42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing Title VII litigants.

Reynolds v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 1995-11-21(k)

The attorney’s fee provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) authorize courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigants.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce fees for litigating a fee award based on the party’s success in recovering merits fees.

Loretta J. Brokeshoulder SCHWARZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-12-22(k)

Applying Harris and Thompson here, the district court was well within its discretion in awarding 50% of the fees-on-fees requested because this ratio actually exceeded the percentage by which Schwarz prevailed on her request for merits fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives district courts authority over attorney’s fees that continues after the parties settle.

Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Incorporated, Appeal of Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, P.C. v. James R. Ant · filed 1995-12-27(k)

Moreover, the underlying litigation was a Title VII case, and Title VII vests in the district court broad authority to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This authority over fees is not extinguished by the parties’ settlement of their case; a district court may decline to approve a settlement if it determines that the amount of fees set by the parties is unreasonable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff obtains relief that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship; a retaliation finding without damages or enforceable relief does not suffice.

DiPietro v. Runyon · filed 1996-02-08(k)

By contrast, the jury’s refusal to award damages leaves DiPietro with neither a judgment to enforce against the Postal Service nor with a mechanism through which to modify its behavior towards him. ... Accordingly, DiPietro is not a prevailing party, and is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k(5).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows only a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

Cynthia J. Fisher, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Vassar College, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1995-12-14(k)

Only a “prevailing party” may recover attorneys’ fees and costs in a civil rights action. See Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1152 (2d Cir.1992); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Our reversal of the district court on the merits of plaintiffs suit therefore would automatically require that we vacate the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Dailey v. Generale · filed 1996-02-14(k)

The plaintiffs position that she was the victim of discrimination was a good-faith claim and by no means frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable so as to justify an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees against the losing party’s counsel in a Title VII action.

Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group · filed 1996-02-21(k)

Therefore, the district court clearly abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) against Ms. Comeveaux’s attorney.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to petition for attorney’s fees and costs, subject to the Christiansburg requirements.

Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1996-02-28(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a court may, in its discretion, “allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” NW has requested attorneys’ fees and costs and, as a prevailing defendant; NW is permitted to petition for same subject to the requirements of Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to reduce a prevailing defendant's attorney's fee award based on the plaintiff's financial condition, while preserving the award's deterrent purpose.

Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Authority · filed 1996-05-01(k)

This court has recognized that while an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant must not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin, it also must fulfill the deterrent purpose of § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) in discouraging plaintiffs from bringing frivolous claims.

Section 2000e-5(k)'s attorney fee remedy, incorporated into the ADA, permits a plaintiff to seek fees in the discrimination action, with recovery contingent on prevailing.

Zarrella v. City of Everett · filed 1996-05-01(k)

The Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. §§12111 et seq. (“ADA”), which plaintiff alleges defendants violated in Count IV, incorporates the remedies and procedures of Title VII. ... Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees if he prevails in the current court proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Luciano v. Olsten Corp. · filed 1996-05-14(k)

Based on the favorable outcome that the plaintiff achieved on each cause of action, the Court finds that the plaintiff is a prevailing party in this action and is entitled to attorneys fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney's fees, including expert fees and ordinary out-of-pocket expenses supported by records.

Legault v. aRusso · filed 1996-05-16(k)

Under 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5 (k), a party prevailing on a claim of discrimination under § 2000e is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. In addition to the attorneys' time charges, "attorney's fees" includes expert fees and other out-of-pocket expenses that an attorney would normally charge to a client.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits expert fees as part of an attorney’s fee, but a prevailing defendant may recover them from a plaintiff only if the suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co. · filed 1996-05-06(k)

Both § 1988(c) and § 2000e-5(k) authorize awards of expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee. In an employment discrimination action, such fees “cannot be awarded against a plaintiff absent a finding that the suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Pollis v. New School for Social Research · filed 1996-07-02(k)

To the extent that she succeeded on her Title VII claims, the awarding of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” is discretionary.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department · filed 1996-07-12(k)

A prevailing defendant may rely on Title YII’s fee-shifting statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), only if the court finds that the plaintiffs claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Sayers v. Stewart Sleep Center, Inc. · filed 1996-07-22(k)

Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes, at the Court’s discretion, the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII case. ... Because Sayers fabricated and embellished significant portions of her case in an effort to enrich herself financially, this Court exercises its discretion to award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $175,000 to Matter Brothers.

A defendant’s attorney’s fee award under § 2000e-5(k) must be reconsidered when some of the plaintiff’s claims survive summary judgment on appeal.

Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1996-07-31(k)

After the district court entered its March 24, 1995 order awarding summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts, the defendants, as the prevailing parties, filed a request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ... Because we have determined that some of the contentions survive summary judgment on the record before us, we must vacate the decision of the district court and remand this matter for redetermination in light of this opinion. The district court shall have to revisit the matter of attorneys’ fees at the conclusion of the proceedings on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Douglas v. State of California, Franchise Tax Board · filed 1996-07-31(k)

Attorney's fees claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are analyzed under the same standard. Both provisions give a court the discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in certain civil rights lawsuits if the court finds that the plaintiff's action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to seek attorney's fees.

Evans v. Connecticut · filed 1996-08-13(k)

As a prevailing party under Title VII, plaintiff may also seek attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim is wholly without foundation.

Hughes v. Regents of the University of Colorado · filed 1996-08-26(k)

In order to award attorney’s fees against a plaintiff in a title VII action, the court must be persuaded that there is no evidence of sex discrimination in the record.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney's fees in Title VII cases, applying the same fee standards used under other federal civil rights statutes.

Joann S. Reed, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-09-11(k)

However, their reasoning applies equally well to attorneys' fees under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees, with the award reflecting the degree of success obtained.

Peanick v. Morris · filed 1996-09-19(k)

A prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action is entitled to recover costs, including reasonable attorney fees. ... Given Peanick's very limited success, it was not an abuse of discretion to award only $500 in attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Marshak v. Sierra Vista Unified Schools · filed 1996-09-30(k)

The District requests attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Under this section we may, in our discretion, award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. "[A]n award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate only when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." ... Because we do not think Marshak's claim was frivolous, we decline to award attorney's fees to the District.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Nassau · filed 1996-09-26(k)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that AFSCME’s claims were not “frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.” We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s and expert witness fees to the County, and reverse the judgments.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees; fees for appellate work depend on whether the party substantially prevailed on appeal.

Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. · filed 1996-10-10(k)

This standard is derived from the language of the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides that in Title VII cases "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs." (emphasis added). ... The relevant inquiry in determining attorney's fees for appellate work is whether a party substantially prevailed at the appellate level. ... We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that plaintiff was entitled to no additional attorney's fees on these grounds.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.

Nelson v. University of Maine System · filed 1996-10-21(k)

It is within the Court’s discretion to award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc. · filed 1996-10-28(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in this Title VII case.

Section 2000e-5(k) usually does not warrant attorney’s fees and costs when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages, though an exception may be appropriate.

Pino v. Raymond Locascio, New York Hospital, Cornell Medical Center, Westchester Division · filed 1996-11-25(k)

We hold that under Farrar v. Hobby attorney’s fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages. While there may be situations where such an award is appropriate, the present record does not support an exception.

Section 2000e-5(k) applies the same standard to attorney’s fees and expert witness fees; a prevailing Title VII defendant may recover them only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education · filed 1996-11-26(k)

The amendment makes it clear that, in Title VII actions, awards for both attorney’s fees and expert witness fees are governed by the same standard. ... On the other hand, a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees only if “the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without, foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees under Title VII.

Jones v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1996-10-15(k)

Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b), Jones is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees and costs when a plaintiff wins a favorable Title VII judgment without damages and obtains substantial damages on a related state-law claim.

Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1996-12-10(k)

Bridges, however, has not lost on the merits of her federal claim. Rather, she has secured: (1) a favorable judgment on the merits — but no damages because of her failure to mitigate — under Title VII; and (2) a favorable judgment on the merits, and substantial damages, under the New York State Human Rights Law. We conclude that this constitutes sufficient success to make Bridges a “prevailing party” eligible for attorney’s fees and costs under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant, but the court may deny fees when the plaintiff’s claims were neither frivolous nor unfounded.

Crowe v. Wiltel Communications Systems · filed 1996-12-26(k)

Title VII permits courts to award the prevailing party in an employment discrimination ease a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of an award of costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The district court was well within its discretion in concluding that Wiltel and Malone were not entitled to fees and costs. The court properly took into account the impracticality of assessing costs and the fact that the plaintiffs claims were neither frivolous nor unfounded in evidence.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; the court may consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay when setting the amount.

Kee v. NEC Technologies, Inc. · filed 1997-01-03(k)

Ever since Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), it has been clear that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is not reciprocal in its operation — that although most prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination litigation may expect to receive attorneys’ fee awards as a matter of course, prevailing defendants may not. ... As the Opinion makes exceedingly plain, those restrictive standards squarely encompass Kee’s situation. ... There is thus no question that Neetech has established its right to an award — instead the question comes down to quantifying its recapture of the attorneys’ fees that it has incurred.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow a plaintiff who loses her Title VII claim to recover attorney's fees as a prevailing party.

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company and Eastman Chemical Company, D/B/A Texas Eastman Company · filed 1997-01-16(k)

Likewise, she is not a "prevailing party" under Title VII, and is, therefore, not entitled to attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a state discrimination action unrelated to a Title VII claim.

Paz v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1997-02-12(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) does not permit a party to sue for attorney’s fees incurred in a state action for employment discrimination when that action is unrelated to any claim brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) gives courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a mixed-motive discrimination case, including a nominal fee when success is limited.

Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc. · filed 1996-12-20(g)(2)(B)

For all these reasons, and given the Fourth Circuit’s views, this Court is of the opinion that only a nominal amount of attorney’s fees should be awarded. ... In its discretion, the Court fixes the appropriate fee at one-half the customary 33% contingency fee, based on the reasonable settlement offer of $5,000.00, for a fee in the amount of $825.00, with costs of $167.02.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits attorney’s fees and costs in a mixed motive retaliation claim even when the employer proves it would have made the same decision without retaliation.

De Llano v. NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVER. · filed 1997-01-17(g)(2)(B)

Finally, applying the mixed motive relief provisions of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to plaintiff’s retaliation claim is consistent with the jury instructions in this case, which applied a mixed motive framework to both the retaliation claim and the discrimination claim. ... For all of the above reasons, the court will award attorney’s fees to plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits fees for a mixed-motive claim when the work is directly attributable to that claim, including work that cannot reasonably be disentangled from related discrimination claims sharing a common core of facts.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. · filed 1997-01-30(g)(2)(B)(i)

Fees are directly attributable to the mixed-motive claim if they cannot be reasonably disentangled from the work done on other discrimination claims which share a common core of facts.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party in a Title VII suit to recover attorney’s fees and costs.

EEOC,et al v. Clear Lake Dodge,et · filed 1997-02-19(k)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a “prevailing party” in a suit brought under Title VII is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs. ... We find no abuse of that discretion with respect to the fees awarded for either the trial or appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs; a district court must consider a disputed supplemental fee request before deciding the award.

Anne DAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOCIETE GENERALE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-03-05(k)

Following trial, plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees and costs, which the court was authorized to award in its discretion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... However, we believe that the district court should make this determination in the first instance, and, from the district court’s opinion, it appears that the November 22 letter may have been overlooked. Accordingly, we remand this ease to the district court for consideration of plaintiff’s supplemental fee application.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, which requires a material change in the parties’ legal relationship.

Nissim v. McNeil Consumer Products Co. · filed 1997-03-17(k)

I conclude that, because the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant was not altered in any material way by the jury verdict, plaintiff is not a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), it is accordingly hereby ORDERED that the motion of plaintiff for attorneys’ fees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee calculated using rates prevailing in the district where the court sits.

Luciano v. Olsten Corp. · filed 1997-03-21(k)

It is well-established that the “prevailing community” the district court should consider to determine the “lodestar” figure is “the district in which the court sits.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs, with the fee adjusted for inadequate records and the attorney’s work and results.

Jackson v. Cassellas · filed 1997-04-09(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b) and 633(a), plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees and expenses in connection with his efforts in this case. ... From the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that there will be a' fifteen percent reduction of the lodestar amount of $306,-743.00, but a ten percent increase for a bonus. This makes for a total reduction of five percent, and a total award of $291,405.85. Plaintiff is also entitled to be reimbursed for $14,785.77 in costs which are undisputed.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney's fees for a party who has not prevailed.

Boston v. John H. Dalton, (Two Cases) · filed 1997-04-25(k)

Because Boston is not the prevailing party we deny Boston's request for attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action at its discretion.

Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy · filed 1997-05-01(k)

As noted supra, the court considers the plaintiff to be a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and, in the exercise of its discretion, will award attorneys fees in his favor.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees for frivolous claims, with the award adjusted for the plaintiff’s financial situation.

Crumpton v. St. Vincent's Hospital · filed 1997-05-27(k)

Alternatively, defendant is also entitled to recover attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under Title VII, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Based on the reasoning set forth above, the court has determined that plaintiff's claims were frivolous, unreasonable and groundless. Even assuming plaintiff did not realize the baselessness of these claims initially, plaintiff clearly continued to litigate these claims after it became clear that they were frivolous and groundless. Upon review of the detailed listing of fees and costs submitted by defendant, the court concludes that the approximately $29,500.00 requested is a reasonable amount. However, taking into account plaintiff's financial situation and other factors, this court has deemed it appropriate to award only $8,000.00.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney's fees only to a prevailing party.

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co · filed 1997-06-02(k)

Likewise, she is not a "prevailing party" under Title VII, and is, therefore, not entitled to attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees, including expert fees, as part of costs.

Davis v. Rutgers Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-06-05(k)

Finally, plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which permits the court to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff but not for a plaintiff who was wholly unsuccessful.

Nelson v. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF INCARNATE WORD · filed 1997-06-19(k)

As a prevailing party, Plaintiff Nelson is also entitled to costs and a reasonable attorneys’ fee. Plaintiff Jessica Trapp, however, was completely unsuccessful on her sole claim and is therefore not a prevailing party deserving of an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees for a Title VII defendant only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Gedo v. Cobe Laboratories · filed 1997-07-30(k)

A defendant in a Title VII action is entitled to an award of attorney fees only upon the court’s finding that plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Accordingly, given the stringent standards for an award of attorney fees to a defendant in a Title VII action and the amount of deference afforded the district court in making attorney fee determinations, we find no error in the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats a plaintiff who wins nominal damages as a prevailing party eligible for reasonable attorney fees.

Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-06-19(k)

A plaintiff who wins nominal damages, however, is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court holds that Bales is a prevailing party against Wal-Mart within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees when an EEOC order gives a plaintiff meaningful nonmonetary relief that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship.

Hashimoto v. Dalton · filed 1997-07-03(k)

We therefore conclude that the EEOC’s order effected a “material alteration in the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant” sufficient to confer prevailing party status upon Hashimoto.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing at trial alone does not suffice.

EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co. · filed 1997-08-25(k)

Accordingly, we conclude that there was some factual basis for the EEOC's retaliation claim, and the district court therefore abused its discretion in awarding L.B. Foster its fees on that claim.

Section 2000e-5 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, with the award adjusted for the results obtained.

Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1997-09-10

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [# 116] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) and D.C.Code § 1-2556. ... For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for 750.70 hours of Mr. Schreiber’s time at $225.00 per hour and 584.87 hours of Mr. Greenberg’s time at $175.00 per hour, with an overall fifteen-percent reduction to account for her lack of success on her common-law claims, for a total of $230,560.45 in fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing party, but winning the right to proceed to trial does not yet qualify.

Smith v. Oakland Scavenger Co. · filed 1997-10-16(k)

Smith has merely eestablished a right to proceed to trial on the merits of her Title VII claim, however, she is not, at least as of yet, a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-5(k) presumptively entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees unless special circumstances make an award unjust.

DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc. · filed 1997-11-05(k)

Although not couched in mandatory terms, this statute Establishes a presumptive entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees for prevailing parties.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for discrimination claims that allege no Title VII violation.

Paz v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1997-11-05(k)

Those discrimination claims did not allege a violation of Title VII. Paz’s claim for attorney’s fees did not, therefore, arise from an “action or proceeding under this subehapter,” as required by Section 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee calculated using the lodestar method; the fee need not be proportional to the damages recovered.

Mary C. QUARATINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIFFANY & CO., Michael Eiring and David Wright, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1997-11-14(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) specifies that a prevailing plaintiff in. civil rights litigation under Title VII is eligible to receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.” ... Inasmuch as the district court’s abandonment of the lodestar method in favor of a “billing judgment” approach conflicts with the rationale and legislative intent of the civil rights fee-shifting statutes, falls outside the scope of Farrar, and is in conflict with this Court’s holdings concerning proportionality, we find an error of law requiring vacatur of the district court’s attorney’s fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees.

Baty v. WILLIAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 1997-11-10(k)

The matter is presently before the’ court on plaintiff’s motion for statutory attorney fees pursuant to Title VIPs fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Doc. 122). ... Plaintiff was clearly the prevailing party in this case and is therefore entitled to an award of statutory attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) calculates a reasonable attorney’s fee using the hours reasonably spent on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.

Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc. · filed 1997-12-03(k)

Plaintiff is permitted to recover a reasonable fee, represented by “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” ... Although this standard was articulated in a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 case, we have held that it applies to fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) as well.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits discretionary appellate attorney’s fees and costs for a plaintiff who prevails on an appeal; success on one appeal does not make the plaintiff a prevailing party on an unsuccessful cross appeal.

Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-01-06(k)

Title VII provides that the court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing plaintiff on appeal attorney’s fees and the costs of appeal. ... Mrs. Deneen is a prevailing party in NWA’s appeal, but she did not prevail on her own cross appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award appellate attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in its discretion.

Deneen v. Northwest Airlines · filed 1998-01-06(k)

Title VII provides that the court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing plaintiff on appeal attorney's fees and the costs of appeal. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Mrs. Deneen is a prevailing party in NWA's appeal, but she did not prevail on her own cross appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover attorney fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. HBE Corp. · filed 1998-01-27(k)

Since Helms and Ey have prevailed on their claims they are entitled to fees, and appellant has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion or that the amount awarded is unreasonable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party in a Title VII lawsuit to recover attorney fees.

EEOC v. HBE Corp. · filed 1998-01-27(k)

A prevailing party in a Title VII lawsuit may recover attorney fees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and other litigation expenses, Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294-95 (8th Cir.1996). ... Since Helms and Ey have prevailed on their claims they are entitled to fees, and appellant has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion or that the amount awarded is unreasonable.

A district court must address a request for costs and attorneys' fees under § 2000e-5(k) so its denial can be reviewed for an appropriate exercise of discretion.

Mitchell v. AT&T Corporation · filed 1997-12-16(k)

Because the district court did not address AT&T's request for costs and attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927; 42 U.S.C. § 1988; or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), we cannot determine whether the denial of costs and fees on these grounds was an appropriate exercise of discretion. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the district court on these statu- tory requests and remand the case for further proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce an attorney’s fee award when counsel unnecessarily prolongs litigation.

Connolly v. National School Bus Service, Inc. · filed 1998-02-10(k)

Although the court could in its discretion deny any award when it finds that counsel has unnecessarily prolonged litigation, it finds that further reducing the fee award is also appropriate. Considering that defendant made its first offer of $12,500 to plaintiff in March 1997, before the motions for summary judgment were filed and before the parties engaged in pretrial preparation, the court will reduce the $34,921.74 award by a third for a total award of $23,281.16.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award only for a prevailing party.

Todd v. Biotech · filed 1998-03-05(k)

Because Todd is no longer a prevailing party, the district court’s award of attorney’s fees must be vacated.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs.

Greenbaum v. SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN, NY · filed 1998-03-06(k)

A prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action may collect attorneys' fees from a defendant under Title VII, which permits a court "in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs" of the action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee, with the degree of success obtained central to the amount.

Migis v. Pearle Vision Inc · filed 1998-03-10(k)

The Supreme Court has twice made clear that “the most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award in a civil rights suit “is the degree of success obtained.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) gives courts discretion to deny attorney’s fees in a mixed-motive case when the plaintiff obtains only a technical victory.

Stevens v. Gravette Medical Center Hospital · filed 1998-02-23(g)(2)(B)(i)

In such eases, Title VII provides that the court “may grant ... attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). ... Clearly the use of the word “may” confers discretion on the court. ... Applying this analysis, we find that, for purposes of a fee award, Stevens is not a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing at trial alone does not establish that standard.

Sayers v. Stewart Sleep Center, Inc. · filed 1998-03-26(k)

Applying the Christiansburg and Sullivan criteria to this ease, we believe the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Sayers’s claim was so unreasonable or unfounded that it merited an attorney’s fee award in favor of Matter Brothers.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney's fees for a plaintiff's appeal.

Mockler v. Multnomah County Dan Noelle Dennis Fitz, and Pieter Van Dyke Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff's Associati · filed 1998-03-31(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees resulting from the instant appeal pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e-5(k), 42 USC § 1988(b), and ORS 659.121(1) and shall file her application therefor in accordance with Ninth Cir.R. 39-1.6.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a plaintiff who prevails on a Title VII claim to recover reasonable attorney’s fees even if other claims fail.

Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-04-09(k)

Although Blakey did not succeed on all claims, she is still a prevailing party because she succeeded on her sexual harassment claim. She is therefore entitled to a reasonable fee award under both Title VII and LAD.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Uherek v. Houston Lighting and Power Co. · filed 1998-04-24(k)

Such fees are allowed when the plaintiff’s underlying claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. ... As is evident from the Court’s previous Order Granting Summary Judgment in this case, Plaintiffs claims utterly lack merit, and therefore, the imposition of fees and costs is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce a Title VII attorney fee award when the plaintiff’s limited success makes the requested fee disproportionate.

Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc. · filed 1998-04-01(k)

Assuming arguendo that counsel’s requested fee represents a reasonable rate for a reasonable amount of time expended on the case, the requested $56,430 fee is disproportionate to Plaintiffs limited success.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, with a reduction when the plaintiff’s overall success is limited.

Coffey v. Dobbs International Services, Inc. · filed 1998-05-05(k)

Though plaintiff prevailed on her retaliation claim, she was unsuccessful as to every other claim, largely due to her failure to prove damages. Because much of the hours requested were spent on these unsuccessful claims, the Court concludes that a twenty percent reduction in the lodestar figure is warranted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party; denying a prevailing plaintiff’s request requires findings of special circumstances that justify the denial.

Russell v. Buchanan · filed 1998-05-19(k)

In any event, without proper findings showing the special circumstances relied on by the trial court in denying its award of attorneys’ fees, we axe unable to properly review this issue. Accordingly, we remand for findings of fact to support the trial court’s denial.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit a court to reduce a fee award solely by comparing the number of claims raised with the number won; the court must consider how the claims are related and the plaintiff's overall success.

Brodziak v. Runyon · filed 1998-05-26(k)

This reasoning contravenes the principle set forth in Hensley that awards of fees and costs should not be based simply on the ratio of claims raised to claims prevailed upon.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.

Perdue v. City University of New York · filed 1998-06-17(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(k), a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action may collect “a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. · filed 1998-06-24(k)

In this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for work on an individual back pay claim only if that claimant prevails.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 ... Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n · filed 1998-07-06(k)

Therefore, plaintiffs can recover fees for time spent in preparation for individual journeyperson’s back pay hearings only to the extent that the individual claimants prevail on their claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Alizai v. MVM, Inc. · filed 1998-07-15(k)

However, Alizai is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, plus interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys' fees.

Boisvert v. Sears · filed 1998-08-05(k)

As Ms. Boisvert is a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), the court will award her reasonable attorneys' fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees, with the amount determined by the district court in its discretion.

Cooper v. Paychex Inc · filed 1998-08-31(k)

As the prevailing party in this civil rights action, Cooper was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The district court had the discretion to deter- mine the amount of the fee award, based on the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows courts to consider a prevailing party’s degree of success when setting attorney fees.

Joy R. Shea, Cross-Appellee v. Galaxie Lumber & Construction Company, Ltd. · filed 1998-08-19(k)

In general, as we have had occasion to note recently, the district courts both can and should look to the degree of success a party achieves in deciding how generous a fee award should be.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary award of reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing Title VII party.

Herndon v. Wm. A. Straub, Inc. · filed 1998-09-14(k)

Plaintiff is also entitled to the discretionary award of reasonable attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) is the authority for awarding attorney's fees on Title VII claims.

Williams v. County of Fairfax · filed 1998-09-24(k)

However, to the extent the fees were awarded for Williams's Title VII claims, the fees should have been awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).

Section 2000e-5(k) calculates reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing government defendant represented by salaried lawyers using prevailing market rates.

Carter v. Rhode Island, Department of Corrections · filed 1998-10-29(k)

The issue presented is whether, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) and 2000e-5(k), the “reasonable attorney’s fee” awarded to government defendants who are represented by salaried government lawyers should be calculated in accordance with the lodestar method that reflects prevailing market rates for such services, or, alternatively, whether it should be based upon the salaries of the defendants’ lawyers. I find that the lodestar method applies and, therefore, award attorneys’ fees based on the fair market value of the services rendered.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing party; a defendant does not qualify when the claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

DeShiro v. Branch · filed 1998-11-02(k)

Because all five claims in this suit were disposed of in either of the aforementioned manners, PARAMOUNT cannot be labeled a “prevailing party.” Consequently, because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) grants this Court discretion to award fees to the prevailing party, PARAMOUNT cannot and is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party and applies to ADA claims through 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

Marinelli v. City of Erie · filed 1998-11-05(k)

Mr. Marinelli qualifies as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), adopted by § 107 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117, and is therefore entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits attorney’s fees for a successful mixed-motive claim even when the plaintiff receives no damages.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. · filed 1998-09-29(g)(2)(B)(i)

Accordingly, we conclude that recovery of damages is not a proper factor upon which to assess the propriety of granting a fee award in a mixed motive case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action, ordinarily absent special circumstances.

Agonafer v. Rubin · filed 1998-12-04(k)

The Court also has discretion to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(k). Absent special circumstances, a court should ordinarily award attorney’s fees. ... As plaintiff is the prevailing party, and circumstances do not make an award unjust, she is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for prevailing Title VII plaintiffs, but a lawyer who represents herself cannot recover those fees.

Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Service Care · filed 1998-12-07(k)

Although a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1981 or Title VII action is ordinarily entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), respectively, a pro se plaintiff is not allowed to recover attorney’s fees for representing herself, even if she is a lawyer.

Section 2000e-5(k) governs court awards of reasonable attorney fees to prevailing Title VII parties; the agency fee regulation does not directly apply once the action reaches court.

Stover v. Riley · filed 1998-12-09(k)

The award of attorney fees in this case is being made pursuant to the standard guiding courts in awarding attorney fees to prevailing parties in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). These actions have progressed beyond the administrative stage, so the cited regulation is not directly applicable.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff’s successful post-judgment work, but fees may be denied for unsuccessful efforts.

Karnes v. SCI Colorado Funeral · filed 1998-12-17(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a district court may award attorneys fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action. ... Attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded for necessary post-judgment efforts. ... We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award Ms. Karnes any post-judgment fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous; the court may consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Stewart v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad · filed 1999-01-05(k)

After considering the above, the fact that plaintiff has not responded to defendants’ application for fees, and the recent Order granting defendants costs in the amount of $1,854.20, the Court, in its discretion, hereby ORDERS plaintiff to pay defendants $1,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees except in unusual circumstances; the size of a supported verdict does not justify denying fees.

Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 1998-12-14(k)

Title VII provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover ... attorneys’ fees except in “unusual circumstances.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The only circumstance to which defendants point is the size of the verdict. We have already held that the verdict amount is supported by the evidence and we therefore doubt that its size could be considered an unusual circumstance within the meaning of section 2000e-5(k). Moreover, defendants cite no authority for their assertion that where a plaintiff receives an award that is allegedly disproportionately high the court need not grant attorneys’ fees. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Lockard attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) uses the lodestar method to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; the fee cannot be set solely as a fraction of the plaintiff’s monetary recovery.

Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., Michael Eiring and David Wright · filed 1999-01-26(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) specifies. that a prevailing plaintiff in civil rights litigation under Title VII is eligible to receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee ... as part of the costs.” ... In sum, we find an error of law in the district court’s abandonment of the lodestar method in favor of a “billing judgment” approach that requires vacatur of the district court’s attorney’s fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages when the victory vindicates workplace rights and serves a public purpose.

Brandau v. State of Kansas · filed 1999-02-16(k)

We conclude that the district court appropriately evaluated the reasonableness of a fee award to Plaintiff in light of controlling case law. We also hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding to Plaintiff $41,598.13 in fees and expenses.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees only for a prevailing party under Title VII.

Burger v. Central Apartment Management, Inc. · filed 1999-03-16(k)

Furthermore, Stancu is not entitled to attorney’s fees because he is not a prevailing party under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney’s fee award for success in state proceedings when significant doubt exists that the complainant could ever recover under Title VII.

Cassas v. Lenox Hill Hospital · filed 1999-03-18(k)

While a complainant may receive attorney’s fees under Title VII even though a judgment has not been entered in favor of the complainant on a Title VII claim due to an intervening factor, e.g., settlement, where significant doubt as to a complainant’s ability to ever recover under Title VII exists, it is inappropriate to award attorney’s fees pursuant to the Title.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides no statutory entitlement to attorney’s fees before an action or proceeding is pending.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of East Haven · filed 1999-03-22(k)

The statute authorizes award of a reasonable attorney’s fee “[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). When Atty. Albis stated the town’s acquiescence in all but the fee demands, there was no “action or proceeding” pending and there was then no statutory entitlement to a fee.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, but a Title VII liability finding without enforceable relief does not make a plaintiff a prevailing party.

Bonner v. Guccione · filed 1999-04-30(k)

The law is clear that, if the Title VII hostile work environment cause of action had been tried separately, and the jury returned its verdict here — a finding of liability without awarding damages — there could be no award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover taxable as well as non-taxable costs.

Lathem v. Department of Children & Youth Services · filed 1999-04-14(k)

The district court, however, noted correctly that the plain language of section 2000e-5(k) does not distinguish between taxable and non-taxable costs; if Congress wanted to limit Title VII plaintiffs' recovery to non-taxable costs, it could have done so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover taxable and non-taxable costs.

Lathem v. Dept. of Children & Youth · filed 1999-04-14(k)

The district court, however, noted correctly that the plain language of section 2000e-5(k) does not distinguish between taxable and non-taxable costs; if Congress wanted to limit Title VII plaintiffs’ recovery to non-taxable costs, it could have done so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees and costs for a prevailing party whose lawsuit produces a material benefit.

Singer v. Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices · filed 1999-05-06(k)

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in turn, permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Because Singer was not a “prevailing party” in his GERA claim against the OSSA, he is not eligible to recover attorney fees or costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party in a Title VII case, with the amount reflecting the plaintiff’s success.

Bailey v. Runyon · filed 1999-05-26(k)

As the court has already noted, in a Title VII case reasonable attorney’s fees are appropriately awarded to the “prevailing party.” ... After considering all of these factors, the court determines that the appropriate fee in this case is $2,000.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, but a contingency arrangement alone does not justify an enhanced hourly rate.

Forshee v. Waterloo Industries · filed 1999-05-27(k)

Conceding that Forshee as prevailing party is entitled to an attorneys’ fee award, see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k), Waterloo argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding Forshee’s lead attorney an enhanced fee based upon an hourly rate above his normal hourly rate. We agree. ... In these circumstances, we conclude that an award to attorney Grider based upon an hourly rate above his normal hourly rate of $100 per hour was an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee for a prevailing party, but an hourly rate increase requires a permissible basis and detailed findings.

No. 98-1604 · filed 1999-05-27(k)

Here, the case was not unusually difficult or complex to prepare and try, the result while favorable to Forshee was not exceptional, Forshee gave only an impermissible reason for enhancement, and the district court made no "detailed findings" that would justify an enhanced fee award. In these circumstances, we conclude that an award to attorney Grider based upon an hourly rate above his normal hourly rate of $100 per hour was an abuse of discretion.

A Title VII liability finding without enforceable relief does not make a plaintiff a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees under § 2000e-5(k).

Bonner v. Guccione · filed 1999-05-27(k)

Plaintiff here failed to obtain either an enforceable judgment or settlement agreement against the defendants on her Title VII cause of action. The jury's liability finding on the Title VII cause of action entitled plaintiff to none of these--there was simply nothing to "enforce."

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff whose nominal damages reflect limited success.

Virostek v. Liberty Township Police Department/Trustees · filed 1999-06-07(k)

While there is no dispute that Plaintiff is the “prevailing party” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), attorney’s fees are not warranted due to the limited success of her case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff unless special circumstances make the award unjust.

Yousuf v. UHS of De La Ronde, Inc. · filed 1999-06-11(k)

Similarly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fees. Ordinarily, a prevailing plaintiff should recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances render such an award unjust.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Black v. M.G.A., Inc. · filed 1999-06-21(k)

This lawsuit is now before the court on a motion by Black for attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976, as amended (42 U.S.C.A. § 1988), and Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k)), in which Black requests a total of $ 58,470.18 for attorneys’ fees ($ 53,244.99) and expenses ($ 5,225.19). For reasons to follow, the court concludes that the motion should be granted to the extent that Black is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $ 15,581.90.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not make attorneys personally liable for costs and fees.

Mitchell v. AT&T Corporation · filed 1999-06-22(k)

As attorneys are not personally liable for costs and fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the award cannot be sustained under those statutes.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney's fees, and a settlement waives that claim only if it does so expressly.

Torres v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 1999-06-24(k)

If the parties to a settlement agreement wish to extinguish the prevailing party's claim for attorney's fees, they must do so specifically and expressly in the terms of the agreement.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing the case or having testimony discredited does not alone justify fees.

Pascouau v. Marietta · filed 1999-07-14(k)

A review of the record persuades us that Ms. Pascouau’s lawsuit was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Although the district court ultimately rejected her claims and discredited her testimony, such findings alone do not mean her lawsuit was devoid of any legitimacy. ... Consequently, we find the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s and expert witness fees to Martin Marietta and revrse the award.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a mixed-motive retaliation verdict.

Behne v. Microtouch Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-07-15(g)(2)(B)

Thus, Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not authorize this Court to award Plaintiff any attorneys fees based on the mixed-motive retaliation verdict in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not give federal courts jurisdiction over a standalone claim for attorney's fees after a Title VII discrimination claim is settled administratively.

Chris v. Tenet · filed 1999-07-28(f)(3)

Thus, the jurisdictional grant in § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not extend to an independent action solely for attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing a claim for employment discrimination in an administrative forum.

The frivolous-claim standard for awarding a prevailing Title VII defendant attorney’s fees under § 2000e-5(k) does not apply to ordinary costs.

Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck, & Company · filed 1999-09-01(k)

We -see no reason, however, to apply the same type of heightened standard to the assessment of costs.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award for a proven mixed-motive violation even when the employee obtains no tangible relief.

Norris v. Sysco Corp. · filed 1999-09-14(g)(2)(B)

That, of course, means that even though the employer has a defense to damage liability, the somewhat wronged employee may recover attorney’s fees. ... Suffice it to say that, contrary to Allied’s position, the mere fact that Norris did not obtain actual tangible relief does not preclude an award of fees to her.

In awarding attorney’s fees under § 2000e-5(k), a court should consider awards in similar cases when the requested amount is unusually high for the case’s complexity and novelty.

Thorne v. Welk Investment · filed 1999-11-22(k)

When, as here, the amount sought by the prevailing party is far more than one would expect for a case of its complexity and novelty, the court should reference awards in similar cases. While we are not imposing an absolute pay scale for Title VII cases, we do believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to overlook this factor.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit attorney’s fees for a Title VII plaintiff who obtains a liability finding but no relief, because she is not a prevailing party.

Lintz v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 1999-11-24(k)

In sum, plaintiffs failure to obtain any relief renders her ineligible for “prevailing party’ status and ineligible for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award to prevailing Title VII defendants when the plaintiff’s claims are unreasonable.

Evans v. North Street Boxing Club · filed 1999-12-16(k)

As the law is clearly established on the issue of individual liability under Title VII, it was unreasonable for Evans to bring a claim against Ward and West under Title VII, entitling them to attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees; when a fee request is unusually high for the case's complexity and novelty, the court should consider awards in similar cases.

Thorne v. Welk Investment · filed 2000-01-06(k)

When, as here, the amount sought by the prevailing party is far more than one would expect for a case of its complexity and novelty, the court should reference awards in similar cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reduced attorney’s fee award when Title VII plaintiffs obtain only limited relief.

Bryant, Lloyd v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-01-14(k)

In the present case, the district judge recognized that the relief obtained was very limited in relationship to the total relief sought. As Hensley points out, in such cases, a reduced fee amount is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who obtains a favorable verdict and damages.

Robinson v. Instructional Systems, Inc. · filed 2000-01-25(k)

In this action, Ms. Robinson is the prevailing party. She obtained a verdict in her favor, and was awarded damages for her injuries. She is therefore entitled to attorneys’ fees from the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, ordinarily absent special circumstances.

Lintz v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2000-01-28(k)

A district court may award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action. ... Under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff is “ordinarily to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.”

Section 2000e-5(k), applied to ADA claims through § 12117(a), does not permit an attorney’s fee award to a plaintiff who loses at final judgment despite receiving interim relief.

Vincent J. Krocka, Cross-Appellee v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Municipal Corporation · filed 2000-02-08(k)

A plaintiff who is a “prevailing party” on an ADA claim may be awarded attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k), 12117(a). ... Krocka did not prevail at trial, and CPD’s decision to gratuitously grant him the relief he requested does not change that fact.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce a prevailing Title VII plaintiff’s attorney’s fees by lowering counsel’s hourly rates when counsel’s misconduct constitutes special circumstances.

Lee v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc. · filed 2000-03-15(k)

Accordingly, I find “special circumstances” justifying a departure from counsels’ requested rates: Ira Kurzban shall be awarded $150 per hour for his pretrial work and $0 for his trial work; Marvin Kurzban’s rate for this action is $0.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering an impermissible factor.

Garcia v. The City of Houston · filed 2000-02-09(g)(2)(B)(i)

Therefore, the employer’s success in its mixed-motive defense does not in itself bar an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover reasonable attorney fees when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Shepherd v. SUMMIT MANAGEMENT CO., INC. · filed 2000-03-24(k)

The trial court's authority awarding attorney fees is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k): ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp. · filed 2000-04-14(k)

A prevailing party in a case brought pursuant to Title VII is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is a prevailing party and entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in Title VII cases.

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. · filed 2000-05-16(k)

Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is the statutory provision authorizing a district court to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in Title VII cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for efforts to collect a Title VII judgment through bankruptcy proceedings.

Seibel v. Paolino · filed 2000-05-19(k)

Here, § 2000e-5(k) of Title VII provides such an independent basis, stating that attorney’s fees are available in any action or proceeding under Title VII. ... As discussed above, this concept is broadly interpreted and the Court finds that it includes the Plaintiffs efforts to collect their Title VII judgment in bankruptcy court.

Section 2000e-5(k) makes attorney’s fee awards discretionary; appellate courts review those awards for abuse of discretion.

Chestand v. Medical Technology · filed 2000-06-22(k)

An award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is, in the words of the statute, discretionary. Accordingly, we review an award of attorney’s fees in a Title VII case under an abuse of discretion standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; the award may be reduced to reflect limited success.

Robinson v. Instructional Systems, Inc. · filed 2000-07-18(k)

The court, in its January 25, 2000 Memorandum Opinion, has held that plaintiff is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Once the entitlement to an attorneys’ fee award is established, the court must calculate a “reasonable fee” amount to award the prevailing party. ... Therefore, the court reduces the initial attorneys fee calculation, $65,978.75, by 50%, awarding plaintiff $32,989.38 in attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k)’s attorney-fee standard can be analyzed alongside Rule 11 when both requests rest on the same conduct.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E.J. Sacco, Inc. · filed 2000-06-30(k)

Accordingly, the court will employ the same analysis under Rule 11 as under Title VII in evaluating defendant’s claims for attorney fees, costs, and sanctions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not give federal courts jurisdiction over an independent action solely for fees and costs incurred during Title VII administrative proceedings.

Chris v. Tenet · filed 2000-07-27(f)(3)

Accordingly, the jurisdictional grant of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not extend to an independent action solely for attorney's fees and costs incurred during the course of the Title VII administrative process.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney's fees for work on unsuccessful state law claims that share a common core of facts with a successful Title VII claim.

Barton v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2000-08-15(k)

Even assuming arguendo that fees are not recoverable under Arkansas law for Barton's state law claims, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion in not further reducing the fee award, because Barton's state claims of assault and battery, outrage, and negligent retention shared a common core of facts with her Title VII claims, all of which arose from Ware's alleged sexual harassment of Barton.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for work on unsuccessful state law claims that share a common core of facts with a successful Title VII claim.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., D/B/A Sam's Wholesale Club v. Barton · filed 2000-08-15(k)

Even assuming arguendo that fees are not recoverable under Arkansas law for Barton’s state law claims, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion in not further reducing the fee award, because Barton’s state claims of assault and battery, outrage, and negligent retention shared a common core of facts with her Title VII claims, all of which arose from Ware’s alleged sexual harassment of Barton.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs in a Title VII action; the court calculates a reasonable fee using reasonable hourly rates and hours expended.

George v. GTE Directories Corp. · filed 2000-08-28(k)

Plaintiff filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The threshold step in determining a reasonable fee award is calculation of the lodestar, which is the product of the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party in an employment discrimination action.

Nash v. Belk · filed 2000-09-27(k)

A district court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in an employment discrimination action. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k); see also Christiansburg Gar- ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Here, the district court found that fees should be awarded to Defendant but that the request for $8165.90 in fees was excessive. Applying the factors first identi- fied in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), the court awarded Defendant $4096 in fees. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees or setting the amount of the award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees; the hourly rate may reflect the market where specially retained counsel necessarily performed the work.

Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasury United States Secret Service Department of Treasury · filed 2000-09-07(k)

Under those circumstances, and on the total record evidence including the uncontested fact that Shapiro’s deposition of McElney significantly contributed to the plaintiffs attainment of a favorable final settlement, the base-point reasonable hourly rate for Shapiro’s work, for lodestar tabulation purposes, was his customary Washington, D.C. $300 per hour fee.

Section 2000e-5(k), alongside § 1988, governs an attorney-fee award in a successful Title VII action.

Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga. · filed 2000-10-27(k)

The award of attorneys’ fees in this action is governed by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Walia v. Vivek Purmasir & Associates, Inc. · filed 2000-11-15(k)

The Court hereby adopts the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Poliak with the following qualifications: ... Under Title VII, a district court is authorized to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an employment discrimination action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not entitle employees who did not prevail on their Title VII claims to attorney’s fees.

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co. · filed 2000-11-20(k)

Under ADEA, Title VII, and their state breach of' contract claim, Jeney, Gentile, and Coleman might be entitled to attorneys fees had they prevailed. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-341.01. As we have affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the employees have not prevailed and thus are not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorneys’ fees for preparing and defending a fee application, but excessive hours may be reduced.

Gu v. Hughes STX Corp. · filed 2001-02-01(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), Plaintiff has filed a supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the filing and defending of Plaintiffs motions for front pay and attorneys’ fees and costs. ... A litigant may recover additional attorneys’ fees for time spent in preparing and defending an attorneys’ fees application. ... Accordingly, the Court shall reduce Jason Bernbachs’ claimed hours in the supplemental petition by 40% to 58.1 hours.