42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to sue over discrimination discovered during a reasonable investigation of an employee’s charge without filing a new charge, provided the EEOC includes it in its reasonable cause determination and follows conciliation procedures.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tempel Steel Co. · filed 1989-08-04(b)

The EEOC can maintain this action without filing a separate charge of discriminatory hiring and recruitment practices.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to seek injunctive relief in the public interest even when the employee’s individual claim is precluded.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP · filed 2000-11-21

Although the EEOC is in privity with Lagatree with respect to the claims for individual relief on behalf of Lagatree, the same is not true for the EEOC’s claims for injunctive relief pursuant to its duty to vindicate the public’s interest in preventing employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to sue over class claims uncovered during an investigation when they have a reasonable nexus to the original charge, even if that charge did not allege a pattern or practice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Caterpillar Inc. · filed 2004-09-22

The court, is satisfied that there is a reasonable nexus between Lambert’s charge and the pattern and practice allegations in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action despite an employment arbitration agreement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C. · filed 2006-09-16(f)(1)

Accordingly, Castillo has an unconditional right to intervene in this action with regard to her Title VII claims and her motion to intervene in this action is therefore granted.

The EEOC may seek relief for affected employees even if they did not meet the charge filing requirements for private actions.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic Healthcare West · filed 2008-01-03(e)(1)

The EEOC may thus seek relief for Girard-Simone and any other employees who may have been affected by Defendant’s discriminatory policy even though they have not complied with the requirements necessary to bring private actions on their own.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives claimants with claims sufficiently similar to the charging party’s an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action, even if they did not file separate charges.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Albertson's LLC · filed 2008-09-17(f)(1)

Therefore, I conclude that the Applicants here are aggrieved persons, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), and thus are given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee the right to intervene when the EEOC brings a civil action against the employer, without a right-to-sue letter.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rite Aid Corp. · filed 2010-11-10(f)(1)

A right to sue letter is necessary for a plaintiff to proceed only when the EEOC chooses not to bring a civil action against an employer. ... Here, the EEOC chose to pursue a civil action against Rite Aid, and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), Mr. Fultz has the right to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) prevents the EEOC from pursuing discrimination claims arising outside the 180-day charging period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Army Sustainment, LLC · filed 2023-09-26(e)(1)

The Court joins the other courts that have concluded that § 706 does not permit the EEOC to pursue otherwise time-bared claims for unlawful employment discrimination.

The EEOC may sue over conduct it discovers during its investigation even if the charging party’s EEOC charge describes only later conduct.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sis-Bro, Inc. · filed 2024-08-16(f)(1)

The EEOC may bring an action based on offending conduct earlier than conduct described in Natasha’s EEOC charge if it discovers such conduct.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved persons the right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Starboard Group, Inc. · filed 2025-08-04(f)(1)

As aggrieved parties, Intervenor Plaintiffs have the right to intervene in the EEOC’s enforcement action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Teamlyders, LLC · filed 2025-09-11(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) states: “…the person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [E.E.O.] Commission…” Id. ... Accordingly, the Court grants Morgan-Bethay’s motion to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits the EEOC’s authority to sue governmental respondents directly, but does not prevent their joinder under Rule 19 when the EEOC seeks no direct relief from them.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Company · filed 2005-03-10(f)(1)

In addition, Title VII limits the EEOC’s authority to proceed against “a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In the case of a governmental respondent, if the EEOC fails to resolve the matter by informal means, the EEOC “shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent.” ... However, a plaintiffs inability to state a direct cause of action against an absentee does not prevent the absentee’s joinder under Rule 19.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action against a respondent in federal district court.

United States v. Wattsburg Area School District · filed 1977-04-18(f)(1)

Under 2000e-5 provision is made for suit by the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against the respondent in the appropriate U.S. District Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the Attorney General exclusive authority to sue a public employer when conciliation fails.

United States v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1977-11-10(f)(1)

The EEOC also gained responsibility for conciliation efforts on behalf of the individual public sector employee complainant, but the act specifically provided that if conciliation failed here against a governmental employer, the Attorney General would have exclusive authority to bring suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f) requires the EEOC to refer unresolved charges against public employers to the Attorney General after conciliation fails; the Attorney General may then sue.

United States v. State of South Carolina · filed 1978-01-16(f)

And, in both types of actions, where the defendant is a public employer, the Commission cannot sue but, following unsuccessful attempts at a conciliation agreement, must refer the matter to the Attorney General.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows an aggrieved person who receives a right-to-sue notice to sue a governmental respondent without the Attorney General bringing the action.

Ferrell v. ASS'N OF CENTRAL OKLAHOMA GOVERNMENTS · filed 1978-09-11(f)(1)

In view of the express language of § 2000e-5(f)(l) set out above, it is obvious that a “person aggrieved” may bring an action against a “government, governmental agency, or political subdivision” after receiving a right to sue notice and that such an action is not required to be brought by the Attorney General.

Section 706’s applicable procedural requirements must be satisfied before the Attorney General may bring a pattern or practice suit against a public employer.

UNITED STATES of America v. FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 1979-03-12

In light of the Reorganization Plan, we hold that the Attorney General may initiate a pattern or practice suit against the School District without a referral from the EEOC if he has satisfied the procedural requirements of § 706 applicable to such suits.

Section 2000e-5's administrative requirements do not apply when the Attorney General initiates a pattern-or-practice discrimination suit under section 2000e-6(a).

United States v. State of NJ · filed 1979-07-13

Accordingly, this Court holds that the Attorney General need not adhere to the administrative requirements of section 706 when initiating a "pattern or practice" discrimination action.

Section 2000e-5’s administrative requirements do not apply when the Attorney General initiates a pattern-or-practice discrimination action against a public employer under section 707(a).

United States v. New Jersey · filed 1979-07-13

Accordingly, this Court holds that the Attorney General need not adhere to the administrative requirements of section 706 when initiating a “pattern or practice” discrimination action.

Section 706’s administrative prerequisites do not apply when the Attorney General brings a section 707 pattern-or-practice suit against a public employer.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1984-08-22

The reference in the Order therefore should be read as the President’s recognition that the only procedures relevant to the Attorney General’s authority under section 707 were those of the Department of Justice.

Section 2000e-5(f) gives the Attorney General broad discretion over Title VII enforcement actions.

National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Meese · filed 1985-07-02(f)

Review under the APA is also unavailable because the Attorney General’s decision to seek a modification of one or more consent decrees is “committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) and 2000e-6 grant to the Attorney General broad discretion with respect to the enforcement of actions under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5 permits the Attorney General to sue a public employer over an individual discrimination charge only after the EEOC investigates, finds reasonable cause, and cannot conciliate it.

United States v. City and County of Denver · filed 1996-06-07(f)

This is in contrast to § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, designed to vindicate individual instances of discrimination, which empowers the Attorney General to sue public employers only after an individual has filed a charge with the EEOC, that agency has investigated, and made a finding of reasonable cause and been unable to conciliate the charge.

Section 2000e-5(f) allows the Attorney General to pursue an individual discrimination claim, but a suit brought solely on an individual's behalf does not give the United States greater power than that individual to seek damages from a state.

United States v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety · filed 2001-09-14(f)

By bringing its suit under section 706 rather than section 707, the United States makes clear that it does not seek to remedy a pattern of intentional discrimination on behalf of the United States or the citizens of Mississippi. Rather, the United States seeks only to vindicate the rights of an individual allegedly discriminated against by an agency of the State of Mississippi in violation of the ADA.

Section 706’s procedural prerequisites do not apply when the Attorney General brings a pattern or practice lawsuit under Section 707.

United States v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections · filed 2015-01-29

Because the Court determines that the Attorney General need not clear the procedural hurdles set forth in Section 706 of Title VII, and is not bound by a statute of limitations, the DOC’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC referral before the Attorney General may bring a Title VII enforcement action against a public employer.

Texas v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2016-06-27(f)(1)

We disagree, and note that Title VII’s enforcement provision contemplates EEOC referral as a prerequisite for any DOJ-brought enforcement action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC referral before the United States may intervene in a Title VII case involving a government employer.

Doe v. Schuylkill County Courthouse · filed 2022-05-12(f)(1)

We agree that a referral from the EEOC was a legal prerequisite to intervention by the United States in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires EEOC referral to the Attorney General for state and local government respondents, but not federal government respondents.

Neville v. Burrows · filed 2025-04-16(f)(1)

In view of the statutory bifurcation, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court precedent confirming that § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s reference to “a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision” is specific to state and local government and excludes the federal government, appellants fail to show that the EEOC’s non-referral of their cases to the Attorney General violates the APA as agency action unlawfully withheld.

The EEOC may intervene in a private Title VII action without first attempting conciliation, but must continue to attempt conciliation after intervening.

Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. · filed 1977-06-02(f)(1)

Because we believe strongly in the value of conciliation, we hold that while the EEOC is not barred from intervention by its failure to attempt to conciliate, it is under a continuing obligation to attempt to conciliate even after it has intervened in the action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene without first attempting conciliation, but requires it to continue attempting conciliation after intervention.

Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. · filed 1977-06-24(f)(1)

Because we believe strongly in the value of conciliation, we hold that while the EEOC is not barred from intervention by its failure to attempt to conciliate, it is under a continuing obligation to attempt to conciliate even after it has intervened in the action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene in a private Title VII action without first completing the administrative prerequisites for a separate EEOC suit.

Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1977-08-15(f)(1)

In this Circuit, it is a meritless contention to argue that the EEOC is trying to employ the right of permissive intervention to circumvent the administrative prerequisites of the statutes, since the EEOC cannot maintain a separate action once a private party has filed a district court action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene on the basis of the original plaintiff’s charge even when it has not conciliated a separate employee charge.

Williams v. St. Louis Diecasting Corp. · filed 1979-05-21(f)(1)

The EEOC intervened herein as a result of the charge filed with the EEOC by plaintiff Williams. A second charge was filed by an employee, William Hubbard, and signed by nineteen additional employees. The evidence failed to establish that the EEOC made any effort to conciliate with respect to the Hubbard charge. Intervention herein, however, is appropriate on the basis of the Williams charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene at the court’s discretion when its application is timely and intervention will not cause undue delay or prejudice.

Benson v. Little Rock Hilton Inn · filed 1980-07-21(f)(1)

Rather intervention is assumed to be permissive and within the Court’s discretion once the required showing of timeliness and lack of delay and prejudice has been made.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private party to intervene as of right in an EEOC action only if the party has Article III standing and the action arose from that party’s charge or another party’s nearly identical claim.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n · filed 1982-03-19(f)(1)

Accordingly, the Court, while attentive to the language and legislative history of the intervention provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l),... holds on the basis of the judicial precedent just discussed that the right of intervention provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) may only be invoked if (1) the proposed intervenor has an interest in the action sufficient to establish standing under article III of the United States Constitution, and (2) the action was commenced by the EEOC in response to a charge filed either (a) by the proposed intervenor or (b) by another private party having a nearly identical claim to the claim raised by the proposed intervenor.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee the right to intervene in an EEOC action, subject to Rule 24(a)'s timeliness requirement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1982-04-02(f)(1)

Although an aggrieved employee has a statutory right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a condition precedent to intervention is interposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), which requires that the application to intervene be timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee a right to intervene in an EEOC civil action, subject to a timely application under Rule 24(a).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1982-04-02(f)(1)

Although an aggrieved employee has a statutory right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a condition precedent to intervention is interposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), which requires that the application to intervene be timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a claimant who did not file an EEOC charge to intervene when other charges gave the employer notice of discrimination claims of the same nature.

Behlar v. Smith · filed 1983-10-27(e)

However, in cases construing Rule 23 with respect to class actions in Title VII cases, it has been held that the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is to provide notice to the charged party so as to bring to bear the voluntary compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC. When any charge is filed, these purposes are served as there is no claim of surprise in such a situation. ... The University, having been apprised of the sex discrimination claims by the other individuals, cannot now claim it was improper to allow Dr. Word to intervene so as to assert charges of the same nature.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene in a private action upon certification that the case is of general public importance and the court’s discretionary approval, without complying with Rule 23 to seek classwide relief.

United Telecommunications, Inc., v. Saffels · filed 1984-08-15(f)(1)

In the section permitting intervention Congress required only two prerequisites: (1) certification by the Commission that its intervention is in the public interest; and (2) the exercise of discretion by the trial court before permitting intervention. If Congress had meant Rule 23 to be a substitute for the investigative procedure required in a direct action, it would have said so. To require compliance with Rule 23 would contradict the plain reasoning and mandate of the Supreme Court in General Telephone.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC, after properly intervening, to continue litigating within the scope of the original plaintiffs’ claims after those plaintiffs settle.

Jacqueline M. Harris, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervenor-Appellant v. Amoco Production Co. · filed 1985-08-16(f)(1)

Since title VII contemplates EEOC intervention in appropriate cases, we hold that, having properly intervened, the EEOC can maintain suit within the scope of the original plaintiffs’ claims even after those plaintiffs have settled.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene upon a timely application and certification that the case is of general public importance, subject to the court’s discretion.

Wurz v. Bill Ewing's Service Center, Inc. · filed 1989-10-30(f)(1)

The court finds that the instant action is of sufficient public importance to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits the EEOC to seeking permission to intervene, with a certification of general public importance, once the aggrieved person files a Title VII action based on the same charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Harris Chernin, Inc. · filed 1993-12-01(f)(1)

If that action is brought, the EEOC may only seek permission to intervene, supported by a certification that the case is of general public importance. If so construed, the statute avoids there being separate actions by the person aggrieved and the EEOC based on the same single alleged violation, and limits the EEOC’s intervention in a private action to a case in which the EEOC is willing to certify general public importance. ... We think this is the sound construction of the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person an unconditional right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Taylor Electric Co. · filed 1994-04-22(f)(1)

Additionally, § 2000e-5(f)(l) of Title VII confers upon Evans the unconditional right to intervene in a civil action commenced by the EEOC. The relevant provision provides that “[t]he person ... aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC]....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The claims asserted by the EEOC identifies Evans as the aggrieved person. Thus, Evans has satisfied the required elements to intervene in this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the EEOC to certify that a case is of general public importance before it intervenes.

Billouin v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1995-05-03(f)(1)

In this case, an additional requirement for EEOC intervention exists: certification by the agency that the case is of general public importance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), 12117(a). In this case, the EEOC’s General Counsel has certified that the case is of general public importance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene in an existing Title VII action without first investigating or attempting conciliation when its charges match the private plaintiffs’ claims.

Sobel v. Yeshiva University · filed 1977-05-31(f)(1)

At the outset, defendants argue that the EEOC should not be allowed to intervene since it has not met the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) concerning investigation and conciliation prior to the institution of litigation. ... However, a direct reading of the statutory language does not seem to impose these requirements on an effort to intervene in existing litigation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a charging employee an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC action, subject to Rule 24’s timeliness requirement.

Willis v. W. H. Braum, Inc. · filed 2003-10-28(f)(1)

The statutory language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which has been incorporated into the ADA, grants the charging employee an unconditional right to intervene in cases brought by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the person who filed the underlying EEOC charge an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s civil action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. GMRI, Inc. · filed 2004-04-09(f)(1)

The Court construes this statutory language to confer on the party who filed the EEOC charge upon which the EEOC’s action is based ... an unconditional and absolute right to intervene in the action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives persons aggrieved by an alleged Title VII violation the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. ABM Industries Inc. · filed 2008-03-05(f)(1)

Here, the proposed complaint in intervention alleges that all of the Applicants are aggrieved employees and/or similarly situated individuals within the meaning of Title VII. (Doc. 10-2,11118-15, 35-40). Thus, all of the Applicants have the right to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. East 40, Inc. · filed 2019-06-10(f)(1)

That section specifically provides that “[t]he person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” ... Accordingly, Davidson's motion (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee a right to intervene in the EEOC’s Title VII action.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. 1618 CONCEPTS, INC. · filed 2020-01-07(f)(1)

Moreover, Matusik has a statutory right to intervene as to the Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 810 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jacobson Memorial Hospital Care Center · filed 2023-10-25(f)(1)

That section specifically provides that “[t]he person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee an unconditional right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Logic Staffing LLC · filed 2025-03-17(f)(1)

Title VII provides an aggrieved employee with an absolute right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Discount Auto Parts LLC · filed 2025-05-22(f)(1)

Warrens has a statutory right to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) which states that the “person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits equitable relief, including back pay, for a failure-to-accommodate claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Tate · filed 2026-01-12(g)(1)

Qualified employees whose employers fail to accommodate their disabilities are entitled to any remedies that would be available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, including compensatory and punitive damages, 42 U.S.C. 1981a(a)(2), and any equitable relief the court deems appropriate, including back pay, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay when discrimination actually or constructively discharges an employee; a transfer compelled by intolerable conditions can qualify as constructive discharge.

Thabatah v. U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2025-03-14(g)(1)

It is up to ajury to determine the veracity of these allegations and if they rise to the level of constructive discharge justifying back pay. Summary judgment is not warranted in favor of Defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay and retroactive promotion when employees would have received those benefits but for unlawful discrimination.

Isabel v. City of Memphis · filed 2005-04-11(g)(1)

The district court found that the most complete relief possible includes both an award of back pay and promotion retroactive as of July 12, 2000, because plaintiffs would have been promoted and received lieutenants’ salaries but for the unlawful discrimination. We agree with the district court, despite the City’s arguments to the contrary.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes back pay an equitable remedy for the district court to award in its discretion, with no right to a jury determination.

Lutz v. Glendale Union High · filed 2005-04-07(g)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that there is no right to have a jury determine the appropriate amount of back pay under Title VII, and thus the ADA, even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Instead, back pay remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes back pay under Title VII, including prejudgment interest, which a court may deny when it would give the plaintiff a windfall.

Goico v. Boeing Co. · filed 2004-12-07(g)(1)

With'regard to prejudgment interest, Title VII and the ADEA both authorize prejudgment interest as part of the back pay remedy. ... Although Blim is not strictly applicable here because the plaintiffs retaliation claim was based upon Title VII as well as the ADEA — and thus Title VII might serve as an independent basis upon which to grant prejudgment interest — the court concludes that the reasoning of Blim and Greene does apply in these circumstances. ... Accordingly, the court will not include any prejudgment interest in the judgment.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits backpay to two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Anderson v. Boeing Co. · filed 2004-03-29(g)(1)

Because injunctive and declaratory relief is prospective, and backpay can only be awarded “up to two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l), the subclass’ limitations period cannot extend beyond two years prior to a subclass plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for class members reaching two years before the EEOC filing.

Wells v. Meyer's Bakery · filed 1977-08-15(g)

Here the record demonstrates continuing discrimination and, as in Stewart, back pay relief to the individual members of the class may go back to two years from the filing of the complaint before the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g)'s two-year back-pay cap limits the period of recovery but permits courts to consider earlier promotion vacancies when determining an employee's injury.

Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc. · filed 1977-09-09(g)

Only after the trial court has determined what each employee’s “rightful place” is, as well as the amount of economic injury visited upon that Plaintiff by virtue of having been denied promotions subsequent to July 2, 1965, can the two year “cap” on back pay provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) be applied.

Before the 1972 amendments, § 2000e-5(g) set no statutory limit on the period for a Title VII backpay award.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines · filed 1977-09-08(g)

Prior to the 1972 amendments, there was no statutory limitation upon the period for which Title VII backpay might be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay that includes lost raises, bonuses, and fringe benefits, with interim earnings deducted.

Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1977-09-14(g)

The backpay award should include all raises, bonuses, and other fringe benefits which Ms. Mead would have received absent her illegal discharge. Any interim earnings should be deducted from the total figure. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, and the employer bears the burden of proving those amounts or the availability of other work.

Abron v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. · filed 1977-10-11(g)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), provides that “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable”. ... The burden is upon the defendant to show such amounts or the availability of other employment which the employee did not act reasonably to procure.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award back pay where appropriate to victims of unlawful employment practices.

15 Fair empl.prac.cas. 827, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7842 Patrick James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co. · filed 1977-11-18(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) back pay may be awarded where appropriate to victims of unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an award of back pay without a finding that the employer acted in bad faith.

United States v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1977-12-12(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) does not condition an award of back pay on a finding of bad faith by the employer: ... The Court is therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief which it requests.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires income received after a discriminatory refusal to hire to be offset against back pay.

Manley v. Mobile County, Ala. · filed 1977-12-12(g)

The mitigation provision of § 2000e-5(g) dictates that any income received by the plaintiff after the wrongful denial of employment must be offset against the salary lost as a result of the discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay measured by the wage difference during a period of discriminatory underpayment.

Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co. · filed 1977-12-31(g)

31. Plaintiff is entitled to back pay from February 10, 1975, when she was promoted to buyer, to May 7, 1975, when she left Powell, calculated on the basis of the difference between her salary at the time she quit and the salary of Robert Sears. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5 places the burden on the employer to show that a plaintiff’s back pay claim should be reduced for failure to mitigate damages.

Cynthia DI SALVO, Appellee, v. the CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF GREATER KANSAS CITY, Appellant · filed 1978-01-12(g)

Once plaintiff in a Title VII case such as this has proven her case and established what she contends to be her damages, the burden of going forth to mitigate the liability or to rebut the damage claim rests with the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars retroactive appointment and back pay when the employer proves by clear and convincing evidence that the employee would not have received the position absent discrimination.

Peele v. Califano · filed 1978-01-19(g)

Defendant has met his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that even but for discrimination, plaintiff would not have been selected for the position of Superintendent of St. Elizabeths. ... Thus, the court cannot award to plaintiff, as part of the relief due him as a prevailing party under Title VII, either a retroactive appointment to the superintendency or commensurate back pay and benefits.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to the two years before a formal administrative complaint is filed, rather than the date the employee first contacts an EEO counselor.

Nitterright v. Claytor · filed 1978-05-23(g)

While there is some logic to plaintiff’s contention that the two-year period should begin to run from the date she first contacted her EEO Counsellor, the statute and regulations are clear on their face. Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 29, 1974, and that is the date from which defendant’s back pay liability under Title VII shall accrue.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay claims to wages arising within two years before an EEOC filing.

Adams v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board · filed 1978-05-25(g)

We therefore hold that with regard to claims for back wages under Title VII a two-year statute of limitations is to be applied and the plaintiffs may assert such claims only if they arose within two years of the filing of complaints with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits retroactive promotion and back pay when discrimination caused an employee to lose a promotion.

Jones v. Middendorf · filed 1978-07-13(g)

Since plaintiff has been the victim of defendant’s racial discrimination with respect to the promotion of August 18, 1974, plaintiff is entitled to retroactive promotion to the GS-9 position as of August 18, 1974 with back pay accruing from that date.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay accrual to two years before an EEOC charge but does not prescribe how to calculate back pay within that period.

Tancredo R. VERZOSA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1978-08-23(g)

This language limits the accrual period of back pay only, not other forms of equitable relief. Further, beyond providing that interim earnings shall be subtracted from back pay, section 2000e-5(g) does not purport to specify how back pay liability for the two-year accrual period shall be computed.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay measured by what an employee reasonably would have earned absent discrimination.

Hill v. Nettleton · filed 1978-08-30(g)

The appropriate remedy for the discrimination against the plaintiff is to award her an amount which she reasonably could have expected to receive for the academic year 1975-76.

Section 2000e-5(g) measures the back pay period from the first relevant EEOC charge, which may differ by type of discrimination claim.

SLEDGE v. J. P. STEVENS & CO. · filed 1978-10-04(g)

Finally, because the period of limitations for purposes of back pay extends back from the date the first relevant EEOC charge was filed, that date will apparently vary for different types of claims.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not automatically end back-pay relief when an employee refuses reinstatement; the court must consider the offer and the employee’s reasons for refusal, while deducting earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad · filed 1978-11-02(g)

Failure to accept an offer of reinstatement in a Title VII case does not necessarily terminate the right to relief, so long as those amounts earned elsewhere or eamable with reasonable diligence are deducted from each plaintiff’s award. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In determining whether the right to relief extends beyond the date of an offer of reinstatement, the trial court must consider the circumstances under which the offer was made or rejected, including the terms of the offer and the reasons for refusal.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars back pay for any period more than two years before an employee files an EEOC charge.

Sias v. City Demonstration Agency · filed 1978-11-08(g)

However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 specifically provides that back pay shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of the EEOC charge, filed in this case in August, 1972.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires each class member seeking back pay to establish an individual entitlement to relief; the employer does not bear that initial burden.

Jane MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MID-CONTINENT SPRING COMPANY OF KENTUCKY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1978-11-09(g)

In our case, the burden of proof was erroneously imposed on Mid-Continent by the Special Master and District Court. ... This showing was insufficient under Teamsters and the judgment must therefore be reversed. On remand, the District Court must determine the application for a job asserted by each individual class member.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay recovery to the two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

Williams v. Yazoo Valley-Minter City Oil Mill, Inc. · filed 1978-11-22(g)

This litigation arises out of Charge No. TJA 5-0768, filed by Plaintiff Williams on or about January 23, 1975. Two years prior to that date is January 23,1973, which would be the maximum statute of limitation of recovery of monetary damages in the nature of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars back pay for any period more than two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

SIAS v. CITY DEMONSTRATION AGENCY · filed 1978-12-29(g)

However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 specifically provides that back pay shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of the EEOC charge, filed in this case in August, 1972.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay beyond an offer of reinstatement that does not include back pay.

Irene (Salazar) Comacho v. Colorado Electronic Technical College, Inc. · filed 1979-01-25(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), as we have seen, gives the trial court discretion as to the remedies. ... Thus we must hold that a reinstatement offer without back pay does not relieve a guilty employer from further liability.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to award affirmative employment relief and back pay for discrimination.

Jones v. Cleland · filed 1979-02-22(g)

The broad remedial powers invested in this court by Congress to curb such discriminatory practices provide for the award of both affirmative relief and monetary damages, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to reduce a back pay award, and the plaintiff must establish her damages before the employer bears the burden of showing a failure to mitigate.

19 Fair empl.prac.cas. 177, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8987 Anna Marie Taylor, Cross-Appellant v. Philips Industries, Inc., C · filed 1979-02-26(g)

It is only with such information that the trial court can carry out its responsibility to reduce the back pay award by the amount of “interim earnings,” 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e — 5(g). ... Not until the plaintiff establishes what she contends are her damages does the burden of going forward to rebut the damage claim or to show plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages, fall on defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the period beginning two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1979-03-06(g)

The back pay period commences two years before the filing of the EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not provide back pay for a period when the claimant was unable to work because of incapacity.

Garrett v. Saluda Shirt Co. · filed 1979-03-23(g)

Because of plaintiff’s mental incapacity during the entire period of her unemployment, a “back-pay” remedy would not contribute to making her whole, even if she had been discriminated against. Thus, the remedy of back-pay is not available to the plaintiff in this action.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to two years before the charge; for class members, the computation date depends on when the employer received notice of their claims.

Chewning v. Schlesinger · filed 1979-04-23(g)

Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that “Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). ... Because Chewning’s complaint put the defendant on notice of its potential back pay liability to that portion of the class, those plaintiffs who worked in the Division of Labor Relations should have their back pay awards measured from December 26, 1972. ... For all class members except those who worked in Division of Labor Relations, therefore, February 27, 1974 is the relevant date for calculating any back pay remedy to which they may be entitled.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before an EEOC charge but permits courts to consider earlier discrimination when reconstructing a claimant’s work history.

Carter v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc. · filed 1979-05-17(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), back pay liability begins no earlier than two years before the plaintiff files his EEOC charge. ... The section thus in no way limited the time period for reconstructing work history.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay when a discriminatory refusal to hire causes an applicant to lose wages.

Butta v. Anne Arundel County · filed 1979-06-06(g)

Accordingly, an award of back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order injunctive and other affirmative relief while denying back pay in its discretion.

Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. · filed 1979-07-17(g)

However, as the Court also ruled at time of trial and now restates, Defendant Local 6’s unlawful requirements and practices did not rise to such level as, within the Court’s sound discretion under Section 706(g) of Title VII and in light of the authorities cited above, Local 6 should be held liable for any back pay herein. The Court thus holds that Local 6 is liable for injunctive and other affirmative relief to correct the effects of its unlawful practices, but not for back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

Willey v. Maben Mfg., Inc. · filed 1979-08-22(g)

Since she did not make an effort to secure employment during the latter part of 1976, she cannot recover for loss of earnings during this period.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable power to award back pay for a discriminatory refusal to hire.

Harmon v. San Diego County · filed 1979-09-13(g)

Since Harmon has shown the County is liable for its discriminatory refusal to hire, the court has broad equitable power to award relief. ... Harmon is entitled to $22,480.00 in back pay, based upon the difference between (a) Harmon’s earnings from May 11,1977, to June 30,1979, and (b) the pay he would have received as Associate Administrator.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay liability to the two years before the EEOC charge was filed in a pattern-or-practice suit based on the same practices.

United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight · filed 1979-09-21(g)

This is a pattern or practice suit based upon the same practices which formed the bases for complaint with the EEOC. Thus, § 706(g), as amended, applies and the limitations period commences two years prior to the date that the charge was filed.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts earned or earnable with reasonable diligence, and the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1979-09-21(g)

Once a violation has been demonstrated and back pay has been awarded, the employer has the burden of showing that the discriminatee did not exercise reasonable diligence in mitigating the damages caused by the employer’s illegal actions.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay when discrimination causes an economic loss, measured by the difference between actual earnings and what the plaintiff would have earned absent discrimination.

Constance KAMBEROS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GTE AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1979-07-16(g)

The Taylor decision, relied on by GTE, applies only when a plaintiff fails to show that her post-discrimination earnings were less than her earnings would have been had she been hired. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Thus, the plaintiff in Taylor failed to establish an economic loss. Kamberos has established her damages by measuring the difference between her actual earnings and those which she would have earned absent the discrimination of defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s two-year backpay period does not apply to a claimant pursuing §§ 1981 and 1983 claims merely because a co-intervenor brings a Title VII claim.

Birdie Mae DAVIS v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY · filed 1979-08-06(g)

The period of limitations applicable to Foster's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 claim is governed by state law, so that only the promotions given during the year preceding January 23, 1974, need be considered. Foster cannot, as the plaintiffs argue, take advantage of the two year period of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) simply because his co-intervenor, Buskey, proceeds under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(g) governs the period for which a court may award backpay as Title VII relief.

Woody v. City of West Miami · filed 1979-09-13(g)

42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1973) applies in determining the appropriate backpay period.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides for back pay as discretionary equitable relief.

20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1289, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,257, 5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 572 Joyce Grayson v. The Wickes Corpora · filed 1979-09-26(g)

This language, in our view, clearly reveals a Congressional intent to provide for backpay as an equitable remedy that is awarded through an exercise of the court's discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from recoverable back pay.

Kirkland v. Buffalo Board of Education · filed 1979-10-09(g)

In accordance with § 2000e-5(g), plaintiff’s interim earnings shall be set off against back pay recoverable.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence to reduce a Title VII back pay award.

Barbara MARKS and Shirley Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PRATTCO, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1979-12-07(g)

Since the district court’s order merely recites the total amounts awarded to appellees, we have no way of knowing whether and to what extent interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence were considered by the court in computing the awards. Accordingly, we remand so that the district court may hold a hearing and enter a more detailed order with respect to the amount of back pay due appellees.

Section 2000e-5(g) lets district courts adjust the end date of a back pay award for equitable reasons.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n · filed 1979-12-28(g)

The discretion granted district courts under § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), subsumes the power to adjust the termination date of a back pay award to comport with equitable considerations.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits backpay to the two years before a charge is filed with the EEOC.

Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc. · filed 1979-12-13(g)

Title VII specifically provides that “[bjack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with” the E.E.O.C. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and reinstatement, but relief may be limited when the employer would have ended the employment for a reason unrelated to discrimination.

Edwards v. School Bd. of City of Norton, Va. · filed 1980-01-18(g)

This court has broad discretion in fashioning an award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... This court concludes from the evidence that defendant would not have renewed plaintiff’s contract for the 1973-74 school term, regardless of her religion, due to inadequate service resulting from excess absences. Therefore, back pay is limited to one year and reinstatement is denied.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay for a discriminatory refusal to hire, limited to the period the worker would have remained employed if a later lawful discharge is established.

Patricia DAVIS, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKSON COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY and Donald Inkship, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-02-08(g)

Ms. Davis is entitled to receive back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... If, in the same circumstances, a white employee would have been discharged, and it is established, that, once the offense was known, Ms. Davis also would have been discharged, then a valid reason for her constructive discharge at that later date might exist. In that case, the court should award her back pay only for the period of time she would have been employed, taking into account any procedures required by state law antecedent to her termination.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay when an employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint.

Crawford v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1980-02-26(g)

Back pay is expressly authorized as an item of damages by Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), where the court finds “that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint.”

Section 2000e-5(g)’s authorization of equitable relief does not permit prejudgment interest or an inflation adjustment on a federal employee’s back-pay award without a clear waiver of the government’s immunity.

Blake v. Joseph A. Califano, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1980-01-30(g)

Appellants rely on the broad authorization for “other equitable relief” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (note 4, supra). We agree, however, with the two Courts of Appeals which have ruled on the issue and have held that this language is insufficient to constitute the necessary statutory authority where the complainant is a federal employee.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a Title VII back-pay award by interim earnings and amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., Inc. · filed 1980-05-19(g)

Title VII further provides, however, that “Interim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence by the person . . . discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Court will therefore reduce the back pay award by $2,831.25, the amount plaintiff earned in defendant’s employ from the date Ray King was hired until she left (a period of 14 weeks).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not permit reinstatement or backpay when an employee was discharged for a valid nondiscriminatory reason.

James F. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF BARBER EXAMINERS, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-04-17(g)

The record reveals that Miller suffered no diminution in pay or benefits as a result of the discriminatory assignment; therefore an award of backpay is not appropriate. Reinstatement is likewise not appropriate because Miller was discharged for a valid nondiscriminatory reason. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces backpay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; unemployment benefits are also deducted.

Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 1980-04-18(g)

By the wording of the appropriate section of Title VII itself, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person . discriminated against shall operate to reduce the backpay otherwise allowable.” Likewise, unemployment benefits should also be deducted from the backpay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, and the employer bears the burden of proving mitigation.

Jones v. Glitsch, Inc. · filed 1980-05-22(g)

The statute directs the Court to reduce Plaintiff’s back pay award by “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The burden of proving reasonable diligence and the amount of mitigation is upon the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a back pay award by amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Grindstaff v. Burger King, Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(g)

The statute also provides that “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person . discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The Court finds that this higher salary was “earnable with reasonable diligence” by plaintiff, and therefore must operate to reduce the award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for unlawful termination and gives district courts broad discretion to fashion relief.

Bertha J. HARPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-06-19(g)

The court’s award consisted of the amount of back pay plaintiff would have earned from Thiokol if she had not been unlawfully terminated (as well as an amount for reasonable attorney’s fees) as is allowed under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... In formulating relief in employment discrimination cases, the district court has broad discretion to fashion remedies as the equities of a particular case compel.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay as a remedy for sex discrimination under Title VII.

23 Fair empl.prac.cas. 72, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,069 Marilyn Horace, Cross-Appellant v. City of Pontiac, Cross-Appell · filed 1980-06-27(g)

“Accordingly, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the City of Pontiac is liable to Mrs. Horace for its acts of sex discrimination. Mrs. Horace seeks an award of back pay; this is an appropriate remedy under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).” ... As to all of the other issues in this case, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for the reasons set forth in Judge Feikens’ opinion, except of course for the attorneys’ fee issue to which we have already referred.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay against employers and labor organizations, which may be jointly liable for a joint unlawful employment practice.

Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co. · filed 1980-06-27(g)

Under these provisions the union and the employer may be held jointly liable when the unlawful activity was a joint undertaking.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII backpay to the two years before an EEOC charge is filed.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1980-06-11(g)

Title VII limits awards of backpay to a period not exceeding two years before filing of the charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Since plaintiffs filed their charge in this case on August 18,1976, they should receive backpay from August 18, 1974.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not automatically treat leaving noncomparable part-time work to seek comparable work elsewhere as a failure to mitigate backpay.

Yolica Y. M. STONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D. A. & S. OIL WELL SERVICING, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-06-23(g)

We are unwilling to hold that, as a matter of law, a jobseeker who voluntarily leaves noncomparable part-time employment and moves to another location to seek comparable work thereby displays a lack of reasonable diligence.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for discriminatory acts within two years before a charge is filed when those acts are part of a pattern or practice of discrimination.

Chisholm v. United States Postal Service · filed 1980-10-03(g)

First, plaintiffs and class members are entitled to recover backpay for discriminatory acts occurring for a period of two years prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination, where that discrimination is part of the pattern and practice of discrimination which the Court has found.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay for federal employees but does not authorize an additional inflation adjustment to that award.

Etta B. SAUNDERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Graham CLAYTOR, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, Et Al., Defendants-Appellan · filed 1980-10-03(g)

The 1972 amendments to Title VII authorize the remedy of back pay for employees of the United States government who are victims of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Although many additional remedies, such as interest on back pay awards, vacation and sick pay adjustments are available to private employees, these remedies are not available to employees of the government because neither the 1972 amendments nor the incorporated provisions of Title VII expressly authorizes them. ... In essence, the inflation factor adjustment is a disguised interest award, which is not permitted under present law.

Section 2000e-5 requires clear and convincing evidence that a rejected applicant would not have been selected without discrimination before back pay may be denied.

Eugene F. MAROTTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. USERY, Secretary of Labor, U. S. Department of Labor, Defendant-Ap · filed 1980-10-06

The District Court properly insisted that a denial of back pay required the defendant to establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that even in the absence of discrimination the rejected applicant would not have been selected for the open position.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay awards against employers and labor organizations, including joint liability when they undertake unlawful activity together.

Glus v. G. C. Murphy Company · filed 1980-11-03(g)

Furthermore, section 706(g) expressly states that a court may award damages for "back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization), . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Under these provisions the union and the employer may be held jointly liable when the unlawful activity was a joint undertaking.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay liability to the two years before an employee files an EEOC charge.

Whatley v. Skaggs Companies, Inc. · filed 1980-11-25(g)

Whatley is also entitled to back pay. The period for which back pay is recoverable commences on September 17, 1971, the date of his termination. Since Whatley filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC on September 20, 1971, this is well within the statutory limit restricting back pay liability to two years prior to the filing of the charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings regardless of the type of work that produced them.

Merriweather v. Hercules · filed 1980-12-01(g)

Under the statute, the amount which an employee would otherwise have been entitled to in the absence of the discrimination will be reduced by any earnings acquired during the interim period regardless of the type of work involved.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence, and back pay may be denied when the claimant fails to seek substantially equivalent work.

Sangster v. United Air Lines · filed 1980-12-08(g)

This notion is expressed in Title VII in the following language: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). ... We conclude that Sangster did not meet her duty to mitigate her damages, and that denial of back pay under the circumstances would not frustrate Title VII's remedial purposes.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; the employer bears the burden of producing evidence of those amounts or a lack of diligence.

Barbara MARKS Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PRATTCO, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1981-01-05(g)

Once a plaintiff in a Title VII case has established a prima facie case and established what he or she contends to be the damages resulting from the discriminatory acts of the employer, the burden of producing further evidence on the question of damages in order to establish the amount of interim earnings or lack of diligence properly falls to the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a reduction in back pay for amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence when the employer demonstrates those amounts.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sage Realty Corp. · filed 1981-01-29(g)

The award of back pay shall not be reduced by the amount of any funds not actually received by Hasselman, however, inasmuch as defendants have failed to demonstrate that pursuant to section 706(g) there were any “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence” after Hasselman’s discharge other than what she actually earned.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before a charge is filed, including for government employers when that period begins before the 1972 amendments took effect.

McKenzie v. Saylor · filed 1981-01-30(g)

Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This two-year period applies to all claims against government employers under Title VII, even where the two-year accrual period would begin before the effective date of the 1972 amendments.

Section 2000e-5(g) excludes proceeds from the sale of a plaintiff’s personal residence from earnings that offset a Title VII back pay award.

Whatley v. Skaggs Companies, Inc. · filed 1981-02-23(g)

The Court finds as a fact that the monthly payments from the land contract on the Denver duplex constitute proceeds from the sale of Whatley’s personal residence. These payments are not earnings within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Hence Skaggs is not entitled to any offset for these payments.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; leaving a later job does not automatically end the award.

McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc. · filed 1981-03-12(g)

The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), provides that interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence shall operate to reduce the back pay award. There is nothing to suggest that quitting a subsequent job necessarily terminates an injured plaintiff’s right to back pay. However, the amounts earnable by plaintiff had she continued her job in Benton Harbor should have the same effect in reducing a back pay award as the amounts actually earned there have.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from back pay, but temporary employment does not itself end the back pay period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1981-03-19(g)

Thus, the statute requires only that interim earnings be deducted from the back pay award, the very procedure implemented by the district court; but it does not require, as Ford urges, that the back pay period end when a discrimination victim accepts other temporary employment. The back pay period may continue past the acceptance of another job by a discrimination victim, as long as the victim's earnings are subtracted from the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits backpay liability to two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Hatton v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1981-01-29(g)

The statutory limitation of defendant’s backpay liability is October 28, 1974; two years prior to plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay and an order placing a person who suffered unlawful employment discrimination in the position she would have held.

Lindsey v. Angelica Corp. · filed 1981-03-06(g)(1)

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to back pay, attorneys' fees, and equitable relief. Back pay amounts to sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000.00), the amount she would have earned working for defendant less the amount she actually earned elsewhere. ... As far as equitable relief is concerned, plaintiff is entitled to the position she would have had absent defendant's illicit discrimination, assistant manager at the Grand Avenue Life Uniform Shop.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to two years before an EEOC charge and to periods when Title VII applied to the defendant.

Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Department · filed 1981-05-07(g)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides that “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge” with the E.E.O.C. Brooks filed her charge with E.E.O.C. on July 3, 1973. The two-year limitations period would permit recovery from July 3, 1971; however, because Title VII was not made applicable to defendants until March 24, 1972, back pay liability under Title VII must be limited to that date.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits precharge Title VII back pay to the two years before an EEOC charge is filed.

Burkey v. Marshall County Board of Education · filed 1981-05-20(g)

The statute of limitations for purposes of a claim under Title VII for back pay is two years prior to the date the EEOC charge was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a claimant’s later enlistment to affect the amount of back pay without defeating the back pay claim.

James Wesley WARD, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE POLICE, Appellee · filed 1981-07-10(g)

Ward’s enlistment may be relevant to the amount of back pay due him under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), if he proves his allegations, but the alleged abandonment does not negate his back pay claims.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits how far back a back pay award may reach to two years before an EEOC charge is filed, but does not bar back pay itself.

Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. · filed 1981-07-20(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides in part: "Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of the charge with the Commission." This provision does not limit the availability of back pay but it does limit the extent to which that remedy may be afforded.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not authorize backpay awards against public officials in their individual capacities.

Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1981-07-06(g)

Personal liability, if any, of the individual defendants must be predicated upon a constitutional violation under § 1983, for we find no authority for holding public officials personally liable for backpay under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits deductions for unemployment benefits and food stamps from a back pay award when equitable considerations make double recovery unnecessary.

Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc. · filed 1981-08-20(g)(1)

Under the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the amount that Thurber received in unemployment benefits should be deducted from her award. ... In our opinion, under these circumstances a double recovery is not necessary to make plaintiff whole for the injury she sustained due to defendant’s discriminatory actions. For the same reasons, the amount plaintiff received in food stamps during her period of unemployment shall be deducted from her back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement and back pay, and does not limit back pay to the remainder of an employee’s current contract.

Ruby EDWARDS, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF NORTON, VIRGINIA, Appellee · filed 1981-09-01(g)

To remedy an illegal discharge, Congress authorized district courts to require reinstatement and award back pay, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), but it did not authorize restricting the award to the unpaid balance of the salary for the remaining period of an employee’s current contract.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for a promotion delayed by unlawful discrimination, but an award requires proof of the pay difference and the length of the delay.

Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach · filed 1981-09-25(g)

Quintana is therefore entitled to damages for the difference in pay between the position to which he was entitled to be promoted and the position in which he was working for the time that his promotion was delayed. Id. § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Plaintiff has not, however, offered any evidence whatsoever on the amount of these pay differentials. He has also not offered sufficiently definite evidence of the length of the delays. It is therefore impossible for me to award him any damages on these claims.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires backpay awards to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Clark v. Marsh · filed 1981-09-02(g)

As appellee concedes, the statute which permits the district court to award plaintiff affirmative relief provides, at the same time, that "backpay otherwise allowable" shall be reduced by "(i)nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The district court was therefore obligated to provide in his award for an appropriate set-off.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires deducting later earnings and unemployment compensation from a back pay award.

Meyers v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. · filed 1981-12-14(g)

However, the statute mandates that the amounts that the plaintiff earned from other employment or received in the form of unemployment compensation should be deducted from the award of back pay pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits backpay accrual to two years before an EEOC charge, but the period used to reconstruct a claimant’s rightful job position can begin when the discrimination began.

Myers v. Gilman Paper Co. · filed 1981-11-04(g)

May 4, 1968 is the date backpay liability commences in this case under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (backpay does not accrue from date more than two years prior to filing charges with EEOC). However, the union was found to have discriminated against the plaintiffs from the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965. The view that the reconstruction period begins when backpay liability commences is rejected.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an award of back pay when a discrimination plaintiff does not seek reinstatement.

Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc. · filed 1982-01-13(g)

Plaintiff does not seek reinstatement to her former position with Revlon, and the appropriate remedy therefore is an award of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes adjusted backpay with interest as a remedy for employment discrimination.

Pennsylvania v. Flaherty · filed 1982-02-17(g)

Included in plaintiffs’ general prayer for injunctive relief is a request for an award of adjusted backpay with interest. Such awards are authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to the two years before an EEOC charge.

Powell v. Georgia Pacific Corp. · filed 1982-03-17(g)

In this case, the Court cannot order a back pay award to commence prior to May 2, 1969, this being two years prior to the filing of the first EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to two years before the administrative complaint was filed.

Grove v. Frostburg National Bank · filed 1982-04-22(g)

Back pay is, however, limited to two years before the administrative complaint was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In this case the cut-off date is March 1, 1974.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars backpay when a claimant voluntarily leaves the labor market or fails to use reasonable diligence to mitigate lost earnings.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Spokane Concrete Products, Inc. · filed 1982-03-12(g)

Finally, it is well established that a plaintiff who has voluntarily removed herself from the labor market or otherwise failed to mitigate is not entitled to backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits hiring or reinstatement with back pay for an employee harmed by discrimination.

Leftwich v. HARRIS-STOWE STATE COLLEGE, ETC. · filed 1982-05-05(g)

Both 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) allow reinstatement or hiring of aggrieved employees with back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits in-kind compensation earned after discharge to reduce back pay, valued approximately when the services were rendered.

McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. · filed 1982-05-14(g)

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the defendant’s motion in limine be and hereby is granted and in the event a trial is held on the matter of damages, the proof on interim earnings may include proof of the plaintiff’s in-kind services, valued at approximately the time the services were rendered.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces Title VII back pay by wages an employee could earn with reasonable diligence after receiving an offer of reinstatement, even if the offer does not include back pay already accrued.

Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility · filed 1982-05-26(g)

In such circumstances, the amounts to be earned under the offer must be considered amounts earnable with reasonable diligence. What is left for litigation is precisely the discrete question of liability for back pay. To hold that back pay must be included, too, is to require, in effect, the full settlement of the lawsuit, which would be inconsistent with the “earnable with reasonable diligence” provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) entitles a plaintiff who proves a Title VII violation to back pay for a period of two years.

Schulte v. Wilson Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-06-17(g)

A plaintiff who proves a violation of Title VII is entitled to an award of back pay for a period of two years. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for class members who show they applied or would have applied for an opportunity denied by a proven discriminator; the employer must rebut their claims by clear and convincing evidence.

McKenzie v. Sawyer · filed 1982-07-27(g)

Because OPS was a proven discriminator, individual members of the plaintiff class were presumptively entitled to relief upon showing, as they were required to do, that they applied or would have applied for the positions at issue. The district court therefore properly concluded that OPS should be required to rebut the plaintiffs' individual showings by clear and convincing evidence.