42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Harris v. The Governing Board of Artesia General Hospital · filed 2021-04-26(k)

These included the Title VII, FMLA, ADA, New Mexico Human Rights Act, and New Mexico Whistleblower claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Under Title VII, court in its discretion may allow prevailing party a “reasonable attorney’s fee”); ... Therefore, the Court approves Plaintiffs’ requested attorney’s fees, paralegal’s fees, and taxes in the amount of $66,372.79.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney fees against the liable Title VII employer.

Winter v. Mike's Trucking, Ltd. · filed 2021-04-26(k)

Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorney fees, but only against Defendant Mike’s Trucking, LTD. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows an attorney fee award whose amount is assessed using reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate.

Porter v. 1st Choice After School Kare · filed 2021-04-28(k)

Pursuant to the Court’s order, on March 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting attorney fees and costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and a declaration establishing the amount of fees to be $14,545. (ECF No. 22.) Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion and declaration, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees. Having already ruled that Plaintiff is entitled to her fees and costs, the Court assess here only the reasonableness of the amount requested. The Court begins by calculating the lodestar amount of the fee, which is determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, pursued after it clearly became so, or brought in bad faith.

WILLARD v. INDUSTRIAL AIR, INC. · filed 2021-05-03(k)

While a prevailing plaintiff generally may recover attorney's fees, a prevailing defendant should recover fees only where the “court finds that [the plaintiff's] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so” or that the plaintiff brought a claim in bad faith. ... Here, Willard’s claims were not so lacking in merit as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees to Industrial Air.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a prevailing Title VII party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs, based on reasonable hours and hourly rates.

Corbin v. Steak 'n Shake, Inc. · filed 2021-07-02(k)

Title VII provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, [in litigation under Title VII] . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the attorney fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for reasonable attorney travel time, but not for unnecessary or unsupported travel time.

Nichols v. Illinois Department of Transp · filed 2021-07-06(k)

This fits neatly with our holding in Henry: reasonable travel warrants attorneys’ fees, but unnecessary or unsupported travel does not.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party in a Title VII action when the requested hours and rate are supported by evidence.

Fry v. Sweet Home Healthcare, LLC · filed 2021-07-23(k)

“An award of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party in a Title VII action is provided by in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).” ... To meet the burden of demonstrating that the requested fees are reasonable, Fry “must submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed.” ... Thus, we are satisfied that the Weisberg affidavit allows us to establish the amount of attorney’s fees in this case as certain in the amount of $18,210.00.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) gives courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs in same-action cases based on the plaintiff’s overall success.

Sourgoutsis v. United States Capitol Police · filed 2021-07-20(g)(2)(B)(i)

Quite to the contrary, the statute provides that courts “may” award attorneys’ fees and costs in same-action cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), and the provision thereby leaves courts with discretion to decide whether fees are appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorney’s fees in Title VII actions.

Payne v. UNISYS Corporation · filed 2021-08-25(k)

The EPA and Minnesota Equal Pay for Equal Work Act mandate awarding fees and costs, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Minn. Stat. § 181.68, subd. 2, while the Court exercises discretion in awarding fees and costs under the MHRA and Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff as part of the costs.

Gaskill-Clayborn v. Mighty Oaks Child Development Center, LLC · filed 2021-09-22(k)

Under Title VII, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party … a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, the Court will impose a ten percent reduction to the lodestar.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Miller v. Management & Training Corporation · filed 2021-09-27(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) 17 provides that in a Title VII case, the court may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the cost. ... A more stringent standard, though, is applied to a prevailing defendant, who may be awarded attorney's fees in a Title VII case only when a court finds that the plaintiff's claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id. at 421.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to use the parties’ contracted hourly rate in a prevailing party’s attorney fee award when that rate is reasonable.

Griffith v. McDonough · filed 2021-09-29(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) allows courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in litigation under §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. ... While Griffith provided evidence of judicially awarded attorneys’ fees in the relevant market that could have supported a higher reasonable rate, we cannot conclude that the magistrate judge clearly erred by awarding only the contracted rates.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII party, based on reasonable hours and an appropriate hourly rate.

Benoist v. Titan Medical Manufacturing, LLC. · filed 2021-09-29(k)

The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party that prevails in a Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court awards $228,430 in reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) applies the same attorney’s fee standard as section 1988, allowing a prevailing defendant to recover fees for frivolous Title VII claims.

PRIOLI v. COUNTY OF OCEAN · filed 2021-09-30(k)

Therefore, the Court will ascertain Defendants’ application for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k) under the same legal framework. ... The only remaining issue is whether Plaintiffs’ 1981 claims and Title VII claims against Individual Defendants are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The Court finds they are.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Dahl v. Tarahumara Express Incorporated · filed 2021-10-13(k)

A prevailing party who brings a Title VII claim may receive a reasonable attorney fee and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Plaintiff is therefore eligible. Plaintiff has also prevailed because she was awarded $53,674.53 in damages after the Court entered default judgment. The Court finds that Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, calculated using compensable hours and appropriate hourly rates.

Pickett v. Mississippi Board of Animal Health · filed 2021-10-26(k)

The Court uses the “lodestar” method to calculate an award of fees. ... Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendant, and will reduce the hours billed by 10% to compensate for the improper quarter-hour billing.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be reduced to account for partial success.

Alozie v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2021-11-30(k)

The Court may award a reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in Title VII litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... However, because Alozie achieved only partial success—on only one of Alozie’s five claims—the Court will reduce the total number of hours calculated into the lodestar figure.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a plaintiff who becomes the prevailing party through a default judgment.

Tillman v. Hammond's Transportation, LLC · filed 2021-11-02(k)

As a result, Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and the Court will award attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows the prevailing party, but not former counsel acting without that party’s authorization, to seek attorney’s fees and costs.

United States v. Southeastern Oklahoma State University · filed 2021-12-28(k)

The right to seek attorneys’ fees and costs exists only in Plaintiff, and she has made clear she does not authorize the supplemental Motion of Young and Novotny.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for time reasonably spent on settlement negotiations and for useful, ordinarily necessary work in a separate but related case.

Perez-Sosa v. Garland · filed 2022-01-07(k)

We hold that a court should include time reasonably expended in settlement negotiations within the lodestar when calculating attorneys' fees. ... The upshot is that Title VII's fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), should be construed as treating all useful and ordinarily necessary legal work as performed "for the litigation," even if the work was done outside the four corners of the particular case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing alone does not meet that standard.

Wang v. Nevada System of Higher Education · filed 2022-01-10(k)

While all of Wang’s claims were ultimately unsuccessful, the Court finds his claims were not frivolous merely because Wang did not ultimately prevail. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. ... The Court therefore declines to award attorneys’ fees to Defendant in the amount requested.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for work preparing an EEOC charge.

Krause v. Kelahan · filed 2022-02-02(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes fee awards for work done in these proceedings, and plaintiff may request reimbursement for her counsel’s work performed from September 16, 2016 through January 10, 2017.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Belton, M.D. v. Borg & Ide Imaging, P.C. · filed 2022-02-10(k)

A court may award attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants under sections 1988(b) and 2000e-5(k), therefore, “only when the plaintiff’s ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. · filed 2022-03-18(k)

However, a prevailing defendant may be awarded fees under Title VII only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Given the dismissal of a nearly identical Title VII claim in Lenk III, and the absence of any facts whatsoever to support his new blacklisting theory, it was clear at the time Lenk filed the present suit that Claim 1 was frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Swirski v. ProTec Association Services · filed 2022-04-29(k)

Title VII provides that in “any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court can’t conclude that it was entirely clear that this case was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” at the outset.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Baldwin v. Kenco Logistics Services LLC · filed 2022-05-27(k)

When a Title VII suit is brought in good faith, the court may award attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants, in its discretion, “only upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... The court is not persuaded that Baldwin’s action against Kenco is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Accordingly, the court, in its discretion, denies Kenco’s request for attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or clearly became so during litigation.

Estevez v. Berkeley College · filed 2022-06-06(k)

The Court cannot, however, say the retaliation claim was so frivolous that an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s Title VII claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Revak v. Miller · filed 2022-07-08(k)

Where the prevailing party is a defendant, the court must rest imposition of fees “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” or “that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Though unmeritorious, plaintiff’s claim of a hostile work environment thus cannot fairly be said to be baseless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII party as part of the costs.

NITKIN v. MAIN LINE HEALTH · filed 2022-07-08(k)

Title VII is a fee-shifting statute, and the Court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to Ms. Nitkin, the prevailing party in this case, as part of the costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

GRUBBS v. GROTE INDUSTRIES, LLC · filed 2022-08-26(k)

Defendant has not met this stringent standard, and accordingly, Defendant's Amended Motion for Attorney's Fees and Expenses [Docket No. 89] is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; a plaintiff whose Title VII claim fails cannot recover them.

RODEMAKER v. CITY OF VALDOSTA BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-08-31(k)

Having determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (allowing award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII employer only when the employee’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

CARLSON v. QUALTEK WIRELESS LLC · filed 2022-09-08(k)

An award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing employer in a Title VII retaliation claim are “sparingly awarded” and only where we find an employee’s claims frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. We make no such finding here. We deny Qualtek’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, but hours that combine legal and clerical work may be reduced when the work cannot be separated.

Richard v. St Tammany Parish Sheriff Department · filed 2022-09-28(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), “[i]n any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.”108 ... However, without any way to disentangle legal from administrative work ... in these mixed time entries, the Court reduces these time entries by 50%.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney fees; a contingent fee agreement does not set the award.

Smith v. Casilo Consulting LLC · filed 2022-09-29(k)

In Title VII actions, the prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). ... The contingent fee agreement may govern the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and her counsel, but it does not set the amount of an attorney fee award. If Plaintiff seeks attorney fees, she must provide the Court with the number of hours expended on this case and a reasonable hourly rate for Title VII cases in this area.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

DeFrancesco v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2022-09-27(k)

On October 12, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). It is well established that in a case brought under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prevailing defendant will generally not receive an award of attorney fees. The Court finds that this is not the rare nor the exceptional case for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing defendant. The motion for attorney fees is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Gilani v. Teneo, Inc. · filed 2022-09-30(k)

Defendants fail to show that Plaintiff’s claims on their own were necessarily “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees without reducing them for work on an unsuccessful claim arising from the same core facts.

Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc. · filed 2022-10-19(k)

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s ERISA claim was based on a common core of facts regarding his employment with Defendant and the circumstances of his termination. Therefore, the Court will not reduce the requested fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Fontana v. Bowls and Salads Mexican Grill Inc. · filed 2022-10-31(k)

Title VII permits a court, in its discretion, to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the “prevailing party.” ... Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff $12,891.50 in attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs to a prevailing Title VII party.

Summers v. City of Charlotte · filed 2022-11-03(k)

Because the statutes on which Plaintiff’s claims are based, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),“define[] costs to include attorneys’ fees . . . such [attorney’s] fees are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68.” Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII party.

Rhoten v. Rocking J. Ranch LLC · filed 2022-11-22(k)

Title VII and the MHRA provide the Court the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney and expert fees, including fees for useful work in related administrative proceedings.

Belcastro-Gonzalez v. City of Omaha · filed 2023-02-14(k)

Further, the Court finds the expert fees were necessary to the litigation and are reasonable for services of this nature. Also, the firm’s work in connection with the disciplinary proceedings and NEOC administrative proceedings were useful and of the type ordinarily necessary to proceed on Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim in this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs.

HARRIS v. SAM'S EAST INC · filed 2023-02-22(k)

Because Harris prevailed on her Title VII retaliatory termination claim, she may recover a “reasonable attorney’s ... fee . . . as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; the prospect of fees cannot itself make a party prevailing.

Reid v. Chao · filed 2023-02-23(k)

Title VII allows courts to award attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” in a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Such fees thus enter the picture only once a party has prevailed—they cannot be the basis for a party’s prevailing.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

THOMAS v. SHOSHONE TRUCKING, LLC. · filed 2023-03-27(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as the prevailing party in a Title VII case, Thomas may recover her attorney's fees and costs. The Court therefore GRANTS Thomas' Petition for Attorney Fees and Costs (Filing No. 108), but for a lesser amount than requested.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII party, with a reduction for limited success.

Ares v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2023-05-09(k)

Here, the court will reduce the lodestar by 20% due to limited success.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

DeVooght v. City of Warren · filed 2023-05-10(k)

Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) in all but special circumstances, while prevailing defendants are entitled to them much less frequently. ... This is not a case of where plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless to support an award of attorney fees to the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party in a Title VII suit to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs at the district court’s discretion.

White v. Patriot Erectors LLC · filed 2023-05-11(k)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a “prevailing party” in a suit brought under Title VII is entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant attorney’s and expert fees only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. East 40, Inc. · filed 2023-05-15(k)

Because there was sufficient evidence to support a claim for discrimination on the record, the claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, for the same reasons the Defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees, he is not entitled to his expert witness fee.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Ismail v. IHI Power Services Corp. · filed 2023-05-25(k)

Title VII vests district courts with the discretion to award “the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, Mr. Ismail is a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing on summary judgment alone does not establish that.

Morales v. New Orleans City · filed 2023-06-15(k)

Under Title VII, the district court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, so long as the prevailing party is not the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(k). “[T]he Supreme Court has held that a successful defendant can only recover [Title VII] fees if ‘the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’” ... Plaintiff brought her claims non-frivolously, and in good faith; this Court simply held that she could not prevail on those claims. ... Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorneys’ fees in this matter.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, calculated from reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate.

Kilchenman v. Smash Restro and Bar, LLC · filed 2023-08-03(k)

Lastly, under Title VII, the Court has the discretion to award the prevailing party a “reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable and awards Plaintiff $4,868.65 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

McKinney v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2023-08-10(k)

In Title VII actions, “a court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, ... a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) allows a prevailing party to recover costs other than attorneys’ fees unless a federal statute, federal rule, or court order states otherwise. As the prevailing plaintiff, McKinney may recover his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Baker v. Davidson · filed 2023-08-25(k)

Title VII and the ADA gives the court discretion to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Based on this record, the court finds it appropriate to award attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees in a Title VII action only when the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Garrow v. Tucson Clips LLC · filed 2023-11-20(k)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Court, “in its discretion, may allow the ... prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). ... Weighing the three factors, the Court concludes that Defendant has not established ... that Plaintiff's Complaint was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” to warrant ... the award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses, including lodging and meals for counsel attending trial.

Glowacki v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC · filed 2023-12-14(k)

As to reasonableness, it is reasonable for counsel to use local lodgings during a trial that is located over an hour from counsel’s office. Accordingly, the lodging and meal expenses are reasonable out-of-pocket costs, compensable under § 2000e-5(k) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2802.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, with the amount subject to reduction for limited success.

Strickland v. Detroit, City of · filed 2023-12-27(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), “[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). ... The Court determines that an award of 40% of the time submitted is reasonable, resulting in an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $204,790.12.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

MEIGS v. CARE PROVIDERS INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC · filed 2024-01-02(k)

These statutes allow a prevailing party to recover an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. Under Title VII, a “court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of appellate attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.

MARCH GOLDWIRE v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida · filed 2024-01-02(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to prevailing party attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Curran v. Bernhardt · filed 2024-01-10(k)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party in a Title VII action to seek attorney fees and costs.

Benson v. Lincoln · filed 2024-01-16(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to file an application for attorney fees, expenses, and costs for consideration of an award by the Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1119(4). The Plaintiff shall be considered the prevailing party in the litigation for all claims when the Court is considering the merits of the application and for no other purposes.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or without foundation.

Johnson v. Federal Information Systems, Inc. · filed 2024-01-26(k)

In this case, although Johnson has failed to withstand summary judgment, she at least presented a prima facie case of retaliation. Thus, the Court cannot say that her retaliation claim is frivolous, groundless, or without foundation. The Court therefore finds that an award of attorney’s fees to FIS would be an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees for unsuccessful claims that share a common core of facts or related legal theories with a successful claim.

Miro v. Bridgeport · filed 2024-01-26(k)

Here, Ms. Miro’s claims do involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, militating against reducing her award of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for related administrative proceedings when that work was useful and necessary to the successful claim.

Mason v. Helping Our Seniors, LLC · filed 2024-01-29(k)

Plaintiffs can recover fees for the time Mr. Galo expended representing them before the Texas Workforce Commission because his work in these proceedings was both useful and necessary in Plaintiffs’ successful prosecution of their claims in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees for administrative work that is useful and ordinarily necessary to pursue a Title VII retaliation claim.

Belcastro-Gonzalez v. City of Omaha · filed 2024-03-11(k)

The City also contends that fees incurred during the administrative proceedings should not be included in the award. But because the work performed during the administrative proceedings was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to pursue a retaliation claim under Title VII, the court properly included those fees.

Title VII’s right to attorney’s fees cannot be prospectively waived in an employment arbitration agreement.

Severinghaus v. Docusign, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28(k)

Just as DocuSign could not require employees to generally waive employment-discrimination claims prospectively—before the claims even arise—so too DocuSign cannot require employees to prospectively waive their right to fee-shifting in employment cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

WATSON v. PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY · filed 2024-03-29(k)

There can be no dispute that “Plaintiff prevail[ed] on some of the benefit sought,”30 and is the prevailing party, entitling him to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Ousley v. CG Consulting, LLC · filed 2024-04-03(k)

Prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII actions are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Perry v. AutoZone Stores, Inc., 624 F. App’x 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2015).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney fees, assessed by the hours spent and counsel’s rates.

Webb, Katharine v. Playmonster LLC · filed 2024-04-18(k)

Both Title VII and the FMLA authorize an award of reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). ... The court finds that the time spent and the hourly rates are reasonable, so the court will grant the request.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs.

LOWE v. ALLSTAR MOVING AND DELIVERY LLC · filed 2024-05-02(k)

Finally, having prevailed on all of his claims, Lowe is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of litigation® pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for work on an unsuccessful claim that shares a common core of facts with the successful claims.

Runkel v. City of Springfield · filed 2024-05-22(k)

“In Title VII actions, the prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k).” ... The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the City and Langfelder involved a common core of facts. ... Thus, the Court will not categorically exclude time spent on the § 1983 claim against Defendant Langfelder.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who prevails on a Title VII retaliation claim, including work on related unsuccessful claims.

Staton v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow · filed 2024-06-03(k)

The Court finds that Staton constitutes a prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney’s fees and that Staton’s discrimination, hostile work environment, and other claims prove related and intertwined with her retaliation claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) limits a Title VII attorney’s fee award to fees incurred in the Title VII action itself.

Graciani v. Providence Health & Services · filed 2024-06-28(k)

And although Congress has authorized recovery of fees in Title VII cases, those fees are limited to those incurred in the Title VII action itself.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Hill v. Enchantment Hotels, Inc. · filed 2024-07-16(k)

Title VII directs: “[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... The Court assumes the truthfulness of Plaintiff’s allegations and will award attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,291 ($10,725 in attorneys’ fees and $566 in costs of court).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be reduced to reflect limited success.

Kubas v. 331B, LLC · filed 2024-07-19(k)

Her degree of success, however, warrants a reduction of the fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff but does not cover fees incurred defending state-law counterclaims, even when those claims allegedly formed part of the retaliation.

Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(k)

She may not, however, extend Title VII’s fee provision to fees incurred defending against HMS’ state-law counterclaims, even if those claims were part of the conduct that she later claimed was retaliatory.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable Westlaw research charges as part of an attorney’s fee award in a Title VII case.

Webb v. City of Venice · filed 2024-09-10(k)

While not recoverable as a cost under § 1920, Westlaw charges have been held recoverable as part of attorneys’ fees under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs.

Segar v. Ashcroft · filed 2024-09-27(k)

Title VII allows a “prevailing party” to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court agrees fully with Plaintiffs’ arguments on the reasonableness of their proposed rates and their costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, with time spent on an unsuccessful punitive damages issue subtracted.

Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc. · filed 2024-10-08(k)

It is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII suit. ... The Court finds that hours spent on the unsuccessful punitive damages claim should be subtracted.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorneys’ fees only if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Vitalis v. Sun Constructors, Inc. · filed 2024-10-09(k)

Under Christiansburg Garment, for a prevailing defendant to recover attorneys’ fees, the defendant must show that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff whose related claims achieve only partial success, with the award reflecting her overall success.

Read v. Oklahoma Flintrock Products · filed 2024-10-25(k)

In Title VII cases, a district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... When a prevailing party succeeds on only some claims, the court must consider two questions: “(1) whether the plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related; and (2) whether the plaintiff’s overall level of success justifies a fee award based on the hours expended by plaintiff’s counsel.” Flitton, 614 F.3d at 1177. ... Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff $59,511.94.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Yerkes v. Ohio State Highway Patrol · filed 2024-12-02(k)

Prevailing parties in Title VII civil rights actions are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for frivolous claims, but the defendant must show which fees arose solely from those claims.

Friedmann v. Franklin Pierce Public Schools · filed 2025-01-21(k)

Title VII provides for a “reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Under federal law, the Court can only award fees “attributable solely to the frivolous claims.” Harris, 631 F.3d at 972. However, Defendants have not segregated their fees by claim in their motion or billing records, see generally Dkt. Nos. 58, 59-3, and the Court cannot award fees based on the percentage of claims that were not wholly frivolous, Harris, 631 F.3d at 971. ... The Court therefore declines to award fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action, with the amount determined by the lodestar method.

Benton v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. · filed 2025-01-31(k)

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 1988(b) authorize a court to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a prevailing party in a action brought to enforce Title VII. In determining whether a fee award is reasonable, courts employ the lodestar method.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, including expert fees, as part of the costs.

Pianko v. General R.V. Center, Inc. · filed 2025-02-19(k)

In a Title VII action, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII party, with the fee reflecting the plaintiff’s degree of success.

McMillian v. Aberdeen School District · filed 2025-02-25(k)

Title VII allows the Court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party. ... Given that McMillian’s suit was relatively successful overall, the Court will reduce the lodestar by only 10 percent to account for McMillian’s two unsuccessful claims. The Court accordingly awards McMillian $68,838.30 in attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses, including attorney travel and lodging, but not attorney meals.

Navarette v. Madison County Sheriff's Office · filed 2025-03-27(k)

Finally, Plaintiff has petitioned for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(k), which allows the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees including expert fees as part of the costs. ... Accordingly, the Court finds the costs of the hotel room339s for trial and mileage expenses are reasonable and appropriate, but the costs for food during trial are not recoverable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff and does not require a reduction solely because related claims failed.

Juarez v. Midwest Division - OPRMC, LLC · filed 2025-04-07(k)

In an action under Title VII, the Court has discretion to award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). ... Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce the lodestar.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a prevailing Title VII defendant seeking attorney fees to substantiate the reasonableness of its lawyers’ rates and hours.

MARTIN v. THE BOEING COMPANY · filed 2025-04-11(k)

Accordingly, I may award Boeing reasonable counsel fees and costs on Martin’s Section 1981 and Title VIJ claims only. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 2000e-5(k). ... The Company has not remotely made a prima facie showing that its lawyers’ (and paralegals’) billing rates and expended hours are reasonable. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. Accordingly, I will deny its Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) fee requests by prevailing Title VII defendants are governed by the Christiansburg standard.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Aaron Thomas Company, Inc. · filed 2025-05-08(k)

Here, Christiansburg directly controls the case, as it sets out the standard for whether Supreme, as a prevailing defendant, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant only in exceptional circumstances, when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Shumate v. Route 1 Incorporated · filed 2025-05-14(k)

In sum, in keeping with the policy of awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant in a ... civil rights case such as this one only in exceptional circumstances and upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, the Court will ... deny Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only in exceptional circumstances, with particular strictness when the plaintiff represents herself.

Hukman v. Ed's Stations, Inc. · filed 2025-05-14(k)

The exceptional circumstances necessary to justify shifting Ed’s Stations’ attorney-fees bill to Hukman, a pro se plaintiff, are not present.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Scott v. Olives, Inc. · filed 2025-06-03(k)

In a Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action, a court has discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because the Court enters default judgment against Olives and in favor of Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, the Court in its discretion finds Plaintiff is entitled to his attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs.

Brown v. MGM Grand Casino · filed 2025-06-25(k)

Under Title VII, a court is empowered to award a prevailing party a “reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs” of the action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Given these other considerations, the Court is satisfied that $500 per hour for Mr. Hurwitz is a reasonable hourly rate for his services.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees, including fees for a successful appeal.

Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc. · filed 2025-08-21(k)

A plaintiff who prevails under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act may recover a reasonable attorney fee award. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978). ... Ms. Carbajal is entitled to her fees on appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Roches-Bowman · filed 2025-09-18(k)

As an initial matter, because Defendant successfully obtained dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, it is clear that Defendant “prevailed” in a proceeding under § 1988 and § 2000e–5(k). ... Here, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation when they were filed. ... For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Tang v. Eastern Virginia Medical School · filed 2025-09-23(k)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff, and finds that she neither unreasonably litigated her disparate treatment/retaliation claims nor advanced her trade secret claims in bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees as sanctions against a federal agency for violating an EEOC administrative judge’s order when no party has yet prevailed.

Authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to Impose Monetary Sanctions Against Federal Agencies for Failu · filed 2003-01-06(k)

When an agency violates an AJ order in an EEOC proceeding, we do not yet have a prevailing party in an administrative proceeding, let alone in a civil action. This consideration (among others) renders section 2000e-5(k) inapplicable to violations of such AJ orders.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats attorney’s fees as costs, so accepting a Rule 68 offer covering all accrued statutory costs settles the Title VII fee claim.

Wilson v. Nomura Securities International, Inc. - dissent · filed 2004-03-03(k)

Because Title VII expressly includes attorney’s fees in its definition of “costs,” Wilson’s acceptance of the Offer settled his claim for damages and his right to attorney’s fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in ADA claims through § 12117.

Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp. · filed 2004-03-31(k)

In the Discrimination Action, Mogilevsky seeks his attorney’s fees and costs under the Agreement for Judgment, and under 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (claims brought under the ADA, to which 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) applies), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (claims brought under the ADEA, to which 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) applies), 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (claims brought under the FMLA), and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9 (claims brought under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B). Each of these statutes permits the plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k), as incorporated by the Rehabilitation Act, permits possible attorney’s fees to count as costs secured by an appeal bond.

Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama · filed 2005-02-23(k)

Rather, applying Pedraza, this court must only find that the definition of “costs” under the Rehab Act can include attorneys’ fees for a prevailing appellee, and that there is a significant risk that appellant will be unable to pay the costs taxed against her. In this case, these essential factors are both present.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.

Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care System · filed 2008-03-31(k)

Plaintiff also requested attorney’s fees, costs and other expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). However, these provisions hold that the “prevailing party” is entitled to attorney’s fees. Plaintiff is not a prevailing party, as judgment as a matter of law will be entered on the damages claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, and Plaintiff will be denied equitable relief pursuant to the ADA. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for attorney’s fees and costs will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee, including expert fees, in a Title VII action.

YULE v. Jones · filed 2010-10-21(k)

The award of attorneys’ fees in this action is governed by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of fees, including expert fees, and costs to prevailing § 504 plaintiffs.

H.D. v. KENNETT CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2019-10-04(k)

The Court may award fees, including expert fees, and costs to plaintiffs who prevail on § 504 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and plaintiffs who prevail on IDEA claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). ... As the Parents have not prevailed on any of their claims, they are not entitled to any award of fees or costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney's fee for a prevailing party, including a plaintiff awarded damages on the claims presented to the jury.

Figueroa v. Gannett Company Incorporated · filed 2023-03-10(k)

Based on this award of damages, the Court finds Figueroa is the prevailing party and is eligible for an award of attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, including fees incurred on appeal.

Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company · filed 2025-10-15(k)

Under Title VII, courts may award the prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), including “fees incurred on appeal,” Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 633 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1981).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees, including expert fees, as costs.

LANGE · filed 2026-01-13(k)

Further, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) of Title VII, "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs."

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Simmons · filed 2026-01-27(k)

In a Title VII action, courts may, in their discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Considering the involvement of these professionals and the total amount of time spent, the Court finds counsel’s request for $7,572.00 in fees reasonable under the lodestar method.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; dismissal on summary judgment alone does not establish that standard.

Whitfield · filed 2026-02-03(k)

Defendant has not met the demanding standard required to recover attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party. Although Plaintiff’s claims were ultimately dismissed on summary judgment, dismissal alone does not render an action frivolous or unreasonable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Ruiz-Romero · filed 2026-02-04(k)

Title VII provides an exception; it allows a court to award “the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Plaintiff is awarded a total of $10,650.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevailed on at least one Title VII claim.

Griffin · filed 2026-03-10(k)

Because Plaintiff was a “prevailing party” at it relates to at least one of her claims, she was entitled to seek attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

A prevailing Title VII plaintiff’s attorney fee award need not be reduced further because the plaintiff rejected pretrial offers of reinstatement and settlement.

Rose Griffin v. Copper Cellar Corp. · filed 2026-05-05(k)

It was under no obligation to reduce the award further because Griffin had rejected the company’s pre-trial offers of reinstatement and settlement. The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in adopting the recommended fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an appellate fee award when it is premature to regard either party as having prevailed.

Stone v. Pima County · filed 2026-06-11(k)

Stone requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., A.R.S. §§ 12-341, 12-342, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). We deny his request because it is premature, at this stage, to regard either party as having prevailed.

Section 2000e-5(h) makes the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to Title VII civil actions.

King v. Georgia Power Company · filed 1968-08-09(h)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) provides that Nprris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, shall not be applicable to civil actions brought under Title VII, thus undercutting any possible basis for the validity of defendant’s position on this matter.

Section 2000e-5(h) exempts Title VII civil actions from the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s limits on injunctions.

Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co. · filed 1997-04-11(h)

The Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, does not apply to civil actions brought under either Title VII or the ADA ■ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

Section 2000e-5(h) exempts civil actions brought under Title VII from the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but the exemption does not cover arbitration of an independent collective bargaining claim.

Taylor v. SW Bell Telephone · filed 2001-05-22(h)

CWA's claim that Southwestern Bell had violated the "just cause" provision of the collective bargaining agreement was not "brought under" either Title VII or the ADA, and the precise issue for arbitration was not identical to the issues in her civil action.

Section 2000e-5 protects EEOC conciliation communications from disclosure without the parties’ written consent and from use as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.

Fears v. Burris Manufacturing Co. · filed 1969-10-29(a)

The Court has heretofore entered an order denying plaintiffs the right to access to correspondence between Burris and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) relating to employment at Burris’ plant and exchanged in the investigation and conciliation procedure undertaken by EEOC of the complaints filed by plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, provides that nothing said or done during and as a part of the investigation or conciliation endeavors of EEOC may be made public by EEOC without the written consent of the parties, or used as evidence in the subsequent proceeding. The Court held that this provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 served a useful purpose and encouraged employers to enter into conciliation proceedings with EEOC. The Court recognized the confidential and privileged nature of such correspondence, and granted Burris the benefit of its provisions.

Section 2000e-5(a) bars the use of EEOC conciliation efforts as evidence, but does not bar evidence of its investigation or probable-cause findings.

Smith v. Universal Services., Inc. · filed 1972-03-08(a)

It is clear from a casual reading of the statute that the emphasized portion of the statute refers only to efforts at conciliation of the EEOC and has no application to the agency's investigation or findings of probable cause.

Section 2000e-5(a) protects statements made during conciliation from disclosure to a party or attorney who did not participate in those discussions.

H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-09-26(a)

Rather, these portions of the Act are intended to insure that those directly involved in the conciliation process can fully and in good faith participate therein, uninhibited by any threat that their statements and actions will be released to anyone not otherwise privy thereto.

Section 2000e-5(a)'s ban on publicizing conciliation communications does not bar disclosure to the parties themselves.

H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1973-01-29(a)

This prohibition, like that pertaining to publication of the original charge, plainly suggests that the parties themselves would not be embraced by the term “public.”

Section 2000e-5(b) does not create an absolute privilege against pretrial discovery of EEOC conciliation materials.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Francis Community Hospital · filed 1976-03-02(b)

To recognize the broad privilege claimed by the Commission herein where the terms of Section 706(b) do not clearly require it would frustrate the clear purposes of the discovery rules.

Section 2000e-5(b) prohibits the EEOC from publicly disclosing predetermination settlement and conciliation agreements made through its informal efforts to resolve discrimination charges.

Parker v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, John H. Powell, Jr., Chairman · filed 1976-04-15(b)

The Court concludes that even though the documents sought herein are not specifically mentioned in the statute upon which Defendants rely, the agreements are specifically within the “categories of documents” which the Commission is prohibited from disclosing under Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The EEOC’s failure to notify a defendant of a charge or attempt conciliation does not bar an employee’s properly filed Title VII action.

Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 1976-07-07(f)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held, however, that the Commission’s failure to attempt conciliation or serve notice on defendants of filed charges is not a jurisdictional bar to an employee’s action if the employee has properly filed his complaint. An employee cannot be charged with the Commission’s failure to execute its statutory duties. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that International Union is properly before it as a party defendant.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows an affected employer to bring a civil action against the EEOC for an alleged violation of its nondisclosure rule.

Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1976-06-25(b)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that an affected employer, in alleging a violation of § 706(b), may thereby state a valid cause of action against the Commission based on alleged violations of that provision.

Section 2000e-5(b) protects information from EEOC settlement negotiations, including predetermination discussions, from disclosure to charging parties.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1977-07-26(b)

The requisite protection can be provided by interpreting the statutory language to deny charging parties access to settlement information.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to pursue discrimination uncovered during a reasonable investigation when its reasonable cause determination gives the employer notice and an opportunity for conciliation.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY · filed 1978-05-24(b)

The reasonable cause determination is not designed to adjudicate an employer's alleged violations of the Act but to notify an employer of the commission's findings and to provide common ground for conciliation. The commission's investigation of the initial charge reasonably satisfied these requirements, and its determination of reasonable cause and the proposed conciliation complied with § 706(b) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).

Section 2000e-5(b) prohibits the EEOC from disclosing information obtained during settlement negotiations to anyone outside the government, including charging parties.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1978-06-09(b)

Having concluded that under § 709(e) the EEOC cannot give out information to any parties outside the government, we hold that § 706(b) imposes a similar restriction on the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(b) prohibits the EEOC from disclosing information obtained during settlement or conciliation negotiations to charging parties outside the government.

Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1978-07-18(b)

Observing that § 706(b) uses essentially the same “make public” language found in § 709(e), and finding no reason to construe the two provisions differently, the Court of Appeals held that § 706(b) prohibited the EEOC from disclosing to parties outside the government any information gleaned from settlement or conciliation negotiations. ... Consequently, this Court adopts the view stated in Sears and will enter judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiff regarding the validity of the EEOC rules and regulations at issue here.

Section 2000e-5(b) prohibits the EEOC from disclosing information obtained during settlement discussions with employers to anyone outside the government.

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION · filed 1978-07-26(b)

Having concluded that under § 709(e) the EEOC cannot give out information to any parties outside the government, we hold that § 706(b) imposes a similar restriction on the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes the EEOC to enter enforceable conciliation agreements that include affirmative action terms.

EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., Inc. · filed 1978-09-28

Were defendant's argument to be adopted herein, it would mean that the conciliatory powers granted to the EEOC by Congress, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, would be meaningless since only the courts could order affirmative action. Thus, the Court concludes that the EEOC has the authority to enter into such conciliation agreements and that such agreements are enforceable herein.

A complainant who timely files an EEOC charge and receives a right-to-sue notice may sue even if the EEOC fails to attempt conciliation.

Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp. · filed 1978-11-09(d)

So long as the plaintiffs have properly and timely filed their administrative charges and received “right to sue” notices, they have satisfied their obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to make a good faith attempt at conciliation before suing an employer.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellee, v. RADIATOR SPECIALTY COMPANY, Appellant · filed 1979-11-15(b)

The law requires, however, no more than a good faith attempt at conciliation.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a reasonable cause determination and conciliation before the EEOC sues; conciliation covers all claims included in that determination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Akron National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1980-05-21(b)

As noted, however, conciliation efforts are a prerequisite to an action by the Commission. The scope of those efforts is defined by the reasonable cause determination. That is, once there is a reasonable cause determination, any conciliation efforts must be viewed as an attempt to settle all claims that were included within that determination.

Section 2000e-5(b) protects proposals and counter-proposals made during EEOC conciliation from disclosure, while allowing disclosure of purely factual material about the charge.

Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Company · filed 1981-03-05(b)

To the extent that the district court required disclosure of proposals and counter-proposals of compromise made by the parties during the Commission's efforts to conciliate Branch's charges against Phillips, its disclosure order was in error. To the extent that the order included purely factual material related to the merits of Branch's charge, it was not.

Section 2000e-5(b) protects information obtained during EEOC charge investigations from public disclosure, so confidentiality does not excuse an employer from complying with an EEOC subpoena.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Applicant-Appellee, v. BAY SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION, Respondent-Appellant · filed 1981-12-31(b)

But, as held in EEOC v. University of New Mexico, supra, 504 F.2d at 1303, confidentiality is no excuse for noncompliance since Title VII imposes criminal penalties for EEOC personnel who publicize information obtained in the course of investigating charges of employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to make a good faith effort to conciliate before suing; rejecting an offer that omits relief the EEOC reasonably believes may be available does not bar suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. California Teachers Ass'n · filed 1982-01-21(b)

Although it is unclear which of these two views controls in our jurisdiction, we believe that in the instant case, the EEOC’s efforts at conciliation would survive even the stringent inquiry into reasonableness applied in the Fifth Circuit. The EEOC rejected CTA’s settlement offer because it did not provide relief for “deterees.” ... Thus, the EEOC’s failure to accept CTA’s settlement offer does not bar the present action.

Section 2000e-5(b) restricts the EEOC’s public disclosure of conciliation information; it does not require employers to keep complaints confidential or bar disclosure to the parties.

Whitaker v. Nancy C. Carney, Director of Employee Relations for the City of Garland · filed 1985-12-10(b)

This admonition does not by its terms extend to employers. The desire for confidentiality on the part of the EEOC is presumably to encourage settlement of grievances by the parties. Finally, we note that even the prescription for EEOC discreetness respecting its informal mediation efforts does not preclude release of the identities of complainants or of the complaints themselves to the parties; rather, only release of such information by the Commission or its employees to the public is proscribed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the EEOC discretion to end conciliation after at least 30 days if it cannot secure an agreement acceptable to it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Newtown Inn Associates · filed 1986-01-24(f)(1)

The statutory language places only one restraint on the exercise of the Commission’s discretion, i.e., that the conciliation period be at least 30 days in length.

Section 2000e-5(b) prohibits disclosure of information about EEOC conciliation efforts.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Knight's Inc. · filed 1986-08-15(b)

Further, the EEOC urges a privilege of “deliberative process”, citing Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1981), and a statutory prohibition against the revelation of information regarding conciliation efforts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The Magistrate is persuaded that the EEOC is correct in its position on both points. The Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery filed July 3, 1986 is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-5(b) supports redacting other respondents’ names from EEOC materials to protect them from disclosure.

E.E.O.C. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1987-01-22(b)

Having considered the motion of the plaintiff to modify my order of January 22, 1987, the Court, although it expressed its unwillingness to revise that order, nonetheless feels that a narrow revision is necessary in order to protect. other respondents’ names from disclosure. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Therefore, the plaintiff may redact the material submitted to me in camera in the fashion requested, so as to omit the names of other respondents.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars use of EEOC conciliation material in later litigation without the concerned persons’ written consent, even by a party to the agency proceeding.

John D. Olitsky, Cross-Appellant v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1988-05-11(b)

Section 706(b) clearly prohibits any use of EEOC conciliation material in subsequent litigation, even by the parties to the agency proceeding.

Section 2000e-5(b) makes EEOC conciliation voluntary for employers and does not authorize sanctions for refusing to conciliate or reach an agreement.

Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. · filed 1988-08-05(b)

The statute does not empower the EEOC or a court of law to impose sanctions on the employer who refuses to conciliate or to reach an agreement.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the EEOC from publicly disclosing charges and conciliation information, including to a charged employer’s insurer.

American Centennial Insurance v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1989-08-17(b)

Therefore, §§ 706(b) and 709(e) fall within Exemption 3 of the FOIA and prohibit the EEOC from disclosing the requested information to the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give an employer an opportunity to resolve alleged discrimination through conciliation before filing suit; its determination letter need not identify every practice or class member.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jordan Graphics, Inc. · filed 1991-08-12(b)

The emphasis of the conciliation provision of Title VII is not to provide a rigid pleading requirement on the EEOC in enunciating the reasonable cause determination, but instead to provide employers with the opportunity to resolve disputes with the EEOC before a lawsuit is filed.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a party to discover EEOC conciliation materials but bars their use in subsequent litigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co. · filed 1992-11-24(b)

Section 706(b) prohibits disclosure to the “public” of documents reflecting “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion” absent written permission of the parties to the agency proceeding. ... Thus FINA may discover Exhibits BB through LL but may not use them in court if this case goes to trial.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s bar on using conciliation negotiations as evidence may be waived when both parties rely on their terms in a jurisdictional dispute.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1996-04-10(b)

Based on these facts, the court finds that Rockwell has waived the bar in 2000e-5(b), and that the court may consider the written conciliation negotiations between the parties for purposes of Rockwell’s jurisdictional motion.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the use of EEOC conciliation communications as evidence in a later proceeding without the parties’ consent.

Sumner v. Wayne County · filed 2000-03-23(b)

However, on its face, section 2000e-5 provides that such information cannot be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings without each party’s consent. Defendants have offered no evidence of Sumner’s consent, so the letter cannot be used as evidence at trial.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to attempt good faith conciliation before suing and leaves the form and substance of those efforts to the agency’s discretion.

Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc. · filed 2001-02-15(b)

Thus, in reviewing EEOC’s efforts, the court leaves the form and substance of conciliation to the agency’s sound discretion. ... In this ease, having reviewed the record as a whole, the court finds that EEOC has properly conciliated its charge against CP.

Section 2000e-5(b) makes conciliation after a reasonable-cause determination a separate step from the EEOC investigation.

Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Georgia · filed 2007-02-21(b)

The “informal method” of conciliation, although an important part of the remedial process, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a), is distinct from the “investigation” that results in the letter of determination.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to attempt conciliation before suing, and judicial review asks whether those efforts gave the employer an opportunity to confront the issues.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hometown Buffet, Inc. · filed 2007-03-06(b)

This court’s role is limited to reviewing whether the EEOC’s efforts afforded the employer an opportunity to confront the issues.

Section 2000e-5(b) protects conciliation information from discovery without the participants’ consent.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Olsten Staffing Services Corp. · filed 2009-06-18(b)

Although the statute states that the conciliation information may not be used as evidence without the participants’ consent, courts considering this issue have found that it also applies to discovery.