42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Dean v. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 476 · filed 2008-04-27(k)

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs arguments do not appear to have been made in bad faith, and the Court concludes that Plaintiffs merit-less motion for reconsideration does not demonstrate that this “action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII party, with the amount reflecting the party’s degree of success.

Sellers v. Peters · filed 2008-04-14(k)

Title VII provides the district court the discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in a civil rights action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

A prevailing Title VII plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees for defending a counterclaim if the counterclaim arises under a fee-shifting statute or is closely intertwined with a claim for which fees may be awarded.

Rozell v. Ross-Holst · filed 2008-05-29(k)

Where a counterclaim is asserted in a Title VII or other civil rights case, a prevailing plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees for defending against that counterclaim in two circumstances: where the counterclaim itself is brought pursuant to a fee-shifting statute or where the merits of the counterclaim are closely intertwined with resolution of an affirmative claim for which fees may be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; the fee analysis considers both the party’s success and the reasonableness of the fees.

Abner v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. · filed 2008-08-15(k)

While Defendant objects to the fees and costs from the first trial on two separate grounds – urging that they were unreasonable and that Plaintiffs did not prevail – these inquiries are by necessity intertwined under the unique facts of this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation when filed.

Gatsas v. Manchester School · filed 2008-08-22(k)

While it qualified as among the weakest cases presented to a jury, given the evidence, still, plaintiff's claims were not "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" at the time the complaint was filed. ... Accordingly, as defendant is unable to establish the necessary prerequisite to an award, the court declines to award attorneys' fees to defendant as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow fees for an unsuccessful claim that is distinct from a successful discrimination claim.

Trout v. Secretary of Navy · filed 2008-09-02(k)

Litigation of the interest issue was not inextricably intertwined with the sex discrimination litigation – it was not necessary to obtain or protect any relief awarded, nor was it necessary to preserve the integrity of the Consent Decree as a whole. The district court therefore correctly determined that the issues were distinct and denied an award of attorneys’ fees for litigation of the interest issue.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorney’s fees, but a prevailing Title VII plaintiff ordinarily receives reasonable fees unless special circumstances justify denial.

Tureaud v. Grambling State University · filed 2008-09-30(k)

The plain language of § 2000e-5(k) indicates that an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party is discretionary. However, the Supreme Court has added an interpretive gloss to this statute: “a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Stover v. Hattiesburg Public School District · filed 2008-11-18(k)

In awarding attorney’s fees to the School District, the district court, as the district court in Pelmer did, appears to have engaged in post hoc reasoning to find that Stover’s action was frivolous. The record does not support a finding that Stover’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney’s fee award to a defendant that, after an appellate reversal, is no longer the prevailing party on a large portion of the plaintiff’s claims.

Parker v. State LA Dept Educ · filed 2009-04-23(k)

The district court, acting on the magistrate judge’s recommendation, awarded the DOE its attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The district court’s award was based upon the fact that the DOE was the prevailing party. By our decision today, the DOE is no longer the prevailing party on a large portion of Parker’s claims. Thus, the award of attorney’s fees, at this point, is inappropriate and should be reversed.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney’s fee award based on a defendant’s prevailing party status when that defendant no longer prevails on a large portion of the claims.

Parker v. Louisiana Department of Education Special School District · filed 2009-04-23(k)

The district court, acting on the magistrate judge’s recommendation, awarded the DOE its attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The district court’s award was based upon the fact that the DOE was the prevailing party. By our decision today, the DOE is no longer the prevailing party on a large portion of Parker’s claims. Thus, the award of attorney’s fees, at this point, is inappropriate and should be reversed.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides the basis for awarding attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases.

Orr v. Mukasey · filed 2009-07-07(k)

This case, of course, arises pursuant to Title VII, not 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides the basis for awarding attorneys’ fees, not 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow an attorney’s fee award to a defendant whose favorable summary judgment has been reversed, because the defendant is not a prevailing party.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Central Wholesalers, Inc. · filed 2009-07-21(k)

Because we are reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Central, Central is not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of § 2000e-5(k), and we therefore affirm the district court’s judgment on this basis.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a successful Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney fees.

Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc. · filed 2009-08-28(k)

A successful plaintiff under the ICRA and Title VII is entitled to reasonable attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) fee awards must use current local hourly rates that reflect the attorneys’ experience when they performed the work.

Lochren v. County of Suffolk · filed 2009-09-03(k)

Accordingly, remand is necessary for the district court to determine and apply current rates in the Eastern District for attorneys -with the experience level of those who worked on the case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits discretionary attorney fees for a prevailing party, but a prevailing Title VII defendant may receive fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Schmidt v. Medicalodges, Inc. · filed 2009-10-20(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) provides that the district court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party in a Title VII action reasonable attorney fees. ... But the Supreme Court has made clear that a Title VII defendant is not entitled to an award of fees unless the court finds that the plaintiff’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... We decline Medicalodges’ invitation to ignore clear Supreme Court precedent supporting the denial of attorney’s fees in these circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, including legal assistant time spent preparing trial materials rather than performing purely clerical tasks.

Stuart v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County · filed 2009-12-21(k)

Both Title VII and the THRA permit the prevailing party in an employment discrimination suit to recover attorneys’ fees. ... Legal assistant time is generally recoverable by the prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action, with the caveat that “purely clerical or secretarial tasks” may not be billed at the standard paralegal rate. ... Therefore, the $320 is recoverable as part of the attorneys’ fee in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in a Title VII action, with the fee reduced to reflect partial success.

Germain v. County of Suffolk · filed 2009-12-05(k)

Presently before the Court is the Plaintiffs motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs fee award should be reduced by 20% to reflect her partial success in this case. ... When the presumptively reasonable fee award is adjusted to account for the 20% across-the-board reduction for partial success, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $207,395. The Plaintiffs unopposed application for costs in the amount of $12,581.98 is granted.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who receives no enforceable relief on her Title VII claim, even if she recovers on a state law claim.

Myers v. CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC. · filed 2010-01-06(k)

In short, Myers is not a prevailing party on the Title VII claim and is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for defending a judgment on appeal.

Luca v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-01-25(k)

Since she successfully defended her verdict, she is entitled to such an award.

A defendant’s fee award under § 2000e-5(k) based on a complaint’s frivolity cannot stand when most of the claims state valid grounds for relief.

La Grande v. DeCrescente Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 2010-03-23(k)

The award of attorneys’ fees to DeCrescente based on the frivolity of La Grande’s complaint cannot survive our holding that most of the claims in that complaint in fact state valid claims for relief.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Hunter v. District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency · filed 2010-05-11(k)

In a Title VII action such as this one, a court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). It has yet to be determined whether Mr. Hunter will be the prevailing party in this action, and Mr. Hunter could, at any time, retain an attorney to represent him, in which case he could recovery attorney’s fees. The District’s motion to dismiss the request for attorney fees will be denied as premature.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party; a fee request need not be dismissed before prevailing-party status is determined when a pro se plaintiff may still retain counsel.

Hunter v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2010-05-11(k)

In a Title VII action such as this one, a court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). It has yet to be determined whether Mr. Hunter will be the prevailing party in this action, and Mr. Hunter could, at any time, retain an attorney to represent him, in which case he could recovery attorney’s fees. The District’s motion to dismiss the request for attorney fees will be denied as premature.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action at its discretion.

Lue-Martin v. March Group L.L.L.P. · filed 2010-05-13(k)

Likewise, there is no abuse of discretion in declining to make a fee award under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5 allows a prevailing Title VII claimant to sue in federal court solely to recover attorney’s fees for work done in administrative proceedings.

Porter v. Winter · filed 2010-05-05(f)(1), (f)(3), (k)

Because 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and 2000e-5(k) authorize a civil suit in federal court solely to recover attor- ney’s fees for legal work done in administrative proceedings, Porter’s claim qualifies as an “action[ ] brought under this subchapter” for purposes of Title VII’s jurisdictional grant.

Section 2000e-5(k) protects a prevailing Title VII claimant’s ability to recover attorney’s fees; an arbitration agreement cannot bar that remedy.

Nino v. JEWELRY EXCHANGE, INC. · filed 2010-06-15(k)

Such provisions also undermine the legislative intent behind fee-shifting statutes like Title VII. ... The arbitration agreement’s restriction on the arbitrator’s ability to award attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses is substantively unconscionable, as the District Court correctly concluded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for work on unsuccessful claims related to a successful claim.

Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2010-08-05(k)

Thus, the unsuccessful claims raised by Ms. Flitton in the second jury trial were not distinct in all respects from the successful claims she pursued in the first jury trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exclude the fees accrued during the second jury trial from Ms. Flitton’s ultimate fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, including fees for work on related claims.

Loos v. Club Paris, LLC · filed 2010-08-09(k)

A court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney’s fees under Title VII to a prevailing party as part of its costs. ... Therefore, the Court approves the Plaintiffs proposed loadstar amount of $20,912.50, representing an hourly rate of $350.00 times 59.75 hours reasonably expended in prosecuting the Title VII and other related claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Hobson v. St. Luke's Hospital & Health Network · filed 2010-08-10(k)

A district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... While mistaken in his belief that his Amended Complaint remedied the flaws of his original Complaint, plaintiffs claims were not so frivolous, his belief not so unreasonable or without foundation as to warrant an award of attorney fees and costs to defendant. Therefore, defendant’s request for leave to file a motion for attorney fees and costs is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees at the court’s discretion; a prevailing defendant must show that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue · filed 2010-09-21(k)

To recover fees from the plaintiff, a defendant must show that “the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party, rather than directly to the party’s lawyer.

Hickey v. Scott · filed 2010-09-16(k)

Not so. Any increased attorney’s fees award would have been granted to Scott, not Hickey.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party in a Title VII suit.

Davis v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 2010-12-17(k)

In a Title VII employment discrimination suit, a court may award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... There is no question here that class counsel represented a “prevailing party” and is entitled to attorneys’ fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court · filed 2011-01-20(k)

In addition to the fees sought under § 12-341.01, defen- dants also sought fees under three civil rights statutes— Arizona Revised Statute § 41-1481(J) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k). ... Fee awards to prevailing defendants under all three of these stat- utes are governed by the same standard: the court may award attorney’s fees only if it finds that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work on related claims despite a plaintiff’s failure to prevail on every claim.

Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C. · filed 2011-02-10(k)

Therefore, while this Court recognizes its authority to reduce an award of attorneys’ fees for limited success, it declines to do so in this case. Lewis’ claims for discrimination and retaliation were clearly related and the evidentiary bases for these claims were inextricably intertwined.

Section 2000e-5(k) attorney fee awards accrue to counsel, not to the individual plaintiff.

Kant v. Seton Hall Univ · filed 2011-04-08(k)

Moreover, despite Kant’s argument to the contrary, he is not eligible for the attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as it is well-established that, “[s]ince the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards must accrue to counsel.” Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977) (receded from on other grounds in Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980)).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary award of reasonable appellate attorney fees for successfully defending an appeal, but not for an unsuccessful cross-appeal.

McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2011-04-11(k)

Such an award is appropriate in this case for McInerney’s successful defense of United’s appeal. However, attorney fees are not appropriate for McInerney’s unsuccessful cross-appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s suit is vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit.

Adcock v. Sunquest Properties, Inc. · filed 2011-04-11(k)

Attorney’s fees for prevailing defendants in Title VII actions are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is made that the underlying civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit. ... While Adcock’s suit was appropriately dismissed on summary judgment, the district court abused its discretion in finding that the case was so groundless as to warrant the award of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Ogletree v. Glen Rose Independent School District · filed 2011-10-11(k)

We cannot say that these claims “were so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless,” see Stover, 549 F.3d at 988, and the district court abused its discretion insofar as its fee award is attributable to Ogletree’s retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII claimant to seek attorney’s fees in federal court for successful state administrative proceedings.

Ballard v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2011-10-26(k)

As such, a suit for attorney’s fees is proper as a supplemental remedy under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Great Steaks, Inc. · filed 2012-01-26(k)

We disagree and hold that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that the EEOC’s case was not frivo- lous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Richardson v. Tex-Tube Co. · filed 2012-02-10(k)

Having established that it is the prevailing party, Tex-Tube must also show that Richardson’s lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ... Based on the deposition testimony of Richardson, taken under oath on July 13, 2011, as well as the underlying factual contentions set forth in the record, the Court finds that the claims Richardson asserted against Tex-Tube were meritless and without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorneys’ fees for a prevailing Title VII party, calculated without reducing the hourly rate because counsel also receives a contingent fee.

Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center · filed 2011-12-15(k)

The contingent fee that an attorney earns from his client and the statutory fee that an attorney recovers from the losing party represent distinct entitlements. In reviewing a fee petition, a district court is tasked only with examining whether the rate and hours requested are reasonable; the total amount that the attorney stands to recover must not influence this determination.

An attorney fee award under § 2000e-5(k) must be reconsidered when an appellate ruling changes the plaintiff’s degree of success.

Sanders v. Lee County School Dist. No. 1 · filed 2012-02-28(k)

Our resolution of the constructive discharge claim and the punitive damage awards directly affects the degree of success Sanders obtained in her civil rights action, requiring a remand on the fee request in any event.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, but fees for work on unrelated unsuccessful claims may be excluded.

Medina v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-04-23(k)

Attorney’s fees may be awarded to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... As is clear from the above review, the work performed on the motions just specified and explained, did not advance in any way his success before the jury.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit a defendant to recover attorney's fees as a prevailing party while the plaintiff still has live claims against it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. · filed 2012-05-08(k)

In light of our reversals of a couple of the district court's summary-judgment orders, CRST is no longer a "prevailing" defendant because the EEOC still asserts live claims against it.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees calculated using prevailing market rates even when a retainer agreement sets a lower rate.

Townsend v. BENJAMIN ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2012-05-09(k)

The district court did not err in declining to use the retainer rate as the basis for calculating the reasonable hourly rate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, excluding unnecessary work.

Aly v. Mohegan Council, Boy Scouts of America · filed 2012-05-18(k)

Title VII- provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs____”42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, plaintiff will be awarded $70,175 in attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not entitle a defendant to an interim fee award for winning nondispositive motions when it has not prevailed on the merits or shown that the underlying suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 2012-06-26(k)

Accordingly, as of this time, U.S. Steel is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as it is not yet a prevailing party, nor has it demonstrated that EEOC’s underlying lawsuit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, despite the opportunity to do so at two separately scheduled hearings.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert fees.

Bennett v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2012-10-30(k)

As prevailing party, the Court may award plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees and costs, including expert fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Plaintiffs trial counsel is hereby awarded $278,740 in attorneys’ fees and $48,683.15 in costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Adams v. Austal, USA, LLC · filed 2013-01-04(k)

For a defendant to obtain an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988 or § 2000e-5(k), the defendant must show that a plaintiff’s claim “was frivolous, unreasonable, . . . groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Given the totality of the circumstances and the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims were not frivolous and denying Austal’s motions for attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award against the EEOC, but a prevailing defendant cannot recover when the EEOC’s claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. · filed 2013-01-18(k)

The EEOC may be held “liable for costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). ... Accordingly, although EEOC’s claim must fail, it was not “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” for them to pursue it, thus attorneys fees will not be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits attorney’s fees and costs only for violations of § 2000e-2(m), so it does not cover mixed-motive retaliation claims.

Carter v. Luminant Power Services Co. · filed 2013-04-03(g)(2)(B)(i)

Section § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) authorizes cost- and fee-shifting only for violations of § 2000e-2(m). Retaliation does not violate § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) does not authorize attorney’s fees or costs for mixed-motive retaliation claims.

Carter v. Luminant Power Services Co. · filed 2013-04-15(g)(2)(B)(i)

But under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), the employer may still need to reimburse the plaintiffs costs and attorney’s fees. The parties dispute whether that cost- and fee-shifting provision applies to mixed-motive retaliation claims. We hold that it does not.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Provensal v. Gaspard · filed 2013-05-16(k)

Costs and attorney’s fees may be awarded under Federal Rule of Civil Pro- cedure 54 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and, in Title VII cases, are explicitly made avail- able and relegated to the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... A prevailing defendant, on the other hand, should recover fees only where the “court finds that [the plaintiff’s] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so” or that the plaintiff brought a claim in bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII party, including a plaintiff who succeeds on a significant issue in an appeal.

Sands v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2013-03-26(k)

A court has discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the "prevailing party" in a Title VII case. ... Because the supreme court agreed that Sands was entitled to front pay, Sands succeeded on a significant issue in Menard's appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing intervenor to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees even when the EEOC brought the action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Autozone, Inc. · filed 2013-03-29(k)

As a rightful plaintiff to the lawsuit, Mahoney Burroughs is, therefore, entitled to recover such attorneys’ fees as are due to any “prevailing party” under the statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee, and a court may compensate for delayed payment without requiring an unusually long delay or misconduct by the defendant.

West v. Potter · filed 2013-06-11(k)

Title VII provides that prevailing parties may recover a “reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... As noted above, the magistrate judge recited as factors in his refusal to provide compensation for delay in payment that the delay was neither unusually long nor attributable to the defendant’s dilatory or stalling conduct. While these may be appropriate factors to consider in whether to award an adjustment for delay, neither we nor the Supreme Court have deemed them exclusive.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant merely because the plaintiff was untruthful about incident details when independent evidence could support her claims.

Park v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections · filed 2013-07-17(k)

Accordingly, because there was evidence, independent of the testimony disbelieved by the court, that supported plaintiffs claims and would have permitted the jury to draw inferences supporting her claims, the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs claims were unreasonable and frivolous is error.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

Taylor v. Republic Services Inc. · filed 2013-09-16(k)

The Court finds that Ms. Taylor, as the prevailing party on her claim for retaliatory discharge, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation · filed 2013-11-27(k)

While the Plaintiff was unsuccessful in his claims under Title VII and the ADA, this Court cannot conclude in hindsight that the claims were so devoid of foundation that to bring suit at all was frivolous.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff unreasonably initiates litigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Propak Logistics, Inc. · filed 2014-03-25(k)

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees to Propak under Section 2000e-5(k). ... We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the EEOC acted unreasonably in initiating this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing party in a Title VII suit to recover attorney’s fees and costs, with the fee award left to the district court’s discretion.

Rhines v. Salinas Construction Technologies, Ltd. · filed 2014-06-25(k)

“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a ‘prevailing party’ in a suit brought under Title VII is entitled to recover [his] attorneys’ fees and costs.” EEOC v. Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir.1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). ... Given the record, Salinas Construction has not shown that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees was error, much less an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing party’s Title VII appeal, but not for an optional internal grievance proceeding.

Barrett v. Salt Lake County · filed 2014-06-13(k)

So it seems pretty plain that under Manders the district court could not award fees for them. ... Section 706(k) of Title VII authorizes courts to award a prevailing party its attorney fees “[i]n any action or proceeding under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees.

Climent García v. Autoridad de Transporte Marítimo y Las Islas Municipio · filed 2014-07-18(k)

When determining the proper amount of attorney’s fees, the lodestar method is used to calculate reasonable fees under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) requires an award of some fees for work on a fee request, while allowing reductions for unreasonableness.

Terry v. City of San Diego · filed 2014-07-25(k)

However, under the federal statute, the district court was required to award some fees on fees, although it retained discretion to reduce the hours or total award for unreasonableness.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees for work on a related assault claim when that work contributed to success on a Title VII claim.

Rand v. Town of Exeter · filed 2014-09-30(k)

While, as a legal matter, Rand was not obligated to prove her assault and battery claim against McAllister in order to prevail on her retaliation claim against the Town, see Rodríguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps of P.R., 743 F.3d 278, 284 n.2 (1st Cir. 2014), those two claims are more than sufficiently related to justify an award of fees, under the Title VII fee-shifting provision, for prosecuting the assault claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Bluestein v. Central Wisconsin Anesthesiology, S.C. · filed 2014-10-15(k)

Bluestein and her lawyer also appeal the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a determination that we review for abuse of discretion. ... A reasonable jurist could conclude that Bluestein’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation, and we therefore affirm the award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney fees when the plaintiff continues litigating after a claim clearly becomes frivolous or without foundation.

Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC · filed 2014-11-18(k)

In light of the foregoing discussion regarding the procedural background of this case, the court finds that the Plaintiff continued to vexatiously and unreasonably litigate a claim that, after the taking of her deposition, had clearly become frivolous and without foundation. Therefore, an award of fees in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Echevarria v. Insight Medical, P.C. · filed 2014-12-22(k)

And while Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim was not ultimately successful, a careful review of the evidence detailed in the Facts section of this Opinion confirms that the claim was not baseless. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; the court assesses the information the EEOC possessed when it filed suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Horizons, Inc. · filed 2015-03-19(k)

After reviewing Christiansburg Garment and its progeny, the Court holds that, once the EEOC’s Title VII claims have been resolved in the defendant’s favor and the defendant files a motion for attorney’s fees, a court must consider the totality of the information possessed by the EEOC when it filed the lawsuit in order to determine if the filing was reasonable, frivolous, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Echevarria v. Insight Medical, P.C. · filed 2015-04-29(k)

Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”) authorize the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (allowing “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees)” to prevailing parties under Title VII); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502 (“In any civil action commenced pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”). ... Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $82,970.04.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees in its discretion.

Porter v. Winter · filed 2015-05-18(k)

The record supports the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee”); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) (an award of reasonable attorney’s fees allowable only for “services performed . . . after the filing of a written complaint, provided that the attorney provides reasonable notice of representation to the agency . . . , except that fees are allowable for a reasonable period of time prior to the notification of representation for any services performed in reaching a determination to represent the complainant”); see also Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-38 (1991) (pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for a prevailing plaintiff on a Title VII retaliation claim.

Mohammed v. Central Driving Mini Storage, Inc. · filed 2015-06-05(k)

As the prevailing party on his claim for retaliatory discharge, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Freeman · filed 2015-09-03(k)

Accordingly, before a prevailing defendant may be awarded fees, it must demonstrate that a plaintiffs claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to reduce a prevailing party’s attorney fee award when the party had limited success.

Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center · filed 2015-09-04(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a district court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII case. It may also reduce a prevailing party’s award based on redundant, excessive, or improperly billed hours, or based on the attorneys’ limited success in the case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover reasonable attorney fees when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Johnson v. City of Mobile · filed 2015-09-30(k)

Having concluded that the circuit court properly determined that Johnson’s claims are frivolous and, thus, that the City is entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the next consideration is whether the attorney fees awarded by the circuit court were reasonable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs.

Makray v. Solis · filed 2016-02-08(k)

Under Title VII, the court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Anderson v. Harrison Cty Adult Deten Ctr · filed 2016-02-12(k)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), like 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), authorize the court, in its discretion, to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. ... That is, a district court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing civil rights defendant only “upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... In the end, however, we decline to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Harrison County’s request for attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court assessing reasonable attorneys’ fees to deny discovery of opposing counsel’s billing records when the records would not help evaluate the fee request and reopening discovery would be burdensome.

Costa v. Sears Home Improvement Products, Inc. · filed 2016-04-18(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes a court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court does not view Defendants’ own billing records as particularly relevant to a resolution of these issues. ... Accordingly, because the Court does not view the records sought by Plaintiff as relevant, particularly when considered in the context of the burden that would be imposed on all parties and the Court by reopening discovery, Plaintiffs motion to reopen discovery (Dkt. 129) is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, including fees calculated at current rates to compensate for delayed payment.

Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of France in the United States · filed 2016-05-24(k)

Title VII grants federal courts discretion to award “the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court will also grant Plaintiff’s request to use current USAO Laffey rates “[i]n lieu of seeking interest” as the method of accounting for these delays.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.

Craig v. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2016-07-15(k)

Under Title VII, the court is authorized, in its discretion, to award “the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e– 5(k). ... After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Ms. Craig’s counsel’s requested rate of $568 per hour is consistent with his customary billing practices and supported by counsel’s skill, experience, and reputation.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not require a Title VII defendant to obtain a favorable ruling on the merits to qualify as a prevailing party for attorney's fees.

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n · filed 2016-05-19(k)

The Court now holds that a favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant has prevailed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party but sets no deadline for filing a fee motion.

West v. Potter · filed 2016-08-12(k)

Plaintiff brings this Motion under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which grants courts discretion to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party in a case brought under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Act does not provide a timing schedule for attorney’s fees motions. See id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 instructs that, unless a statute or court order provides otherwise, a motion for attorney’s fees must “be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 54(d)(2)(B)(i).

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

Ridgell-Boltz v. Colvin · filed 2016-08-10(k)

Exercising our discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), we deny Ms. Ridgell-Boltz’s request for attorney fees and costs incurred for this appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Costa v. Sears Home Improvement Products, Inc. · filed 2016-09-22(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes a court, in its discretion, to award the reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize appellate attorney fees when a remand merely allows a claim to proceed and does not make the plaintiff a prevailing party.

Ridgell-Boltz v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-07(k)

Citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), Ms. Ridgell-Boltz requests her attorney fees and costs incurred for this appeal. However, obtaining a remand on her hostile-work- environment claim does not make her a prevailing party under that statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, with reductions for inadequately documented hours, clerical work, and time spent on unsuccessful claims.

Brown v. Mountainview Cutters, LLC · filed 2016-11-28(k)

A prevailing party in a Title VII action “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” ... Based on the court’s review of the records submitted and its knowledge of the case and others like it, the court finds it appropriate to reduce the number of hours billed by Mr. Grimes and Ms. Haddox by 15 percent, and the number of hours billed by the paralegal by 20 percent.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Tridico v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-01-30(k)

The Court has discretion to award a prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees and costs in Title VII and USERRA actions.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Payne v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2017-03-14(k)

Under Title VII, the district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, so long as the prevailing ... party is not the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). “[T]he Supreme Court has held that a successful defendant can only recover [Title VII] fees if ‘the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’” ... We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion in the award of attorneys’ fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a lodestar fee award despite a contingency fee agreement.

Fox v. Pittsburg State University · filed 2017-06-26(k)

Despite the contingency agreement in this matter, the Court still properly conducts a lodestar calculation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing private parties in actions enforcing equal employment discrimination laws.

Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. · filed 2017-06-28(k)

Under the fee-shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts may award “a reasonable attorneys’ fee” to prevailing private parties in any action or proceeding to enforce equal employment discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) requires courts to determine whether each plaintiff is a prevailing party before awarding attorney fees for that plaintiff.

Howe v. City of Akron · filed 2017-08-15(k)

This is not impermissible parsing; it is exactly what §§ 2000e-5 and 1988 require. ... Thus, the district court was required to determine whether each ... plaintiff was, in fact, a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a district court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Latin v. Bellio Trucking · filed 2017-12-20(k)

In a Title VII discrimination case, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) allows a district court, “in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award despite nominal damages when the plaintiff obtains significant injunctive relief and the litigation serves a public purpose.

Burke v. Mattis · filed 2018-06-04(k)

As noted, the Court has discretion to award attorney's fees in successful Title VII cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Here, the Court fashioned significant injunctive relief complementing the nominal damages award. Accordingly, this factor favors an award of attorney's fees. ... For these reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2018-06-08(k)

Although section 706(k) of Title VII provides for fee shift- ing in favor of any “prevailing party,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), courts have long recognized that fees should be awarded to prevailing defendants only in exceptional cases. ... A district court may award fees to a prevailing defendant only “upon a find- ing that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for administrative work that advances successful Title VII litigation, but not for work on unrelated benefit issues.

Romano v. Marklund Children's Home · filed 2018-09-10(k)

The court believes time spent at the IDES hearing itself is compensable. Time devoted to research concerning Plaintiff’s eligibility for unemployment benefits, the standard of review for such a decision, and the “good cause” standard, however, is not necessary to advance this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing Title VII party, based on reasonable hours and hourly rates.

Ruggles v. Annett Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-01-03(k)

A court may award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to the prevailing party in litigation under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court concludes that the lodestar amount is a reasonable fee in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, with fees determined using reasonable hourly rates and hours.

Nichols v. Illinois Department Of Transportation · filed 2019-01-10(k)

On August 11, 2017, Nichols filed the present motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) seeking $1,709,345 in fees and $4,460.47 in costs. As will be discussed in detail below, the fees are significantly overstated and will be reduced by the Court through the determination of a reasonable hourly rate and reasonable hours.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Incorporated · filed 2018-11-02(k)

Although section 706(k) of Title VII provides for fee shift- ing in favor of any “prevailing party,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), courts have long recognized that fees should be awarded to prevailing defendants only in exceptional cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney’s fee award to a defendant that is no longer a prevailing party.

Eeoc v. Global Horizons, Inc · filed 2019-02-06(k)

Finally, we reverse the district court’s order granting the Growers’ motions for attorney’s fees, as the Growers are no longer prevailing parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees only in actions or proceedings under Title VII.

Dorval v. Moe's Fresh Market · filed 2019-02-19(k)

Defendants also seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which allows for attorney’s fees “[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter,” i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this case does not involve any Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorneys’ fees and expenses when a plaintiff retains a judgment establishing liability.

Sansone v. Brennan · filed 2019-03-06(k)

Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats attorneys’ fees as costs, so Rule 68’s cost-shifting provision applies to attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases.

Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC · filed 2019-06-12(k)

And because the enforcement provision of Title VII defines costs to include attorneys’ fees, the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68 also applies to attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases. Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party; an unopposed fee request need not be granted in full.

Hubbell v. SmartPost · filed 2019-08-05(k)

But just because district courts—or even this court—have done so in some cases does not mean that the court is required to do so. Indeed, adopting such a rule would be in considerable tension with this circuit’s caselaw requiring district courts to calculate the “lodestar” and then any applicable adjustments. See, e.g., Waldo, 726 F.3d at 821–22 (collecting cases). It would also be inconsistent with the statutory language allowing for attorney’s fees in Title VII actions, which states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when a claim is frivolous or groundless, but leaves the award to the court’s discretion.

Badgerow v. REJ Properties, Inc. · filed 2019-08-14(k)

Even assuming that Defendant could identify from its billing records how much time was devoted solely to defending the class aspect of the Title VII claim (as opposed to the hostile work environment claim which was not alleged to be class-based), the Court is not persuaded that an attorney fee award is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Tinsley v. City of Charlotte · filed 2019-08-19(k)

According to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k), a Court may award a prevailing party in Title VII actions attorney’s fees. ... In the Court’s discretion, the Court finds that this case is an appropriate case for an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees, including ordinary litigation expenses charged to a client.

Rebollar v. Ortega Medical Clinic, P.L.L.C. · filed 2019-08-22(k)

Under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff may recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court likewise concludes that Rebollar’s is entitled to recover the entirety of her requested costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover fees for frivolous claims only when those claims caused the fees.

Evans v. County School District · filed 2019-08-22(k)

The Court finds that Defendant’s attorney’s fees cannot be fairly attributed to the defense of Plaintiff’s frivolous claims, nor were the frivolous claims the but-for cause of any of Defendant’s legal expenses.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees in a Title VII case, including fees for work on the fee petition.

Johnson v. Southwest Research Institute · filed 2019-08-23(k)

And in Title VII cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) further allows courts to include a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of these costs, including fees for the time spent working on the fee petition.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Morris v. BNSF Railway · filed 2019-09-13(k)

The prevailing party in an employment discrimination case under Title VII or section 1981 may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). ... The Court deems the fee request reasonable in terms of both the number of hours worked and the attorneys' hourly rates, which accord with the rates they have been awarded in prior cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party; a plaintiff whose claims fail at summary judgment is not a prevailing party.

Lovett v. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP · filed 2019-10-03(k)

Because none of his claims survive summary judgment, Plaintiff is not a prevailing party and his claim for attorney’s fees also fails.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Davis v. Penn Aluminum International, LLC · filed 2019-09-25(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits the Court, in its discretion, to award “reasonable attorney’s fee” to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Under these circumstances, this Court does not find Davis’ pursuit of the same wholly unreasonable. Accordingly, Penn’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 40) is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Edwards v. The Urban League of Nebraska, Inc. · filed 2019-10-21(k)

The Court finds that an attorney's fee award to defendant is not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.

Fuller v. Corrections, Idaho Department of · filed 2019-11-26(k)

Fuller has now filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Nontaxable Costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) & (c), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the court “may allow the prevailing party” to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” ... The Court finds that the rates requested by Fuller’s counsel are reasonable and declines to reduce the rate used in the lodestar calculation simply because Fuller’s counsel was awarded different rates in an unrelated state case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney fees for unsuccessful claims that are factually and legally related to a successful claim.

Sommers-Wilson v. Samsung SDI America, Inc. · filed 2019-11-27(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party and entrusts the effectuation of this statutory policy to the discretion of the district courts. ... These precedents weigh against Samsung for good reason: often, as here, discrimination and retaliation claims are factually and legally related, a crucial factor under Hensley.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable fees attributable to frivolous claims; a court may use a supported estimate to calculate those fees.

EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10(k)

Affording substantial deference to the district court’s determination, see Fox, 563 U.S. at 838, we find no error in the district court’s “find[ing] that this method properly approximates the amount of fees expended for each claimant.” CRST IV, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 1052.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing private party in a Title VII action.

Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. · filed 2019-12-12(k)

Their attorney’s fees argument depends on reversal of both the Title VII and FEHA verdicts, and by affirming Title VII liability we also affirm plaintiff’s legal entitlement to attorney’s fees (defendants do not challenge as excessive the amount of the fee award). (See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) [“In any action or proceeding under this [subchapter] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee”].)

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the plaintiff continues litigating after the claim clearly becomes baseless.

TAYLOR v. STEAK N SHAKE ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2019-12-17(k)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff continued litigating this action after it became clear that the action lacked foundation, so Defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award a prevailing Title VII party a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Stovall v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corporation · filed 2020-01-09(k)

In Title VII and ADA cases, a district court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party; a lodestar fee is presumptively reasonable unless a reduction is justified.

Hannah v. Walmart · filed 2020-02-03(k)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), authorizes a district court to, “in its discretion, . . . allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” ... We conclude that Walmart has not met its burden to establish that a reduction of the presumptively reasonable lodestar amount was justified.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees; the plaintiff’s litigation misconduct does not itself make a fee award unjust.

Murphy v. Vaive Wood Products Co. · filed 2020-02-10(k)

But under the law of our circuit, “a plaintiff’s bad acts” are not “special circumstances” that render a fee award unjust. Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1982)). Murphy’s deposition testimony therefore does not bar her from receiving attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

HARRIS v. AUTO SYSTEMS CENTERS, INC. · filed 2020-02-20(k)

As the prevailing party at trial, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 43 P.S. § 962(c.2).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney fees when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Anderson v. Martin · filed 2020-02-25(k)

These fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case “upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... We would agree that, given the circumstances of this case, Martco is entitled to attorney fees related to plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit attorney fees for a prevailing defendant solely because a plaintiff pursued a nonfrivolous claim in bad faith.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. HP Pelzer Automotive Systems, Inc. (TV2) · filed 2020-03-02(k)

Turning first to § 2000e-5(k), the bad faith pursuit of a non-frivolous claim does not provide an independent basis for awarding attorney fees under the Christiansburg standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, including expert fees, as part of the costs.

Schmidt v. Shasta County Marshal's Office · filed 2020-03-10(k)

Plaintiff, however, is explicitly permitted to recover expert fees under the relevant substantive statutes. ... Because Plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of expert fees, these costs will be taxed as well.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; the court may reduce the fee to reflect the plaintiff’s degree of success.

WILLIAMS v. DEARBORN MOTORS 1, LLC · filed 2020-03-16(k)

Both Title VII and ELCRA authorize the Court to award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2802. ... Thus, the Court awards Plaintiff Howard $5,771.88 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff but excludes fees for unnecessary work.

Alvarez v. McCarthy · filed 2020-04-06(k)

The Court agrees that the additional attorneys’ fees charged by Mr. Dama and Ms. Wheeler are not reasonable and cannot find that they were necessary.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII party reasonable attorney's fees, expert fees, and costs.

Perez v. County of Rensselaer, New York · filed 2020-04-24(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a prevailing party for a Title VII claim may, at the court's discretion, recover costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable expert fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a reasonable attorneys’ fee to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Corbin v. Steak N' Shake, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17(k)

Under Title VII, the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorneys’ fee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). It is undisputed that Corbin is a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees in its discretion.

Desmesmin v. City of Boston · filed 2020-04-30(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.”). There are no grounds that would warrant punishing Desmesmin in this manner, so the Court DENIES this request.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party in a Title VII suit.

HOLT v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-05-01(k)

It is undisputed that Holt is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Title VII’s attorney’s fees provision and Section 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, with fees reduced to account for excessive hours and inefficient staffing.

Torres v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-18(k)

The settlement provided that Plaintiff was entitled to make an application for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees in the amount of $289,859 and costs in the amount of $17,193.32.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee as costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Peterson v. West TN Expediting, Inc. · filed 2020-06-26(k)

“In any action or proceeding under” Title VII, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court finds no reason for a downward adjustment, especially in light of the fact that Defendant has not objected to the amount sought.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, and a request for fees may remain pending while a Title VII claim proceeds.

Batayias v. The Mechanical Shop, Inc. · filed 2020-07-14(k)

While none of Plaintiff’s claims against Local 188 survive summary judgment, Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim against TMS will proceed. Because of this, the Court will have the authority, after any trial, to award the prevailing party attorney’s fees and related costs, if it finds such an award to be appropriate at that time. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Local 188’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim but DENIES TMS’s Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent that Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees based on her Title VII hostile workplace claim against it.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it became so.

Calvillo v. Paik · filed 2020-07-22(k)

The court, in light of defendants’ misconduct and the lack of a formal human resources department—or even clear anti-discrimination policies—finds that plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. The court does not find exceptional circumstances warranting attorneys’ fees and declines defendants’ motion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the suit is frivolous or groundless, and the court may limit fees to work incurred after the suit became untenable.

Hicks v. Gilchrist Construction Co L L C · filed 2020-07-24(k)

Furthermore, because this case was not patently frivolous at the outset, -- at least according to the complaint -- and involved a pro se plaintiff untrained in the law, the court finds that fees should be awarded beginning only from the point when plaintiff appeared to recognize the futility of the suit, which would be around the time that he failed to respond to defendant’s discovery requests, i.e., February 27, 2020.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Parker v. VIVA USA, Inc. · filed 2020-07-31(k)

Simply put, if a defendant employer is the prevailing party in an employment discrimination lawsuit, defendant can only seek and receive attorney’s fees if plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems Incorporated · filed 2020-08-12(k)

The Court therefore finds that Lenk’s Title VII claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless within the meaning of Christiansburg.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Silva v. Yosemite Community College District · filed 2020-08-18(k)

In light of this conclusion and given courts’ general reluctance to award prevailing defendants attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases, the court will deny defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, with reductions for excessive hours and inefficient staffing.

Torres v. City of New York · filed 2020-08-20(k)

The parties signed a formal settlement agreement on November 4, 2019, which entitled Plaintiff to make an application for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Plaintiff is awarded fees of $294,229.65 and costs in the amount of $17,193.32, for a total of $311,422.97.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) gives courts discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs after a mixed-motive verdict, even when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination.

Mercer v. State of Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2020-09-02(g)(2)(B)

This court finds the analysis in Gudenkauf to be persuasive and, even more importantly, supported by the text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The word “may” has to have meaning,4 and the language of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) indicates that the court “has discretion to award (or not to award) attorney’s fees.” Pitrolo, 2012 WL 4511173, at *2. This court exercises its discretion to approve an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the verdict for Plaintiff, which “constitutes a victory on a significant legal issue that furthers a public goal . . . .” Gudenkauf, 158 F.3d at 1081.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, made in bad faith, or pursued after that became clear.

Badgerow v. REJ Properties, Incorporated, e · filed 2020-09-11(k)

But “[p]revailing defendants may recover only upon a finding that the ... plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, made in bad faith, or persisted in after its character as one of these has become clear.” ... Thus, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it determined that this case falls outside “the more select category of frivolous cases where a defense-based fee award is appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s civil rights claim lacked factual merit or was pursued after its flaws became apparent.

Elam v. Rooftopdc LLC · filed 2020-11-16(k)

For an award of attorney’s fees under sec- tion 2000e-5(k), then, a defendant must show that the plaintiff filed a civil rights case devoid of factual merit to support it or litigated the case past a reasonable point when the infirmities in the plaintiff’s claims had become apparent.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

EEOC v. HP Pelzer Auto. Sys. · filed 2020-12-18(k)

Under Title VII, a court may award the prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. ... 1642, 1645 (2016). In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court explained that a court may award a prevailing defendant attorney’s fees only if the court finds that a plaintiff’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... It did not abuse its broad discretion in denying Pelzer fees on the ground that the case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Eccles v. City of Lewiston Library Board of Trustees · filed 2021-01-27(k)

Two federal statutes allow for attorney’s fees in this case. A court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees, including litigation expenses and costs, to a prevailing party in an action commenced under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for litigation continued after the plaintiff’s claim clearly became unreasonable or groundless.

Torres v. Carter · filed 2021-02-18(k)

In sum, the court finds reasonable the amount of $3,060.00 for time spent after May 15, 2020, comprising attorneys’ fees awardable in this case, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a Title VII plaintiff who becomes a prevailing party by obtaining beneficial equitable relief.

Furcron v. Mail Centers Plys, LLC · filed 2021-03-03(k)

Having obtained equitable relief against MCP that benefitted her at the time of the judgment, Furcron became a prevailing party. And the district court could, therefore, award her attorney’s fees, unless MCP’s Rule 68 offer was more ... favorable than the relief that she received.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing party in a Title VII action a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs, using the same fee standards as § 1988.

Nicholson v. RB2, LLC · filed 2021-03-09(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e(17) provides a prevailing party may be allowed reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs to pursue the action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred enforcing a judgment.

Small v. The State of New York · filed 2021-03-15(k)

But the Second Circuit did not determine Small’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with her efforts to enforce the judgment against the State Defendants. And the State Defendants offer no opposition to Small’s request in this regard. Accordingly, Small’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs related to her efforts to enforce the judgment against the State Defendants will be granted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who accepts a Rule 68 offer of judgment.

Sanson v. City of New York · filed 2021-03-30(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.