42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for fee awards and permits courts to use current rates when calculating them.

Palmer v. Shultz · filed 1984-09-17(k)

Section 706(k) is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and current rates may be employed when calculating a fee award against the government.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Burston v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1984-09-28(k)

The Court has discretion to award attorneys' fees to plaintiff, who is the prevailing party here, under both 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (for prevailing on certain of his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (for prevailing on certain of his Title VII claims).

Section 2000e-5(k) gives counsel no independent right to seek a direct award of attorney’s fees.

Rainsbarger v. Columbia Glass & Window Co. · filed 1984-10-09(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) simply does not create any right in counsel for either the plaintiff or the defendant in a Title VII case to make a claim for a direct award of attorneys' fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not warrant attorney’s fees against the EEOC when it reasonably filed a Title VII claim and later dismissed it after discovery showed the evidence was inadequate.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TARRANT DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1984-10-26(k)

Section 706(k) provides a disincentive to the bringing of Title VII claims that are unreasonable, frivolous or meritless. At the same time, we must be careful to avoid providing a disincentive to the EEOC’s dismissal of a case which was reasonably based when filed but which discovery later disclosed to be inadequately supported by available evidence. The EEOC should be permitted to dismiss those cases subsequently determined to be marginal without risking assessment of the penalty of attorney’s fees when the EEOC has otherwise acted in a reasonable manner.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not warrant awarding a defendant attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s case is not frivolous, unreasonable, or brought in bad faith.

Bell v. Home Life Insurance · filed 1984-11-15(k)

Defendants have requested that the Court award attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (1981). Plaintiff’s case was in no manner frivolous, unreasonable, nor brought in bad faith, and so defendant’s request is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII party other than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the United States.

Thompson v. Barrett · filed 1984-12-19(k)

As there can be no question that plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action, they are entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under both of the above-cited statutes. ... Under these provisions, a prevailing party in a Title VII claim, other than the Equal Opportunity Commission or the United States, may, in the discretion of the trial court, be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees from the government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to calculate an attorney’s fee award using a firm’s established billing rates and to enhance the award for exceptional representation.

Palmer v. Shultz · filed 1984-12-21(k)

This matter is presently before the Court on defendant’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 17, 1984 Memorandum Opinion granting, pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), plaintiffs fees and costs in the amount of $439,-541.48. ... The Court finds that plaintiffs do indeed have an established billing rate, $80 per hour for partners and $65 per hour for associates, which results in a merits lodestar of $181,820.15 and a fee litigation lodestar of $40,400.00. ... In view of plaintiffs’ superior services and exceptional success, the Court believes that the merits lodestar should be adjusted upwards by 54.75%, producing an enhancement of $99,546.53.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits recovery of attorneys’ fees for earlier Title VII work even when counsel did not represent the plaintiff at trial.

Zack v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1985-01-09(k)

The fact that Oakes & Kanatz did not represent plaintiff in the actual trial of this action does not preclude it from recovering attorneys’ fees under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not presume a Title VII suit frivolous merely because the E.E.O.C. found no reasonable cause to believe the charges were true.

Eichman v. Linden & Sons · filed 1985-01-15(k)

For the same reason, we decline to hold that a plaintiff who files a lawsuit after the E.E.O.C. has found no reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true is presumed to be filing a frivolous lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc. · filed 1985-01-15(k)

Therefore, assuming that Linden was a prevailing Title VII defendant, it would be entitled to attorney’s fees only if Eichman’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or if Eichman continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Section 2000e-5(k)'s frivolous-suit standard for awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant does not govern an award of costs.

Lewis v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 1985-01-18(k)

In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court, in interpreting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) of Title VII, 21 held attorney's fees should be awarded a prevailing defendant only where the suit is frivolous. This Court, however, has expressly rejected the position that Christiansburg also applies to the awarding of costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires findings that explain a reduced attorney’s fee award sufficiently for appellate review.

Barbara A. McClure Cross-Appellant v. Mexia Independent School District, Cross-Appellee · filed 1985-02-12(k)

On her cross-appeal, McClure contends that the attorney’s fees awarded her upon her Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), were inadequate and that, without adequate explanation, the district court reduced her itemized and substantiated statement of attorney’s fees to an arbitrarily set lower amount. We find merit to this contention. ... For similar reasons, we vacate the award of the attorney’s fees in the present case, and remand for reconsideration and proper findings.

Even assuming subsection (k) permits a fee award to the United States for a plaintiff’s bad faith, repeated meritless suits alone do not prove the malice needed for that award.

Austin v. United States Postalservice William H. Phillips, Safety Manager · filed 1985-02-18(k)

However, a finding of bad faith requires some proof of malice apart from the filing of frivolous suits. ... Since the record contains no evidence of plaintiff's subjective bad faith, defendants are not entitled to attorney's fees under section 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) applies a prevailing-party standard to attorney-fee requests.

Stewart v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1985-02-22(k)

As to the fees regarding the back pay appeal* we find no error in the district court’s application of the prevailing party standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous.

Cobb v. Dufresne-Henry, Inc. · filed 1985-03-01(k)

The defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees if the Court finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (K). In assessing the factors for determining whether plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, the letter finding that reasonable cause exists to believe that the charges are true, issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, must be considered, as well as subjective bad faith, and in this case the Court finds that the plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous, and defendant is not entitled to any attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the prevailing party, rather than her attorney, the right to seek attorney’s fees and costs.

Clark v. Marsh · filed 1985-03-12(k)

Under the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs is in Plaintiff, not her attorneys.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award when a party prevails through a negotiated settlement.

Cook v. Block · filed 1985-03-15(k)

Where, as is the case here, plaintiffs have achieved relief by virtue of a negotiated settlement, rather than by a trial on the merits, the requirement that the recipient of the fees be a “prevailing party” is satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits discretionary attorney's fee awards, and a denial of fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Torres v. County of Oakland · filed 1985-03-19(k)

Although this is a somewhat close case, we review a district court's ruling on a motion for attorney's fees only for abuse of discretion. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k); Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 424, 98 S.Ct. at 700, 701, 54 L.Ed.2d 648; Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280, 288 (7th Cir.1981). We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Torres v. County of Oakland · filed 1985-03-19(k)

Under the Christiansburg standard, a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim “was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or ... the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to seek fees and costs at the close of a Title VII case, including those incurred during litigation.

Joyce C. MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KOPECKY CHARTER BUS COMPANY and Ken Kopecky, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1985-05-01(k)

We agree. Morgan, if she prevails, may petition the district court for fees at the close of the case, including all fees and costs incurred during the pend-ency of the litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to prevailing parties only for time reasonably expended.

Grogg v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1985-06-06(k)

For all of the above reasons, I conclude that the union plaintiffs are prevailing parties within the meaning of the Act. An award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), however, may only be made for time reasonably expended.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a Title VII class plaintiff to voluntarily offer to waive statutory attorney’s fees during settlement negotiations when the defendant has not demanded the waiver.

Moore v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc · filed 1985-06-19(k)

After a careful review of the decisions and authorities, we conclude that in the present context of Title VII class actions, simultaneous negotiations of merits, fees, and costs should not be prohibited completely. We also hold that a plaintiff may voluntarily waive claims to statutory fees and costs, at least where a demand for such has not been made by a defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorneys' fees for a prevailing party in a Title VII action, so a fee award must be vacated when the underlying claim is remanded for reconsideration.

Clemente v. United States · filed 1985-07-24(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k), attorneys' fees are available to the prevailing party in a Title VII action. Since we have remanded on the issue of retaliation, we also vacate the award of attorneys' fees under Title VII pending reconsideration of the retaliatory discrimination issue by the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Edwards v. Department of Corrections · filed 1985-07-25(k)

Finally, the court will award Edwards a reasonable attorney fee pursuant to 42 U.S. C.A. §§ 2000e-5(k), determined according to the standards set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney fees governed by the prevailing-party fee standards used under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Hall v. Bolger · filed 1985-08-19(k)

Although these two cases concerned fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, their reasoning applies to the awards in the present case, which are authorized under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(b) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) uses the same standard for awarding attorney’s fees as § 1988.

Gilyard v. South Carolina Department of Youth Services · filed 1985-09-05(k)

Standards for awarding attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the corresponding Title VII provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are identical.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an upward adjustment of a prevailing party's attorney fee only when specific claims and evidence justify it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Burlington Northern Inc. · filed 1985-09-20(k)

There is heavy burden on attorneys for prevailing parties who seek to justify any upward adjustment; this burden is met only if there are specific claims based on particular factors and supported by specific evidence.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party’s fee request to be assessed in light of both monetary and equitable relief obtained.

Bennett v. Central Telephone Co. of Illinois · filed 1985-09-30(k)

Plainly the requested fee award must be measured against not only the monetary award but also the wide-ranging equitable relief embodied in the settlement. In that context, the fee request could in no event be deemed unreasonable on the theory it is disproportionate to the results obtained by plaintiffs and their lawyers.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff when special circumstances would make an award unjust.

Sobel v. Yeshiva University · filed 1985-10-09(k)

This Court finds that special circumstances warrant denial of both Ms. Josephs’ and S & B’s applications for attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; bad faith is unnecessary.

Agbuke v. Catholic Social Services · filed 1985-10-28(k)

Applying the guidelines embodied in Christiansburg Garment Co., supra, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s action was patently frivolous and meritless. ... Instead, the Court awards attorneys’ fees in favor of Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $3,500.00.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits appellate attorneys’ fees for a plaintiff who prevails on a significant issue and obtains some of the relief sought in bringing suit.

39 Fair empl.prac.cas. 822, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,745 Alfred Ekanem v. The Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion · filed 1985-12-05(k)

To recover attorneys’ fees under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the plaintiff must be a “prevailing party” — i.e., he must, “succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” ... We hold that the district court correctly found that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and were not entitled to appellate attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s suit was without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kenneth Balk & Associates, Inc. · filed 1986-01-10(k)

Under the above circumstances, this Court finds that this lawsuit was without foundation and, therefore, that defendants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees against plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

McCrory v. Rapides Regional Medical Center · filed 1986-01-27(k)

Further, the Court finds that attorney’s fees and costs should be awarded to defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.

A fee award under § 2000e-5(k) does not cap a reasonable contingent fee agreed to before the Cooper fee rule, which applies only prospectively.

Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1985-12-18(k)

Our research discloses that Cooper v. Singer seems to be the only opinion holding that a fee shifting award entered by the district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) constitutes the only "reasonable" fee allowable to an attorney who has contracted with his client under a contingent fee agreement. ... Therefore, the three-prong analysis of Chevron Oil Company v. Huson leads us to hold that Cooper v. Singer should be applied prospectively.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a full attorney's fee award when Title VII plaintiffs obtain substantial class-wide relief, even if claims against other defendants are dismissed.

Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement System · filed 1986-01-13(k)

The district court awarded plaintiffs $66,116.25 in attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (1982). ... Because plaintiffs obtained substantial class-wide relief on their Title VII claim, no reduction of fees is warranted.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; the defendant must document the requested amount.

Broussard v. CACI, Inc.-Federal · filed 1986-02-21(k)

As the Court stated, supra, Defendants have demonstrated that they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, under the standards enunciated in Christiansburg. Nevertheless, this Court is not prepared to grant such an award at this time, absent further documentation of the work performed by each attorney for the Defendants.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees as costs, so a fee request is collateral to the merits judgment.

Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. · filed 1986-03-26(k)

We hold that a motion for attorney’s fees in a Title VII action is not a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59. ... Title VII on its face treats attorney’s fees as costs. “[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, including one whose rights are vindicated through a consent decree.

York v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1986-02-26(k)

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, and the attorney fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), authorize courts to award reasonable attorney fees to prevailing civil rights litigants. ... Here, the plaintiffs have plainly vindicated their rights with the consent decree adopted by this court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing party’s reasonable efforts to enforce a Title VII consent judgment even when individual post-judgment efforts fail.

Turner v. Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force · filed 1986-04-07(k)

Appellants’ further argument that they are not obliged to pay for unsuccessful post-judgment litigation undertaken by the PMC both on its own and on behalf of section IX complainants because Title VII allows an award of attorneys’ fees only to “the prevailing party” is likewise unavailing; for the PMC is a “prevailing party” for purposes of this provision of Title VII even when it is not successful in such post-judgment litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who prevails on Title VII harassment claims.

Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc. · filed 1986-03-05(k)

Moreover, Mitchell will be awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 706 of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows an award of reasonable attorney’s fees for defending a frivolous Title VII claim; the award must reflect reasonable rates and hours spent on that claim.

Broussard v. Caci, Inc.—Federal · filed 1986-04-15(k)

Presently before the Court are the supplemental motions of Defendant CACI, Inc. —Federal (“CACI”) and of Defendants Michael Holshey and Andrew Blackwell for attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Such a vague intermingling of the tasks, and the lack of reference in the itemization to the work which directly addressed the Title VII questions, prevents the Court from accepting in its entirety the request of Holshey and Blackwell for attorneys’ fees. The requested award of Holshey and Blackwell, therefore, will be reduced by twenty-five percent.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats reasonable attorney’s fees as costs when they are properly available, so a Title VII offer of judgment must include them expressly or implicitly.

Bentley v. Bolger · filed 1986-04-16(k)

Those costs or attorney’s fees “properly available” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are “reasonable” fees as determined in the Court’s “discretion.” ... A valid Offer of Judgment in response to a Title VII claim must either explicitly or implicitly encompass a provision for costs, including attorney’s fees that are reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit a complete denial of fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff solely because the fee request is excessive when counsel's records support a reasonable award.

Zabkowicz v. West Bend Company · filed 1986-04-24(k)

Contrary to both Brown and Vocca, the fee request in the present case is not so egregious nor is counsel's recordkeeping so inept that a complete denial of fees is warranted, although we readily agree with the district court that the fee request for $127,515 in the limited circumstances of this case is undoubtedly excessive and unreasonable. ... We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying any fees and, accordingly, remand this case for a reasonable fee determination in accordance with Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, and its progeny.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Thomas v. Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-05-29(k)

As the prevailing party, plaintiff is entitled under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to a reasonable fee and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for legal work that contributed to a prevailing Title VII claimant’s success even if the lawyer was not counsel of record at trial.

Mammano v. Pittston Co. · filed 1986-06-05(k)

Serving as counsel of record at trial is not a prerequisite to the recovery of fees. The issue, simply, is whether services were performed which contributed to claimant’s success in the lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Jackson v. Color Tile, Inc. · filed 1986-04-25(k)

Furthermore, the court hereby determines that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation; thus, the court in its discretion rules that Color Tile should prevail upon its counterclaim for attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is unreasonable and groundless.

Johnson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1986-05-08(k)

In view of the foregoing, the Court, pursuant to its discretionary authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) awards attorney’s fees to the defendants.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; losing at trial alone does not justify fees.

Berry v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1986-05-14(k)

A district court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when it finds that the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Although the Court in its opinion found that the plaintiff’s evidence at trial did not support an inference of discrimination, the plaintiff’s claims were not “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” within the stringent standards as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. at 700-01.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Logan v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center · filed 1986-05-20(k)

Although discovery revealed that several allegations in Logan’s claims were unsupportable, these shortcomings do not rise to the level of irresponsibility which has prompted other courts in this district to award counsel fees to a civil rights defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not warrant attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s central claim was unsuccessful but not frivolous, without foundation, or brought in bad faith.

Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc. · filed 1986-06-10(k)

While the evidence offered in support of this theory at trial was weak and ultimately unpersuasive, the Court cannot say that the central claim was frivolous, without any foundation in faet, or brought in bad faith. ... It is ordered that Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and F.R.Civ.P. Rule 11, be, and hereby is, denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff entitled to at least nominal damages, even without a finding of constructive discharge.

Derr v. Gulf Oil Corporation · filed 1986-06-25(k)

Because Ms. Derr was a prevailing party and will be entitled to at least nominal damages, she is, regardless of the trial court’s constructive discharge finding, entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5 does not authorize attorney fees in a case brought solely under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, which does not incorporate Title VII.

Tatum v. Labor & Industry Review Commission · filed 1986-07-09

FDL claims that an award of attorney fees is authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and by sec. 814.025, Stats. We can quickly dispose of the Title VII argument, because this case does not involve a Title VII claim and because the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), secs. 111.31-.395, Stats., does not ipso facto incorporate Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes a reasonable attorney’s fee for a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Boomsma v. Greyhound Food Management, Inc. · filed 1986-07-24(k)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,088.42, plus a reasonable attorney’s fee. Id. at § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an interim attorney’s fee award for a party who wins a remand for trial but has not prevailed on the merits.

Corine Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, a Delaware Corporation · filed 1986-08-01(k)

Proctor’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is denied without prejudice because she is not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of that statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to defendants in a Title VII suit, with the amount supported by attorney time records.

Johnson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1986-08-05(k)

On May 8, 1986, 639 F.Supp. 887, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 and Title YII complaints and awarded attorneys’ fees to defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... In sum, the Court allows to the Transit Authority only $250.00 costs, and to the Union $6,900.00 fees and $32.50 costs, aggregating $6,932.50.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

LeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. · filed 1986-08-22(k)

A prevailing plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would make the award unjust, but a prevailing defendant will recover fees only upon a showing that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation ... or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... We hold here, however, that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants in this case.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney's fees against the United States but does not waive its immunity from interest or an adjustment for delayed payment.

Library of Congress v. Shaw · filed 1986-07-01(k)

Title VII's provision making the United States liable "the same as a private person" waives the Government's immunity from attorney's fees, but not interest.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorneys’ fees for proceedings to determine individual relief after a class prevails, including for claimants who do not receive back pay, unless their claims are frivolous or vexatious.

McKenzie v. Kennickell · filed 1986-08-08(k)

This Court has already held that plaintiffs are the “prevailing party” in this litigation and are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Moreover, even unsuccessful individual claimants have benefited from the substantial injunctive relief contained in the 1981 order. Accordingly, under the order of reference, the government shall pay all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by individual claimants in the proceedings before the Special Master except where the claims are found to be frivolous or vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys' fees to a defendant only when the plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Dezell v. Day Island Yacht Club · filed 1986-08-08(k)

In order for a defendant to recover costs against a plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k), a district court must first find "that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." ... We hold that the action was not so frivolous as to merit the award of attorneys' fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII enforcement action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Denton v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers · filed 1986-09-05(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in a civil action to enforce the provisions of Title VII.

For a fee award under § 2000e-5(k), a court applies the result-obtained adjustment to the lodestar before combining other justified adjustments.

Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Electric Company · filed 1986-09-22(k)

The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 and the attorney's fee provision contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide that in federal civil rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (1982). ... To establish a uniform practice in the Third Circuit, we now hold that a district court should first apply the result-obtained adjustment to the lodestar. Following this adjustment, the court should then add together the other (whether they be reducer or enhancer) adjustments it has found to be justified and multiply that combined factor by the result-obtained-adjusted lodestar.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable fees for preparing a fee petition; the award must account for the party’s success and supported hourly rates.

Trappanese v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · filed 1986-09-22(k)

Like the time spent in litigating the civil rights claim, the time spent in preparing the fee petition is recoverable as a statutorily authorized attorney’s fee award. ... In the instant fee petition award the district court abused its discretion twice: once in failing to consider the petitioning counsel’s success in obtaining the full fee award sought, and a second time in reducing the hourly rate to a standard $75 per hour when PECO filed no affidavit contesting the historical rates or the time spent.

Section 2000e-5(k) limits a reasonable attorney-fee award to an hourly rate no higher than the market rate needed to attract competent counsel.

Coulter v. Tennessee · filed 1986-10-29(k)

We therefore apply the principle that hourly rates for fee awards should not exceed the market rates necessary to encourage competent lawyers to undertake the representation in question.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an interim award of attorneys’ fees in a Title VII case.

McKenzie v. Kennickell · filed 1986-09-12(k)

Plaintiffs have now filed a motion for an interim award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Court believes that such an award is justified and grants plaintiffs’ motion as explained below.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorneys’ fees for a Title VII plaintiff who prevails by succeeding on a significant issue and obtaining some of the benefit sought.

Thorne v. City of El Segundo · filed 1986-10-20(k)

In this case, Thome clearly succeeded in her Title VII claim against the City, and thus was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a discrimination claim strong enough to survive judgment after the plaintiff’s proof does not meet that standard.

Pearlie Mai Haynie and Her Counsel, Avon N. Williams, Jr. v. Ross Gear Division of Trw, Inc. · filed 1986-11-04(k)

Even though Ms. Haynie did not bring this action in subjective bad faith, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), teaches that the court still had discretion to require her to bear the prevailing defendants’ attorney fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), if her action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The trial court found, however, that Ms. Haynie had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against Ross Gear, and we are at a loss to understand how a case that is strong enough to withstand a motion for judgment at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proofs can be considered “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) sets no intrinsic deadline for filing an attorney’s fee motion.

Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems Agency · filed 1986-12-01(k)

The motion for fees was based upon ... 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k). ... Neither Rule 11 nor any of the three statutes authorizing fee awards contains any intrinsic time limitation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs to a prevailing plaintiff.

Angell v. Leslie · filed 1986-12-09(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs incurred in prosecuting this action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize reimbursement for legal work in a related criminal case, even when the criminal proceeding was instigated in violation of Title VII.

Mayson v. Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. · filed 1987-01-06(k)

With respect to plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees in the related criminal proceeding, the district court correctly held that Title VII does not envision reimbursement for legal work done in criminal cases, even if the criminal proceeding was instigated in violation of Title VII, especially when the defendant did not prevail in that litigation.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires the United States and the EEOC to pay interim attorney’s fee awards on the same terms as private parties, without waiting for a final judgment.

Jurgens v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1987-01-15(k)

The specific issue on which this motion turns is whether a court’s award of interim attorneys fees against the United States is payable only after entry of a final order which is not appealed, notwithstanding specific language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) that the United States must be treated as a private person for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees. The court concludes that this statute means what it says: an award of interim fees against the United States is payable in the same manner as an award of interim fees against a private person.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Cecil C. Shrock, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Altru Nurses Registry, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1987-01-20(k)

The fact that Shrock was a Title VII plaintiff would not automatically disentitle Altru to an award of attorney’s fees; a defendant in a Title VII suit is entitled to such an award if the plaintiff’s suit is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1987-01-27(k)

Accordingly, while the court has found that Sears was entitled to prevail in this case, the court finds that EEOC’s case, from filing to final arguments, was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. The court therefore denies Sears’ motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the bad faith exception to the American Rule.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees as costs for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, with the award tied to the degree of success.

Rohrer v. Slatile Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., Inc. · filed 1987-02-10(k)

Section 2000e allows the court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs to “prevailing parties” in Title VII actions. ... Thus, the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees in an amount directly related to the degree of relief won.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney's fee for a prevailing party, with the amount reflecting the degree of success obtained.

Foster v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County · filed 1987-02-19(k)

Thus, the district court's reduction for the limited success obtained by the plaintiffs did not require a second prevailing party determination. Rather, the district court correctly followed the language of the attorney's fees statutes and Supreme Court in setting a "reasonable" fee for the prevailing party by making it "clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained." Id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 53.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing defendant to recover attorneys' fees only when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or in bad faith, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp. · filed 1987-03-09(k)

Prevailing defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees under section 706(k) of Title VII or under section 1988 only upon a showing that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or made in bad faith, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kenneth Balk & Associates, Inc. · filed 1987-03-11(k)

A prevailing defendant in a discrimination suit under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may recover attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff’s case was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) commits attorney's fee awards to the district court's discretion, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc. · filed 1987-03-20(k)

The decision to award attorney's fees under either section 1927 or section 2000e-5(k) is committed to the district court's discretion and that decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees when a Title VII plaintiff prevails on the central issue and obtains the primary relief sought.

Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc. · filed 1987-04-01(k)

The Court may also award attorneys fees to plaintiffs Ross and Stoudenmire if they are “prevailing parties” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... It is clear that plaintiffs received the primary relief sought since they obtained reinstatement, back pay and injunctive relief. Thus, the Court shall award attorneys fees to the plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the prevailing Title VII claimant, rather than the claimant’s attorney, the right to seek attorney’s fees.

Kenneth KEESEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Verne ORR, Secretary of the United States Department of the Air Force, Defendant · filed 1987-04-17(k)

Here, there was no client for whose benefit an award of attorney’s fees could be made because the client settled his Title VII claim before any final administrative decision on his complaint was made and before any court action was filed. The attorney had no right, equitable or otherwise, to stand in the shoes of a nonexistent client in order to collect his fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a Title VII action; a plaintiff who does not prevail cannot recover fees for that claim.

Mariano S. Falcon v. General Telephone Company · filed 1987-04-23(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII provides the “prevailing party” in a Title VII action with reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Where a plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for the hours spent on that claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit attorney’s fees for an appeal when the party has not succeeded on the merits of an underlying claim.

Arnold v. United States · filed 1987-05-05(k)

Arnold requests attorney’s fees in this appeal under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 2000e-16(d). Parties may not receive attorney’s fees for an appeal if they have not succeeded on the merits of any of their underlying claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a reasonable attorney’s fee for Title VII relief obtained through a nonfrivolous settlement claim, limited to the relief the party secured.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Madison Community Unit School District No. 12 · filed 1987-05-05(k)

The only distinctly Title VII aspect of the consent decree is the prohibition against retaliating for exercise of rights conferred by Title VII. On remand the district judge must assess a reasonable (presumably very modest) attorney’s fee for obtaining this provision.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award when a party prevails on a contempt motion and obtains a consent agreement resolving the disputed relief.

Afro-American Patrolmen's League v. City of Atlanta · filed 1987-05-27(k)

By prevailing on the contempt motion and achieving a consent agreement resolving the issue of promotions, the FOP prevailed to the extent necessary for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Lewis v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1987-06-02(k)

In this case, plaintiffs action was not frivolous or unreasonable. ... In that context, a defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) or 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a state dismissal hearing that was not required to pursue a Title VII claim.

Cooper v. Williamson County Board of Education · filed 1987-06-02(k)

The state dismissal hearing, which occurred after the Title VII action, was not a proceeding under Title VII because Cooper’s participation was not a condition precedent to his pursuing his employment discrimination claim in federal court. Thus, Section 706(k) does not extend to the fee request.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a party to prevail to receive attorney’s fees; reversal of the judgment ends that party’s eligibility for the award.

Garrett v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1987-06-10(k)

Because the judgment must be reversed, defendants no longer are prevailing parties under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Thus, the award of $5,000 attorney’s fees must be vacated.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Bynum v. Michigan State University · filed 1987-06-22(k)

Under Section 706(k) of Title VII, the court may award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendant in a Title VII case “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or, without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the prevailing party, rather than the attorney, the right to seek attorney’s fees.

Soliman v. Ebasco Services Incorporated · filed 1987-06-30(k)

Thus, independent of his client, an attorney has no personal right to an award of statutory attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to review an unopposed fee request and award only reasonable attorney’s fees.

Mary Jane CURTIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BILL HANNA FORD, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-07-24(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) does not permit the award of any fees requested, but only of “reasonable attorney’s fees.” It also entrusts the award of fees to the court’s discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorney's fees when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

In Re Ruben · filed 1987-07-30(k)

In Christiansburg, supra, the Supreme Court described the test for awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. The Supreme Court stated: "In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. As will be described, we conclude that this standard does not support an award of attorneys' fees against Rathbun.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows prevailing Title VII defendants to seek attorney’s fees, with the timing of their motions governed by the White rationale.

Rathbun v. Warren City Schools · filed 1987-07-30(k)

Ruben should have known that defendants, as the prevailing parties, could seek recovery of their attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the language of which parallels section 1988 and therefore falls within the White rationale.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party.

Richards v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1987-08-24(k)

As a final matter, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorneys fees as the prevailing party in this action.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award against a Title VII plaintiff who continues litigating after her claim clearly becomes unreasonable.

Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co. · filed 1987-08-31(k)

An award of fees is warranted in this case due to plaintiff’s assertion of her pregnancy and mental anguish claims as well as her continuation of the litigation after her Title VII action “clearly” became “unreasonable” on December 18, 1986. ... Accordingly, defendant is hereby awarded legal fees of $6,000, $5,000 imposed on plaintiff pursuant to § 706(k) and Rule 11, and $1,000 imposed on plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Rule 11.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant in its discretion.

Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1987-09-02(k)

Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, and for attorneys fees as prevailing parties under Title VII, is denied. ... Defendants’ request for attorneys fees is denied in the discretion of the court.

When awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant, a court should consider the plaintiff’s financial resources and avoid an award that would cause financial ruin.

Miller v. Los Angeles County Board of Education and Stuart E. Gothold, Los Angeles County Superintendent of · filed 1987-09-09(k)

While an award of attorney’s fees for a frivolous lawsuit may be necessary to fulfill the deterrent purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the award should not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits interim attorney’s fee awards against the United States on the same terms as against a private employer.

McKenzie v. Kennickell · filed 1987-09-10(k)

To carry out the statute’s express instruction that the United States “shall” be treated identically with private persons for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, courts must award interim fee awards against the United States on the same terms as against a private employer.

Section 2000e-5(k) excludes the United States from recovering attorney’s fees as a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Butler v. United States Department of Agriculture · filed 1987-09-10(k)

The statute before us contains no ambiguity in its exclusion of the United States from receipt of attorney’s fees as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Tye v. Houston County Board of Education · filed 1987-09-21(k)

Finally, the court will require that the defendants pay Tye a reasonable attorney fee. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing claimant to seek attorney’s fees in federal court for a state administrative discrimination proceeding even when state law provides no fee award.

Jones v. American State Bank · filed 1987-09-22(k)

This Court finds New York Gaslight Club dispositive. South Dakota has not provided for attorney’s fees. Title VII provides supplementation in this area and does provide for such attorney’s fees and therefore Plaintiff’s position is well founded under the holding of New York Gaslight Club.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for post-settlement work only when the claimant obtains relief from the defendant, rather than a larger share of a settlement fund at other plaintiffs’ expense.

In Re Burlington Northern, Inc. Employment Practices Litigation. Appeals of Mitchell White, Claude E. Brown, Charles Tay · filed 1987-11-06(k)

To be prevailing parties for purposes of Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, the law firms would have to have achieved some relief in the post-settlement allocation proceedings from Burlington Northern, not from fellow plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorneys’ fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Lockette v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1987-12-03(k)

This court also declines to award attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). That section permits an award of attorneys’ fees in favor of a prevailing defendant only when the suit is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an upward adjustment of the lodestar based on a case’s difficulty, counsel’s skill, time constraints, and the results obtained.

Shipes v. Trinity Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-12-07(k)

Regardless of any future determination of the propriety of additional adjustment for risk in this case, it is clear that the lodestar fixed in the July 15 order must be adjusted upward on the basis of this action’s novelty and difficulty, counsel’s skill, the preclusion of other employment that counsel suffered because of their commitment to this matter, the time limitations imposed, and the results obtained. ... Thus, reserving for now only an adjustment for contingency and risk that later may be found appropriate, counsel is hereby awarded an amended total fee under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) of (1.8) X ($144,712.70), or $260,482.86.

Section 2000e-5(k) bars an award of attorney’s fees to the United States as a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Harris v. Marsh · filed 1987-12-28(k)

Section 706(k) contains no ambiguity in its exclusion of the United States as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k), as incorporated into federal-sector Title VII, does not permit current billing rates to compensate for delayed payment of attorney’s fees when the federal government is the defendant.

Thompson v. Ralph E. Kennickell, Jr., Public Printer, Dorothy M. Thompson v. Ralph E. Kennickell, Jr., Public · filed 1988-01-08(k)

Class counsel applied for attorneys’ fees and costs under the fee-shifting provisions of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and Title VII, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-16(d), incorporating 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(k). ... So we conclude that Shaw prohibits the use of current rates for work performed under Title VII.

A district court’s denial of attorney’s fees under § 2000e-5(k) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc. · filed 1988-01-21(k)

The panel also affirmed the district court’s denial of Capital’s request for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Recognizing that the standard of review for denial of attorney’s fees under both statutory provisions is abuse of discretion, the panel correctly concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Capital's request for attorney’s fees under either provision and, discerning no error, we adopt the panel opinion in this regard.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1988-02-08(k)

In order for a prevailing defendant to recover these expenses under any of the three provisions, the district court must find that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. ... The district judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to award attorneys’ fees and other expenses pursuant to section 2000e-5(k), section 659.121(1), or rule 11.

Section 2000e-5(k) bases a reasonable hourly rate on the lawyer’s skill and the level of litigation, rather than the size of the lawyer’s firm.

Palmer v. Shultz · filed 1988-02-26(k)

Moreover, the focal point of inquiry in ascertaining relevant comparable community hourly rates concerns itself with the particular fee applicant’s degree of skill in handling a particular level of litigation, as opposed to the size of the fee applicant’s firm.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Williams v. HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. OF FLORIDA · filed 1988-03-01(k)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), provides that a district court may, in its discretion, award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant upon a finding that plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... In conclusion, the court finds plaintiff’s claims, while unsuccessful, were not so lacking in foundation nor so frivolous as to warrant an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be reduced for inadequate documentation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Nutri/System, Inc. · filed 1988-05-05(k)

First, it is Congress’ intent, made explicit in the statute, that a “prevailing party” should recover reasonable attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Given all the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the proposed lodestar figure should be reduced by 25% from $43,689 to $32,767.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a claimant to establish a Title VII violation before receiving an attorney’s fee award.

Grant Anthony v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of H.H.S. · filed 1988-06-07(k)

As is made clear by Hanrahan and Grubbs, the claimant’s proof of a civil rights violation is a prerequisite to an attorney’s fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover attorneys’ fees only when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, groundless or in bad faith; losing alone is insufficient.

Bruce HUDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-07-01(k)

Western asks for an award of the costs of the suit and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). Prevailing Title VII defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees only when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, groundless or in bad faith. ... Nonetheless, we do not find that Hudson’s continued litigation of this claim was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless or in bad faith. The fact that Hudson did not prevail is not enough.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work performed before a successful claim emerged when that work was essential to the claim.

Avila v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 1988-07-12(k)

We further hold, however, that the district court erred in calculating the number of hours expended in connection with the retaliation claim. The district court awarded fees for only those hours expended on or after February 7, 1984, the day of the trial on which the retaliation issue first came to light. Certainly, some of the work performed before February 7 was essential to the retaliation claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny fees for an unsuccessful, related claim when the plaintiff obtains only limited success.

Avila v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 1988-07-12(k)

Thus, we hold that the district court had discretion to disallow, at least in part, fees for the unsuccessful national origins claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII claimant to sue in federal court solely for attorney’s fees incurred in a mandatory state proceeding.

Lisa M. Jones, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae v. American State Bank · filed 1988-09-21(k)

We affirm the district court in all respects and hold that a claimant may bring an action in federal court to recover attorney’s fees for work done in a state proceeding to which a claimant was deferred pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney fees as part of costs but does not itself authorize an award of ordinary costs.

Williams v. Hevi-Duty Electric Co. · filed 1988-09-29(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 2000e-5(k) make no provisions for an award of costs.

Attorney fee awards under § 2000e-5(k) follow the same principles that govern fee awards under § 1988.

Nancy FADHL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1988-10-04(k)

Awards of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are governed by the same principles.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, without requiring subjective bad faith.

Paul v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1988-10-13(k)

While the Court finds sanctions under Rule 11 inappropriate, defendant need not show plaintiff acted in bad faith to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Furthermore, defendant has not shown, and the court does not find, that the Complaint itself was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney fees for prevailing Title VII litigants.

Stokes v. City of Montgomery, Ala. · filed 1988-10-31(k)

The attorney fees provisions of 42 U.S.C. A. § 1988 and of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), authorize courts to award reasonable fees to prevailing civil rights litigants. Plaintiff Stokes is unquestionably the prevailing litigant in this lawsuit and is thus entitled to reasonable attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and costs.

Whites v. Hahn · filed 1988-11-09(k)

Plaintiff is entitled to award of attorney's fees and costs incurred and shall within fifteen (15) days of this Order submit a bill of costs. A report relative to attorney's fees also shall be submitted for the Court's consideration, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorney fees to be awarded as part of a prevailing Title VII plaintiff’s costs.

Sahs v. Amarillo Equity Investors, Inc. · filed 1988-12-14(k)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) Plaintiff be awarded reasonable attorney fees as part of her costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney's fee for a prevailing party, but an enhancement requires findings that the case is rare or exceptional.

Krieger v. Gold Bond Building Products · filed 1988-12-19(k)

The district court did not indicate that it felt this case was particularly difficult in comparison with other Title VII cases; nor did it make any other findings to support the view that this was a rare or exceptional case. We conclude that enhancement was impermissible, and we therefore remand for a recalculation of the attorney's fees to be awarded without enhancement, and the entry of a new judgment reflecting the new calculation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court, in its discretion, to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees.

Witzsche v. Jaeger & Haines, Inc. · filed 1989-02-01(k)

Because of the lack of merit in this case detailed above, it may be that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of an attorney’s fee and costs in this case, but, in view of the cases cited above, and in the exercise of its discretion, the court declines to do so under this provision of law.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff whose litigation significantly contributed to the relief obtained.

Spencer v. General Electric Co. · filed 1989-03-01(k)

As a prevailing party, plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This Court has limited discretion to deny her a fee award “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s action was groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-03-03(k)

On the contrary, we hold only that attorneys’ fees should be allowed only in egregious circumstances, which we find to be present here.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees when her lawsuit materially contributes to a favorable settlement, even if she prevails on only one claim.

Y. Nanetti v. University of Illinois at Chicago · filed 1989-01-31(k)

A prevailing party in a Title VII lawsuit is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred. ... The lawsuit itself was a catalyst or material factor in the favorable increase in salary. ... Nanetti is entitled to receive therefore a just and reasonable portion of her attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits recovery of reasonable attorney expenses ordinarily charged to a client in addition to the costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Noble v. Herrington · filed 1989-02-14(k)

The costs listed in this provision do not, however, provide an exhaustive list of the costs recoverable by a prevailing party in a Title VII suit. This is because Title VII also contains a provision authorizing an award of costs to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Title VII’s provision on costs has been construed as a supplemental power conferred upon courts “to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client in the course of providing legal services.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, taking a pro se plaintiff’s ability to assess the claim into account.

Chester v. St. Louis Housing Authority · filed 1989-04-27(k)

Title VII gives a district court the discretion to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Unlike a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action, who “ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances,” a successful Title VII defendant may be awarded attorney’s fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits appellate attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who prevailed on the merits even if the plaintiff did not prevail on every contention.

William LATTIMORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OMAN CONSTRUCTION, Defendant-Appellant, Bill White, Defendant · filed 1989-04-28(k)

Oman also takes the untenable position that Lattimore is not entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) because he was not a “prevailing party” in the first appeal. ... Moreover, Lattimore became the prevailing party when he obtained a judgment on the merits of his claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves an award of attorney’s fees to the court’s discretion.

Bowman v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1989-05-01(k)

This case was well presented by both sides, and an award of fees is within the discretion of this Court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a plaintiff who partially prevails on a Title VII claim to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Corbett v. Wild West Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1989-05-05(k)

Plaintiff is a prevailing party having partially prevailed on her Title VII claim and is entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a party seeking attorney’s fees to have prevailed in the Title VII action.

Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1989-05-25(k)

To conclude, the Court finds Plaintiff is not entitled to its attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying Title VII case because it cannot cross the threshold required to receive such fees — achieving prevailing party status.

Section 2000e-5(k) calls for an objective assessment of the Title VII claim as a whole after its disposition; a defendant may receive fees if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even if it survived earlier motions.

Alice Lisa Greenberg, Cross-Appellant, Phyllis Gelman, Susan R. Meredith v. Hilton International Co., Cross-Appellee · filed 1989-06-01(k)

Unlike Rule 11, which imposes sanctions for discrete filings, Section 2000e-5(k) comes into play only after the Title VII claim has been disposed of and requires the court to assess the strength or weakness of that claim viewing the case as a whole. If plaintiffs case, viewed as a whole, was objectively “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” the court should award fees even though plaintiff survived motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to decline to pursue fees against a Title VII plaintiff when her lack of involvement and financial circumstances make an award inequitable.

Greenberg v. Hilton International Co. · filed 1989-06-01(k)

Nevertheless, there is no indication that Ms. Greenberg affirmatively participated in the aggressive pursuit of the costly discovery, compare Brown v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 560 F.Supp. 391, 407 n. 7 (D.N.J.1983), and Ms. Greenberg's straitened financial circumstances would make such an award inequitable and probably superfluous. Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1978). We therefore decline to remand the issue of an award of fees under Section 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Gordon v. Hercules, Inc. · filed 1989-06-09(k)

Therefore, the court cannot say that plaintiffs’ initiation or litigation of this action was either frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. Thus, the court will exercise its discretion and deny defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees against a losing Title VII intervenor only when the intervenor's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes · filed 1989-06-22(k)

Proceeding, then, to interpret the statute in light of the competing equities that Congress normally takes into account, we conclude that district courts should similarly award Title VII attorney's fees against losing intervenors only where the intervenors' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides for a reasonable attorney fee that attracts competent counsel without producing a windfall.

Norwood v. CHARLOTTE MEMORIAL HOSP. & MED. CENTER · filed 1989-06-26(k)

In awards made pursuant to fee-shifting statutes, such as this one, the fee also should be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but ... not produce windfalls to attorneys.”

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorneys' fees for work in an optional internal grievance procedure that is not a prerequisite to a Title VII action.

Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health · filed 1989-05-04(k)

Because the internal grievance procedure was not a prerequisite to the plaintiffs' filing a Title VII action, the procedure does not fall within section 706(k)'s "action or proceeding" language and attorneys' fees for services during the grievance procedure are not available.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of costs and attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Sanchez v. Banco Santander—Puerto Rico · filed 1989-10-31(k)

We also find that she is entitled to damages in the amount of $10,000.00, plus costs and ... attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Richardson v. Lamar County Board of Education · filed 1989-11-30(k)

The court will also require that the school board pay reasonable attorney’s fees to her attorney. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows appellate attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII party, but fees may be awarded against an intervenor only when its actions were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1989-12-04(k)

The Court held that attorney fees should be awarded to a Title VII prevailing party against an intervenor only where the intervenor's actions were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2736. Here, as in Zipes, the Union intervened to protect the interests of incumbent employees, an act that was neither frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Id. at 2738-39. Following the reasoning in Zipes, we decline to award attorney fees as costs to Davis for this appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) waives the United States' sovereign immunity from claims for interim attorney's fees in Title VII cases.

In Re Trout · filed 1989-12-15(k)

In other words, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) waives the United States' immunity from claims, whether final or interim, for attorney's fees as an element of costs.