42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court that finds unlawful employment practices to enjoin them and order appropriate affirmative relief, including sensitivity training.

Webb v. Hyman · filed 1994-11-05(g)

Under Title VII cases where there is a finding of unlawful employment practices, “the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In its discretion, and in the interests of justice and fairness, the Court shall grant the Plaintiff the bulk of the injunctive relief requested, and shall further order that Defendant Paylor, and all others similarly situated, receive sensitivity training in accordance with the Department’s stated policy.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to award appropriate equitable relief, including reinstatement and backpay, without requiring either remedy in every case.

Castle v. Bentsen · filed 1995-01-18(g)

To so find would be to ignore the plain language of the statute which vests in the Court the discretion to grant “any ... equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Court’s discretion to go beyond the verdict form alone in fashioning equitable relief is particularly vivid in light of the Plaintiffs stipulation that the Court could determine such issues on the basis of the entire record.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives federal courts broad discretion to order equitable relief for Title VII violations, including reinstatement and back pay.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc. · filed 1995-04-07(g)

Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), vests broad discretion in the federal courts to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) limits make-whole relief to actual victims of discrimination; it does not compensate a plaintiff for a promotion to a position that never opened.

Bishopp v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1995-06-16(g)

Section 706(g) does not provide relief to every plaintiff who did not receive a promotion where another person is unlawfully selected on the basis of race.

Section 2000e-5 permits a court to enjoin discriminatory practices or order affirmative action when a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Frey v. Alldata Corp. · filed 1995-07-28(g)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the court may enjoin discriminatory practices or order the defendant to take affirmative action if the defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Although the plaintiff wants the defendant to initiate a procedure to handle accommodation requests, the plaintiff has neither outlined the procedure, beyond citing administrative regulations, nor explained why the procedure would work. Because the court will not make arguments for the litigants, the court denies the motion for injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits an injunction against workplace harassment; a former employee may need reinstatement for that injunction to provide relief.

Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company · filed 1995-08-03(g)(1)

However, because Amirmokri is no longer employed by BG & E, an injunction against future harassment would be of no benefit to him unless he first obtains an injunction reinstating him at Calvert Cliffs. Thus, to obtain equitable relief on his harassment claim, he must prevail on his constructive discharge claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award equitable relief beyond reinstatement, front pay, and back pay.

Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl · filed 1995-10-06(g)

The damages provision of Title VII provide remedies beyond reinstatement, front pay, and back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). These provisions state that a Court, beyond offering an employee these remedies, may “provide other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) allows relief for losses caused by a failure to accommodate religion even when the employer later terminates the employee for conduct caused by that failure.

Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-10-12(g)

The court cannot envision a construction of Title VII that permits an employer to refuse reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religion, placing the employee in the untenable position of choosing between adherence to the dictates of religion or the dictates of the employer, that also permits the employer to be relieved of the burden of damages to the employee for the employer’s refusal to accommodate, because the employee subsequently chooses to follow the dictates of the employee’s religion rather than those of the employer.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides remedies that may be appropriate depending on the circumstances of a Title VII claim.

Greenlaw v. H. Lawrence Garrett, Iii, Secretary, Department of the Navy B.J. McMillin Richard B. Cheney, Sec · filed 1996-01-17(g)

Under Title VII there are a series of potentially appropriate remedies available depending on the circumstances of each case. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 2000e-16(d).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes equitable remedies, including reinstatement, available to prevailing Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs.

Kemp v. Monge · filed 1996-02-09(g)(1)

As such, prevailing Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs are entitled to the same remedies as prevailing Title VII plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) gives courts broad discretion to limit equitable relief when misconduct discovered after an unlawful termination would have justified firing the employee.

Dian L. Castle v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury · filed 1996-03-15(g)(1)

The district court has broad discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief for a Title VII plaintiff. ... Although McKennon arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), its principles clearly apply in Title VII actions. ... We therefore conclude that the court had jurisdiction to utilize the after-acquired evidence doctrine in fashioning an equitable remedy for Castle’s unlawful termination by the OCC.

Before the 1991 amendments, § 2000e-5(g) allowed only equitable relief, and reinstatement required proof that the discharge was racially discriminatory.

Duane Love v. State of California Department of General Services · filed 1996-04-04(g)

Before 1991 legislation, Title VII allowed the district court to grant only equitable relief, not damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972). The equitable relief sought by Love, reinstatement, was prohibited unless Love could show he was discharged for racially-discriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) permits the EEOC to seek preliminary relief, subject to the traditional four-part injunction test.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1996-06-27(f)(2)

Consequently, in ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, this Court will apply the familiar four-part standard and consider whether the EEOC has established that: 1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, 2) there exists, absent injunctive relief, a significant risk of irreparable harm, 3) the balance of hardship tilts in its favor, and 4) granting the injunction will not negatively affect the public interest.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay available for proven Title VII discrimination.

Howard v. Town of Jonesville · filed 1996-07-02(g)

In this case should Howard prove that she has been the victim of an intentional unlawful employment practice, a number of remedies will be available to her under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including an order enjoining the defendants from engaging in the unlawful practice, reinstatement to her former position, a monetary award in the form of back pay, and compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) allows the EEOC to seek preliminary relief, but the EEOC must satisfy the usual four-part test, including a showing of irreparable harm.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra USA, Inc. · filed 1996-09-06(f)(2)

Because we see no evidence in this instance that Congress, in drafting section 706(f)(2), intended the courts to depart from this rule, we hold that the EEOC—like any other suitor—must meet the familiar four-part test for preliminary injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief, including retroactive promotion, for a Title VII violation.

Barvick v. Cisneros · filed 1997-02-14(g)

Title VII provides for a broad range of remedies, including an award of appropriate equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits an injunction after a court finds intentional employment discrimination without requiring proof of a pattern or practice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ilona of Hungary, Incorporated · filed 1997-03-06(g)(1)

The section of Title VII authorizing injunctive relief does not itself require that a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct be shown; instead, injunctive relief is authorized once the court has found that the defendant intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides only equitable relief.

Ostrach v. Regents of the University of California · filed 1997-03-17(g)

Without replicating in detail the veritable labyrinth that must be traced in an effort to determine what remedies are available, it appears that this referral and re-referral process leads to only two statutes addressing remedies, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) and 2000a-3(a), both providing only equitable relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides remedies including reinstatement and back pay, which courts may select to fit the facts of an ADA case.

Criado v. IBM Corp. · filed 1997-05-07(g)

Section 12117 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) incorporates all the enforcement' mechanisms and remedial provisions of Title VII, like reinstatement and back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 12117; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). We have discretion to fashion any remedy necessary to compensate fully a plaintiff “in a manner that suits the specific facts of the case; this discretion includes the selection of the elements which comprise the remedial recovery.” Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1997).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad discretion to award equitable relief that restores victims of discrimination to the position they likely would have held absent discrimination.

Davoll v. Webb · filed 1997-06-25(g)

The statute allows for an award of any equitable relief the court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). I have broad discretion in fashioning relief to achieve the broad purpose of eliminating the efforts of discriminatory practices and restoring the Plaintiffs to the position each would have likely enjoyed had it not been for the discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief when an employer deliberately engages in an unlawful employment practice; intent to discriminate is unnecessary.

Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc. · filed 1997-09-02(g)

Under Title VII, the intent which must be shown as a basis for injunctive relief is merely the intent to do the act which has discriminatory effect; it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant intended to discriminate. It is enough to show that “the practice was followed deliberately, not accidentally.”

Section 2000e-5(g) does not support an award of speculative make-whole relief for future therapy or lost wages.

Griffin v. Dillon Family & Youth Services, Doing Business as Shadow Mountain Institute, a Corporation · filed 1997-12-16(g)

Plaintiff maintains that she was entitled to a "make whole" remedy under prior law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972) (authorizing equitable relief). Accordingly, plaintiff avers that defendant must pay for her future psychological therapy and compensate her for wages she might have made but for defendant's mistreatment. These claims are too speculative to support a damages award.

Before the 1991 amendments, § 2000e-5(g) provided only equitable relief for Title VII violations.

Price v. Public Service Co. of Colorado · filed 1998-04-03(g)

Before the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the only relief for violations of its provisions was equitable in nature.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes courts to enjoin further discrimination and order appropriate equitable relief when intentional discrimination is found.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1998-04-27(g)(1)

The court may enjoin further discrimination, and may order appropriate affirmative action, including equitable relief. Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction against continuing discrimination when it would personally benefit the employee.

Blackshear v. City of Wilmington · filed 1998-07-31(g)

Here, plaintiff established that the discriminatory conduct is continuing, and an injunction would benefit Blackshear personally because he remains in the City’s employ. Consequently, the Court will enter an injunction barring the City from engaging in discriminatory behavior directed at Blackshear.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief only when the applicant was qualified for employment; an alien must have been authorized to work in the United States at the relevant time.

Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc. · filed 1998-08-19(g)

A plaintiff is entitled to the above remedies only upon a successful showing that the applicant was qualified for employment. When the applicant is an alien, being "qualified" for the position is not deter- mined by the applicant's capacity to perform the job-- rather, it is determined by whether the applicant was an alien authorized for employment in the United States at the time in question.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to grant equitable relief to employees who are not named plaintiffs when an employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice.

Brown v. City of Chicago · filed 1998-09-16(g)

Although only Sergeant Raymond is a named plaintiff in this case, Title VII clearly allows the court discretion to order broader equitable and affirmative relief than that advocated by the City. ... Accordingly, this court has the discretion to award relief to employees other than the named plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief, including back pay, for Title VII disparate impact claims; damages are unavailable.

Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc. · filed 1999-03-18(g)

To summarize, in a Title VII disparate impact case, the employee may seek only equitable relief, to include back pay; no damages are permitted. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l).

For conduct occurring before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2000e-5(g) did not provide a jury trial or compensatory or punitive damages.

Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp. · filed 1999-04-09(g)

At the time of these alleged acts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) did not afford a plaintiff the right to a trial by jury or to seek compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).

Section 2000e-5(g) provides reinstatement and backpay as remedies for a discharge that violates Title VII.

Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization · filed 1975-02-18(g)

If the discharges in these cases are violative of § 704 (a) of Title VII, the remedial provisions of that Title provide the means by which Hollins and Hawkins may recover their jobs with backpay. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. III).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not provide lost wages and benefits to a claimant who is not ready, willing and able to return to work.

Jackson v. Dillard's Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-10-17(g)

Ms. Jackson filed Title VII claims against Dillard’s for sexual discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a), seeking equitable relief in the form of lost wages and benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Relying only on her earlier deposition testimony, the district court correctly found Ms. Jackson was not “ready, willing and able” to return to work. Thus, the equitable relief she sought on her Title VII claims (lost wages and benefits) was not available to her as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes equitable relief, including back pay, but does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages.

Kramer, Colleen P. v. Banc America · filed 2004-01-20(g)(1)

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides that a court may order certain equitable relief including, but not limited to, back pay, but it does not provide for compensa- tory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to order promotion, with or without back pay, if unlawful discrimination prevented the promotion.

Douglas v. Norton · filed 2006-01-19(g)(1), (g)(2)(A)

Indeed, if Douglas were to succeed on his Title VII claim, the court could order his promotion to a GS-15 with or without back pay, assuming Douglas would have been promoted but for the unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not apply to claims under Title III of the ADA.

Goodwin Ex Rel. Estate of Lunnin v. C.N.J., Inc. · filed 2006-01-30(g)

We need not dwell upon the merits of that asseveration because the Executrix overlooks the fact that section 2000e-5(g) does not apply to claims under Title III.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) gives courts discretion to grant equitable relief for intentional unlawful employment practices, including removal of specified personnel records.

Hudson v. Chertoff · filed 2007-03-19(g)(1)

Thus, this Court has full discretion to grant equitable relief as it deems appropriate utilizing its broad equitable powers under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) to remedy the statutory violations determined by the jury.

Section 2000e-5 supplies the Title VII remedies incorporated into employment-related ADA retaliation claims, including the expanded remedies available after the 1991 amendments.

Rumler v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA · filed 2008-04-25(g)

Section 12117 in turn adopts the “powers, remedies, and procedures” set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Thus, the Court must look to the remedies available under Title VII in determining what remedies are available to a plaintiff alleging retaliation under the ADA arising in the employment context.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad discretion to order remedies, including reinstatement, for intentional unlawful employment practices.

Zhou v. State University of New York Institute of Technology · filed 2014-03-06(g)

Title VII permits courts broad discretion to choose among a spectrum of remedies, including an order of affirmative action such as reinstatement, against an employer who has been found to have intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes equitable relief but does not itself authorize compensatory or punitive damages.

Chapman v. Olymbec USA, LLC. · filed 2020-04-24(g)(1)

Section 2000e–5(g)(1) of Title VII provides that a court may order certain “equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,” but it does not allow a court to order compensatory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes equitable relief but does not permit compensatory or punitive damages.

Bolden v. Lake County Board of Education · filed 2021-10-21(g)(1)

Section 2000e–5(g)(1) of Title VII then authorizes a court to order certain “equitable relief as the court deems appropriate” but does not permit a court to order compensatory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay and reinstatement to remedy employment discrimination, which can weigh against preliminary injunctive relief.

PAYTON v. WALSH · filed 2022-01-07(g)(1)

The range of remedies includes backpay to compensate for lost income; reinstatement or front pay to mitigate future harm; compensatory damages; and punitive damages to punish, should the jury find that the employer engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or deliberate indifference. ... The Court cannot ignore the wide range of equitable and legal remedies available to Dr. Delcoco in the future if she prevails.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits relief from discriminatory practices, but an individual claim becomes moot when the employer voluntarily ends the discrimination.

Jenkins v. United Gas Corp. · filed 1966-12-22(g)

Comparing the above quoted section with the section describing the purpose of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as being to obtain “voluntary compliance” with the statute, it follows that the remedy of the plaintiff is to be freed from the discriminatory practices to which he is subjected. When the discrimination, if any there was, is ended voluntarily by the defendant, either before or subsequent to the filing of a suit in court, then the cause of action, as to the plaintiff individually, becomes moot.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits an employee’s suit to continue after the employee accepts the disputed promotion when claims for back pay or an injunction remain.

Jenkins v. United Gas Corporation and Allan B. Caldwell · filed 1968-09-25(f)

We hold that the action is not moot on either score and therefore reverse and remand for a full hearing. ... In dollars Employee’s claim for past due wages may be tiny. But before a Court as to which there is no jurisdictional minimum, (§ 706(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)), it is enough on which to launch a full scale inquiry into the charged unlawful motivation in employment practices. It is even more so considering the prayer for injunction as a protection against a repetition of such conduct in the future.

Section 2000e-5 allows an aggrieved person to seek judicial enforcement of Title VII, and the disappearance of the initial grievance does not necessarily moot a suit addressing continuing discrimination.

Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, a Delaware Corporation, Leah Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, a Delawa · filed 1971-06-01(e)

The ultimate sanction is judicial enforcement initiated by individuals who are aggrieved. Section 706(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... So considered, such a suit constitutes more than the assertion of a private claim and, consequently, it is not necessarily defeated by the disappearance of the particular grievance which gave rise to the action.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, so settling a state discrimination claim that offers no financial relief does not implicitly settle the federal claim.

Lopez v. State Foundry & MacHine, Inc. · filed 1972-01-17(g)

While both state and federal law in this case is aimed at eliminating employment discrimination, the remedies differ in that back pay is awardable under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), but not under Wisconsin law, Murphy v. Industrial Commission, 37 Wis.2d 704, 155 N.W.2d 545, 157 N.W.2d 568 (1968). An agreement to settle a claim offering no possibility of financial remuneration cannot be said by implication to settle a claim wherein financial liability exists.

Section 2000e-5(f) confers district court jurisdiction over Civil Rights Act actions but does not remove the Seventh Amendment jury right for a legal back-wages claim.

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. · filed 1968-06-24(f)

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), merely confers jurisdiction on the District Courts to hear actions brought under the Act. The Act makes the allegation as to the employer’s motive the crux on which jurisdiction hangs; however, the action is still, in its origin, one for breach of an employment contract, and as such is clearly within the jury trial guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to award back pay as part of Title VII relief without a jury trial on that issue.

Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad · filed 1968-12-09(g)

This case comes into this Court under Title VII and the gravamen of the complaint is injunctive and declaratory relief against racial discrimination in employment affecting plaintiffs and the class. Back pay is one of the modes of relief that a court can grant. ... I am of the opinion that denial thereof does not contravene the Constitution and therefore strike the demand.

Section 2000e-5(g) assigns Title VII back-pay decisions to the judge and does not give the defendant a right to a jury trial on back pay.

Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1969-07-31(g)

Certainly the statutory language seems to treat the back pay issue as one for the trial judge rather than a jury. ... Accordingly, it is ordered that plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s demand for a jury trial be and the same is hereby granted.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides back pay as an equitable remedy for the court to award in its discretion, without a jury.

Richard JOHNSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1969-12-16(g)

Under that section, if the court finds illegal employment practices, one available remedy is reinstatement with or without back pay. The demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court's discretion, and not by a jury.

A Title VII claim seeking back pay under § 2000e-5(g) does not carry a right to jury trial under binding circuit precedent.

Ochoa v. American Oil Company · filed 1972-02-11(g)

The precise question raised by the motion at bar was presented and decided in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), where the Court of Appeals for this Circuit held that the right to trial by jury does not exist in a Title VII suit. Although this conclusion was stated in a single paragraph and in a manner so summary as to suggest that the Court had not been fully apprised of the serious constitutional implications of its decision, it is nonetheless the law of the Circuit and, as such, binds this Court. Accordingly, the cause shall be struck from the jury docket.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay an equitable remedy that does not require a jury trial.

Slack v. Havens · filed 1975-07-28(g)

Here, the award of back pay is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement (See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975) --- U.S. ---, ---, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280); to consider it apart from that context would be to distort the traditional line dividing legal from equitable remedies.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay a discretionary equitable remedy to be decided by the court, not a jury.

Booker v. ELEC. WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 2021, IBEW · filed 1977-02-18(g)

The demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion, and not by a jury.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides discretionary equitable relief, including reinstatement and back pay, for Title VII claims.

Polstorff v. Fletcher · filed 1977-04-13(g)

Actions under Title VII seeking reinstatement and back pay are actions in personam, within the court’s discretion, and are almost universally held to be equitable in nature.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable remedies, including back pay and reinstatement, that do not require a jury trial.

McCray v. Standard Oil Co. · filed 1977-11-03(g)

Courts have characterized demands for back pay and reinstatement under the Act as part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution. A jury trial is not required for equitable claims.

Section 2000e-5’s equitable remedies of back pay and reinstatement are determined by the court without a jury.

Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1978-02-13(g)

In so doing, we are also constrained to grant the motion to strike plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial. Title VII actions, being equitable in nature, do not give rise to jury actions, since the relief sought, back pay and reinstatement, is properly determined through the discretion of the court, not the jury.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable remedies, including back pay, without a right to a jury trial.

United States v. County of Milwaukee · filed 1978-10-19(g)

All three of the statutes under which the plaintiffs are proceeding provide that a United States district court may grant various types of equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); 42 U.S.C. § 3766(c)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 1242(g). None of these statutes explicitly provide either for relief in the form of damages or for jury trials in actions brought pursuant to them.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes backpay a discretionary equitable remedy that does not entitle parties to a jury trial.

Grayson v. Wickes Corp. · filed 1979-09-07(g)

This language, in our view, clearly reveals a Congressional intent to provide for backpay as an equitable remedy that is awarded through an exercise of the court’s discretion.

This district court held under pre-1991 law that a Title VII plaintiff could demand a jury trial on a backpay claim.

Beesley v. Hartford Fire Insurance · filed 1989-10-19(g)

The clear object of Title VII is also to make the victim whole. It is impossible to fashion a believable rationale for granting a jury trial in Title VIII while denying it in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f) through (k) does not affirmatively and unambiguously grant a right to a jury trial in handicap discrimination cases brought under 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Ahonen v. Frank · filed 1991-07-24(f)-(k)

Further, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, which deems the procedures in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) through (k) applicable to handicap discrimination cases, is silent on the jury trial entitlement. Because neither statute affirmatively and unambiguously provides for trial by jury, under the principle established in Lehman, Mr. Ahonen is not entitled to trial by jury.

Under the version of § 2000e-5(g) at issue, Title VII remedies were equitable, so a claim seeking them was tried by the court without a jury.

Turner v. Mitchell Pontiac, Inc. · filed 1991-09-10(g)

The statute empowers a court, not a jury, to enjoin any unlawful employment practice, reinstate the employee with or without back pay, or provide for “any other equitable relief.” ... Therefore, in light of the equitable nature of Title VII remedies, the language of the statute, and the apparent intent of Congress, this court follows well-established precedent and finds that Title VII claims are brought in equity and are therefore not triable to a jury.

Under the former version of subsection (g), back pay is equitable relief and does not entitle a Title VII plaintiff to a jury trial.

Wilson v. Belmont Homes, Inc. · filed 1992-08-21(g)

Wilson has given us no reason to reject our longstanding rule that back pay under title VII is an equitable remedy.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief, including back pay, without a right to a jury trial for that relief.

Dickinson v. Ohio Bell Communications, Inc. And Ameritech, Inc. · filed 1993-07-07(g)

Congress did not, however, create a right to a jury trial for back pay and the other equitable relief permitted under § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief such as back pay, whose availability a jury has no right to decide.

Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. · filed 1998-10-02(g)

Of course, even in pattern or practice cases involving requests for compensatory and punitive damages, the right to a jury trial provided by section 1981a(c) does not include the power to determine the availability of back pay or front pay. See § 1981 a(b)(2) ("Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)].”). These are equitable remedies to which no right to jury' trial attaches.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing deadline is a limitations defense, and a jury decides disputed facts about timeliness when a jury trial is demanded.

Begolli v. Home Depot, U.S.A. · filed 2012-11-29(e)(1)

The filing deadline is just a defense in a Title VII suit, and there is no reason to distinguish it from other defenses and therefore exclude it from the jury trial.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides only equitable remedies for Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims that incorporate it, so those claims do not carry a right to a jury trial.

D'Agostino v. Secretary United States Air Force · filed 2024-03-21(g)(1)

The only remedies available for such claims, see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g)(1)), are equitable in nature, ... So D’Agostino was not guaranteed a jury trial.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a complainant seeking appointed counsel to show an inability to hire an attorney, principally because of financial inability.

Petition of Ramirez · filed 1968-03-01(e)

Assuming arguendo that this court has the power and authority to appoint and to require counsel to represent petitioners in this civil case without compensation, which is what petitioners assume, but which is very doubtful, I construe the Act to require that as a condition to the appointment of counsel by the court, the petitioners must demonstrate their inability to employ an attorney.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a court to deny a request for appointed counsel when it is premature to assess the claim’s merits.

Green v. Cotton Concentration Company · filed 1968-12-20(e)

It would be premature to assess the merits of a claim before issue is joined. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of an attorney is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a court to appoint counsel and allow a complainant to begin suit without paying fees, costs, or security, and does not require affidavits to establish inability to hire counsel.

Edmonds v. EI duPONT deNEMOURS & COMPANY · filed 1970-05-26(e)

The Court took into consideration the fact that under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the Court may deem just, the Court could appoint an attorney for a complainant and authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs or security, and believed that, in its discretion, an attorney could be appointed for the plaintiff and that she could be authorized to commence the action without payment of fees, costs or giving security. ... The Court finds nothing in the statute requiring the filing of oaths, statements, inventories of assets or affidavits in support thereof in order to establish financial inability to employ counsel.

Section 2000e-5(e) makes appointment of counsel discretionary and requires a complainant to show a diligent but unsuccessful effort to retain counsel first.

Johnson v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1970-09-15(e)

Before counsel can be appointed it must first be shown that plaintiff has made a diligent effort to retain counsel, and has been unable to do so.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a court to appoint independent counsel for dissenting class members when their interests conflict with existing representation.

Amalgamated Meat Cutters Workmen, Local 340 v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1971-01-25(e)

While the Court has the utmost confidence in the integrity of the counsel before the Court, it does appear that there may be presently involved some conflict of interest, and in order to resolve and obviate any possibility of such conflict, the Court proposes, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), to appoint independent counsel for the dissenting members of the Class, and direct that the litigation be continued through trial and judgment of the Court, unless a fruitful and acceptable compromise is hereafter effected by all potential parties and counsel, including counsel for dissenting Class members, and approved by the Court. The Court hereby designates and appoints Terry O’Keefe, a member of the Bar of this Court, to be counsel for and represent the dissenting members of the Class of plaintiffs in this cause.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel, and an applicant must first try to obtain counsel independently.

John T. SPANOS, Appellant, v. PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1972-12-12(e)

Coming then to the substantive question before us, Mr. Spanos made no representation in his petition that he had attempted to enlist the aid of counsel, a burden certainly placed upon him, as did the petitioner in Petete v. Consolidated Freightways. ... The disposition of the petition was well within the discretion of the District Court and nothing in the way of abuse thereof has been shown or even alleged.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to deny appointed counsel when the plaintiff has not shown a meritorious claim.

Sol v. I.N.A. Insurance · filed 1976-04-13(f)(1)

One of the few things that is clear with respect to § 2000e-5(f)(l) is that where there is a finding by EEOC adverse to the plaintiff in a Title VII action, and the court’s independent review of the record supports a finding that plaintiff’s claim is “frivolous,” the request for appointment of counsel can, in the discretion of the district court, be denied. ... The motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII complainants, but requires a reasoned and informed decision.

Fulton CASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, HATTIESBURG, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-08-05(f)(1)

The statute authorizes the appointment of counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” Application of such a test necessarily demands the exercise of a broad discretion. Exercise of discretion, however, implies the application of a reasoned and well-informed judgment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII cases after considering the claim’s merits and the plaintiff’s efforts and ability to retain counsel.

McIntyre v. Michelin Tire Corp. · filed 1978-11-02(f)(1)

Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(l)), provides for appointment of counsel in Title VII cases in certain limited circumstances. ... Rather, the decision of whether to provide counsel lies solely within the judgment of the court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to deny appointed counsel after considering the complainant’s ability to obtain counsel and represent herself.

HUDAK v. CURATORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI · filed 1978-11-15(f)(1)

After discovery was nearly complete and three attorneys retained by Hudak had withdrawn, Hudak moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel to represent her under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... The record reflects here that Hudak is indigent, but it also appears that the case is one in which a contingent fee arrangement is feasible, and three attorneys have previously taken her case. More significantly, Hudak is a lawyer and a former professor of law, with an advanced legal degree. ... We find under the facts and existing circumstances that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointed counsel when the claimant has not shown a sufficiently meritorious Title VII claim.

Beckett v. Kent County · filed 1980-01-10(f)(1)

It is therefore the conclusion of this Court, based upon the record thus far presented to it, that Ms. Beckett has not shown that she has a claim meritorious enough to warrant the Court’s exercising its discretion to appoint an attorney to represent her.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when just, considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Luna v. International Association of Machinists · filed 1980-03-28(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), plaintiffs may receive appointed counsel for their Title VII claims "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." ... We conclude that the district judge abused his discretion when he refused to appoint counsel for Luna.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel, but an EEOC finding of no probable cause alone does not justify denying a request for counsel.

Excell JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WFYR RADIO/RKO GENERAL, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-07-22(f)(1)

Section 706(f) thus confers discretion on the district court to appoint counsel. ... We agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that an EEOC finding of no probable cause alone is insufficient to justify the denial of a request for appointed counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1), as applied to federal employment suits, requires agencies to tell unsuccessful complainants that they may ask the court to appoint counsel; a complainant prejudiced by lack of notice cannot be penalized for failing to ask.

Hilliard v. Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board · filed 1981-02-03(f)(1)

We hold, then, that Title VII requires federal agencies conducting proceedings thereunder to inform administratively unsuccessful complainants that in the event of suit the court has discretionary power to appoint counsel for them. We further hold that a litigant who, for unawareness of the court’s power, fails to request counsel should not be penalized because the agency has been remiss in this duty.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII complainants, guided by the claim’s merits, the complainant’s efforts to find counsel, and the ability to pay.

White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. · filed 1981-05-29(f)(1)

These factors are (1) the merits of the complainant's claims of discrimination, (2) the efforts taken by the complainant to obtain counsel on his or her own, and (3) a complainant's financial ability to retain counsel. ... In addition, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in reaching any constitutional issue before attempting to conform to the guidelines laid down in Caston.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel in Title VII suits when the circumstances warrant it.

Arnold v. Speedgrip Chuck, Inc. · filed 1981-10-21(f)(1)

The statute’s clear intent is to limit the appointment of counsel in suits brought pursuant to Title VII to only those situations where, in the sound discretion of the court, the circumstances clearly warrant it.

An EEOC finding of reasonable cause ordinarily satisfies the merit requirement for appointing counsel under § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B).

Nancy S. Bradshaw, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Zoological Society of San Diego · filed 1981-12-07(f)(1)(B)

Where the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute has made a determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination, as it has in Miss Bradshaw's case, the court need ordinarily make no further inquiry for purposes of appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives trial courts broad discretion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases, with denials reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska · filed 1982-03-29(f)(1)

There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for employment discrimination claims, Moore v. Sun-Beam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1977), and the trial court's discretion under § 2000e-5(f)(1) in determining whether counsel should be appointed is broad, the appellate court's review being limited to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes district courts to appoint counsel for complainants in Title VII suits.

Camps v. C & P Telephone Co. · filed 1982-12-31(f)(1)

Whether or not a particular Title VII employment discrimination action is “the exceptional case that calls for the appointment of counsel” ... under the in forma pauperis legislation, Title VII specifically authorizes district courts to assign counsel for complainants in suits brought thereunder.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) applies the guidelines for appointing counsel in Title VII cases to review of an appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw.

Sharon D. BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL BANK OF BIRMINGHAM, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-10-21(f)(1)

The court of appeals explicitly pointed out in White that Caston established the factors for evaluating initial applications for appointment of counsel. Those guidelines apply similarly to the review of existing appointments of counsel. With this alternative method of disposition open, the district court clearly abused its discretion by assigning constitutional reasons for its decision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs and requires a flexible, case-by-case assessment of whether appointment is just.

Jenkins v. Chemical Bank · filed 1983-11-09(f)(1)

The statute's words, "as the court may deem just," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), require a flexible and sensitive case-by-case approach.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires courts to give serious, flexible consideration to a Title VII plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel, but does not guarantee counsel.

Jenkins v. Chemical Bank · filed 1983-11-09(f)(1)

The statute’s words, “as the court may deem just,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), require a flexible and sensitive case-by-case approach.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel when just, considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Hale v. North Little Rock Housing Authority · filed 1983-11-17(f)(1)

Section 706(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f) (1976), provides that the district court may appoint counsel "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." This decision is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hudak v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 586 F.2d 105, 106-07 (8th Cir.1978). In ruling upon a motion for appointment of counsel, the district court may consider the merits of the claim, the plaintiff's efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff's financial ability to retain an attorney. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.1981); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.1977). The district court did not abuse its discretion in the present case because appellant made almost no effort to retain counsel and the issues presented were neither complex nor facially meritorious.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) directs courts considering a request for appointed counsel to weigh the plaintiff’s ability to afford counsel, the claim’s merits, efforts to find counsel, and ability to present the case without counsel.

Poindexter v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1984-06-26(f)(1)

Based on the analysis in these cases, and the history and purpose of Title VII and the appointment provision, we believe a. court ought to consider the following factors: (1) the ability of the plaintiff to afford an attorney; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s case; (3) the efforts of the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (4) the capacity of the plaintiff to present the case adequately without aid of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits appointment of counsel for a Title VII complainant but does not require a court to satisfy the complainant’s preferences or order a lawyer to file a claim found frivolous.

Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Department · filed 1984-07-20(f)(1)(B)

There is no requirement that the District Judge, in seeking a lawyer to prosecute a civil rights claim on behalf of a person unable to pay, must either satisfy the desire (or whim) of the complainant in relation to such potentially charitable representation or order a lawyer to file a case which his investigation indicates is frivolous.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits appointment of counsel without proof of indigency, and a court must assess a complainant’s ability to pay when that issue bears on its decision.

Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Department · filed 1984-07-20(f)(1)(B)

We find abuse of discretion in the District Court’s failure to conduct a hearing on Cox’s financial ability to retain counsel. This Court has held that proof of indigency is not required as a prerequisite for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court to consider case-specific factors when deciding whether to appoint counsel, including whether a coercive appointment is appropriate after a diligent search for willing counsel.

Bradshaw v. United States District Court · filed 1984-09-07(f)(1)(B)

When this case was last before us we discussed three factors which a district court must consider in exercising its discretionary power of appointment under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). ... The concerns addressed by the district court on remand are properly part of the decision whether to appoint counsel. ... Under such circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court deciding whether to appoint counsel to consider additional circumstances, including whether a willing attorney can be found.

Bradshaw v. United States District Court for Southern District · filed 1984-09-07(f)(1)(B)

The concerns addressed by the district court on remand are properly part of the decision whether to appoint counsel. Moreover, we are not prepared to say the district court came to the wrong conclusion in its consideration of these additional factors.

When considering appointment of counsel under § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B), courts should consider the plaintiff's financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the apparent merit of the claim; denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Department · filed 1985-05-22(f)(1)(B)

Second, the district courts, in considering an application for appointment of counsel, should at least consider plaintiff's financial resources, the efforts of plaintiff to obtain counsel, and whether plaintiff's claim appears to have any merit. Third, upon a review of a district court's denial of a motion for appointment of counsel, the standard to be applied is whether the trial court abused its discretion. We agree with these positions.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a court to appoint counsel in a Title VII case after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Johnson v. NCT SERVICES · filed 1986-04-09(f)(1)(B)

In determining whether to appoint counsel, district courts are to consider “(1) the plaintiffs financial resources, (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel, and (3) whether the plaintiffs claim has merit.” ... IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs request for court-appointed counsel BE AND HEREBY IS DENIED.

Under § 2000e-5(f)(1), a court denying appointed counsel because a Title VII claim lacks merit must give the plaintiff an opportunity to present facts and object to the EEOC's determination.

Willie Luther DARDEN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-07-30(f)(1)

We hold, therefore, that in cases in which a counsel request is denied because of the claim's lack of merit, the record must reflect that the court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to give his or her version of the facts and to object to the EEOC's determination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel without charge for a Title VII plaintiff.

Gray v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. · filed 1988-01-15(f)(1)

NIPSCO correctly asserts that there is no unqualified right or presumption in favor of appointment of counsel in a Title VII case; § 706(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1), establishes that the decision to appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff without charge is within the discretion of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel when just, but a plaintiff who has contacted only one attorney has not shown sufficient effort to obtain representation.

Gonzales v. Postmaster General of the United States · filed 1988-03-25(f)(1)

Having contacted only one attorney, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that appointment of counsel is appropriate in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows courts to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs when circumstances are just, but gives plaintiffs no automatic right to counsel.

Hunter v. Department of the Air Force Agency · filed 1988-06-10(f)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff has no automatic right to appointed counsel. However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) authorizes appointment of counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits courts to appoint counsel in Title VII cases; inability to retain counsel alone does not justify dismissal.

Johnson v. Dencek · filed 1989-02-22(f)(1)

Moreover, even when no lawyer will take the case, the court may “appoint an attorney for [the] complainant m Title VII cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), or “request an attorney to represent any such [indigent] person unable to employ counsel”, in other civil cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). These are hollow powers if inability to retain counsel is sufficient ground for dismissing the suit.

Section 2000e-5 permits courts to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases, with some likelihood of merit serving as a threshold consideration.

Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc. · filed 1989-06-01(f)(1)

These considerations, especially a threshold showing of some likelihood of merit, should be borne in mind by trial and appellate courts in deciding whether to appoint counsel. ... In the pending case, we are satisfied that the showing of likely merit is entirely too insubstantial to warrant the appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) requires a court to rule on a Title VII plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel before considering a motion to dispose of the case before trial.

Miles v. Department of the Army · filed 1989-08-07(f)(1)(B)

The district court did abuse its discretion, however, in failing to rule on Miles’ request for counsel before granting the Government’s motion to dismiss. ... Thus, on remand, the district court must rule on Miles’ request for counsel before it entertains any further Government motions to dispose of the case in their favor before trial.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases, considering the complainant's finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the claim's merit.

Ishman v. United States Postal Service Paul N. Carlin, Postmaster General · filed 1989-12-13(f)(1)

The district court had discretion in this employment discrimination case to grant Ishman counsel if it deemed such appointment just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). We previously have noted that in exercising its discretion a district court should consider, among other things, the complainant's financial resources and efforts to secure counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) directs courts deciding whether to appoint counsel to consider the plaintiff's finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Theede v. Veterans Administration · filed 1991-02-26(f)(1)(B)

In determining whether counsel should be appointed pursuant to section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B), the court must consider the plaintiff's financial resources, efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel, and the merit of the plaintiff's claim. Miles, 881 F.2d at 784 n. 6. The court based its decision to deny Theede's motions upon Theede's financial affidavit showing significant income and upon its finding that his claim was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. The denial was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) permits a district court to require an attorney to represent a Title VII plaintiff when the conditions for appointing counsel are met.

Scott v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 1991-08-22(f)(1)(B)

We believe that the word “appoint” confers upon district courts the coercive power to require attorneys to represent plaintiffs in Title VII cases, once the other considerations set forth in In re Lane and Nelson that bear upon the district court’s exercise of discretion have been satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claims.

Mavy-Amenberg v. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, United States Army · filed 1991-08-28(f)(1)

The district court may appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff in such circumstances as the court deems just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The district court must assess (1) the plaintiff's financial condition, (2) the plaintiff's efforts to secure counsel, and (3) whether the plaintiff's claims have merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to deny appointed counsel when a Title VII plaintiff's claims lack merit, even if the plaintiff has limited resources and tried to secure counsel.

Rebuth v. United States Peace Corps, Director of the Peace Corps · filed 1991-10-23(f)(1)

We find no abuse of discretion by the court in denying Rebuth appointed counsel. Although Rebuth had limited financial resources and attempted to secure counsel on her own, her claims lacked merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when just, considering the plaintiff's resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Nkop v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1992-03-03(f)(1)

The district court may appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff in such circumstances as the court deems just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The following three factors are relevant in determining whether to appoint counsel: "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his own; and (3) the meritoriousness of plaintiff's claim." ... Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nkop's motion for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases when the court deems it just, considering the plaintiff’s finances, efforts to obtain counsel, and the claim’s merit.

Brown v. Department of the Navy · filed 1992-04-14(f)(1)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In exercising its discretion, the court must consider three factors: "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources, (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel, and (3) whether the plaintiff's claim has merit." Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. ... We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel for Brown.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel in a Title VII case after considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain representation, and the plaintiff’s financial ability.

Frederick GADSON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CONCORD HOSPITAL, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1992-06-09(f)(1)

A district court considers three factors in determining whether to appoint counsel under Title VII: (1) the merits of plaintiff’s case; (2) the efforts by plaintiff to obtain legal representation; and (3) the plaintiff’s financial ability. ... Based on a review of the relevant filings, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to appoint counsel to represent Gadson.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff who shows financial inability to hire counsel, diligent efforts to find counsel, and meritorious allegations; in close cases, the court should also consider the plaintiff’s ability to present the case alone.

Susan B. CASTNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO SPRINGS CABLEVISION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1992-11-17(f)(1)

We believe that all four of the factors identified above are relevant to the inquiry whether to appoint counsel for a civil litigant in a Title VII action. Before counsel may be appointed, a plaintiff must make affirmative showings óf (1) financial inability to pay for counsel, (2) diligence in attempting to secure counsel and (3) meritorious allegations of discrimination. The fourth factor — the plaintiffs capacity to present the case without counsel — should be considered in close cases as an aid in exercising discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel after the court considers the plaintiff’s financial resources, efforts to find counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Robert L. Theede, D.D.S. v. Veterans Administration, William L. Roberts · filed 1993-04-30(f)(1)

Counsel may only be appointed under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) if, after considering plaintiff's financial resources, efforts to locate counsel, and the meritoriousness of the claim, the trial court finds such an appointment appropriate. Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.1982). This motion was filed after the district court had dismissed this action for failure to prosecute. Consequently, reviewing the record below, we are unable to state that the district court abused its discretion in weighing these factors and denying appellant's motion for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff's financial resources, efforts to secure counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Clark v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General · filed 1993-09-01(f)(1)

Title VII provides the district court with discretion to appoint counsel to plaintiffs "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). When deciding whether to appoint counsel, the district court must consider the plaintiff's financial resources, his efforts to secure counsel on his own, and the merits of his claim. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.1981). Because Clark's claims lacked merit or were time-barred, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for appointment of counsel. See id.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff’s financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Burchell v. United States of America, Secretary of the Army · filed 1993-11-08(f)(1)

The district court may appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff in such circumstances as the court deems just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The following three factors are relevant in determining whether to appoint counsel: "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his own; and (3) the meritoriousness of plaintiff's claim." Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (1982). ... Our review of the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burchell's motion for appointment of counsel. See id.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives courts discretion to appoint counsel for a complainant; appointment may be denied when the applicants have retained counsel and their fees will be paid.

Reynolds v. Roberts · filed 1994-02-09(f)(1)

Title VII does contain a provision for appointment of counsel “Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just____” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e — 5(f)(1). Although the Transportation Department and the non-class-member employees have not invoked this provision, the court has considered it and declines to exercise its discretion to appoint counsel under these circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a district court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff, but the claim must have a reasonable likelihood of success to justify appointment.

Vasquez v. United States Office of Personnel Management · filed 1994-03-25(f)(1)

For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides that the district court may, “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” appoint counsel for a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1). ... However, the Court finds that the facts as presently alleged and the documentation offered to date do not clearly present a claim with a reasonable likelihood of success, either by settlement or litigation, and therefore there is no sufficiently meritorious claim to justify appointed counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not entitle a Title VII plaintiff who fails to cooperate with appointed counsel to a second lawyer.

Otis v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-07-18(f)(1)

Section 2000e-5(f) does not require judges to provide unlimited legal aid to indigent civil rights litigants. ... Like the district judge, we believe that this is a different matter entirely, and that a plaintiff who squanders her opportunity has no entitlement to a second chance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant, and a weak claim can justify denying that request.

Tatum v. Community Bank · filed 1994-10-24(f)(1)

Therefore, movant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success meriting the appointment of an attorney.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) requires a court considering appointment of counsel to weigh the plaintiff’s financial resources, efforts to retain counsel, and claim merits; an EEOC no-cause finding cannot be the sole basis for denial.

Javidi v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, Inc. Dameron Hospital Rameo Puzon Luis Arismendi · filed 1994-12-16(f)(1)(B)

The district court must consider three factors when ruling on a motion for appointment of counsel: (1) the plaintiff's financial resources, (2) the efforts the plaintiff has made to retain counsel, and (3) the merits of the plaintiff's lawsuit. ... An EEOC determination that no reasonable cause supports the plaintiff's claim may not be the only basis of the district court's denial of a motion for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel for a Title VII plaintiff when just; failing to rule on a pending request before granting summary judgment is an abuse of discretion, but the error may be harmless if the claim lacks merit.

Jose Castillo, Jr. v. California Department of Parks and Recreation California State Personnel Board · filed 1995-03-21(f)(1)

In a Title VII case, however, counsel for indigent plaintiffs may be appointed "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because Castillo had submitted a motion for appointment of counsel at the time he filed his amended complaint, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to rule on Castillo's motion before granting summary judgment for the Department. ... Accordingly, any error made by the district court in failing to rule on Castillo's motion for appointment of counsel was harmless.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel for Title VII plaintiffs, who have no right to appointed counsel.

Spurio v. Choice Security Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-03-27(f)(1)

Plaintiff requests counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), the provision of Title VII that grants a district court discretion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases upon application of the plaintiff “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” Title VII plaintiffs have no right to counsel under this provision. ... Application of the relevant factors here compels me to deny plaintiffs request for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant when the court deems it just; the court may consider whether reasonable efforts to secure counsel have been exhausted.

Woods v. Bentsen · filed 1995-06-14(f)(1)

While plaintiff motioned pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and Tabron involved 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the language and purposes of the two statutes are sufficiently close to apply the analysis evinced in Tabron to the case at bar.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII complainant, but refusing counsel is within the court’s discretion when the complainant has not shown that Title VII applies.

Moomchi v. Univ Of New Mexico · filed 1995-12-08(f)(1)

Furthermore, respecting the court’s discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) to appoint counsel for Title VII actions, Moomchi has not pled an employment relationship. There being no showing that Title VII applies, the court was within its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel.

A district court abuses its discretion by failing to rule on a Title VII request for appointed counsel, although the error can be harmless.

Davis v. Stone · filed 1995-12-27(f)(1)(B)

The district court's failure to rule on Davis's request for appointment of counsel under Title VII, however, was an abuse of discretion. See Miles v. Department of the Army, 881 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir.1989) (finding abuse of discretion where district court failed to rule on request for counsel). Nevertheless, we find that the district court's error was harmless given the jurisdictional defects of Davis's action, and the district court's finding that he had little likelihood of success on the merits.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a court discretion to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s ability to pay, efforts to retain counsel, the merits of the case, and ability to represent himself.

Young v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1996-01-22(f)(1)

These courts have agreed on three relevant factors for a district judge to consider: (1) the plaintiffs financial ability to retain an attorney; (2) the efforts of the plaintiff to retain counsel; and (3) the merits of the case. ... Some courts have also considered the plaintiffs ability to represent himself. ... The Court finds these four factors helpful in deciding whether to grant Plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) allows a court to consider the merits of a Title VII claim when deciding whether to appoint counsel.

Davis v. Sacramento County District Attorney's Office · filed 1996-01-25(f)(1)(B)

Furthermore, given this inability to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis' motion for appointment of counsel. Cf. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318-19 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the district court must consider the merits of plaintiff's lawsuit when ruling on a motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B)).

Section 2000e-5(f) allows a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff but does not give the plaintiff a right to appointed counsel.

Tyson v. Pitt County Government · filed 1996-03-28(f)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) states that the court may appoint counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” The statute grants the right to request a court appointed attorney, but does not create a statutory right to such counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) gives district courts discretion to appoint counsel after considering the plaintiff’s ability to pay, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claims.

Joerger v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice · filed 1996-06-19(f)(1)(B)

Pursuant to Title VII, a district court has the discretion to appoint counsel "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). The court must evaluate: (1) whether the plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay for private counsel; (2) plaintiff's efforts to secure counsel; and (3) whether the claims presented have merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII plaintiff after considering the plaintiff's financial resources, efforts to obtain counsel, and the merits of the claim.

Dalal v. Kaiser Permanente Ken Collings Jim Mathews Darryl Melvin Jim Robinson Dely Tsuchida · filed 1996-08-07(f)(1)

We have previously held that the court must consider three factors when deciding whether to appoint counsel: "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (3) whether the plaintiff's claim has merit." ... The district court's application of the incorrect law to Dalal's request for appointment of counsel under Title VII was an abuse of discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows appointment of counsel in a Title VII action based on the plaintiff’s financial resources, efforts to secure counsel, and the merit of the claim.

Schultz v. Mule Creek State Prison California Department of Corrections · filed 1996-08-19(f)(1)

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision denying appointment of counsel under section 2000e-5(f)(1). See Johnson v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir.1991). When determining whether to appoint counsel, a district court must consider "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his or her own; and (3) the merit of the plaintiff's claim." Id.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a complainant to request appointed counsel, but appointment is within the court’s discretion.

Maxwell v. Kight · filed 1996-12-31(f)(1)

Although this section grants the right to request an attorney, it does not confer a right to actually have one appointed. The decision whether to appoint an attorney is one within the broad discretion of the trial judge given the particular facts of the case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits appointment of counsel when just, considering the claim’s merits, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and the plaintiff’s ability to pay.

Mirakhorli v. Hilton Hotel · filed 1998-12-10(f)(1)

Appointment of counsel under Title VII may be made “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.”6 To determine whether counsel should be appointed, we consider: “(1) the merits of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination; (2) the efforts taken by the plaintiff to obtain counsel; and (3) the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain counsel.”7 In denying Mirakhorli’s motion, the magistrate judge applied the proper precedents and reached a defensible conclusion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) leaves appointment of counsel for a Title VII complainant to the court’s discretion.

Weber v. Holiday Inn · filed 1999-03-04(f)(1)

Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the report of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. ... A civil litigant, proceeding under Title VII, has no absolute right to appointed counsel. ... Rather, the decision to appoint counsel is left within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows courts to appoint counsel for Title VII complainants without requiring an in forma pauperis application or proof of indigence.

Vera v. UT Dept.Human Serv. · filed 2000-02-04(f)(1)

It erroneously denied counsel solely on the basis of Mr. Vera’s failure to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis or to establish that he was indigent, when, in fact, neither is required under § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to appoint counsel for a Title VII claimant, with denial reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Singh v. Council/Bureau for Private Postsecondary & Vocational Education · filed 2001-12-27(f)(1)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s request for appointment of counsel.