42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5 permits lost sick leave benefits, back wages, reinstatement with seniority, and reasonable attorney fees as relief for a Title VII violation.

Nora D. SATTY, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NASHVILLE GAS COMPANY, Def · filed 1975-08-08

The District Court, finding that Nashville Gas’ policy violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, ordered that plaintiff recover sick leave benefits that should have been paid during her maternity leave; back wages from March 14, 1973, including any across the board increases, and reduced by temporary wages and unemployment insuranee; reinstatement with full seniority and recovery of reasonable attorney fees. ... Under the guidelines of Meadows v. Ford Motor Company, 510 F.2d 939 (1975), and Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Company, 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973), we find the District Court’s relief appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay for workers who suffered employment discrimination, but does not require relief for workers who were not discriminated against.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1148, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,223 Jack A. Gamble v. Birmingham Southern Railroad Company · filed 1975-06-16(g)

Congress has clearly authorized back pay awards under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). ... The class of persons affected for purposes of back pay awards from 1965 to date should include those black switchmen who would have been promoted but for their race. The Act does not require a remedy for those not discriminated against.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s two-year back pay limit may guide an award even when the EEOC decided the charge before the 1972 amendment.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 · filed 1975-06-27(g)

However, on March 24, 1972, Title VII was amended by Congress to provide that as to all cases pending before the EEOC on that date or filed thereafter, back pay liability accrues from a date no more than two years prior to the filing of the charge with the EEOC. Pub.L. 92-261, §§ 4(a), 14, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). While the case here was determined by the EEOC prior to March 24, 1972, this amendment has a bearing on Congressional intent as to the limitation to be imposed in granting back pay awards, and will be applied here.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay after unlawful discrimination and allows its denial only for reasons consistent with Title VII’s purposes of ending discrimination and making injured workers whole.

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody · filed 1975-06-25(g)

It follows that, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year limit on backpay accrual does not apply to an Attorney General action begun without an EEOC charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 · filed 1975-07-18(g)

Title VII specifically provides that “back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). X'o such time limitation is imposed here, however, because unlike the Rios class action case, this action was not initiated by the filing of a charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) authorizes the EEOC to seek preliminary judicial relief while it investigates a discrimination charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rinella & Rinella · filed 1975-07-22(f)(2)

Procedurally then, we find the preliminary action authorized by § 706(f)(2) is an accepted and appropriate form of relief, especially in Title VII litigation where swift and decisive action may be warranted to counteract invidious conduct or retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars an order requiring hiring or back pay when an employer refused employment for a reason other than discrimination based on a protected trait.

McCann L. REID, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. MEMPHIS PUBLISHING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appe · filed 1975-08-20(g)

These two statutes are plain and unambiguous. They are aimed solely at discrimination and nothing else.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay against an employer or labor organization responsible for an unlawful employment practice.

United Transportation Union Local No. 974 v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1975-09-22(g)

At the same time, consistent with the purposes of the Act, any judgment should be against N & W and the unions jointly and severally, or against N & W solely, with a right to partial indemnity from the unions so as to insure that there be an economic incentive for an employer to obviate discrimination voluntarily, rather than by court decree, and that an employee entitled to back pay shall be made whole by obtaining a judgment against a financially responsible party.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a reasonably certain causal link between unlawful discrimination and back-pay losses; once injury is shown, the employer bears the burden of disproving claimed damages.

United States v. United States Steel Corporation · filed 1975-10-08(g)

First, there is the requirement that the economic disparity the damages be the reasonably certain result of unlawful conduct perpetrated against the aggrieved individual or the class to which he belongs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). But second, once a court has determined that a defendant's inequitable conduct caused some damages to the class, or to a representative sample of its members, then the burden falls upon the wrongdoer to explain away or disprove the damages which each claimant's evidence arguably supports.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits seniority adjustments in a pattern or practice case without proof of a specific discriminatory act against each affected employee.

United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1975-11-05(g)

“Rightful place” does not require in a Title VII “pattern and practice” case that we limit the remedy of seniority adjustment to specific individuals who can demonstrate specific acts of discrimination against themselves. ... A prima facie case, such as was established by the Government here, which is not refuted is sufficient to establish liability and to permit the courts to turn to the task of fashioning a remedy which may include seniority adjustments.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay liability to the two years before the employee filed an EEOC charge.

Sherrill v. JP Stevens and Co., Inc. · filed 1975-11-11(g)

The relevant time period for determining defendant's liability for back pay is July 22, 1969, two years prior to the filing by plaintiff Sherrill of his charge with EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to practices after Title VII took effect and to the two years before an EEOC charge was filed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 2P, Lithographers & Photoengravers International Union · filed 1975-12-22(g)

Under Title VII, back pay liability exists only for practices occurring after July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Act, and accrues only from a date two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Therefore, the defendant’s liability to the Lewis brothers for the assessment of back pay may not extend prior to August 17, 1968.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the period beginning two years before a charge is filed with the EEOC.

Eeoc v. Loc. 2p, Litho. & Photoengravers Iu · filed 1976-02-26(g)

Under Title VII, back pay liability exists only for practices occurring after July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Act, and accrues only from a date two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Therefore, the defendant's liability to the Lewis brothers for the assessment of back pay may not extend prior to August 17, 1968.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee to seek preliminary relief preserving employment during EEOC proceedings without first obtaining a right-to-sue letter.

Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc. · filed 1976-01-05(f)(1)

In such circumstances, the intent of Congress to eliminate unfair and discriminatory employment practices is best served by permitting the private employee to seek to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the proceedings in EEOC. Requiring a right-to-sue letter would thwart this intent and therefore the court holds that a letter is not required in the present case.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a district court to award remedial seniority to employees who prove they lost seniority because of sex discrimination.

Acha v. Beame · filed 1976-02-19(g)

Award of seniority to those who had actually been discriminated against by these defendants is not a “preference” because of sex. It is rather a remedial device well within the broad power conferred on the district court by section 706(g). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and retroactive promotion only if the employee would have received the promotion absent discrimination.

Day v. Mathews · filed 1976-02-23(g)

The statute makes it clear that these forms of relief are available only where the employee would have received the promotion had he not been the victim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a back-pay award for people injured by discriminatory hiring or promotion practices.

United States v. City of Chicago · filed 1976-02-02(g)

The Government seeks back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) for those who have been injured by the City defendants’ discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. ... Accordingly, the decree should provide for such an award to be sought by the Government.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay against a city as an employer, but not against individual public officials.

12 Fair empl.prac.cas. 836, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,755 Jane Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New · filed 1976-03-08(g)

They also correctly state that one of the remedies provided for violation of the Act is the award of back pay. Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay is specifically made “payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice.” Id. (emphasis added). There is no statutory warrant for such an award against a public official, however. Accordingly, so far as the Title VII claim is concerned, employees discriminated against may henceforth obtain an award of back pay against the city itself (but not against individual officials).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad equitable discretion to order appropriate affirmative action to remedy past employment discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 · filed 1976-03-08(g)

On the other hand, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) specifically gives authority to the district courts to order any "affirmative action" which "may be appropriate" to remedy past discrimination. Section 2000e-5(g) expressly states that the scope of the district courts' remedies for employment violations is to be "equitable," which is to say, broadly discretionary.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable discretion to award seniority relief to victims of discriminatory hiring to make them whole.

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. · filed 1976-03-24(g)

This is emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars reinstatement and back pay when an employee was discharged for a reason other than prohibited discrimination.

Compston v. Borden, Inc. · filed 1976-03-29(g)

But, as has been stated hereinabove, Mr. Compston’s discharge from defendant’s employ was not motivated by plaintiff’s religion or national ancestry. It follows that Mr. Compston is not entitled to reinstatement or to any award of back pay from the date of his discharge.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay against an employer or labor organization responsible for an unlawful employment practice.

United Transportation Union Local No. 974 v. Norfolk · filed 1976-04-19(g)

At the same time, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) authorizes an award of back pay against an "employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice . . . ."

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay as a remedy for unlawful employment discrimination; determining an applicant’s eligibility may require findings about when employment would have begun.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT Et Al., Appellees · filed 1976-05-25(g)

Title VII empowers the court to: enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay * * *. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The remaining fourteen were never interviewed and thus the the record is unclear as to when they would have commenced employment had they not been discriminated against. We hesitate to decide the eligibility of these fourteen for backpay without such information, and accordingly remand the question to the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to grant appropriate equitable relief for unlawful employment practices; an award of seniority is not required in every case.

12 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1514, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,959 Leon Jones, Etc. v. Pacific Intermountain Express · filed 1976-06-21(g)

Bowman, supra, does not hold that “an award of seniority status is requisite in all circumstances.” ... The remedy under § 706(g) authorizes the court to “enjoin . . unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).”

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) permits temporary relief to preserve the status quo during EEOC administrative proceedings, but does not authorize an injunction after those proceedings end or prove futile.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing Association · filed 1976-07-02(f)(2)

The district court was without authority to issue an injunction under § 2000e-5(f)(2) once the private action based on the November 1972 charge had been initiated because that charge was no longer "pending final disposition" by EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order membership goals and referral quotas as remedies for proven Title VII discrimination.

United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors · filed 1976-07-21(g)

Nowhere in the enforcement provisions of Title VII is there any prohibition against the imposition of a membership goal or a referral quota to help achieve that goal.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order membership goals, referral quotas, and changes to hiring and seniority practices as remedies for a Title VII violation.

United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5 · filed 1976-07-21(g)

The district court properly concluded that it could, under the authority vested in it by § 706(g), grant the four kinds of injunctive relief utilized in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to order affirmative action to remedy the effects of past employment discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1976-08-23(g)

The federal courts in overcoming the effects of past discrimination are expressly authorized in Title VII to take affirmative action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a backpay award against a labor organization responsible for an unlawful employment practice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local No. 638 · filed 1976-09-07(g)

We agree with the Government and the Rios plaintiffs that the union's arguments against a backpay award amount to a claim for special treatment for unions and special immunity for the discriminatory practices in which they engage. This claim has no support in equity or law. The statute, which refers to "back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice) . . .," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), is directly to the contrary.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year backpay limit does not apply retroactively to suits filed before the 1972 amendment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638 · filed 1976-09-07(g)

We disagree with this retroactive application of the new statute of limitations rule, as have the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII backpay to a period beginning two years before an EEOC charge is filed.

13 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1035, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,260 Joe Stewart, Cross-Appellants v. General Motors Corporation, C · filed 1976-10-04(g)

Title VII contains an explicit statute of limitations for backpay liability, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), providing that backpay shall only accrue for a period beginning two years prior to the filing of a complaint before the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay, reinstatement, and other appropriate relief for a successful Title VII claimant.

Theodore v. Elmhurst College · filed 1976-09-15(g)

In the case at bar, not only can this court grant back pay to make plaintiff whole, but reinstatement as well as any other appropriate relief can be awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces otherwise allowable back pay by the claimant's interim earnings.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. New York Times Broadcasting Service · filed 1976-10-04(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) specifically provides that any award of back pay otherwise allowable will be reduced by interim earnings of the person discriminated against. Assuming, with out deciding, that Ms. Wilson was discriminated against by the defendant, she clearly was not damaged monetarily thereby.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires an employer seeking to reduce a back pay award for potential earnings to show both that the employee failed to seek work diligently and that work was available.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc. · filed 1976-10-08(g)

However, Title VII requires that a back pay award be reduced only by “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” To sustain its burden of establishing such deductions, the defendant must show not only that plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in seeking employment, but also that had she been diligent she might have found employment and had some earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s two-year limit on back pay recovery applies to Title VII cases pending in federal court when the 1972 amendment took effect.

Roberts v. Western Airlines · filed 1976-10-12(g)

The Court will apply the two-year period of recovery to this case, which was pending in court in March 1972, because doing so will not result in injustice to the parties and is consistent with the purpose of the 1972 amendment.

Before the 1972 amendments, § 2000e-5(g) imposed no statutory limit on the period for which Title VII backpay could be awarded.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1976-10-20(g)

Prior to the 1972 amendments, there was no statutory limitation upon the period for which Title VII backpay might be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and benefits measured by the difference between what an employee would have earned and what she actually earned.

Davis v. Jobs for Progress, Inc. · filed 1976-11-16(g)

4. The plaintiff is entitled to back pay and benefits equal to the difference between what she would have earned as an Instructor II and what she actually earned during the same period of time. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad discretion to impose mandatory hiring and promotion quotas to remedy Title VII violations when the circumstances justify them.

United States of America v. City of Chicago · filed 1977-01-11(g)

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing mandatory quotas upon the Police Department. Under Title VII Congress has equipped the courts with wide discretionary power to remedy statutory violations by fashioning the most complete relief possible. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to the two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

Woodrum v. Abbott Linen Supply Co. · filed 1977-02-10(g)

Since the plaintiff has previously not opposed the dismissal of the Fair Labor Standards Act claim, and since there appears to be no incorporation of that Act’s statute of limitations to Title VII actions, this Court will adhere to the two-year back pay rule as set forth in § 2000e-5(g). It follows that back pay, if awarded, will be limited to that period after January 27, 1969.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a finding that the defendants engaged in the unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint before a court grants Title VII relief.

Elmo v. Myers v. Gilman Paper Corporation v. International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers (Afl-Cio) · filed 1977-03-21(g)

Before a court can grant any relief in a Title VII suit, it must find that the defendants engaged in the unlawful employment practice alleged in the complaint.

Section 2000e-5 limits Title VII back pay to the two years before the first EEOC charge; a class may include people from that period while individual entitlement is decided later.

McBroom v. Western Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1977-04-04(g)(1)

If discrimination is found, back pay may not be awarded under Title VII for more than two years prior to the first charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)’s intent requirement for injunctive relief is satisfied when the unlawful employment practice was not accidental.

Saracini v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1977-05-12(g)

The “intent” requirement of this section is met by a showing that the employment practice was not accidental.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a showing that discrimination affected the promotion decision before a court may award back pay or retroactive promotion.

Beckwith v. Hampton · filed 1977-04-18(g)

It simply means that a showing of discrimination is insufficient standing alone to justify the particular remedy of back pay and retroactive promotion. The express terms of Title VII require a demonstration that the promotional decision was dependent on the unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces a back pay award by interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Allen v. Lovejoy · filed 1977-04-21(g)

Entitlement to back pay is qualified by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) which provides: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable."

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Aubrey J. CROSS and John Lee Parks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-04-21(g)

In permitting back pay as a remedy for violation of Title VII Congress provided in part: “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Thus, though back pay is part of the “make whole” purpose of Title VII, ... the liability of an employer who has violated the act is limited by the actual or potential earnings of the person against whom the discrimination is practiced.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay reaching back two years from the filing of an EEOC complaint.

Wells v. Meyer's Bakery · filed 1977-06-22(g)

Here the record demonstrates continuing discrimination and, as in Stewart, back pay relief to the individual members of the class may go back to two years from the filing of the complaint before the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before an employee files an EEOC charge.

Stallings v. Container Corp. of America · filed 1977-07-15(g)

The one proviso, of course, is that any such back pay award can only accrue from a date two years prior to his filing the charge with the EEOC on March 29, 1970.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides equitable relief, with any monetary award forming part of that remedy.

Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc. · filed 1977-06-27(g)

The clear inference from the wording of the Title VII section is that Congress contemplated only equitable relief and hence the award of any monetary relief can only be viewed as part of that equitable remedy.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require an employer to promote an unqualified person.

Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-08-01(g)

As a matter of fact it is set forth in the act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not to be used for the purpose of requiring employers to employ or promote unqualified persons.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not authorize displacing a better-qualified appointee to give the position to a discrimination victim.

Kennedy v. Godwin · filed 1977-09-06(g)

Title VII does not contemplate “bumping” an innocent beneficiary of unlawful discrimination in favor of a less qualified victim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative action relief without requiring every beneficiary to be an identifiable victim of discrimination.

Telephone Workers Union, Local 827 v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1977-09-08(g)

The argument that affirmative action should be available only to identifiable victims of discrimination is therefore rejected. The fact that Everett, who was hired over plaintiff Biel, was not an identifiable victim should not prevent the entire affirmative action plan formed in the Consent Decree from being given effect.

Section 2000e-5 does not require a hiring or promotion quota that offers no relief to employees injured by discrimination when other remedies provide adequate relief.

White v. Carolina Paperboard Corporation · filed 1977-09-23(g)

Therefore, since the quota offers no relief to injured plaintiffs or class members, we see no "compelling need," Patterson, at 275, to approve it. The Act does not require the application of a remedy to employees who are not subject to discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats an unlawful employment practice as intentional when the employer’s conduct was not accidental, inadvertent, heedless, or mistaken; discriminatory intent need not be proved.

Kennerly v. ARO, Inc. · filed 1977-09-28(g)

In order for ARO’s unlawful employment practices to have been “intentional” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), it was only necessary for Mr. Kennerly to have shown that such employer’s conduct was not accidental, inadvertent, or heedless, or that it did not arise from a mistake; he was not required to prove any sort of discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) permits the EEOC to seek preliminary relief on retaliation charges in an existing action without filing a separate action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Locals 14 & 15, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1977-10-14(f)(2)

Jurisdiction also exists independently under Section 706(f)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2), which provides in pertinent part: ... Furthermore, a finding of jurisdiction based on the aforementioned retaliation charges does not require the filing of a separate action on the retaliation issues: the retaliation action is ancillary to the main action.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to restore leave lost because of unlawful retaliation as equitable relief.

Dual v. Griffin · filed 1977-11-18(g)

The Court concludes that the evidence supports the finding that plaintiff’s illness was proximately caused by defendant’s retaliatory actions and that the restoration of lost leave under these circumstances is a proper exercise of the court’s broad discretionary power to grant relief for violations of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes backpay and other appropriate relief for a successful Title VII discrimination claim.

Meyer v. Missouri State Highway Commission · filed 1977-12-14(g)

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the district court with directions to grant appellant back pay, attorneys’ fees, and costs in the district court action, and other appropriate relief in conformity with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative action as an equitable remedy only after a finding of unlawful discrimination.

Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young · filed 1978-02-27(g)

A clear reading of Section 706(g) and the legislative history of the Act indicates that the section presupposes a finding of unlawful discrimination and that so-called “affirmative action” is a fluid equitable remedy always requiring, at a minimum, the cessation of employment practices and procedures which discriminate and the creation of employment policies designed to achieve equal opportunity for all.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not provide injunctive relief to an individual plaintiff when the injunction would not benefit that plaintiff personally.

Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. · filed 1978-03-29(g)

Any injunctive relief which plaintiff requests will not benefit him personally. Therefore, I hold that even if the plaintiff were able to prove a violation of Title VII by the Home in 1977, he would not be entitled to relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief that addresses a Title VII violation without directly benefiting the plaintiff.

Williams v. Boorstin · filed 1978-04-04(g)

Relief inuring directly to the personal benefit of the plaintiff is not the exclusive equitable relief device available to the courts for redressing this violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to deny retroactive relief when equitable circumstances make it inappropriate, despite a strong presumption favoring that relief.

City of Los Angeles Department of Water v. Manhart · filed 1978-04-25(g)

Title VII does not require a district court to grant any retroactive relief. A court that finds unlawful discrimination "may enjoin [the discrimination] . . . and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement . . . with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. V). To the point of redundancy, the statute stresses that retroactive relief "may" be awarded if it is "appropriate."

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable power to remedy proven Title VII employment discrimination.

Allen v. City of Mobile · filed 1978-09-29(g)

This court is invested with quite broad equitable powers under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) empowering it to fashion that relief deemed necessary to rectify the effects of adjudged discriminatory employment practices proscribed by Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes injunctions available to stop unlawful employment practices.

Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1978-10-19(g)

Not only is an injunction an “appropriate remedy,” but Title VII ... was designed for the simple purpose of enjoining unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Thus, the relief plaintiff seeks here, an injunction, is available under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts discretion to tailor equitable relief to make victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole.

Kunda v. Muhlenberg College · filed 1978-11-17(g)

As the cases have made clear, the remedies set forth in section 706(g) are not mandatory, but are to be used by the district court in its discretion in an attempt to secure complete justice to injured parties.

Section 2000e-5 permits monetary relief to make victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole.

Hul v. City of Dell Rapids · filed 1978-12-20

The purpose of monetary relief in a civil rights action is to make persons whole for the injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes relief aimed at restoring a victim of discrimination to the position she would have held without the discrimination.

Somers v. Aldine Independent School District · filed 1979-02-12(g)

The court’s goal in fashioning a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) is to restore the victim, so far as possible, to the status she would have held but for the unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes make-whole relief for a plaintiff subjected to sex discrimination.

Foster v. Simon · filed 1979-03-23(g)

The court concludes, as a matter of law, that plaintiff Foster has been discriminated against because of her sex in violation of § 717 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and is entitled to be made whole under § 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to permanently enjoin an employer from continuing a proven pattern of sex discrimination.

Evans v. Central Piedmont Community College · filed 1979-08-20(g)

Therefore the defendant will be permanently enjoined under § 706(g) of the Act from further discrimination against women.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to remedy Title VII violations and past discrimination through a race-conscious hiring plan.

Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, Inc. v. City of Louisville · filed 1979-09-18(g)

Where there is a significant underrepresentation of an ethnic minority, and where violations of Title VII have occurred, there is an obligation upon the Court to remedy that past discrimination. ... However, the Court believes that if 1 out of every 3 persons appointed to recruit school is black during the years 1979 through 1984, and if the members of the present Police Force remain in approximately the same racial ratio which they now have, a ratio of approximately 14.5% would result at the end of the period.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to issue an injunction after finding past intentional employment discrimination, even if the discrimination has ceased.

Taylor v. Teletype Corp. · filed 1979-11-02(g)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) authorizes injunctive relief upon a finding that the employer “has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in . . .” an unlawful employment practice (emphasis added); this language contemplates an injunction in this case in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) requires the Commission to establish irreparable harm to obtain preliminary relief.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp. · filed 1979-12-19(f)(2)

Nonetheless, in view of the Ekanem holding and the statutory directive that § 2000e-5(f)(2) actions be governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I find that the Commission must establish the existence of irreparable harm in order to prevail on its motion for preliminary relief.

Section 2000e-5 permits a private plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge to seek preliminary reinstatement before completing conciliation if the plaintiff shows irreparable harm and probable success on the merits.

McCarthy v. Cortland County Community Action Program, Inc. · filed 1980-02-14(f)(2)

Accordingly, this court joins the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that subject matter jurisdiction may properly be invoked under Title VII in cases involving a retaliatory discharge, without exhaustion of the usual conciliation procedures, if the plaintiff demonstrates irreparable harm and probable success on the merits.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a district court to award remedial seniority after finding unlawful employment discrimination.

Moseley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company · filed 1980-02-21(g)

When a court determines that a company has engaged in unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) gives a district court the power to order such affirmative action as it may deem appropriate. ... Such affirmative action includes the granting of remedial seniority.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a district court to grant remedial seniority after finding unlawful employment discrimination.

Moseley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1980-02-21(g)

When a court determines that a company has engaged in unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) gives a district court the power to order such affirmative action as it may deem appropriate. The district court is given broad discretion in this matter. ... Such affirmative action includes the granting of remedial seniority.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief supported by past discriminatory acts as background evidence, even when those acts are no longer actionable.

Charles v. National Tea Co. · filed 1980-03-20(g)

These facts do constitute relevant background evidence which justifies the Court’s determination to grant injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and it is ordered that defendant, National Tea Company, cease and desist from engaging in any reprisals or retaliation against plaintiff because of his assertion of his Title VII rights or because of his participation in the EEO process and that defendant shall not intentionally engage in systematic disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a causal link between unlawful discrimination and the challenged discharge before a court may grant relief.

Wright v. Allis-Chalmers · filed 1980-04-07(g)

The fact of discrimination alone does not establish the illegality of a challenged action. There must be a causal nexus with the disciplinary action in question, so that the challenged discipline would not have been received by the employee but for the improper conduct of the employer.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits properly imposed quotas to remedy past discrimination.

Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1980-04-25(g)

The proper imposition of quotas as a remedy for past discrimination violates neither statute. E. E. O. C. v. A. T. & T. (quota remedies do not violate Title VII remedial provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)), nor the Constitution, United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 538 F.2d at 1018; Erie Human Relations Commission v. Tullio, 493 F.2d at 375, n. 7.

Section 2000e-5 authorizes an injunction and hiring as remedies for unlawful employment discrimination.

Schwartz v. State of Fla. · filed 1980-05-14(g)

Plaintiff is eligible for the relief provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, including injunction of defendants from engaging in racial and sexual discrimination against her and hiring by defendants as an assistant professor in Early Childhood and Special Education.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to order equitable, affirmative relief after finding a Title VII violation.

Pina v. City of East Providence · filed 1980-06-03(g)

In accord with the broad powers to furnish equitable, affirmative relief afforded to this Court by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) where Plaintiffs have proven a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, this Court orders the Defendants to prepare and present to this Court, within sixty days, for approval, a plan for the implementation of the Ordinance entitled “AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN FOR THE CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND,” Chapter 61 of the Ordinances of the City of East Providence, as it applies to appointment of candidates to the Fire Department of the City of East Providence.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative relief, including expungement of personnel records, when it helps make a victim of unlawful retaliation whole.

Croushorn v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Tenn. · filed 1980-06-19(g)

Pursuant to the enforcement section of Title VII, the court has the authority to enjoin unlawful employment practices that have been found to exist and order such other affirmative relief as may be appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The court believes that this injunction should be granted and that eradication of all references to plaintiff’s pay inequity and employment discrimination claims generally should be required. ... Expungement of these records therefore serves the statutory objective of making the victim of retaliation whole.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes broad injunctive relief for employment discrimination, and an injunction is mandatory absent clear and convincing proof that further noncompliance is improbable.

Thompson v. Boyle · filed 1980-07-08(g)

Congress has granted courts plenary equitable powers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), for constructing appropriate remedies for employment discrimination. ... The broad injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs is clearly appropriate under the facts of this case. Although injunctive relief is within the discretion of the Court, absent clear and convincing proof of no probability of further noncompliance with the law, a grant of injunctive relief under Title VII is mandatory.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order affirmative hiring in an individual action when it finds intentional discrimination.

Taylor v. Jones · filed 1980-08-08(g)

The statute is not limited to class actions. It applies in individual actions as well and is clear authority for the power of a court of equity, in its discretion, to order affirmative hiring.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay as equitable relief when workplace hostility makes reinstatement inappropriate, even if the plaintiff did not request reinstatement.

Regina FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIRLOIN STOCKADE, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-08-21(g)

The statute allows for an award of any equitable relief the court deems appropriate. ... We see no necessity for the plaintiff to request reinstatement as a prerequisite to obtaining front pay where the evidence reveals an atmosphere of hostility.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s intent requirement is satisfied when an employer knows a practice has discriminatory consequences, even without a discriminatory purpose.

LeBoeuf v. Ramsey · filed 1980-09-16(g)

In the present case, city defendants acted with knowledge of the consequences of disparate impact of the height requirement on women and therefore “intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice” as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) even though, as stated in Part IV, supra, they did not act with “discriminatory purpose” in the sense relevant to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves injunctive relief to the district court’s discretion even when discrimination is proved.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Monarch Machine Tool Co. · filed 1980-11-14(g)

To the extent that such a finding endeavors to set forth an inflexible rule, it would in our view be inconsistent with the grant of discretion given a district judge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). We emphasize with respect to injunctive relief that it is fundamentally an exercise of equitable power and we leave to the discretion of the trial judge on remand the final decision whether such relief is appropriate under all the circumstances of the case, if it is shown that the employer has been guilty of the discriminatory practices alleged.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows courts to consider equitable principles when deciding whether reinstatement is appropriate, even after finding retaliation.

St. John v. Employment Development Department · filed 1981-02-23(g)

Next, St. John asserts that once the district court found retaliation, it was required to make her whole. We disagree. Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), provides that a court “may . . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include .. . reinstatement . . . . ” Courts have read this subsection to require that principles of equity be considered in determining what relief is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s intentional conduct requirement is satisfied when a union deliberately agrees to an unlawful seniority system, even without an intent to discriminate.

Sears v. Bennett · filed 1981-03-11(g)

It is unnecessary for us to find that the union entered the agreement with the intention of discriminating. The action of agreeing to the seniority system was nonaccidental and deliberate. We conclude that the union “intentionally engag[ed] in an unlawful employment practice” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) and (k) authorize reinstatement, injunctive relief, back pay reduced by interim earnings, benefits, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Harris v. Richards Manufacturing Co. · filed 1981-03-31(g), (k)

In regard to the relief awarded under Title VII, by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and (k) this Court 1) orders immediate reinstatement of the plaintiff Clara M. Harris by the defendant as a final otology inspector; 2) enjoins the defendant from subjecting plaintiff to any special conditions of employment or denying plaintiff equal employment opportunity in any manner subsequent to her reinstatement; 3) awards plaintiff full back pay less any wages earned from other employment during this time, and benefits from the date of her termination on February 15, 1977, to her date of reinstatement; and 4) awards reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order race-conscious affirmative relief to remedy proven Title VII discrimination.

Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1981-04-08(g)

Section 706(g) specifically provides that upon finding a violation a court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), and § 703(j) of the Act does not bar race-conscious relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats a union's deliberate agreement to a discriminatory seniority system as intentional engagement in an unlawful employment practice, without requiring proof that the union intended to discriminate.

Sears v. Bennett · filed 1981-05-11(g)

It is unnecessary for us to find that the union entered the agreement with the intention of discriminating. The action of agreeing to the seniority system was nonaccidental and deliberate. We conclude that the union "intentionally engag(ed) in an unlawful employment practice" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad equitable power to place a person harmed by discrimination as near as possible to the position they would have occupied without it.

Frankie Odomes, Cross-Appellant v. Nucare, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1981-08-25(g)

Upon remand we direct the district court to exercise to the extent it determines necessary the broad equitable powers granted to it by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and thereby to place Mrs. Odomes “as near as may be, in the situation [s]he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975).

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) permits preliminary relief during an EEOC investigation under relaxed Rule 65 standards when needed to protect the investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Credit Consultants, Inc. · filed 1981-08-26(f)(2)

It therefore appears that the intent of the Congress would be frustrated were this Court not to relax the traditional Rule 65 standards and issue, in limited form, the injunction requested by the EEOC.

In a Title VII action filed after administrative remedies are exhausted, irreparable injury is presumed when the employee seeks a preliminary injunction.

Middleton-Keirn v. Stone · filed 1981-09-08

We find that the Sampson, Parks, and Morgan decisions are inapplicable when, as here, the employee has exhausted all administrative remedies and has filed suit in the district court. An action in that posture is governed by Hayes, and irreparable injury is presumed.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad discretion to award equitable relief for Title VII discrimination, but the record must support the remedy ordered.

Julius B. LOCKE, Appellee, v. KANSAS CITY POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellant · filed 1981-09-28(g)

Under this standard none of the remedial measures ordered by the district court per se went beyond the broad equitable powers specifically granted in § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The problem is that there are insufficient findings in the record for us to evaluate the soundness of the district court’s exercise of discretion and we therefore vacate parts of the judgment and remand for further findings and reconsideration.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction benefiting nonparties in an individual suit when the facts warrant prospective relief.

Mary Beth MEYER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BROWN & ROOT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1981-11-13(g)

Injunctive relief which benefits non-parties may sometimes be proper even where the suit is not brought as a Rule 23 class action. ... This is not a case where injunctive relief need be designed for a just disposition of the action. That portion of the judgment granting injunctive relief is therefore reversed.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad discretion to order injunctive relief, including flexible hiring and promotion goals, to remedy proven discrimination.

Chisholm v. United States Postal Service · filed 1981-11-25(g)

Federal district courts are granted broad discretion to shape the relief for Title VII cases presented to them; this broad discretion is mandated by the highly individual nature of the relief needed to remedy discrimination in each particular case. ... In light of the district court's broad discretion and its duty to accord complete relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the injunctive relief challenged here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) requires the EEOC to show irreparable injury to itself or the charging party to obtain preliminary relief.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anchor Hocking Corp. · filed 1981-12-16(f)(2)

The irreparable injury which must be established under § 706(f)(2) may be, as the district court held, to the EEOC or to the charging party.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) requires the EEOC to show irreparable injury to itself or the charging party to obtain preliminary relief.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anchor Hocking Corporation · filed 1981-12-16(f)(2)

The irreparable injury which must be established under § 706(f)(2) may be, as the district court held, to the EEOC or to the charging party. The Commission can obtain relief by showing, e.g., that the charging party will in fact suffer irreparable harm if he is not reinstated.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a court to consider temporary injunctive relief against employer retaliation while an EEOC charge is pending, even before the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter.

Patricia SHEEHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PUROLATOR COURIER CORPORATION and Purolator, Inc., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1982-02-22(f)(1)

We hold only that where a person has filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC, the court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for temporary injunctive relief against employer retaliation while the charge is pending before the EEOC and before the EEOC has issued a right to sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits with the balance of hardships strongly in the plaintiff’s favor.

Gibson v. U. S. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1982-02-26(g)

Thus, in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction under § 706(g) of the Act, plaintiff must meet the traditional standards for the granting of preliminary relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable discretion to order reinstatement that restores an employee to the position she would have occupied absent unlawful discrimination.

Sebastian v. Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1982-03-18(g)

To effectuate this “make whole” objective, Congress in § 706(g) vested broad equitable discretion in the federal courts “to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1981).

Section 2000e-5 permits preliminary injunctive relief before the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter.

Aguilar v. Baine Service Systems, Inc. · filed 1982-03-22(f)(1)

It would be inconsistent with this goal to construe the technical requirements of Title VII rigidly to foreclose the possibility of immediate relief for an aggrieved plaintiff. The Sheehan decision recognizes the importance of observing the policy goals of Title VII and thus places this Circuit in accord with the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings that a right to sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to preliminary relief.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not bar preliminary relief against employer retaliation before the 180-day EEOC period expires when the plaintiff shows irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits.

Cassidy v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp. · filed 1982-04-20(f)(1)

This court agrees, however, with the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Kearse in Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1982). There the court held that where a plaintiff makes a showing of the traditional requirements of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits, the court may grant preliminary relief pursuant to its inherent equity powers in order to maintain the status quo pending determination of the merits of the discrimination charge by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits interim quotas as equitable relief when needed to end employment discrimination.

Thompson v. Sawyer · filed 1982-04-27(g)

Title VII grants the court wide discretion in formulating injunctive relief, which may include "affirmative action" and "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). ... We join our sister circuits in recognizing the acceptability of interim quotas in Title VII relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts discretion to order equitable relief, including equalizing discriminatory pension benefits.

Retired Public Employees' Association of California v. State of California · filed 1982-05-17(g)

The district court's April 25, 1980 order requiring the State defendants (appellants) to "raise monthly retirement benefits of members of the class to the level received by similarly situated members of the opposite sex without reducing the benefits of any individual" is a remedy consistent with that court's discretionary power to award equitable relief under the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction against unlawful employment practices even without a certified class or an award of appointment and back pay to the plaintiff.

Evans v. The Harnett County Board of Education · filed 1982-07-27(g)

The primary remedial provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), provides that “the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in [an] unlawful employment practice ... . ” Although this grant of authority is framed in discretionary terms, a court’s discretion is not unfettered. It must be exercised to serve the purposes of the Act. ... We cannot accept the board’s contention that injunctive relief is barred because Evans neither certified this suit as a class action nor advanced a meritorious individual claim.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement with full seniority as relief for discriminatory termination.

Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1982-12-22(g)

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to be reinstated with full seniority under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad power to fashion effective Title VII remedies, including judgment against a county that funds a liable court.

Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County · filed 1982-12-30(g)

On the third-party complaint, the Court finds that the County is inextricably involved in this litigation inasmuch as it is the funding source of the Circuit Court, Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, No. 78-1255C(3) (E.D.Mo. May 14, 1980), and that without entering judgment against it on the third-party complaint, the Court's broad powers to fashion a remedy to further the objectives of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), would be a nullity.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) authorizes the EEOC to seek preliminary injunctive relief and does not bar a court from hearing a private retaliation plaintiff’s request for that relief before administrative exhaustion.

Guerrero v. Reeves Bros. · filed 1983-02-14(f)(2)

Congress specifically authorized the EEOC to seek preliminary injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2), but was silent as to the right of private litigants to pursue this remedy. ... Until the Fourth Circuit announces its position, this Court will accept subject-matter jurisdiction of Title VII retaliation actions by private litigants seeking preliminary relief, without exhaustion of the usual conciliation procedures, in the belief that acceptance of such jurisdiction best achieves the goals of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) generally calls for reinstatement or a hiring preference to make a victim of employment discrimination whole, unless unusual circumstances justify denying that relief.

Diane Elder Garza v. Brownsville Independent School District · filed 1983-03-17(g)

It is undisputed that District Courts have discretion to fashion fair and appropriate remedies in Title VII cases. This discretion, however, is to be exercised with a view to making victims of employment discrimination whole. Accordingly, reinstatement or hiring preference remedies are to be granted in all but the unusual cases.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts discretion to fashion remedies for employment discrimination; whether to enjoin a successor employer depends on a fact specific balancing of interests.

In re National Airlines, Inc. · filed 1983-03-17(g)

As a general rule, district judges have broad discretion in the fashioning of orders to remedy past and present discrimination. See, e.g., Harper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 494 (5th Cir.1980). See also, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). ... We agree that the balancing of interests, fact specific analysis employed by the Supreme Court in labor law successor cases is the proper method for determining whether a successor employer should be bound by the Title VII transgressions charged against its predecessor. ... We find only that in light of the particular facts in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief against Pan American.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court that finds a Title VII violation to order appropriate equitable relief, including promotion, front pay, and back pay.

Nichelson v. Quaker Oats Co. · filed 1983-06-22(g)

Once a violation of Title VII has been established, the Court has the power to order whatever equitable relief, including, but not limited to, reinstatement, back pay, costs and attorney’s fees, as may be appropriate. § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts equitable power to fashion Title VII remedies, including prospective relief when retroactive relief would jeopardize pension funds.

Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris · filed 1983-07-06(g)

This real danger of bankrupting pension funds requires that our decision be made prospective. Such a prospective holding is, of course, consistent with our equitable powers under Title VII to fashion an appropriate remedy. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g); Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718-719.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable remedies, including prejudgment interest to make a discrimination plaintiff whole.

Turgeon v. Howard University · filed 1983-07-13(g)

The Court is also authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) to fashion equitable or other remedies as may be appropriate. ... In order to make Plaintiff whole as a result of her wrongful termination, the Court will require Defendant to pay prejudgment interest thereon at the rate fixed by D.C.Code § 28-3302(c).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits promotion and training as equitable relief for unlawful employment practices.

Clemente v. United States · filed 1983-08-12(g)

(2) Plaintiff should be promoted to a GS-12, step 4 position and given appropriate training to prepare her for the same under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).