed 2020-10-30(f)(3)

Thus, New Jersey does not qualify as a proper venue under the third prong of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Hamlett v. Centene Management Company, LLC · filed 2020-11-05(f)(3)

Because the alleged events occurred in Queens County, New York, all of the United States District Courts within the State of New York ‒ including this Court and the Eastern District of New York ‒ are proper venues for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; the plaintiff must establish that connection to the district.

BINKS v. US TECH SOLUTIONS · filed 2020-11-12(f)(3)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)’s first venue option, I find that Binks has not established that the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in New Jersey.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) requires each named plaintiff in a Title VII class action to independently establish proper venue.

Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. · filed 2020-11-30(f)(3)

In short, this Court finds the decisions requiring all named plaintiffs to establish venue to be persuasive. Consequently, the Court concludes that Bland’s claims are improperly venued in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

HOLMES v. LEIDOS HOLDINGS, INC. · filed 2020-12-04(f)(3)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)’s second venue option, this Court finds that the employment records relevant to Plaintiff’s claims are administered and maintained in Tennessee and Afghanistan.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

KANE v. SENIOR LIFE · filed 2020-12-16(f)(3)

As for Kane’s Title VII claims, contained in Counts I through III of the complaint, because Kane alleges that she was discriminated against in Pennsylvania, venue is proper under § 2000e-5(f)(3) in any judicial district in the Commonwealth.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Kane v. PACE Healthcare Transportation · filed 2020-12-16(f)(3)

As for Kane’s Title VII claims, contained in Counts I through III of the complaint, because Kane alleges that she was discriminated against in Pennsylvania, venue is proper under § 2000e-5(f)(3) in any judicial district in the Commonwealth.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to districts connected to the alleged unlawful practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked; the defendant’s principal office is an option only if none of those conditions applies.

RODRIGUEZ v. DEJOY · filed 2020-12-29(f)(3)

Title VII contains an exclusive venue provision. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), a plaintiff may only bring a Title VII claim in a district where: (1) the allegedly unlawful employment practice was committed; (2) the relevant employment records are maintained and administered; (3) the plaintiff would have worked but for the allegedly unlawful employment practice; or (4) if none of these conditions applies, where the defendant’s principal office is situated.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) supplies special venue rules for Title VII employment discrimination actions.

Nkumba v. GM Financial · filed 2020-12-29(f)(3)

Employment discrimination actions asserting a violation of federal law based on race, color, and national origin implicate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contains special venue provisions that “displace[] the general rules for venue.”