42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was neither frivolous, unreasonable, nor groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wendy's of Colorado Springs, Inc. · filed 1989-12-27(k)

Plaintiff here presented a prima facie case. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim was neither frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; I decline to award attorney’s fees to the Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's case was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith, and does not require a separate hearing on fees.

Kasuri v. St. Elizabeth Hospital Medical Center · filed 1990-01-02(k)

A district judge has discretion to award fees to a defendant only upon a finding that the plaintiff's actions in pursuing the case were frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith. ... Section 2000e-5(k) does not require the court to conduct a hearing on the matter of attorney's fees, however.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, with the award reflecting both the damages recovered and the need to encourage counsel to take meritorious cases.

Cowan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1990-01-08(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) provides that in Title VII cases the court may, in its discretion, award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee. ... Taking into account the congressional purpose as well as the size of the damage award, I believe an appropriate award of fees is $20,000.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides for attorney’s fees in Title VII claims, but does not authorize fees for claims brought solely under state law.

Kump v. Xyvision, Inc. · filed 1990-02-02(k)

While Section 2000e-5 of Title VII does provide for attorney fees, plaintiff’s claims are not brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff when the lawsuit causes the defendant to take voluntary remedial action.

Spencer v. General Electric Co. · filed 1990-02-13(k)

Here, the trial court found as a fact that this lawsuit served "as a catalyst for the prompt development and promulgation of G.E.'s revised [anti-harassment] policy." Spencer, 706 F.Supp. at 1238. This finding is sufficient to support the court's conclusion that Spencer was a prevailing party. ... Thus, we affirm the trial court's holding that Spencer was a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees as costs to a prevailing party, but not to the government when it prevails.

Lopez v. Louisiana National Guard · filed 1990-03-20(k)

While the provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (made applicable to this action by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)) generally give the court the discretion to award the prevailing party attorney’s fees as part of its costs, these provisions do not apply where the government (viz., defendant Temple as Chief of the National Guard Bureau) is the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing claimant to recover attorney’s fees even if she did not intervene as a plaintiff in the EEOC’s suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Service News Company · filed 1990-03-23(k)

Although her failure to intervene as plaintiff is unusual, restricting the definition of “prevailing party” to exclude Phillips would clearly frustrate the purpose of the statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees for a good-faith suit only if the suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Tutton v. Garland Independent School District · filed 1990-03-30(k)

GISD has not attempted to demonstrate that plaintiffs’ action was brought in bad faith. Defendant must therefore demonstrate that the suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. For reasons that are apparent in the court’s discussion below, the court can find none of these possibilities satisfied in the present case and thus denies § 2000e-5(k) relief.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 1990-04-10(k)

Although it is held herein that Kishaba failed to establish Title VII liability on the part of either Hilton or McDonough, this Court does not conclude that Kishaba’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or that it was brought in bad faith. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees is hereby denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not cap a reasonable contingent fee at the amount of the statutory attorney’s fee award.

Jackson v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 1990-05-23(k)

Section 2000e-5(k), like section 1988, does not “prevent [Jackson’s lawyers] from collecting a reasonable [contingent] fee ... even if it exceeds the statutory award.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Prichard v. Ledford · filed 1990-05-24(k)

In addition, plaintiff is entitled to recover her attorney’s fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1981).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow fees for time spent litigating individual class members’ backpay claims when those members ultimately receive no backpay.

Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries Corporation and Russell Sportswear Corporation · filed 1990-05-24(k)

Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that the class attorneys should not have been compensated for time spent litigating the damage claims of individual plaintiff class members who have not and ultimately do not receive a backpay award. On remand the District Court should reduce the fees by the time spent litigating those individual claims.

Section 2000e-5(k), as incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act, does not provide appellate attorney's fees at this stage when the plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief on the merits.

Brezovski v. United States Postal Service · filed 1990-06-11(k)

While plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs on appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 39; 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(a)(1) (1982) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (1982)), because plaintiff has not yet established that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims, plaintiff's request for an award of attorneys' fees at this juncture is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing private party in a Title VII action.

Bailey v. Great Lakes Canning, Inc. · filed 1990-07-19(k)

Reasonable attorney fees may, in the discretion of the court, be awarded to a prevailing private party in a Title VII civil action as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and to a prevailing private party in a § 1981 action as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It was appropriate for the district court to use the lodestar method of calculating the attorney fees by multiplying the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, there being no other relevant factors requiring further modification.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff continues litigating after a claim clearly becomes groundless.

Smith v. Continental Ins. Corp. · filed 1990-09-25(k)

A district court properly exercises its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action where it finds that the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable expert witness fees for work outside court to be awarded as part of a Title VII attorney’s fee award.

United States v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1990-09-25(k)

In light of the foregoing authorities and the policy of encouraging litigation of Title VII suits through adequate compensation, the court finds that reasonable witness fees, at least for activities other than court attendance, if not more, are available as a component of attorneys' fees under Title VII and section 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not prevent a court from awarding sanctions to the government for bad faith litigation in a Title VII case.

Blue v. United States Department of the Army · filed 1990-10-12(k)

We find no intent in § 706(k) to preclude all awards of sanctions to the government no matter how egregious the conduct of the opposing party or counsel.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for a Title VII plaintiff who proves discrimination.

Vaughn v. Robert Edel, Texaco, Inc. · filed 1990-12-06(k)

Vaughn is also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the calculation of which we leave to the trial court on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney's fees when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Whatley v. Masciopinto · filed 1990-12-07(k)

Because the district judge did not erroneously deny the motion to dismiss and did not abuse her discretion in finding that this Title VII suit against Masciopinto was not frivolous, the denial of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) also was proper.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who obtains a monetary settlement.

Keener v. Department of Army · filed 1991-02-08(k)

A district court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII civil rights case. § 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Such awards can be made pursuant to a monetary settlement.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a reasonable attorney's fee award to account for the plaintiff's degree of success and the relationship between successful and unsuccessful claims.

Oliphant v. Charlotte Memorial Hosp. and Medical Center · filed 1991-02-19(k)

We find that the district court, while acknowledging that the plaintiffs did not prevail on every issue, erred in failing to consider the relevant importance of the issues raised by plaintiffs and their interrelation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to let a Title VII plaintiff commence an action without paying costs, but does not prevent the court from taxing costs after judgment.

Washington v. Dennis Patlis, Colette A. Washington v. Herbert Patlis and Dennis Patlis, D/B/A Pico's Restaura · filed 1990-11-08(f)(1)

By contrast, Title VII, which contains the word “payment,” relates only to the commencement of the action. Title VII does not make an exception to the general rule that federal courts may award costs to the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s suit was brought in bad faith, for harassment, or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Broadcasting Co. · filed 1990-12-07(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), also authorizes the court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant. ... A prevailing defendant may be awarded discretionary attorneys’ fees only if the plaintiff’s lawsuit was brought in bad faith or for harassment purposes, or was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Although NBC is the prevailing party here, the preceding discussion establishes sufficient merit to warrant a denial of any application for attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing parties.

Fortino v. Quasar Co. · filed 1990-12-07(k)

Also the plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs as prevailing parties. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b)(ADEA) and 216(b)(FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII); 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees as costs, ordinarily absent special circumstances.

Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. · filed 1991-03-08(k)

Absent special circumstances, the court should award reasonable attorney fees. ... No such circumstances exist in this case; accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to recover her costs and attorney fees in this action.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes an attorney's fee award to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College · filed 1991-03-14(k)

We also affirm the district court's ruling in awarding attorney's fees to Alvarado. Such a fee award is authorized by Title VII of The Civil Rights Act, 13 and by The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act.

Title VII attorney’s fee applications use the same analysis as fee applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Deniece Scales v. J.C. Bradford and Company · filed 1991-03-19

Although the application for fees in this case has been brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and not the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we feel that the analysis under either section is the same.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit a plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees from a defendant for an appeal on which they took the same position.

William C. Bigby, and Maurice Thoele, Intervening v. City of Chicago and Chicago Police Department · filed 1991-03-25(k)

The City was as much a prevailing party when the appeal was dismissed as were the Big-by plaintiffs; therefore, the Bigby plaintiffs do not qualify for an award of attorney’s fees under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in Title VII cases.

Carter v. Sedgwick County · filed 1991-04-08(k)

However, Sec. 706(k) of Title VII provides specific authority for prevailing parties to recover attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not include counsel’s incidental out-of-pocket expenses in reasonable attorney’s fees.

Prichard v. Ledford · filed 1991-04-12(k)

The Court cannot award these incidental out-of-pocket expenses incurred by plaintiffs counsel as part of the reasonable attorney’s fees under section 2000e-5(k). The statute does not provide for the recovery of costs and attorney’s expenses.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny a defendant’s request for fees and costs when the plaintiff’s Title VII claim was not brought in bad faith or for harassment and was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Byrnes v. Herion, Inc. · filed 1991-05-24(k)

it is HEREBY ORDERED the discretionary fees and costs shall not be awarded inasmuch as the Court is satisfied that plaintiff’s Title VII claim was not brought in bad faith, or for harassment purposes, or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits successful Title VII plaintiff classes to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1991-06-06(k)

Finally, the Johnson class is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the action was brought in bad faith or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Marshall v. Electric · filed 1991-06-21(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) grants the Court discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action and the Supreme Court has clearly defined the standard for making such an award to a prevailing defendant. A defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in a Title VII action only if the Court makes a finding that the action was brought in bad faith or was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ... Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to recover their attorney fees as the prevailing party in this matter.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize assessing attorney’s fees against a losing party’s attorney.

Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc. And Playskool Baby, Inc · filed 1991-07-05(k)

Title VII gives the district court considerable discretion to award fees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), but the statute is silent as to who shall pay the fees. Nevertheless, we have said the statute does not authorize assessment of fees against the loser’s attorney.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in a Title VII case.

Dickerson v. New Jersey, Department of Human Services · filed 1991-07-10(k)

Under the statute the district court may also grant reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as part of the award. ... Defendant is further directed to pay plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff even when the plaintiff has no obligation to pay counsel.

Barbara STARKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE COURT COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1991-07-11(k)

Although Mr. Starks had no obligation to pay either attorney’s fees or costs, Congress has provided that the district court may permit the prevailing party in a Title VII action to recover its costs. ... Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the absence of a plaintiffs obligation to pay attorney’s fees does not preclude an award of statutory fees in civil rights cases. ... Under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney fees and costs upon application.

Evans v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1991-07-26(k)

Evans is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), upon her subsequent application under Local Rule 54.3.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits prevailing parties in Title VII suits to recover attorneys’ fees and costs, making a separate claim for those fees redundant.

Iturbe v. Wandel & Goltermann, Technologies, Inc. · filed 1991-05-23(k)

Title VII allows for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs by prevailing parties in suits brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Since the sixth claim does nothing not covered elsewhere in the complaint, it will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff continues litigating after its claim becomes unreasonable and groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc. · filed 1991-07-12(k)

The Court is of the opinion that in this instance the EEOC continued to litigate this action after it became clear that the claim was unreasonable and groundless. Accordingly, Olson’s may recover its attorney’s fees as part of the costs, provided that it submits an itemized statement to the Court, properly verified and explained by affidavit of its counsel, within 10 days from the date of this Order.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for work in an administrative proceeding when that work is useful and ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation.

Jean BOBBITT, Appellant, v. PARAMOUNT CAP MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1991-08-19(k)

An attorney’s work done in connection with administrative proceedings is compensable under § 2000e-5(k) if the work product from the administrative proceedings was “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows two reductions to an attorney’s fee award only when each addresses a distinct shortfall in the plaintiff’s success.

Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Cross-Appellee v. University of Illinois at Chicago, Cross-Appellant · filed 1991-10-08(k)

Nevertheless, for a case to require two distinct reductions, the factors considered in formulating each reduction must also be distinct.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives a Title VII attorney's fee award to the prevailing party, rather than its lawyer.

Turner v. Secretary of Air Force · filed 1991-10-09(k)

Therefore, it is clear that the award of attorneys' fees belongs to the prevailing party, not to the attorney representing the party.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives district courts discretion to award prevailing parties attorney’s fees; appellate courts review those decisions for abuse of discretion.

Charlene EVANS, Individually and on Behalf of a Class, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF EVANSTON, Et Al., Defendants-Appe · filed 1991-10-24(k)

Title VII’s fee-shifting statute provides that the district court may allow the prevailing party fees “in its discretion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Pursuant to this statutory command, we limit our review of a district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to the question of whether the district court abused this discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorneys’ fees for defense counsel in Title VII actions only in the most egregious circumstances.

Noyes v. Channel Products, Inc. · filed 1991-08-05(k)

This concern aside, it is evident from the record that this was not an appropriate case in which to assess fees against the plaintiff. This court has noted that attorneys’ fees should be awarded to defense counsel in Title VII actions only in the most “egregious circumstances.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to decline an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

Bernardi v. Yeutter · filed 1991-09-25(k)

Finally, the female class has requested attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(K). We note that § 2000e-5(K) "is couched in permissive language." Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1008 n. 5 (9th Cir.1972). We decline to award any attorneys' fees or costs on this appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a Title VII plaintiff to obtain something more tangible than a jury finding of sexual harassment to qualify as a prevailing party for attorney’s fees.

Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, a Subsidiary of Square D Company · filed 1991-10-18(k)

Therefore, in accordance with Hewitt and Rhodes, we hold that to be a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), requires the attainment of something more tangible than a jury finding of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees when a plaintiff obtains a substantial settlement that provides some of the relief sought.

Lyte v. Sara Lee Corporation and Electrolux Corp. · filed 1991-12-03(k)

We find that plaintiff in the instant case is a “prevailing party” under section 2000e-5(k). Clearly, plaintiff has achieved “some of the benefit” sought in his complaint as a result of the $9,500 settlement.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work on an unsuccessful claim unless that work was clearly unrelated to the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed.

Wileman v. Frank · filed 1991-12-10(k)

Under this test, a district court is not required to disallow hours spent on an unsuccessful claim unless it clearly appears that those hours were unrelated to the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit contingency enhancements to attorney’s fee awards in the D.C. Circuit.

Mabel A. King v. James F. Palmer, Director, D.C. Department of Corrections Mabel A. King v. James F. Palmer, Director, D · filed 1991-12-13(k)

Keeping in mind that a majority of the Supreme Court clearly agrees that the question of attorney’s fees must not turn into major litigation in itself, see Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 722, 107 S.Ct. at 3085, we think the appropriate course is to hold that contingency enhancements will not be available in this Circuit.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff even when the plaintiff wins only nominal damages.

Campbell v. Kansas State University · filed 1991-12-18(k)

Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Despite losing on her retaliation and constructive discharge claims, the plaintiff succeeded on her main theory, sexual harassment. ... Because the plaintiff is a prevailing party, she is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees even though she won only nominal damages.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award to a prevailing defendant when the discrimination claim is plainly without merit.

Williamson v. Autorama, Inc. Wes Burrow, Service Manager Susan Quasdori, New Car Sales Mgr. · filed 1991-11-06(k)

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees as partial costs to defendants. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 421 (1978). The lack of merit to this case is easily recognizable by a person untrained in law.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court setting a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees to consider the losing plaintiff’s financial resources; a plaintiff seeking a reduction must plead and establish limited finances.

Gibbs v. Clements Food Company · filed 1991-11-14(k)

We join the circuits cited in finding that the nonprevailing plaintiff’s financial condition and resources are relevant to a court’s equitable decision on the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Of course, the party seeking to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees because of limited finances has the burden to plead and establish his or her financial status.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, including when that becomes clear after trial.

Ronald C. Taylor, Cross-Appellee v. Coors Biotech Products Company, Cross-Appellant · filed 1991-12-24(k)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), 2 a district court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant if it finds that the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978). ... However, this admonition is merely cautionary and in no way precludes a district court from concluding that an action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" after hearing the merits of the case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Detroit-Macomb Hospital Corp. A/K/A MacOmb Hospital Center · filed 1992-01-27(k)

The Supreme Court instructs trial courts to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action only "upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.

Johnson v. United States Elevator Corp. · filed 1991-12-17(k)

Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to his attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation pursuant to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not award attorney’s fees for a purely technical victory that leaves the parties’ legal relationship unchanged.

Margaret Slade, for the Estate of Lawrence Slade, Deceased v. United States Postal Service · filed 1991-12-26(k)

Plaintiff’s success, however, was purely technical. Therefore, he did not satisfy even a “generous formulation” of prevailing party status. ... Because Plaintiff was not a prevailing party, he is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) treats attorney’s fees as part of costs, so a final judgment directing each party to bear its own costs denies fees.

Toliver v. County of Sullivan Richard L. Green Lloyd T. Shimer Leon Siegal and Brian Ingber · filed 1992-02-13(k)

Here, however, the district court in ordering final judgment included both liability and “costs”, of which attorney’s fees are a part.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award to a defendant that prevails against a baseless Title VII claim in later proceedings, even if the plaintiff obtained some relief earlier.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. ANDERSON'S RESTAURANT OF CHARLOTTE · filed 1992-03-24(k)

In response to these arguments, we agree with the district court's finding that, annunciated by the Commission's motion to dismiss, the defendant was the prevailing party with respect to the remand proceedings. Despite the Commission's contention to the contrary, we do not believe that the mere fact that the Commission initially obtains a portion of its requested relief invariably protects it from having fees assessed against it if, in a later stage of the litigation, it chooses to pursue a course so utterly without merit as the one at hand. In addition, we believe that the district court properly applied the relevant standards concerning fee awards to defendants in finding that the Commission had brought and pursued a baseless claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees unless special circumstances make the award unjust.

CLARKE v. FRANK · filed 1992-04-06(k)

Congress has provided such authority in Title VII cases: "In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2000e-5(k) to mandate attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff unless "special circumstances" would render such an award unjust. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to award attorney's fees to Clarke.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for reasonable work protecting a Title VII judgment, even when the prevailing party loses the particular motion.

Jane Sauceman, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant. v. City of Girard, Ohio., Defendants-Appellant's/cross-Appellees · filed 1992-04-23(k)

In light of the City's financial problems, a reasonable attorney would have believed opposition to the motion to be necessary to protect and preserve the judgment obtained in the Title VII proceedings. Accordingly, the district court's denial of attorney's fees for this portion of the case is REVERSED and REMANDED to the court below with instructions to provide attorney's fees for hours expended opposing the defendants' motion.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Stockett v. Tolin · filed 1992-04-24(k)

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff, as a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff who represents himself.

Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance · filed 1992-05-09(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing pro se plaintiff, however.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorneys’ fees in age discrimination actions; those fees are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).

Bentler v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association · filed 1992-03-17(k)

Bentler is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) as he contends; attorneys’ fees in age discrimination actions are awarded, if at all, under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees at the prevailing market rate for salaried union counsel when the fees are deposited in a segregated litigation fund.

Kean v. Stone · filed 1992-06-03(k)

We conclude there are no ethical barriers to giving market rate attorney fees to salaried union attorneys when those fees are deposited in a segregated litigation fund, and hold that under such circumstances a salaried union attorney is entitled to attorney fees calculated at the prevailing market rate under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees for work in an optional state or local proceeding that addresses employment discrimination.

Duello v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 1992-06-25(k)

We conclude from the language and history of Title VII, the nature of Duello's appeal under Wis. Adm. Code sec. UWS 3.08, and the furtherance in those proceedings of the objective of Title VII to remedy discrimination in employment practices, that Duello's appeal was a "proceeding" under § 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits discretionary attorney’s fees for a prevailing party but does not change the Rule 54(d) standard for other costs.

Myrick v. TNT Overland Express · filed 1992-07-09(k)

The only provision in Title VII relating to costs is 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), which allows the court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Section 2000e-5(k) does not alter the standard by which the court awards costs that are not attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 54(d).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to seek reasonable attorney's fees when the plaintiff's suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Ladner v. Thornton Township and Thornton Township Youth Committee, Inc. · filed 1992-07-14(k)

Thornton Township also contends that the district court abused its discretion in declining to award it reasonable attorneys' fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which allows a defendant to a Title VII action to seek reasonable attorney's fees where the plaintiff has filed a suit that is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). For the reasons outlined above, we again conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an award of costs under this attorneys' fees statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who receives only nominal damages; limited success may reduce the fee amount.

Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin Corporation, Brenda Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin · filed 1992-07-31(k)

First, we reject GTE’s argument that Parton is not entitled to any attorney fees at all. In a Title VII case, reasonable attorney fees are appropriately awarded to the “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). GTE argues that Parton cannot be a prevailing party, as the only success she achieved on her lawsuit was an award of one dollar in nominal damages for her sexual harassment claim — relief she had not even sought. It has been this court’s practice, however, to allow attorney fees under federal fee-shifting statutes when only nominal damages are awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees for work in state administrative proceedings that Title VII requires claimants to pursue.

Gonzalez v. Town of Stratford · filed 1992-08-04(k)

Currently pending before the court is the plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Supreme Court has authorized the award of attorney’s fees for work performed in state administrative and judicial proceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants to invoke. ... Therefore, the time expended in relation to the CCHRO complaint is appropriately included in the request.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the action is without foundation, and the plaintiff's financial status may affect the amount.

Gibbs v. Clements Food Company · filed 1992-08-07(k)

The district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Mr. Gibbs' action was without foundation, and the court specifically followed our remand order and considered Mr. Gibbs' financial status in reducing the award to $300. We find no abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to include reasonable time spent defending a class settlement in a prevailing party's attorney's fee award.

Roysworth D. GRANT v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION · filed 1992-08-18(k)

Both 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provide that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." ... Given class counsel's role in establishing the fairness of the settlement, which benefited both the class members and Bethlehem, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in including in the lodestar calculation the time expended defending the settlement.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to use current hourly rates to compensate prevailing-party counsel for delayed payment in protracted litigation.

Grant v. Martinez · filed 1992-08-18(k)

The method of compensation for delay selected by the district court resulted in less than full compensation for the delay; thus, Bethlehem has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by using current rates to calculate the lodestar.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII appellant.

Intlekofer v. Turnage · filed 1992-08-24(k)

Because Intlekofer is the prevailing party in this appeal, we grant her request for attorney's fees under section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-5)(k). The amount of fees shall be determined on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of costs and attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff.

Turner v. Barr · filed 1992-11-25(k)

Costs and attorney fees shall be awarded the Plaintiff as the prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc. · filed 1992-12-17(k)

Finally, Cronin is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a lack of credible evidence can support that finding.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bruno's Restaurant · filed 1992-12-31(k)

We are convinced that the district judge applied the correct legal test and that his conclusion was supported by the record. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in his determination that the EEOC action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to exclude hours attributable to an unsuccessful state-law claim from a Title VII attorney's fee award when the work can reasonably be separated.

Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc. · filed 1993-01-20(k)

But it does not follow that the district court is prevented from eliminating hours attributable to state-law claims where, as here, the court reasonably concludes that there is not a complete overlap and separation is proper.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to exclude from a Title VII attorney's fee award hours that would not have been incurred but for an unsuccessful state-law claim.

PHETOSOMPHONE v. ALLISON REED GROUP · filed 1993-01-20(k)

On the same principle, we believe that the court was entitled to eliminate or discount hours or other expenses that it found would not have been incurred but for the unsuccessful state-law claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Redd v. Fisher Controls · filed 1993-01-21(k)

As correctly stated by Defendant, a court may, in its discretion, award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendant in a Title VII case if it finds “plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Accordingly, this Court does not find Plaintiff liable for Defendant’s attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees only for a prevailing party; establishing jurisdiction without obtaining relief on the merits does not qualify.

Reginald T. HUEY, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee · filed 1993-01-28(k)

Under Title VII, Huey is entitled to attorney’s fees only if he is a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... We agree with the district court that Huey did not prevail on any issue going to the merits of his claim after February 8, 1989. The district court found against Huey on his claim for additional relief, and we affirm. Huey’s argument that he is a prevailing party because the district court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit and retained jurisdiction to oversee the Agency’s execution of the judgment is entirely without merit. Establishing jurisdiction is a procedural victory that does not justify fee shifting.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an attorney fee award to be enhanced because payment was contingent on success.

MORRIS v. AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN CORPORATION · filed 1993-03-03(k)

American National Can Corporation and Glen Besore (collectively referred to as "American National") appeal the district court's decision to enhance the award of attorney fees awarded pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... In light of the intervening decision in Dague, we reverse the enhancement of attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the suit was frivolous.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cross-Appellee v. Consolidated Service Systems, Cross-Appellant · filed 1993-03-04(k)

Although Consolidated has been dragged through seven years of federal litigation at outrageous expense for a firm of its size, we agree with the Commission that this suit was not frivolous.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc. · filed 1993-03-09(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) allows the district court to grant the prevailing party in a Title VII action to recover reasonable attorney's fees. Because we render judgment for the EEOC on liability, it is the EEOC who prevails and not Olson's.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees only for a party who prevailed in an action or proceeding arising under Title VII.

Grant Anthony v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-03-23(k)

Title VII fees are only available when a party prevailed in an action or proceeding arising under Title VII, see supra note 1, and this court has already decided that the district court action did not arise under Title VII and that Anthony did not prevail on a Title VII claim in the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney’s fees and costs in Title VII cases, with the reasonable hourly rate generally based on the market where the case was filed.

Cullens v. Georgia Department of Transportation · filed 1993-03-31(k)

This court awarded them attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The presumption is that the rate of attorney’s fees is that of the place where the case was filed. ... Absent evidence of such an attempt, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing why a market rate other than that where the case was filed is appropriate. Thus, the prevailing rate in Macon applies.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a district court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. OLSON'S DAIRY QUEENS · filed 1993-04-21(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) allows the district court to grant the prevailing party in a Title VII action reasonable attorney's fees. Therefore, we reverse the district court's award of attorney's fees to Olson's and its attorney; Mr. Lopez. Because we render judgment for the EEOC on liability, it is the EEOC who prevails and not Olson's.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit attorney's fees for a party whose appellate reversal has not resulted in a judgment in that party's favor.

Reynolds v. State of Arizona · filed 1993-04-28(k)

Reynolds seeks an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which permits attorney's fees to be awarded to a prevailing party in a Title VII action. "As a general rule, a party who obtains the reversal of judgment on appeal is not a 'prevailing party' unless such reversal also resulted in entry of judgment for that party." Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 933 (9th Cir.1991) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 875 (1992). No such judgment has yet been entered here; accordingly we decline to award attorney's fees to Reynolds at this time.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit enhancing a Title VII attorney fee award based on the risk of nonpayment under a contingency fee arrangement.

Morris v. American National Can Corp. · filed 1993-03-03(k)

We reverse the district court’s decision to enhance Morris attorneys fees based on the contingency fee arrangement between Morris and her attorney.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to decline attorney fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff established a prima facie Title VII case.

Thompson v. Price Broadcasting Co. · filed 1993-03-12(k)

The court declines to award attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(k) for the reason that plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees in Title VII actions, but a fee motion may be denied for missing the applicable local filing deadline without good cause.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-Minnesota Federal Credit Union · filed 1993-04-08(k)

Unlike EAJA, no statutory provision governs the time for filing a motion for fees under Title VII. ... The court thus finds that Mid-Minnesota has failed • to demonstrate good cause for failing to timely file its motion for fees under Title VII. Accordingly, the court denies Mid-Minnesota’s motion for fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party unless special circumstances make an award unjust.

Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. · filed 1993-05-14(k)

Title VII and MHRA authorize an award of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” in cases brought under their authority. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Minn.Stat. § 363.14, subd. 3. The Supreme Court and Minnesota courts interpret the attorney’s fees sections to require the award of fees “unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.” ... Plaintiffs have prevailed on their claims of sex discrimination in promotions and sexual harassment. No special circumstances exist which would render an award unjust. Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be entitled to costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, which they have incurred in connection with prosecuting those claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award when a plaintiff obtains the relief sought through settlement, even without an adjudication of discrimination or an admission of liability.

Petite v. Reno · filed 1993-05-18(k)

Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Title VIPs fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The fact that there has been no adjudication of the plaintiffs discrimination claim and no admission of liability by the defendant does not preclude a fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) generally allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees unless special circumstances make the award unjust.

Davis v. Kansas City Housing Authority · filed 1993-05-25(k)

A prevailing party in an action brought under Title VII may be awarded attorney’s fees in the Court’s discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). While discretionary language is used in the statute, prevailing plaintiffs are essentially entitled to attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust in light of Congressional goals underlying enforcement of fee awards in civil rights litigation. Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 F.2d 101 (2d Cir.1991). No such circumstances exist in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for state administrative proceedings that Title VII requires a claimant to invoke before filing suit, but not for optional internal review proceedings.

Duello v. UNIV. BOARD OF REGENTS · filed 1993-06-17(k)

For the reasons set forth above we conclude that Title VII allows the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees only for those state administrative proceedings that Title VII requires a claimant to invoke prior to bringing a Title VII action in court. Because the internal review proceedings before the CFRR were an optional review process which Duello was not required to invoke pursuant to Title VII, she is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Moses v. Phelps Dodge Corp. · filed 1993-06-21(k)

It is well established that an award of fees to a prevailing defendant under § 2000e-5(k) is appropriate only upon a finding that the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s action was not “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation”. Defendant is therefore not entitled to an award of fees under either the federal or state civil rights statutory scheme.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims were unreasonable or without foundation.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Nassau · filed 1993-06-24(k)

It was that view which leaves the court secure in holding that the plaintiffs’ pursuit of their claims was unreasonable and without foundation and that the award of fees to the prevailing defendants protects them from burdensome litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award against a Title VII plaintiff who brings or continues a frivolous, unreasonable, or baseless claim; bad faith is not required.

Robert Albert, and Cross v. The Edward J. Debartolo Corporation, D/B/A Southern Park Mall, Martin J. Plocica, Jack Petru · filed 1993-07-20(k)

Where the Title VII action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," or where the plaintiff maintains the suit after this becomes clear, an award of fees is appropriate. Bad faith on the part of the plaintiff is not required. Under this provision, it is the party and not the party's attorney against whom sanctions are imposed. Again, the magistrate judge relied on the reasons for denying Rule 11 sanctions to deny Title VII attorneys' fees. This was error. While the award of Title VII fees is discretionary, the same reasons that support the imposition of sanctions under section 1927, support the award of fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award a prevailing class attorneys’ fees for successful work implementing a Title VII consent decree after its entry.

Sherry Eirhart and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Company and Lof Glass Incorporated · filed 1993-06-01(k)

By its terms, Title VII allows a district court to award attorneys’ fees “in its discretion” to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The district court had continuing discretion to award the class attorneys’ fees, at least for class counsel’s successful efforts to implement the decree.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award when a plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction that addresses the merits and provides some of the relief sought.

Scelsa v. City University of New York · filed 1993-08-19(k)

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. ... Since the merits of plaintiffs’ suit were addressed and found compelling enough to grant the equitable relief sought in plaintiffs’ application for. a preliminary injunction, the grant of a fees award is warranted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff for an appeal.

Jerrold S. HELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EBB AUTO CO., Dba Ron Tonkin Mitsubishi, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1993-11-05(k)

We award ... reasonable attorney’s fees to Heller for this appeal. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp.1991).

The EAJA cannot provide a more lenient route to attorney’s fees in a Title VII case than § 2000e-5(k) allows.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Consolidated Service Systems · filed 1993-12-01(k)

This court concludes that permitting EAJA to apply in Title VII cases would subvert the balance set by Congress.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a district court that awards attorney's fees to consider fees for an appeal as part of that award.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. · filed 1993-12-07(k)

As for the workers, we leave for the district court to consider whether they are entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). ... We direct that if the district court ultimately awards fees, it shall consider in its award fees for this appeal.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides no fees for a mixed motive retaliation claim without a violation of § 2000e-2(m), and subsection (k) permits fees only for a prevailing party.

Riess v. Dalton · filed 1993-12-17(g)(2)(B), (k)

He is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) because the jury found no violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). He is not entitled to recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) because he was not the “prevailing party” in the action.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; losing the case alone does not justify fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bruno's Restaurant · filed 1993-12-29(k)

This is the wrong inquiry. To justify an award of attorney’s fees, the district court would have had to find not merely that the EEOC failed to conciliate adequately, but that its belief that its conciliation efforts were adequate was unreasonable. Or it would have had to find not that the EEOC failed to present credible evidence of discriminatory conduct, but that the EEOC should have anticipated at the outset that none of its evidence of discriminatory conduct was credible.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award to a prevailing party, but a plaintiff who achieves no success is not entitled to one.

Griffith v. State of Colorado, Division of Youth Services · filed 1994-02-28(k)

The standard for the award of attorneys’ fee under § 1988(b) is the same as that under § 2000e-5(k). ... Guided by Farrar, we hold that in light of the failure by Griffith to accomplish any success in this litigation, she would not be entitled to any attorney fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees for work on a settled EEO complaint even when related union grievances also produced the relief sought.

Carney v. Runyon · filed 1994-03-14(k)

The court concludes that because plaintiff obtained settlements with defendant on both her union grievances and her EEO claim, defendant cannot now claim that she is not a prevailing party in the EEO matter and is not entitled to attorney fees under section 2000e-5(k) for work done in pursuing her EEO claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees when a Title VII plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party.

Myree v. Local 41, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1994-03-31(k)

Under these circumstances, plaintiff was a prevailing party within the meaning of § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Marquart v. Lodge 837, International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers · filed 1994-06-13(k)

That is, while a prevailing Title VII plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam), a prevailing Title VII defendant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless we determine that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees against the EEOC or the United States only when its Title VII suit is frivolous; the Equal Access to Justice Act’s substantial-justification standard does not apply.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATED SERVICE SYSTEMS, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1994-06-29(k)

Section 706(k) is such a provision, and would be altered if the substantial-justification standard were to be applied in a case to which the provision applied.

Section 2000e-5(k) governs attorney fee awards for Title VII claims.

Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 1994-08-01(k)

Section 2000e-5(k), and not Sec. 1988, of Title 42 would therefore be the applicable provision, if any, governing an award of attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a Title VII defendant to recover attorneys’ fees only when the action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Elgin Teachers Association · filed 1994-06-17(k)

The Teachers’ Association asks for an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The defendant in a suit under Title VII may recover attorneys’ fees only when the action is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees for work preparing an administrative appeal when that work is related to a successful claim.

James v. Runyon · filed 1994-06-20(k)

Section 2000e-5(k), Title 42 provides for attorney fees in “any action or proceeding.” ... There can be no logical distinction made between the Plaintiffs appeal to the MSPB and the filing of the supplemental complaint. Service in preparation for filing the MSPB appeal are reasonably and logically related to the filing of the supplemental complaint.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney fees against an intervenor whose appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Latin American Law Enforcement Association v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1994-07-21(k)

The plaintiffs-appellees request an award of reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses for this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). "[A]ttorney fees should be awarded to a Title VII prevailing party against an intervenor only where the intervenor's actions were 'frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' " Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1452 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989)). ... Accordingly, we conclude that an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Hatley v. Store Kraft Manufacturing Co. · filed 1994-08-03(k)

In summary, after considering and balancing each factor, I shall grant the application for attorney fees and award Hatley attorney fees in the sum of $25,173.45, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp.1994).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII litigant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Stokes v. City of Montgomery · filed 1994-08-11(k)

The attorney’s fee provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), authorizes courts to award reasonable fees and expenses to prevailing civil rights litigants. Stokes is a prevailing litigant and is thus entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Section 2000e-5(k) generally entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would make the award unjust.

Evans v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1994-08-25(k)

While discretionary language is used in the statute, prevailing plaintiffs are essentially entitled to attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust in light of Congressional goals underlying enforcement of fee awards in civil rights litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, but a damages multiplier cannot be the sole or dominant basis for calculating that fee.

Bennie Cullens, James Gonder, Larry Cooper v. Georgia Department of Transportation · filed 1994-08-25(k)

Use of the multiplier as a sole or dominant criterion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of proportionality of damages as a basis for a fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily entitles a prevailing plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees unless special circumstances justify denial.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Accurate Mechanical Contractors, Inc. · filed 1994-09-08(k)

Under that provision, the court may, in its discretion, award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under this section. A prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 2000e-5(k) in all but special circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to defer an attorney’s fee award until final disposition.

Lena R. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna W. SHALALA, Secretary, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-09-08(k)

In the circumstances in this case, we believe that any award of attorney’s fees should await final disposition.

Section 2000e-5(k)'s attorney’s fee provision does not apply to a suit brought under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act rather than Title VII.

Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1994-09-13(k)

Although plaintiffs state that they are seeking their fees under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ... the Title VII fee provision is not applicable here because this is not a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to reduce a prevailing party's attorney's fee award for limited success and excessive time billed.

Polacco v. The Curators Of The University Of Missouri · filed 1994-10-11(k)

The court further reduced the requested fee award because of Polacco's limited success in the litigation--numerous claims for substantial damages were dismissed by the court or rejected by the jury--and because excessive attorney and law clerk time was spent on "what was not a particularly complicated case." These rulings are not an abuse of the court's discretion under the governing principles of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-41, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574-75, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a Title VII plaintiff who obtains relief on the merits to recover reasonable attorney's fees without requiring the fees to be proportional to damages.

Alexander v. Gerhardt Enterprises · filed 1994-11-14(k)

Congress has provided that a "prevailing party" in a Title VII action may recover its "reasonable attorney's fee" as part of costs. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). ... This conclusion and award on the merits clearly renders Alexander a prevailing party and entitles her to reasonable attorney's fees. ... In determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees, this court has rejected the notion that the fees must be calculated proportionally to damages.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a Title VII plaintiff who obtains relief on the merits to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Alexander v. Gerhardt Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-11-14(k)

Congress has provided that a “prevailing party” in a Title VII action may recover its “reasonable attorney’s fee” as part of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... This conclusion and award on the merits clearly renders Alexander a prevailing party and entitles her to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a fee award to be reassessed when the underlying Title VII judgment is vacated and the court must make new findings and determine relief.

Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co. · filed 1994-11-18(k)

Yet, because we are vacating the judgment below and remanding for the entry of independent findings and a fresh judgment, we also must vacate the fee award and ask the district court to reassess Dombeck's request for attorney's fees once the court has made its findings and entered any appropriate relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) authorizes attorney’s fees when an employer would have made the same decision without the discriminatory motive, but the 1991 amendment does not apply retroactively.

Bristow v. Drake Street Inc. · filed 1994-12-01(g)(2)(B)(i)

The 1991 amendments to Title VII authorize the award of attorney’s fees in such a situation, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), but the amendments are not applicable to this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees as costs to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota · filed 1994-12-13(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides in pertinent part, “In any action or proceeding under this title [Title VII], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” ... Ms. Sassaman is entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in this cause, but the district court must determine what fee is “reasonable.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) treats attorney’s fees separately from costs, so Rule 68’s shifting of post-offer costs does not cut off those fees.

Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc. · filed 1994-12-19(g)(2)(B)(i)

By deliberately and significantly altering the verbal formulation in section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to separate attorney’s fees from “costs,” Congress has steered a middle course.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Daramola v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1995-01-04(k)

The court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even thought not brought in subjective bad faith. ... The court finds Daramola acted in bad faith, that his claims of wrongful discrimination were without foundation, and that his claims were frivolous in that they were based on lies and false and fraudulent testimony.

Section 2000e-5 allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff’s successful Title VII claim, with the district court assessing whether related claims warrant fees.

Spicer v. Virginia, Department of Corrections · filed 1995-01-18(k)

If this was done, it was error because Spicer was not the prevailing party on her retaliation claim. On remand the district court should only award appropriate fees incurred in connection with Spicer’s hostile environment claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII party without reducing the award because of a contingent-fee agreement.

Mendoza v. Union Street Bus Co., Inc. · filed 1995-02-10(k)

These observations suggest that to penalize a plaintiff who has made a contingent-fee arrangement with his attorney by reducing his court-awarded attorneys’ fee would undermine the purpose of § 1988 and its Title VII analog, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) authorizes attorney's fees in certain mixed-motive cases, but the 1991 amendment does not apply to this pre-amendment case.

Bristow v. Drake Street Incorporated · filed 1995-02-01(g)(2)(B)(i)

The 1991 amendments to Title VII authorize the award of attorney's fees in such a situation, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), but the amendments are not applicable to this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney fees only if the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Northwest Structural Components, Inc. · filed 1995-02-13(k)

The court also finds that the Title VII claim asserted by Plaintiff is not frivolous. Therefore, NSC is not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) governs attorney fees assessed as costs; it does not govern ordinary taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Rosser v. Pipefitters Union Local 392 · filed 1995-02-16(k)

The Haynie ruling discusses attorney fees assessed as costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It does not specifically discuss costs assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 in any detail. ... This Court’s conclusion that Haynie was directed to the issue of the award of attorney fees as costs and not costs assessed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is supported by the concurring opinion in Brooks, et al. v. Center Park Associates, et al., 33 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir.1994), (Martin, J., concurring).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award no attorney's fees when the relief obtained lacks substantial value.

Hodge v. Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation · filed 1995-03-23(k)

Plaintiff's acquisition of an option (the opportunity to be reassigned to New York with her husband) may well have altered the "legal relationship" between plaintiff and defendant sufficiently to establish plaintiff the "prevailing party" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (1988). See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566, 572-73 (1992). However, even though an option may have substantial value in a case where (as here) the owner ultimately decides against exercise, we interpret the trial court's denial of fees as representing a judgment that the option acquired here was not of substantial value, so that the reasonable fee for the case was "no fee at all." Id. at 575. There was no abuse of discretion in such a conclusion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits prevailing defendants to recover attorney’s fees, but applies a stricter standard to them than to prevailing plaintiffs.

Vitug v. Multistate Tax Commission · filed 1995-03-27(k)

These statutes clearly allow prevailing defendants as well as prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees; however, the neutral language belies the different standards actually applied to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in evaluating motions for attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) makes a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees and costs.

Clark v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General U.S. Postal Service · filed 1995-04-14(k)

Clark has also requested attorney's fees and costs, but is ineligible for such an award because he is not a prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing private party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, subject to the court’s discretion to reduce fees for duplicative work.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd. · filed 1995-05-22(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 provides that in the discretion of the court “the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States” may recover “reasonable” attorney’s fees and costs. ... It might have been preferable had the district court made a closer examination of the duplicative nature of the fees, but the examination made was close enough. We see no abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Johnson v. Resources for Human Development · filed 1995-06-01(k)

Because we are unwilling to find on this evidence that Plaintiff knew his case was meritless, we decline to award attorney’s fees against Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) and 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Hicks v. Arthur · filed 1995-06-15(k)

Both 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) give the prevailing party in a civil rights action the ability to receive reasonable attorney’s fees from a litigant as part of the costs of suit. ... Prevailing defendants, however, can only receive attorney’s fees if the district court finds that the plaintiffs “claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... For these reasons, we will not award Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses against the individual Plaintiffs.

A prevailing Title VII defendant may recover attorney fees under § 2000e-5(k) only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Warren III v. City of Carlsbad Brian Watson James Thompson Frank Mannen Raymond Patchett Stewart Gary Ann J · filed 1995-06-22(k)

We have previously held that a district court may impose monetary sanctions, in the form of attorneys’ fees, upon plaintiffs who file Title VII claims that are “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” ... We also deny the appellees' request for attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing private party to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs; a court may reduce fees for duplicative work if it explains the reduction.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Aic Security Investigations, Ltd. · filed 1995-06-28(k)

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 provides that in the discretion of the court "the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States" may recover "reasonable" attorney's fees and costs. ... A district court may not arbitrarily reduce a fee award; it must instead provide a "concise but clear explanation" of why it reduced the total amount of hours or fees. ... We see no abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff but does not permit a contingent fee multiplier.

Stewart v. Weis Markets, Inc. · filed 1995-06-30(k)

On the basis of Burlington, and its progeny, we conclude that plaintiff is not entitled under federal law to the contingent multiplier sought.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Witte v. Lakeside Inn and Casino · filed 1995-07-25(k)

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). The Supreme Court determined that this section supports an award of fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's claim "was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ... This establishes that even in the face of a valid settlement agreement, the case was not frivolous as a matter of law. ... We therefore find that the award of fees was an abuse of discretion, and vacate that award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees, but fees for private counsel must account for work that duplicated adequate EEOC representation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Clear Lake Dodge · filed 1995-07-26(k)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a "prevailing party" in a suit brought under Title VII is entitled to recover her attorneys' fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). ... Our consideration of the district court's award of $132,926.25 in attorneys' fees in comparison to that contribution, however, convinces us that although the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding some attorneys' fees, its award must on remand be trimmed back significantly.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney's fees when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or became so during litigation.

United States v. Crosby · filed 1995-07-27(k)

Our review of the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its discretion. While the United States was ultimately unable to prove intentional discrimination, its allegations were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, nor did they become so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a full reasonable attorney's fee award when a prevailing plaintiff obtains the relief sought on related claims.

Dunning v. Simmons Airlines · filed 1995-07-31(k)

Dunning achieved "excellent results," id., in that she received the relief she requested (backpay for eighteen weeks), and the grant of the fee request was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff who obtains excellent results to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for work on related claims sharing a common core of facts.

Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc. · filed 1995-07-31(k)

Because of the interrelated nature of the two claims, her attorneys had to prepare for the “litigation as a whole,” rather than merely preparing for “a series of discreet claims.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing party.

Felde v. City of San Jose, San Jose Police Officers Association International Association of Firefighters, Local 23 · filed 1995-09-14(k)

As Felde is not a prevailing party, he is not entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12117 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not warrant attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s unsuccessful claim had a reasonable foundation.

Davis v. Wesley Retirement Communities, Inc. · filed 1995-11-08(k)

Based on the split in the circuits, and the fact that the 10th Circuit had not yet ruled on equitable tolling in a similar factual situation when this motion was filed, plaintiff was not without foundation for seeking equitable tolling in this case. The court therefore finds that it would not be appropriate to award defendants attorney’s fees even though they have prevailed on the Title VII and KAAD claims.