42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to consider preliminary injunctive relief before the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, including when the alleged retaliation concerns an earlier discrimination lawsuit.

Irizarry v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1983-11-08(f)(1)

The Sheehan exception to the exhaustion requirement applies with equal force whether the plaintiff alleges retaliation for an earlier lawsuit, or for a currently pending charge of discrimination.

A Title VII claimant seeking preliminary relief while an EEOC charge is pending must show irreparable injury sufficient to justify disrupting Section 2000e-5's administrative process.

Cecil O. BAILEY, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Defendant, Appellee · filed 1983-12-08(f)(1)

At a minimum, an aggrieved person seeking preliminary relief outside the statutory scheme for alleged Title VII violations would have to make a showing of irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to justify the disruption of the prescribed administrative process and overcome the reluctance to enforce personal service contracts in equity.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts discretion to order appropriate relief, including injunctions and back pay, after finding unlawful employment discrimination.

AM. FED. OF ST., CTY. & MUN. EMP. v. State of Wash. · filed 1983-12-14(g)

A court that finds unlawful discrimination "... may enjoin the [discrimination] ... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, ... with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Because each case should be meticulously considered in determining the appropriate remedy, the choice of remedy is left to the discretion of the district courts.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deny reinstatement when the circumstances make it inappropriate.

Hopkins v. City of Jonesboro · filed 1983-12-16(g)

The law provides that a Court “May ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include ... reinstatement____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The Court finds that reinstatement is inappropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award reinstatement, backpay, and retroactive seniority as equitable remedies for retaliatory discharge.

Sorrells v. Veterans Administration · filed 1983-12-20(g)

Reinstatement, backpay and retroactive seniority are proper equitable remedies which the Court may, in its discretion, grant to the victim of retaliatory discharge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits relief for retaliatory discharge only when protected opposition was a but-for cause of the discharge.

McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. · filed 1984-02-27(g)

Title VII does not grant relief to individuals who were "discharged for any reason other than discrimination ... in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) (1976). In determining whether a plaintiff is protected by Title VII, the Seventh Circuit applies a "but for" test. See Sherkow, 630 F.2d at 502. McCluney must have shown the district court that but for his opposition to a protected activity he would not have been fired.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to order reinstatement and backpay to make employees whole for Title VII violations.

Spence v. Local 1250, United Auto Workers · filed 1984-03-29(g)

Section 2000e-5(g) arms the courts with full equitable powers to carry out Title VII’s purpose of making persons whole for injuries suffered as a result of illegal employment discrimination.

A plaintiff's deliberate bypass of EEOC conciliation is a factor in deciding whether to grant equitable relief under Section 2000e-5(f)(1).

Moteles v. University of Pennsylvania and Local 506, United Plant Guard Workers of America · filed 1984-04-25(f)(1)

The preference for conciliation as the dispute resolution method in employment discrimination proceedings should not be undermined by a party's deliberate by-pass of administrative remedies. Accordingly, the plaintiff's actions in foreclosing EEOC conciliation efforts is one factor to be considered in determining whether equitable relief should be granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) does not require the EEOC to show irreparable injury to obtain preliminary relief.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Southwest Airlines · filed 1984-04-20(f)(2)

Thus, there is support in the legislative history of Title VII for the conclusion that section 706(f)(2) does not require the EEOC to show irreparable injury to obtain preliminary relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative relief that adjusts seniority rights, including narrowly tailored class-wide relief.

Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service · filed 1984-05-03(g)

Indeed, given a finding of discrimination, “the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). These remedial provisions have been interpreted by the Supreme Court broadly, to allow for awards of constructive seniority to victims of discrimination, in order to make them whole.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief for deliberate discrimination even when the employer acted in good faith.

Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford · filed 1984-06-06(g)

Here, Crawford proved that appellants' discriminatory act with respect to her was deliberate and purposeful and not accidental or inadvertent. The fact that appellants may have acted in good faith is of no moment. ... At trial, Crawford proved the intentional nature of appellants' acts. Accordingly, Judge Bowen did not err in awarding her injunctive relief and damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief when an employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice; good faith does not excuse deliberate discrimination.

Maryland National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Crawford · filed 1984-06-06(g)

At trial, Crawford proved the intentional nature of appellants’ acts. Accordingly, Judge Bowen did not err in awarding her injunctive relief and damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district judges discretion to decide whether injunctive relief is appropriate after employment discrimination is shown.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Monarch Machine Tool Co. · filed 1984-06-22(g)

To the extent that such a finding endeavors to set forth an inflexible rule, it would in our view be inconsistent with the grant of discretion given a district judge under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). We emphasize with respect to injunctive relief that it is fundamentally an exercise of equitable power and we leave to the discretion of the trial judge on remand the final decision whether such relief is appropriate under all the circumstances of the case, if it is shown that the employer has been guilty of the discriminatory practices alleged.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a plaintiff seeking relief for lost promotions, training, or employment to show that discrimination caused those losses.

Meyers v. General Services Administration · filed 1984-06-22(g)

Plaintiff has failed to show that “but for” sex or race discrimination she would have received promotions, completed the TADA and not been removed from employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 923-925 (3d Cir.1977).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief that places a discrimination plaintiff in her rightful position, and notice to later selectees can preserve that relief.

Holland v. Dole · filed 1984-07-09(g)

In fact, notice to potential innocent victims will serve the plaintiff’s interests in receiving complete equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and the public’s interests in maintaining effective enforcement of the Civil Rights laws.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars relief when an employee is denied a promotion for a reason other than discrimination.

Pollard v. Grinstead · filed 1984-08-16(g)

Pollard was refused promotion, in the words of the statute, for a "reason other than discrimination." The absence of discrimination when the agency weighed the qualifications of the two applicants bars relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars relief when an employee was refused promotion for a reason other than discrimination.

Pollard v. Grinstead · filed 1984-08-16(g)

Finally, § 2000e-5(g) prohibits a court from granting relief if the employee was refused promotion for any reason other than discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits monetary relief under Title VII to backpay or other equitable relief.

Domingo v. New England Fish Co. · filed 1984-09-07(g)

Title VII allows monetary relief only in the form of backpay or other equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g): Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.1982). Because plaintiffs have not shown that any minority group received an inferior quality food as compared to that received by other groups, we have no basis for a monetary award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to enjoin discriminatory pension payments and award appropriate equitable relief, including retroactive equalization of benefits.

Retired Public Employees' Ass'n v. California · filed 1984-11-13(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), this class is entitled to an injunction prohibiting the State defendants from using the sex-based actuarial tables to calculate monthly benefit payments made to the class. The class is also entitled to other affirmative action and equitable relief “as the court deems appropriate.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that a monetary award of equalized benefits retroactive to the date of the Manhart decision is appropriate relief in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award monetary relief to a plaintiff class without paying people outside that class.

Howard v. McLucas · filed 1984-11-19(g)

Paying the plaintiff class is certainly not unlawful, as this court could have ordered the defendant to pay this amount — and possibly more — to the exclusion of movants had this case gone to trial. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West 1981).

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable relief and limited back pay, but does not bar a separate tort claim for physical and emotional injury.

Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America · filed 1984-12-21(g)

Similarly, Title VII does not offer compensation to Rice for any physical and psychic damage to her which may have resulted from any outrageous acts by defendants. Nowhere does the statute itself, which speaks solely in terms of equitable relief, expressly authorize an award of any money damages other than back pay, limited to a two-year period and reduced by the amount of interim earnings. ... We conclude Rice's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not subsumed by Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes affirmative relief, including back pay, for unlawful employment discrimination.

Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va. · filed 1985-03-01(g)

10. Plaintiff is entitled to affirmative relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 11. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of back pay in the amount of $36,973.09, the amount he would have earned had he not been unlawfully discriminated against, less the interim earnings from his principal occupation.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits other equitable relief as an alternative remedy rather than an additional award.

Mandhare v. W.S. Lafargue Elementary School · filed 1985-03-29(g)

The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), does not provide that other equitable relief as the court may deem appropriate may be ordered in addition. It provides that such may be ordered in the alternative.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a Title VII consent decree to provide relief beyond what a court could order after trial, so long as the decree is consistent with Title VII.

Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, and Local Number 93, I.A.F.F., Afl-Cio, Intervenor-Appellant · filed 1985-04-22(g)

To be sure, a consent decree is a judicial "order" and may not be inconsistent with the underlying statute. It is one thing, however, to say that decrees must be consistent with the underlying statute and quite another to say that they must mimic court-ordered remedies in every particular.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits court-ordered relief only for actual victims of discrimination.

Lujan v. Franklin County Board of Education · filed 1985-06-17(g)

In the alternative, even assuming that the Board was subject to a Singleton duty, Lujan may obtain no relief in this Title VII action because Title VII forbids court-ordered remedies for those who are not the actual victims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s make-whole remedy does not require full relief under a consent decree entered without a finding or concession of discrimination.

EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons · filed 1985-07-24(g)

The problem with appellants' argument is that the principle that they cite applies only after there has been a judicial determination or a concession of liability. There can be no court-imposed remedy without a finding of liability. In the present case, there has been no such finding. The parties reached a settlement without a concession of liability by defendants and with the substantial possibility that trial would entirely absolve defendants.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s make-whole principle does not require a consent decree to provide full relief when discrimination has neither been admitted nor found.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. · filed 1985-07-24(g)

The problem with appellants’ argument is that the principle that they cite applies only after there has been a judicial determination or a concession of liability. There can be no court-imposed remedy without a finding of liability.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes reinstatement, with the scope of that remedy left to the district court’s discretion.

42 Fair empl.prac.cas. 771, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,456 Sharon A. Henry, Cross-Appellee v. Lennox Industries, Inc., Cro · filed 1985-07-29(g)

While the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), clearly provides for reinstatement, the scope of the remedy rests within the discretion of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement with retroactive seniority after a discriminatory discharge, even when a later layoff ends back pay.

Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. · filed 1985-08-27(g)

The evidence preponderates, and the parties have stipulated that plaintiff would have been laid off effective January 22, 1983. While this interdicts the claim for back pay, plaintiff is entitled to be reinstated effective March 17, 1980, with full seniority rights retroactive to that date. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not authorize nominal damages as equitable relief.

Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind. · filed 1985-09-11(g)

Nominal damages are not “equitable” relief within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to order reinstatement as a remedy for unlawful employment discrimination.

Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church · filed 1985-09-18(g)

That remedy is within the discretion of the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Defendants have not opposed Mayson’s reinstatement. Accordingly, the court orders that Mayson be reinstated.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deny reinstatement when hostility between the parties makes it inappropriate.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Financial Assurance, Inc. · filed 1985-09-24(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the court has a rather wide range of relief available in dealing with a Title VII violation. A finding of liability ordinarily creates a right to reinstatement and back pay. ... My own finding is that reinstatement would be quite inappropriate, given the nature of the relationship which must exist between an executive secretary and the executive, and given the high degree of hostility which in fact exists between Butler and the Merrimans.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to enjoin intentional employment discrimination and order appropriate affirmative relief.

Lenihan v. City of New York · filed 1986-01-15(g)

Section 2000e-5(g) of title VII provides that “[i]f the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The framing of a remedial decree is in the trial court’s discretion. ... In my view, the only equitable way to accommodate Lenihan’s interest in being free from discriminatory treatment on the one hand, and the Department’s interest in maintaining control over the utilization of its officers on the other, is to enter an order that restrains defendants from retiring plaintiff on psychiatric grounds based on the record they have compiled to date. Accordingly, I shall enter such an order.

Section 2000e-5(g) and (k) provide remedies for proven employment discrimination, including reinstatement, counsel fees, costs, moving expenses, and prejudgment interest.

Thomas v. Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-01-31(g), (k)

Plaintiff is entitled also to her monetary damages since August 31, 1985, and to job reinstatement, counsel fees, costs, moving expenses to return to Peachland, and prejudgment interest on all items. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to fashion equitable remedies consistent with Title VII’s purposes.

McDowell v. Mississippi Power and Light · filed 1986-07-31(g)

The language of section 2000e-5(g) provides the court with discretion to fashion an equitable remedy. The court’s discretion is to be guided by standards consistent with the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award promotions, back pay, benefits, and seniority to remedy employment discrimination.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1986-08-28(g)

Accordingly, Gilbert and Lockhart are to receive promotions to the next available sergeant positions. Complete relief also requires that they be compensated for lost wages and benefits from the dates they would have been promoted in 1978 had they received the eighth and eleventh promotions, to the dates they actually receive their promotions. This compensation should include any wage and benefit increases they would have received within that period.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides make-whole relief that places a discrimination victim as near as possible to the position she would have held absent discrimination.

Pecker v. Heckler · filed 1986-09-24(g)

The central issue raised in this appeal is whether the remedy afforded by the EEOC and affirmed by the district court was adequate to make plaintiff whole pursuant to the remedial provisions of Title VII. ... See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) and 2000e-16. We recently stated the standard to be applied by the courts of this circuit in determining what is an appropriate remedy under the statute: “[0]ur objective is to place plaintiff in a position as near as possible to where she would now be had discrimination not occurred.”

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief for lost income caused by an employer’s unfair administration of overtime.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1986-11-10(g)

After reviewing Hileman’s complaint we conclude that he has alleged an injury compensable under Title VII. For example, Hileman alleges that he suffered a loss of income through defendants’ failure to fairly administer such matters as overtime. Such an injury would appear to be compensable as an equitable remedy under § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes district courts to order appropriate affirmative relief to make a discrimination victim whole.

Johnson v. William Brock, in His Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor · filed 1987-01-20(g)

To accomplish this goal, section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), gives the district courts the power to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) permits race-conscious remedies only when they address a supported finding of past discrimination.

Hammon v. Barry · filed 1987-02-27(g)

There must, in essence, be a direct nexus between the race-preferential action and the remediation of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief for employees as a class even after the charging employee privately settles.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Goodyear Aerospace Corporation · filed 1987-04-07(f)(1)

Pettigrew’s settlement does not moot the EEOC’s right of action seeking injunctive relief to protect employees as a class and to deter the employer from discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) requires courts to apply the traditional Rule 65 standard, including irreparable harm, when the EEOC seeks preliminary relief.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chateau Normandy, Inc. · filed 1987-04-08(f)(2)

Therefore, the petition for a preliminary injunction shall be evaluated in view of the traditional standard imposed under Rule 65.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts discretion to enjoin unlawful discrimination and order appropriate equitable relief.

Bollenbach v. Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District · filed 1987-05-08(g)

The appropriate remedy once a Title VII violation has been found is left to the discretion of the district court. A court that finds unlawful discrimination “may enjoin [the discrimination] ... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement... with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This Court holds that regardless of client preference, drivers must be assigned to a bus route on the basis of seniority, as opposed to sex.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay for Title VII wage discrimination, limited by the administrative complaint periods and proven wage disparities.

Denny v. Westfield State College · filed 1987-05-12(g)

Moreover, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of backpay limited by the periods in which the administrative complaints were filed as measured by the extent of the wage disparities discovered in Dr. Ash’s results.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits relief that puts a victim of discrimination in the position she would have occupied absent the unlawful practice.

Storey v. City of Sparta Police Department · filed 1987-05-26(g)

The victim of discrimination is entitled to be “made whole” — that is, to be put in the same position she would occupy had the failure to hire not occurred.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction for an intentional unlawful employment practice even when the EEOC has not alleged a pattern of discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. FLC & Bros. Rebel, Inc. · filed 1987-06-29(g)

Since this court is authorized to grant an injunction if it finds that FLC has “intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice” under § 2000e-5(g), the fact that EEOC has not alleged a pattern of discriminatory activity does not prevent the remedy sought.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a Title VII back pay award without deducting unemployment compensation.

Jones v. Ohio Department of Mental Health · filed 1987-07-06(g)

As to the issue of damages, the unemployment compensation received by plaintiff during 1981 and 1982 should not be deducted from the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings, including earnings that exceed hypothetical wages during a yearly calculation period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fotios · filed 1987-07-15(g)

In the 1985 period, Ms. Leija’s interim income exceeded her hypothetical earnings by $384.40. This differential should be deducted from the total amount owed, reducing Ms. Leija’s award from $2,075.22, as calculated by the Commission, to $1,690.82.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a transfer remedy for proven individual discrimination, but relief extending to other employees must be supported by the discrimination found.

Kent County Sheriff's Ass'n v. County of Kent · filed 1987-08-13(g)

In light of our decision that the district court did not err in finding discrimination, this relief was a proper remedy under section 2000e-5(g), 42 U.S.C.A. However, the district court went further; it directed that the most senior, interested (male) deputy should also be transferred to the road patrol and that the remaining, interested corrections deputies be placed on a seniority list for future transfer. We believe this additional action was erroneous and went beyond the proper bounds of a remedial action for sex discrimination against females.

When individual victims cannot be identified and backpay is distributed pro rata, § 2000e-5(g) reduces each claimant’s award by outside earnings multiplied by the ratio of lost jobs to claimants.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works · filed 1987-08-19(g)

It involves ratably reducing the total earnings by each claimant ... to reflect the ratio of shortfall jobs to the total number of claimants (in EEOC’s hypothetical example, which is being used for analysis, 700/2000 or 35%).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay reduced by earnings from suitable replacement employment.

Sennello v. Reserve Life Insurance · filed 1987-08-24(g)

The founding and development of an insurance agency certainly fall within the realm of suitable post-termination employment under the case-law applying 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Moreover, Ms. Sennello’s continued operation of this agency while working in a well-paid position for Florida Showcase Publications constituted further suitable employment under the statute. Accordingly, she is entitled to baseline back pay reduced by her actual earnings from May 1, 1983 until the date of trial.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows injunctive relief as well as back pay and reinstatement, so rejecting an offer that does not provide full relief does not waive a Title VII claim.

Moore v. Trump Casino-Hotel · filed 1987-08-24(g)

Furthermore, regardless of the amount of this offer, the offer did not constitute full relief available under the statute. Moore, by rejecting the offer did not waive his right to pursue his Title VII claim which seeks both monetary and injunctive relief such as enjoining Trump from continuing further alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits classwide back pay to be distributed pro rata among qualified class members when identifying each person entitled to relief would require guesswork.

Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1987-09-09(g)

In such a situation a court may, as the district court did in this case, award relief on a classwide, rather than individual, basis by calculating the number of positions for which class members should have been hired and distributing pro rata among all qualified class members the total amount of back pay for which the defendant may be held responsible.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces backpay by amounts the plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence during the same period.

Cowan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1987-09-21(g)

Accordingly, the statute expressly provides that “[interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). I find that Mr. Cowan is not entitled to an award of backpay because the evidence clearly demonstrates that, had he been promoted to the position of sales manager in November 1978, he would have earned less than what he could reasonably have earned as an insurance agent.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces Title VII back pay by interim earnings and amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Denton v. Boilermakers Local 29 · filed 1987-10-01(g)

Under Title VII “[i]nterim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence by the persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... In addition, the court concludes that the ice cream store generated interim earnings that must be deducted from the back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes relief for victims of an employer’s discrimination, including a promotion denied because of that discrimination.

Howard v. McLucas · filed 1987-10-05(g)

There is no question that section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), authorizes relief to victims of an employer’s discrimination. Normally, where an employee has been denied a promotion, the remedy will ordinarily include not only back pay, but also an injunction to assure that the one who was unlawfully denied a promotion be given the position improperly denied her.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay for an unlawful employment practice, measured by the wages the employee would have earned absent discrimination less the wages actually earned.

Cooper v. Rosenberg · filed 1987-10-16(g)

It is within the Court’s discretion to award back pay upon a finding of an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Consequently, this Court will award plaintiff back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires workers’ compensation payments for lost wages to be deducted from Title VII back pay, but payments for physical impairment are not deducted.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Blue & White Service Corp. · filed 1987-11-19(g)

Under Minnesota law, Butler’s worker’s compensation benefits may be broken down into two components: a sum of money for lost wages due to the injury and a sum of money for physical impairment. The latter sum should not be offset from a back pay award, while the sum representing lost wages should be offset to avoid double recovery for lost earnings.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2), as incorporated into the federal employee provisions of Title VII, permits a federal employee to seek interim injunctive relief during administrative proceedings.

Wagner v. Reese H. Taylor, Jr., Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission · filed 1987-12-24(f)(2)

Section 2Q00e-16, which pertains exclusively to federal employees, incorporates the private-sector provisions of §§ 2000e-5(f) through (k) “as applicable.” ... As the court reasoned in Parks v. Brennan, supra, because the agency cannot seek an interim injunction against itself, that task must fall to the individual federal claimant, 389 F.Supp. at 793; otherwise, federal employees will be denied an important right enjoyed by private-sector employees. As indicated, Congress intended Title VII to achieve substantial parity between federal and nonfederal workers, and we must interpret the statutory language to effectuate that intent.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces allowable backpay by interim earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Ford v. Nicks · filed 1988-02-09(g)

In addition, plaintiff is entitled to back-pay to compensate her for wages lost as a result of the discriminatory conduct involved in this case. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Absent discrimination, plaintiff would have earned substantially more as a professor at MTSU than she has in real estate. However, the backpay otherwise allowable is to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Hartman v. Wick · filed 1988-02-16(g)

Title VII mandates that “back pay otherwise allowable” be reduced by “[ijnterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Thus, the Court must order that all back pay awards be reduced by amounts that claimants earned or could have earned “with reasonable diligence.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge and receive a right-to-sue letter before bringing suit.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department · filed 1988-02-16(f)(1)

Before bringing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative remedies available under section 2000e-5. Plaintiff must file a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receive a right-to-sue letter from the Commission.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII plaintiff to make reasonable efforts to find other work to mitigate damages, while the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to do so.

Sowers v. Kemira, Inc. · filed 1988-02-17(g)

A plaintiff is required to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages by seeking alternative employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The burden of proving a lack of diligence in mitigating damages is on the defendant. ... Defendant has not carried this burden.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to two years before the charge, but permits an earlier, unlawfully denied position to serve as the pay benchmark.

Spears v. Board of Education of Pike County, Kentucky · filed 1988-03-08(g)

Because Title VII limits the award of back pay to “a date [not] more than two years prior to the filing of a charge ...,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), defendants contend that the magistrate could not consider the rate of pay for positions for which Mrs. Spears had been improperly passed over more than two years before the filing of her claim. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 291 (D.C.Cir.1982), points the other way, however, and we have recently recognized that Title VII requires that an injured party be placed as nearly as possible in the situation he would have occupied had the wrong not been committed. Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (6th Cir.1985). We believe that the magistrate did select the wrong benchmark for determining back pay and front pay, nonetheless, because he used the rate of pay for a position (the co-principalship at Phelps) for which Mrs. Spears was not improperly passed over.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires reasonable diligence to mitigate back pay, but a plaintiff’s failure to seek comparable work may be excused when a noncompetition agreement makes that search futile.

Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. · filed 1988-03-11(g)

Because of the restrictive covenant and Defendants’ apparent willingness and demonstrable ability to enforce it, it would have been futile, we believe, for Plaintiff to seek work in an industry in which she could not legally be employed.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, but a claimant need not remain in noncomparable interim employment to mitigate damages.

Mary Juanita Sellers, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Delgado Community College and State of Louisiana, Defendants · filed 1988-03-18(g)

The natural concomitant of the Supreme Court’s holding that a Title VII claimant is not under an obligation to accept noncomparable employment is that the same claimant is not obligated to remain in an inferior position should he be fortunate enough to obtain one during the pendency of his claim.

A Title VII claim omitted from an administrative charge may proceed when it is reasonably related to the charged allegations and the employer and agencies had adequate notice of it.

Yates v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1988-03-23(f)(1)

In the instant action there is no doubt but that plaintiff’s claims of racial and national origin discrimination are reasonably related, and that as a result defendant and the administrative agencies involved had adequate notice of plaintiff’s national origin claim. ... Under such circumstances, this Court is not barred from considering plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits promotion as equitable relief for a discrimination victim who is qualified for the position.

Harrison v. Honorable John O. Marsh · filed 1988-03-25(g)

A court can in appropriate circumstances order a promotion as relief for a victim of discrimination, but cannot under Title VII properly order the promotion of an employee to a position for which he or she is not qualified.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, front pay, and injunctive relief through a group remedy when the employer has agreed to that procedure.

Pitre v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1988-03-29(g)

In these circumstances, we will instead apply the logic of the group remedy cases. ... In short, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to grant back pay, front pay, and an injunction was a proper exercise of its equitable discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes a back pay award after a finding of intentional discrimination.

Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. · filed 1988-03-30(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) authorizes the Court to make an award of back pay once there has been a finding of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s backpay mitigation principles apply to federal employment claims under the Rehabilitation Act through 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Huegel v. Tisch · filed 1988-04-07(g)

In the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (29 U.S.C. § 794a), Congress specifically provided for application of the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth” in § 2000e-5(g) to complaints arising under 29 U.S.C. § 791. Consequently, we conclude that the analysis employed in Ford and other cases applying the mitigation provisions of Title VII is completely applicable in this context.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires an employee to use reasonable diligence to mitigate lost pay, but lack of transportation can justify declining another job.

EEOC v. FLC & Brothers Rebel · filed 1988-04-12(g)

While 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g) requires that an employee mitigate any loss by use of reasonable diligence, the lack of transportation served in this case as a justifiable excuse for Besares' failure to mitigate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for wages lost because of an unlawful employment practice, with liability limited to the two years before the EEOC charge.

Shrout v. Black Clawson Co. · filed 1988-04-13(g)

Plaintiff may recover back pay in an amount comparable to the salary she would have received but for defendant’s unlawful employment practice. Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay liability accrues no more than two years prior to the filing of the EEOC charge. ... Given the conflicting evidence on this matter, the Court concludes that a reasonable award of backpay is $17,000.00.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits recovery for Title VII violations to the two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kettler Brothers Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kettler Bro · filed 1988-04-27(g)

The statute of limitations for the Title VII claim starts to run two years prior to the time Andrus filed her complaint with the EEOC on July 31, 1984. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for promotions denied through unlawful retaliation.

Volk v. Coler · filed 1988-05-02(g)

Accordingly, we direct the district court to enter judgment against the DCFS on Volk's retaliation claims under Title VII and assess $35,000 in damages. Those damages represent back pay related to the denial of Volk's promotions. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) places the burden on the employer to prove that substantially equivalent work was available and that the claimant failed to seek it with reasonable diligence.

Floca v. Homcare Health Services, Inc. · filed 1988-05-18(g)

Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination and has presented evidence on damages, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that substantially equivalent employment positions were available and that the claimant failed to use reasonable diligence in seeking those positions.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable relief to restore a discrimination victim to the employment position she would have held without discrimination.

46 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1329, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,955 Bernice Bennett, Cross-Appellee v. Corroon & Black Corp., Cros · filed 1988-06-09(g)

The object of that equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) is to restore the victim of discrimination to fruits and status of employment as if there had been no discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits prejudgment interest as part of a Title VII backpay award, including in suits brought under § 717.

Loeffler v. Frank · filed 1988-06-13(g)

And, just as this section provides for prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit against a private employer, it provides for prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit brought under § 717.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits discretionary back pay to restore a victim of discrimination to the position she would have occupied, subject to a duty to seek equivalent employment with reasonable diligence.

Lampley v. Big Discount Food Store, Inc. · filed 1988-06-24(g)

The awarding of back pay in Title VII cases is governed by Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). While discretionary with the court, back pay generally is appropriate to restore the Plaintiff to the position she would have occupied were it not for the unlawful discrimination. ... However, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages which requires that the claimant be reasonably diligent in seeking equivalent employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief that makes a successful Title VII plaintiff whole, including back pay and adjusted retirement benefits.

Hale v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Department · filed 1988-08-12(g)

“If the court finds that [a defendant] has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice ... the court may ... order ... any ... equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West 1981). ... Also, CCWD is to adjust Mrs. Hale’s retirement benefits to the level they would have been had she earned what Mr. Hanna earned from April 2, 1983 until her retirement.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief for Title VII violations.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Company · filed 1988-09-19(g)

We recognize that Title VII gives the court discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), and we simply remind the court that Title VII's protections in this case extend only to those employees and prospective employees who have religious objections to attending the devotional services.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts flexible equitable authority over Title VII relief, but retroactive pension relief need not depend on a particular fund's finances.

Florida v. Long · filed 1988-09-15(g)

Our power to order appropriate relief under Title VII is equitable in nature and flexible, Manhart, supra, at 718-719; see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g), but the particular circumstances of a case are not the sole determinant of relief.

When the parties agree to a group remedy, § 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, front pay, and an injunction if the award serves Title VII's purposes.

Pitre v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1988-09-23(g)

In these circumstances, we will instead apply the logic of the group remedy cases. In so doing, we will examine the particular remedy imposed to ensure that it does not frustrate the purposes of the statute. ... In short, we conclude that the trial court's decision to grant back pay, front pay, and an injunction was a proper exercise of its equitable discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes injunctive relief after a plaintiff prevails on the merits, not as a preliminary remedy.

White v. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary, Department of Defense, and James Webb, Secretary, Department of the Nav · filed 1989-01-12(g)

Although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) authorizes injunctive relief, it speaks only to post-trial remedies after a plaintiff has actually prevailed on the merits of his or her claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief even after an employer apparently discontinues a discriminatory practice.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1989-04-14(g)

Under federal law, Title VII remedies have not been limited to correcting only ongoing discriminatory policies. District courts clearly have the authority and should exercise the power to grant injunc-tive relief even after apparent discontinuance of unlawful practices.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief even after an employer apparently discontinues an unlawful practice.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1989-07-20(g)

Under federal law, Title VII remedies have not been limited to correcting only ongoing discriminatory policies. District courts clearly have the authority and should exercise the power to grant injunctive relief even after apparent discontinuance of unlawful practices.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to grant appropriate equitable relief for Title VII violations, including an injunction.

Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1989-08-28(g)

Courts have discretion under Title VII to award a victorious plaintiff back-pay, reinstatement, and “any equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). ... There is no indication that either of these situations exist. Thus, this Court finds it appropriate to impose injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief but does not permit an award of nominal damages.

Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1989-08-16(g)

Since nominal damages are not available as equitable relief, we must reverse the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides primarily equitable remedies for successful Title VII claims, including injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay.

Zowayyed v. Lowen Co., Inc. · filed 1990-04-17(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), a plaintiff who successfully demonstrates a violation of Title VII is entitled to remedies which are primarily equitable: injunctive relief prohibiting further acts of discrimination, reinstatement, and back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay and other equitable relief for a Title VII violation.

James v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1990-05-17(g)

Title VII expressly authorizes only an award of back pay “or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5 provides for equitable relief, back pay, and reasonable attorneys’ fees for Title VII violations.

Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health, Office of Health Systems Management · filed 1990-05-25(g), (k)

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for a determination of damages. The damages available under Title VII include equitable relief and back pay, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see id. § 2000e-5(k).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits individualized equitable relief when individual damages can be determined accurately.

Davis v. City of Dallas · filed 1990-06-14(g)

The language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(g), guides this court in fashioning a remedy. ... Damages shall be determined on an individual basis, rather than on a class-wide basis, because under the circumstances of this case, individual determinations of damages will be the more accurate and therefore the more equitable remedy for all concerned.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to order reinstatement after a Title VII violation and permits denial when reinstatement would cause undue friction and controversy.

Cross-Appellant v. General Motors Corporation, Cross-Appellee · filed 1990-08-21(g)

Therefore, although Title VII empowers the court to order reinstatement of an employee who succeeds in proving racial discrimination, the power is discretionary and should not be used where the result would be undue friction and controversy.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, reinstatement, and other equitable relief for unlawful employment discrimination.

Daines v. City of Mankato · filed 1990-09-07(g)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), such affirmative action may include back pay, reinstatement or “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award partnership as equitable relief when discrimination denied a person admission to partnership.

Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1990-12-04(g)

We would directly subvert what Congress intended in the 1972 amendments if we were to hold that partnership could not be awarded to a person who was denied it because of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes a court that finds an intentional unlawful employment practice to enjoin the employer and require measures to prevent further discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc. · filed 1991-02-20(g)

Upon a finding of an intentional, unlawful employment practice, Title VII authorizes a court to enjoin an employer from engaging in the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The EEOC has asked the Court: (1) to enjoin AHM from violating Title VII, and (2) to direct AHM to develop and implement a nondiscriminatory, written policy concerning leaves and schedule adjustments. The EEOC’s injunctive request is granted.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to consider back pay through judgment and instatement or front pay after an employee resigns without being constructively discharged.

Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen · filed 1991-03-15(g)

For reasons stated more fully below, I will not limit the scope of damages to back pay only up to the date of the plaintiff’s resignation from the defendant firm. The appropriate relief within the scope of Title VII here may include back pay up the date of judgment and instatement as a member of the firm or, alternatively, front pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a federal employee to seek monetary relief for Title VII discrimination despite FECA’s coverage of workplace injuries.

George v. Frank · filed 1991-03-27(g)

Accordingly, the court holds that George may seek money damages for disparate treatment in connection with a Title VII gender discrimination theory.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to limit equitable relief when a successful Title VII plaintiff materially falsified her employment application.

Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University · filed 1991-07-12(g)

Therefore, under its equitable power of awarding Title VII damages, the court will take the back pay plaintiff would have made in the PSO position, minus mitigation, and reduce it by fifty percent.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits nominal damages as equitable relief when a Title VII plaintiff proves a violation but cannot recover actual monetary damages.

Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc. · filed 1991-07-31(g)

In short, this Court believes that a nominal damage award is an appropriate equitable remedy in this kind of a situation.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order hiring as equitable relief for discrimination even if doing so displaces an incumbent employee.

Bruno v. City of Crown Point · filed 1991-11-27(g)

Title VII grants federal courts the power to “order such affirmative actions as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... This is true even where incumbents are bumped from their jobs because those incumbents would not have been hired if the discrimination had not occurred. What the Supreme Court has called ordinary relief, we will not call extraordinary.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows reinstatement and back pay under either a hostile environment sexual harassment theory or a disparate treatment theory.

Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. · filed 1991-12-16(g)

Regardless of whether Title VII recovery is awarded under a theory of environmental sexual harassment or a theory of disparate treatment, plaintiffs may seek reinstatement, back pay, and attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement and back pay reduced by interim earnings after a successful Title VII claim.

Morris v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1992-02-20(g)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), plaintiff is entitled to immediate job reinstatement at the rate of pay that she would have been entitled to if she had never been dismissed and back pay less interim earnings.

Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2000e-5(g) authorized only equitable relief, excluding compensatory and punitive damages.

McCormick v. Consolidation Coal Co. · filed 1992-03-20(g)

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ initial argument, compensatory and punitive damages were not available under Title VII, prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, inasmuch as § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), authorized the award only of equitable relief, in the form of back pay, front pay, remedial seniority, injunctions, and declaratory relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief but does not authorize nominal damages, which the court treats as compensatory relief.

McLaughlin v. New York, Governor's Office of Employee Relations · filed 1992-03-05(g)

This court adopts the Bohen view because there is no indication in Title VII (or elsewhere) to justify the view that an award of nominal damages should be considered equitable, and not compensatory, relief.

Before the 1991 Act, § 2000e-5(g) authorized equitable relief but did not allow compensatory damages.

Thomas v. Frank · filed 1992-02-13(g)

Prior to enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII expressly authorized an award of back-pay “or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... I conclude therefore, that retroactive application of the compensatory damages provision of § 102(b) of the 1991 Act would infringe upon the established, recognized right of the Defendant to be free from legal damages in Title VII actions.

Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act, § 2000e-5(g) limited Title VII relief to equitable remedies.

Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. · filed 1992-05-22(g)

Before the Act became law, Title VII relief was limited to equitable remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).

Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2000e-5(g) authorized backpay and other equitable relief, but not compensatory or punitive damages.

Aiken v. Bucks Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. · filed 1992-07-14(g)

Prior to enactment of the Act, Title VII authorized a court to remedy a Title VII violation through an award of backpay “or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). Because both punitive and compensatory damages are viewed as legal relief, they were not available under Title VII prior to the Act.

Section 2000e-5(g), before the 1991 amendments, allowed equitable relief but excluded nominal damages.

Landgraf v. USI Film Products · filed 1992-07-30(g)

Nominal damages such as those awarded in Huddleston and Baker are legal, not equitable relief and are therefore outside the scope of remedies available under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief, including back pay, front pay, lost benefits, and reinstatement.

Bartlett v. United States · filed 1993-10-14(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the court may award such equitable relief as is warranted, including back and front pay, value of lost benefits, or reinstatement.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to permanently enjoin an employer from engaging in sex discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Continuity Programs Inc. · filed 1993-12-23(g)

In addition, defendant is permanently enjoined from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes courts to order hiring as relief for a Title VII violation.

Legault v. aRusso · filed 1994-02-10(g)(1)

First, Title VII explicitly authorizes court-ordered hiring. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5(g)(1) (West 1993).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes equitable relief, including reinstatement and back pay; compensatory and punitive damages were unavailable for this pre-1991 Title VII claim.

Feldstein v. New York State Office of Mental Health, Bronx Psychiatric Center · filed 1994-03-16(g)(1)

Similarly, in a Title VII action, the relief generally available is also reinstatement and back pay. ... Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (which plaintiff concedes is not applied retroactively in this circuit), compensatory and punitive damages were not available in Title VII actions in the Second Circuit.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay and other appropriate equitable relief after a plaintiff prevails.

Shelton v. Babbitt · filed 1994-04-26(g)

Title VII provides that when the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay and other equitable relief that the Court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief, including back pay, but did not permit punitive damages during the relevant period.

Fisher v. Vassar College · filed 1994-06-30(g)

While Title VII, during the relevant period, did not permit an award of punitive damages, typically, remedies under Title VII have included retroactive promotion, back pay and attorneys’ fees.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief for unlawful employment practices, but a claim fails when no available equitable remedy can redress the harm.

Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, D/B/A Ozark Mahoney & Co. · filed 1994-07-29(g)

Title VII provides that where a court finds that an employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices, it may order action “which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Yet, because Garcia continued to work for Seagraves Ozark in the same position with at least the same compensation, and because Locke no longer works for Sea-graves Ozark, neither an award of back pay nor any other form of injunctive relief would be appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to award backpay and other equitable relief for an intentional unlawful employment practice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. · filed 1994-08-02(g)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l), if a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, a “court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include * * * [the payment of] backpay * * * or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”