42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing party when special circumstances would make an award unjust.

Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1974-07-25(k)

In short, there are special circumstances here which would render an award of attorney’s fees unjust and would not serve the interests expressed by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, as the reasons for the legislative grant of authority to this court, in its discretion, to award such attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives district courts discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 1974-09-09(k)

It is clear that it is within the discretion of the district court to allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees in Title VII actions. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney fees for a successful plaintiff’s counsel, including services in proceedings before a master.

Senter v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, INLAND DIV. · filed 1974-09-11(k)

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), reasonable attorney fees will be awarded for all services rendered by counsel for the plaintiff. The Master is directed to make a determination and report to the Court the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be awarded to the attorney for the plaintiff for those services rendered in proceedings before the Master.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award against the EEOC and treats a significant, discrete interlocutory appeal as a basis for prevailing-party status.

Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1974-09-13(k)

We conclude that the plain meaning of Section 706 (k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees against the Commission. ... But this interlocutory appeal is sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit. Thus, the fact that Xerox prevailed on this appeal qualifies it as a “prevailing party” eligible for an award of attorney’s fees connected with the appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the action against it was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.

United States Steel Corporation v. United States · filed 1974-09-16(k)

Thus, section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 emerged as an accommodation between two congressional concerns. The first, the inability of low income minorities to bear the financial burden of attorney’s fees in vindicating their Civil Rights; and, secondly, the award of attorney fees to those parties who must defend against unreasonable, frivolous, merit-less or vexatious actions brought by either private parties or the government. ... Our consideration of the record in this proceeding, in light of the foregoing, convinces us that the respondents’ demand for access was a bona fide effort to seek information and, while substantial controversy surrounded the scope of the information sought, there is nothing to indicate the demand for access was brought to harass, embarrass or abuse either the petitioner or the enforcement process, nor can we say respondents’ action was unfounded, merit-less, frivolous or vexatiously brought.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows costs and attorney’s fees only to a prevailing party.

Hazel A. Parmer v. The National Cash Register Company · filed 1974-09-20(k)

Also appellant’s fourth assignment is unavailing since, by virtue of the language of Section 2000e-5(k), costs and attorney’s fees are awarded only to the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, but a policy change does not make plaintiffs prevailing parties without proof that their action helped bring about the change.

Ackerman v. Board of Education of City of New York · filed 1974-12-27(k)

Plaintiffs are not the “prevailing party” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and are not entitled to any allowance for attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action.

Matyi v. BEER BOTTLERS UNION LOCAL NO. 1187 · filed 1974-12-31(k)

This statute plainly allows a Court to award attorney's fees to prevailing defendants and while the Court is aware of authority disallowing applications by prevailing defendants for attorney's fees in other Title VII cases, the Court, on the record before it, will grant attorney's fees to defendant in the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when it had to defend against a frivolous or factually baseless action.

Lee v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company · filed 1975-01-27(k)

While a defendant does not act as a “private attorney general” in a Title VII action, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968), a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e-5(k) when required to defend against a frivolous or factually baseless action brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, with the amount tied to the extent of the party’s success.

Spero v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1975-04-16(k)

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) authorizes an award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in the court’s discretion. ... Accordingly, the fee award should bear some relationship “to the extent to which the plaintiff prevails in the suit.” ... Applying such a standard to the instant request, it is clear that the fee award should be substantially less than that suggested by plaintiff’s counsel.

Section 2000e-5 permits recovery of costs and reasonable counsel fees after a plaintiff proves classwide discrimination, even if the need for an injunction remains undecided.

Barnett v. W. T. Grant Company · filed 1975-06-12(k)

Regardless what the district court's inquiry shows, Barnett should recover his costs and reasonable counsel fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a Title VII class representative who wins relief for the class to recover costs and reasonable counsel fees despite losing his individual claim.

Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co. · filed 1975-06-12(k)

Regardless what the district court’s inquiry shows, Barnett should recover his costs and reasonable counsel fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award attorney’s fees and costs to a successful plaintiff.

Cross v. Board of Ed. of Dollarway, Ark. Sch. Dist. · filed 1975-06-17(k)

The plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 706(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff despite the defendant’s good-faith reliance defense under section 713(b).

Leah ROSENFELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1975-06-24(k)

We conclude, however, that an award of attorneys’ fees under section 706(k) does not constitute the imposition of “liability or punishment” which is barred by section 713(b).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action, with the amount left to the court’s discretion.

Peltier v. City of Fargo · filed 1975-06-25(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), grants the Court, in its discretion, the power to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for public interest counsel; only the EEOC and the United States are excluded from fee awards.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 · filed 1975-06-27(k)

Plaintiffs were the “prevailing party” and the grant of an attorneys’ fee is precluded only to the EEOC or the United States. Fee arrangements, if any, between the prevailing party and its attorneys are immaterial.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires an attorney's fee award to approximate the customary local fee for similar work, while allowing the court to consider whether the hours claimed were reasonably necessary.

Singer v. Mahoning County Board of Mental Retardation · filed 1975-07-18(k)

Although we interpret the statute to require the district court to award a fee that would approximate the customary fee in the community for similar work, the record before us does not show that an expenditure of 40 hours by five attorneys was reasonably necessary for the preparation and presentation of the case. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district judge abused his discretion in awarding only $1,000 in attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff upon proper application.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc. · filed 1975-07-31(k)

Consistent with the statutory policy of encouraging individuals to protect Title VII rights, plaintiff’s counsel will be allowed reasonable attorney’s fees upon proper application to the court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney fees against the EEOC to a prevailing private party in a proper case, at the court’s discretion.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America Et Al. · filed 1975-06-16(k)

We therefore conclude that Section 706(k) authorizes a grant of attorney fees against the EEOC as part of costs in a proper case. We are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in deciding not to award an attorney’s fee in this case to U.S. Steel.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of appropriate attorney’s fees for district court and appellate proceedings.

Buck Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation · filed 1975-09-15(k)

On remand, the court should also award the plaintiff appropriate attorney’s fees for proceedings in the district court and on appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a defendant to recover attorney's fees in a Title VII action when the plaintiff's conduct is vexatious, in bad faith, abusive, or intended to harass or embarrass.

Robinson v. KMOX-TV, CBS TELEVISION STATION · filed 1975-09-18(k)

Criteria to be used in determining whether or not attorney's fees should be allowed against a plaintiff in a Title VII action are: (1) the conduct of the plaintiff and (2) whether or not there was vexatiousness, bad faith, abusive conduct or an attempt to harass or embarrass. ... It is clear that a defendant may recover attorney's fees in a Title VII action under § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not entitle a plaintiff to attorney’s fees for an unsuccessful class claim, even if the lawsuit caused the employer to change its practices.

Samuel TAYLOR, and the Class He Represents, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-10-03(k)

Even if Taylor could show that these changes were a direct result of his lawsuit, he still would not be entitled to attorney’s fees for the class since he did not prevail on any of the class claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e— 5(k) in not awarding attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Meier v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. · filed 1975-12-18(k)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, attorneys’ fees may be awarded within the sound discretion of the Court to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Plaintiff has not prevailed in this lawsuit and absent any other statutory authorization for attorneys’ fees, she is not entitled to such an award.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorney's fees as costs but does not provide for payment of expenses.

Fabian v. IND. SCH. DIST. NO. 89 OF OKL. CTY., OKL. · filed 1976-02-09(k)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) makes no provision for the payment of expenses, and, therefore, the claim for expenses incurred herein is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs.

Walker v. Ralston Purina Co. · filed 1976-02-27(k)

As to attorneys’ fees for time already expended the court thus awards Ms. Turner $19,985.00 (571 hours X $35.00); Mr. Sherwood $4,875.00 (65 hours X $75.00); Mr. Butler $1,600.00 (32 hours X $50.00), and plaintiffs’ cost of $3,428.01, all of which shall be paid by the defendant company and unions with each paying their proportionate share computed on the same percentage basis as they agreed among themselves to pay the monies already paid to members of the plaintiff class.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorneys’ fees for litigation in which the substantive relief was obtained under §§ 1981 and 1983.

Chance v. Board of Examiners · filed 1976-02-11(k)

By limiting the purpose of their proposed Title VII claim to the recovery of attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs are clearly seeking such fees under Title VII for litigation in which substantive relief was granted under §§ 1981 and 1983. Yet that is precisely what Alyeska and Kirkland, supra, determined to be improper. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint should be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party in a Title VII action to recover reasonable attorney fees for work at trial and on appeal.

Diane Peltier, Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. City of Fargo, a Municipal Corporation, Appellees-Cross-Appellants · filed 1976-03-30(k)

Attorney fees may be recovered by the prevailing party in a Title VII action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... We find, therefore, that an award of $4,000 for work done at trial and $1,000 for work performed on appeal is reasonable and should be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevails on a Title VII claim.

Mitchell v. BD. OF TR. OF PICKENS CTY. SD" A" · filed 1976-04-06(k)

In addition, the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), directs defendants to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fee in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred and No/100 ($1,200.00) Dollars.

Section 2000e-5(k) may permit attorney fees for a class representative whose individual claim fails when the class succeeds.

Watkins v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1976-04-29(k)

We recognize, of course, that the individual plaintiff Will Robinson cannot be said to have directly prevailed in this case. Nevertheless, an individual plaintiff may be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees, despite his failure to prove his own claim, when the class he represents is successful.

Section 2000e-5(k) normally permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party in a Title VII case unless exceptional circumstances counsel against it.

Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1976-05-05(k)

In a Title VII case, attorney’s fees are normally awarded to the prevailing party, unless there are exceptional circumstances indicating that such an award should not be made. No such circumstances exist in the present case. Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant, and the Commission’s good faith alone does not bar an award.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Service Container Corp. · filed 1976-05-06(k)

Plaintiff claims because it brought this suit on good faith beliefs, Defendant is not entitled to an attorney’s fee. Plaintiff reads something into the pertinent statute, supra, which is not there. The Court does not question Plaintiff’s good faith but this is not all that should be considered under the Statute in the exercise of discretion on this point.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the action is unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.

Odessa CARRION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1976-05-07(k)

We conclude, therefore, that while a successful plaintiff in Title VII cases is routinely permitted to recover counsel fees under the Newman-Northcross rule, a prevailing defendant should be permitted such fees, not routinely, not simply because he succeeds, but only where the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees for a prevailing party, but a settlement that denies liability does not, by itself, establish that the plaintiffs prevailed.

Clanton v. Allied Chemical Corp. · filed 1976-03-04(k)

Before awarding attorney fees, however, the Court must decide which side was the “prevailing party.” ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the state of the instant record is not sufficient to determine culpability on the merits so as to allow an informed judgment on whether the plaintiffs are the “prevailing parties.”

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a plaintiff who settles a Title VII claim to recover attorney’s fees as a prevailing party when the lawsuit was necessary and the plaintiff succeeded on the central discrimination issue.

Parker v. Matthews · filed 1976-04-01(k)

This Court concludes that to be a “prevailing party” within the meaning of that term as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) does not require as an essential criteria the securing of a favorable judgment after trial on the merits; that a party who settles his or her Title VII lawsuit may be a “prevailing party” under the statute; and that whether to award attorneys’ fees where there has been a settlement of a Title VII lawsuit must be determined by a close scrutiny of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the settlement, focusing particularly on the necessity for bringing the action and whether the party is the successful party with respect to the central issue — discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorneys’ fee award against an entity that purports to appeal as a party and requires Title VII plaintiffs to defend their settlement, even though the entity was not a party below.

Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers International Union · filed 1976-05-06(k)

The first question is whether any attorneys’ fees are taxable against the Association under Title VII, since the Association was not a “party.” But the Association purported to become a party appellant when it filed its appeal, and the plaintiffs were compelled to defend against its efforts in order to maintain their hard-won settlement agreement. This is not a situation in which the court is being asked to enter an award against a person which has in no way entered its name upon the court records. We think the liberal purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are furthered by, and provide authority for, an award against the Association.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a Title VII plaintiff to recover attorneys fees only if she prevails, even if the evidence justified bringing the suit.

12 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1286, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,914 Dorothy S. Thomas, Cross v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., Cross · filed 1976-05-07(k)

Under Title VII, Thomas is entitled to attorneys fees only if she is the prevailing party, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), whether or not the evidence justified prosecution of the action. With the failure to prove discrimination, the award of attorneys fees falls.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees to the party that generally prevails in the action, rather than awarding fees issue by issue.

Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Company · filed 1976-06-18(k)

The court notes that as to those issues on which plaintiffs did not succeed, the defendant company seeks reimbursement as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). While there is arguable logic in Glamorgan’s position, the court is of opinion that the statute must be read as allowing such an award to the party generally prevailing, whether such party be the plaintiff or the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney's fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Farris v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis · filed 1976-06-25(k)

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), this Court will allow plaintiff's attorney an attorney's fee of $400.00.

Section 2000e-5(k) ordinarily permits prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees, but special circumstances may make an award unjust.

Chastang v. Flynn · filed 1976-06-10(k)

While the award of such fees rests with the sound discretion of the district court, prevailing parties in Title VII actions should ordinarily be awarded attorneys' fees absent special circumstances would render such an award unjust. ... We think that such circumstances exist here, so that it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to deny attorneys’ fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs when special circumstances would make an award unjust.

Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co. · filed 1976-06-10(k)

In short, in denying an award of counsel fees, the district court’s finding of special circumstances to deny the award is supported factually, and we cannot say that the district court exceeded its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees for representation in administrative proceedings as well as in court.

McMullen v. Warner · filed 1976-07-26(k)

The Court concludes, therefore, that § 2000e-5(k) authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees for the administrative portion of this case as well as for the judicial portion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award when plaintiffs obtain their requested relief through a settlement without a trial on the merits.

Richardson v. CIVIL SERVICE COM'N OF STATE OF NY · filed 1976-07-27(k)

Defendants next contend that plaintiffs are not prevailing parties within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) since the matter terminated in a stipulation of settlement rather than an adjudication on the merits after the trial of the action. The Court disagrees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a prevailing third-party defendant in a Title VII suit.

Howard v. Ward County · filed 1976-07-30(k)

Consequently, I do not think a third-party complaint in a Title VII suit is an “action or proceeding under [Title VII]” calling for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a plaintiff seeking attorney’s fees after a promotion without a merits ruling to establish that she prevailed on the merits or obtain a stipulation for fees.

Goodall v. Mason · filed 1976-08-09(k)

Plaintiff must either procure a stipulation from the defendants as to payment of counsel fees or affirmatively establish, either by uncontroverted affidavits or the introduction of evidence at trial, that she has prevailed on the merits before she is entitled to recover attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles the prevailing party in a discrimination action to reasonable attorney fees.

Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education · filed 1976-08-18(k)

The prevailing party in a discrimination action of this sort is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the court discretion to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and requires the court to assess a proposed fee in a Title VII settlement.

Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc. · filed 1976-08-27(k)

Therefore, when a prevailing party in a Title VII action seeks recovery of attorneys’ fees as part of a settlement package, this Court concludes that it is statutorily charged with the responsibility to determine whether or not fees should be awarded and, if so, to fashion a reasonable fee.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney's fee award only to a prevailing party.

13 Fair empl.prac.cas. 694, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,178 Adrian Mandujano, Daniel Perez and Fidel Gutierrez v. Basic Veg · filed 1976-08-27(k)

In addition, Title VII allows for an award of attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). But such awards can only be made to "the prevailing party."

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award against an association that purported to appeal a Title VII settlement and required the plaintiffs to defend it, even though the association was not formally a party.

William E. Moten, Sr. v. Bricklayers, Masons And Plasterers International Union Of America · filed 1976-08-27(k)

But the Association purported to become a party appellant when it filed its appeal, and the plaintiffs were compelled to defend against its efforts in order to maintain their hard-won settlement agreement. This is not a situation in which the court is being asked to enter an award against a person which had in no way entered its name upon the court records. We think the liberal purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are furthered by, and provide authority for, an award against the Association.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not expressly displace customary fee rules for a prevailing government defendant in a federal Title VII action; fees require an exception such as bad faith.

Burgess v. Hampton · filed 1976-09-29(k)

Thus, where a Government defendant prevails in a Title VII action there certainly has been no explicit congressional determination to alter the traditional judicial power to award attorney’s fees. Without explicit congressional action to the contrary, the customary fee rules outlined in Alyeska apply, and the Secretary of the Treasury is entitled to attorney’s fees only under an exception to the general rule against granting them.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff’s Title VII suit is frivolous or vexatious.

Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1976-10-26(k)

Finally, Title VII provides that the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees as part of the costs in the discretion of the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). “Prevailing party” includes defendant-employers.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to plaintiffs who prevail through a negotiated settlement.

Firebird Society v. Members of the Board of Fire Commissioners · filed 1976-11-03(k)

The fact that the plaintiffs achieved these significant results by virtue of a negotiated settlement rather than a trial on the merits alters neither their notable success in the outcome nor their status as the prevailing parties under the statute.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts broad discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1977-01-06(k)

As shown, the jurisprudence is legion that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ... gives the trial Judge extensive discretion to assess appropriate attorney fees in cases justifying such an award.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes attorneys’ fees in a Title VII action.

Mills v. Fox · filed 1976-10-21(k)

First of all, attorneys’ fees are clearly authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), so this part of the motion is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of fair and reasonable attorney’s fees in a Title VII case.

Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis · filed 1977-02-02(k)

Attorney’s fees under Title VII may be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The fees awarded in this case, both on remand and upon completion of the balance of the case, should be in a fair and reasonable amount in accordance with twelve guidelines set by the court in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). In our opinion the award of $3,000 suggested by the trial court is grossly inadequate under these guidelines for work done prior to appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee that accounts for work on appeal.

14 Fair empl.prac.cas. 687, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,537 Rose M. Jacobs, Cross-Appellant v. The Martin Sweets Company, I · filed 1977-02-11(k)

On the record before us, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion. However, it is evident that Jacobs’ counsel has expended considerable professional time and effort on this appeal, so that the fee allowed below should be increased to reflect such services.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees in Title VII cases, with awards set at a fair and reasonable amount.

Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis · filed 1977-02-25(k)

Attorney's fees under Title VII may be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The fees awarded in this case, both on remand and upon completion of the balance of the case, should be in a fair and reasonable amount in accordance with twelve guidelines set by the court in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). In our opinion the award of $3,000 suggested by the trial court is grossly inadequate under these guidelines for work done prior to appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Stevenson v. International Paper Co. · filed 1977-04-29(k)

Undoubtedly the plaintiff class is the prevailing party within the meaning of the statute. The Court exercises its discretion to award it a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to consider attorney’s services in an administrative proceeding on remand from a district court action when awarding fees to a prevailing party.

James A. JOHNSON, Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America Et Al., Appellants · filed 1977-05-04(k)

We conclude that the district court properly took into consideration the attorney’s services in the agency proceeding. In a sense, this remanded administrative proceeding was ancillary to Johnson’s initial action in the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow plaintiffs to recover fees from defendants for opposing an intervention that the defendants also opposed.

FIREBIRD SOCIETY, Etc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MEMBERS OF the BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS, Etc., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1977-05-12(k)

This is an appeal from an award of counsel fees authorized for successful plaintiffs in a civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The appellants’ claim that counsel fees should be assessed against the appellees for services in opposing the intervention of the Firefighters’ Committee is clearly without merit. The appellees joined in opposing intervention and as to that issue were as much prevailing parties as the appellants. There is no viable theory advanced which would permit the recovery of legal fees and costs in these circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney's fees against the EEOC for bad faith or vexatious litigation; an unpersuasive argument alone does not establish either.

EEOC v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-05-19(k)

In United States Steel Corporation v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975), we held that attorney's fees could be awarded against the EEOC under § 706(k) of Title VII, 1 at least in cases where a proceeding was maintained in bad faith. ... But although we have found the EEOC's effort to distinguish Gilbert to be unpersuasive, we cannot say that the effort was made vexatiously or in bad faith. ... Thus we will deny the Hospital's fee application.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees against the EEOC at least when it maintains a proceeding in bad faith; an unpersuasive but good-faith appeal does not warrant fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Children's Hospital · filed 1977-05-19(k)

we held that attorney’s fees could be awarded against the EEOC under § 706(k) of Title VII,... at least in cases where a proceeding was maintained in bad faith. ... Thus we will deny the Hospital’s fee application.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney's fee for a prevailing class even when the named plaintiff loses her individual claim.

Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp. · filed 1977-06-08(k)

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970), allows a court in its discretion to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in a suit brought under the Act. ... After consideration, we are convinced that attorneys fees and costs are appropriate and should be awarded in this action.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves an award of costs and attorney’s fees to the court’s discretion.

Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Clifton Fountain, Plaintiff-Cross v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Defendant-Cross · filed 1977-06-15(k)

In its cross-appeal, Safeway contends it is entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This issue was properly addressed to the sound discretion of the court. ... We find no abuse of this discretion by the district court, and affirm its refusal to award costs and attorney’s fees to Safeway.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing defendant for a procedural hearing when the opposing party’s conduct is frivolous and vexatious.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co. · filed 1977-06-15(k)

Since the Act provides for counsel fees and costs in “any action or proceeding,” was the instant hearing, which was really only a side issue to the entire case, an “action or proceeding” where counsel fees may be awarded? It was. ... Although the instant case involved a procedural motion, we hold that in the present circumstances the Company, as prevailing party, is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover attorney fees as part of costs.

Smith v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 1977-06-21(k)

Plaintiff may also recover an award of attorneys fees as part of her costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a prevailing federal employee attorney’s fees for work in related administrative proceedings.

Parker v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1977-06-30(k)

Our analysis leads us to reject the limitation suggested by appellant and to conclude that in a Title VII suit, brought by a federal employee, attorneys’ fees awarded under Section 706(k) may include compensation for work done at both judicial and administrative levels.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to deny a prevailing union attorney's fees at trial and on appeal.

Huston v. Local No. 93 · filed 1977-07-19(k)

The Union's request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) was denied by the trial court. We deem this denial to have been well within the discretion imparted to the trial court by that statute. The Union also requests an award of costs on appeal, including attorney's fees, under both Title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1912. We do not consider this an appropriate case for an award of attorney's fees to the Union under either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) or 28 U.S.C. § 1912. Accordingly, the Union's request for an award of attorney's fees on appeal is denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.

Huntley v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1977-04-08(k)

Finally, the trial court should also address the plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees, which the Court may allow to the prevailing party, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5(k), 2000e-16(d) (1974).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney's fees, including fees for an appeal, and gives the district court discretion to determine a reasonable amount.

King v. New Hampshire Department of Resources · filed 1977-09-01(k)

Plaintiff submitted a motion for costs and fees in the district court which, as summarized by plaintiff on appeal, requested $4,909 for some 132 hours of attorney time. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The district court is clearly the best judge of what constitutes a "reasonable" fee, and we cannot say that the award of $1,500 for the preparation and presentation of this relatively simple case was unreasonably low.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for an appeal, assessed in light of the case and the presentation of the issues.

King v. New Hampshire Department of Resources & Economic Development · filed 1977-09-01(k)

Plaintiff has also submitted a motion for attorney’s fees on appeal. Considering the nature of the case, and the presentation of the issues on appeal, the court will award $900 as a reasonable fee on appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII claimant to recover reasonable attorney fees for work in administrative proceedings when relief follows the filing of a lawsuit.

Foster v. The Honorable Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress, the Library of Congress · filed 1977-08-11(k)

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for a determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees under Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Consistent with our opinion in Parker v. Califano, supra, the District Court’s determination of the attorney fee award should include compensation for services rendered by appellant’s counsel at the administrative level.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not bar a prevailing federal defendant from recovering attorneys’ fees under the traditional bad-faith exception.

Copeland v. Martinez · filed 1977-08-23(k)

In awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to the Government, the Court expressly relies on equitable considerations, implicit in the American Rule, separate and apart from the statute. ... Therefore, without explicit congressional action to the contrary, the customary fee rules outlined in Alyeska, supra, apply, and defendant in the instant case is entitled to fees under that rule.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an interim attorney’s fee award after plaintiffs prevail on liability, even while remedies remain unresolved.

Nicodemus v. CHRYSLER CORP.-TOLEDO MACH. PLANT · filed 1977-10-27(k)

Despite the fact that the question of injunctive relief as well as back pay remains to be adjudicated in this action, it is clear that for purposes of the statute plaintiffs are prevailing parties. The statute does not require that an award be made only upon the entering of a final order against the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII party and subjects the EEOC to fee liability like other parties.

Neloms v. Southwestern Electric Power Co. · filed 1977-11-23(k)

A District Court may award a prevailing party in an action pursuant to Title VII a reasonable attorney’s fee as a part of the cost of the action; the EEOC is liable for attorney’s fees just as any other party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees from the EEOC only when the proceeding was instituted in bad faith, without reasonable grounds, or to harass or embarrass the defendant.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1977-12-08(k)

Charged with the duty of eliminating racial discrimination in private employment, the court has concluded that EEOC should not be held to the same standard as applied in cases where a victim must bring an action to curtail or eliminate racial discrimination. Only in cases where the proceeding is instituted in bad faith, without reasonable grounds, or to harass or embarrass the responding party, is the court justified in making such an award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing defendant without requiring a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the BAILEY COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-10-17(k)

We decline to hold that a finding of bad faith on the part of the losing plaintiff in a Title VII case is a necessary prerequisite to awarding attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant employer. Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), does not, on its face, permit the adoption of such an explicitly stated double standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney fees for a plaintiff who prevails on a substantial claim even if other claims fail.

Croker v. Boeing Co.(Vertol Division) · filed 1977-11-17(k)

In order to be entitled to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party, a plaintiff need not win all of its claims; success on any of its substantial claims may entitle a plaintiff to be considered as the prevailing party. In this case, as this Court finds that each of these plaintiffs was successful on substantial claims of employment discrimination, they will be considered prevailing parties.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII case.

Sherrill v. JP Stevens & Co., Inc. · filed 1977-12-09(k)

It is appropriate to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in accordance with the policy established by Congress in such cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a successful Title VII defendant to recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiff brought a case that clearly should not have been brought.

Black Musicians v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians · filed 1977-12-22(k)

Keeping in mind this policy of the Circuit regarding fees, we conclude that only cases which clearly should not have been brought may result in an award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant under the United States Steel standard.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow attorney's fees for a plaintiff in a case over which the district court had no jurisdiction.

RICHARDSON v. WILEY · filed 1977-12-22(k)

We express no view of the scope of the term "prevailing party" except to hold that it cannot include a plaintiff in a case in which the district court had no jurisdiction. The award of attorneys' fees must be reversed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to consider hours reasonably spent pursuing an attorney-fee award when setting a prevailing party’s fee.

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1977-12-30(k)

Colgate argues that the hours counsel have submitted that they have expended in the controversy over the fee award may not be considered in arriving at a fee award. The Court rejects this argument. By statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), it is provided that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . ..” Thus considered, fees are incident to the relief available to a successful Title VII litigant, and the hours reasonably expended in pursuing such an award are to be accorded the same consideration as hours expended on other parts of the claim.

When awarding fees under § 2000e-5(k), a court must consider the nonduplicative work of every attorney who represented the prevailing party.

Helen H. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Patrick F. COOMEY Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1978-01-05(k)

While our discussion in Greenblatt did not focus on the precise question involved here, we think it made clear that where more than one attorney represents the prevailing party, the contribution of all attorneys must be taken into consideration and the fees awarded should reflect the efforts of all, at least to the extent that the time reported does not reflect duplication of effort or work that would be performed by nonlawyers.

Section 706(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even without subjective bad faith.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1978-01-23(k)

In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action, with the amount assessed under the Johnson factors.

Neely v. City of Grenada · filed 1978-01-26(k)

The liability of the City for reasonable attorney fees as part of the cost of litigation rests upon § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides: ... In making an award of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees, we are controlled by the familiar standards set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5 Cir. 1974), and often applied in awarding fees in Title VII cases.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to order awarded attorneys’ fees paid directly to the plaintiff’s counsel.

Parker v. Califano · filed 1978-01-13(k)

Notwithstanding defendant’s attempt to infer from the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) some limitation on the permissible method of attorneys’ fees payment, it is clear that the method of payment proposed by plaintiff is reasonable, consistent with the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and fully within this Court’s authority.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, taking into account the extent of the party’s success.

Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., Inc. · filed 1978-01-16(k)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides: In any action or proceeding under this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. ... this Court concludes that a reasonable attorneys’ fee in this case is $2,000.00.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to seek attorney’s fees, but leaves the award to the trial court’s discretion.

Anne L. ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas C. REED, Secretary of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-02-15(k)

Although Adams was sufficiently successful to come within the “prevailing party” language of the statute and was therefore entitled to the exercise of the District Court’s discretion, her success was not sufficiently related to the central issue of the suit — discrimination on the basis of sex — to make the denial of attorneys’ fees an abuse of that discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous.

Reed v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word of Louisiana, Inc. · filed 1978-03-09(k)

The Court may award the prevailing party in a Title VII action a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the cost of the action. ... This is particularly true where the entirety of plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous. This litigation indeed was frivolous, and, indeed, vexatious in the highest degree.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for an unsuccessful preliminary injunction motion and for litigating entitlement to fees.

Richardson v. Civil Serv. Com'n of State of NY · filed 1978-03-22(k)

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Magistrate’s inclusion in his computations of compensable time the attorney’s fees incurred in preparing and litigating both the unsuccessful preliminary injunction and the issue of entitlement to attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a federal employee who prevails on an administrative discrimination complaint to seek attorney’s fees in district court for the administrative work and the fee action.

Noble v. Claytor · filed 1978-04-13(k)

As to plaintiff’s claim under § 2000e-5(k) for attorney’s fees and costs incurred for work performed at the administrative level and in prosecuting this action, plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be, and the same hereby is granted.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows fees for a prevailing party’s union-employed attorney to be calculated using the same criteria as for private counsel.

Stephenson v. Simon · filed 1978-03-31(k)

The Court finds these authorities and their analyses to be persuasive, and the Court will therefore consider the same criteria in determining a fair and appropriate hourly rate for Mr. Goldman in this case as it would if he were a private firm attorney.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.

Hoard v. Teletype Corp. · filed 1978-05-08(k)

The Court awards attorney’s fees in the sum of $2,000 to Richard Mays, and $2,000 to Les Hollingsworth as counsel for the prevailing parties in a Title VII action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) provides for adequate attorney fees to encourage people injured by discrimination to seek judicial relief.

Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1978-05-12(k)

Under § 706(k) of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), courts are expected to award adequate fees to encourage individuals injured by discrimination to seek judicial relief.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to award attorney's fees to a party who prevailed on a discrimination complaint in administrative proceedings.

Margienell S. FISCHER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Brock ADAMS, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1978-05-17(k)

Even if the bringing of this action did not in any way prompt the agency to grant full relief, we hold that a party who has prevailed on the merits of a discrimination complaint in administrative proceedings before the CSC may be granted fees by a federal district court under section 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party who obtains relief through the administrative process without a judicial decision on the merits.

Canty v. Olivarez · filed 1978-05-18(k)

Title VII provides that a court may, in its discretion, award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... A “prevailing party” may be one who obtains relief from an unfair employment decision in the administrative stages of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and without a recourse to the courts for a judicial determination on the merits.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII party to recover reasonable attorney's fees for work on appeal.

DONNELL v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION · filed 1978-05-24(k)

The prevailing party in a Title VII action is entitled to an award of "a reasonable attorney's fee," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and this Court has awarded attorney's fees to parties prevailing on appeal. ... Accordingly, we award the plaintiff attorney's fees for the appellate portion of this litigation in the sum of $1,000.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims were groundless, vexatious, or unreasonable, or continued after becoming so.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Datapoint Corp. · filed 1978-06-28(k)

This Court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to the prevailing Defendant in a Title VII case on a finding that Plaintiff’s claims were without foundation, or were brought vexatiously, or were brought unreasonably, or that Plaintiff continued to litigate after they clearly became so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee that includes an increase above hourly rates when the result and prevailing local rates justify it.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer · filed 1978-07-12(k)

Additionally the Court, having considered the testimony of the expert witness that his firm, one of Hartford’s most respected, customarily added on 15% to the overall hourly rates where a favorable result was obtained in a case such as this one, is now of the opinion that such an increment would be reasonable here and in keeping with the prevailing rates in the Hartford area.

Section 2000e-5(k) calls for reasonable attorney's fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant when the suit is unreasonable, vexatious or groundless, unless affirmative reasons justify denying fees.

PRATE v. FREEDMAN · filed 1978-08-08(k)

The clear import of the reasoning in Christiansburg and Carrion is that reasonable attorneys' fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action found to have been unreasonable, vexatious or groundless unless there exist affirmative reasons for not doing so.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award for paralegal and law clerk services, limited to the lower of their actual or reasonable cost.

Chapman v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1978-09-01(k)

Attorney’s fees awarded on account of paralegal-law clerk services should, however, be limited to the actual or reasonable cost of those services, whichever is lower. ... Under the proration previously established, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of one-ninth of $4,720 (590 hours X $8), or $525.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows compensation for time reasonably necessary to prepare a fee petition and successfully appeal a fee award.

PRANDINI v. NATIONAL TEA COMPANY · filed 1978-07-19(k)

This case is Not an equitable fund case. The award here was statutorily authorized, and was made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... We hold therefore that the appellant attorneys are entitled to be compensated for time spent successfully appealing the first fee award, and in preparing the fee petition, to the extent that time was reasonably necessary to obtaining a reasonable fee award, See Hughes v. Repko, supra, at 487 a determination to be made in the first instance by the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits compensation for time reasonably necessary to prepare a fee petition and successfully appeal a fee award.

Prandini v. National Tea Co. · filed 1978-07-19(k)

The award here was statutorily authorized, and was made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... Hence, the time expended by attorneys in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorneys’ fee application, and in the court’s fee award.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney's fees and costs for obtaining an injunction before the entire Title VII case is decided when that work is sufficiently significant and discrete.

18 Fair empl.prac.cas. 709, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8676 · filed 1978-09-06(k)

Finally, appellant contends that appellee may not be entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Section 706(k) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) as he is not yet the "prevailing" party and cannot be considered as such until the entire case is adjudicated. We disagree. The fees and costs awarded by the district court for the efforts in obtaining the injunction are clearly reasonable and there was no error in awarding them at this time; the attorney's efforts were "sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit" under this provision of the Act.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs before the entire case is adjudicated when the work obtaining an injunction is sufficiently significant and discrete.

Smallwood v. National Can Co. · filed 1978-09-06(k)

Finally, appellant contends that appellee may not be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under Section 706(k) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) as he is not yet the “prevailing” party and cannot be considered as such until the entire case is adjudicated. We disagree. The fees and costs awarded by the district court for the efforts in obtaining the injunction are clearly reasonable and there was no error in awarding them at this time; the attorney’s efforts were “sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit” under this provision of the Act.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1978-09-07(k)

We also conclude that Anderson is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the amount of which shall be fixed by the district court on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney fee for a prevailing plaintiff despite a modest recovery, but the fee may not be punitive or a windfall.

White v. Ed Miller & Sons, Inc. · filed 1978-09-20(k)

Whereas an award of attorney fees in this type of case must be sufficient to make legal representation economically and financially attractive to qualified lawyers, the attorney fees must not be awarded as a substitute for damages and it will not do that the fees are punitive or awarded as a penalty against defendant, nor should the fees be a windfall for plaintiff’s counsel.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party’s fee award to cover reasonable legal work in a closely related earlier suit brought outside Title VII.

Kulkarni v. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army · filed 1978-09-29(k)

Though the fee provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), authorizes an award of fees in a court suit only if that litigation is brought under Title VII (as is the present action) the literal terms of that clause ... do not preclude consideration in setting the award of services rendered in so closely and integrally connected a prior non-Title VII case as the first suit here.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff’s claims were without foundation, brought vexatiously or unreasonably, or continued after they clearly became so.

Sierra v. Datapoint Corp. · filed 1978-10-10(k)

This Court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to the prevailing Defendant in a Title VII case on a finding that Plaintiff’s claim were without foundation, were brought vexatiously, were brought unreasonably, or that Plaintiff continued to litigate after they clearly became so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) makes attorney’s fees for a prevailing Title VII defendant discretionary; the plaintiff’s good faith is a relevant factor.

Silver v. Kca, Inc. · filed 1978-11-13(k)

Attorneys’ fees may be awarded in the court’s discretion; they are not automatic. ... KCA does not dispute that Silver’s appeal, too, was taken in good faith, and we so find. Consequently, each party shall bear its own attorneys’ fees on this appeal, but the defendant is awarded all other costs of the appeal.

Section 2000e-5 does not entitle a complainant to attorneys’ fees merely because she filed a parallel federal suit after obtaining relief in state proceedings.

Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. · filed 1978-09-15(k)

However while it appears that the pendency of related employment discrimination actions in both state and federal courts is now a sanctioned practice, ... it by no means follows that the mere filing of a federal suit should serve to entitle an aggrieved party to attorneys’ fees. And under the circumstances of this case I conclude that it does not.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not permit a specific attorney fee award on an inadequate record.

Copeland v. Marshall · filed 1978-10-30(k)

On the basis of the record in this case, no specific award of fees can yet be made.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a plaintiff who obtains a substantial settlement, even without a finding or admission of liability.

Foster v. Gloucester County Board of Chosen Freeholders · filed 1978-11-21(k)

In this case, having examined the totality of the circumstances of the settlement, the court is drawn to the same conelusion as the Magistrate; the plaintiff must be considered a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the applicable fee statutes. While there has been no finding or admission of liability, it seems clear that the action would have survived a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment since disputed facts existed concerning the reasons for plaintiff’s termination.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award a reasonable attorney’s fee as costs; awarding less than the amount requested is not itself an abuse of discretion.

Carreathers v. Alexander · filed 1978-11-28(k)

The statute grants the court discretion in the matter of the award and talks about a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... While refusal to award attorneys’ fees might well be an abuse of discretion, the failure to give the amount demanded or an amount substantially in accordance with the demand does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a court awarding attorney’s fees to explain the basis of its award sufficiently for appellate review.

Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Louis · filed 1978-11-29(k)

Moreover, the basis of the award of attorney’s fees should be set forth in detail so that this Court can adequately review the record. Failure of the District Court to disclose the basis of its award may compel the conclusion that it has abused its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a plaintiff who settles after litigation begins to make a prima facie showing of discrimination to qualify as a prevailing party for attorney’s fees and costs.

Brown v. Boorstin · filed 1978-12-05(k)

There first must be a prima facie showing of some discrimination before a Title VII party plaintiff “prevails” under circumstances resulting in settlement after litigation commences. Finding no such showing in this case, this Court exercises its discretion under § 706(k) and denies plaintiff’s application for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows courts to award reasonable attorney's fees as costs in Title VII suits by federal employees, with the amount left to the court's discretion.

CARREATHERS v. ALEXANDER · filed 1978-12-21(k)

The statute grants the court discretion in the matter of the award and talks about a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). No doubt the provision applies to employees of the government as well as to employees of the private sector under § 717(d) of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) attorney's fee awards should follow the Johnson guidelines and state their basis in enough detail for appellate review.

FIREFIGHTERS INSTITUTE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY v. The CITY OF ST. LOUIS · filed 1978-12-22(k)

The guidelines for awarding attorney's fees, which are set forth in Johnson, have received repeated approval by this Court. ... They should be followed. Moreover, the basis of the award of attorney's fees should be set forth in detail so that this Court can adequately review the record.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of attorney’s fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1979-01-05(k)

Attorney’s fees will be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of a prevailing plaintiff’s costs.

Duane Terrell BURNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO. Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1979-01-08(k)

Burns is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee as a part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the amount of which shall be fixed by the district court on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for defending a frivolous appeal.

Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1979-01-09(k)

After examining the entire file in this case, I believe that Bethlehem Steel, as the “prevailing party” on appeal, is entitled to a fee award for the appeal. Once Judge Clary determined that plaintiff’s legal claim was so frivolous as to justify a fee award to the prevailing defendant, plaintiff’s persistent efforts to secure a reversal on appeal were likewise frivolous. Accordingly, a fee award for the appeal is justified here.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees as part of costs in a Title VII action.

ANDERSON v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CONVAIR AEROSPACE DIVISION · filed 1979-01-16(k)

We also conclude that Anderson is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee as part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the amount of which shall be fixed by the district court on remand.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Cosby v. United States · filed 1979-01-17(k)

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his costs of this action and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party and to deny fees when both sides prevail in part.

19 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1528, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8861 Judy Davis Roesel, Cross-Appellant v. Joliet Wrought Washer Comp · filed 1979-01-18(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that the prevailing party may recover an attorney’s fee as part of its costs. ... Under the circumstances, with each party prevailing in some part, it seems sound to award fees to neither.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing Title VII defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Hills Passavant Hospital · filed 1979-02-26(k)

A defendant in a Title VII action can be awarded attorney fees under Section 706(k) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which allows the district court to grant the “prevailing party” in an action under Title VII a “reasonable attorney’s fee.” ... The Supreme Court has stated that an award to a prevailing defendant is appropriate “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” ... Therefore, as part of its final order, we will deny an award of costs and attorney’s fees to the Hospital.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits fees for a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; a weak claim does not necessarily warrant fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fry-Wagner Moving & Storage Co. · filed 1979-02-27(k)

Although attorney’s fees may be awarded to a prevailing party, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), fees may only be awarded to a prevailing defendant ... upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. ... Although the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s position herein was exceedingly weak, the Court concludes that an award of attorney’s fees to defendant would not be appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a court to award a prevailing Title VII plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees, accounting for the hours and work reasonably required.

Hul v. City of Dell Rapids · filed 1979-02-28(k)

The preceding factors have all influenced my consideration of “reasonable” attorneys’ fees. ... My award of attorneys’ fees is for 301% hours at $50 per hour for a total award of $15,087.50.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney’s fees after a Title VII settlement only when the plaintiff prevailed legally as well as factually.

Young v. Kenley · filed 1979-03-01(k)

It is well settled that a plaintiff whose suit is ended by settlement may still be considered a “prevailing party” within the meaning of §§ 1988 and 2000e — 5(k). ... The Court concludes that although Mrs. Young can fulfill the factual test for prevailing, she cannot meet the legal test and her motion for an award of attorney’s fees must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for public interest counsel, with the amount determined under standards similar to those used in other civil rights cases.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1979-03-05(k)

Although this award is made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and not 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the purposes of the parallel legislation and case law dealing with attorney’s fees in civil rights cases indicate that similar standards for determining attorney’s fees should be employed.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees only for a prevailing party.

Morales v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc. · filed 1979-03-29(k)

As plaintiff is entitled to no relief, his request for attorney’s fees must be denied, as such an award can only be made to a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award a prevailing Title VII defendant attorney’s fees incurred after the plaintiff continues litigating a claim that has become clearly groundless.

Davis v. Braniff Airways, Inc. · filed 1979-04-11(k)

Because I find that Plaintiff’s duty at the least was triggered upon his receipt of the motion to dismiss, I find that any hours attributable to defense of the action after such time are properly awardable under section 706(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee as costs for a successful appeal.

Blake v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1979-05-02(k)

Appellants are awarded their costs together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as costs for the successful prosecution of this appeal. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).)

Section 2000e-5(k) makes the amount of an attorney's fee depend on the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. SAFEWAY STORES · filed 1979-05-04(k)

The dollar amount of an attorney's fee to be awarded in a case of this type depends upon the extent to which the plaintiff himself prevailed in his civil right's action.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing complainant to recover attorney's fees for state administrative proceedings following an EEOC referral.

Ms. Cidni CAREY v. NEW YORK GASLIGHT CLUB · filed 1979-05-08(k)

A complaining party who is successful in state administrative proceedings after having her complaint under Title VII referred to a state agency in accordance with the statutory scheme of that Title is entitled to recover attorney's fees in the same manner as a party who prevails in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Reddick LITTLE v. SOUTHERN ELECTRIC STEEL CO. · filed 1979-05-22(k)

Here, however, we think it inappropriate to remand for that purpose because we conclude that the record before us would not support a finding that plaintiff's action in filing this suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows appellate attorney’s fees for defending a Title VII injunction.

Sue L. KENNEDY, Appellee v. R. M. LANDON, J. D. Cox, A. T. Robinson, and W. B. Digges, Appellants · filed 1979-05-24(k)

Additionally, Mrs. Kennedy is entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal in defending her injunction against Digges.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a prevailing party to seek reasonable attorney’s fees as costs in an existing action, but does not create an independent counterclaim for fees before the action is resolved.

Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. · filed 1979-06-05(k)

The question whether a defendant can request section 706(k) relief by way of counterclaim appears to be a novel one. The Court concludes that he cannot.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party, but the prospect of a fee award cannot keep an otherwise moot case alive.

Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute · filed 1979-06-25(k)

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) (court may award prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). That may well be true, but it is no answer to the mootness problem. A litigant’s desire to obtain a fee award at the conclusion of a case cannot keep the case in federal court after it has become moot in all other respects.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not support an attorney’s fee award to a defendant when the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful efforts to comply with a joinder order were not frivolous.

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee · filed 1979-07-09(k)

Although plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint does not adequately comply with the Court's order regarding indispensable parties, plaintiffs have not proceeded in a manner that could be categorized as “frivolous,” justifying an award of attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not foreclose an award of attorney’s fees to the United States when a suit is pursued in bad faith.

Copeland v. Martinez · filed 1979-07-24(k)

Likewise, we think it unlikely that Congress intended through § 706(k) to foreclose an award of fees in the exceptional case in which the whole suit is pursued in bad faith.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not authorize an attorney’s fee award against an unsuccessful party’s attorneys.

20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 588, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,283 J. D. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., Robert E. Piper, Jr., Mova · filed 1979-08-03(k)

Nothing in the language of those statutes and nothing in the cases cited to us by the appellees leads us to believe that §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k) authorize the imposition of attorneys’ fees against an unsuccessful party’s attorneys.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Shaw v. Library of Congress · filed 1979-09-14(k)

FURTHER ORDERED: That plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the precise amount of such fees and costs to be determined after further proceedings and a decision by our Court of Appeals en banc in Copeland v. Marshall.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires courts setting a defendant’s attorney’s fee award to consider the plaintiff’s ability to pay and good faith.

Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Company · filed 1979-09-28(k)

In determining the size of the award, the court below should have ascertained whether, in light of Faraci's ability to pay, a lesser sum assessed would have fulfilled the statute's deterrent purpose without subjecting him to financial ruin. Moreover, the plaintiff's degree of good faith in prosecuting the action should have also been considered.