42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a person aggrieved to sue only if their interests fall within Title VII’s protected zone; a nonemployee with no relevant employment relationship with the defendant falls outside it.

Simmons v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2020-08-25(f)(1)

The zone of interests that Title VII protects is limited to those in employment relationships with the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not permit an advocacy organization to sue as a person aggrieved when its alleged injury is purely ideological or derivative of employees’ injuries.

One Fair Wage, Inc. v. Darden Restaurants Inc. · filed 2021-09-14(f)(1)

To have standing to bring such an action the plaintiff must be “a person claiming to be aggrieved . . . ” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Simply put, OFW cites no case law establishing that a non-employee – here, an advocacy organization – has standing to challenge an employment practice, particularly where the alleged injury it contends renders it “aggrieved” is either purely ideological or entirely derivative of the injury directly suffered by actual employees.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee harmed as the intended means of retaliating against another employee to bring a third-party retaliation claim, but the employee must show evidence of that retaliatory purpose.

Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Com · filed 2022-07-13(f)(1)

If a reasonable jury could conclude that Illinois Central took action against Lesiv to harm his brother, Lesiv would fall within Title VII’s zone of interests and would therefore have a valid claim for that retaliation. Since a reasonable jury could not come to that conclusion, Lesiv’s claim fails on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s ten-day notice of a discrimination charge need not allege a separate failure to preserve employment records.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. BATTLEGROUND RESTAURANTS, INC. · filed 2025-02-24(b)

Section 2000e-5(b), then, did not require the EEOC to include in its 10-day notice of the written charge of discrimination an allegation that Kickback Jacks had failed to preserve records under a completely different provision of the statute.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to notify an employer within ten days after a charge is filed.

HITCH v. THE FRICK PITTSBURGH · filed 2023-05-31(b)

When a charge is filed against an employer through the EEOC, the employer is notified of that charge within ten days of its filing.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires the EEOC to serve a charge on the respondent within ten days.

Barra v. Rose Tree Media School District · filed 2004-09-17(e)(1)

Under Section 2000e-5 of Title VII, a filed charge “shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The responsibility for serving the charge rests with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires the EEOC to serve a charge on the respondent within a reasonable time after receiving it; an unreasonable delay can bar the EEOC from demanding evidence.

Chromcraft Corp. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-01-06(a)

Since EEOC failed to show why it was not feasible to serve upon petitioner a copy of Mrs. Madlock’s charge as soon as practicable after its receipt, we conclude on these facts that EEOC failed to act with reasonable diligence, thus violating its duty to serve the charge within a reasonable period of time and barring it from now demanding evidence from the petitioner.

Section 2000e-5(a) limits an EEOC investigation based on an aggrieved person’s charge to matters relevant to that person’s complaint.

Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1971-12-08(a)

With equal clarity, it is the intent of that section that when the charge is made by an aggrieved person, the investigation should be limited to matters relevant to the grievant’s complaint, and surely Congress did not intend that an aggrieved person could trigger an investigation of employment practices not relevant to that person’s complaints.

Section 2000e-5(a) does not make a plaintiff responsible for the Commission’s failure to notify the employer of a charge once the plaintiff has fulfilled the administrative requirements.

Foye v. United A. G. Stores Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1972-01-11(a)

It is stated by defendant that it is a fatal defect that defendant was not notified of the charges filed against it by the Federal Equal Opportunity Commission, as required by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a). The Court finds the allegation without merit. The courts that have considered similar questions have taken the position that the plaintiff is not responsible for acts or omissions of the Commission and that once the plaintiff has done everything that he can do to satisfy the requirements of the statute to pursue his administrative remedy he should not be adversely affected in seeking judicial relief.

Section 2000e-5 requires notice of a discrimination charge and an EEOC investigation before a private civil suit; a claim lacking that administrative development is jurisdictionally barred.

Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 1974-05-24(b), (e)

Although the question of subject matter jurisdiction of the sexual discrimination allegations is not free from doubt on the facts of this case, the court has concluded that the absence of administrative development of such allegations by the EEOC presents a jurisdictional bar at this time. The court is mindful that an actual attempt at conciliation by the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private suit, Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), but it is clear that “notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstance of the alleged unlawful employment practice)” and an EEOC investigation are mandated by the statute before a civil action is brought. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e).

Before the 1972 amendment, Section 2000e-5(a) required the EEOC to give the employer a copy of the charge before attempting conciliation but set no deadline for doing so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Laacke & Joys Co. · filed 1974-03-08(a)

The foregoing provision expressed no time limit within which the copy of the charge was to be given to the employer. A fair reading of the provision indicates the copy should have been provided before any effort was made to conciliate the charge.

Section 706(b) does not require the EEOC’s notice of a discrimination charge to name the charging party.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1974-09-26(b)

There is no requirement that the charging party be named.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the employer to receive notice of a charge; mailing the notice alone does not establish compliance.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Air Guide Corp. · filed 1975-06-19(b)

Accordingly, although the EEOC can attempt to “serve” the required notice by mailing a written notice pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1974), it is receipt that is determinative of whether the EEOC has complied with § 706(b).

Section 2000e-5(b)'s charge notice requirement does not bar an EEOC suit when defective notice causes the employer no prejudice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. T. Marzetti Co. · filed 1976-01-16(b)

It would be incongruous to hold that failure of the letter notice should be tested for prejudice while failure of the Section 2000e — 5(b) notice should be held to be a jurisdictional necessity. ... For the purpose of determining jurisdiction and whether the complaint sets forth facts forming a basis for relief, the Court finds no prejudice which requires that the motion to dismiss be sustained.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s ten-day notice requirement does not bar subpoena enforcement when late notice causes the employer no prejudice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1976-09-16(b)

Therefore, because the respondent has not shown prejudice and because failure to comply with the ten-day provision should not bar subpoena enforcement, the court holds that subpoena enforcement should not be denied on the basis of the ten-day provision.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s charge notice requirement does not bar an EEOC suit for an unintentional defect in compliance without a showing of prejudice to the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Airguide Corporation · filed 1976-09-29(b)

But neither do we have reason to think that Congress intended to prevent the Commission from suing because of an unintentional defect in compliance, without a showing that such "non-compliance" has caused prejudice to the defendant-employer.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to serve notice of a charge after the state-agency deferral period ends or the state proceedings terminate earlier.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. · filed 1977-08-01(b)

Delaying service upon the employer of the notice of the charges until the termination of the sixty day deferral period or earlier official termination of the state proceedings is consistent with this decision. ... I find that the EEOC timely served such notices under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 706 gives the EEOC investigative authority as broad as a court's for alleged employer violations of Title VII.

Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1978-01-24

Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 gives the EEOC the breadth in the scope of any investigation regarding “unlawful employment practice[s]” equal with that of this Court insofar as any employer-violation under § 2000e-2(a) is concerned.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s restriction on making charges public does not prohibit disclosure to the charged employer and therefore does not establish a FOIA exemption on that basis.

CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY v. PERRY · filed 1978-01-26(b)

So construed, disclosure in this case to the Hospital would not be "specifically exempt from disclosure" under the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires notice of the dates of alleged discrimination; describing the practices only as “continuing” is insufficient, but a good faith estimate of the probable period may suffice.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DEAN WITTER COMPANY, INC., Respondent-Appellee · filed 1980-12-22(b)

Here the EEOC charged only that the practices were “continuing.” The use of this term informs Dean Witter and the court that the practices are continuing in the present but does not disclose whether the practices have occurred in the past, or at least, when they began in the past.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to disclose a charge to the employee who filed it but treats that employee as a member of the public with respect to other employees' charges.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corp. · filed 1981-01-26(b)

The reason, however, is that the charging party is obviously aware of the charge he has filed, and so cannot belong to the public to which Congress referred when it directed that "[c]harges shall not be made public." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b). But there is no reason why the charging party should know the content of any other employee's charge, and he must be considered a member of the public with respect to charges filed by other people.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not make a timely EEOC charge ineffective because the EEOC fails to serve or properly process it.

Watson v. Gulf & Western Industries · filed 1981-01-30(e)

The EEOC’s failure to serve the charge on Paramount Corporation and Gulf and Western Industries does not interfere with Watson’s rights. ... Watson’s mailing of the charge and the EEOC’s failure to process the form properly are also not detrimental to Watson’s claim.

Section 2000e-5 permits a state agency to file an EEOC charge on a complainant’s behalf, with a charge transmitted during the deferral period treated as filed when that period ends.

Hall v. Board of County Com'rs of Frederick County · filed 1981-02-24(c), (e)

The court holds, therefore, that the MCHR could have filed a charge on behalf of plaintiff with the EEOC. ... The court holds, therefore, that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed with the EEOC and that this court has jurisdiction over her Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not automatically bar an EEOC enforcement action for late notice of a charge, but willful or bad-faith delay or substantial prejudice to the employer may bar it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Burlington Northern, Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Burling · filed 1981-03-20(e)

Thus, failure of timely notice may preclude an EEOC action if either willfulness or bad faith- on the part of the agency or substantial prejudice to the employer is shown.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not make a timely EEOC charge ineffective because the EEOC failed to serve it on the respondents.

Watson v. Gulf & Western Industries · filed 1981-06-23(e)

Paramount corporation and Gulf and Western assert that the July 1976 charge was not valid because it was never served on either of them as required by § 706(e). ... The EEOC's failure to serve the charge on Paramount Corporation and Gulf and Western Industries does not interfere with Watson's rights.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires notice of a discrimination charge to describe the circumstances of the employer’s actions against the charging employee; it does not require examples of more favorable treatment of employees of other races.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. MICHAEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1983-06-01(b)

Consistent with this purpose, we hold that the “circumstances” to which Title VII refers are the circumstances of the employer’s actions against the employee who alleges improper racial motivation.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give an employer notice within 10 days of a charge’s filing that includes the information required in the charge itself.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1984-04-02(b)

Accordingly, we construe § 706(b) to require the Commission, within 10 days of the filing of a charge, to reveal to the employer all of the information that must be included in the charge itself under the current version of 29 CFR § 1601.12(a)(3) (1983).

An EEOC reasonable cause determination is not a final appealable order because the aggrieved party can sue the allegedly discriminating employers in district court.

May v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1985-09-20(b)

A reasonable cause determination is not a final order because the aggrieved party is able to file a suit in the district court against the companies allegedly involved in the employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes the EEOC to investigate discrimination charges, but gives it no authority to conduct adjudicatory hearings.

Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., Roger Thomas Kiekhofer, & Robert Friend · filed 1985-09-27(b)

The EEOC clearly has no authority to conduct an adjudicatory hearing, instead, if it determines after a complete investigation that there is reasonable cause in the record to establish employment discrimination, the EEOC files a complaint in Federal district court where the complainant is entitled to a trial on the merits.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not deprive the EEOC of authority to investigate merely because a charge allegedly fails regulatory content requirements.

Mississippi Chemical Corporation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1986-03-25(b)

We conclude that the allegation that the EEOC has not complied with the Shell Oil interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3) does not state a claim that the EEOC lacks a statutory mandate to investigate.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to investigate a charge without first deciding whether it was timely filed, and timeliness is not decided in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellee, v. OCEAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant · filed 1986-04-10(b)

We determine, however, that EEOC is not required to resolve whether a charge was timely filed as a prerequisite to its being able to conduct an investigation on that charge. Nor is the timely filing of a charge a matter to be considered by the district court in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to investigate individual discrimination charges against state or local government employers and issue subpoenas before referring a case to the Attorney General for litigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Board of Public Education · filed 1986-05-30(f)(1)

Although the EEOC’s authority under § 707 was transferred back to the Attorney General, it retained its § 706 power to investigate governmental entities. ... This includes, of course, the ability to investigate and issue subpoenas.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) applies to filing a discrimination complaint against a state agency, but does not restrict EEOC subpoena enforcement proceedings.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Missouri, Department of Social Services · filed 1986-08-29(f)(1)

But, this cited provision applies to the actual filing of a civil complaint in federal district court. It contains no language that suggests, either directly or indirectly, that it applies to a subpoena enforcement proceeding.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) reserves civil actions against government respondents to the Attorney General after failed conciliation, but allows the EEOC to enforce investigative subpoenas against them.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Illinois State Tollway Authority · filed 1986-09-03(f)(1)

We hold that under §§ 706 and 710 of Title VII the EEOC has the authority to enforce its investigative subpoenas against state and local government agencies.

Delayed notice of a charge under § 2000e-5(b) does not bar an EEOC suit when the employer shows no substantial prejudice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wayside World Corp. · filed 1986-09-15(b)

Since the defendant has alleged no substantial prejudice, failure of the EEOC to serve notice of the charge upon Wayside does not cause the complaint to be time barred, either statutorily or for laches.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline cannot be raised as a defense to enforcement of an EEOC investigative subpoena.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee, v. TEMPEL STEEL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant · filed 1987-03-20(e)

We therefore join those courts that have determined that a timeliness defense may not be raised to block enforcement of an EEOC subpoena.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to notify an employer of a filed charge within 10 days, but requires no separate notice of an investigation when no additional charge is required.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1988-05-19(b)

The Commission has no general duty to apprise an employer of the course or focus of its investigation. Rather, its specific duty is only to serve a notice of the charge on the employer within 10 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14a. If, as here, no charge is required, the EEOC is under no separate or additional obligation to inform the employer of the suspected discrimination it is investigating.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a discrimination charge to give the employer sufficient notice of the allegations; these charges met that requirement for enforcement of EEOC subpoenas.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co. · filed 1991-05-21(b)

The court concludes that these charges clearly provided sufficient notice for Grinned to (1) discover the allegations against it; (2) investigate on its own and voluntarily comply with Title VII; and (3) be alerted to the range of personnel records which should be kept for purposes of the Commission’s investigation.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not allow the EEOC to enforce an investigative subpoena after it issues a determination and right to sue letter on the charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 1999-03-10(b)

In sum, the EEOC’s authority to issue and enforce the document subpoena expired with the issuance of its Determination and the right to sue letter. Thus, the EEOC no longer has the authority to pursue its administrative subpoena enforcement action as a part of its investigation into Morgan's charge and hence the application to enforce the subpoena must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate charges of discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Med-National, Inc. · filed 1999-05-04(b)

Congress not only has authorized but requires the EEOC to investigate charges of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate every charge, though an investigation may take less than 180 days.

Simler v. Harrison County Hospital · filed 2000-08-28(b)

Following these other district courts within the Seventh Circuit, we agree with the Tesfaye conclusion that an investigation, short of 180 days, can satisfy the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) that the Commission investigate every charge filed.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate a charge but leaves the manner and extent of the investigation to the agency’s discretion.

Newsome v. EEOC · filed 2002-08-06(b)

Here, although Title VII provides that the EEOC “shall make an investigation” of a charge filed, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), it does not prescribe the manner for doing so.

The EEOC's failure to carry out its duties after a valid charge is filed does not bar the employee's Title VII claim.

Edelman v. Lynchburg Col · filed 2002-08-29(b)

Once a valid charge has been filed, a simple failure by the EEOC to fulfill its statutory duties regarding the charge does not preclude a plaintiff's Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5 does not require a claimant to cooperate with the EEOC’s investigation as a condition of bringing a private Title VII suit.

Doe, Jane v. Oberweis Dairy · filed 2006-07-28(f)(1)

Although neither the regulations nor Title VII makes cooperation a condition of the complainant’s being able to sue, the Tenth Circuit has decided that failure to cooperate in good faith is a bar to suit.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s investigation mandate is satisfied when an EEOC official determines that the agency cannot complete administrative processing within 180 days before issuing an early right-to-sue letter.

Krause v. Turnberry Country Club · filed 2008-04-17(b)

Unlike the Simler court, this Court finds persuasive the Berry court’s conclusion that the determination by an EEOC official satisfies 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)’s investigation mandate.

Section 2000e-5(b) treats the EEOC charge, rather than a questionnaire, as the filing that gives a respondent notice of a discrimination claim.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich · filed 2008-05-27(b)

Under Title VII, however, “it is the charge rather than the questionnaire that matters.” ... Assertions in the questionnaire, without more, are not enough to put the IGB on notice that it was being charged.

Section 2000e-5(b) authorizes the EEOC to investigate employment discrimination charges and determine whether reasonable cause exists.

Standing Rock Housing Authority v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2008-11-10(b)

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The statutory framework of Title VII makes it clear that the EEOC is authorized to investigate charges of employment discrimination to determine whether reasonable cause exists. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not end the EEOC’s authority to investigate a charge when the charging party receives a right-to-sue notice and files a private action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2009-03-03(f)(1)

Finally, with respect to the Hearst decision, Hearst held that the EEOC was divested of authority even though nothing in § 706(f)(1) of Title VII indicates that the EEOC’s investigatory powers over a charge cease when the charging party files a private action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not end the EEOC’s authority to investigate a charge and subpoena relevant information when the charging party receives a right-to-sue notice and files a private action.

Eeoc v. Fedex Corp · filed 2009-03-03(f)(1)

For all of these reasons, we hold that the EEOC retains the authority to issue an administrative subpoena against an employer even after the charging party has been issued a right-to-sue notice and instituted a private action based upon that charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not require the EEOC to investigate a consistently alleged date of discrimination further when it has no reason to doubt that date.

Tillbery v. Kent Island Yacht Club, Inc. · filed 2012-01-19(b)

It was given no inkling of reason to question Tillbery’s claim that the discrimination occurred in July 2006, and without any reason to doubt the facts as claimed multiple times by Tillbery, even when represented by counsel, we cannot conclude that the EEOC’s investigation was not reasonable.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a discrimination charge concerning a particular person or entity before the EEOC may investigate.

EEOC v. Randstad · filed 2012-07-24(b)

Each statute authorizes the EEOC to investigate instances of discrimination, but only if a charge of discrimination has been made with respect to a particular per- son or entity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

Section 2000e-5 does not permit judicial review of the adequacy of the EEOC’s investigation in an enforcement action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. BOK Financial Corp. · filed 2014-01-28

The adequacy of the EEOC investigation is non justiciable as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate a discrimination charge before suing; a nationwide claim requires evidence of a nationwide investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. · filed 2014-03-10(b)

... it ignores the fact that the absence of a nationwide pre-suit investigation is a defense to the EEOC’s nationwide pattern-or-practice claim.

Section 2000e-5 does not end the EEOC’s authority to investigate a charge when the charging parties receive right-to-sue notices, bring a private suit, or lose that suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2015-05-01(f)(1)

I find the reasoning of Federal Express to be more persuasive and conclude that the issuance of right-to-sue notices, complainants’ civil suit, and the judgment in favor of Union Pacific do not divest the EEOC of authority to continue its investigation.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate a charge before suing; courts may review whether an investigation occurred, but not its sufficiency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sterling Jewelers Inc. · filed 2015-09-09(b)

The sole question for judicial review is whether the EEOC conducted an investigation.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate a discrimination charge but does not prescribe investigative techniques or standards.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AutoZone, Inc. · filed 2015-11-04(b)

The Act requires the EEOC to conduct “an investigation” when it receives a charge of an unlawful employment practice (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)), but it does not mandate any particular investigative techniques or standards.

Section 2000e-5 requires the EEOC to notify an employer within ten days after an EEOC charge is filed.

Herron-Williams v. Alabama State University · filed 2020-02-07(b), (e)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (e)(1), the EEOC is required to notify an employer of the filing of an EEOC charge within ten days of filing, which would require notification by March 19, 2015, and March 20, 2015, respectively.

The EEOC’s failure to notify an employer of a charge within ten days does not bar an enforcement action unless the employer shows prejudice from the delay.

EEOC v. Vantage Drilling Company · filed 2020-04-03(e)(1)

But the agency’s failure to provide notice of the charge within ten days does not per se violate due process or bar the filing of an enforcement action. Instead, the employer must demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the delay.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ties a person’s right to intervene in an EEOC action to a charge first filed with the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1973-10-05(f)(1)

Thus, the statutory language which speaks of the “person or persons aggrieved” encompasses the concept of an original charge having been first filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits the Commission to seeking permissive intervention once the charging party has filed suit after receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1974-02-25(f)(1)

Thus we conclude that, once the charging party has filed suit pursuant to a “right to sue” notice, the Commission is relegated to its right of permissive intervention.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to seek permissive intervention, which a court may deny when the request comes late, the case has advanced, and the plaintiff is adequately represented.

Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co. · filed 1974-02-27(f)(1)

Secondly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has moved to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1) (permissive intervention). ... There is no question but that the requested intervention is permissive in nature, and that the Court must weigh the many competing factors involved before deciding whether or not intervention would be appropriate. ... Considering the late date of the proposed intervention, the progress made in readying the issue for resolution and the adequacy of plaintiff’s representation, this Court will apply the holding of Patterson and deny the Commission’s motion to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to limit EEOC intervention to particular issues.

Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1974-05-29(f)(1)

The district court’s discretion, at least under Rule 24(b), to grant or deny an application for permissive intervention includes discretion to limit intervention to particular issues. ... We perceive no reason why the district court’s discretion under § 2000e-5(f) (1) should differ in this regard.

Section 2000e-5 gives a person aggrieved a right to intervene when the alleged discrimination falls within an EEOC charge, regardless of who filed the charge.

United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc. · filed 1974-06-07(f)(1)

The court concludes that §§ 707(e) and 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-6(e) and 2000e-5, confer upon some petitioners a right to intervene within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(1), F.R.Civ.P. This statutory right is provided to a “person or persons aggrieved” within the meaning of Title VII. In this context, the term refers to those individuals with respect to whom alleged discrimination by the defendants is within the scope of a charge which has heretofore been presented to the EEOC, without regard to whether such charge was filed by them, by fellow employees with similar complaints, by an organization on their behalf, or by a member of the EEOC, and without regard to whether or not they are named plaintiffs or actual or putative class members in pending litigation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person an unconditional right to intervene in any suit brought by the EEOC.

Equal Emp. Op. Com'n v. BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS, ETC. · filed 1974-11-26(f)(1)

The proper interpretation, in this court's view, is, therefore, that the statute grants the person aggrieved an unconditional right to intervene in any case brought by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not allow intervention as an aggrieved person based solely on a consent decree’s adverse effect on existing contractual rights.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1974-12-19(f)(1)

We are satisfied that in any case the statutory term “aggrieved” is not intended to encompass the aggrievement which one may feel by reason of the adverse effect upon his existing contractual rights and practices which a decree granting the relief sought by the Commission’s suit may have.

An aggrieved person has an unconditional right to intervene in any civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers of America, Local 857 · filed 1974-11-26(f)(1)

The proper interpretation, in this court’s view, is, therefore, that the statute grants the person aggrieved an unconditional right to intervene in any case brought by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to intervene in a private Title VII action upon certification that the case is of general public importance, without establishing an independent jurisdictional basis.

Stuart v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 1975-02-06(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), supra allows the court to permit intervention by the EEOC upon certification by the Commission that the case is of general public importance. It is clear from a reading of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) that Congress has obviated the need for the Commission to establish an independent jurisdictional base by satisfying any of the jurisdictional prerequisites which might be required if the EEOC were seeking to initiate the action, instead of to merely intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee an absolute right to intervene in an EEOC civil action, subject to a timely application.

Maudra NEVILLES Et Al., Appellants, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and Union Electric Company, Appellees · filed 1975-03-03(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), an aggrieved employee has an absolute right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s statutory right to intervene does not extend to claims in a section 707 suit that did not follow section 706's administrative process.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Air Lines · filed 1975-05-12(f)(1)

This action was not brought under section 706, however, but under section 707, which provides only for suits to be brought in federal court by the Attorney General, contains no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies, and gives no explicit right of intervention to private parties. The claims of the appellants, with the exception of Flores, were not the subject of administrative proceedings, and did not follow the route prescribed by section 706. The statutory right of intervention that attaches by virtue of section 706 is therefore not applicable to these claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved persons a right to intervene in an EEOC action under § 706, but that right does not extend to a § 707 pattern or practice action.

United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries · filed 1975-08-18(f)(1)

Section 706(f)(1), which, as pertinent, contains the procedures for filing charges with the EEOC and the filing of lawsuits by the Commission or charging parties when conciliation fails, confers upon the "person or persons aggrieved" a right to intervene in a civil action brought thereunder by the Commission. ... Specifically, we hold that intervention as of right was not conferred in this proceeding by any act of Congress. We do so because it is plain from a careful examination of the government's complaint that this was not in substance a § 706 action, but rather a "pattern or practice" action authorized by § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, which the EEOC was empowered to institute by virtue of the transfer of functions outlined in § 707(c).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved persons a right to intervene in an EEOC action under that section, but does not confer that right in a pattern-or-practice action under § 2000e-6.

United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc. · filed 1975-08-18(f)(1)

Specifically, we hold that intervention as of right was not conferred in this proceeding by any act of Congress.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) makes EEOC intervention in a private Title VII action discretionary; a court may deny a delayed motion when intervention could delay the case.

Blowers v. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. · filed 1975-12-10(f)(1)

EEOC sensibly concedes that under the language of the statute and under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b), its right to intervene is permissive, not absolute. ... In view of the 21 months that went by before EEOC filed its motion although it was aware of the cases almost from the start, the state of discovery when the motion was made, the possibility of delay, and the continued permission EEOC has to participate as amicus, the district judge could properly deny the motion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a charging party who intervened in an EEOC suit to continue the claim after the EEOC's suit is dismissed for jurisdictional defects, without obtaining a Right to Sue letter.

Eeoc v. Intern. Bro. of Elec. Wkrs. · filed 1981-01-20(f)(1)

Accordingly, we find that § 706(f)(1) grants this court jurisdiction over intervenor Goodman's claim against the International even though the EEOC's suit has been dismissed for jurisdictional defects and the intervenor has not obtained a Right to Sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require a second right-to-sue letter when the EEOC issued one prematurely but the 180-day period has since expired.

Allen v. Schwab Rehabilitation Hospital · filed 1981-02-25(f)(1)

Now the remaining 36 days of the 180 day period have expired. This Court will not require Allen to engage in the pointless formality of obtaining a second right to sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a charging party who intervened in an EEOC suit to continue litigating after that suit is dismissed for jurisdictional defects, without obtaining a Right to Sue letter.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1981-01-20(f)(1)

Accordingly, we find that § 706(f)(1) grants this court jurisdiction over intervenor Goodman’s claim against the International even though the EEOC’s suit has been dismissed for jurisdictional defects and the intervenor has not obtained a Right to Sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows aggrieved persons to intervene in certain enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General and allows the Attorney General to intervene in qualifying actions brought by aggrieved persons.

Nash v. City of Oakwood · filed 1982-03-25(f)(1)

However, an examination of that section indicates that the power of intervention conferred therein is limited to certain situations which are not reflected in the present case. For example, aggrieved persons are given the right to intervene in enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. However, the present action is not an enforcement action brought by the Attorney General, and thus, granting intervention on that basis would be inappropriate. The remaining portion of § 2000e-5(f)(l) permits intervention by the Attorney General in actions which are brought by an aggrieved party, and are deemed to be of “general public importance.” While this section might permit the Attorney General, under proper circumstances, to intervene in the present action, it does not confer such a .right upon the proposed intervenor, Raymond Jordan. Thus, there is no unconditioned right to intervention, granted by statute, which is applicable in the present action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved party a right to intervene when the EEOC brought the action.

Leach v. Standard Register Co. · filed 1982-05-14(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-...5(f)(1) does however provide for intervention of right by an aggrieved party, but only when the action is commenced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This action was not so instituted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) precludes a charging party who did not intervene in an EEOC action from suing individually after that action ends in a consent decree.

Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. · filed 1983-01-17(f)(1)

We read Sec. 706(f)(1) in these circumstances to preclude suits by individuals who are charging parties, but who have not intervened in the pending EEOC action in their behalf, once the EEOC action has been concluded by a consent decree.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits an affected person to intervene in a Title VII action brought by the government; a person who does not intervene is not a party to that action.

United States v. County of Oconto · filed 1991-11-25(f)

While 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) provides that Heider could have intervened in this action, he did not. Heider is not a party to this action, and Oconto County has cited no authority which would give this court the power to dismiss this action against a nonparty.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person an unconditional right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC, including one against a private employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Century I, L.C. · filed 1992-06-25(f)(1)

Thus, the statute provides an unconditional right of intervention to aggrieved persons in cases brought by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the person on whose behalf the EEOC sues an unconditional right to intervene.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. · filed 1994-12-14(f)(1)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) confers such a right on Ms. Moore.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives persons aggrieved, including employees who filed EEOC charges, an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s Title VII action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rekrem, Inc. · filed 2001-04-06(f)(1)

Because the Tazul intervenors are clearly persons aggrieved under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the court finds that these parties have an unconditional right to intervene in this action with regard to the Title VII claims contained in the proposed Tazul complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a person who filed an EEOC charge an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s civil action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal · filed 2003-07-29(f)(1)

It is undisputed that Ashraf filed a charge with the EECO and that she is a person aggrieved under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Accordingly, Ashraf has an unconditional right to intervene in this action with regard to her Title VII claims and her motion to intervene in this action is therefore granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved employees a right to intervene in an EEOC action, but an employee who has already brought her own Title VII suit cannot also intervene of right in a duplicative action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Von Maur, Inc. · filed 2006-07-10(f)(1)

The Court agrees with Von Maur that Ward is not entitled to intervene of right. Ward filed a charge with the EEOC, requested and received a Right-to-Sue letter, and has initiated her own Title VII action. The enforcement provisions of Title VII set up a regime in which, generally, if the EEOC sues first the aggrieved employees may intervene of right, if the employee sues first the EEOC may seek permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b), but either way, ordinarily there is a single lawsuit.

An employee’s right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action is procedural and does not prevent enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate the employee’s claims.

EEOC v. Woodmen of the World · filed 2007-03-09(f)(1)

An employee indisputably has a right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), but she also has a right to contract for an arbitral forum within which to litigate her claims. ... Considering the Title VII enforcement regime as a whole, as well as the complete analysis in the Waffle House opinion, we conclude that neither Title VII nor Waffle House precludes Rollins from arbitrating her dispute with Woodmen, and that the FAA compels her to arbitrate the dispute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee the right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action, but that procedural right does not prevent enforcement of her agreement to arbitrate her claims.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Louella Rollins v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, And/or Omaha Woo · filed 2007-03-09(f)(1)

An employee indisputably has a right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1), but she also has a right to contract for an arbitral forum within which to litigate her claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved persons a right to timely intervene in a Title VII suit brought by the EEOC or Attorney General.

United States v. Municipio De Vega Alta · filed 2007-05-15(f)(1)

However, by the time Molina, Garcia and Bidot filed their Intervenor Complaint, the United States had already begun a sex-based discrimination action against the Municipality pursuant to Title VII, which gives the persons aggrieved an unconditional right to intervene in a federal law suit brought against defendant by the Commission or the Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Thus, Intervenor Plaintiffs Molina, García and Bidot’s intervention in the Title VII sex-based discrimination claim filed by the United States is not untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person who did not file an EEOC charge to intervene in an EEOC action when she alleges similar discrimination by the same actors during the same period as the charging parties.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Outback Steak House of Florida, Inc. · filed 2007-11-02(f)(1)

Based on this circuit’s application of the single filing rule, I hold that a plaintiff who failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, but who asserts she was subject to similar discrimination by the same actors during the same time frame as the charging parties, is an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of section 2000e — (f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a person whose charge underlies an EEOC civil action an unconditional right to intervene in that action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Merchants State Bank · filed 2008-04-22(f)(1)

Because Engel’s motion is timely, the court must consider whether Engel has an unconditional right to intervene under § 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Here, Engel is the aggrieved person because he is the person who filed a charge with the EEOC and the EEOC’s lawsuit is based upon his charge. Therefore, under the facts of this case, Engel has an unconditional right to intervene in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC suit only to aggrieved persons who previously filed a charge with the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fry's Electronics, Inc. · filed 2011-03-17(f)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff-intervenor Rios does not have an unconditional right to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in an EEOC discrimination action, but that right does not extend to a separate FMLA claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. · filed 2012-04-23(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a person aggrieved by an act of discrimination “shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by” the EEOC, and Grams’ motion was granted. ... Grams’ Motion To Intervene was granted pursuant to F.R.C.P. 24(a)(1), because he had a statutory right to intervene. That right was related to his ADA claim, not to his FMLA claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person an unconditional right to intervene in a Title VII action brought by the Commission or Attorney General, but does not give an unconditional right to add claims they did not bring.

United States v. Policía De Puerto Rico · filed 2012-06-13(f)(1)

Section 706 of Title VII confers such an unconditional right as it provides that “the person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or the Attorney General.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). However, said statute does not confer an unconditional right to assert claims in addition to those already presented by the Government.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives aggrieved persons the right to intervene in an enforcement action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Pony Pizza, Inc. · filed 2013-08-09(f)(1)

The court agrees with the EEOC that Johnson-Hampton is accorded the right, as an “aggrieved person,” to intervene in this action by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period prevents a claimant from intervening based on another person’s charge when the claimant’s filing period expired before that person’s claim arose.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Pony Pizza, Inc. · filed 2016-03-28(e)

The 180-day filing period for Washington, Ranson, and Moton’s claims expired before Johnson-Hampton’s, the claim that ultimately resulted- in this suit, arose. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). For this reason, and because Johnson-Hampton’s charge could not possibly have put- Stone Pony on notice of their claims, Washington, Ranson, and Moton should not have been, permitted to intervene in this EEOC action and will be removed as Intervenor Plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action regardless of whether the employee’s claim is subject to arbitration.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. PJ Utah, LLC · filed 2016-05-18(f)(1)

The enforcement provision of Title VII states that “the person . . . aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This language unambiguously gives employees an unconditional right to intervene in EEOC enforcement actions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee an unconditional right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Lowe v. STME, LLC · filed 2019-09-12(f)(1)

The language of § 2000e-5(f)(1) unambiguously gives employees an unconditional right to intervene in EEOC enforcement actions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee a right to intervene in a Title VII action, but the request must be timely.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bay Club Fairbanks Ranch, LLC · filed 2021-03-19(f)(1)

Though Title VII expressly provides an aggrieved employee with a right to intervene, the intervention request must still be timely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action.

U.S. EEOC v. Cappo Management XXIX, Inc. · filed 2021-04-01(f)(1)

Title VII provides individuals a right to intervene. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5 (f)(1) (“[T]he person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC] . . . .”). ... The Court thus determines that Plaintiff-Intervenor has a right to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene when the EEOC sues an employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Georgia Foods Inc. · filed 2022-04-13(f)(1)

Additionally, “[u]nder Title VII, where the EEOC has filed an action against an employer, the person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in the civil action.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mayflower Seafood of Goldsboro, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-636-BO, 2016 WL 9782116, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)); ... Accordingly, the undersigned will allow the Motion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in an EEOC enforcement action to protect their own interests.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2023-01-05(f)(1)

Ms. Perez has always possessed the right to intervene, as the Court has recently reminded her.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a person who filed an EEOC charge an unconditional right to intervene in the EEOC’s civil action.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. PRC INDUSTRIES, INC. CORP · filed 2023-06-27(f)(1)

The Court is satisfied that the Woodses have an absolute right to intervene because they have an unconditional right to intervene as set forth in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boxwood Hotels, LLC · filed 2025-06-17(f)(1)

And under Title VII, “the person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” ... The Court therefore concludes that Bringuel’s intervention is both timely and appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Genesh, Inc. · filed 2025-07-18(f)(1)

Section 706(f)(1) provides that “[t]he person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC] Commissioner.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Lassen is an aggrieved person under Title VII, with a right to intervene.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee to bring a Title VII suit after final arbitration of a grievance under a collective-bargaining agreement.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. · filed 1974-02-19(f)(1)

There is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction.

Title VII claims may be subject to compulsory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Joan Chason ALFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. and Don L. Harris, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1991-08-02

Because both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced by the EEOC, compare 29 U.S.C. § 626 with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable remedies for Title VII claims that arbitration cannot provide.

Borenstein v. Tucker · filed 1991-01-09(g)

Similarly, this court will not displace access to the courts for claims brought pursuant to Title VII. ... First, arbitral boards do not have the power to award broad equitable relief which courts have under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5’s right to bring a Title VII action in federal court is not waived by a collective bargaining agreement that ends arbitration when an employee files a state discrimination charge.

Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities · filed 2008-07-07(f)(1)

Richardson remained free to file a charge with the EEOC, as she did, and to pursue a Title VII action in federal court, as she has. She did not prospectively waive any of her Title VII rights, nor did her union do so on her behalf.

Section 2000e-5(b) restricts the use of evidence from EEOC proceedings without the parties’ consent, but that restriction does not apply to Civil Service Commission proceedings.

Abrams v. Johnson · filed 1974-02-21(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) prohibits the use of evidence developed in the non-adversary proceedings of the EEOC unless the parties consent. This prohibition is not contained in section 717 of Title VII, and it does not apply to the Civil Service Commission.

An EEOC probable cause determination is admissible in a Title VII lawsuit regardless of other claims or whether a judge or jury tries the case.

Jeanette J. PLUMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN INTERNATIONAL HOTELS COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-12-03

We therefore hold that the plaintiff has a right to introduce an EEOC probable cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit, regardless of what other claims are asserted, or whether the case is tried before a judge or jury.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the use of statements made during EEOC conciliation as evidence in a later proceeding without the consent of the persons concerned.

Joseph v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 2005-09-16(b)

Because the excerpted portion of the Kemp Notice clearly reiterated something “said or done” by the EEOC, it was inadmissible “as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.”

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay awards against state employers despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer · filed 1976-06-28(g)

Our analysis begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case the "threshold fact of congressional authorization," id., at 672, to sue the State as employer is clearly present. ... We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.

Section 2000e-5(f) authorizes Title VII suits against respondents in federal district court and makes Congress’s abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity clear.

Iris I. Varner, and United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee v. Illinois State University · filed 1998-10-13(f)

These provisions make it unmistakably clear, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fitzpatrick, that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5 does not waive federal sovereign immunity for an employer’s declaratory judgment action against the EEOC challenging its conduct.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1999-08-12

The inquiry then turns to the employment discrimination statutes invoked in Circuit City’s complaint. And, as with the statutes already discussed, none of the employment discrimination statutes unequivocally and clearly provide for an action such as this one against the United States. Thus, none of the employment discrimination statutes on which Circuit City relies in paragraph (4) of its complaint provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for the type of action here presented.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1)’s back pay remedy, as incorporated into GERA, makes a state employer responsible for payment and supports abrogation of state sovereign immunity.

Alaska v. EEOC · filed 2009-05-01(g)(1)

GERA's provisions, entitling state employees to "back pay ... payable by the employer," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 2000e-16c, unmistakably express Congress's intent to allow suits against states for damages.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for Title VII claims in federal court.

HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS v. TYROME DORNELL GRANT, SR. · filed 2026-06-10(f)(3)

Title VII claims contain a waiver of immunity in federal court. See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(3); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (96 SCt 2666, 49 LE2d 614) (1976); Collier v. Clayton County Comm. Serv. Bd., 236 F Supp2d 1345, 1370(III)(A)(2) (N. D. Ga. 2002).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) and (f)(3) do not give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over private Title VII actions; state courts may hear them too.

Bennun v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF RUTGERS, ETC. · filed 1976-05-21(f)(1), (f)(3)

It is clear that neither the language giving rise to the cause of action by the person aggrieved nor the language investing the district courts with jurisdiction over these causes of action either expressly or by necessary implication vests the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over these matters.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) grants jurisdiction to federal district courts without making that jurisdiction exclusive.

Patzer v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System · filed 1984-01-19(f)(1)

In 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the grant of jurisdiction to district courts is not, by its terms, exclusive.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal district courts jurisdiction over Title VII actions without excluding state court jurisdiction.

Colleen Donnelly, Cross-Appellant v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1989-07-17(f)(3)

Because we find that jurisdiction over Title VII claims is vested in both state and federal court, we reject Yellow Freight’s argument that the state court filing did not toll the 90-day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over Title VII actions without excluding concurrent state-court jurisdiction.

Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly · filed 1990-04-17(f)(3)

Title VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant who receives an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a timely Title VII action in a Georgia superior court.

Collins v. Department of Transportation · filed 1993-03-19(f)(1)

We thus hold that, based on the federal statute and Donnelly, the superior courts in Georgia have subject matter jurisdiction over timely Title VII claims filed pursuant to EEOC notification to the claimant that, the federal prerequisites for suit having been fulfilled, suit may be filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal district courts jurisdiction over Title VII actions without making that jurisdiction exclusive.

Salazar v. United States Postal Service · filed 1996-07-01(f)(3)

With respect to jurisdiction, § 2000e-5 then states only that federal district courts “shall have jurisdiction” over actions brought pursuant to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Significantly, the provision does not specify exclusive federal jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a state court to hear an ADA claim filed where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Tavares v. Barbour Threads, Inc., No. Cv99-0153332s (Nov. 9, 1999) · filed 1999-11-09(f)(3)

Tavares brought her action in the state court in the judicial district of Waterbury, which is the judicial district in which unlawful employment practices were CT Page 14788 alleged to have been committed and where Tavares was employed by Barbour Threads. Therefore, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides a federal forum for Title VII claims but does not expressly provide for suit in state court.

Brewer v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ILL. · filed 2003-06-17(f)(3)

Neither Title VII nor section 1983 provides that plaintiffs may sue in state court. Those two statutes, by their terms, provide a right of action in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 1988 (2000).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides a federal forum for Title VII claims but does not expressly provide for suits in state court, where concurrent jurisdiction rests on a presumption.

Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2003-06-17(f)(3)

Neither Title VII nor section 1983 provides that plaintiffs may sue in state court. Those two statutes, by their terms, provide a right of action in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—5(f)(3), 1988 (2000). Because of “the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system,” state courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over claims under Title VII and section 1983.

When incorporated into the waiver for federal employees’ Title VII claims, § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not authorize suits against the United States in state court.

Bullock v. Napolitano · filed 2012-01-23(f)(3)

While § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not man- date that suits be filed in federal courts, it likewise contains no language authorizing Title VII suits to be filed in state courts.

Section 2000e-5(f), as applied to federal employees, does not authorize the District of Columbia Superior Court to hear Title VII claims against federal employers.

Day v. Price · filed 2018-04-02(f)

ln sum, Title lVll’s “complete silence” on whether the Superio_r Court of the District-of Columbia may hear Title VII claims against federal employers leaves the-sovereign immunity of the United States intact.

Section 2000e-5(f) does not authorize the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to hear Title VII claims against federal employers.

Day v. Azar · filed 2018-04-02(f)

Section 2000e-5(f) clarifies the scope of the waiver by specifying which courts shall have jurisdiction over Title VII claims. ... Accordingly, it is not expressly authorized to hear claims against federal employers.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits state courts to hear Title VII claims against federal employers when applied through § 2000e-16.

Aguilar v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency · filed 2019-05-29(f)(3)

To paraphrase Gomez-Perez, that § 2000e-16 references § 2000e-5 does not mean that § 2000e-5 must surmount the same high hurdle as § 2000e-16. The language of § 2000e-16(c), coupled with Yellow Freight, is sufficient for this Court to conclude that Congress intended for federal employees to bring an action in the same manner, and in the same jurisdictions, as private sector employees.

Section 2000e-5(f) does not give state courts jurisdiction over federal employees’ Title VII claims against the United States.

Jordan v. Ormond · filed 2022-06-01(f)

And laws proscribing discrimination in federal employment do not confer jurisdiction upon state courts to hear permissible claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits state courts to hear Rehabilitation Act claims.

John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute · filed 2023-07-31(f)(3)

Because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) is also the enforcement provision for the RA, see 29 U.S.C. § ... 794a, we agree with Massey that states courts are authorized to hear cases asserting claims under the RA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) grants jurisdiction over Title VII actions to United States district courts and United States courts of places subject to U.S. jurisdiction, but not to the D.C. Superior Court.

Berry v. Buttigieg · filed 2025-03-19(f)(3)

“Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f). The D.C. Superior Court is neither a district court nor a United States court.

A district court applied a state limitations period to a private suit under § 2000e-5.

Clayton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. · filed 1976-08-03(f)

Section 706 of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) sets a timetable for the aggrieved person to cause EEOC to commence its investigation. ... It is well-established that in a private civil rights action, where Congress has not provided a statute of limitations, the state statute applied to similar litigation will be applied to the federal action. ... There is simply no valid reason for not requiring a private party to file his action within, say, a three year period.

Section 2000e-5 sets the deadlines for filing an EEOC charge and a Title VII civil action; a state statute of limitations does not bar an action filed within those deadlines.

Wilson v. Continental Group, Inc. · filed 1978-05-12

The charge must be filed within 180 days after the discriminatory employment practice occurred, or within 300 days after such practice if the complaining party has initially begun proceedings with an appropriate state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Title VII also provides that a complaining party may bring a civil action in federal district court if such action is begun within ninety days after receipt from EEOC of appropriate notification that conciliation efforts have been unsuccessful, usually accomplished by a right-to-sue notice letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Numerous cases have held that state statutes of limitations are not applicable in determining whether a private individual has lost his right of action under Title VII through the passage of time. ... Having complied with the time limitations of Title VII, the plaintiff’s action based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., is not time barred.

Section 2000e-5 supplies the time limits for private Title VII suits, so state statutes of limitations do not apply.

David L. KIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-07-19

We conclude that Title VII does not borrow state statutes of limitations because the time limits for filing a charge and giving notice to the employer are a Congressionally established statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5 supplies the filing and suit deadlines for Title I ADA claims, so courts may not add a state statute of limitations.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. W.H. Braum, Inc. · filed 2003-10-28

There is no gap in Title VII’s scheme such that a state statute of limitations should be imported to apply to aggrieved employees’ claims. Congress has explicitly provided time limitations within the statute that work together to provide a particular time frame in which personal actions may be brought under the ADA.

An EEOC enforcement action may be barred when the agency unreasonably delays bringing suit and the delay prejudices the employer's defense.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American National Bank · filed 1976-08-31

As alluded to above, the elements of the affirmative defense, here denominated as “in the nature of laches,” (regardless of its source in general equity or the Administrative Procedure Act) are: (1) unreasonable or unexplained delay in bringing proceedings and (2) resulting prejudice to the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day period does not bar an EEOC enforcement suit filed after that period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Western Metal Specialty, Inc. · filed 1976-11-10(f)(1)

The defendant’s alleged second jurisdictional defect is that the Commission failed to file suit within 180 days after the filing of charges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... This Court is persuaded by the great weight of authority that the 180-day limit does not bar the Commission’s suit here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue after 180 days but imposes no filing deadline on EEOC enforcement suits.

Occidental Life Insurance v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1977-06-20(f)(1)

The legislative history of § 706 (f) (1) thus demonstrates that the provision was intended to mean exactly what it seems to say: An aggrieved person unwilling to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings may institute a private lawsuit 180 days after a charge has been filed. The subsection imposes no limitation upon the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes EEOC enforcement suits without a rigid filing deadline, but unreasonable delay that prejudices the employer can bar a suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. · filed 1978-02-27(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the EEOC is empowered to bring a civil action to redress employment discrimination. ... Although the EEOC is not restricted by any rigid statutory time limits in bringing its actions, its enforcement powers are, nonetheless, limited by traditional equitable notices and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. ... There is, therefore, ample authority for the notion that the EEOC, despite the absence of specific statutory time limits, may not unreasonably delay enforcement without excuse, to the prejudice of the parties charged. ... It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court that the facts in this case constitute sufficient prejudice to satisfy the defense of laches and APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Section 2000e-5 permits equitable dismissal of delayed EEOC enforcement claims when the employer clearly establishes substantial and undue prejudice to its defense.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1979-03-14(f)(1)

We emphasize that under any of these theories a defendant must establish “with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy” that it has been substantially and unduly prejudiced in its ability to defend the lawsuit because of the EEOC’s delay.

Section 2000e-5 requires the EEOC to investigate charges promptly and, so far as practicable, make a reasonable-cause determination within 120 days.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bray Lumber Co. · filed 1979-09-20(b)

It is indeed difficult to imagine what circumstances would necessitate such a dramatic departure from the clear mandate of the Act that an initial investigation and cause determination would have to be postponed until the time when evidence has been lost or is so stale and memories so faded as to be valueless. No explanation has been offered by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to seek relief for a group of aggrieved individuals without obtaining Rule 23 class certification.

General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1980-05-12(f)(1)

Its authority to bring such actions is in no way dependent upon Rule 23, and the Rule has no application to a § 706 suit.