42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give an employer enough information to understand the charge and participate fully in conciliation, but does not require disclosure of all underlying evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hibbing Taconite Co. · filed 2009-12-07(b)

Under the circumstances presented here, the Court agrees with the EEOC, that the conciliation requirement does not necessitate that the EEOC disclose all of the underlying evidence or information to the employer. Rather, the conciliation process requires that the EEOC provide the employer with sufficient information to assure that the employer knows the basis of the charge, and is able to participate in the conciliation process fully.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to attempt good-faith conciliation; inviting an employer to propose terms can satisfy that duty when the employer responds late with an inadequate offer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Supervalu, Inc. · filed 2009-12-15(b)

Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the EEOC failed to carry out its obligation to engage in good-faith conciliation efforts. The EEOC invited the defendants to engage in the conciliation process. However, the defendants responded long after the deadline indicated by the Commission. And when the defendants finally did respond, their offer was underwhelming.

Section 2000e-5(b) prevents information revealed during EEOC mediation from being disclosed in later proceedings, including EEOC investigations and litigation.

Logsdon v. Turbines, Inc. · filed 2010-10-20(b)

Information revealed while the EEOC is performing its informal mediation function cannot be revealed in subsequent proceedings, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, including those in which the EEOC performs its investigative and litigation functions.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars using conciliation communications to establish an alleged oral conciliation agreement in a subsequent proceeding without written consent.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Philip Services Corp. · filed 2011-03-04(b)

What was “said or done” during conciliation must be revealed to determine the existence of an oral agreement. Such disclosure is clearly prohibited in a subsequent proceeding to establish the existence of an oral conciliation agreement.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to tell an employer what practice allegedly harmed whom and give the employer an opportunity to discuss voluntary compliance before suing; courts may review whether it did so.

MacH Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n · filed 2015-04-29(b)

So the EEOC, to meet the statutory condition, must tell the employer about the claim—essentially, what practice has harmed which person or class—and must provide the employer with an opportunity to discuss the matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance. See also infra, at 13. If the Commission does not take those specified ac- tions, it has not satisfied Title VII’s requirement to at- tempt conciliation.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to make an actual attempt to engage an employer in conciliation before suing.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. OhioHealth Corp. · filed 2015-06-29(b)

But an unsupported demand letter such as the one involved here alone cannot logically Constitute an attempt to inform and engage in the conciliation- process. ... Given the foregoing, this Court concludes, that the EEOC has failed to show that it met the conciliation requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars disclosure of anything said or done during EEOC conciliation without the written consent of the persons concerned.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mach Mining, LLC · filed 2016-01-19(b)

Further, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the parties are BARRED from disclosing anything said or done during and/or as part of the informal methods of “conference, conciliation, and persuasion” in this matter without the written consent of the persons concerned.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the use of conciliation communications as evidence in a later proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Amsted Rail Co., Inc. · filed 2016-01-20(b)

As the content of these communications cannot be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), and there is no evidence the EEOC, Ingram or any other potential class member has consented to such use, the Court disregards this evidence other than to confirm that communication between the EEOC and Amsted occurred.

Section 2000e-5(b) keeps conciliation materials confidential and bars their use to challenge the EEOC’s conciliation efforts in a later suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Western Distributing Co. · filed 2016-11-21(b)

I also GRANT IN PART the EEOC’s motion to strike (ECF No. 31) because the filings in question contain materials that are statutorily required to remain confidential under § 2000e-5(b). I do not consider these confidential materials in deciding this motion.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars using conciliation proposals as evidence in a later proceeding without the concerned persons’ written consent and supports striking such material from the docket.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Int'l, Inc. · filed 2018-12-07(b)

Absent authority indicating otherwise, the Court is bound to disregard the letter as evidence and to strike the letter from the docket.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars public disclosure or use of conciliation communications as evidence without written consent; protected material may be stricken and sealed.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sol Mexican Grill LLC · filed 2019-11-12(b)

The Court finds that Defendants violation of the disclosure prohibition in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) shall result in such information being stricken from the pleadings and sealed so that it is not accessible to the public.

Section 2000e-5(b) protects information about EEOC conciliation from public disclosure and supports redacting it from court filings.

Franchitti v. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation · filed 2021-05-05(b)

The Court agrees that information concerning the conciliation process should be redacted from future filings.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars testimony about what transpired during the conciliation process.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-06-11(b)

Plaintiff is correct that Mr. Johnson is barred by law from disclosing via testimony what transpired during the conciliation process. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(b)’s confidentiality provision does not protect a finalized conciliation agreement from disclosure.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Company, The · filed 2022-08-08(b)

If such a finalized document exists, it should not be treated as conciliation material subject to the confidentiality provision of § 2000e–5(b) for purposes of the EEOC’s motion to quash.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not bar redacted evidence of an employer’s notice and participation in conciliation when the substance of the discussions remains confidential.

EEOC v. American Flange and Grief, Inc. · filed 2023-07-27(b)

Accordingly, § 2000e-5(b) does not bar admission of the redacted emails for the limited purpose of showing that O’Brien, representing Greif, confirmed receipt of a notice from the EEOC and engaged in conciliation discussions.

Section 2000e-5(b) makes statements in an EEOC investigation confidential, and unpublished statements cannot support a defamation claim.

Talley v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2024-10-22(b)

Statements that are part of an EEOC investigation are confidential. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b). If neither the EEOC nor the defaming party publishes them, they are not actionable for defamation. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars using confidential conciliation materials as evidence in a later proceeding; sealing them does not substitute for striking them.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-05-23(b)

Such a remedy would be contrary to the statutory text which provides that confidential materials may not be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.” § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(b) provides for EEOC investigation and conciliation of discrimination charges.

Hardy v. Potter · filed 2002-02-28(b)

One of the purposes of the requirement to file an EEO counseling and to bring the matter before the EEOC is to give that body an opportunity to investigate and attempt conciliation before a court action is commenced. ... The Court remands the matter as to the remaining claim of retaliation based on pervasive harassment.

Section 2000e-5(b)(1) prohibits the EEOC from publicly disclosing what was said or done during conciliation without written consent, limiting the detail available in pleadings about those efforts.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ready-Mix · filed 2026-06-25(b)(1)

Moreover, the applicable statute expressly prohibits the EEOC from publicly disclosing matters “said or done” during conciliation without “written consent of the persons concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1). This necessarily limits the detail available at the pleading stage regarding conciliation efforts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue over violations uncovered during its investigation, and courts do not review whether the investigation supported its decision to sue.

Caterpillar, Inc v. EEOC · filed 2005-05-27(f)(1)

If courts may not limit a suit by the EEOC to claims made in the administrative charge, they likewise have no business limiting the suit to claims that the court finds to be sup- ported by the evidence obtained in the Commission’s investigation. The existence of probable cause to sue is gen- erally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue over additional violations found during its investigation, and courts may not review whether the investigation supported its decision to sue.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Caterpillar, Inc., Defendant-Petitioner · filed 2005-05-27(f)(1)

If courts may not limit a suit by the EEOC to claims made in the administrative charge, they likewise have no business limiting the suit to claims that the court finds to be supported by the evidence obtained in the Commission’s investigation. The existence of probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.

Section 2000e-5 provides for EEOC investigation and attempted resolution of a discrimination charge and permits the EEOC to sue in its own name, but does not authorize it to enter a judgment resolving the employee’s dispute.

Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc. · filed 2004-05-13(b), (f)

Rather, once the employee files a discrimination claim against the employer before the EEOC, the EEOC begins an investigation, attempts to resolve any unlawful employment practice, and, if unsuccessful, files a civil action against the employer in its own name — not in the name of the employee. ... Accordingly, the EEOC has no power to enter any judgment resolving a dispute between employee or employer. ... We agree with the District Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day period governs how long an aggrieved party must wait during Commission conciliation; it does not set a deadline for the Commission to sue.

Equal Employ. Op. Com'n v. Bartenders Int. U., Loc. U. No. 41 · filed 1973-06-21(f)(1)

Accordingly the court finds that the 180 day requirement is only a period in which a private party must wait while the Commission attempts to conciliate. It does not define the period in which the Commission must commence suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day period sets how long a private party must wait while the Commission attempts conciliation; it does not limit when the Commission may sue.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bartenders International Union · filed 1973-06-21(f)(1)

Accordingly the court finds that the 180 day requirement is only a period in which a private party must wait while the Commission attempts to conciliate. It does not define the period in which the Commission must commence suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to sue after the first 30 days following a charge and sets no final deadline for its suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1973-08-27(f)(1)

First, no one may sue within the first 30 days after a charge is filed. Secondly, between the 30th day and the 180th day only the EEOC may sue. Thirdly, after the 180th day (if notice is given to the aggrieved employee) both the EEOC and the aggrieved employee may sue. There is no final time within which the EEOC must sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the Commission to intervene in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1973-09-12(f)(1)

To dismiss the instant action would not deprive the plaintiff a remedy as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) provides for the Commission’s intervention in a civil action brought by the aggrieved party.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day period gives aggrieved individuals another route to court; it does not bar a later EEOC enforcement suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eagle Iron Works · filed 1973-12-06(f)(1)

Suffice it to say that Eagle’s contention requires a tortuous reading of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) and also requires the Court to ignore the legislative history of the 1972 Act, which clearly indicates Congressional recognition of the fact that many cases take longer to process than 180 days and that the 180-day limitations period was intended to provide relief for aggrieved individuals by opening an alternative avenue to seek judicial redress, not solace to alleged discriminators by foreclosing court action by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge is not tolled by a union grievance that did not raise racial discrimination.

Ross v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1973-12-13(d)

As a result, this is not a case when either the facts or the policy behind the elimination of engrained employment discrimination compels a finding that the 180 day requirement for initiation of an EEOC complaint should be tolled. Although it is doubtful that the expiration of 180 days renders an otherwise viable claim stale, faded, or slumbering, this is a matter of Congressional intent which may not be disturbed by the courts. Accordingly, insofar as plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the remedies provided by Title VII, his claims are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day period does not bar the EEOC from filing suit after that period.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP. COM'N v. Hickey-Mitchell Co. · filed 1973-12-21(f)(1)

This statutory section which empowers the EEOC to bring a civil action against any respondent named in the administrative charge before the EEOC does not explicitly establish a period of limitation within which the EEOC must sue if it is to sue at all. The Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid one hundred and eighty day period is not a period after which the EEOC may not bring its action.

Section 2000e-5 requires the EEOC to have a valid charge against the defendants before filing suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McLean Trucking Co. · filed 1974-01-18(f)(1)

Since the three defendant unions were not named in the original charge filed by Mr. Brown with the Commission on September 21, 1970, or by any charge of any other employee of McLean prior to the filing of this suit, the plaintiff has not satisfied the necessary statutory prerequisites of 706(b) and 706(f)(1). Neither did E.E.O.C. have a valid and subsisting charge on which to base this suit when filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not bar the EEOC from suing more than 180 days after a charge is filed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Chestnut Run & Affiliated Facilities · filed 1974-03-29(f)(1)

Based primarily on these sources, I conclude that Congress did not intend to bar Commission suit after the passage of 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day period does not limit when the EEOC may bring suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Christiansburg Garment Co. · filed 1974-05-07(f)(1)

Although as noted in the Union Oil Company case, supra, persuasive arguments can be made in favor of either construction of the statute, upon consideration of the above cases this court finds itself in agreement with the line of authorities holding that the 180 day period was not intended as a time bar on the power of the EEOC to bring suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day period opens the time for an aggrieved person to sue but does not terminate the EEOC’s right to sue.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. CLEVELAND MILLS COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1974-08-19(f)(1)

We thus conclude that the 180-day period contained in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (1) is referable to the beginning of the time within which an aggrieved party may file a private action, but that its expiration does not finally terminate the Commission’s right of action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) imposes no 180-day deadline on the EEOC’s right to sue after conciliation fails.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appe · filed 1975-01-30(f)(1)

No explicit time limitation on the Commission's right to bring civil actions is mentioned in the subsection.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not bar the EEOC from suing more than 180 days after a charge is filed.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-02-14(f)(1)

The EEOC is not barred from basing a complaint on a charge filed more than 180 days prior to the EEOC’s suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day provision does not bar an EEOC enforcement action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Humko Products, Division of Kraftco Corp. · filed 1975-04-21(f)(1)

Neither the 180 day provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) nor the Tennessee statute of limitations bars the instant action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a government enforcement action more than 180 days after an EEOC charge is filed.

United States v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1975-04-30(f)(1)

This action was timely filed although more than 180 days had elapsed since Zamora filed his charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not bar the EEOC from filing an enforcement action more than 180 days after a discrimination charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Meyer Brothers Drug Company · filed 1975-06-30(f)(1)

In Hazel Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 74-1890, 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), another panel of this Court concluded that § 706(f)(1) is not a bar to EEOC enforcement action after 180 days. ... We adhere to that conclusion, which is in accord with the holdings of all four Courts of Appeals which have examined the issue.

After a charging party files a private suit, § 2000e-5(f)(1) leaves the EEOC only the option to intervene if the case is of general public importance.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Hills Passavant Hospital · filed 1975-11-03(f)(1)

Finally it appears to the Court that consistent with the legislative intent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, once a right-to-sue letter issues, and a private party institutes an action on his own behalf, the only recourse left to the EEOC is to intervene in the case if it is one of general public importance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the United States to sue as a plaintiff in a Title VII enforcement action.

United States v. City of St. Louis · filed 1976-04-09(f)(1)

Defendants' and intervenors' objections to the presence of the United States as plaintiff herein are without merit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day period does not limit when the EEOC may sue in its own name.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defend · filed 1976-05-11(f)(1)

Finding this avalanche of authority most persuasive, we adopt the rule that the 180-day language of Section 706(f)(1) does not constitute a limitation upon the EEOC’s ability to sue in its own name.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require the EEOC to sue within 180 days after an individual files a discrimination charge.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILSON AND COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1976-05-17(f)(1)

Like the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, we held that the Commission's authority to sue is not restricted to the 180-day period. ... Accordingly, Duval negates the primary reason relied on by the trial court in dismissing the action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to seek relief for discrimination against people other than the charging party when the allegations were investigated and conciliation was attempted before suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix · filed 1976-05-19(f)(1)

Further, when EEOC sues on its own behalf it is entitled to broad judicial relief that encompasses discrimination against persons other than the charging party, as long as all charges of discrimination are the subject of investigation and conciliation prior to initiation of the judicial action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require the EEOC to sue within 90 days after the charging party receives notice that conciliation has failed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc. · filed 1976-06-30(f)(1)

Although the March 25 orders in the instant case and in EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., supra, declined to rule on this point, this court now specifically holds that the EEOC is not required to bring an action on a charging party’s complaint within 90 days after the charging party has been notified that conciliation efforts have failed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the discriminatory act; an isolated refusal to hire does not extend that deadline merely because the position remains open.

Smith v. Office of Economic Opportunity for the State of Arkansas · filed 1976-07-21(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), Smith was required to file charges with the EEOC within 180 days after the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful employment practice. ... In our judgment, the District Court fairly construed the appellant's complaint and amended complaint to allege only an isolated act of discrimination directed at himself rather than an ongoing discriminatory system. Moreover, the effects of the alleged discrimination were felt by the appellant when he was denied employment and they terminated at that date. To predicate a finding of continuing discrimination on these facts would do violence to the policies underlying the limitations provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars the EEOC from bringing Title VII suits against governmental bodies itself.

United States v. Bd. of Ed. of Garfield Hights. City Sch. Dist. · filed 1976-10-04(f)(1)

Although this court must reject any suggestion from the Pima Community College opinion that the EEOC can itself bring lawsuits in the federal courts against governmental bodies (such a possibility being explicitly foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)), in denying standing to the Attorney General under Title VII the Arizona district court reached the same end result as does this court in the instant case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to bring its own civil action even when a private party has sued over the same facts or charges.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Hills Passavant Hospital · filed 1976-11-22(f)(1)

The plain words say that the EEOC may bring a civil action against a non-governmental respondent. They do not say that the EEOC loses that power when a private party brings a suit based on the same facts or charges. The EEOC had the statutory authority to bring the lawsuit in the instant case.

Section 706(f)(1) requires the EEOC to seek intervention, rather than file a separate suit on the same charge, once the charging party has sued.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-01-21(f)(1)

We believe that the statutory provision for intervention must be read as the exclusive procedure by which the EEOC may participate in a previously filed private lawsuit under § 706(f)(1) in order to give it significance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars an employee’s separate suit when the EEOC has sued first on the employee’s claim, but permits the employee to intervene as of right in the EEOC suit.

Theophilus McCLAIN, Appellant, v. WAGNER ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1977-03-09(f)(1)

Accordingly, we now hold that the plaintiff had no right to maintain his 1975 suit, and that his remedy was by way of intervention as of right in the 1973 suit.

The EEOC may not use intervention to expand a private Title VII action when it has not attempted the conciliation required before bringing its own action.

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1977-01-26(f)(1)

Because the EEOC failed to attempt conciliation, it will be limited to intervening and assisting the private plaintiffs. The EEOC will not be permitted to use the mechanism of intervention to circumvent the statutory prerequisites to the EEOC’s institution of its own action.

An EEOC civil action is limited to allegations on which the Commission found reasonable cause, and the employer must have a chance to settle before the EEOC sues.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Upjohn Corp. · filed 1977-12-09(f)(1)

Similarly, the judicial inquiry is limited to those allegations of complainants Boney and Benischek upon which the EEOC made a reasonable cause determination. An EEOC lawsuit brought before a defendant has a chance to voluntarily settle the issues is premature.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue on broader discrimination allegations founded on its reasonable cause determination and conciliation efforts.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK · filed 1978-04-18(f)(1)

The commission was entitled to bring suit on these broader allegations because they were founded on the reasonable cause determination and conciliation efforts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue on allegations broader than the original charge when its reasonable cause determination and conciliation efforts covered them.

Equal Employment Opportunities Commission v. American National Bank · filed 1978-04-18(f)(1)

The commission was entitled to bring suit on these broader allegations because they were founded on the reasonable cause determination and conciliation efforts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits the Commission’s lawsuit to discrimination claims included in its investigation, fact findings, and conciliation efforts.

Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. · filed 1979-03-30(f)(1)

The law is clear that the Commission may not litigate items of alleged discrimination which were not included in its investigation, fact findings, and conciliation efforts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits when a complainant may sue after a right-to-sue notice but imposes no corresponding deadline on an EEOC enforcement suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Appleton Electric Co. · filed 1980-04-14(f)(1)

Finally, the statute clearly limits the time during which a complainant may file suit but imposes no such limitation on the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to sue in its own name after a discrimination charge is filed and conciliation fails.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American National Bank · filed 1981-06-26(f)(1)

Initially we consider and reject the district court's conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over that part of the suit concerning ANB's Portsmouth branches. ... Section 706 enabled the EEOC, after a charge alleging discrimination had been filed with the EEOC and conciliation efforts with the respondent had failed, to bring suit in its own name.

Section 2000e-5 requires a charge, notice to the employer, an investigation, a reasonable-cause determination, and an effort at conciliation before the EEOC may sue.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American National Bank · filed 1981-06-26(f)(1)

Before the EEOC may bring a civil action under Title VII against an employer there must be a charge filed with the EEOC, notice of the charge to the employer, investigation by the EEOC, a determination of reasonable cause, and an effort at conciliation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to continue an enforcement suit after the charging party settles, even when the suit alleges no broader discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1983-04-18(f)(1)

However, while this case may approach the mootness line, it does not cross over that line. Plaintiff should not be bound in its enforcement efforts to a settlement offer, since withdrawn, which was more than a de minimus amount larger than the settlement by the charging party. Likewise, the use of broader allegations is not a mandatory requirement for the EEOC to bring suit.

Section 2000e-5 lets the EEOC seek relief for all affected persons without meeting Rule 23’s class action requirements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company · filed 1984-07-13(f)(1)

Thus, Congress has focused in the EEOC the power to investigate and bring actions aimed at seeking a remedy on behalf of all affected persons. The EEOC has this power without regard to the requirements of class action suits.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes the EEOC to bring a Title VII enforcement action against a labor organization.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 798 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen · filed 1986-09-05(f)(1)

2. The EEOC is an agency of the United States charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue in its own name over discrimination uncovered while investigating a valid charge, even if the person for whom it seeks relief did not file a charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n · filed 1995-05-03(f)(1)

Here, it is undisputed that the instant claim reasonably grew out of the investigation of Langseth’s discrimination charge, that the EEOC conducted an independent investigation of Strawhorn’s claim following its issuance of an amended determination, and that the EEOC attempted to conciliate Straw-horn’s particular claim. In this Court’s view, the law required no more of the EEOC before it filed this lawsuit on behalf of Straw-horn and others similarly situated to challenge a policy that allegedly represents ongoing discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 does not permit the EEOC to continue investigating an individual’s charge after the charging party receives a right-to-sue notice and begins litigation based on that charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hearst Corporation, Doing Business as the Houston Chronicle Publishing Compan · filed 1997-01-22(f)

Having considered the arguments of the parties, and the structure and purpose of the investigative authority created by Title VII, we conclude that the EEOC may not continue an administrative investigation based upon an individual’s charge once the charging party has been issued a right to sue letter and has initiated litigation based upon that charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not authorize the EEOC to continue investigating a charge after the charging party receives a right to sue notice and brings a civil action based on the charged conduct.

EEOC v. Hearst Corporation · filed 1997-06-02(b)

Accordingly, we hold that, in a case where the charging party has requested and received a right to sue notice and is engaged in a civil action that is based upon the conduct alleged in the charge filed with the EEOC, that charge no longer provides a basis for EEOC investigation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the EEOC an independent right to sue that an employee’s private arbitration agreement cannot waive.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK’S NURSERY & CRAFTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1999-04-23(f)(1)

While we express no opinion on the ability of the EEOC to agree to arbitrate its disputes with private employers, we conclude, based on the provisions in Title VII creating public and private rights of action and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, that the EEOC's cause of action in this case falls into a category of claims as to which courts should hold private agreements to arbitrate unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5(f) authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil enforcement action without a charging individual, a power incorporated into the ADA.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murray, Inc. · filed 2001-11-13(f)

Under the ADA, the EEOC may bring a charge of unlawful employment practice and may file a civil action without a charging individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (establishing ability of EEOC to bring a civil action for enforcement of Title); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting the powers, remedies, and procedures of enforcing Title VII as equally applicable to the ADA).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars the EEOC from naming an Indian tribe as a defendant in a Title VII suit, even when the tribe is a necessary party.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Coal Co. · filed 2002-09-26(f)(1)

This Court is persuaded that Congress did not intend to authorize the EEOC to name the Indian tribes as defendants in a lawsuit alleging Title VII violations, no matter what their role.

Section 2000e-5(b) authorizes the EEOC to seek an informal resolution of a discrimination charge but gives it no independent power to adjudicate the charge.

Sullivan v. University of Texas Health Science Center · filed 2007-02-13(b)

Furthermore, the EEOC does not retain independent adjudicatory authority. Rather, its authority is limited to “endeavor[ing] to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to sue on behalf of people whose discrimination claims it reasonably discovers while investigating other employees’ charges.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Worthington, Moore & Jacobs, Inc. · filed 2008-10-22(f)(1)

The agency, therefore, has made a sufficient showing that the Hennen, Ford and Sandy claims were “reasonably ascertained” during the course of its Thomas/Guzman investigation. Thus, the EEOC is authorized to bring suit on their behalf.

Section 706(a) permits the EEOC to bring an intentional discrimination claim in its own name without identifying an aggrieved job applicant in the complaint.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rosebud Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2015-04-07(a)

Thus, the Court concludes that the EEOC may bring its current claims against Defendants under the authorization provided by § 706 and that its allegations of intentional discrimination are sufficient to state a claim for Title VII relief in the even in the absence of the identification of an individual job applicant who was rejected because of his race.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1), incorporated into the ADA, authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil suit seeking relief for a group of people affected by disability discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2016-01-25(f)(1)

So as a starting point, the EEOC plainly has authority to bring suit seeking to eradicate employment discrimination on the basis of disability.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes the EEOC to bring an independent civil action against a private employer reasonably suspected of violating Title VII.

U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Rent-A-Center E. Inc. · filed 2018-03-28

Congress was clear in authorizing the EEOC's enforcement powers to independently bring a civil action in federal district court against private employers reasonably suspected of violating Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes the EEOC to challenge an employer’s settlement of a discrimination charge when the EEOC finds the resolution unacceptable.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Austal United States, LLC · filed 2019-05-20(f)(1)

This express authority over the acceptability of the employer's conciliation agreement indicates that the EEOC is authorized to challenge a settlement by an employer.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes the EEOC to challenge an employer’s settlement with a charging party when the EEOC finds the resolution unacceptable.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Austal USA, LLC · filed 2019-05-20(f)(1)

This express authority over the acceptability of the employer’s conciliation agreement indicates that the EEOC is authorized to challenge a settlement by an employer.

Section 706 authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil action to prevent unlawful employment practices.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Green Jobworks, LLC · filed 2022-04-25(a)

Sections 706 and 707 are enforcement provisions that authorize the EEOC to bring a civil action against an employer for Title VII violations. Section 706 refers to the EEOC’s authority “to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(a).

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge and receive authority to sue.

Svendsen v. Pritzker · filed 2024-01-29(b), (f)(1)

These theories encounter procedural problems. For exam- ple, a claim under Title VII depends on filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving authority to sue.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes the EEOC to sue in its own name for relief for a group of aggrieved individuals.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Allied Services, LLC · filed 2025-08-05(f)(1)

Title VII authorizes the EEOC to seek relief for aggrieved individuals in addition to the charging party when it determines an employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. “[T]he EEOC need look no further than [42 U.S.C. §2000e-5] for its authority to bring suit in its own name for the purpose . . . of securing relief for a group of aggrieved individuals.”

Section 2000e-5(b) authorizes the EEOC to use informal procedures to settle discrimination suits, including requiring claimants to attest to their eligibility for settlement funds.

United States v. John W. Milton and James Milton, United States of America v. John W. Milton · filed 1994-03-14(b)

If the EEOC can bring lawsuits, if it can settle the lawsuits it brings, if it is charged with the duty of combatting employment discrimination, if its objective is to protect those who are subject to such discrimination — if it had a statutory basis to do all these things, and there is no doubt that it did, the EEOC had a statutory basis for requiring claimants to submit forms attesting to their entitlement to a portion of the funds.

Section 2000e-5(i) authorizes the EEOC to bring proceedings to compel compliance with a court order entered in a private Title VII action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Association Of Journeymen And Apprentices Of The Plumbing And Pipefitt · filed 1971-02-03(i)

We now hold that this is an appropriate proceeding "to compel compliance" with the District Court order in the Locke case (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i)) and that the District Court had both jurisdiction and power to enter the supplementary order here appealed from.

Section 2000e-5(i) lets the EEOC seek to compel compliance with a court order after the defendant disobeys it, but does not authorize the EEOC to participate in formulating relief.

Air Lines Stewards & Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. American Airlines · filed 1972-01-18(i)

Section 706(i) does not authorize Commission participation in all suits as soon as judgment is rendered for plaintiffs. Simply stated, the interest afforded under Section 706(i) is the limited one of the ability to initiate contempt proceedings upon the defendant's failure to comply with the order of the trial court.

Section 706(i) permits the Commission to seek enforcement of a court order only after the order has been issued and disobeyed.

Air Lines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1972-01-18(i)

Clearly Section 706(i) empowers the Commission to initiate court proceedings to compel compliance only when (1) a court order, coercive or consensual, has issued and (2) the subject of that order has failed to obey it.

Section 2000e-5(i) lets the EEOC seek compliance with a court order but does not make it a party to a private Title VII lawsuit before or after judgment.

Braddy v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-01-11(i)

We hold only that the EEOC does not become a party to a private Title VII lawsuit either before or after a final order has been entered.

Section 2000e-5(i) permits the EEOC to seek compliance with a prior court order but does not authorize a new complaint to relitigate that order.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. First Alabama Bank · filed 1977-01-21(i)

Title 42, U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(i) provides that “in any case in which an employer, * * * fails to comply with the order of a court issued in a civil action brought under this section, the Commission may commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order”. ... The foregoing statute does not authorize the EEOC to commence a new complaint.

Section 2000e-5(i) lets the EEOC seek compliance with a court order in a private Title VII suit, but does not let it seek to modify the order.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST ALABAMA BANK OF MONTGOMERY, N.A., Defendant-Appel · filed 1979-05-23(i)

We do not agree that § 706(i) confers on EEOC the power to seek modification of orders of prior private discrimination suits.

Section 2000e-5(i) allows the EEOC to seek compliance with a Title VII court order, so a consent decree does not strip it of authority to investigate possible violations.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Children's Hospital Medical Center · filed 1983-11-08(i)

If we were to say the consent decree divested the Commission of its power to investigate, this provision of Title VII would lack any substance. How else but through investigation could the EEOC determine compliance with a court decree?

Section 2000e-5(i) permits the EEOC to investigate compliance with a court decree; the decree does not itself end the Commission’s investigatory authority.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Children's Hospital Medical Center · filed 1983-11-08(i)

Morton Salt and § 2000e-5(i) ought to be dispositive of this appeal. ... Even if the EEOC’s subjective purpose behind the investigation is somehow relevant, the law remains clear that raising the preclusive effect of the consent decree as a defense to the subpoenas is premature.

Section 2000e-5(i) lets the EEOC compel compliance with a court order, but does not let it enforce a private settlement whose terms the court did not incorporate into an order.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac · filed 1985-12-11(i)

Under this provision, the EEOC may initiate court proceedings to compel compliance only when a court order has been issued and the subject has failed to comply with it. ... However, that Approval Order did not incorporate the provisions of the Frese Settlement Agreement nor were there any other court orders entered that did so.

Section 2000e-5(i) authorizes the EEOC to seek enforcement of court orders, and back pay may be awarded as a civil contempt sanction for violating such an order.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cross-Appellee v. Guardian Pools, Inc., Cross-Appellant · filed 1987-10-05(i)

Section 706(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i), authorizes the EEOC to commence proceedings to compel compliance with court orders. ... We find that a variety of contempt sanctions may be imposed, including an award of back pay, but believe it appropriate to permit the district court to decide what, if any, sanction is justified for Guardian’s failure to achieve the mandated quota and ratio.

Section 706(i) permits the EEOC to seek compliance with a court order but does not make it a party to a private Title VII lawsuit or allow it to overturn the final order.

Braddy v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1991-03-29(i)

We do not intend by this opinion to delineate the parameters within which the EEOC is allowed to function under Section 706(i). We hold only that the EEOC does not become a party to a private Title VII lawsuit either before or after a final order has been entered.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to seek specific enforcement of a conciliation agreement, including an appropriate extension of its term.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Contour Chair Lounge Co. · filed 1979-04-24

The enforcement provisions of Title VII are to be found in the various subdivisions of § 706 of the Act, which is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... In such circumstances we think that the agreement here involved can be enforced specifically at the suit of the Commission and in that connection that the life of the agreement can be extended appropriately.

Section 2000e-5 allows the EEOC to seek specific enforcement of a conciliation agreement reached after investigating discrimination charges, and the court may extend the agreement’s term.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. CONTOUR CHAIR LOUNGE COMPANY · filed 1979-05-15

In such circumstances we think that the agreement here involved can be enforced specifically at the suit of the Commission and in that connection that the life of the agreement can be extended appropriately.

Section 2000e-5 limits EEOC conciliation to Title VII charges; an EEOC settlement releasing only a Title VII claim does not automatically release related claims under § 1981 or contract law.

Okonko v. Union Oil Co. of California · filed 1981-07-10

In interpreting the effect of a settlement agreement reached through the conciliation efforts of the EEOC it is significant that the EEOC can only enter into a conciliation agreement as to the Title VII charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).

Section 2000e-5(b)’s policy of encouraging voluntary settlement supports applying federal law to determine whether an oral Title VII settlement is valid.

Louis E. FULGENCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1981-12-07(b)

On the other hand, Louisiana’s requirement that settlement agreements be reduced to writing might hamper a significant federal interest, since Congress has mandated a policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of Title VII claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); ... We conclude that federal law determines the validity of oral settlement agreements in employment discrimination actions brought pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not confer federal jurisdiction over an EEOC suit to enforce a conciliation agreement that Title VII did not require the employer to enter.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Liberty Trucking Co. · filed 1981-12-17(f)(3)

From the language of Title VII and its history, I conclude that Title VII does not explicitly or implicitly compel employers, under any circumstance, to enter into conciliation agreements. The chain of indirection from (1) Title VII to (2) conciliation agreement is insufficient to support jurisdiction under § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives district courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce Title VII conciliation agreements.

EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1982-03-31(f)(3)

Therefore, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) which provides: “Each United States district court . .. shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under [Title VII].”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal district courts jurisdiction over EEOC actions to enforce conciliation agreements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Liberty Trucking Co. · filed 1982-12-20(f)(3)

We conclude, therefore, that an EEOC action to enforce a conciliation agreement is an action brought directly under Title VII, and the federal district courts have jurisdiction over such actions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce Title VII conciliation agreements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Safeway Stores · filed 1983-09-16(f)(3)

We hold, therefore, that federal jurisdiction to enforce conciliation agreements exists directly under Title VII by means of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over EEOC suits to enforce Title VII conciliation agreements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1983-09-16(f)(3)

We find that jurisdiction exists in federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) over suits brought by the EEOC to enforce conciliation agreements.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over an EEOC suit solely to enforce a pre-determination settlement agreement, without litigating the underlying discrimination charge.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. the HENRY BECK COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1984-03-07(f)(3)

Because we agree that § 706(f)(3) provides a basis for jurisdiction in this case, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s policy favoring conciliation supports giving a voluntary settlement of equivalent state claims effect against a later Title VII suit on the same claims.

Perez Ex Rel. Estate of Perez v. Maine · filed 1984-05-03(b)

Consequently, it follows that if a plaintiff could settle his claim and then proceed against the same defendant on the same cause of action arising out of the same operative facts, no defendant would sign a conciliation agreement. Thus the scheme for voluntary resolution of such claims envisioned by Congress in Title VII would be defeated.

A plaintiff seeking to enforce an EEOC settlement agreement must exhaust Title VII’s administrative remedies, including obtaining a right-to-sue notice, even when suing for breach of contract under state law.

35 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1121, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,618 Patricia S. Parsons, Cross-Appellee v. Yellow Freight System, · filed 1984-08-28(f)(1)

While we have not found nor have we had cited to us any case which is on all fours with the present case, we do not believe that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement has been met in these proceedings. There is no indication that plaintiff ever received or for that matter ever applied for an EEOC right-to-sue letter. Nor is there any indication that she ever sought to invoke EEOC’s conciliation of this current dispute. We do not think that the jurisdictional requirements recited above can be evaded by a suit designed to enforce a contract under state law where the contract itself is a product of EEOC action and the EEOC is a signatory to the contract.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over employees’ suits to enforce agreements releasing Title VII claims, even without prior EEOC participation.

Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works · filed 1985-09-03(f)(3)

Following this line of authority, we hold that the releases signed by the employed appellees, in which they agreed not to bring charges under Title VII in return for Bristol Steel's compliance with the executive order conciliation agreement, are themselves "Title VII conciliation agreements," and that appellees' suit, which, in essence, seeks to enforce the terms of the releases, is an "action[ ] brought under" Title VII. Appellees need not have filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged breaches in order to bring this action "under" Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s exhaustion and ninety-day filing requirements do not apply to an action enforcing a labor agreement by reference to a conciliation agreement when the claim alleges breach of contract rather than discrimination.

Cisneros v. ABC Rail Corporation · filed 2000-07-07(f)(1)

This ambiguity is ultimately irrelevant, however, because we conclude that neither the exhaustion requirements nor the limitation periods of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), nor those of the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-306(11), (14), apply to this action to enforce the terms of a labor agreement as defined by reference to a conciliation agreement.

Section 2000e-5 does not authorize the EEOC to sue public employers to enforce settlement or conciliation agreements reached during its administrative process; the Attorney General must bring those actions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Actions Against Public Employers to Enforce Settlement or Conciliation Agreement · filed 2003-09-08

Neither section 2000e-5 nor section 2000e-6 clearly and unambiguously vests the EEOC with authority to sue to enforce predetermination settlement or concilia- tion agreements.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to be a person claiming to be aggrieved; collateral harm from discrimination against others does not establish statutory standing.

One Fair Wage, Inc. v. Darden Restaurants Inc. · filed 2024-04-24

The second argument lacks merit because the Court correctly noted that, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a plaintiff must be “a person claiming to be aggrieved” in order to have statutory standing.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires an aggrieved person to have an existing or potential employment relationship to bring suit.

Hackett v. McGuire Bros. · filed 1970-10-01(f)

The court finds that this suit must be dismissed as the plaintiff lacks standing to sue. The Civil Rights Act is directed at the protection of rights of persons having an employment relationship, or a potential employment relationship, with an employer. In order to have standing to sue, an aggrieved person must fall within one of these categories.

Section 2000e-5 allows a person claiming to be aggrieved by employment discrimination to sue despite accepting pension benefits, if the person alleges an injury sufficient for Article III standing.

Hackett v. Mcguire Brothers, Inc. · filed 1971-07-08(e)

The use in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of the language "a person claiming to be aggrieved" shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.

Section 2000e-5 gives a person claiming injury from a forbidden employment practice standing to sue even after accepting a pension, subject to Article III limits.

Hackett v. McGuire Bros. · filed 1971-07-08(e)

The use in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of the language “a person claiming to be aggrieved” shows a' congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.

Section 2000e-5 allows an aggrieved person to file an EEOC charge and bring suit in federal district court without being the defendant’s employee.

Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital · filed 1972-04-03

The question of whether Mr. Wilson is an “employee” of the hospital is not germane to our decision on the merits. A person need only be an aggrieved person to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and to later bring suit before a United States District Court.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a person deterred by a discriminatory job advertisement to sue if the person has a real, present interest in the advertised work.

Hailes v. United Air Lines · filed 1972-07-19(e)

To be aggrieved under this subsection a person must be able to demonstrate that he has a real, present interest in the type of employment advertised. In addition, that person must be able to show he was effectively deterred by the improper ad from applying for such employment.

Section 2000e-5 permits a person injured by an unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC complaint and later sue even if the conduct was not directed at that person.

Thomas v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1973-11-08(b), (f)(1)

According to Section 2000e-5(b) and (f)(1) of Title VII, a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice may be filed with the EEOC, and later in federal court, by “a person claiming to be aggrieved.” The statute nowhere requires the aggrieved party to have been the object of the conduct complained of, only that he claim to have been injured thereby.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not give an employer standing to sue as a person aggrieved by its own employment discrimination.

Foust v. Transamerica Corporation · filed 1975-03-18(f)(1)

An employer cannot claim standing as a “person aggrieved” under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5 permits a union to sue as an aggrieved person on behalf of members who are victims of discrimination.

Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc. · filed 1976-08-24(f)(1)

The reference in § 2000e-5 to the “person aggrieved” does not indicate a congressional intent to define standing narrowly for cases brought under Title VII. ... We conclude that a union has standing as an “aggrieved person” under Title VII to represent members who are victims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 allows a union to sue as an aggrieved person on behalf of members who are victims of employment discrimination.

Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Standard Brands · filed 1976-09-22

The reference in § 2000e-5 to the "person aggrieved" does not indicate a congressional intent to define standing narrowly for cases brought under Title VII. ... We conclude that a union has standing as an "aggrieved person" under Title VII to represent members who are victims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 grants standing to a person claiming injury from an unlawful employment practice as broadly as Article III permits.

Gray v. Greyhound Lines · filed 1976-10-13

In some statutory schemes, however, Congress has itself determined that standing should be granted to anyone who satisfies the constitutional requirements. Title VII is such a statute. "The use in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971). Thus, since plaintiffs have claimed injury in fact as a result of defendants' allegedly illegal practices, they have standing to sue under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5 allows a person injured by workplace discrimination against a group to which she does not belong to sue to redress that discrimination.

Waters v. Heublein, Inc. · filed 1976-11-12(f)(1)

Whether Waters has standing to sue to enjoin discrimination against groups to which she does not belong depends on whether she is a “person claiming to be aggrieved” by such discrimination. §§ 706(b), (f)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). We find this case logically indistinguishable from Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1972, 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415, and we therefore agree with Waters that she has standing.

Section 2000e-5 allows an employee injured by discrimination against another group to sue as a person claiming to be aggrieved.

Waters v. Heublein · filed 1977-03-21(b), (f)(1)

Whether Waters has standing to sue to enjoin discrimination against groups to which she does not belong depends on whether she is a "person claiming to be aggrieved" by such discrimination. §§ 706(b), (f)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). We find this case logically indistinguishable from Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1972, 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415, and we therefore agree with Waters that she has standing.

Section 2000e-5 allows an employee to continue challenging workplace discrimination on behalf of a class after his individual claim fails when discrimination is generally practiced where he works.

Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers · filed 1977-05-11(f)(1)

Congress has broadly defined the right of a person claiming to be aggrieved to bring an action challenging discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This authorization includes continuing to attack employment discrimination even after the person has failed in his own action since he is an aggrieved person even in the absence of evidence sufficient to support his personal claim, where, as here, the employment discrimination is being generally practiced in the place where he works.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not allow a shareholder to bring a derivative Title VII action on behalf of a corporate employer for its own discriminatory practices.

Foust v. Safeway Stores · filed 1977-06-30(f)(1)

We hold that a stockholders' derivative action will not lie because the corporate employer is not a "person aggrieved" under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) by reason of the discriminatory employment practices of its board.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not allow a shareholder to bring a derivative Title VII action on behalf of a corporate employer for its own discriminatory employment practices.

Foust v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1977-06-30(f)(1)

We hold that a stockholders’ derivative action will not lie because the corporate employer is not a “person aggrieved” under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) by reason of the discriminatory employment practices of its board.

Section 2000e-5 permits a labor union to sue as a person aggrieved on behalf of its members, at least when it seeks injunctive relief.

International Woodworkers v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1977-12-16(a), (e)

Under Title VII, a suit alleging discrimination can be brought by any “person claiming to be aggrieved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (e). Labor unions are expressly included in the definition of “person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). ... We conclude that IWA has standing to sue as the representative of its members employed in the forestry, plywood, and chemical facilities of Georgia-Pacific at Crossett, Arkansas, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought.

Section 2000e-5 allows a labor union to sue as a person aggrieved on behalf of its injured members, at least for injunctive relief.

INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC and its Local 5-475 v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION · filed 1978-01-05(a), (e)

Under Title VII, a suit alleging discrimination can be brought by any "person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (e). Labor unions are expressly included in the definition of "person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). ... We conclude that IWA has standing to sue as the representative of its members employed in the forestry, plywood, and chemical facilities of Georgia-Pacific at Crossett, Arkansas, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought.

Section 706(f)(1) gives the EEOC standing to sue to enforce Title VII after it meets the required administrative charge procedures.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Whirlpool Corp., Local 808 · filed 1978-02-03(f)(1)

Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 gives the Commission the right, hence, the standing to sue to compel compliance with Title VII, after certain administrative charge-handling prerequisites have been met.

An individual plaintiff cannot challenge a job requirement under § 2000e-5(f)(1) when she met the requirement and was not injured by it.

Lightfoot v. Board of Trustees of Prince George's Community College · filed 1978-07-28(f)(1)

Since plaintiff met this educational qualification requirement and since this is not a class action, plaintiff has not been injured by the requirement. She does not have standing to challenge it here on its merits, and, even if the educational requirement were inconsistent with Title VII, plaintiff could not prevail and impose Title VII liability on defendant PGCC on account of such educational qualification requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a person challenging discriminatory practices under Title VII to be aggrieved by those practices.

Tucker v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. · filed 1978-07-12(f)(1)

To have standing to challenge discriminatory practices under Title VII, a person bringing suit must claim to be “aggrieved” by those practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Therefore, I believe that the plaintiff has suffered no injury from the defendant’s hiring practices, and pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of discriminatory hiring.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an employee to charge racial discrimination against a group to which she does not belong if she meets Article III standing requirements based on injury to her own working environment.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-11-12(b)

We conclude that § 706 of Title VII permits Summers to file a charge asserting that Mississippi College discriminates against blacks on the basis of race in recruitment and hiring. ... We hold no more than that, provided she meets the standing requirements imposed by Article III, Summers may charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination.

A labor union is a person aggrieved under Section 2000e-5 and may sue under Title VII.

EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co. · filed 1982-03-31(a), (e)

It is beyond question that a labor union is considered a "person aggrieved" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (e), and that a labor union is a proper plaintiff in a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice, but a person offered higher wages than a female employee is outside the interests Title VII protects.

Pecorella v. Oak Orchard Community Health Center, Inc. · filed 1982-10-13(f)(1)

Applying these principles to this case, I find plaintiff not to be within the “zone of interests” which Congress intended to protect by the enactment of Title VII. Plaintiff is in essence claiming that defendant engaged in sex discrimination by offering him a higher wage than defendant paid an already existing female employee. If there is in fact any actionable sex discrimination under these facts, I find plaintiff to be the wrong person to complain.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s “on behalf of” language does not give a plaintiff who is not a class representative standing to assert another person’s Title VII rights.

Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hospital · filed 1983-08-31(b)

Finally, Ms. Poindexter does not have standing on the basis of the “on behalf of” language in § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), because she is not the class representative.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a person aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice to sue; an employer cannot sue a union as the victim of its own alleged discrimination.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. City of New York · filed 1984-12-27(f)(1)

If the union has in fact engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the only persons “aggrieved” under this allegation are the plaintiff-employees. An employer cannot be the victim of its own discriminatory employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a person injured by an unlawful employment practice to sue even when the discrimination targeted coworkers of a different sex.

Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc. · filed 1986-10-14(f)(1)

According to Stewart, the scope of the language “person aggrieved” confers standing to all persons injured by an unlawful employment practice. These male plaintiffs allege such an injury, and thus have standing.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not let male employees sue as aggrieved persons based on alleged wage discrimination against female co-workers when they do not claim discrimination because they are men.

Jerrold I. Patee, Jr., Allan R. Jones, Jr., and Michael J. Nowak v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company · filed 1986-10-24(f)(1)

To have standing to bring such an action the plaintiff must be “a person claiming to be aggrieved____” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... The male workers do not claim that they have been discriminated against because they are men. The alternative holding in Spaulding requires us to conclude that the male workers cannot assert the right of their female co-workers to be free from discrimination based on their sex.

Section 2000e-5 permits a person aggrieved to sue under Title VII, but men alleging lower pay because of discrimination against women lack standing when they claim no injury because they are men.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Nassau · filed 1987-07-13(f)(1)

Unlike the Allen court, this court holds that the absence of injury to the men as men is a fatal flaw for title VII purposes.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not permit a plaintiff’s spouse or conjugal partnership to sue when they were not named in the EEOC charge and did not file a charge themselves.

Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc. · filed 1988-08-26(f)(1)

Only she was named in the charge, and Abel Rossy and the conjugal partnership were not included. They are, therefore, not “persons claiming to be aggrieved.” They have not complied with the prelitigation administrative requirement of filing a Commission charge as required by section 2000e-5(f)(l), and have no standing to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not give an employee’s spouse standing to sue for employment discrimination solely because of the marriage.

Patton v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1995-12-21(f)(1)

Moreover, even if Vera could meet all of the other requirements, she is not a current or former employee or applicant for employment of UPS and has no standing to sue UPS under Title VII or the TCHRA. The spouse of an employee simply is not a covered individual under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives white men statutory standing to assert hostile environment claims based on discrimination directed at black or female coworkers.

Childress v. City of Richmond · filed 1997-08-05(f)(1)

As part of its enforcement scheme, Congress conferred a private right of action on “the person claiming to be aggrieved ... by the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 1994). ... We hold that white men have standing to assert hostile environment claims under Title VII when the discriminatory conduct is directed at blacks or females.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a woman injured by sexual harassment of other women in her workplace to sue as an aggrieved person even if she was not personally targeted.

Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1998-05-05(f)(1)

Title VII allows a “person claiming to be aggrieved ... by any unlawful employment practice” to bring suit against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(A). The term “aggrieved” as used in Title VII is both a-limitation on who can bring suit, embodying constitutional requirements of standing, and a substantive element of a Title VII claim to be proved at trial. Plaintiff is “aggrieved” in both senses.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a person alleging unlawful employment discrimination the right to file a civil action after exhausting administrative remedies.

Phillips v. CIGNA Investments, Inc. · filed 1998-11-23(f)(1)

As discussed below, based upon the express statutory language of Title VII that allows an aggrieved person to bring a civil action in federal court, as well as the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, amending Title VII, and Supreme Court precedent, we find this was a “legitimate expectation.” ... We begin with the proposition that Title VII gives a person aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice the statutory right to file a civil action after exhausting administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5 does not permit a plaintiff to assert discrimination claims on behalf of other persons, though their treatment may support the plaintiff’s own hostile work environment claim.

Sidari v. Orleans County · filed 2000-06-14

With regard to those portions of the Decision and Order [# 137] which struck other portions of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was and is properly denied, since plaintiff has no standing to raise discrimination claims on behalf of other persons.

Section 2000e-5 permits a state to sue in its parens patriae capacity under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2003-06-17

The court therefore finds that Congress, by authorizing state governments to bring suit under Title VII, must have envisioned such suits being brought in the states’ capacity as parens patriae.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives broad standing to a person harmed by an unlawful employment practice, even if that person was not the target of the discrimination.

Pelekai v. Raytheon Constructors, Inc. · filed 2003-09-08(f)(1)

Title VII allows “a person claiming to be aggrieved” by an unlawful employment practice to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This language has been interpreted to define Title VU’s statutory standing broadly.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue, but a plaintiff whose discrimination claim rests on treatment of others must allege that the employer intended to affect her.

Finn v. Kent Security Services, Inc. · filed 2013-11-06(f)(1)

Assuming that Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for discrimination under Title VII, the allegations in the Complaint as currently pled do not establish that Plaintiff falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII because they do not establish that Defendant either discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or that Defendant engaged in discrimination against others on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, with the intent to affect her.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person claiming to be aggrieved to bring a civil action if the EEOC declines to sue.

Tolar v. Marion Bank & Trust, Co. · filed 2019-03-29(f)(1)

The statute permits "a person claiming to be aggrieved" to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer retaliated, and, if the EEOC declines to sue the employer, then the statute permits a civil action to "be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved ... by the alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). ... Greg and Andrew are Persons Aggrieved.