42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before the complaint was filed.

McKenzie v. Sawyer · filed 1982-07-27(g)

The plaintiffs are, of course, subject to the statutory limit that back pay under Title VII may not accrue for a period more than two years before the filing of the complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a back-pay award dating from two years before the discrimination charge was filed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hay Associates · filed 1982-08-20(g)

The limitations period that applies to the promotion claims is that prescribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), which gives us jurisdiction to award back pay from two years prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination, i.e., from December 9, 1975.

Section 2000e-5(g) stops further backpay accrual when an employer unconditionally offers a claimant the job previously denied, even without retroactive seniority.

Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-06-28(g)

The rule tolling the further accrual of backpay liability if the defendant offers the claimant the job originally sought well serves the objective of ending discrimination through voluntary compliance, for it gives an employer a strong incentive to hire the Title VII claimant.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes instatement, related benefits, and backpay to make victims of Title VII discrimination whole, subject to limits on backpay and an offset for interim earnings.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1982-07-01(g)

This “make-whole” relief available under Title VII includes, first, instatement to the position sought, with accompanying promotions and retirement and other benefits which the person would have received had he or she not been illegally denied employment; and, second, back-pay from as far back as two years prior to the required filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or as far back as the time of the discriminatory rejection, whichever is more recent, until the time of the person’s employment by the employer charged with discrimination, less any amounts the person earned or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have earned in the interim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires reasonable diligence in pursuing earnings to mitigate back pay, but does not require a claimant to seek new employment whenever her workweek falls below 40 hours.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Container Corp. · filed 1982-10-01(g)

Claimants under Title VII must use reasonable diligence in pursuit of earnings but we do not believe this includes a requirement that claimants must seek new employment every time their work week dips below 40 hours. The standard is one of reasonableness and, under the facts of this case, the claimant has lived up to that standard.

Section 2000e-5(g) places the burden on the employer to prove interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence that should be deducted from a back pay award.

Paxton v. Union National Bank · filed 1982-10-27(g)

Once the gross amount of back pay owed Mosley has been determined, the burden shifts to Union National Bank to prove what should be deducted from that award as "(i)nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and retroactive promotion only when the employee would have received the promotion absent discrimination.

Paterson v. Greenwood School District 50 · filed 1982-12-15(g)

The statute makes it clear that these forms of relief are available only where the employee would have received the promotion had she not been the victim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows retroactive promotion and back pay only when the employee would have received the promotion absent discrimination.

Patterson v. Greenwood School District 50 · filed 1982-12-15(g)

The statute makes it clear that these forms of relief are available only where the employee would have received the promotion had she not been the victim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from an otherwise allowable backpay award.

Adler v. John Carroll University · filed 1982-09-25(g)

Title VII sets forth its own limits on backpay by expressly requiring that interim earnings be set off against any otherwise allowable backpay award. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).

Section 2000e-5(g) bars reinstatement and back pay when an employee was discharged for a reason other than discrimination.

Mateen v. Connecticut Transit · filed 1982-10-05(g)

Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), in turn, states in relevant part: “No order of the court shall require ... reinstatement of an individual ... as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was ... discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of [retaliation provisions].” ... Even assuming the presence of a prima facie case, the substantial proof offered by defendant effectively established that plaintiff was terminated for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay against public officials in their official capacities but does not authorize individual backpay liability.

Williams v. City of Montgomery · filed 1982-10-19(g)

This backpay relief must be against the defendants in the instant case in their official capacities only; Title VII provides no authority to hold public officials individually liable for backpay awards.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a finding that an employee would have received a promotion but for discrimination before a court may order retroactive promotion.

Earl B. HARBISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Neil GOLDSCHMIDT, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation, Defend · filed 1982-11-17(g)

The statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), authorizes courts to order "such affirmative action as may be necessary" to remedy unlawful employment practices. ... We must conclude that the statute requires a "but for" finding and a reversal and remand is necessary.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay awards for up to two years before an EEOC charge is filed.

Zahorik v. Cornell University · filed 1983-01-10(g)

Because back pay awards may be retroactive for two years prior to the date of the filing of a charge with the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), the Court must look to the earliest date that one of the plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a trial court to deduct unemployment compensation from a Title VII back pay award in its discretion, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Manufacturing Co. · filed 1983-01-17(g)

Because Merriweather holds that the decision to deduct unemployment compensation from Title VII back pay awards is within the discretion of the trial court, this panel may not hold otherwise. We may only reverse the trial court for an abuse of that discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay for a continuing Title VII violation beginning two years before the administrative complaint was filed.

Harrison v. Lewis · filed 1983-01-25(g)

Since plaintiffs have demonstrated a continuing violation of Title VII, see Conclusion of Law 8, individuals may recover backpay and other appropriate relief for the period beginning August 3, 1975, two years before the filing of the administrative complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay as a remedy for a Title VII violation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Joseph Paper Co. · filed 1983-02-18(g)

By way of remedy, the Court finds that Sylvester Hudson is entitled to receive back pay from St. Joe. § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require state-funded unemployment benefits to be deducted from a successful plaintiff’s backpay award.

Kauffman v. Sidereal Corporation, an Oregon Corporation · filed 1983-01-03(g)

We are persuaded by the reasoning of both Gullett Gin and the trial judge and accordingly hold that unemployment-benefits received by a successful plaintiff in an employment discrimination action are not offsets against a backpay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats moonlighting income as interim earnings that reduce back pay when the worker could not have held the side job alongside the lost position.

Whatley v. Skaggs Companies · filed 1983-05-09(g)

Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) provides, "Interim earnings ... by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Moonlighting earnings will be considered "interim" earnings and offset against a successful plaintiff's back pay award if he would have been unable to hold the moonlighting job at the same time as the job he lost because of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves the deduction of unemployment compensation from a Title VII back pay award to the district court’s discretion, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Manufacturing Co. · filed 1983-04-11(g)

Because Merriweather holds that the decision to deduct unemployment compensation from Title VII back pay awards is within the discretion of the trial court, this panel may not hold otherwise. We may only reverse the trial court for an abuse of that discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for victims of discrimination, reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Hunter v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1983-05-31(g)

Section 706 of Title YII allows a court to make victims of illegal discrimination whole by awarding those victims back pay reduced by the amount of any “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This Court has already concluded that but for the period when plaintiff Hunter adopted her child and the period following plaintiff Campbell’s marriage, all the plaintiffs exercised due diligence in seeking employment and are thus entitled to awards of back pay reduced by their earnings since their discharges.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for Title VII violations, and a court’s discretion to deny it after economic loss is shown is narrow.

Annie Mae Carpenter, Cross-Appellants v. Stephen F. Austin State University, Cross-Appellees · filed 1983-06-06(g)

Guided by this jurisprudence, we differ with the district court and find that denial of back pay herein would thwart Title VII’s remedial goals of eradicating discrimination and of making whole the victims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and fringe benefits as equitable relief for unlawful employment discrimination, with earnings during the award period reducing back pay.

Kumar v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF MASS. · filed 1983-07-01(g)

Upon consideration, the Court concludes that a reasonable remedy consistent with the purposes of Title VII is the award of back pay, together with fringe benefits, for the period covering the academic years 1976-1977 through 1982-1983, and interest thereon at a rate to be determined by the Court.

Section 2000e-5(g), when incorporated into a federal employee’s Rehabilitation Act claim, limits monetary recovery to accrued back pay rather than general compensatory damages.

Campbell v. U.S. Navy · filed 1983-07-11(g)

Second, § 2000e-5(g), incorporated by reference into § 2000e-16 by § 2000e-16(d), limits the handicapped employee’s monetary recovery to a certain amount of accrued back pay. Federal employees suing under Title VII may not recover “compensatory” damages within the usual meaning of the term.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year backpay period does not authorize backpay for conduct before Title VII applied to a state or local employer.

Liberles v. County of Cook · filed 1983-05-26(g)

We do not feel that these decisions warrant extension of backpay or seniority relief to compensate for IDPA’s and CCDPA’s actions prior to the time their actions became unlawful. ... Absent explicit congressional intent to authorize backpay and seniority relief for pre-Act violations, we must conclude that Congress did not intend the unusual result sought here.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s two-year remedy period does not authorize backpay or seniority relief for state or local government actions before Title VII applied to those employers.

Liberles v. County of Cook · filed 1983-06-01(g)

Absent explicit congressional intent to authorize backpay and seniority relief for pre-Act violations, we must conclude that Congress did not intend the unusual result sought here. Title VII's two-year backpay and seniority provisions do not extend to actions by state and local governments prior to the effective date of the Act.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires backpay to be reduced by interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, including pay from an equivalent job the claimant quits without adequate reason.

Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, Inc. · filed 1983-07-12(g)

Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) requires that a backpay award be reduced by any “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against.” When a plaintiff has obtained employment equivalent to that from which he was excluded by the defendant, and quits without adequate reason, the backpay award must be offset by the amount the plaintiff would have earned had he kept the job.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to enjoin unlawful employment practices and award appropriate relief, including back pay and reinstatement.

Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1983-08-30(g)

Under Title VII, courts are authorized to enjoin unlawful employment practices and to order such affirmative relief, including back pay and reinstatement, as the court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves back pay to the court’s discretion and permits it only when the employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission · filed 1983-10-03(g)

However, a back pay award remains within the discretion of the court and is available only where “the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); ... Accordingly, the request for compensatory relief in the form of back pay is hereby denied.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from Title VII back pay, but unemployment benefits are not deducted.

Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc. · filed 1983-11-07(g)

Although the issue is extremely close and one over which reasonable persons could differ, we conclude that unemployment benefits should not be deducted from a Title VII back pay award for the following reasons: ... Section 2000e-5(g) explicitly provides that interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence must be deducted from back pay otherwise allowable.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires deductions for interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, but unemployment benefits are not deducted from a back pay award.

Craig v. Y & Y Snacks · filed 1983-12-02(g)

In summary, we adopt the rule of nondeductibility of unemployment benefits because we conclude that the legislative history and Gullett Gin are persuasive, that the primary prophylactic policy of Title VII would thereby be better served, that the rule would foster uniformity in applying the back pay remedy, and that the recoupment of unemployment benefits by the state is the better way of dealing with any possible unfairness as between the state and recipient.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require deducting supplemental earnings from backpay when the employee could have earned them in the new position.

Behlar v. Smith · filed 1983-10-27(g)

The district court properly considered this issue under the standards discussed in Bing v. Roadway Express, 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1973), and found that the amounts earned during the summer months and in the evenings during regular school terms were in excess of their contract amounts and were compensation for services which these plaintiffs could earn in spite of their new positions. It refused to allow a deduction as interim earnings under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). We conclude that this finding is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows fringe benefits to be included in back pay to make a discrimination victim whole.

Gates v. ITT Continental Baking Co. · filed 1984-01-09(g)

In keeping with the “make whole” purpose of Title VII, the Court finds that fringe benefits shall be included in an award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not reduce back pay when a claimant declines a different job with more onerous conditions while the desired position remains available.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1984-02-09(g)

Offering promotion to a different job is ineffective when the desired position is still available, especially if the offered position had different conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) calculates back pay by offsetting interim earnings period by period; higher earnings in one period do not erase losses in another.

Alfonso DARNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF JASPER, ALABAMA, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-04-23(g)

Although we have discovered no cases applying the “quarterly earnings formula” in the context of a Title VII action, we conclude that such a formula more faithfully serves the remedial objectives of Title VII and, in any case, promotes the consistent application of back pay awards rendered under both Title VII and the NLRA. Therefore, the district court erred by refusing to award Darnell back pay for those periods in which his earnings were less than the amount he would have earned as a Jasper police officer.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay payable by the employer; federal funding of a state agency does not make the United States liable for back pay to that agency’s employees.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-04-23(g)

Although back pay awards are “payable by the employer”, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the United States is explicitly excluded from the Title VII definition of an employer, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and thus from Title VII liability to employees other than of its own agencies, regardless of its role in partially funding the state welfare program.

Title VII back pay may begin no more than two years before a formal EEOC charge is filed; an earlier Department of Labor complaint does not start that period.

Miller v. Kansas Power & Light Co. · filed 1984-04-26(g)

Subsection (g) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 provides that “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the commission.” Subsection (b) provides that “[cjharges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the commission requires.” Although plaintiff complained to the Department of Labor as early as July 1978, she did not file a formal “charge” with the EEOC until she was requested to do so in July of 1981. Plaintiff’s formal charge was received, and presumably filed, by the EEOC on August 3, 1981. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to back pay commencing on August 3, 1979.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay to remedy discriminatory employment practices, with awards against board members limited to their official capacities.

Williams v. The City of Montgomery · filed 1984-05-03(g)

Title VII permits the district court to undertake any affirmative action, including backpay, to halt an employer’s discriminatory employment practices. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). The Fifth Circuit only allows backpay awards against employers in their official capacities. ... The district court adhered to the Fifth Circuit rule by granting the backpay award against the board members only in their official capacities.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order hiring or comparable placement and award back pay and back benefits.

Connie M. LEWIS, Individually and as Class Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William French SMITH, Etc., Et Al., D · filed 1984-05-14(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) the district court can further order the plaintiff hired for the position of criminal investigator trainee or a comparable position and award her back pay and back benefits.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay payable by the employer; federal funding of a state agency does not make the United States liable for that agency’s employees’ back pay.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-05-18(g)

Although back pay awards are "payable by the employer", Sec. 706, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), the United States is explicitly excluded from the Title VII definition of an employer, Sec. 701, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b), and thus from Title VII liability to employees other than of its own agencies, regardless of its role in partially funding the state welfare program.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year back-pay cap is a substantive limit on liability rather than a filing deadline.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1984-07-20(g)

As a limit on liability rather than a statute of limitations, section 2000e-5(g) is a substantive rather than a procedural measure.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits the period for which relief may be awarded to two years before an administrative complaint is filed.

Segar v. William French Smith, Attorney General, Henry W. Segar, Cross-Appellants v. William French Smith, Atto · filed 1984-06-26(g)

Plaintiffs are subject to the statutory limit on the period of actionable discrimination; under Title VII liability may not accrue for a period of more than two years before the date of filing of an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires the court to determine whether the employer would have hired the applicant absent discrimination before ordering hiring and backpay.

Ernestine KING, Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Appellee · filed 1984-06-28(g)

However, the district court must determine whether TWA would have hired appellant, absent the unlawful discrimination, before appellant is entitled to complete relief in the form of an order directing TWA to offer to hire appellant and to backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g) imposes a substantive two-year cap on backpay liability rather than a deadline for filing a claim.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines · filed 1984-07-20(g)

As a limit on liability rather than a statute of limitations, section 2000e-5(g) is a substantive rather than a procedural measure.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires earnings from another job to offset back pay owed for a position discriminatorily denied.

Curl v. Reavis · filed 1984-08-01(g)

Her salary as dispatcher will, of course, offset back pay liability for the patrol deputy position, under the mitigation requirement of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement only when the employee would have been hired but for the discrimination.

Fadhl v. City · filed 1984-08-29(g)

Like back pay, reinstatement can be ordered only when the plaintiff would have been hired but for the discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). Front pay in this case was premised on a right to reinstatement, and the award must be reversed for the same reasons we have reversed the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay, reinstatement, or front pay in lieu of reinstatement only when the employee would have held the position but for the discrimination.

Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1984-08-29(g)

Like back pay, reinstatement can be ordered only when the plaintiff would have been hired but for the discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Front pay in this case was premised on a right to reinstatement, and the award must be reversed for the same reasons we have reversed the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII backpay to the two years before the charge was filed, even when a continuing violation makes the charge timely.

Scott v. City of Overland Park · filed 1984-09-11(g)

Title VII limits backpay recovery to two years prior to the date of filing the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for unlawful discrimination occurring up to two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Lusted v. San Antonio Independent School District · filed 1984-09-17(g)

If a violation of that statute was established by the evidence, the School District was liable to Lusted for back pay accruing from a date not more than two years prior to the filing of Lusted's discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), assuming the unlawful discrimination existed during that period. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deduct state-paid unemployment compensation and public assistance from a Title VII back pay award against the state.

Dillon v. Coles · filed 1984-10-29(g)

Title VII gives the court the authority to award appropriate relief, including "reinstatement or hiring, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) (1982). ... Craig does not control where the back pay award is against the state. Consequently the reduction was properly allowed in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay for intentional discrimination, reduced by amounts the claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

EEOC v. Exxon Shipping Co. · filed 1984-11-05(g)

Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), gives courts the discretion to award backpay as a remedy for intentional discrimination. It expressly incorporates, however, the "ancient principle" of the law of damages, 458 U.S. at 231, 102 S.Ct. at 3065, that an injured claimant must use reasonable diligence to cut his losses: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the backpay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a backpay claimant to use reasonable diligence to limit losses, but the claimant need not accept a substantially more onerous job.

Cook v. Exxon Shipping Co. · filed 1984-11-05(g)

If the employee has refused the offer of a specific job, whether from defendant or another employer, the question is basically the same: was the employee’s refusal of the job reasonable?

Earnings from a higher paying job after the back pay period ends do not reduce a back pay award under § 2000e-5(g).

Kathryn Davis MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A-1, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1984-12-17(g)

The district court, in this case, properly refused to deduct Matthews’ earnings at a higher paying position from her damage award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deduct unemployment compensation from a Title VII back pay award to avoid double recovery.

Townsend v. Grey Line Bus Co. · filed 1984-12-28(g)

In calculating the amount of plaintiff’s recovery, Townsend’s earned income must be subtracted from the total sum which Grey Line would have paid him. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Therefore, I rule that plaintiff’s unemployment compensation should be deducted from his back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits discretionary backpay awards, but backpay based on a salary that violated the Equal Pay Act must use the salary adjusted to comply with that Act.

Crabtree v. Baptist Hospital of Gadsden · filed 1985-01-08(g)

While the district court has discretion to decide whether to award backpay, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), "that decision is guided by meaningful standards and subject to thorough appellate review." ... Basing a backpay award under Title VII on a salary found to violate the Equal Pay Act would ignore both Title VII's purpose of making victims whole for economic losses suffered through past discrimination and the requirement that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act be read in harmony.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII backpay award to use a salary adjusted to comply with the Equal Pay Act when the employee’s former salary violated that Act.

Crabtree v. Baptist Hospital of Gadsden, Inc. · filed 1985-01-08(g)

Basing a backpay award under Title VII on a salary found to violate the Equal Pay Act would ignore both Title VII’s purpose of making victims whole for economic losses suffered through past discrimination and the requirement that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act be read in harmony. We therefore remand to the district court for a redeter-mination of the Title VII backpay award based on Crabtree’s salary as adjusted in compliance with the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires credit for all interim earnings and excludes back pay for unemployment following a justified discharge from interim employment.

Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 1985-02-06(g)

We think the Knickerbocker rule should apply in this case with two minor exceptions. First, the statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), requires a credit for all earnings, so computing that figure quarterly, as the NLRB does, should not apply. Second, we think that periods of unemployment following justified discharges are to be completely excluded from the back pay period. During such a period the claimant has excluded himself from the employment market.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits, but does not require, courts to award backpay and other equitable relief for a Title VII violation.

Thomas v. City of Evanston · filed 1985-02-26(g)

The statute permits, but does not demand, such relief, as it provides that the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) generally requires back pay after a Title VII violation unless special factors justify denying it.

Horn v. Duke Homes, Division of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc. · filed 1985-02-26(g)

Because a denial of back pay undercuts Congress’ directive to afford the plaintiff “complete relief,” back pay must be awarded unless “special factors” are shown; such special factors “usually include only circumstances where state legislation is in conflict with Title VII.”

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Felts v. Radio Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 1985-03-15(g)

Felts failed in her duty to mitigate her damages when she terminated her employment with Inlander Steindler Paper Company in July 1984.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay in a Title VII case and places the burden of proving failure to mitigate damages on the defendant.

Pree v. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. · filed 1985-03-20(g)(1)

The burden of proving that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages rests on the defendants.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires backpay to be reduced by voluntary payments that have already remedied discrimination-related economic harm.

Chang v. University of Rhode Island · filed 1985-04-04(g)

The voluntary payments made by the University scumbled some of the economic harm stemming from the discrimination. If the backpay award is not offset to the extent of the volunteered reparation, the claimant would receive a trouvaille, that is, remuneration beyond the parameters of the economic injury suffered.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for an unlawful retaliatory discharge, reduced by wages earned from other employment.

Crockwell v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc. · filed 1985-04-12(g)

Plaintiff is entitled under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(g) and (k) to an award of full back pay less any wages earned from other employment from the date of her termination until January, 1984.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from a Title VII back pay award.

Nord v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1985-04-25(g)

The law explicitly states that interim earnings shall be deducted. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). Thus, the lower court erred in not deducting the $1,336.00 from plaintiff's back pay award and we remand for correction of this error.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay during a period of lower-paid employment when the employee has mitigated damages and continues seeking comparable work.

McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., Tommy McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1985-07-03(g)

We hold that the district court erred in determining that McIntosh abandoned his claim to backpay when he contracted to teach on a full-time basis. ... However, because the full-time teaching position paid less than McIntosh's position with Jones, and because McIntosh did not abandon his pursuit of trucking industry employment until he had completed his first full year of teaching, we conclude that McIntosh was entitled to backpay during the first year in which he taught on a full-time basis.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay against local governments to the two years before the initial EEOC charge was filed.

Arnold v. City of Seminole, Okl. · filed 1985-07-10(g)

According to statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), back pay awards against local governments cannot extend more than two years before the date the initial charge was filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) stops the accrual of back pay when a claimant rejects an unconditional offer of reinstatement.

Thelma Marie FIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUICK FILL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-07-29(g)

We therefore uphold the district court’s finding that Quick Fill made an unconditional offer of reinstatement to Figgs which tolled the accrual of back pay liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s two-year back-pay limit does not extend recovery for a discriminatory hiring pattern beyond the applicable EEOC charge-filing period.

Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. · filed 1985-09-25(g)

In fixing the beginning date, we reject appellants' contention that the two-year back-pay limitations period of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) dictates a beginning date two years before filing of the Lewis charge. We do not agree that a discriminatory hiring pattern (as opposed to other possible discriminatory practices) existing prior to a charge-filing period can be considered a "continuing violation" extending into the charge filing period to give this result.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, requiring a plaintiff to seek suitable employment.

Blizzard v. Newport News Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1985-10-02(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), “[ijnterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence ... shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” Plaintiffs, therefore, have an affirmative duty to mitigate the amount of back pay by seeking suitable employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits interest on a Title VII backpay award against the Postal Service because it has generally waived sovereign immunity.

Nagy v. United States Postal Service · filed 1985-10-15(g)

Whatever the proper effect of the language “any other equitable relief” in the case of a federal defendant that enjoys broad sovereign immunity, we hold that the ... language does authorize the collection of interest on a Title VII backpay award from an entity, such as the Postal Service, that has generally waived its sovereign immunity.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay that includes salary, raises, and fringe benefits.

Catlett v. Missouri State Highway Commission · filed 1985-12-13(g)

Plaintiffs are entitled to a back pay award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In light of Title VIPs policy to make whole a victim of discrimination, the award of back pay should include not only the straight salary, but raises and fringe benefits as well.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay beginning no more than two years before the EEOC charge and extending to the date of judgment.

Sellers v. Delgado College and the State of Louisiana · filed 1986-01-30(g)

Back pay may be awarded for a period beginning not more than two years before the filing of the EEOC claim and may extend to the date of judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The magistrate did not explain why the back pay period ran from May 16, 1977, about nine months before the EEOC charge was filed.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an award of backpay and employment benefits lost because of unlawful termination.

Carter v. COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY OF CHAMBERS · filed 1985-11-07(g)

First, Carter seeks and is entitled under Title VII to backpay and other employment benefits she would have received had White and the agency not illegally terminated her employment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for up to two years before a discrimination charge is filed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Maryland Cup Corporation · filed 1986-02-28(g)

Moreover, the evidence is relevant to the issue of back pay liability. For a charge filed in 1979, the company could be liable for back pay from 1977. See Title VII, Sec. 706(g), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay liability to the two years before an EEOC complaint is filed.

Virgo v. Local Union 580 · filed 1986-03-17(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), back pay liability shall not accrue more than two years prior to the filing of a complaint with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay discretionary and permits its denial when an employer relied in good faith on a state protective regulation and the balance of hardships warrants denial.

Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., Claim of Connie Barrios and Louise Lopez, Claimants-Appellants v. Contadina · filed 1986-04-01(g)

In private actions under Title VII, the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include * * * back pay.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Contadina’s good faith reliance on the order should therefore immunize it from liability for back pay through October 8, 1971.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay and appropriate affirmative relief, including time-in-grade seniority.

Osahar v. Carlin · filed 1986-04-30(g)

This Court is empowered to award back pay and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Within that authority, the Court awards the Plaintiff $2750.00 in back pay and instructs the Defendant to give the Plaintiff time-in-grade seniority in the position of electronics technician level 9 as of February 17, 1984, the day immediately preceding the day on which the first white co-worker with a lower score on the MN-500 test than Plaintiff was promoted to that position.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII backpay to the two years before an EEOC charge, but an earlier award may rest on contract or § 1983 liability.

Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Board Of Education · filed 1986-05-30(g)

Heidorn and the Board point out that a backpay award under Title VII may not reach back more than two years prior to the filing of the EEOC charge. They correctly state the law. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). Nonetheless we may allow the award to stand, for the Board's liability is based in part on the contract violation and Heidorn's liability is premised on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering backpay as of the 1981 violation.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a back pay award to include the difference between the unemployment benefits employees would have received from the employer and those they actually received elsewhere.

Green v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1986-08-01(g)

Thus, although unemployment compensation benefits most closely resemble collateral benefits, in order to make plaintiffs whole, plaintiffs are entitled to the difference between the unemployment compensation benefits they would have received at USS and those they did receive, if any, while employed outside USS.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not reduce back pay by earnings from a secondary job the employee could have held alongside the job denied through discrimination.

Lilly v. City Of Beckley · filed 1986-08-07(g)

The district court specifically held that the City was "not entitled to an offset from secondary employment inasmuch as [Lilly] proved to the court's satisfaction that [the moonlighting] earnings could have been achieved had he been hired as a police officer." This factual finding is supported by the record, and the district court therefore properly concluded that Lilly's damages should not be reduced by the amount of money that Lilly earned from secondary employment.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year backpay limit does not limit the scope of discovery or proof at trial.

Flanagan v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1986-06-25(g)

The legislative history of the 1972 amendment establishing the backpay accrual date in no way indicates that this damage provision was intended to limit the scope of discovery or proof at trial.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require wages earned after a plaintiff obtains comparable employment to be deducted from backpay as interim earnings.

Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners · filed 1986-06-26(g)

Here, Sims’ earnings at Cadillac were not “interim earnings.” ... Accordingly, we conclude Sims’ wages from Cadillac are not properly deductible from backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a claimant seeking backpay to use reasonable diligence to find other suitable employment.

Miller v. Hall's Birmingham Wholesale Florist · filed 1986-07-23(g)

Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), governs the award of backpay in Title VII cases. An underemployed or unemployed claimant has a statutory duty to mitigate damages by using reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for discrimination before a federal employee’s physical disability, even if the employee later receives FECA benefits.

Miller v. William Bolger, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service and the United States o · filed 1986-09-30(g)

Under Title VII, Miller may recover back pay as relief for discrimination in the period prior to his physical disability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., Inc. · filed 1986-10-24(g)

Congress, however, has provided that “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Pollard’s wage claim must be reduced by $8,234.52 in order to mitigate his damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) presumptively entitles a victim of Title VII discrimination to back pay and retroactive promotion unless the employer proves by clear and convincing evidence that the victim would not have been promoted without discrimination.

MacHakos v. Meese · filed 1986-11-03(g)

A finding of a violation of Title VII entitles presumptively the victim of discrimination to back pay and retroactive promotion. ... In accordance with this presumption of entitlement to back pay and retroactive promotion, Ms. Machakos should be awarded back pay and retroactive promotion unless the defendants can prove by clear and convincing evidence that she would not have been promoted even if there had been no discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to reduce backpay for laches only after finding that the plaintiff’s delay was inexcusable and prejudiced the employer.

Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. · filed 1986-08-25(g)

Just as a decision on laches as a defense requires a finding whether Waddell’s delay was excusable or not, so also does a decision that laches can be used to bar part of Waddell’s backpay claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII plaintiff seeking back pay to make a reasonably diligent effort to find substantially equivalent employment.

Walters v. City of Atlanta · filed 1986-11-10(g)

A Title VII plaintiff is required, however, to mitigate damages by being reasonably diligent in seeking employment substantially equivalent to the position he lost.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a back-pay claimant to mitigate damages through reasonable diligence in seeking other employment.

Ensor v. Painter · filed 1987-02-06(g)

Of course, both plaintiffs were under a duty to mitigate damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff Ensor has failed to mitigate her damages and that her award of back pay should be adjusted accordingly.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a Title VII back-pay award by earnings the employee received or could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Cowan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1988-07-22(g)

However, Title VII expressly provides that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) (1982). Therefore an award of back pay must take into account amounts which Cowan earned or could have earned with reasonable effort.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require a claimant to remain in an inferior job to mitigate back pay damages.

United States v. City of Chicago · filed 1988-08-03(g)

Nor is a claimant required to continue in an inferior position that she has already accepted.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires reasonable diligence to reduce back pay, but a claimant need not remain in a dissimilar, lower-paying job.

United States v. City of Chicago · filed 1988-08-09(g)

Likewise, the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that McNamara was not required to mitigate her damages by continuing in a dissimilar and lower-paying job.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not provide backpay for a period when an employee is unavailable for work because of disability.

Priest v. Rotary · filed 1986-02-12(g)

The Court finds that plaintiff was unavailable for employment due to disability from the end of November 1978 through November 1979. Plaintiff accrued no rights to backpay during this period of time.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a claimant seeking back pay to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking suitable alternative employment.

William T. Black Mary A. Davis v. The Armstrong Rubber Company John Woods David Lichtle Ben Marberry · filed 1989-01-13(g)

The district court's award to Davis of $24,000 in back pay is also clearly erroneous because (as the arbitrator of her union grievance had previously found) Davis failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking other suitable employment, as required by statute and by case law. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g); Rasimas v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 623-24 (6th Cir.1983).

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a backpay award by amounts the plaintiff earned or could have earned with reasonable diligence after the discrimination.

Gutzwiller v. Fenik · filed 1988-11-01(g)

Any amount which Gutzwiller earned, or with reasonable diligence could have earned, after she was denied tenure shall operate to reduce the backpay otherwise allowable. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g); Rasimas, 714 F.2d at 623.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a back pay award for amounts a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Johnson v. Memphis Police Department · filed 1989-03-20(g)

Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)), governs the award of back pay in Title VII cases. ... Until plaintiff resumed efforts to obtain employment in the field for which he had experience and training, the plaintiff was not pursuing earnings or amounts eamable with due diligence.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to limit back pay to the period it finds the employee would have remained employed.

Enstrom v. Beech Aircraft Corp. · filed 1989-03-28(g)

Plaintiffs backpay award is limited to the year 1984. ... The court concludes that back pay for the entire year is sufficient to compensate her for the retaliatory discharge.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay when a claimant fails to make reasonable efforts to obtain substantially equivalent employment.

Dr. Lani Ford v. Chancellor Roy S. Nicks · filed 1989-04-11(g)

Mrs. Ford simply left the labor market for entry level professors of education in 1974 and made no further effort to obtain work in that field, apart from the prosecution of this lawsuit. She was perfectly free to make this choice, of course, but under § 2000e-5(g) she was not free to impose the costs of that decision on her former employer. We believe the district court’s findings to the contrary are clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to two years before the filing of an administrative complaint, but that limit does not apply to reinstatement or other relief.

Prince v. Commissioner, United States Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1989-04-13(g)

Second, the compensation provision of section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), which limits an award of back pay to two years prior to the filing of an administrative complaint, does not apply to claims for reinstatement or other relief, Thus, if the INS’ personnel records defense was creditable, the mere drafting of document destruction regulations could insulate the Government from claims by its employees that they had suffered discrimination at any time for which records were no longer required to be preserved.

Section 2000e-5 allows backpay for a discriminatory promotion only when there is sufficient certainty that the employee would have been promoted absent discrimination.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1989-01-27(g)

Backpay is available to remedy discrimination in a promotional system, however, only where the employee would have been promoted absent discrimination. Because backpay is an equitable remedy, there must be some certainty that the promotion would have occurred absent the discrimination. That degree of certainty is absent in the case of appellant Walters.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad discretion to award back pay based on a reasonable estimate of lost earnings.

Sennello v. Reserve Life Insurance · filed 1989-05-09(g)

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) grants federal courts broad discretion to remedy discrimination by fashioning "the most complete relief possible." ... There was clearly no abuse of discretion in using Sennello's earnings from her final forty eight months as a basis on which to determine an appropriate back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII plaintiff seeking back pay to use reasonable diligence to find suitable employment; back pay is reduced for periods when the plaintiff does not seek work.

Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District · filed 1989-05-22(g)

A successful Title VII plaintiff is entitled to back pay, subject to a statutory duty to minimize his damages. ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This duty to mitigate required Johnston to use reasonable diligence in finding other, suitable employment. ... After this initial inquiry, Johnston did not try to obtain other employment and, thus, did not fulfill his duty to exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate his damages. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s award of back pay and remand with instructions to reduce the award commensurate with the time Johnston was not seeking other employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a plaintiff seeking back pay to make reasonably diligent efforts to find substantially equivalent work; failure to do so reduces the award.

Candelario v. Postmaster General · filed 1989-05-31(g)

Title VII obligates the plaintiff, however, to make reasonably diligent efforts to seek a substantially equivalent position. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Any failure by the plaintiff to meet this obligation should result in a reduction in the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a back pay claimant to use reasonable diligence to reduce lost wages, while the employer bears the burden of proving interim earnings or a failure to mitigate.

Jane M. WOOLDRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARLENE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1989-07-06(g)

A person discriminated against must exercise reasonable diligence to earn amounts which will reduce any back pay allowable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, defendant has “the burden of producing sufficient evidence to establish the amount of interim earnings or lack of diligence” in mitigating damages on the part of plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay, but Title VII does not expressly authorize interest on a back pay award against the federal government.

Mitchell v. Secretary of Commerce · filed 1989-07-17(g)

Accordingly, as it is specifically authorized to do, the Court awarded Mitchell back pay under §§ 717(d) and 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(d) and 2000e-5(g). ... As Mitchell concedes, however, Title VII itself nowhere authorizes the award of interest, whether on back pay or any other form of monetary relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for discriminatory discharge, but an award may be limited to the employee’s contract term and reinstatement may be denied on equitable grounds.

Daniels v. City of Alcoa · filed 1989-09-22(g)

Because the plaintiff was on a yearly contract and was not tenured at the time of his discharge, the Court is of the opinion that an award of back pay must be limited to the term of his 1982-1983 contract; moreover, reinstatement would not be appropriate for the same reasons and the Court declines to order reinstatement based on the equities of the case.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay, reinstatement, and accrued employment benefits for a victim of Title VII discrimination or retaliation.

Dunning v. National Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-08-09(g)

As a victim of such retaliation and discrimination, Dunning is entitled to backpay and reinstatement in her former position, with the concomitants of employment which would have accrued to her absent these violations of her civil rights.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief, including back pay, for intentional unlawful employment practices.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. · filed 1989-10-26(g)

Having found Carolina Freight retaliated against Francisco Rios, the plaintiff is entitled to relief. When an employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice, Title VII provides for injunctive relief and “such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief.”

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by earnings from a job the employee could not have held if the discrimination had not occurred, regardless of other jobs the employee could have taken.

Chesser v. Illinois · filed 1990-02-06(g)

“Interim earnings” includes the earnings from jobs that could not have been worked had no discrimination occurred. Where an employee accepts a job that he could not have taken if he remained in his old employment, the earnings from that job are interim earnings. This is so regardless of the availability to him of employment in “permissible” jobs not actually chosen.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits retroactive promotion and back pay, but limits back pay to the two years before the charge was filed.

Bua v. County of San Diego · filed 1990-03-02(g)

The plaintiffs are entitled to retroactive promotions and awards of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay may only be awarded for up to two years prior to the filing of the charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay against employment agencies on the same basis as employers.

Rosie Lee Pegues, Cross-Appellants v. Mississippi State Employment Service, Cross-Appellees · filed 1990-05-07(g)

We note that in the face of this obvious distinction Congress specifically provided that employment agencies may be held liable for back pay, and there is no indication in the legislation that courts would treat them differently from employers.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires courts to reduce Title VII back pay by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1990-05-25(g)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), courts are directed to reduce a Title VII plaintiffs back pay award by “[ijnterim earnings or amounts earned with reasonable diligence.” This provision incorporates into Title VII law the traditional common law obligation to mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes a court that finds unlawful discrimination to award appropriate relief, including retroactive promotion, back pay, and benefits.

Edwards v. Hodel · filed 1990-05-29(g)

Once a court finds unlawful discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) empowers it to order any appropriate remedy. Plaintiff seeks retroactive promotion to grade 13, effective June 1981, and to grade 14 effective June 1982, including back pay and other benefits. I conclude that those promotions would be appropriate to make the plaintiff whole and that he is entitled to them.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay when a Title VII claimant fails to use reasonable diligence to obtain substantially equivalent employment.

Sellers v. Delgado College · filed 1990-06-27(g)

Since the claim for damages in this case is therefore based on Sellers’ failure to obtain substantially equivalent employment, the focus of our mitigation inquiry is necessarily whether she exercised reasonable diligence to obtain substantially equivalent employment, not any other employment. ... After reviewing the entire record, we hold that the magistrate’s finding that Delgado proved Sellers failed to mitigate damages is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a back pay award without deducting unemployment benefits.

Cooper v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1990-08-01(g)

This Court follows the rule that Ms. Cooper’s unemployment benefits should not be deducted from any back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order equitable relief, including promotion and back pay, for intentional employment discrimination.

Jew v. University of Iowa · filed 1990-08-28(g)

On that record, I am satisfied that the appropriate remedy in respect to the failure to promote claim is to order promotion of Dr. Jew to full professor effective July 1, 1984, with back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Sabat QUINONES CANDELARIO, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. POSTMASTER GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Defendant, Appellant · filed 1990-09-04(g)

In this case, estopping the Postal Service from asserting Quiñones’ failure to mitigate damages would be a “manifest injustice,” and would violate the statutory mandate in compliance proceedings brought before the district court that “[ijnterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).

Section 2000e-5(g) bars back pay accruing more than two years before an EEOC charge but permits back pay accruing within that period after an earlier constructive discharge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Gurnee Inn Corp. · filed 1990-09-13(g)

Under the facts of this case, damages accruing before February 25, 1983, are precluded. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) (back pay awards "shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission"). ... Rather, it awarded back pay damages--for periods of unemployment after February 25, 1983, that were caused by Tinsley's conduct--to four claimants who were constructively discharged prior to that date and testified that they would have remained at Gurnee but for Tinsley's sexual harassment. Such awards are neither unlawful nor beyond the scope of the district court's discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for victims of Title VII discrimination, reduced by money earned in mitigation.

Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp. · filed 1990-09-26(g)

Weiss and Engel are entitled to an award of back pay less money received in mitigation.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require back pay to be reduced by earnings from a supplemental job the claimant could continue alongside the position denied by discrimination.

Willis v. Watson Chapel School District · filed 1990-10-12(g)

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs back pay award should be offset by the money she earned as a school bus driver as interim earnings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The plaintiffs award of backpay should not be reduced by the money she earned “moonlighting” as a school bus driver. ... The defendant has failed to adequately prove that the plaintiff could not moonlight in such a position while working as an administrator with the school.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to the two years before an administrative charge is filed, even when the Back Pay Act would allow a longer period.

Brown v. Secretary of the Army. Wellington Mitchell v. Secretary of Commerce · filed 1990-11-09(g)

Title VII limits recovery to back pay accruing within two years prior to the filing of the administrative charge. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). This difference, however, is easily accommodated. The specific limitation of Title VII must prevail over the more generous term of the Back Pay Act.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay to be calculated using salaries from interchangeable positions, including overtime earnings the employee would likely have earned.

Danna v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1991-01-29(g)

Since the positions were generally interchangeable, and the record showed that Danna sought out overtime work, it is reasonable for the court, in its discretionary capacity, to determine damages based on the broader array of salaries.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay for salary lost during a disability caused by sex discrimination and constructive discharge.

Cline v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. · filed 1991-01-31(g)

Ms. Cline is therefore entitled to the full salary she would have earned had she remained at GECAL during the period of her disability—that is, the period between May, 1988 when she went on short-term disability leave and had her pay reduced and May 1990 when she achieved success in controlling the pain from her tic douloureux and began working again, earning substantially the same salary as she had earned at GECAL. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay with interest to make a victim of discrimination whole even when the employer acted without bad faith.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Reads, Inc. · filed 1991-03-25(g)

The Court finds that READS exhibited no bad faith in this case, and did not willfully discriminate against Moore. Nevertheless, to deny back pay would frustrate the statutory purpose of Title VII — the eradication of employment discrimination and the compensation of victims of employment discrimination is such a way as to make them whole. Accordingly, the Court will award Moore back pay with interest.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces backpay by actual earnings and amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delight Wholesale Co. · filed 1991-06-13(g)

Therefore, calculation of plaintiff’s backpay damages must be offset by any actual earnings plaintiff made during the relevant time and by the amount plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). The amounts plaintiff did earn, or reasonably should have earned, in mitigation are deducted from the backpay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not permit a court to reduce backpay by wages an employee would have earned in a former, lower-paid position after properly accepting a promotion.

Corine Proctor, Cross-Appellee v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, a Delaware Corporation, Cross-Appell · filed 1991-09-05(g)

Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), governs the award of backpay in Title VII cases such as this. ... Therefore, we hold that it is not within the discretion of the district court to calculate backpay based on the pay of the former position held by an employee who properly accepted a promotion to a higher position.

Section 2000e-5(g) places the burden on the employer to show that substantially equivalent work was available and that the claimant failed to use reasonable diligence to obtain or keep it.

Fauser v. Memphis Housing Authority · filed 1991-09-17(g)

The burden, however, is on the alleged discriminating employer to show (1) that there was a substantially equivalent position, and (2) that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence in seeking or maintaining such position.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts the plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Baker v. Emery Worldwide · filed 1991-10-28(g)

Title YII imposes on plaintiff a duty to mitigate, requiring any interim earnings and amounts earnable through reasonable diligence by plaintiff to be set off against the back pay otherwise awardable.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for wages lost because of discrimination; back pay is unavailable when the discrimination did not cause the employee’s departure.

Cuesta v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 1991-11-01(g)

Because there was no constructive discharge, the Court will be unable to award back pay. Title VII only provides for equitable relief in the form of the difference between what plaintiff earned as a consequence of the discrimination and what plaintiff would have earned absent the discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits how far back before a charge back pay may accrue; it does not cap the total period of back pay at two years.

Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1991-12-10(g)

Calling this limitation a “cap” is a misnomer. Rather, it states a limit as to the period of time prior to the filing of a complaint for which back pay may be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a Title VII back-pay award to begin two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Hatcher-Capers v. Haley · filed 1992-03-20(g)

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the back pay award shall commence two years prior to the date the plaintiff filed her formal charge with the EEOC, that is, two years prior to July 15, 1989, or July 15, 1987, and continue through the date of this Opinion and Order.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable relief, including backpay; when a plaintiff does not seek reinstatement, the court requires constructive discharge for backpay.

Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1992-02-07(g)

Therefore, Saxton’s only possible recovery in this case, since she is not interested in having her employment with AT & T reinstated, is limited to backpay if she was “constructively discharged.”

Section 2000e-5 permits backpay awards against municipalities without Alabama’s $100,000 damages limit.

Patrick v. City of Florala · filed 1992-03-06(g)(1)

A “central statutory purpos[e]” of a monetary award under § 2000e-5 of Title VII is to make a person whole for injuries caused by illegal employment discrimination. ... Application of an arbitrary $100,000 limit to backpay awards against municipalities in Alabama, without regard to the employee’s actual salary level or the duration of the violation, would clearly frustrate this important goal.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay liability to the two years before an EEOC complaint is filed.

Cain v. Michael P.W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, and the Department of the Army · filed 1992-07-06(g)

Since Cain filed his EEOC complaint on January 12, 1988, the Secretary's liability, if any, cannot begin to accrue prior to January 12, 1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 706(g) authorizes backpay to make victims of Title VII discrimination whole; the remedy is compensatory rather than punitive.

Schaefer v. Tannian · filed 1992-06-01(g)

It is true that the policy behind section 706(g) is compensatory rather than punitive. However, an award of backpay in this instance is necessary to “make whole” the plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay when a claimant voluntarily quits comparable interim work for personal reasons, but does not toll back pay when the quit is prompted by unreasonable working conditions or a search for better work.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. DELIGHT WHOLESALE COMPANY · filed 1992-08-25(g)

Although a claimant fails to mitigate damages by voluntarily quitting comparable interim employment for personal reasons, a voluntary quit does not toll the back pay period when it is motivated by unreasonable working conditions or an earnest search for better employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a district court to award back pay for up to two years before the EEOC charge was filed without requiring proof of a continuing violation.

The ESTATE of Janice D. PITRE v. WESTERN ELECTRIC CO. · filed 1992-09-14(g)

In addition, we observe that a plaintiff need not establish a continuing violation in order to receive damages for the two-year period. Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes the district court in its discretion to make such an award to any Title VII plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits Title VII back pay beginning two years before the discrimination charge is filed with the EEOC.

Korte v. Ronald Diemer, Individually and as Sheriff Putnam County Sheriff's Office Putnam County Commissioners · filed 1992-12-28(g)

The period of back pay available under Title VII begins two years prior to the date of filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, however.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not permit reducing a backpay award because the employee contributed to a strained working relationship.

Robinson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1993-01-08(g)

The trial court also supported its reduction of Robinson’s award of backpay by finding that Robinson contributed to the decay of his working relationship with SEPTA. ... However, we need not remand this question inasmuch as we believe that such a reduction is impermissible.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not permit reducing backpay because the employee contributed to the deterioration of the employment relationship.

ROBINSON v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY · filed 1993-01-19(g)

The trial court also supported its reduction of Robinson's award of backpay by finding that Robinson contributed to the decay of his working relationship with SEPTA. Neither the trial judge nor SEPTA has provided any case law in which backpay damages were reduced through a comparative fault-type analysis. It is questionable whether the trial court believed, irrespective of the tax consequences, that the backpay award should be reduced to account for Robinson's blame. However, we need not remand this question inasmuch as we believe that such a reduction is impermissible.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, subject to the claimant’s duty to seek comparable employment and the employer’s burden to prove inadequate mitigation efforts.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pizza Hut of Roanoke Rapids, Incorporated · filed 1993-03-24(g)

A claimant has an affirmative duty to produce evidence to support her claim for damages by showing she was unable to find comparable employment. After she has done so the burden shifts to the employer to prove she did not exert reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. ... Her efforts at employment were proper to mitigate her damages. ... These are findings of fact, and we cannot say that they are clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-5(g) measures back pay by lost wages reduced by actual earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc. · filed 1993-04-26(g)

Back pay is ordinarily measured by the difference between the wages that would have been earned but for defendant’s wrongful action and what was actually earned together with what was earnable with reasonable diligence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5 permits back pay for a qualified employee denied a promotion through discrimination without requiring her to prove she would have received the promotion.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1993-03-03(g)(1)

Rambo does not have to prove that she would have been promoted to establish her entitlement to back-pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a backpay award even when the plaintiff did not request it in the complaint, so long as the late request does not prejudice the defendant.

Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc. · filed 1993-04-01(g)

Backpay is specifically authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... This Court finds the defendant has suffered no prejudice simply because the plaintiff did not originally ask for backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces allowable back pay by the plaintiff’s interim earnings.

Bruhn v. Foley · filed 1993-06-03(g)

Therefore, under § 2000e~5(g) (interim earnings serve to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable), plaintiff is entitled to recover $30,688.00 in back pay from Box Butte County.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay without deducting the employee’s unemployment benefits.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Corinth, Inc. · filed 1993-06-28(g)

Because “unemployment is a vast and complicated system whose funds are not directly attributable to the employer,” Id., it is the holding of this Court that the $1,336 received in unemployment benefits by Amy Alexander will not be deducted from her award of back-pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings, including overtime pay, to be deducted from a backpay award.

Reilly v. Cisneros · filed 1993-08-10(g)

The interim earnings at the SBA shall include any amounts Reilly earned for working overtime. Section 706(g) states that interim earnings are deducted from a backpay award. It does not distinguish between standard pay and overtime pay.

The employer bears the burden of proving that a Title VII plaintiff failed to mitigate backpay damages under § 2000e-5(g).

Hutchison v. Amateur Electronics Supply, Inc. · filed 1993-12-03(g)

The employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires consideration of whether a claimant reasonably refused substitute employment before back pay is tolled.

Ladson v. Ulltra East Parking Corp. · filed 1994-05-10(g)

Therefore, the Court declines to summarily conclude that back pay should be tolled in the instant matter in light of the factual issues in the record concerning the reasonableness of Ladson’s refusal in light of the threats alleged. In view of the offer of employment at a distinct worksite, at best a “substantially equivalent” job, the Court exercises its discretion to let the action proceed for the purpose of further developing the record as to whether Ladson met his duty to mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) excludes unemployment compensation from interim earnings but permits an equitable deduction from back pay when the employer effectively funded those benefits.

Williams v. Secretary of the Navy · filed 1994-05-10(g)

Unemployment contributions are not “earnings” for purposes of the section. But the court may deduct them from a back pay award as a matter of equity. ... Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8509 the Navy Exchange reimburses the Federal Employees Compensation Account in an amount equal to unemployment compensation paid to its employees. The source of federal employees’ unemployment compensation is not collateral, but effectively is the federal employer. Defendant properly withheld from plaintiff’s back pay the amount of her unemployment compensation.

Back pay under Section 2000e-5(g) should be calculated through the date of judgment and should ordinarily include compound interest.

Sands v. Runyon · filed 1994-07-01(g)

Back pay should be calculated to the date of judgment, and should ordinarily include compound interest.