42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) does not warrant attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who did not prevail or for a defendant whose opponent’s action was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.

Guy v. Peaches Records & Tapes, Inc. · filed 1979-09-28(k)

Both plaintiff and defendant have requested attorneys’ fees in this action. As plaintiff has not prevailed on any of her claims, her request will be denied. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). And as defendant has not shown that plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, the Court concludes that attorneys’ fees on its behalf are unwarranted.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who proves a Title VII violation.

Ball v. Ridgeway Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1979-10-15(k)

The plaintiff is entitled to all lost wages, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), appropriate equitable relief, and, according to the guidelines set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), attorney’s fees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for plaintiffs who prevail on a central Title VII claim even if they do not succeed on every related claim.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1979-10-30(k)

It is clear that if plaintiffs had brought a successful action seeking relief only for United’s discriminatory enforcement of the weight standards, plaintiffs would have been the prevailing parties for the purposes of Title VII and § 2000e-5(k). The court can find no reason why plaintiffs should be penalized for having sought additional relief with respect to the validity of the standards themselves.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats attorney’s fees as costs, so a Rule 68 offer for accrued costs includes fees and can bar recovery of fees for work after the offer.

Waters v. Heublein, Inc. · filed 1979-11-09(k)

Several factors lead to the conclusion that the only reasonable accommodation of Rule 68 and the fees provision of Title VII involves treating an offer for costs then accrued as including fees and finding, in this context, that such an offer, if it exceeds the judgment finally obtained, bars the recovery of the relevant fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees and expenses, with compensable hours limited to those reasonably required for adequate representation.

Willey v. Maben Manufacturing Co. · filed 1979-11-11(k)

The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and withheld entry of a final judgment pending determination of the amount of the award. ... The number of hours devoted to the prosecution of a suit for which a defendant may be held liable in an action such as the one sub judice, must be limited to those hours reasonably required to afford adequate representation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-12-26(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that a reasonable attorney’s fee may be awarded the prevailing party in an action of the present type. The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586 (1978) held that a prevailing defendant in a Title VII proceeding is to be awarded attorney’s fees only when the court in the exercise of its discretion finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. As mentioned above, the trial court found that the instant case was frivolous in its inception and was motivated in bad faith. However, our study of the record convinces us that in awarding attorney’s fees in the sum of $25,000 the trial court abused its discretion and therefore such award must be vacated.

Section 2000e-5(k) makes the prevailing employee the initial recipient of an attorney's fee award and the real party in interest in an action to recover it.

Richards v. Reed · filed 1980-02-07(k)

As filed, this action for attorney's fees was brought by the lawyer, Dianne Richards, rather than the client who prevailed at the administrative level, Judy Berry. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k). ... It was proper for Berry to be made a real party in interest because the recovery will go to her in the first instance, although her lawyer will ultimately benefit.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff when special circumstances make an award unjust.

Young v. Kenley · filed 1980-02-08(k)

Applying this test upon the factual background set out in the prior opinion, this Court finds that it would be unjust to impose the benefit of attorney’s fees upon plaintiff and the burden of attorney’s fees upon defendants.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for class members whose objections to a proposed consent decree benefit a class that ultimately prevails.

Dennis FISHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROCTER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-03-12(k)

We are satisfied that under the broad discretion vested in the court by virtue of section 706(k), the district court was justified in granting attorney’s fees to the “objectors.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs upon proper application in a successful Title VII action.

Guilday v. Department of Justice · filed 1980-01-31(k)

Consistent with the statutory policy of encouraging individuals to protect Title VII rights, plaintiff’s counsel will also be allowed reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs upon proper application to the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous or meritless.

Fisher v. Fashion Institute of Technology · filed 1980-03-28(k)

Such an award is expressly authorized by Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides: ... Although the award of fees is in a district court’s discretion, the Supreme Court has limited awards against plaintiffs to cases in which “a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Furthermore, plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and meritless, in that it lacked any factual basis, and was pressed in the face of overwhelming factual evidence that showed that FIT, its personnel, and the union acted on nondiscriminatory bases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Law v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1980-04-01(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), permits the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in the discretion of the Court. Commenting upon the appropriate standard governing an award of attorney’s fees to a defendant under section 706(k), the Supreme Court stated: “[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Plaintiff’s complaint may not be characterized in such manner. This conclusion forecloses an award of attorney’s fees to defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a private intervenor who prevails on a significant Title VII claim, even in a suit brought by the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1980-04-02(k)

However, the Court finds that Wells is deserving of attorney’s fees despite the EEOC’s participation in the lawsuit. First, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), read literally, suggests that Wells is entitled to fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney's fees and costs to a Title VII defendant only if the defendant prevails.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-04-02(k)

Because we hold that the district court should not have dismissed this cause, we must necessarily reverse the award of attorney's fees and costs. A district court may only award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing Title VII defendant, pursuant to § 706(k) of the Act.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff brought or maintained the suit in bad faith.

Obin v. DIST. NO. 9, INTERN. ASS'N OF MACHINISTS · filed 1980-04-09(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that a reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded to a prevailing party in a Title VII case. In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), reaffirms the principle that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant where the suit was brought or maintained in bad faith. The record in this case discloses unequivocally that plaintiff's action had no merit and was brought or maintained in bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chandelle Club · filed 1980-04-25(k)

When the prevailing party in a civil rights case is the defendant, attorney’s fees should only be awarded after a finding that plaintiff’s cause of action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, in order to discourage frivolous or unjustified suits.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to seek attorney's fees after a victory on the merits in the trial court.

Rodriguez v. Board of Education of Eastchester Union Free School District · filed 1980-05-02(k)

Dr. Rodriguez's claim for attorney's fees incurred in connection with this appeal is premature. Title VII's provision for fee awards to the "prevailing party," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), is applicable only upon victory on the merits in the trial court.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow a defendant’s attorney’s fees based solely on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute, because that failure alone does not establish that the claim was frivolous or vexatious.

Mrs. Althea ANTHONY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-05-29(k)

We do not believe that the mere failure to prosecute, without more, establishes as a matter of law that a claim is either frivolous or vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII complainant to recover attorney's fees for work in state proceedings required by Title VII.

New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey · filed 1980-06-09(k)

In sum, we conclude that §§ 706 (f) and 706 (k) of Title VII authorize a federal-court action to recover an award of attorney's fees for work done by the prevailing complainant in state proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Smith v. Josten's American Yearbook Company · filed 1980-06-13(k)

The commencement of this suit was not frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable within the meaning of the Supreme Court's Christiansburg decision. ... We hold the lower court's denial of appellant's motion for an award of section 2000e-5(k) attorney's fees was not an abuse of its discretion and was proper on the facts.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily allows attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff unless special circumstances would make an award unjust.

Chicano Police Officer's Association v. Stover · filed 1980-06-17(k)

We hold the Piggie Park standard is to be applied in awarding fees under sections 1988 and 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would make the award unjust.

Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover · filed 1980-06-17(k)

We hold the Piggie Park standard is to be applied in awarding fees under sections 1988 and 2000e-5(k). ... On remand, if the settlement meets the standards discussed hereafter the court should make an award of attorneys’ fees unless it finds special circumstances that would make such an award unjust.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not make opposing counsel liable for attorney's fees or expand the costs recoverable from counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper · filed 1980-06-23(k)

Neither § 1988 nor § 2000e-5 (k) makes any mention of attorney liability for costs and fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.

Henry L. LUJAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-07-07(k)

The Department cross-appeals the trial court’s refusal to award it attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). “[A] prevailing defendant in a Title VII proceeding is to be awarded attorney’s fees only when the court in the exercise of its discretion finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.” ... Upon review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and we affirm the trial court’s refusal to award attorneys fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an attorney’s fee for a plaintiff whose claim is dismissed as moot because the plaintiff is not a prevailing party.

Ward v. Arkansas State Police · filed 1980-07-29(k)

Indeed, plaintiff is not entitled to an attorney’s fee in this case because he was not the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party; the court must consider the Johnson factors rather than impose an inflexible local hourly ceiling.

23 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1533, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,190 Jasper Neely v. The City of Grenada · filed 1980-08-20(k)

Following judgment, plaintiffs’ attorneys, John L. Walker and Ural B. Adams, Jr., appellants here, moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ... To begin with a perceived local maximum fee, then find that the other Johnson factors favor an award of substantial attorney’s fees, and then conclude that the local rate should be the fee, amounts to a failure to consider the Johnson factors other than the local rates. ... Accordingly, the district court here, as in Knighton, erred.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover fees for all time reasonably spent on the case even if the plaintiff did not prevail on every issue.

Dr. Sara SHERKOW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-08-20(k)

Since the plaintiff prevailed in part but not as to her entire claim against the defendant, should her recovery of attorneys’ fees and expenses be reduced accordingly? ... Once the court has determined that the plaintiff has prevailed then the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all the time reasonably spent on a matter.

Attorney's fees authorized by § 2000e-5(k) are part of the relief sought, so a judgment that reserves their determination is not final and appealable until the fees are set.

24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1608, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,230 · filed 1980-08-28(k)

While it is unusual for this court to write an opinion on a purely procedural matter, it appeared to us that it would be helpful to clarify whether statutorily authorized attorneys' fees, here under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), are to be treated like contractually stipulated fees, hence barring an appeal prior to determination of them, or whether they are more "collateral" in nature and thus do not affect the finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal. We hold the former for reasons that appear below, and therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Attorney’s fees authorized by § 2000e-5(k) are part of the relief sought, so a judgment that reserves the fee issue is not final and appealable until fees are set.

Johnson v. University of Bridgeport · filed 1980-08-28(k)

While it is unusual for this court to write an opinion on a purely procedural matter, it appeared to us that it would be helpful to clarify whether statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees, here under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), are to be treated like contractually stipulated fees, hence barring an appeal prior to determination of them, or whether they are more “collateral” in nature and thus do not affect the finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal. We hold the former for reasons that appear below, and therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) calls for calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee the same way whether the losing defendant is the United States or a private party.

Dolores J. Copeland, Individually and on Behalf of the Class of All Others Similarly Situated v. F. Ray Marshall, Secret · filed 1980-09-02(k)

The language of the statute indicates that the calculation of the fee should not vary with the identity of the losing defendant, and the policies underlying the attorney's fee provision are fully consistent with this plain language.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize interim attorney’s fees based solely on a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff has not prevailed on the merits of any claim.

Oshiver v. PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ETC. · filed 1980-09-08(k)

Plaintiff’s right to fees turns on the question whether she is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), ... and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ... A preliminary injunction is not an adjudication on the merits. ... But to this point plaintiff has not advanced so far as to justify an award.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney's fees for obtaining a preliminary injunction that merely preserves the status quo when the plaintiff establishes no right or wrong.

Smith v. University of North Carolina · filed 1980-09-30(k)

As we comprehend the rule, to "prevail" a party must establish in an enduring way that he or she was right on a matter in issue and that the litigation activities served to establish the existence of the right or contributed to an enjoyment of the right.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing party in a Title VII action to reasonable attorney's fees.

Hameed v. International Association of Bridge · filed 1980-11-03(k)

The prevailing party in a title VII action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. ... Since the plaintiff prevailed in Rule III, the district court's failure to award attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a prevailing party in a Title VII action to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 396 · filed 1980-11-03(k)

The prevailing party in a title VII action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees and costs for work in local administrative proceedings.

Porter v. District of Columbia · filed 1980-11-05(k)

There is simply no basis to argue that D. C. employees not covered by the civil service laws should be barred from recovering such attorney’s fees and costs, when their counterparts in the civil service, in private industry, and most likely, in state governments, would be permitted to recover such fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves the amount of a Title VII attorney’s fee award largely to the district court’s discretion, subject to review for reasonableness.

24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 961, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,350 Walter Jones, Jr., Cross v. Armstrong Cork Company, Armstrong C · filed 1980-11-12(k)

The amount of attorney’s fees authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), is left largely to the sound discretion of the district court. The reasonableness of the award, however, is subject to review by this Court.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances exist.

Baker v. City of Detroit · filed 1980-11-17(k)

In contrast, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a successful arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement that is separate from Title VII enforcement.

Sullivan v. Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 1980-12-24(k)

The arbitration in which Sullivan prevailed was an enforcement mechanism additional to, not a predicate of, Title VII enforcement and hence was not an “action or proceeding under” Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party, but a prevailing defendant may recover from a plaintiff only if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Shirley NULF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., a New York Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-01-05(k)

A court, in its discretion, may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in a Title VII action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). However, as the Supreme Court stated in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 701, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), “a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Under this standard, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Company.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a Title VII plaintiff who prevailed on an issue even though changes to the challenged practice made other relief unavailable.

Donnell v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1980-10-28(k)

Defendants argue that plaintiff is not a prevailing party, since no relief is to be afforded. This Court cannot agree. Plaintiff prevailed on appeal and therefore should have prevailed in this Court originally on the issue of the validity of the educational requirements. He prevailed, of course, only as to General Motors and Local 25. Had defendants not changed the requirements on their own, declaratory and injunctive relief would have been appropriate. The fact that such relief was mooted does not negate plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) treats a person who succeeds wholly or partly at the trial or administrative level as a prevailing party.

Earl Smith, Jr. v. Secretary of the Navy · filed 1981-01-30(k)

The term "prevailing party," as it appears in the pertinent section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), encompasses persons who are either wholly or partially successful at both trial and administrative levels.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when a plaintiff continues litigating after the claim has clearly become groundless.

Hughes v. Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia · filed 1981-02-20(k)

Defendants do, however, seek to recover fees incurred after the jury’s verdict had been rendered, and they are plainly entitled to them because Hughes continued to press his claim even after it was apparent that it was groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for work on a successful Title VII claim even when the plaintiff loses a separate discrimination claim.

Davis v. Bolger · filed 1981-02-20(k)

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff is a “prevailing party” under section 706(k) of the Title VII with regard to the witness compensation issue, and is therefore entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee for the work performed thereon.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff regardless of how the plaintiff later uses the award.

Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806 · filed 1981-02-27(k)

Plaintiff’s position is that the district court correctly held that he is a prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 706(k) and that whatever he elects to do with the funds subsequently is his own business and cannot violate the First Amendment. We agree, and therefore affirm the district court on this issue as well.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work within Title VII procedures or related required procedures, but excludes work on separate contract debarment proceedings.

Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. · filed 1981-03-06(k)

This section requires that the attorney’s time and efforts be mandated by the Title VII statute, or by related and required procedures. The emphasized language makes it clear that the attorney’s time must be within the Title Vll procedure. The Executive Order utilized here cannot be transformed by legal alchemistry into such a proceeding.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorneys' fees for work on interrelated issues, even when they do not succeed on every issue.

Mosley v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1981-01-27(k)

Plaintiffs prevailed in this Title VII action and are therefore entitled to such an award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to be compensated for all time reasonably spent in pursuit of the results ultimately obtained. ... This Court therefore believes that it is not appropriate to reduce the reasonable number of hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys due to plaintiffs' lack of success on several issues.

Section 2000e-5(g) and (k) authorize back pay, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees as relief for Title VII discrimination.

Furr v. Goodwill Industries Rehabilitation Center · filed 1981-03-31(g), (k)

In regard to the relief authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and (k), the Court observes that plaintiff has not requested reinstatement as she has a job with the Metropolitan Interfaith Association in Memphis (MIFA) as a driver which she wishes to retain. The Court will decree an award of some back pay to plaintiff along with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney's fees for a successful Title VII claim but excludes time devoted solely to an unsuccessful claim.

Smith v. Flesh Co., Inc. · filed 1981-04-03(k)

Turning to plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney's fees, the Court finds that plaintiff may be compensated for all the hours reasonably spent in connection with Count I of this matter, on which plaintiff substantially prevailed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Time devoted exclusively to Count II may not be allowed, because plaintiff did not prevail on that Count, although the Court takes cognizance of the "interrelated nature of [the] prevailing and non-prevailing claims," Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Autumn Leaves Nursing Home · filed 1981-04-03(k)

Autumn Leaves seeks an allowance of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This section provides that the court may allow the prevailing party, other than the EEOC or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. ... The facts and circumstances of the action sub judice do not justify such a holding by the court. The request will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Martin v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1981-04-06(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) allows the Court, in its discretion, to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. A prevailing defendant in a Title VII case is to be awarded attorney’s fees only when the Court finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ... The plaintiff’s case was neither frivolous nor without foundation and it was vigorously and capably prosecuted. The Title VII claims did prove noticeably weak but not unreasonable, and the weakness may have been exaggerated by the well-prepared defense. For these reasons, the Court determines that each party shall pay its own attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee that accounts for factors beyond the back pay award and may include work on appeal.

25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 680, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,716 Anthony M. Salone, Jr. v. United States of America · filed 1981-04-10(k)

We conclude that the standards as set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, supra, should generally be applied where attorneys' fees are authorized. ... The case should be remanded to the district court for a hearing on attorneys’ fees and should include a reasonable fee for the present appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees regardless of how he later uses the award.

Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers · filed 1981-04-20(k)

Plaintiff's position is that the district court correctly held that he is a prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under Section 706(k) and that whatever he elects to do with the funds subsequently is his own business and cannot violate the First Amendment. We agree, and therefore affirm the district court on this issue as well.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1981-05-04(k)

The award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action is a matter committed to the discretion of the district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Therefore, an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate only when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work on an unsuccessful issue tied to a successful Title VII claim, but allows a reduction when counsel continues to pursue a highly improbable issue after qualifying for fees.

Blake v. Hoston · filed 1981-04-09(k)

The court believes that in those rare cases where the plaintiffs have already qualified for attorney fees under Title VII and continue to press highly improbable issues that áre part and parcel of their successful claim, the court, in its discretion, may choose to reduce counsel fees by a “noncontingency” factor. ... Finally, the court will reduce the “lodestar” figure, arrived at by multiplying the hours noted above by the hourly rates requested by plaintiffs’ attorneys, by 20% to account for the noncontingency factor discussed earlier.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s claim is meritless; a weak claim alone is insufficient.

Obin v. District No. 9 of the International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1981-06-11(k)

For purposes of determining the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action, however, plaintiff’s claim must be not only weak but meritless. ... It follows, therefore, that the district court erred in awarding the Company attorney’s fees for its defense of Obin’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a reasonable attorney's fee as part of a plaintiff's costs.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1981-06-23(k)

We also conclude that Anderson is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), in an amount to be fixed by the district court on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Reed v. Famous Barr Division · filed 1981-06-25(k)

While attorneys' fees have been routinely awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in civil rights cases unless special circumstances render such an award unjust, the purpose of such policy, namely to encourage the vindication of civil rights through private litigation, does not support a similarly liberal policy for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant, unless the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ... Accordingly, defendant's request for attorneys' fees is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are not totally without foundation.

Taylor v. Amaturo Group, Inc. · filed 1981-08-07(k)

This Court can not characterize plaintiff’s claims as totally without foundation. Therefore, defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not justify awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant solely because the plaintiff failed to prove discrimination; a colorable claim is not frivolous.

Pippin v. United States Truck Co., Inc. · filed 1981-08-12(k)

Although plaintiff here was urn able to present enough evidence to allow this court to find that she had been the victim of discriminatory treatment, this failure does not translate into a finding of frivolity, and this court indeed finds that plaintiff’s claim was not a frivolous one but was colorable in the law. ... Costs, but not attorneys’ fees, are awarded to defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a plaintiff who ultimately prevails in federal court to recover attorney’s fees for required state proceedings regardless of the outcome there.

Trudy UNGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Counter-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, Counter-Appe · filed 1981-08-14(k)

We believe the Court meant that plaintiffs who ultimately prevail in federal court are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work in state proceedings which Title VII required and encouraged them to pursue, without respect to the success or failure on the merits of the state proceedings.

A prevailing Title VII plaintiff who intervenes in an EEOC action may recover reasonable attorney’s fees even though she did not initiate the suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sage Realty Corp. · filed 1981-08-26(k)

A prevailing plaintiff should not be denied an award of attorneys’ fees because, as here, she did not herself initiate the action but rather exercised her statutory right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) to intervene in an action commenced by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it became so.

Whiten v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1981-08-31(k)

The applicable statutes the Court must apply in this case are 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ... It is well settled that a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action may be awarded attorney’s fees only when the plaintiff’s claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or .. . plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so”. ... After a careful review of the record in this case, this Court finds that plaintiff’s claims were frivolous and groundless at the time the suit was filed and that plaintiff continued to litigate this suit even after the discovery and court rulings revealed that the allegations in this suit were frivolous and groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1981-09-24(k)

Therefore, an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate only when the plaintiff's claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows discretionary attorney's fees as costs, but setting those fees is distinct from routinely taxing costs under the Federal Rules.

26 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1569, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,160 · filed 1981-09-30(k)

We recognize that both the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and title VII, id. § 2000e-5(k), in granting the right to seek attorney's fees, direct that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988; id. § 2000e-5(k). ... We agree that the denomination of attorney's fees as "costs" in the relevant attorney's fees statutes was not intended to equate the often time-consuming process of setting fees with the routine award of other costs contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award as part of costs, but setting the fee amount is not routine taxation of costs for purposes of a final judgment.

Croker v. Boeing Co. · filed 1981-09-30(k)

We recognize that both the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and title VII, id. § 2000e-5(k), in granting the right to seek attorney’s fees, direct that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988; id. § 2000e-5(k). ... We agree that the denomination of attorney’s fees as “costs” in the relevant attorney’s fees statutes was not intended to equate the often time-consuming process of setting fees with the routine award of other costs contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for Title VII plaintiffs who obtain injunctive relief even if their damages claim is denied.

Manhart v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1981-08-07(k)

By securing an injunction to prohibit the city from continuing its discriminatory practice, they achieved a large part of the benefit which they sought. That is enough to make them prevailing parties for the purposes of § 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff pursues a frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless appeal.

Harris v. Group Health Ass'n · filed 1981-08-25(k)

Accordingly, we award appellate costs and attorneys’ fees to appellee.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorneys' fees for Title VII work when the plaintiff obtains the relief sought and that work materially contributed to the result, even if the relief came through arbitration.

Sullivan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor · filed 1981-10-26(k)

Thus, we hold that to qualify for an award of attorneys' fees under section 706(k) for work done by counsel in connection with proceedings before the EEOC and in Title VII litigation in federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, the plaintiff must be a "prevailing party"; i. e., the plaintiff must essentially succeed in obtaining the relief sought on the merits. Second, the circumstances under which the plaintiff obtained the relief sought must be causally linked to the prosecution of the Title VII complaint, in the sense that the Title VII proceedings constituted a material contributing factor in bringing about the events that resulted in the obtaining of the desired relief.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a plaintiff who wins significant injunctive relief even if the plaintiff loses a damages claim.

Manhart v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1981-11-16(k)

By securing an injunction to prohibit the city from continuing its discriminatory practice, they achieved a large part of the benefit which they sought. That is enough to make them prevailing parties for the purposes of § 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees, expenses and costs in a Title VII action.

Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1981-11-17(k)

ORDERED that defendant Western Electric shall pay to counsel for plaintiff attorney’s fees, expenses and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) in the amount of Six-hundred and sixty-three thousand, eight hundred and seventy dollars and ninety-eight cents dollars ($663,870.98), less previous payments made under prior orders of this Court in the amount of two hundred eighty thousand, eight hundred thirty-four dollars and forty-nine cents ($280,834.49); ... ORDERED that, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 54(b), final judgment be and is hereby entered with respect to those claims of plaintiff class as to which judgment is being entered on behalf of defendant Western Electric, there being no just reason for delay, particularly because in the event of reversal of said rulings, the Stage II mechanism for trying individual claims is presently in position.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award based on compensable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.

Minority Employees at NASA V. Frosch · filed 1981-11-19(k)

Plaintiffs’ attorney seeks a fee award for the period from March 29, 1976, through September 20, 1978, pursuant to §§ 706(k) and 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 2000e-16(d). ... As set out in Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980), any fee-setting inquiry begins with the “lodestar,” the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. ... Accordingly, based on the 184 compensable hours at $100.00 an hour, the Court will award an attorney’s fee to plaintiffs in the amount of $18,400.00.

In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, a plaintiff may discover the defense’s attorney hours and nonfee costs, but not the legal fees it paid.

Blowers v. Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. · filed 1981-12-08(k)

For the reasons set out below, I hold that information concerning the amount of time spent by defendants’ law firm in defending the action and the amount of costs and disbursements may be discovered, but that the amount of legal fees expended by defendants may not.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney's fee award when the plaintiff is no longer the prevailing party.

Rose Schwabenbauer v. Board Of Education Of The City School District Of The City Of Olean · filed 1981-12-17(k)

Since plaintiff is no longer the "prevailing party", we also vacate the district court's award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) ... In the event that Schwabenbauer should prevail on remand, we think a caveat as to remedy is worthwhile.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits denial of attorney's fees to a Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's action is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Keys v. Lutheran Family · filed 1981-12-21(k)

Also, in the matter of the defendants' cross-appeal of the district court's refusal to grant attorney's fees, the district court's decision is affirmed. The above discussion makes clear that this action is not "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses in addition to attorney’s fees.

Jones v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1981-12-03(k)

In addition, this Court will grant the request of Plaintiff’s counsel for out-of-pocket expenses of $393.45 in connection with the pre-settlement legal services. Such expenses are authorized by the attorney’s fees statute, apart from the fee award based on hourly rates.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who prevails on a significant issue and obtains a benefit sought, even without money damages.

Herbert NANTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the BARROWS COMPANY, Formerly Barrows Furniture Company, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-12-28(k)

He need not be awarded money damages to achieve a benefit sought in his lawsuit. Accordingly, Nanty is a “prevailing party,” and is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Camp Corp. · filed 1982-01-05(k)

A prevailing defendant may recover attorney’s fees either under the Court’s inherent equity power where the prosecution is in bad faith, or under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) only where the Court finds “that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith,” 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for work that helped secure a Title VII settlement and does not require counsel’s customary hourly rates to be reduced to local rates.

28 Fair empl.prac.cas. 19, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,459 Alta Chrapliwy, and Cross-Appellees v. Uniroyal, Inc., a Corpora · filed 1982-02-16(k)

We find that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to refuse to award attorneys’ fees for the time spent by the plaintiffs persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts. We also find that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to lower the hourly rates customarily charged by the plaintiffs’ attorneys to rates customarily charged by attorneys in South Bend, Indiana, where the district court sits.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an appellate court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Bugg v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers of America · filed 1982-02-18(k)

Thus, we find that section 2000e-5(k) does confer power on an appellate court to allow a reasonable attorney's fee for appellate work to a prevailing Title VII defendant-appellee. ... Thus, we find that an appellate court may exercise its power to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant-appellee only if the plaintiff's appeal is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith; losing alone is insufficient.

Bruce MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-02-22(k)

Reasonable attorneys’ fees may be awarded to the prevailing party in this type of action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The fact that plaintiff did not prevail does not necessarily mean that these criteria are met. ... Therefore, the record in this case does not persuade us that plaintiff’s action in appealing this suit was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation or in bad faith so as to justify awarding attorneys’ fees to defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, including one who prevails through settlement.

Brown v. Gillette Co. · filed 1982-02-24(k)

It is now settled that a party who prevails through a settlement rather than through litigation is equally entitled to attorney’s fees as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees.

Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of White Plains · filed 1982-02-25(k)

Plaintiffs have prevailed, and are entitled to their attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; the amount may account for the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Colucci v. New York Times Co. · filed 1982-03-10(k)

The Court is constrained to find that the defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, in order to achieve one of the purposes of section 706(k) of Title VII — to deter meritless civil rights suits and to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no factual or legal basis.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves attorney's fees to the trial court's discretion, which may account for the extent to which a plaintiff failed to prevail on other claims.

Mortensen v. Callaway · filed 1982-03-18(k)

The award of attorney's fees is subject to the trial court's discretion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the trial court may consider the extent to which the plaintiff failed to prevail on her other claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a nonprofit organization that financed a successful Title VII suit to recover reasonable litigation costs it actually incurred.

Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan · filed 1982-03-29(k)

From the beginning of this suit, it has borne all of the costs for the plaintiff class and in this opinion I address its petition to recover those costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Had the class, or even its attorneys, shouldered the burden of these costs, they would, subject to my discretion, have been entitled to reimbursement. I see no reason not to reimburse Focus: HOPE.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Marafino v. ST. LOUIS CTY. CIRCUIT COURT · filed 1982-03-29(k)

The defendant Circuit Court has requested an award of attorneys' fees in its answer to the second amended complaint. Because this Court does not find that plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, the request for an award of attorneys' fees will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Burris v. Davidson Transfer and Storage Co. · filed 1982-04-27(k)

Fees will be awarded to a prevailing defendant, however, only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for work in administrative proceedings that was relevant and beneficial in preparing a Title VII claim.

Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1982-05-05(k)

Moreover, it is perfectly acceptable for the court to compensate the time plaintiffs’ attorneys spent in administrative proceedings which were relevant and beneficial in preparing the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees from the EEOC for an unreasonable or groundless claim without proving bad faith.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shoney's, Inc. · filed 1982-05-28(k)

While it is not necessary for the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to find that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, see Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 419, 98 S.Ct. at 699, 54 L.Ed.2d at 655, the actions of the EEOC so blatantly demonstrate bad faith that they cannot be overlooked.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes courts to award reasonable attorney's fees in Title VII cases, with broad discretion over the amount.

Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines · filed 1982-06-04(k)

Title VII confers statutory authority on the court to award attorneys' fees. Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The trial court's broad discretion to determine reasonable attorneys' fees has been well recognized by the circuits.

When a prevailing Title VII defendant qualifies for fees under § 2000e-5(k), the plaintiff’s financial condition may reduce but cannot eliminate the award.

Alvin DURRETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENKINS BRICKYARD, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1982-06-14(k)

At the same time, we hold that in no case may the district court refuse altogether to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant because of the plaintiff’s financial condition. A fee must be assessed which will serve the deterrent purpose of the statute, and no fee will provide no deterrence.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the action is frivolous, unreasonable, or vexatious.

Brisbane v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1982-06-17(k)

I note at the outset that while it is within the discretion of the Court to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants in Title VII actions, ... such discretion should be exercised with caution and only in cases which are found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or vexatious. ... I conclude, therefore, that defendants are entitled to a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs of defending this clearly unreasonable action.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives district courts discretion to award attorney's fees during litigation and to reconsider a temporary denial later.

Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania · filed 1982-07-19(k)

Section 706(k), however, does nothing of the sort. It merely gives the district court the discretion to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. In exercising that discretion, the district court has the same broad powers with respect to timing and other considerations that it has generally in the management of the cases before it as they proceed through the various stages before and during trial. As part of that discretion, the district court may issue an order denying attorney's fees on a temporary basis, subject to later reconsideration.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit reducing an attorney’s fee award because the defendant is a nonprofit, publicly supported university.

Rajender v. University of Minnesota · filed 1982-07-24(k)

Nor, in the instant case should the Court defer to the University of Minnesota simply because it is a non-profit, publicly-supported institution. This Court can imagine no situation more anomalous than one in which the statute designed to encourage compliance with and enforcement of civil rights laws is interpreted to grant special favors to one class of defendants because of their status.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims lack foundation, with the amount informed by the parties’ circumstances.

Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp. · filed 1982-06-30(k)

This Court likewise concludes that plaintiff’s claims in this litigation were not substantiated at trial by any evidence and were without foundation in fact or law. ... Title VII specifies that reasonable attorney fees to prevailing parties may be awarded. ... An award of attorney fees in the amount of $3,000.00 would accomplish the deterrent purpose of the statute, afford defendant some compensation for services required in the defense of this action, yet not financially cripple plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award to a successful Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 300, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,937 National Organization for Women v. Bank of California, National · filed 1982-07-08(k)

The standard of review is abuse of discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1981). The standard that should "inform a district court's discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees to a successful defendant in a Title VII" case is whether the action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E. E. O. C., 434 U.S. 412, 417, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (emphasis in original).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pet Inc. · filed 1982-07-16(k)

The standard which must be utilized to determine whether attorneys’ fees should be awarded Pet is provided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of congressional intent in passing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... In determining whether attorneys’ fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant, the inquiry prescribed by the Supreme Court requires the Court to find whether a plaintiff’s claim “was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” ... Based on the foregoing, this Court declines to award attorneys’ fees to Pet.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees; the court declined to award fees for a law student’s services.

Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Services · filed 1982-09-21(k)

The Court will not permit plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees for Mr. Bachhuber’s services. ... As Congress has only provided for “reasonable attorney’s fees” under Title VII and § 1988, the Court will take Congress at its word. In its discretion, the Court declines to expand upon the statutes that the legislative branch so carefully drafted.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Fancher v. Nimmo · filed 1982-11-02(k)

The plaintiff is also entitled to recovery of her costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees.

Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1982-11-18(k)

Plaintiff may also recover reasonable attorneys fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff continues litigating a groundless claim after recognizing it lacks merit.

Lucas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1982-12-13(k)

From the plaintiff’s dilatory and irresponsible actions in the instant I find that she knew at an early stage of this litigation that her Title VII claim was unreasonable and groundless, yet she continued to press her claim long after she realized it was without merit. I conclude that the defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under this provision.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for work in Title VII administrative proceedings only when the claimant prevails on the merits of a discrimination claim; success on a procedural claim alone is insufficient.

Skinner v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-11-12(k)

After examining the applicable law, however, we are convinced that the plaintiff may not be considered a “prevailing party” under Title VII and thus cannot recover attorney fees for work done at the administrative level. To be considered a prevailing party, plaintiff must prevail on the merits of at least one of her Title VII discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for Title VII plaintiffs who prevail on significant issues, including when the case ends in a substantial settlement.

Communications Workers of America v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company · filed 1982-11-24(k)

Accordingly, it is thus that plaintiffs, by succeeding on significant issues in this litigation which benefit-ted the plaintiff class, are prevailing parties.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff unless special circumstances make the award unjust.

Stinson v. Tennessee Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1982-12-21(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-5 has been interpreted as mandating attorney’s fees to prevailing parties unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. ... There being no special circumstances in this case warranting the denial of attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s attorneys shall be awarded fees based upon the number of hours used in preparing and arguing the claim, the novelty and complexity of the case, the skill and preparedness of the attorney, the resulting judgment and awards in similar cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII enforcement action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

Foster v. MCI Telecommunications, Corp. · filed 1983-01-20(k)

Foster is also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in a civil action to enforce the provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney's fees for work on unsuccessful claims related to the litigation's ultimate goal.

Pate v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District · filed 1983-01-25(k)

Thus, in determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, a district court acts within its discretion if it compensates a prevailing plaintiff for all work performed on any related issue which was advanced in pursuit of the ultimate goal of the action.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant in a government Title VII suit to recover attorneys’ fees if the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kimbrough Investment Co. · filed 1983-02-11(k)

Under Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a prevailing defendant can recover attorneys’ fees in a case brought by the government if the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious. ... We cannot conclude the case was vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Brown v. Fairleigh Dickinson University · filed 1983-03-15(k)

But a court should award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney's fees as part of costs, but a fee motion is independent of a motion for costs.

Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College · filed 1983-03-15(k)

To support their view, the defendants rely upon 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k), which provides in part that a prevailing party may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The defendants' reliance on this statutory language is misplaced. ... Because a motion for attorneys' fees is independent from a motion for costs, it is not subject to Local Rule 24(C)(2), which covers only costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, and such a fee should be awarded unless special circumstances would make it unjust.

Feher v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 1983-03-17(k)

Although the award of attorneys’ fees against DLIR is within the discretion of this Court, it is now clear that a prevailing Title VII plaintiff should be awarded attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. (Citations omitted.) No such special circumstances exist in this case and the Court finds that an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriately given.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a successful defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.

Dee v. Institutional Networks Corp. · filed 1983-03-21(k)

Turning to defendants’ application for attorney’s fees, the law is clear: An award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant is proper “only where the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a delayed attorney's fee request unless the delay unfairly surprises or prejudices the affected party.

Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co. · filed 1983-04-01(k)

The request was based on 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(k), 2 which allows attorneys' fees to prevailing parties as part of costs. ... The timing of the motion alone is not determinative. Absent a proper finding of prejudice or unfair surprise, the court should consider Christiansburg.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorneys' fees in a government Title VII case if the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kimbrough Investment Co. · filed 1983-04-01(k)

Under Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k), a prevailing defendant can recover attorneys' fees in a case brought by the government if the action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious. ... We cannot conclude the case was vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires courts to apply the prevailing-party standard when deciding a request for attorney fees.

Otha J. Miller Richard Nissley v. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller of the United States · filed 1983-04-29(k)

Appellants then filed a petition under Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), for attorney fees incurred in the intervening litigation. The District Court denied the petition because appellants were not “prevailing parties” within the meaning of the statute. We find that the District Court applied an improper standard in determining appellants’ “prevailing parties” status. Therefore, we vacate its decision and remand for further proceedings on the attorney fees petition.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an automatic reduction of claimed attorney hours solely because counsel lacks contemporaneous time records.

Martha Johnson and Delores J. Ceballos, Etc. v. University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham George W. · filed 1983-06-10(k)

The lack of contemporaneous records does not justify an automatic reduction in the hours claimed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s Title VII case is frivolous.

Charves v. The Western Union Telegraph Co. · filed 1983-07-11(k)

A finding after that process has been exhausted that the plaintiff’s case is frivolous provides an adequate foundation for the court to exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a successful local proceeding when a state agency deferred the discrimination charge to that proceeding.

Moreno v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1983-07-25(k)

Title VII authorizes an award of attorney's fees for "any action or proceeding under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Moreno obtained complete relief in a local proceeding; to deny him attorney's fees would be to create an "incentive to get into federal court." It is immaterial that Moreno was not "required" to proceed before the CSC in the sense that the EEOC would not have referred his complaint directly to that agency; he was required to proceed before the DFEH, and that agency deferred to the CSC. For practical purposes, the CSC was thus incorporated into the Title VII scheme.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award based on reasonable hours and rates, with reductions for undocumented work and unsuccessful, unrelated claims.

Coble v. Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1983-07-25(k)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ application for award of attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The district court should start by determining the number of hours reasonably expended and the appropriate rate. ... Hours not “reasonably expended” should be excluded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees when a plaintiff wins the right to be judged under nondiscriminatory hiring criteria, even without obtaining the job, back pay, or seniority.

Hall v. City of Auburn · filed 1983-07-11(k)

Defendants’ argument ignores the fact that Bernard sought and won the right to be judged on nondiscriminatory job criteria. This achievement alone establishes her as a prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a supplemental attorney’s fee award for time spent successfully litigating entitlement to fees under Title VII.

Maszk v. Alumatic Corp. of America · filed 1983-07-27(k)

Thus, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a supplemental award of attorneys’ fees for successfully litigating the plaintiff’s entitlement to a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees for work on unsuccessful issues that are part of the same matter.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1983-08-04(k)

Because Title VII authorizes an award of fees only to a “prevailing” party, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), Defendant , objects to an award of fees for the hours Plaintiffs’ counsel spent preparing and litigating motions that were decided in Defendant’s favor. ... This Court concurs in Defendant’s assessment that Hensley is relevant to this dispute, but concludes that virtually all of the hours devoted to the so-called “lost issues” are fully compensable.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the record does not show that the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.

Crawford v. American Federation of Government Employees · filed 1983-08-15(k)

Title VII has its own attorney’s fee provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court declines to award defendant attorney’s fees under Title VII as a prevailing party because it finds that defendant has not met the Christiansburg Garment standard of demonstrating that plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

Dennis J. LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BROWN & ROOT, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-08-15(k)

Plaintiffs are to recover, we are told, virtually in the normal course, defendants only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. The trial court so found, and that finding is not clearly erroneous; this is the standard for review of such findings in our circuit.

Section 2000e-5 permits attorney fee awards in Title VII cases, and the amount is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Joan L. CHESCHEIR and Charity O’Connell (Gass), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-App · filed 1983-09-06(k)

The court also awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976), after considering the guidelines of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974). ... On the contrary, we find ample support for the hourly rates in the trial court’s evaluation of the Johnson factors.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court deciding a prevailing Title VII defendant’s fee request to consider an EEOC reasonable-cause finding when assessing whether the suit was frivolous.

George BADILLO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CENTRAL STEEL & WIRE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1983-09-23(k)

We feel that the district court could properly consider the EEOC decision in exercising its discretion in this area.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is groundless or frivolous; the trial court may consider mitigating factors when setting the amount.

James D. ARNOLD, Jr., Appellant, v. BURGER KING CORPORATION and Fickling Enterprises, Appellees · filed 1983-10-05(k)

A plaintiff acting in good faith may nevertheless be assessed fees if his claim is groundless or frivolous. ... A fee award must be based on the reasonable value of the work actually performed on the case; but beyond that limitation, the trial court has broad discretion to reduce the fee award in light of mitigating factors, such as the difficulty of the case, the motivation of the plaintiff, and the relative economic status of the litigants.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award attorney’s fees in its discretion to a prevailing party; fees are unavailable before a party prevails.

Evans v. Meadow Steel Products, Inc. · filed 1983-10-12(k)

Defendants’ final request is that attorneys’ fees be assessed to plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 1988. Both statutes allow the court, in its discretion, to award attorney’s fees to “the prevailing party.” At this point there is no “prevailing party;” defendants’ motion is, therefore, DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of costs and attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Poindexter v. Kansas City · filed 1983-10-28(k)

We finally conclude that plaintiff is further entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees for a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued litigating after it clearly became so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pet Inc. · filed 1983-11-07(k)

The standard which must be utilized to determine whether attorneys' fees should be awarded Pet is provided by the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional intent in passing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). ... In determining whether attorneys' fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant, the inquiry prescribed by the Supreme Court requires the Court to find whether a plaintiff's claim "was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ... Based on the foregoing, this Court declines to award attorneys' fees to Pet.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs in a Title VII proceeding.

Ross v. City of Fort Wayne Board of Public Safety · filed 1983-12-06(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that in any Title VII proceeding, the court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. The court finds that costs and attorney’s fees should be assessed against defendant in this action.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a court considering a defendant's fee request to compare the plaintiff's claims with the results obtained, then determine whether the claims were frivolous, vexatious, or brought to harass.

COMMONWEALTH OIL REFINING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appe · filed 1983-12-12(k)

Thus, the district court below was required by Section 706(k) and case precedent to weigh the claims for relief advanced by the EEOC against the results obtained by it to determine whether Commonwealth was the prevailing party as the initial step in determining whether Commonwealth was entitled to a fee award. As the next step, it was required to determine whether the claims advanced by the EEOC were frivolous, vexatious or brought to harass Commonwealth.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant when the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. F & D Distributing, Inc. · filed 1984-03-05(k)

The defendant’s cross-appeal attacks the trial court’s failure to award it attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). In deciding whether fees should be awarded, the trial court must determine whether the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. ... The trial court’s determination that the suit was not so unreasonable as to warrant the award of fees was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant when the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. F & D Distributing · filed 1984-03-05(k)

The defendant's cross-appeal attacks the trial court's failure to award it attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). In deciding whether fees should be awarded, the trial court must determine whether the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648. The trial court's determination that the suit was not so unreasonable as to warrant the award of fees was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an appellate court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

Barbara C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. ALLYN & BACON, INC., Defendant, Appellee · filed 1984-03-29(k)

Thus, we conclude that an appellate court may exercise its power to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant-appellee if the appeal is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when a Title VII claim is unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel · filed 1984-03-30(k)

Under section 706(k) of Title VII and under the bad faith exception to the American Rule, the Court has the discretionary power to award a prevailing defendant attorney’s fees in an action that is unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when a plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or continued after it clearly became so.

Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co. · filed 1984-03-30(k)

Thus, a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, or that plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who prevails through settlement when the lawsuit helped secure relief and the claim had a minimum basis in law.

Echols v. Nimmo · filed 1984-04-26(k)

Because Plaintiff has satisfied both prongs of the Johnston test, the Court finds that he is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 706(k). Therefore, reasonable attorney’s fees will be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award based on reasonable hours at market rates; a multiplier need not be applied when the circumstances do not warrant one.

Reid v. State of NY · filed 1984-04-26(k)

Plaintiffs move for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k), 1988. ... In sum, plaintiffs are awarded the full number of hpurs expended in litigating this class action suit, and at the respective partners’ customary and market rates of hourly compensation. Accordingly, $28,170 is awarded to plaintiffs. A multiplier of this lodestar figure is not deemed appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; the court may consider the parties’ relative wealth when setting the amount.

Rogers v. Kroger Co. · filed 1984-05-07(k)

Accordingly, in keeping with that intent, plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and severally, are hereby ordered to pay defendant attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k); plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Clementine Hannah, is additionally ordered to pay defendant attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,500.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award the prevailing party in a Title VII proceeding reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs.

Curler v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1984-06-29(k)

Section 2000e-5(k), Title 42 of the United States Code, provides that in any Title VII proceeding, the court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs. The court finds that costs and attorney fees should be assessed against defendant in this action.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit attorney fees for a litigant’s own work, even when the litigant is an attorney who prevails.

Lawrence v. Staats · filed 1984-05-15(k)

After careful review of the applicable attorney fee statutes and the relevant caselaw, this court holds that pro se attorneys are not entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or § 2000e-5(k) even if they prevail.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s case is groundless; the plaintiff’s financial circumstances can affect the amount.

Piljan v. Michigan Department of Social Services · filed 1984-06-01(k)

Social Services and Civil Service are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees against plaintiff. The failure to file a motion for summary judgment is not determinative; the record satisfies the Christiansburg test. The question is “how much” given plaintiff’s undisputed personal circumstances. ... I am satisfied that an award of $3,000 in attorney fees against plaintiff is appropriate to assure that the deterrent purpose of an award in favor of a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case is respected.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

O'Hara v. Board of Education of the Vocational School in the County of Camden · filed 1984-06-27(k)

Defendant moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) as the prevailing defendant in a Title VII case if it finds “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... For the reasons which follow, the court will deny defendant’s motion. ... As this court has granted summary judgment in this action before the trial, the court has not been in a position to evaluate the merits of plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination at a merits hearing.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow attorney fees for appeal or remand work when the applicant is not a prevailing party.

Harmon v. San Diego County · filed 1984-07-03(k)

Finally, Harmon requests attorney fees for time spent on appeal and on remand. The district court rejected Harmon's claim because he was not a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). We agree.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.

Shore v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 1984-07-03(k)

As the prevailing party in this action, plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit an additional fee enhancement for payment delay when the lodestar already accounts for that delay.

Murray v. Weinberger · filed 1984-08-24(k)

If the delay factor is reflected in the lodestar figure itself, an additional enhancement for delay would not be appropriate in this case.