42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to assess a joint attorney fee request based on the case as a whole and reduce an excessive award in light of limited success.

Maxwell v. US Dept of Interior · filed 2001-03-20(k)

Although it might have been preferable for the district court to consider attorneys’ fees on an individual basis, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by considering the fee award for the case as a whole. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the award as excessive in relation to the results obtained.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court awarded attorney fee in a Title VII case; when counsel also has a contingent fee contract, counsel receives the greater of the court awarded fee or the contract fee, not both.

Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska · filed 2001-03-22(k)

To determine the appropriate sum of attorney fees in this case we must first calculate what counsel would collect under the contingent fee contract and compare it with the court awarded fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The greater of those fees is the sum to which counsel is entitled in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney fee for a prevailing party, including an enhancement above the lodestar when the resulting fee is reasonable.

Daggitt v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 304A · filed 2001-04-04(k)

The prevailing party in an action for unlawful employment practices may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs" awarded to that party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Given the complexity of the case and the modest nature of the lodestar figure, we believe this fee award was entirely reasonable. Upon careful review of the record and the arguments submitted, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded the enhancement.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; reconstructed time records alone do not require a fee reduction.

Kline v. City of Kansas City · filed 2001-04-05(k)

Under those statutes, the trial court, "in its discretion," may award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to the prevailing party, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... This circuit has already rejected, furthermore, the imposition of a per se rule that the submission of reconstructed time records rather than contemporaneous time accounts requires the denial of all attorneys' fees, see id., so we see little reason to require a reduction of attorneys' fees in the same circumstances. ... In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in awarding approximately $277,900 in attorneys' fees to Ms. Kline.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not allow fees and costs for mixed-motive retaliation, and § 2000e-5(k) requires a plaintiff to be a prevailing party.

Behne v. 3m Microtouch Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-04-05(g)(2)(B), (k)

Behne is unable to recover attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), because there was a finding of mixed-motive retaliation. ... She is also unable to recover attorney’s fees and costs under § 2000e-5(k) because she is not a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a reasonable attempt to extend the law does not qualify.

Barrett v. American Medical Response, N.W., Inc. · filed 2001-03-28(k)

Accordingly, I ADOPT the Findings and Recommendation (# 16) of Judge Stewart. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (# 7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, but AMR’s accompanying request for attorney fees is denied. ... Thus, because Barrett reasonably seeks to extend the reach of Title VII, and has not raised a frivolous or “unreasonable” claim, AMR’s motion for attorney fees should be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Safeguard Chemical Corp. · filed 2001-04-18(k)

Because this action is not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, an award of attorneys’ fees would be inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k), as incorporated by the ADA, permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing plaintiff.

Fink v. City of New York · filed 2001-05-23(k)

Section 12117(a) of the ADA refers the claimant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee....” 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-5(k) (1964). ... Fink prevailed on all of his claims, and thus, there is no question that and no dispute about the fact that he is a prevailing party for the purposes of these statutes. He is consequently eligible to receive attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff, but an award to a partially successful plaintiff must account for reasonable hours and the degree of success achieved.

McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-06-19(k)

In civil rights cases, the district court has statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees to "the prevailing party." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b); id. § 2000e-5(k); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 & n.2, 433 n.7 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Court has inter- preted these statutes to allow prevailing plaintiffs to receive fees in most cases while prevailing defendants may receive fees only in lim- ited circumstances). When litigation results in a mixed verdict, as occurred here, a plaintiff’s success on some issues will suffice to con- fer prevailing party status. See id. at 433. In awarding fees to a par- tially successful plaintiff, the district court must consider both the hours reasonably devoted to the litigation and the degree of success achieved. See id. at 433-37.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a defense verdict alone does not establish that standard.

Harrington v. Cleburne County Bd. of Educ. · filed 2001-05-18(k)

A defendant who has prevailed has not "prevailed" unless the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Sayers v. Stewart Sleep Ctr., Inc., 140 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)). The Special Order makes no determination that any of Harrington's claims are "frivolous," nor does a defense verdict necessarily imply frivolity. See Sayers, 140 F.3d at 1353.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII party to receive reasonable attorneys' fees, including expert fees, and costs.

Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services · filed 2001-06-12(k)

Title VII provides that a prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees, including expert fees, and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Globe's attempt to defeat the remedial purpose of Title VII taints the entire agreement, making it unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, but a purely technical or de minimis victory may warrant no fee.

Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc. · filed 2001-07-02(k)

First, under the relevant civil rights statutes, a court determines whether an award of fees should be made. Second, the court determines what amount would constitute a reasonable fee. In certain circumstances, that is, when an evaluation of the O’Connor factors reveals that “the plaintiff’s success is purely technical or de minimis,” no fee should be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII claimant to seek an award of all her fees and costs, making an arbitration agreement that requires her to bear half of them unenforceable.

Flyer Printing Company, Inc. v. Hill · filed 2001-07-18(k)

Consistent with Perez, in this case we approve the circuit court's refusal to enforce the parties' arbitration agreement because it required Hill to bear half the fees and costs associated with the arbitration. In so doing, the agreement contravened Hill's statutory right to seek a full award of her fees and costs under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act, thus defeating the remedial purposes of those statutes.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; an equitable award unrelated to the Title VII claims does not make a plaintiff a prevailing party.

Vaughn v. Shalala · filed 2001-07-31(k)

The district court correctly denied an award of attorney’s fees because Vaughn was not a prevailing party.2 ... Such relief was totally unrelated to the substance of Vaughn’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII party; informal pre-suit negotiations alone do not justify reducing an otherwise appropriate award.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and New Haven Branch of the Naacp v. Town of East Haven, and · filed 2001-08-01(k)

Title VII provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party [in litigation under Title VII] ... a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... For purposes of this case, it suffices to hold, as we now do, that Ortiz’s prohibition against relying on “informal negotiations and hindsight to determine whether future litigation was warranted and, accordingly, whether attorney’s fees should be awarded,” id. at 140, applied to post-suit negotiations in Ortiz, applies to pre-suit negotiations as well.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not authorize attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved a Title VII claim.

Michael Shaw, and Fred L. Arthur v. City of Sacramento Sacramento Police Department Joseph Serna Arturo Venegas, Jr., Ch · filed 2001-06-29(g)(2)(B)

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply because Arthur never stated a claim under Title VII in his complaint, nor did he prove a Title VII claim at trial.

Section 2000e-5(k) uses essentially the same standard for awarding attorneys’ fees as § 1988 and permits denial of fees when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.

Virostek v. Liberty Township Police Department/Trustees · filed 2001-07-11(k)

For the reasons asserted by the district court, we affirm the decision to deny Virostek’s request for attorneys’ fees. ... As both the Supreme Court and this circuit have noted, the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees is essentially the same under § 1988 and § 2000e-5(k), as the provision for attorneys’ fees under § 1988 was patterned after that in § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or brought or continued in bad faith.

Williams v. State of California Department of Corrections · filed 2001-07-17(k)

Such awards to prevailing defendants are proper only if a plaintiffs civil rights “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,” or was “brought or continued ... in bad faith.” ... Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits recovery of reasonable investigation expenses but does not cover mediation costs.

Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center · filed 2001-08-09(k)

We find that section 2000e-5(k) supports the award of investigation fees as a "reasonable out-of-pocket expense."65 However, mediation costs do not fall within the limited category of expenses taxable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees and paralegal charges to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, including work on closely related unsuccessful claims.

Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp. · filed 2001-08-30(k)

Title VII gives a district court discretion to award a reasonable amount of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The claims which were dismissed — intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract — were closely related to the Title VII claims on which Jaros ultimately prevailed. Under these circumstances, she is entitled to a fully compensatory award of attorney fees and paralegal charges.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney’s fees for work in both state and federal Title VII proceedings.

Hyland v. Indicator Lites, Inc. · filed 2001-09-04(k)

The parties here do not dispute that the “reasonable fee” mentioned in defendant’s Rule 68 offer of judgment pertains to both federal and state proceedings, as the fee-shifting provision of Title VII specifically provides.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees against a Title VII plaintiff only if the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Coleman v. Roadway Express · filed 2001-09-06(k)

In suits brought under § 1981 and Title VII, attorneys’ fees are authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k); however, fees may be imposed against a plaintiff only if his claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... The court will deny Roadway Express’s request for attorneys’ fees for time spent defending Coleman’s new-trial motion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a plaintiff who obtains an enforceable judgment that materially changes the parties’ legal relationship.

Dodge v. Hunt Petroleum Corp. · filed 2001-09-19(k)

Under Title VII, the court “may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The court determines that Dodge is a prevailing party because she has obtained an enforceable judgment against Hunt Petroleum which materially altered the legal relationship between her and Hunt Petroleum.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith.

Leeny v. Clark County · filed 2001-10-24(k)

Although we agree with the district court that summary judgment was appropriate, Leeny’s claims were not so unfounded or unreasonable as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII party; an arbitration agreement cannot eliminate that right.

Spinetti v. Service Corp. International · filed 2001-11-15(k)

Title VII and the ADEA permit a district court to award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b). I agree with Spinetti that the Agreement truncates these statutorily granted rights.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney fee for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, taking account of the time spent, the results obtained, and the legal and factual questions presented.

Griffin v. Washington Convention Center · filed 2001-11-21(k)

Therefore, I will award plaintiff $195,000 in attorney fees. I view this as a most reasonable award when one considers the time expended, the results obtained, and the legal and factual questions presented.

Section 2000e-5(k) limits attorney fee awards to prevailing parties; prompting a voluntary policy change alone does not qualify.

Johnson, Kevin M. v. ITT Aerospace · filed 2001-11-29(k)

He is too late. The Supreme Court has rejected the "catalyst" ground for obtaining attorneys’ fees under fee- shifting provisions, such as that of Title VII, that limit the award of fees to a "prevailing party" in the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not require a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s fees to be proportional to the damages recovered.

Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass'n · filed 2001-12-11(k)

That the fees awarded are, as the district court acknowledged, “nearly five times the amount of plaintiffs recovery,” JA 507, does not make them excessive.

Section 2000e-5(k) presumptively entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to attorney’s fees.

Flockhart v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. · filed 2001-12-21(k)

The plaintiff, as a prevailing party, is presumptively entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees when a party prevails on significant issues in the litigation.

Worth, Lisa v. Tyer, Robert H. · filed 2001-12-27(k)

Defendants’ final contention is that the district court erred in awarding Worth attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(k) because Worth was not a prevailing party. Defendants’ argument is without merit as Worth prevailed on significant issues in the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Stefanoni v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington · filed 2002-01-15(k)

The standard for awarding attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to a prevailing defendant differs from that which applies to a prevailing plaintiff. While prevailing plaintiffs “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,” a prevailing defendant is only entitled to fees “upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... Based on the foregoing, the Court finds defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees because plaintiffs’ case was frivolous.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award to a party who prevails on significant issues in Title VII litigation.

Worth v. Tyer · filed 2002-01-18(k)

Defendants' final contention is that the district court erred in awarding Worth attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(k) because Worth was not a prevailing party. Defendants' argument is without merit as Worth prevailed on significant issues in the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, calculated by multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate.

Figueroa Ex Rel. Havre v. Savanar Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2002-01-22(k)

To determine a reasonable fee, a district court must calculate a “lodestar” figure by first determining “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” and then multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney and expert fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Albright v. City of New Orleans · filed 2002-01-24(k)

Under Title VII, in addition to compensatory damages, the Court “may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs in this case are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees, including expert fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII party reasonable attorney’s fees as part of costs.

Godinet v. Management and Training Corp. · filed 2002-01-25(k)

Similarly, as a prevailing party in a Title VII action, federal law grants the present plaintiff the same opportunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, ... a reasonable attorneys’ fee .... ”). ... IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 288) is granted in the amount of $257,014.91.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Jerelds v. City of Orlando · filed 2002-03-27(k)

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to reasonable fees from the Plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, and an arbitration agreement that bars that remedy is unenforceable.

McCaskill, Gloria v. SCI Mgmt Corp · filed 2002-04-04(k)

Similar to Graham Oil, the clause here purports to forfeit McCaskill’s statutory right to attorney’s fees, a remedy that we have already recognized is essential to fulfill the remedial and deterrent functions of Title VII. Because the provision prevents her from effectively vindicating her rights in the arbitral forum by preemptively denying her remedies authorized by Title VII, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, and an arbitration agreement that bars that remedy is unenforceable.

McCaskill v. Sci Management Corporation, Sci Illinois Services, Incorporated, Doing Business as Evergreen Ceme · filed 2002-04-04(k)

One of the remedies provided by Title VII is that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and we noted in Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 1995), that a prevailing party should ordinarily recover attorney's fee absent special circumstances rendering such an award unjust. ... Because the provision prevents her from effectively vindicating her rights in the arbitral forum by preemptively denying her remedies authorized by Title VII, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable.

An award of attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant under subsection (k) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

El-Mosalamy v. Loma Linda University Medical Center · filed 2002-04-15(k)

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party, subject to review of the hours billed and rates charged.

Campos v. City of Blue Springs · filed 2002-05-15(k)

Finally, conceding that Campos, as a prevailing party, is entitled to an attorney’s fee award, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994), the City argues that the ... district court abused its discretion by awarding Campos’s attorneys $90,556.20 in fees because they charged excessive rates, and because the law firm of Benson & Associates billed an unreasonable number of hours.8 ... Nevertheless, upon careful review of the record and the arguments submitted, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the 11% reduction. We also agree that the rates charged by Campos’s attorneys were not excessive.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Welch v. Hat Six Homes · filed 2002-05-28(k)

While the parties raise the issue whether or not Hat Six was a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), we need not determine this issue because the suit clearly was not frivolous. ... Under these circumstances, Hat Six is not entitled to recover any of its attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce a prevailing party’s attorney’s fee when the party’s success is limited relative to the litigation as a whole, even if the claims are related.

Shannon v. BellSouth Telecommunications · filed 2002-05-31(k)

Even though the discrimination and the retaliation claims are related, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee award because Shannon’s success with the retaliation claim was limited in relation “to the scope of the litigation as a whole.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party, with excessive hours subject to reduction.

Campos v. City of Blue Springs, Missouri · filed 2002-06-26(k)

Nevertheless, upon careful review of the record and the arguments submitted, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the 11% reduction. We also agree that the rates charged by Campos’s attorneys were not excessive.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII party, with the award reflecting the degree of success obtained.

Fish v. St. Cloud State University · filed 2002-07-09(k)

The court in its discretion may allow a party prevailing on a Title VII claim reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the lodestar by 15% to reflect the lack of complete success.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Burks v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2002-07-25(k)

We review a trial court’s grant of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) for abuse of discretion. ... “[A] plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Such circumstances did not exist here.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Anita Ferroni, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Warehousemen Local No. 222, Defendant-Appel · filed 2002-08-07(k)

“[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs- action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... We reject these arguments and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Union’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees and costs.

Vernon v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JER. · filed 2002-08-26(k)

An attorney for a prevailing plaintiff is eligible to seek attorney’s fees and costs under both Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the prevailing party, rather than the party’s attorney, the right to request attorney’s fees.

Bandera v. City of Quincy · filed 2002-08-29(k)

... the ability to apply for attorney’s fees under section 1988 and, by analogy, under the same language in section 2000e-5(k) of Title VII, belongs to the client and not his attorney.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Co. · filed 2002-09-24(k)

I find plaintiffs claim neither frivolous, nor unreasonable, nor without foundation. Accordingly, I will deny defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Adams v. Giant Food, Inc. · filed 2002-09-30(k)

I cannot conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs calculated using the lodestar method.

Martino v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2002-10-22(k)

Martino’s petition for attorney’s fees and costs under the fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and M.G.L. ch. 151B, § 9, is GRANTED. The lodestar figure is $76,977.50, and the costs are $6,486.70, which together amount to a total of $83,464.20.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous.

Gauthier v. Hoye · filed 2002-11-27(k)

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Gauthier’s claims were frivolous and awarded Metro its attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a prevailing party to seek appellate attorneys’ fees within a reasonable time after the appellate court enters final judgment.

Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp. · filed 2002-12-12(k)

The Court finds that a prevailing party must seek appellate attorneys’ fees in a Title VII action within a reasonable period of time after the circuit’s entry of final judgment.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award when a prevailing plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims share facts with a successful claim.

Reynolds v. USX Corp. · filed 2003-01-15(k)

USX also challenges the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Reynolds under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (granting discretion to district courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing party under this subchapter). ... In this case, the District Court expressly found that the circumstances and evidence relating to Reynolds’ claims of intentional discrimination were relevant to her successful hostile work environment claim. Therefore, the order awarding Reynolds attorney’s fees in the amount of $54,853.50 will be affirmed.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily provides attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, and an arbitration agreement cannot categorically deny that remedy.

Plaskett v. Bechtel International, Inc. · filed 2003-01-27(k)

A term of an arbitration provision of the Agreement entered into by Plaskett deprives him of this remedy available under Title VII in that it mandates that each party pay its own attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome of the arbitration. Agreement, ¶ 19. The term regarding attorney’s fees unreasonably favors Bechtel in that it preemptively denies Plaskett his remedies authorized by Title VII. Therefore, it is unconscionable.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing party; prevailing Title VII plaintiffs ordinarily receive fees except in special circumstances.

LILLIAN PEBBLES MORRISON v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., MARK F. SHANKLE, SR. v. PEP BOYS — MANNY, MOE & JACK, INC. · filed 2003-01-30(k)

The wording of the arbitration agreement, however, is veiy similar to the statutory provision in question, § 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which authorizes the court, “in its discretion,” to award the prevailing party attorney fees. For this reason, we do not hold that the attorney fees provision in the Circuit City arbitration agreement is unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees but does not restrict what a plaintiff may agree to pay an attorney under a contingent fee agreement.

Gobert v. Williams · filed 2003-03-26(k)

As with § 1988, “there is nothing in [§ 2000e-5(k)] to regulate what plaintiffs may or may not promise to pay their attorneys if they lose or if they win.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who receives compensatory damages.

Hine v. Mineta · filed 2003-03-28(k)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff is a prevailing party who is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party, including when a Title VII claim is arbitrated.

Spinetti v. Service Corp · filed 2003-03-31(k)

The district court properly determined that the proviso requiring each party to pay its own attorney’s fees — regardless of the outcome of the arbitration — runs counter to statutory provisions under Title VII and ADEA that permit an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to a Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Stefanoni v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington · filed 2003-04-17(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(k), a district court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to defendants in a Title VII proceeding “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... Therefore, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize an attorney’s-fee award to a defendant when the plaintiff’s action is not frivolous.

Beard-Williams v. Palmdale School District · filed 2003-04-24(k)

Having determined that Beard-Williams’s action was not frivolous, the district court properly denied the District’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Boler v. Space Gateway Support Co. LLC · filed 2003-05-29(k)

Neither § 1988(b) nor § 2000e-5 distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. However, the Supreme Court has developed two distinct standards-one for prevailing civil rights plaintiffs and another for prevailing civil rights defendants. ... A prevailing defendant may recover its attorney’s fees only where it establishes that the plaintiffs actions were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though the action was not brought in subjective bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) awards attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, not directly to the party’s lawyers.

Collins v. Educational Therapy Center · filed 2003-07-31(k)

Moreover, an attorney fee award under Title VII technically is to the “prevailing party,” not to the party’s lawyer or lawyers.

The court may award stipulated attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs under § 2000e-5(g).

Jones v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. · filed 2003-08-20(g)

The court approves the parties stipulation, and awards attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs to plaintiff in the amount of $53,430.95, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, with the award adjusted to reflect the plaintiff’s degree of success.

Flaherty v. Marchand · filed 2003-09-17(k)

Considering the above factors, and the policy to support access to the competent counsel and access to the jury system in civil rights cases, the Court finds that a fifteen percent reduction in the lodestar figure is an appropriate reflection of the Plaintiff’s success in the case.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a private Title VII suit.

Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes · filed 1979-03-20(k)

Congress has expressly authorized the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in private suits brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes discretionary attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a Title VII suit; it does not govern the value of fees owed by a client to its attorney.

Adams, George, Lee, Schulte, & Ward, P. A., Cross v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Cross · filed 1979-08-09(k)

Johnson dealt with the discretionary award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII suit as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). What is involved here is not a discretionary fee awarded to allocate the costs of litigation among parties, but the valuation of an obligation agreed to by attorney and client, the subject of the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover fees for good-faith work on unsuccessful claims when that work cannot be separated from the successful claims and the plaintiff prevailed in most of the case.

Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc. · filed 1980-03-06(k)

Especially where, as here, it is impossible to allocate time among successful and unsuccessful claims and the plaintiffs have prevailed in the greater part of their case, time spent in good faith on the preparation and pursuit of unsuccessful claims should not be excluded in computing the fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Futran v. Ring Radio Co. · filed 1980-09-25(k)

In sum, the court finds for the plaintiff in the amount of $9,000 in compensatory damages and $9,000 in liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act; $3,685 as back pay under Title VII; and costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. Both the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), provide for reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Montoya v. Anderson · filed 1981-04-02(k)

Montoya is also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees and expenses to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Parton v. GTE North, Inc. · filed 1991-09-09(k)

ORDERED that attorney fees and expenses be awarded to plaintiff, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), in the total amount of $26,292.63 for the reasons set forth above.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, with the award reviewed in light of the party’s success on the claims.

Horney v. Westfield Gage Comp · filed 2003-10-09(k)

The district court should review the award once it has determined the extent to which Horney is a prevailing party. See Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 30 (1st Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) provides for an attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party, but the award is substantively for counsel and may be paid directly to counsel.

Porter v. United States Agency for International Development · filed 2003-11-25(k)

While the “prevailing party” language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) certainly means that the form of an attorneys’ fee award is that of an award made to the prevailing party, in substance the award is to counsel.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for administrative work that is necessary and useful to pursue Title VII claims.

Mock v. South Dakota Board of Regents · filed 2003-10-28(k)

The Court finds Mr. Jensen’s work in connection with administrative proceedings is compensable because it was necessary and useful to proceed on Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims in this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee to be awarded as part of the costs of suit.

Conway-Jepsen v. Small Business Administration · filed 2004-02-17(k)

4. Defendant Hector Barreto shall pay Plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fee to be determined by the Court as part of Plaintiffs costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize an award of a prevailing defendant’s fees and costs against the plaintiffs’ counsel.

Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems · filed 2004-02-18(k)

The Court cannot and will not levy Defendants’ fees and costs against Plaintiffs’ counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees and recovery of necessary out-of-pocket litigation expenses.

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1976-12-08(k)

The allowance of attorney’s fees and expenses in this case is authorized by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-559. ... With regard to items of expense in actions such as the one sub judice, reasonable out-of-pocket expenses necessarily incurred in preparing for and conducting the litigation are recoverable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, without requiring proof of bad faith.

Johnson v. Tower Air, Inc. · filed 1993-07-08(k)

Courts have allowed successful defendants to collect attorneys fees incurred in defending a claim that is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” under both statutory sections without demonstrating bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. ... For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions are hereby granted and defendants’ motions for fees under Sections 1988 and 2000e-5(k) are denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees as costs in a Title VII action but does not create a separate claim for fees apart from the underlying grievance.

Hansson v. Norton · filed 2004-03-30(k)

In contrast, the plain words of Section 706(k) do not suggest that a Title VII plaintiff may bring a cause of action for attorneys’ fees apart from her underlying grievance.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greenbriar Pontiac-Oldsmobile-GMC Trucks-Kia, Inc. · filed 2004-04-14(k)

Section 706(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant where the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ... Accordingly, the court does not find that the EEOC’s attorneys lacked an adequate foundation or were unreasonable in bringing the claims against Greenbriar.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII party; the party’s degree of success is a crucial factor in setting the amount.

White v. Burlington Northern · filed 2004-04-14(k)

Under Title VII, a district court has discretion to award a prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). In determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee, the degree of success achieved in the lawsuit is a crucial factor.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, with the amount reflecting the party’s degree of success.

Sheila White, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant-Appellant/cros · filed 2004-04-14(k)

Under Title VII, a district court has discretion to award a prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... In light of this consideration and others addressed by the district court in its decision, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding White eighty percent of her attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; a plaintiff who obtains relief through a private settlement without a merits judgment or court-ordered consent decree does not qualify.

Rodriguez-Freytas v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2004-04-27(k)

Numerous federal statutes, including § 1988 and § 2000e-5(k), allow courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to the “prevailing party.” ... According to Buckhannon, she cannot be considered a prevailing party, and is therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees unless special circumstances make an award unjust.

McKNATT v. Delaware · filed 2004-05-12(k)

The court does not discern any special circumstance which would render an award of attorneys’ fees in the present matter unjust. Furthermore, defendant does not contest the award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. (D.I. 80 at ¶¶ 2-3) The court concludes plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Certain v. Potter · filed 2004-08-04(k)

Plaintiff has moved to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Under each of these statutory provisions, the Court, in its discretion, may award attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” in a Title VII case. There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this case because she received nominal damages with respect to her hostile-work-environment claim and $25,000 in compensatory damages with respect to her retaliation claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

Perry v. Orange County · filed 2004-08-27(k)

A prevailing defendant may recover its attorneys’ fees only where it establishes that the plaintiffs’ actions were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though the action was not brought in subjective bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees and expenses to prevailing parties.

Delgado v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-08-30(k)

DECLARED that plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as costs when no special circumstances justify denying fees.

Reiter v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2004-09-10(k)

The jury’s verdict in Reiter’s favor makes him a “prevailing party” and, because there are no “special circumstances” justifying a denial of fees, he is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs assessed against the NYCTA.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII party, with a reduction for work on unrelated unsuccessful claims.

Pinner v. Budget Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. · filed 2004-09-17(k)

A prevailing party in a case brought pursuant to Title VII is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court finds that the withdrawn Title VII religious and gender discrimination claims were unrelated to the successful retaliation claim. However, the Court also finds that the failed sexual harassment-hostile work environment claim and the successful retaliation claim are related and inextricably linked. Therefore, the Court will make a reduction of five percent for the two withdrawn causes.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney fee award to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action.

Moyer v. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. · filed 2004-10-26(k)

Elvis George Moyer appeals the district court’s order awarding $3500 in attorneys fees to Defendant, the prevailing party in this Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Stewart v. Department of Health & Hospitals · filed 2004-12-01(k)

Under title VII, a prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees at the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). According to Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), prevailing defendants may recover such fees only where the court finds that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... We conclude that it would be an abuse of discretion to award fees here, because the claim is not frivolous to the extent that fees would be justified under the standards in the statute and caselaw.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for work on unsuccessful claims that share a common core of facts with successful Title VII claims.

Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp. · filed 2005-01-24(k)

The court, in its discretion, may award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party if the fees are “reasonable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 & n.7 (1983). ... Similarly in this case, Plaintiff’s legal theories were intimately related to her Title VII sexual harassment claim and were based on a “common core of facts.” Moreover, Plaintiff “substantially prevailed” because the jury returned a verdict in her favor not only on her Title VII claims, but also on her negligent retention, assault, and battery claims. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff her attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

McDonough v. City of Quincy · filed 2005-01-26(k)

As McDonough prevailed on claims under both Title VII and chapter 151B, he is entitled to seek reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Butler v. Rapides Foundation · filed 2005-02-07(k)

The court, therefore, concludes that Butler’s petition was utterly without basis in law or in fact such that it was unreasonable, frivolous, groundless or without foundation. The Defendants, therefore, are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees as part of the costs under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, Inc. · filed 2005-02-09(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney's fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action. ... Guided by this standard, the Court finds an award of attorney's fees to TSA be inappropriate. Although the claims of discrimination are found to be without merit, they are not frivolous or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action.

Farshidi v. Norfolk State University · filed 2005-02-17(k)

Dr. Jamshid Farshidi appeals the district court’s order awarding $5000 in attorney’s fees to Defendant, the prevailing party in this Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems · filed 2005-03-10(k)

Title VII allows a district court, in its discretion, to award a prevailing defendant reasonable attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s case was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... It was unreasonable for Appellants to bring the action based upon a policy that caused them nothing more than aggravation. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees by the district court was proper on all counts.

Section 2000e-5(k) makes attorney’s fees discretionary, so limited success may justify awarding no fees.

Shore v. Groom Law Group · filed 2005-03-14(k)

Appellant’s assertion that the panel did so in this case must fail, primarily because the relevant statutes provide only that the court (or in this instance, as agreed by the parties, the arbitration panel) “may allow” or “may grant” appropriate relief, including attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k); D.C.Code § 2-1403.16(b).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees, including expert fees, as part of costs; it does not limit an award of ordinary costs.

Rolison v. Bozeman Deaconess Health Services, Inc. · filed 2005-04-19(k)

Neither the federal statute nor Christiansburg supports Rolison’s position, however, because both apply to attorney’s fees and not to costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Brown v. Institute for Family Centered Services, Inc. · filed 2005-04-27(k)

Title VII contains a provision which allows courts, in their discretion, to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party as part of the bill of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Considering Plaintiffs affidavit, in which she stated under oath that she mentioned her sex-based Title VII claims to various EEOC employees, the court cannot find Plaintiffs sex-based claims frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation so as to satisfy the Christiansburg standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits prevailing parties to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, with the amount left to the district court’s discretion.

Firestine v. Parkview Health System, Inc. · filed 2005-06-08(k)

Prevailing parties are expressly authorized to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The district court has broad discretion to determine the reasonable fees and costs that should be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees for defending a frivolous claim, but not for defending an unsuccessful claim that is not frivolous.

Quintana v. Jenne · filed 2005-06-28(k)

We affirm the decision to award Jenne attorney’s fees for the defense against the claim of retaliation, which was frivolous, but we reverse the decision to award fees for the defense against the claim of discrimination, which was not frivolous.

An arbitration agreement cannot bar the attorney’s fees remedy available to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff under § 2000e-5(k).

Safranek v. Copart, Inc. · filed 2005-07-14(k)

In light of the history and goals of statute, this Court determines that the provision prohibiting the grant of attorney’s fees conflicts with Title VII. With such a bar in place, a plaintiff cannot effectively vindicate her rights in an arbitral forum: the preemptive denial of attorney’s fees keeps the statute from serving its remedial and deterrent purposes.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Okwuosa v. Employment Development Department · filed 2005-07-20(k)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees under section 706(k) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff asserted at least one non-frivolous claim.

Balmer v. HCA, Inc. · filed 2005-09-14(k)

Based on the language of Haynie and Tarter, we conclude that in this circuit attorneys’ fees may not be awarded to defendants where the plaintiff has asserted at least one non-frivolous claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits discretionary attorney’s fees, including expert fees, as costs, but a pro se litigant cannot recover fee awards or litigation expenses under its fee provision.

Rainone v. Potter · filed 2005-09-17(k)

Title VII permits a court, in its discretion, to award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee, including expert fees, as part of the costs. ... However, pro se litigants such at the Plaintiff in this case are not entitled to fee awards or litigation expenses authorized by fee-shifting statutes.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; summary judgment alone does not justify an award.

Pisharodi v. Valley Baptist Medical Center · filed 2005-10-13(k)

This Court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in Title VII and § 1981 cases. ... Although cases decided in favor of the defendant on summary judgment are typical “frivolity” cases, an award of summary judgment does not, by itself, entitle the defendant to costs and attorney’s fees. ... This Court finds no reason to grant costs and attorney’s fees to Defendants in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees only to a party that prevails on a substantive Title VII claim.

Arline v. Potter · filed 2005-12-08(k)

The request for attorney’s fees and costs by itself cannot support Arline’s standing inasmuch as attorney’s fees and costs are available under Title VII only to a party that has “prevailed]” on his or her Title VII claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). Without a substantive claim on which to prevail, a party obviously cannot claim any entitlement to these fees or costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant to the court’s discretion, even when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous.

Franchitti v. Bloomberg, L.P. · filed 2006-01-30(k)

Nevertheless, an award of attorneys’ fees in a case like this rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. And the Court will ... not exercise its discretion in favor of a party that dissembled, as Bloomberg did.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

Young v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2006-02-15(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), we have discretion to award fees. ... Likewise, attorneys’ fees are awarded 7-Eleven for this appeal and the matter is remanded to the district court to assess the proper amount.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Murphy v. BOARD OF EDUC. ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL · filed 2006-03-10(k)

Awarding fees to a prevailing defendant is not mandatory; the relevant statutes provide that such an award may be made within the discretion of the court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award attorneys’ fees in a Title VII action at its discretion, using reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate to calculate the award.

Farfaras, Jennifer v. Citizens Bank Trust · filed 2006-01-11(k)

A district court may in its discretion award attorneys’ fees for an action under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The district court properly utilized the lodestar method for determining attorneys’ fees. The lodestar figure is arrived at by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; the degree of success takes account of both equitable and compensatory relief.

Pleasants v. Ridge · filed 2006-03-29(k)

Therefore, in measuring the degree of success obtained, the court should consider both the value of the equitable and compensatory awards.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney's fees when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; a very weak claim need not qualify.

Sista v. CDC Ixis North America, Inc. · filed 2006-04-13(k)

Although the claim of racial discrimination in this case is "very weak," cf. Tancredi, 378 F.3d at 230, we agree with the District Court that it is not so frivolous as to warrant an award of attorneys' fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs to a prevailing party, including fees for an appeal.

Suire v. Lcs Corrections Services, Inc. · filed 2006-05-03(k)

With respect to attorney’s fees, we first note that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that the trial court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. ... Accordingly, we increase the award of attorney’s fees from $3,000.00 to $5,000.00. ... In response to Plaintiff’s answer to appeal seeking an award of additional attorney’s fees for work done in connection with the appeal of this matter, we find that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to an additional $2,000.00 in attorney’s fees for this appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for work in a prior termination proceeding when that work was useful and ordinarily necessary to advance a successful Title VII claim.

Cox v. Shelby State Community College · filed 2006-07-25(k)

Title VII allows a reasonable attorney’s fee where warranted, which it is in this case even though 308 hours of the fee were earned during the formal termination hearing.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees against litigants, not against their counsel.

Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc. · filed 2006-07-31(k)

The Title VII attorney’s fees provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), could not have supported these sanctions, because the provision authorizes attorney’s fees only against litigants, not against counsel.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) ordinarily permits attorney fees when a plaintiff proves a discriminatory motive but receives no damages, and a rejected pretrial settlement offer does not reduce the award.

Keelan v. Denver Merchandise Mart · filed 2006-05-31(g)(2)(B)

W e held in Gudenkauf that not only did Farrar not foreclose an award of fees in financially unsuccessful mixed-motive cases, id. at 1080, but that a plaintiff who establishes a discriminatory motive, despite recovering no damages, “should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances,” id. at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted). ... Gudenkauf controls on each of the arguments the M art has raised.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work on administrative proceedings required before a Title VII suit, but the court may exclude fees for collateral proceedings.

Dixon v. International Brotherhood of Police Officers · filed 2006-06-19(k)

Though the Court has the discretion to allow attorneys’ fees for the hours documented in framing the MCAD complaint as the prerequisite to the federal Title VII suit, the Court will not use its discretion to allow for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the disciplinary and administrative hearings before City of Lowell and the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission. These proceedings were collateral matters not statutorily required to instigate the private Title VII suit.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover appellate attorneys’ fees without first obtaining a trial-court fee award.

Superior Protection, Inc. v. Martinez · filed 2006-06-21(k)

Under these circumstances, an order granting attorneys’ fees in the circuit court is not a condition precedent to obtaining an award of appellate attorneys’ fees. As the prevailing party in this appeal and in this lawsuit, Mr. Martinez is entitled to his attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees attributable to frivolous claims, including through a partial award.

Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough · filed 2006-08-24(k)

The district judge was intimately familiar with the case and could thus properly apportion the fees incurred by the defendant in responding to the claims that were frivolous.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Mbulu v. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. · filed 2006-08-31(k)

But where, as here, the prevailing party is a Title VII defendant, the presumption is reversed. Unlike fee awards to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs, fee awards to successful Title VII defendants should be exceptional rather than routine. ... Hence, the Court concludes that an award of attorney’s fees to defendant in this case would not be in keeping with the legislative purpose of section 706(k), as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a colorable claim does not justify fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trans States Airlines, Inc. · filed 2006-09-19(k)

Trans States appeals the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. ... The plaintiffs had a colorable argument in support of their claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reimbursement of attorney’s fees under Title VII or § 1927.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action as costs.

DOES I, II, III v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-09-05(k)

Under § 1988 and Title VII actions, attorneys’ fees are recoverable as costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII party, based on reasonable hours and an hourly rate.

Dye v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2006-11-21(k)

Under Title VII, a court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000). A fee awarded under this statute must be reasonable. ... The proper lodestar amount is based on 210.4 hours at $200.00 per hour, totaling $42,080.00 in attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow fees and costs for an unsuccessful prejudgment-interest claim that is distinct from a successful Title VII claim.

Trout v. Winter · filed 2006-12-15(k)

Thus, plaintiffs did not prevail on this discrete claim, which was neither an alternative ground for a successful outcome nor integral to the larger Title VII litigation. Attorneys’ fees and costs therefore may not be awarded to plaintiffs with respect to that claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Cioffi v. New York Community Bank · filed 2006-12-18(k)

Here, the plaintiff Rose Cioffi is a prevailing party who is entitled to attorney’s fees because the jury rendered a verdict in her favor on the Federal and State retaliation claim and awarded her back pay and punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a Title VII plaintiff who prevails on the merits to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for a successful interlocutory appeal.

Crumpacker v. State of Kansas · filed 2007-01-10(k)

In drawing this conclusion, however, we likewise hold that parties who prevail on interlocutory review in this ... court, and who subsequently become prevailing parties under Title VII or another fee-shifting provision at the conclusion of merits proceedings, are implicitly entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees related to the interlocutory appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to reasonable attorney fees.

Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Utility · filed 2007-01-18(k)

One additional “damages” issue deserves mention here as well: we have ruled that Plaintiffs have prevailed on their disparate impact claim and, as prevailing parties, they are entitled to have Citizens pay their reasonable attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, which requires court-awarded relief.

Hardman v. Autozone, Inc. · filed 2007-01-25(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the court may allow a “prevailing party” to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee. ... Accordingly, M r. Hardman was awarded no relief by the court and was therefore not a “prevailing party.”

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow attorney’s fees when a plaintiff receives only a declaration of a Title VII violation that provides no enforceable relief or change in the parties’ legal relationship.

Azimi v. Jordan's Meats, Inc. · filed 2007-01-29(k)

Azimi can point to no effect that the judicial declaration has had on the legal relationship of the parties or on Jordan’s Meats behavior toward him. Finally, the declaratory relief awarded did not achieve any of Azimi’s paramount goals in bringing suit. Without any relief to enforce, Azimi cannot be considered a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action, using the same fee analysis as in Section 1983 actions.

Richard v. BD. OF SUPER. OF LA. STATE UNIV. · filed 2007-03-28(k)

The analysis for attorney's fees is the same for both 1983 and Title VII actions.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award in a Title VII action, but a prevailing defendant must show that the plaintiff’s claim was brought in bad faith or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Mirzai v. New Mexico General Services Department · filed 2007-03-30(k)

For actions proceeding under Title VII, however, the Court may, in its discretion, “allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Before a prevailing defendant may be awarded fees in a Title VII action, it must demonstrate “the plaintiffs claim was brought in bad faith, or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... The GSD has not argued, and the Court does not believe, that Mirzai’s claims against it were brought in bad faith, were frivolous, or were unreasonable. ... Under , the circumstances of this case, and based on the record before it, the Court will not award fees at this time.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. PVNF, L.L.C. · filed 2007-05-14(k)

Finally, because the EEOC’s claims related to M s. Segovia are clearly not frivolous, the District Court abused its discretion in awarding CDM attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a Title VII fee claimant to support the requested hourly rate with evidence of prevailing market rates for similar work in the relevant community.

Depaoli v. Vacation Sales Associates, L.L.C. · filed 2007-06-12(k)

Finally, Vacation Sales contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys fees and costs to Depaoli, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Because there is an absence of evidence in the record to support a market rate of $305 and $325 per hour for charges by a plaintiff’s Title VII attorney in Title VII cases, we are left only with the relevant evidence that Loeschen himself regularly charged Depaoli $225 per hour. Thus, applying the $225 hourly rate to the 726.4 hours for which the district court awarded attorneys fees, we reduce the award from $235,260 to $163,440.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a party seeking attorney fees to provide evidence supporting the prevailing market rate for comparable work.

Depaoli v. Vacation Sales Associates · filed 2007-06-12(k)

In claiming attorneys fees, Depaoli had the burden of "produc[ing] specific evidence of the `prevailing market rates in the relevant community' for the type of work" Loeschen performed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorneys’ fees for a prevailing party in a Title VII claim.

Frahm v. United States · filed 2007-06-27(k)

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that Miss Frahm is not entitled to attorneys’ fees, as she is not yet a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney’s fees against litigants, not their counsel.

Amlong & Amlong, PA v. Denny's, Inc. · filed 2007-09-17(k)

The Title VII attorney’s fees provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), could not have supported these sanctions, because the provision authorizes attorney’s fees only against litigants, not against counsel.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees.

Chopra v. General Electric Co. · filed 2007-12-03(k)

As a prevailing plaintiff to this civil rights action, plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 29 U.S.C. § 621; and Conn. GemStat. § 46a-104.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Marin v. USAG · filed 2007-10-10(k)

The DOJ does not dispute the fact that Marquez is a prevailing party and, as such, is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Her motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (document n o . 44) is granted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Schmidt v. Medicalodges, Inc. · filed 2007-11-08(k)

The Court cannot conclude that plaintiffs claims here were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, especially given the jury’s finding that plaintiff did suffer sexual harassment and the evidence that ultimately a number of employees complained of harassment by Mr: Garbín. Accordingly, the Court denies defendant’s motion for statutory attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Robert L. Reeves & Associates · filed 2007-12-27(k)

“[A] plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Accordingly, we hold that, in awarding fees to R&A, the district court failed to exercise its discretion within the permissible bounds of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney expenses normally charged to clients as part of costs.

Sturgill v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2008-01-15(k)

The district court rejected UPS’s contention because other circuits have construed § 2000e-5(k) as allowing the award of “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee paying client.” ... Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding these costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney expenses normally charged to a paying client as costs.

Sturgill v. UPS · filed 2008-01-15(k)

The district court rejected UPS’s contention because other circuits have construed § 2000e-5(k) as allowing the award of “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee paying client.” ... We conclude that this rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989), as construed in W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1991). UPS does not argue that the expenses in question are not normally charged to fee-paying clients. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding these costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Dehart v. Stevens-Henager College · filed 2008-02-04(k)

“A Title VII defendant is not entitled to an award of fees unless the court finds that the plaintiff’s ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’” ... We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees to Stevens- Henager.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable supplemental attorney’s fees for post-trial work in a successful Title VII suit.

Zakre v. Girozentrale · filed 2008-02-08(k)

Zakre has moved for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the City Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-502(f). ... As to the application for Supplemental Attorneys Fees, Zakre has satisfactorily met the objections posed by Nord/ LB. The attorney time and disbursements were in fact billed to Zakre. Furthermore, the explanations of time spent cite-checking, opposing the Nord/LB post-trial motions, and researching reinstatement and punitive damages appear to be reasonable, and are in line with awards for post-trial attorney’s fees in comparable cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who obtains enforceable equitable relief without monetary damages.

Hare v. Potter · filed 2008-02-12(k)

A nominal monetary judgment is not a prerequisite to a fee award under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; the amount may be reduced to reflect partial success.

Vialpando v. Johanns · filed 2008-02-12(k)

The Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and § 2000e-5(k). ... Viewing the issues raised in the trial as a whole, the Court finds that a substantial reduction of the Plaintiffs claimed fees is necessary to reflect the Plaintiffs partial success. ... Accordingly, the Court approves an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $40,955.33.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees for Title VII claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Vinnett v. General Electric Co. · filed 2008-02-29(k)

The Defendant seeks attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which allow a prevailing party to recover attorney fees in employment discrimination cases. ... The fact that two magistrate judges disagreed on the same legal issues given the same set of facts (namely, the settlement agreement) is evidence enough for me that the Plaintiffs claim is neither frivolous, unreasonable, nor without foundation. ... These claims in Count I of the Plaintiffs Complaint were completely frivolous. An award of attorney fees as to these claims serves the important purpose of deterring frivolous claims and upholding the importance of settlements in resolving potential employment discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, but the court may reduce compensation for excessive hours.

Weingarten v. Optima Communications Systems, Inc. · filed 2008-03-12(k)

As a result, the Court finds that the approximately fifteen to sixteen hours billed by counsel for the opposition to defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict is excessive, and exercises its discretion to reduce the number of compensable hours to ten.