42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the complainant’s financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Marangos v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2002-03-20(f)(1)

Similarly, the district court’s ability to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases is discretionary.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant, with the likely merit of the claim informing that decision.

Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center · filed 2003-03-21(f)(1)

The decision of whether to appoint counsel to a pro se litigant in a Title VII action is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), which provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney.” ... We find Ferrelli’s case unlikely to be meritorious, and therefore conclude that the district court did not err in failing to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s appointment-of-counsel provision applies to Title VII and Title I ADA claims, but not Title II ADA claims.

Storman v. Sacramento Regional Transit District · filed 2003-07-03(f)(1)

Although § 2000e-5(f)(l) does apply to claims under Title I of the ADA, which relates to employment discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), it does not apply to Storman’s claim under Title II of the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the court deems it just.

Barnell v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis Inc. · filed 1984-01-19(f)(1)

Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointed counsel when the plaintiff fails to show that the claim has some merit.

Radovich v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury · filed 2004-10-13(f)(1)

The district court, applying the factors as set forth in Johnson v. United States Treasury Department, 27 F.3d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), found that Radovich failed to demonstrate his claim had “some merit,” and therefore denied his motion for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This determination was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows Title VII complainants to request appointed counsel but does not give them a right to effective assistance of counsel or reversal for their attorney’s errors.

Nelson v. Boeing Commercial · filed 2006-05-03(f)(1)

But Congress’s decision to make appointed counsel available, in the discretion of the court, to a wider class of litigants does not imply that Congress intended to abrogate the long-standing principle of not recognizing a right to the effective assistance of counsel in civil cases.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII claimant; the court should consider the claimant’s finances, efforts to find counsel, claim merits, and ability to present the case.

Sandle v. Principi · filed 2006-10-17(f)(1)

There are, however, two statutes that apply to a case such as this: the first is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which allows a court to appoint counsel for a claimant in a Title VII case; the second is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), which allows a court to attempt to obtain counsel for an in forma pauperis person in a civil case. In exercising its discretion to appoint counsel in a Title VII case, the district court should consider: (1) the financial inability to afford counsel; (2) diligence in searching for counsel; (3) the merits of the claims; and (4) the ability to present the case without counsel. ... Here, the record demonstrates that the first two orders considered the relevant factors for appointing counsel in Title VII cases, including those announced in Castner, and applied those factors to the facts presented by plaintiff. ... W e find no abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in a Title VII suit, with the merits of the discrimination claim among the factors the court considers.

Blackman v. Global Industries Offshore, L.L.C. · filed 2007-04-02(f)(1)

The district court’s conclusion that Blackman failed the “merits” prong of the § 2000e-5(f)(1) test for appointment of counsel in a Title VII case was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointed counsel when the plaintiff’s claims are unexhausted or lack merit.

Hawkins v. Wegmans Food Market, Inc. · filed 2007-05-21(f)(1)

As Hawkins’s claims are either unexhausted or without merit, his motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1); Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-74 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases; the substance of the applicant’s claims is a threshold consideration.

Silva v. Peninsula Hotel · filed 2007-09-13(f)(1)

As Judge Katz’s Order explained, appointment of pro bono counsel in a Title VII case is made at the discretion of the Court. ... The threshold issue for appointment of counsel is whether the "indigent's position seems likely to be of substance.” ... Therefore the Court finds that plaintiff's claims do not merit appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s finances, the merits of the case, efforts to obtain counsel, and ability to proceed without counsel.

Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ. · filed 2009-06-17(f)(1)

After careful consideration of all the relevant factors, and based upon the record evidence at this time, the Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not appropriate here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases, guided in part by the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.

Ginger Gude v. Rockford Center Inc. · filed 2010-09-10(f)(1)

Gude was not proceeding in forma pauperis, and counsel was thus not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), but district courts have the discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See Hicks, 572 F.2d at 969. That discretion is guided by “several factors,” including the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant seeking appointed counsel to show, as a threshold matter, that the claim has merit.

Mentor v. Hillside Board of Ed · filed 2011-05-23(f)(1)

Regardless of whether we review the District Court‟s order under Tabron or § 2000e-5(f)(1), Mentor must show as a threshold matter that her claim had merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII plaintiff to request appointed counsel, but appointment is discretionary and depends on the plaintiff’s finances, case merits, efforts to find counsel, and ability to proceed without counsel.

Dantzler v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2011-09-16(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff may submit an application requesting that the court appoint an attorney “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1129 & n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that a Title VII plaintiff has the right to request counsel). ... Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a person seeking appointed counsel in an employment discrimination action to satisfy three factors.

Hosea v. Donley · filed 2012-07-13(f)(1)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hosea’s motion for appointment of counsel because Hosea failed to establish that he satisfied all three factors for appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s appointment-of-counsel provision does not apply to an action brought under § 1981 rather than Title VII.

Akmal v. Centerstance Inc. · filed 2013-01-03(f)(1)

The district court construed Akmal’s request for counsel under both Title VII’s appointment provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the provision generally applicable to indigent civil litigants, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). However, because Akmal has consistently and expressly stated that her claims are brought under § 1981, and not Title VII, only § 1915(e) is properly at issue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when exceptional circumstances warrant it.

Dominguez v. Lake Como Club · filed 2013-06-05(f)(1)(B)

Therefore, because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dominguez’s request for appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(B), we also affirm that order.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in a Title VII case when just, considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, financial ability, and ability to represent herself.

Paskauskiene v. Alcor PetroLab, L.L.P. · filed 2013-06-14(f)(1)

Title VII provides for the appointment of counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In determining whether to appoint counsel in a Title VII case, a court should consider “(1) the merits of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination; (2) the efforts taken by the plaintiff to obtain counsel; and (3) the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain counsel.” ... For these reasons, as ... well as those stated above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Paskauskiene’s motion for the appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when just, with the apparent merit of the claim serving as a threshold consideration.

Davis v. NYS Department of Corrections Attica Correctional Facility P.O. Box 149 Attica, N.Y. 14001 · filed 2014-09-12(f)(1)

It is a “threshold requirement” that the plaintiffs position seems likely to be of substance. ... Because Plaintiffs claims fail to meet this threshold standard, appointment of counsel is not appropriate in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when just, considering the complainant’s ability to pay, the claim’s merits, efforts to obtain counsel, and ability to present the case unaided.

Gaskins v. McIntyre · filed 2018-07-19(f)(1)

Title VII specifically provides that, "[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... In sum, after carefully reviewing the Poindexter factors and Plaintiff's motion, the court determines that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel in an employment discrimination case when it deems appointment just, considering factors including the merits of the case.

Valcarcel v. Abm Industries/Diversico Indus. · filed 2019-05-24(f)(1)

Careful review of the present case in light of these standards convinces the court that Valcarcel has not established extraordinary circumstances to warrant appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, nor has there been a sufficient showing as to the merits of the case that would warrant appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Valcarcel's request for appointment of an attorney (Doc. 36) will therefore be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in a Title VII case when the circumstances warrant it; an indigent claimant must show exceptional circumstances.

Shipp v. Hargan · filed 2019-09-03(f)(1)

Therefore, no exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the appointment of an attorney to represent Shipp pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases when circumstances are just, considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and claim merits.

Thibeault v. Brennan · filed 2019-09-06(f)(1)

Although this statute authorizes district courts to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” the courts are “not obligated to appoint counsel in every employment discrimination case.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff, but the plaintiff must make a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel.

Paige v. City of Farmington · filed 2019-11-25(f)(1)

Because it does not appear that Ms. Paige made a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel, her failure to do so is grounds enough to deny her request for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) authorizes appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases, but does not entitle a plaintiff to counsel when the complaint does not indicate employment by any defendant.

Souza v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 2019-12-09(f)(1)(B)

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), which authorizes the appointment of counsel to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Because the Complaint does not contain any indication that Plaintiff was employed by any of the defendants, she is not entitled to appointment of counsel under § 2000e-5(f).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel in a Title VII case when it deems appointment just, considering the plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel and litigate the case.

Preston v. Forge Industrial Staffing, Inc. · filed 2020-01-21(f)(1)

Rather, district courts are empowered to appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff without charge when he is “unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), or in Title VII cases “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Therefore, because Preston has not established a financial inability to retain private counsel, and because he appears to be competent and fully capable of representing himself in this suit at this juncture, see Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 289, his request for counsel (ECF 41) will be DENIED without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives trial courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases.

VENEY v. AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS · filed 2020-02-06(f)(1)

However, Congress has given trial courts the discretion to appoint counsel in cases brought under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because the Court is dismissing Mr. Veney’s complaint, by definition, he cannot show that his claims, as currently pled, have some merit in fact or law. Thus, the Court will deny his request for counsel at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when circumstances are just, but the court may deny the request when the complaint does not show that the claims have some merit.

Lyons v. Dec · filed 2020-02-19(f)(1)(B)

Therefore, although two of the three factors weigh in favor of Lyons, in the absence of a showing that there is at least “some merit” to Lyons’ claims, the Court in exercising its discretion cannot in good conscious appoint Lyons an attorney under Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances make appointment just.

Robinson v. Concentrix · filed 2020-03-20(f)(1)

Additionally, for parties bringing employment discrimination claims under Title VII, that statute also provides the court discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”...For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel (ECF No. 4) in Case No. 19-1260-JTM-GEB.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for plaintiffs bringing Title VII employment discrimination claims.

Robinson v. Metro PCS · filed 2020-03-20(f)(1)

Additionally, for parties bringing employment discrimination claims under Title VII, that statute also provides the court discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”16 ... For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel (ECF No. 4) in Case No. 19-1260-JTM-GEB.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII plaintiff to seek appointed counsel, subject to the court’s assessment of the relevant factors.

Randle v. Conduent, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17(f)(1)

Although there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases, “a plaintiff may apply to the Court to appoint counsel for him or her, under Title VII’s own provision for appointment of counsel.” De Luca v. Barreto, No. 04Civ.8133 (KMW)(DF), 2005 WL 1949516, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); collecting cases). ... After considering these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to retain counsel, the merits of the case, and ability to represent herself.

Reid v. Lancaster School District · filed 2020-05-06(f)(1)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as well as other circuits have generally held when considering whether to exercise their discretion to appoint counsel under § 2000e-5(f)(1) that a district court should consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s financial resources; (2) the efforts of the plaintiff to retain counsel; and (3) the merits of the plaintiff’s case. ... Some circuits have also considered the plaintiff’s ability to represent herself. ... Finding this authority persuasive, as have other courts in this circuit, this court will review the plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel under these four factors.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when just, considering the complainant’s finances, efforts to retain counsel, claim merits, and ability to represent themselves.

Capone v. Columbia, City of · filed 2020-05-08(f)(1)

Some actions, such as those brought under Title VII or the ADA, provide statutory discretionary authority for a litigant to request appointment of counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA) (applying by reference the powers, remedies, and procedures in § 2000e-5). ... Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiff has not demonstrated that justice requires he be appointed counsel in this matter. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel are denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the circumstances are just, considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claims.

Scott v. The Roman Catholic Church Diocese of Baton Rouge · filed 2020-07-09(f)(1)

Title VII provides for the appointment of counsel “[u]pon application…and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Accordingly, this Court’s liberal construction of pro se pleadings and motions, combined with Plaintiff’s apparent ability to litigate this action pro se, convinces the Court that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases when the circumstances justify it.

Carter v. Chief Carriers · filed 2020-09-01(f)(1)

Title VII, however, grants the Court discretion to appoint counsel in an employment-discrimination case in circumstances the Court deems just. ... Applying these standards, the Court finds the circumstances of this case do not warrant appointing counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant after considering the circumstances, including the complainant’s ability to pay and efforts to obtain counsel.

Oliver v. New York State Police · filed 2020-09-09(f)(1)

The decision of whether to appoint counsel to a pro se litigant in a Title VII action is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), which provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney.” ... After considering all of the competing factors, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel, but concludes that appointment of standby counsel to be present to assist Plaintiff at trial is “more likely to lead to a just determination.” Ferrelli, 323 F.3d at 204.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the circumstances are just.

Weathersby v. Ensign Drilling · filed 2020-09-10(f)(1)

Title VII provides for the appointment of an attorney for a plaintiff upon request “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Under the law governing the appointment of counsel in Title VII and ADEA proceedings, I must deny Weathersby’s request to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances make it just to do so.

Akbulut v. McAleenan · filed 2020-09-23(f)(1)

Notwithstanding the denial of Akubulut’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Title VII contains a specific provision allowing for the appointment of counsel “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Consequently, the Court does not find it appropriate to appoint counsel at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when just, but a court need not consider a request made after final judgment.

Thompson v. Resale Resources Corporation · filed 2020-11-15(f)(1)

Title VII permits district courts to appoint an attorney for a Title VII complainant upon request and “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Thompson requested that the Court appoint an attorney for him almost a year after this Court closed this case and entered final judgment. No dispute remains before this Court, and the Court will not consider Thompson’s request.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts broad discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances justify it.

Dawson v. Home Depot · filed 2021-03-04(f)(1)

The court’s discretion to appoint counsel under § 2000e-5 is “extremely broad.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) leaves appointment of counsel for a Title VII plaintiff to the court’s discretion; the plaintiff has no absolute right to counsel.

Williams v. Magnolia Cafe · filed 2021-03-18(f)(1)

The decision of whether to provide counsel to a Title VII plaintiff rests solely in the discretion of the court, as a Title VII plaintiff has no absolute right to appointment of counsel, despite Plaintiff’s apparent belief to the contrary.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when it deems appointment just; an applicant must show reasonable efforts to obtain counsel.

Brown v. Titan Protection & Consulting · filed 2021-03-19(f)(1)

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not made an affirmative showing she made reasonable efforts or attempts to secure counsel prior to filing her motion for appointment of counsel. The Court will therefore deny her motion without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases; the plaintiff’s claim must have arguable merit before counsel is appointed.

TURNER v. ABINGTON/JEFFERSON HOSPITAL · filed 2021-04-09(f)(1)

However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) grants district courts the discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases. ... As a threshold matter, the Court must first consider whether the plaintiff’s claim has any merit. ... Because the Court is dismissing Turner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, “by definition, [she] cannot show that [her] claims, as currently pled, have some merit in fact or law.” ... As such, we will deny Turner’s motion for appointment of counsel, without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the circumstances justify it.

Cordova v. Textron Aviation, Inc. · filed 2021-05-03(f)(1)

But because Plaintiff’s claims are based, at least in part, on employment discrimination, the Title VII ... statutes may also provide discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”5 ... Under the circumstances, the factors weigh against seeking an attorney to represent Plaintiff at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases but does not give an indigent plaintiff a right to counsel.

VanHorn v. United States Postal Service · filed 2021-05-04(f)(1)

Additionally, because Plaintiff’s claims are based, at least in part, on employment discrimination, the Title VII statutes may also provide discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”7 However, these laws do not bestow upon an indigent plaintiff the right to counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to recruit counsel in a Title VII case when the circumstances make doing so just.

Austin v. Auto Handling Corporation · filed 2021-06-11(f)(1)

... or that the instant circumstances—which include his repeated inability to cooperate with his prior counsel—make the Court’s recruitment of counsel on his behalf “just,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel in Title VII cases when just; an applicant’s reasonable efforts to find counsel inform that decision.

Smith v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2021-06-23(f)(1)

For employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court may appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” ... With regard to the second factor, this Court requires non-incarcerated plaintiffs in civil cases to show they have made reasonably diligent efforts under the circumstances to obtain an attorney to represent them. ... The Court will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII complainants when the circumstances make it just.

Williams v. Louisiana Department of Education · filed 2021-08-23(f)(1)

The enforcement provision of Title VII provides that: “Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). There is no absolute right to appointed counsel under Title VII. Rather, the decision to appoint counsel lies within the “considerable discretion” of the court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to find counsel, and the apparent merit of the claim.

Jones v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General United States Postal Service (Pacific Area) Agency · filed 2021-11-01(f)(1)

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). A district court is not obligated to appoint counsel in every case. Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991). In exercising its discretion regarding whether to appoint counsel, a district court must assess: “(1) the plaintiff’s financial resources, (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel, and (3) whether the plaintiff’s claim has merit.” Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to secure counsel, and the apparent merit of the claims.

Blackshire v. Buca Restaurants 2, Inc. · filed 2022-01-03(f)(1)

After considering the three factors identified in Ivey, the Complaint, and the filings before the Court, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(1) at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant after considering the complainant’s financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Al-Mohamad v. State of Washington State Patrol · filed 2022-01-31(f)(1)

In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a Title VII case, the court assesses the applicant’s financial resources, efforts the applicant has already made to secure counsel, and whether the claim has merit. ... Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel should be denied without prejudice because she does not include financial records.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides for appointment of counsel in employment discrimination matters and does not apply to claims that allege no employment discrimination.

Thomas-Weisner v. Gipson · filed 2022-02-16(f)(1)

Since Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint did not assert any employment discrimination claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5 does not apply here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) directs courts considering appointed counsel to examine the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, claim merits, and ability to present the case.

Dawson v. Home Depot · filed 2022-02-28(f)(1)

In considering whether to appoint counsel pursuant to § 2000e–5, the court examines the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s “financial inability to pay for counsel”; (2) the plaintiff’s “diligence in attempting to secure counsel”; (3) the merits of the plaintiff’s claims; and (4) the plaintiff’s ability to present the case without counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when it deems the circumstances just.

Hendricks v. Pride Industries Inc · filed 2022-03-01(f)(1)

As Magistrate Judge Hornsby’s order correctly stated, Title VII allows for the appointment of counsel in circumstances that the court deems just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant after considering the complainant’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Franklin v. McDonough · filed 2022-03-28(f)(1)

However, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that the Court may appoint an attorney “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... On this record, the Court is not prepared to find at this time that this case is of such merit to warrant the appointment of counsel for full scope representation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when it deems appointment just, considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claims.

Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka · filed 2022-04-27(f)(1)

For employment discrimination cases under Title VII, the Court may appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”... Reviewing Plaintiff’s motion under the above-referenced factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel should be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances are just; the court considers the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to find counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Perry v. White · filed 2022-06-03(f)(1)

But “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney” for a plaintiff bringing claims under Title VII and the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117(a). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met their burden of establishing the circumstances that warrant an appointment of counsel at this point in the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases when circumstances make appointment just.

Clark v. 10 Roads Express · filed 2022-09-23(f)(1)

Title VII gives courts discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... The court does not find it appropriate to appoint counsel for Clark.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in Title VII cases without requiring extraordinary circumstances.

Encinas v. University of Washington · filed 2022-09-30(f)(1)

Notably, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 does not require “extraordinary circumstances” to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the merits of the claim, the plaintiff’s efforts to find counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay for counsel.

Berrios v. Magnus · filed 2022-10-06(f)(1)

That provision permits a court to, in “circumstances as [it] may deem just,” appoint counsel for a plaintiff who files a complaint in a district court after the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”) decides not to pursue a claim on the plaintiff’s behalf. ... Whether to appoint counsel under Title VII is a discretionary decision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases when circumstances make it just.

Oliver v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority · filed 2022-10-21(f)(1)

Title VII gives courts discretionary authority to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... The court does not find it appropriate to appoint counsel for Oliver.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances justify it.

Brown v. USD 501 Topeka · filed 2023-01-10(f)(1)

The Court therefore declines to appoint counsel for Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs.

Encinas v. University of Washington · filed 2023-02-14(f)(1)

The Court has the authority and discretion to appoint pro bono counsel for Plaintiff, who brings a Title VII claim of employment discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the court deems it just, but does not require appointment.

Dunbar v. Foxx · filed 2023-03-31(f)(1)

Title VII allows a plaintiff to apply for appointment of counsel but does not obligate the court to order such an appointment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances justify it, considering the complainant’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and likely merits.

Fuqua v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2023-07-21(f)(1)

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is therefore DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when circumstances are just; the court considers the applicant’s finances, efforts to secure counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Stanback v. DeJoy · filed 2023-11-02(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court may appoint counsel “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... But on balance, at this stage of the case, and particularly considering the lack of financial information provided, Mr. Stanback does not meet the requirements for court-appointed counsel under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when it deems appointment just, considering the applicant’s finances, efforts to find counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Clark v. Washington State Department of Health · filed 2023-12-06(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court may appoint counsel “upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When considering a request for counsel for Title VII claims, the Court assesses the applicant’s financial resources, efforts the applicant has already made to secure counsel, and whether the claim has merit. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). ... Because two of the three Title VII factors and the section 1983 analysis weigh against appointment of counsel, the Court DENIES Ms. Clark’s motion for court-appointed counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances make appointment just.

Morgan v. Becerra · filed 2024-01-02(f)(1)

In federal civil cases for unlawful discrimination in employment, “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Exercising its sound discretion, the Court finds that counsel should not be appointed to represent Dr. Morgan.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to consider a Title VII plaintiff’s probable success, efforts to retain counsel, and financial ability when deciding whether to appoint counsel.

Berrios v. Magnus · filed 2024-01-03(f)(1)

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. ... The Court will address each factor considered for appointment of counsel under the Title VII framework: (1) the probable success of the claim, (2) the efforts by the plaintiff to retain counsel, and (3) the Plaintiff’s financial ability.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant seeking appointed counsel to make a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel without the court’s assistance.

McPherson v. Ochsner Health System Skilled Nursing Facility West Campus · filed 2024-01-31(f)(1)

Before counsel may be appointed under Title VII, a claimant must make a reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel without the court's assistance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel when the court deems it just, considering the plaintiff’s ability to pay, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Trimble v. Louisiana State University System · filed 2024-02-07(f)(1)

While Plaintiff is not bringing a claim under Title VII, the court court may appoint counsel for a plaintiff bringing claims under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the appointment of counsel provisions of Title VII. ... Title VII provides for the appointment of an attorney upon request “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Having considered the record, the Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in a Title VII case only after the claimant makes a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel independently.

Godfrey v. First Student · filed 2024-02-16(f)(1)

Before counsel may be appointed under Title VII, however, a claimant must make a reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel without the court's assistance. A reasonably diligent attempt to secure counsel means, at a minimum, speaking to an attorney about the merits of the case and pursuing a contingent fee arrangement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel in a Title VII case, but the claimant must first make a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel.

McPherson v. Ochsner Health System Skilled Nursing Facility West Campus · filed 2024-04-11(f)(1)

Before counsel may be appointed under Title VII, a claimant must make a reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel without the court's assistance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to consider a plaintiff’s financial means when deciding whether to appoint counsel in a Title I ADA case.

Walley v. Amazon.com Inc · filed 2024-06-06(f)(1)

But while indigence might not be a prerequisite for appointment of counsel under that statute as it is under § 1915, see Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 2006), “the financial means of the plaintiff” remains “one of several factors guiding the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in appointing counsel” under § 2000e-5(f)(1), Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 969 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977)). Given that factor and several others, 1 we cannot say that the District Court was required to appoint counsel in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointment of counsel when the complainant has made too few efforts to retain an attorney independently.

Clark v. Washington State Department of Health · filed 2024-05-30(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court may appoint counsel “upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... While the Court appreciates Ms. Clark’s continued efforts to retain counsel on her own, it still finds that appointment of counsel is inappropriate under the Title VII test at this time given that she has only contacted a few additional attorneys since her last motion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel after considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Thomas v. Enriched Schools · filed 2024-07-19(f)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e provides for the appointment of an attorney upon request “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ... Thomas is not entitled to appointment under Title VII parameters.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Morris v. Yellen · filed 2024-08-05(f)(1)

The Act incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a), and Title VII authorizes a district court to appoint counsel for a plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1). ... In sum, all three factors weigh against appointing counsel for Morris under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court therefore declines to do so.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII plaintiff to seek appointed counsel; the court may deny the request when the complaint lacks sufficient facts to show a meritorious claim.

Buchanan v. Doris Duke Foundation - Shangri-La Museum of Islamic Art · filed 2024-09-11(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a plaintiff bringing employment discrimination claims under Title VII may seek the appointment of counsel. ... Here, as discussed above, the Court finds that the Complaint lacks sufficient factual detail to state a meritorious claim for relief. ... Consequently, Buchanan’s request for the appointment of counsel, Dkt. No. 6, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) leaves appointment of counsel to the court’s discretion, even when some factors favor appointment.

Morgan v. Becerra · filed 2024-09-30(f)(1)

Title VII states, and the Castner court recognized, that whether to appoint counsel is a matter of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when circumstances are just, considering the applicant’s finances, efforts to find counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Gardner v. City of Ocean Shores · filed 2024-12-11(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the ... Court may appoint counsel “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as ... the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... But at this stage of the case, Mr. Gardner does not meet the requirements for court-appointed counsel under Title VII. The Court therefore DENIES his motion to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff in its discretion after considering financial ability, diligence in seeking counsel, and the merits of the allegations.

Quintana v. New Mexico Department of Transportation · filed 2025-01-17(f)(1)

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, provides that the district court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). ... “Before counsel may be appointed, a plaintiff must make affirmative showings of (1) financial inability to pay for counsel, (2) diligence in attempting to secure counsel[,] and (3) meritorious allegations of discrimination.” Id. at 1421 (emphasis added). ... After considering the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that appointing counsel in this case is not justified under the circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when just, but Title VII requires an employment relationship.

Simmons v. Together Credit Union · filed 2025-01-23(f)(1)(B)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permits courts to appoint counsel for a complainant “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). However, Title VII broadly applies to employment discrimination, Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (“Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based on race, sex, and national origin (emphasis added)), and Plaintiff makes no allegations concerning an employment relationship with Defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances are just.

Gossage v. Office of Personnel Management · filed 2025-01-28(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court may appoint counsel “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... At this stage of the case, Mr. Gossage does not meet the requirements for court-appointed ... counsel under Title VII. The Court therefore DENIES his motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. 12.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances are just.

Watkins v. Wesley Homes · filed 2025-03-12(f)(1)

In Title VII cases, the Court may seek to appoint counsel “upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... The Court finds that the Title VII factors as a whole weigh against appointing Ms. Watkins counsel at this stage.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the circumstances make appointment just.

Yendluri v. Cognizant Inc. · filed 2025-04-25(f)(1)

Title VII permits the court to appoint counsel for plaintiffs “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because Yendluri sued under Title VII and is not proceeding in forma pauperis, the Caston factors, rather than the Ulmer factors, apply. ... Under the Caston analysis, Yendluri has not established a sufficient basis for the court to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the circumstances are just.

Castellon v. Textron Aviation · filed 2025-05-08(f)(1)

For a plaintiff who asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the district court has discretion to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”... The Court therefore denies Plaintiff's motion, but without prejudice to the refiling of the motion at a later stage of the proceedings after resolution of dispositive motions, if warranted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in an employment discrimination case, but a claim lacking any allegation of employment by the defendant does not support appointment on the merits.

Bo v. Board of Regents of the University of California · filed 2025-05-09(f)(1)

But his complaint is void of any allegation that he was ever employed by the defendant, so he cannot have leveled a meritorious employment-discrimination claim. The Court denies his § 2000e-5 appointment request.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances justify it, but appointment is not automatic.

Avila v. Statewide Remodeling · filed 2025-05-20(f)(1)

Title VII provides for the appointment of counsel upon request “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). There is no automatic right to the appointment of counsel in these cases, however.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the circumstances justify it, considering the complainant’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Clark v. Washington State Department of Health · filed 2025-05-21(f)(1)

But in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court may appoint counsel “upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When considering a request for counsel for Title VII claims, the Court assesses the applicant’s financial resources, efforts the applicant has already made to secure counsel, and whether the claim has merit. ... However, the second and third factors weigh against granting the motion. ... Thus, the renewed motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel when just, considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Gilmore v. Kernan · filed 2025-05-22(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), the Court may appoint counsel for Title VII claims “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” as well as for claims under the Rehabilitation Act. ... Appointment is not proper in this case because Plaintiff has not demonstrated her financial inability to retain counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to seek counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Deakin v. Herman Pearl Company · filed 2025-05-28(f)(1)

The Court can ask for an attorney to represent a pro se plaintiff in a Title VII civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing for the appointment of counsel); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (providing that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 applies to ADA claims against employers). A court considers three factors when determining whether counsel should be appointed: “(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his or her own; and (3) the merit of the plaintiff’s claim.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the court deems it just.

Stewart v. Coastal Community Bank · filed 2025-06-04(f)(1)

However, in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII, the Court may appoint counsel “upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... As it is too early to determine if Plaintiff’s case has merit, Plaintiff’s motion for court-appointed counsel (Dkt. 5) is denied without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to seek counsel for a pro se Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to find counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Deakin v. Herman Pearl Company · filed 2025-06-11(f)(1)

The Court may ask for an attorney to represent a pro se plaintiff in a Title VII civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing for the appointment of counsel); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (providing that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 applies to ADA claims against employers). A court considers three factors when determining whether counsel should be appointed: “(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his or her own; and (3) the merit of the plaintiff’s claim.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in Title VII employment discrimination cases, but does not entitle a plaintiff to counsel in a case without such claims.

Weems v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2025-06-24(f)(1)

We note that Weems’s first motion for the appointment of counsel was made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which allows for the appointment of counsel in Title VII employment discrimination cases. As Weems’s civil action did not involve such claims, she was not entitled to the appointment of counsel under this section.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff in its discretion, considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Quintana v. New Mexico Department of Transportation · filed 2025-07-21(f)(1)

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, provides that the district court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). ... As set forth in the Court’s previous order, Plaintiff has still not presented circumstances justifying appointing counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to secure counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Pavageau v. Delta Airlines Inflight Services · filed 2025-07-22(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for” a Title VII plaintiff. When considering a request for counsel for Title VII claims, courts assess the applicant’s financial resources, efforts the applicant has already made to secure counsel, and whether the claim has merit. ... This factor weighs against appointing counsel, and the Court finds that the Title VII factors as a whole weigh against appointing Ms. Pavageau counsel at this stage.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when circumstances justify it.

Jackson v. Gragg Advertising · filed 2025-08-20(f)(1)

For a plaintiff who asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the district court has discretion to appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs; a plaintiff who alleges no employment relationship with any defendant and otherwise fails to show entitlement is not entitled to appointed counsel.

Noh v. United States · filed 2025-09-15(f)(1)

However, she does not allege ... that she had an employment relationship with any Defendant, so for that reason and the reasons set forth above, she has not shown that she is entitled to appointment of counsel under Title VII, either.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant seeking appointed counsel to make a reasonably diligent effort to obtain counsel without the court’s assistance.

Brown v. Talavera · filed 2025-09-19(f)(1)

Further, before counsel may be appointed under Title VII, a claimant must make a reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel without the court's assistance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases, considering the claim and the litigant's ability to proceed.

Aguilar v. N2MIS · filed 2025-09-26(f)(1)

Statutes also may grant discretionary power to appoint counsel for a pro se litigant if the claims or parties qualify. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(granting discretionary power to appoint counsel for employment discrimination claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (granting discretionary power to appoint counsel for pro se litigants proceeding in forma pauperis). ... None of Aguilar’s fundamental liberties are at stake, and he has shown himself capable of presenting his claims diligently. ... Thus, the Court denies the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs after considering their ability to pay, efforts to secure counsel, allegations, and ability to present the case.

Clark v. Jet.com/Walmart · filed 2019-10-21(f)(1)

The Court therefore declines to appoint counsel for Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs, considering their finances, efforts to find counsel, claim merit, and ability to present the case.

Braithwaite v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2020-05-28(f)(1)

The Court declines to appoint counsel for Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5((1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel when it deems the circumstances just; that authority also applies to ADA claims through incorporation.

Moses · filed 2025-11-04(f)(1)

Title VII provides that “in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Thus, the court may consider Plaintiff’s request for counsel in the context of her ADA claims. ... For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when the court deems it just.

Reese v. United Petroleum Transports · filed 2025-11-06(f)(1)

A federal court may appoint counsel to represent a Title VII plaintiff in “circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... On our own examination of the merits, the district court was well within its discretion to determine that Reese was not suited for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s ability to pay, ability to present the case, the merits, and efforts to find counsel.

Thomas · filed 2025-11-06(f)(1)

That reasoning is entirely consistent with what Thomas calls the “factor-based, discretionary analysis” courts employ when addressing requests for counsel made pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... But in any event, those factors considered in the aggregate weigh heavily against the appointment of counsel in this case, notwithstanding Thomas’s diligence in trying to obtain counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointed counsel when the plaintiff has not shown financial inability to pay or diligence in seeking counsel.

Rakestraw · filed 2025-12-08(f)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to make affirmative showing of the first two factors: his financial inability to pay for counsel and his diligence in attempting to secure counsel prior to filing his motion. ... The Court therefore denies Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), but without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel in Title VII cases after considering the plaintiff’s financial need, efforts to secure counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Cordova · filed 2025-12-10(f)(1)

In employment discrimination cases like this one, Title VII provides that the court may appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Before appointing counsel, our Circuit requires that a “plaintiff must make affirmative showings of (1) financial inability to pay for counsel, (2) diligence in attempting to secure counsel and (3) meritorious allegations of discrimination.” Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1992). ... The court thus denies plaintiff’s request to appoint counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to request counsel for a Title VII complainant, but does not authorize it to compel an attorney to serve.

Roper · filed 2026-02-05(f)(1)

We start with the scope of the district court’s authority: The court cannot appoint counsel; instead, the court can only ask an attorney to take the case. ... The Court declines to request legal representation for Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when it deems appointment just, but creates no automatic right to counsel.

Warner · filed 2026-04-27(f)(1)

Additionally, “Title VII provides for the appointment of an attorney for a Title VII complainant upon request ‘in such circumstances as the court may deem just.’” Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). The statute does not create an automatic right to counsel. Id. ... Nonetheless, because the Court finds that Ms. Warmer is more than capable of representing herself at this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not appropriate at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when it deems appointment just; financial need and efforts to find counsel do not require appointment when the plaintiff can presently pursue her claims pro se.

Swier · filed 2026-06-16(f)(1)

Although Swier has demonstrated financial need and efforts to obtain counsel, she appears presently capable of pursuing her claims pro se. ... If an evidentiary hearing or trial becomes necessary, this Court may appoint counsel, but at this stage of the proceedings, her motions to appoint counsel, Docs. 2 and 8, are denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when exceptional circumstances warrant it.

Roberts v. Bharat Forge · filed 2026-06-17(f)(1)

The first is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and the second is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Ms. Roberts, therefore, must demonstrate that exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits a court to award attorney fees and costs when sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if the employer proves it would have made the same decision anyway.

Adams v. Little Rock, City of · filed 2023-09-15(g)(2)(B)(i)

The Court has discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to grant attorney fees and costs in actions in which an individual proves that sex was a motivating factor for the termination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), even when the defendant proves it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s sex.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

KENGERSKI v. THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL · filed 2023-05-26(k)

Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Kengerski was a prevailing party for purposes of obtaining his attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an attorney fee award to a prevailing Title VII defendant only when the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; losing alone is insufficient.

White v. Vance County, North Carolina · filed 2023-05-18(k)

Defendants Vance County and Vance County Sheriff's Office seek an award of attorney fees in the amount of $8,925.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... The Court, in its discretion, declines to award attorney fees to defendants Vance County and Vance County Sheriff's Office. Although plaintiff's claims against these defendants ultimately failed, the Court does not find that plaintiffs failure to agree to dismissal of these defendants was vexatious or groundless.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party, but a plaintiff who wins only nominal damages may receive no fee when her success is minimal.

Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality International, Inc. · filed 2005-08-26(k)

Here, Plaintiff has been awarded nominal damages, thus qualifying her as a “prevailing party.” However, application of the three-factor test shows this is the usual nominal-damages case, entitling Plaintiff to no fee at all.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a district court to reduce a fee award by a reasonable percentage to exclude excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours; the award is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Guardians Ass'n of Police Department v. City of New York · filed 2005-06-03(k)

We review a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) for abuse of discretion. ... However, excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours are to be excluded from a fees award, and a district court may apply a reasonable percentage reduction as a practical shortcut to do so. ... Nonetheless, we hold that, on the facts presented by this case, the 80% reduction was within the range of the broad discretion committed to the district court.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not allow an attorneys’ fee award to a plaintiff who is no longer the prevailing party after reversal of the judgment.

Neoma Shafer, Judith Ann Parks v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service United States Department of Defense · filed 2004-08-26(k)

However, given our complete reversal of the district court’s judgment in this case, it is clear that Parks is no longer a prevailing party. Accordingly, the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees is also REVERSED. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 706(k) allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, and its policy weighs against a fee penalty on charging parties when the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment.

Miller v. International Paper Company · filed 1969-02-26(k)

section 706 (k) provides for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party as an added inducement to voluntary compliance out of court. ... In the present case, since we have determined that the appellees were not entitled to summary judgment, the award of attorney’s fees against the charging parties reverses the clear policy of the Act. The penalty assessment, therefore, cannot stand.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for plaintiffs who obtain Title VII relief.

Clark v. American Marine Corporation · filed 1969-09-15(k)

Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees, including fees for an appeal, for a plaintiff who prevails on a Title VII class discrimination claim.

Arthur Ray PARHAM, Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Appellee · filed 1970-10-28(k)

Having prevailed in his contentions of racial discrimination against blacks generally prior to February, 1967, Par-ham is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, including services for this appeal, to be allowed by the district court as authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of costs for an unlawful employment practice.

Local 246, Utility Workers Union of America v. Southern California Edison Co. · filed 1970-12-23(k)

Under these circumstances, Section 706(k) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) provides that plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. ... Therefore, this Court deems it proper to award reasonable attorney’s fees to plaintiff as part of her costs.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award attorneys’ fees against the United States as part of a prevailing party’s costs, in the court’s discretion.

United States Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. · filed 1970-05-05(k)

That 28 U.S.C. § 2412 is not a statutory prohibition to the awarding of attorneys’ fees against the United States, for the reason that Section 706 (k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), specifically provides that the United States may be liable for attorneys’ fees, in the discretion of the Court, as part of the costs awarded the prevailing party to the action.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorneys' fees for successful Title VII plaintiffs, and a plaintiff's use of the suit as a test case alone does not justify denying them.

Shirley Lea, Romona Pinnix and Annie Tinnin v. Cone Mills Corporation, Shirley Lea, Romona Pinnix and Annie Tinnin v. Co · filed 1971-01-29(k)

Plaintiffs should not be denied attorneys' fees merely because theirs was a "test case". ... With this parallel before us, it is unquestionable that the District Court erred in its refusal to decree counsel fees. This was a misdirection of the trial judge's discretion. See section 706 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) governs whether an attorneys’ fee award in a Title VII case is reasonable.

Alex Clark, John T. Magee, and Robert Turner v. American Marine Corporation · filed 1971-02-10(k)

The only qüestion this appeal presents is whether the.district court’s award of attorneys’ fees was reasonable within ... the meaning of Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The judgment is affirmed for the reasons stated in Judge Alvin Rubin’s opinion order dated April 24, 1970, Clark v. American Marine Corporation, D.C., 320 F.Supp. 709.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a fee award for appointed counsel who withdrew after an adverse trial judgment when the plaintiff ultimately prevailed.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1971-07-01(k)

It would disparage this policy to deny a fee and expenses to counsel as here where plaintiff eventually prevailed simply because he withdrew after trial and after filing the notice of appeal.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives the court discretion to deny a prevailing defendant attorney’s fees when the plaintiff pursued statutory rights in good faith.

Richardson v. Hotel Corporation of America · filed 1971-09-21(k)

In any event, the award is discretionary with the court. The court finds that the award is not justified here for, so far as can be determined from the record, the plaintiff proceeded in good faith on the advice of competent counsel to attempt to vindicate statutory rights. The defendant’s demand for attorney’s fees is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party even when the employer relied in good faith on a state law and no back pay is awarded.

LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. · filed 1971-10-04(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII allows the Court in its discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k). There is no requirement that the prevailing party be the victim of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, but a voluntary union merger without direct judicial intervention did not make the plaintiffs prevailing parties.

4 Fair empl.prac.cas. 257, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7647 Linell Long v. Georgia Kraft Company · filed 1972-01-28(k)

It must be remembered that the appellants were not the “prevailing party” as that term is used in Title VII. Although the locals were merged, the merger occurred without direct judicial intervention and was not court-ordered.

Section 2000e-5(k) entitles a Title VII plaintiff to costs and reasonable counsel fees when the court retains a class action to ensure unlawful practices end, whether it later dismisses the action or orders an injunction.

Marvin W. BROWN, Appellant, v. GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1972-05-22(k)

If, at the end of this period, the court finds that the company's employment policies have completely eliminated the unlawful practices prohibited by Sec. 703(a), it may dismiss this action. However, if any unlawful employment practices remain, the court must order appropriate injunctive relief. In either event, the plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and reasonable counsel fees.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits courts to award reasonable attorneys fees to private Title VII litigants in their discretion.

Jake ROWE Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-03-02(k)

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) provides that the Court in its discretion may award reasonable attorneys fees to private litigants under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves a reasonable attorney’s fee to the court’s discretion and requires no particular formula.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-09-07(k)

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 Ú.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow ... a reasonable attorney’s fee”. (Emphasis added.) The language is not mandatory nor does it imply the requirement of any formula.

Section 2000e-5(k) leaves the amount of an attorney's fee award to the district court's discretion, including its assessment of excessive or duplicative work.

Shirley LEA Et Al., Appellants, v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, a Corporation, Appellee · filed 1972-09-11(k)

The fee award was sought by motion under the provisions of Sec. 706(k) of Title VII. ... Considering the number of lawyers involved, the indications of duplication of effort, Judge Stanley's expression of his view that some of the work would reasonably require less time than actually spent and his own observation of the work product and his capacity to evaluate it, we cannot conclude that a fee of $10,000 was so unreasonably low as to be beyond the range of his discretion.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary award of attorney’s fees; the court may limit the award to fees incurred prosecuting the federal claim after related state proceedings.

Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corporation · filed 1972-10-30(k)

Under these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that Illinois law and policy should control plaintiffs’ Illinois claim and therefore deems inappropriate an award of counsel fees for the state proceeding. Consequently, plaintiffs’ recovery in this court shall be limited to its costs and attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting their federal claim against the defendant Furnco.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees without requiring a particular formula.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone · filed 1973-01-11(k)

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) states that "the court, in its discretion, may allow . . . a reasonable attorney's fee". (Emphasis added.) The language is not mandatory nor does it imply the requirement of any formula.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for work on appeal.

Mabel L. LOWRY, Appellee-Plaintiff, v. WHITAKER CABLE CORPORATION, Appellant-Defendant · filed 1973-02-08(k)

Miss Lowry is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal as well as in the trial court.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a plaintiff’s suit exposes a discriminatory promotion policy, even if the plaintiff was not personally denied promotion because of sex.

Fogg v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-08-14(k)

While Mrs. Fogg was not denied promotion because she was a woman, she did perform a valuable public service by instituting the complaint with the EEOC and bringing this law suit. ... Mrs. Fogg is, therefore, entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for a successful Title VII plaintiff, including fees for an appeal.

Johnnie A. REED, Appellant, v. ARLINGTON HOTEL COMPANY, INC., Appellee · filed 1973-04-26(k)

The plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, including services for this appeal, to be allowed by the District Court as authorized by 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing private Title VII litigant without a finding that the defendant intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Carey v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1973-06-15(k)

Title VII expressly provides that the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing private litigant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k). Notably, the awarding of attorney’s fees is not conditioned on a finding that the Title VII defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(k) provides for attorneys’ fees for a prevailing party; a plaintiff who does not prevail is not entitled to an award.

Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company · filed 1973-06-21(k)

The Act provides for attorneys’ fees for the “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This issue was raised on final argument by plaintiff’s counsel, although no evidence was presented on the point. Having failed to prevail, plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to no such award.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes reasonable attorney's fees for plaintiffs who prevail on Title VII sex discrimination claims.

Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp. · filed 1973-11-07(k)

The plaintiffs, having been found hereinabove to have been victims of unlawful employment discrimination because of their female sex in the manners delineated, they are entitled also to an award of reasonable fees for the services performed for them herein by their respective counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., D.C.La., 333 F.Supp. 602, 611-612 [12, 13], affirmed C.A. 5th (1972), 460 F.2d 1228.

Section 2000e-5(k) gives courts discretion to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as costs.

Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company · filed 1973-12-17(k)

In a Title VII case the Court has the statutory discretion to allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). ... In the light of all the circumstances shown by the proof in the instant case this Court concludes that its discretion should be exercised by not awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(g) and (k) provide for back pay and attorney’s fees after a Title VII violation; the trial judge decides those awards, with back pay generally required absent exceptional circumstances.

6 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1141, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9035 Robert Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Loca · filed 1973-12-19(g), (k)

Having found that post-Act discrimination did occur, we must deal with the demand of the complaint that back pay and attorney’s fees be awarded as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and § 2000e-5(k). ... These are matters within the discretion of the trial judge who should make findings thereon in accordance with our holding in Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra, and the authorities cited therein.

Section 2000e-5(k) requires a court setting a reasonable attorney's fee to consider the relevant factors and make a record showing that consideration.

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express · filed 1974-01-21(k)

To put these guidelines into perspective and as a caveat to their application, courts must remember that they do not have a mandate under Section 706(k) to make the prevailing counsel rich. ... In sum, we hold it to be an abuse of discretion not to consider the factors we approved in Clark v. American Marine Co., and which we amplify here, and that a meaningful review requires a record that reflects such consideration.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a court to award private plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs.

Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co. · filed 1973-10-02(k)

The Court may allow private plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(k) does not provide attorney’s fees to a plaintiff whose claims fail on the merits.

Causey v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1974-04-05(k)

3. That the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees must fail in view of the Court’s decision upon the merits.

Section 2000e-5(k) permits a discretionary award of reasonable attorney’s fees in federal employee discrimination suits against the United States after the 1972 amendment.

Reynolds v. Wise · filed 1974-04-22(k)

The Court first considered the defendant’s motion to strike the award of attorneys fees and has determined that the motion should be overruled. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) provides: ... While this provision as originally enacted did not apply in cases brought against the United States the amendment of March 24, 1972 made it applicable. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(d).

Section 2000e-5(k) permits an award of costs and reasonable attorneys fees to a plaintiff who prevails on a Title VII claim.

Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District No. 7 · filed 1974-04-25(k)

Plaintiff is awarded costs and reasonable attorneys fees under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 706(k) permits a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in its discretion.

Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., Inc. · filed 1974-05-01(k)

Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), grants the court, in its discretion, the power to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. The court considers that this is an appropriate case for an award.

Section 2000e-5(k) allows lawyers for successful Title VII plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney fees.

Tobe DUHON, Jr. and Charles L. Walker, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, BEAUMONT PLANT, De · filed 1974-05-24(k)

The issue relating to counsel fees is controlled by United States v. Georgia Power Company, supra, where we said: “The district court recognized that section 706 (k) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)] and our decision in Clark v. American Marine Co., ... entitle the plaintiffs’ lawyers in a successful VII suit to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.”

Section 2000e-5(k) allows attorney fees only for counsel who vindicates the right to be free from discrimination.

Leisner v. New York Telephone Company · filed 1974-06-12(k)

The court is of the view that attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are to be allowed only where counsel acting as a “private attorney general” has vindicated the rights not to be discriminated against embodied in the remainder of that statute.