42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5 requires administrative exhaustion before a Title VII suit, but a complaint that omits an allegation of exhaustion may be amended when it does not show that the plaintiff failed to exhaust.

Lucille E. ROHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRW, INC., William N. Lesley and Ralph M. Lehman, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1978-05-24

Nor do we dispute that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ... When it does not affirmatively appear that there has been a failure to comply with jurisdictional prerequisites, however, then Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that leave to amend be given to allow the plaintiff to attempt to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.

Section 2000e-5 does not provide the EEOC route for an employee of a Federal Reserve Bank because the bank is an executive agency whose employees must first complain to the Civil Service Commission.

Dorsey v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · filed 1978-05-24

At issue is whether the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is an "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 or an "executive agency" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and 5 U.S.C. § 105. ... An examination of those sections of the United States Code convinces the Court that the Federal Reserve Bank is an "executive agency." ... Plaintiff simply may not proceed here without first complaining to the Civil Service Commission.

Section 2000e-5 permits a plaintiff to cure a premature Title VII filing by later exhausting EEOC procedures and supplementing the complaint with a right-to-sue letter when the delay causes no prejudice.

Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1978-07-14

Before we ruled upon plaintiffs’ motion for class designation, plaintiffs’ counsel filed that letter as a supplement to the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d). Local 107 did not oppose the supplementary filing. We conclude that the filing of that notice of right to sue letter cured any jurisdictional defect which may have supported defendants’ motion initially.

Section 2000e-5 permits a district court to retain jurisdiction while Title VII claimants seek EEOC assistance before receiving right-to-sue letters.

Bethel v. Jefferson · filed 1978-11-09

The District Court should retain jurisdiction but grant leave to appellants to invoke, within 30 days, the assistance of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit to encompass discrimination that a reasonable investigation of a layperson’s EEOC charge would uncover.

Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1978-11-30

Guided by the above authorities, the appropriate conclusion is that even without the Ximines charge the pro se charge is sufficient to raise the panoply of mechanisms of the alleged employment discrimination in the present case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) entitles an employee to de novo judicial review of discrimination charges against an employer.

Sauls v. Bristol-Myers Co. · filed 1978-12-22(f)(1)

Plaintiff cannot convert his failure to prevail in administrative proceedings under Title VII into broader claims of governmental deprivation of constitutional rights. Title VII entitles plaintiff to de novo judicial review of the merits of his charges against his employer.

Section 2000e-5 does not provide for preliminary judicial review of an EEOC reasonable-cause determination; a later discrimination suit is tried de novo.

GEORATOR CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-02-23(f)(1)

Title VII details the procedures for civil action in an employment discrimination case, but does not provide for preliminary review of the Commission’s determination of reasonable cause.

Section 2000e-5 allows a Title VII judicial complaint to cover claims within the scope of an EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the discrimination charge.

Association of Flight Attendants v. Ozark Air Lines · filed 1979-05-14

The court disagrees. The scope of the judicial complaint is not limited to the facts at the precise moment in time the EEOC charge is filed. Rather, “the ‘scope’ of the judicial complaint is limited to the ‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII lawsuit to claims included in or related to the employee’s EEOC charge.

Centenio v. Helena Garment Co. · filed 1979-07-10(f)

The plaintiff’s verified charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not include any allegations ... regarding discrimination by the defendants in pay or advancement, and therefore these issues are not properly before the Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC charge and a right-to-sue letter before a Title VII action, and limits the suit to matters investigated or reasonably expected to arise from the charge.

Meyer v. Macmillan Publishing Co. · filed 1980-01-31(f)(1)

A prerequisite to bringing a Title VII action is filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC and obtaining from that agency a “right to sue” letter. ... The inclusion of the “on behalf of” charge might be expected to alert the EEOC to a claim that discrimination was practiced on a class of women, but cannot reasonably be expected to alert the agency to the separate and distinct charge of retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge before a private Title VII suit, and the judicial claim must fall within the investigation reasonably expected from that charge.

LeGare v. University of Pennsylvania Medical School · filed 1980-04-17(e)

Under Hicks, to establish jurisdiction for the sex claim the plaintiff needed to plead either that one of her charges included sex discrimination or that the EEOC reasonably should have discovered sex discrimination based on her charges of race discrimination. Although the complaint recites in detail the filing of charges of race discrimination and retaliation, it is devoid of any such jurisdictional allegations with regard to sex. Accordingly, it must be dismissed insofar as it seeks relief under title VII for sex-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII lawsuit to claims reasonably related to the discrimination charge submitted to the EEOC.

Abraham v. Field Enterprises · filed 1980-12-11

Hence, inherent in Title VII’s jurisdictional prerequisites is that a claim made in a Title VII action must be reasonably related to the charges submitted to the EEOC.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim must be presented to the EEOC before it can be heard in court; a charge alleging only retaliation does not suffice.

Spiridigliozzi v. Bethlehem Mines Corp. Cambria Div. · filed 1980-12-15(f)(1)

However, plaintiff’s charge No. 034-790954 (Ex. 4 to defendants’ brief) does not specify sex as the alleged ground of discrimination, but retaliation for having filed the prior charge. In fact plaintiff expressly states that 150 female applicants have been hired. Therefore, in the light of the Ostapowicz principle, this Court does not have jurisdiction of the instant case as a sex discrimination case as its jurisdiction is invoked in the complaint.

Section 2000e-5 covers District of Columbia Fire Department employees without displacing their independent right to sue under § 1981.

Torre v. Marion Barry, Jr., Individually and as Mayor of the District of Columbia · filed 1981-08-04

It follows that they are covered by section 706 of Title VII, rather than section 717, and they retain an independent right of action under section 1981. This right of action, moreover, is not dependent on initial resort to Title VII’s administrative procedures.

Section 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5) calls for prompt Title VII trials and permits referral to a master if the court cannot try a case within 120 days; state claims that would delay the Title VII case conflict with that policy.

Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co. · filed 1982-01-28(f)(4)-(5)

Title VII cases are to be tried to a judge, and are to be expedited. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5). If the court is unable to try the case within 120 days, it is empowered to refer the case to a master. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(5). These and other provisions of Title VII indicate a clear congressional policy that Title VII cases be adjudicated as promptly as possible. To hear state contract and tort claims in a Title VII case would conflict with this policy.

Section 2000e-5(f) establishes an exclusive federal remedy for enforcing Title VII’s employment protections.

Brudnicki v. General Electric Co. · filed 1982-02-24(f)

Moreover, both federal and state law establish exclusive remedies for the enforcement of their terms and the corresponding vindication of the public policies involved.

A defendant may be estopped from arguing that an administrative charge omitted a claim in a Title VII suit under § 2000e-5(f) when it waits until after the claim is heard administratively to object.

Jackson v. Nimmo · filed 1983-02-22(f)

Applying the Home Savings estoppel requirements in light of Zipes, I find and conclude that the VA is estopped from moving to dismiss Jackson’s judicial complaint for failure to allege constructive discharge in her administrative charge.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII class action based on an individual EEOC charge when an investigation of class discrimination could reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge.

Laura FELLOWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL RESTAURANTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-03-28

The scope of Ms. Fellows’ judicial complaint could include class action allegations, since EEOC investigation of class discrimination against women could reasonably be expected to grow out of her allegations in her initial EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to include claims concerning predecessor facilities when the administrative investigation gave the employer adequate notice of their substance.

LUCKY STORES, INC., Petitioner, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent · filed 1983-08-30(f)(1)

Because Vacaville is the successor of those facilities added to the amended complaint, Lucky received “adequate notice during administrative investigation of the substance of the issue subsequently raised....” Occidental Life, 535 F.2d at 542.

A Title VII judicial complaint may include allegations reasonably related to the EEOC charge; an inconsequential difference does not bar suit.

Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., a Corporation, and Ray Smalley, Individually · filed 1983-08-15

The charges stated in the judicial complaint could reasonably be expected to have been addressed by any EEOC investigation based on the administrative complaint. ... Any variance between appellee’s EEOC and judicial complaints was inconsequential.

Section 2000e-5 creates a private right of action under Title VII.

Bailey v. Binyon · filed 1984-03-30

A private right of action under Title VII is created by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(f)(5) calls for expedited hearings in diligently prosecuted Title VII cases but does not shift counsel’s responsibility to move a case forward.

Washington v. Walker · filed 1984-05-22(f)(5)

There is no indication whatsoever that these amendments were intended to shift the traditional responsibility of counsel to move cases forward, as in all litigation. A fairer reading is that the amendments were meant to express Congress’s intention that diligently prosecuted cases not be “buried” in a busy court docket.

Section 2000e-5(f)(5)’s expedited trial requirement precludes pendent jurisdiction over state law claims in private Title VII actions.

Mongeon v. Shellcraft Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-07-23(f)(5)

Once it is clear that private actions were intended to be expeditious, it is also clear that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in such actions is fundamentally inconsistent with their intended form. Indeed, some of the very purposes for which plaintiffs may seek to join state law actions, including the availability of broader relief and a jury trial, are the sort of relief and procedure that Congress implicitly rejected in favor of a streamlined remedy. We therefore concur with the courts that have denied pendent jurisdiction in private actions under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5)'s expedited, judge-tried procedures weigh against pendent jurisdiction over state claims that expand a Title VII action.

Haroldson v. Hospitality Systems, Inc. · filed 1984-11-05(f)(4)-(5)

Specifically, Title VII cases are to be expedited and tried to a judge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5). The joinder of state claims which expand the issues involved frustrates the express congressional intent of having employment discrimination claims under Title VII resolved in the most expeditious manner possible.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not permit pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims when hearing them would impair Title VII’s statutory scheme.

Chavez v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1985-04-16(f)(3)

The Court is persuaded that the Kroger test precludes the Court from exercising pendent jurisdiction in this action. The reasons for this decision rest primarily in the nature and history of Title VII. Congress has provided for specific equitable relief in Title VII actions, and has expressed its desire that these matters be resolved as expeditiously as possible. Furthermore, Title VII actions are tried to the Court. It is evident to this Court that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would impair the statutory scheme so carefully constructed by Congress in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5’s enforcement scheme prevents a plaintiff from pursuing rights created by Title VII through §§ 1981 or 1983, but permits claims with an independent basis alongside a Title VII claim.

Tafoya v. Adams · filed 1985-07-08

It is inconsistent with the general statutory scheme of Title VII to permit the consideration of Title VII claims and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims based upon Title VII in the same lawsuit in federal court.

Section 2000e-5’s enforcement requirements cannot be bypassed by using § 1983 to pursue a Title VII violation.

Strama v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-08-07

From the comprehensive nature of Title VII’s jurisdictional prerequisites and remedial scheme, we presume congressional intent to preclude recovery for Title VII violations under § 1983.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII claim when the administrative proceedings gave the EEOC and employer notice of the alleged discrimination and an opportunity for voluntary compliance, even if the EEOC charge did not expressly name the claim.

Reiter v. Center Consolidated School District No. 26-JT. · filed 1985-10-11

In this case, the CCRC found that plaintiffs charge “should be amended to include the allegation that the refusal to rehire was based on her perceived association with the Hispanic community group, La Frontera, ...” Therefore, the CCRC’s finding notified the EEOC of possible discrimination based on plaintiff’s association with the Hispanic community. Consequently, the EEOC was permitted to seek voluntary compliance through conciliation. In addition, CCRC’s finding notified defendant of what it was allegedly doing wrong. Therefore, defendant could have voluntarily corrected the alleged wrong-doing before the EEOC notified plaintiff of her right to sue in court. Accordingly, I hold that I have subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII over plaintiff’s claim that she was discriminated against because of her association with the Hispanic community.

Section 2000e-5 requires a discrimination claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before suing; a claim reasonably related to the EEOC charge may proceed.

Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-06-30(b), (c)

A discrimination claimant must exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a discrimination claim in a federal court. ... Therefore, Malone’s disparate treatment claim is reasonably related to her EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5 requires a private Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge before suing; claims voluntarily withdrawn from EEOC investigation cannot be litigated.

Wright v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-07-01

Before filing an action in federal court under Title VII, a private litigant must first file a complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5; Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). ... Wright cannot litigate in federal court those charges which he voluntarily withdrew from investigation by the EEOC. See Rivera, 830 F.2d at 1039.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires compliance with Title VII’s administrative requirements before a plaintiff may raise a race discrimination claim in court.

Johnston v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-09-15(f)

... it does not appear that they did in fact comply with those requirements, so they are now precluded from raising an argument based on race.

Section 2000e-5 permits a discrimination claim arising during an EEOC investigation when the claimant brings the event to the investigator’s attention before the right-to-sue letter issues and the investigation could reasonably encompass the claim.

Foust v. FMC Corp. · filed 1997-04-21(f)(1)

In the instant case, while the claim of discriminatory rehiring is neither closely related to the claim of failure to hire nor an explanation of that failure, it did arise during the pendency of the investigation, it was brought to the attention of the EEOC investigator before the Right to Sue letter issued, and the investigator responded to it before the letter issued. Therefore, it was preserved and properly raised in Plaintiffs Complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires an administrative charge before a Title VII suit; a later discrimination claim must fall within the charge’s scope or the investigation reasonably expected from it.

Tunnicliff v. Motel 6, OLP · filed 1998-01-13(f)

Prior to commencing a civil action for employment discrimination under Chapter 151B, the ADEA, the ADA and Title VII, an employee must file a timely administrative charge. ... The scope of any subsequent civil complaint for discrimination is limited to the scope of the charge filed with the administrative agency and “the investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge.” ... Because those claims and the facts supporting them exceed the scope of the allegations Tunnicliff filed with the MCAD and EEOC, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy with respect thereto.

Section 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) require a Title I ADA plaintiff to exhaust EEOC remedies before filing suit.

Saylor v. Ridge · filed 1998-01-08(e), (f)(1)

A plaintiff alleging a violation of Title I must exhaust administrative remedies available through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before instituting a private lawsuit. ... Likewise, at subsection B of their Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs have conceded that they were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under Title I of the ADA Accordingly, these claims are dismissed in their entirety.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies; a judicial claim must reasonably grow out of the EEOC charge.

Hall v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1998-09-24(f)(1)

Similarly, the absence of any mention or even inference of sex discrimination in Hall’s EEOC charge leads to the conclusion that the gender issue does not reasonably grow out of her racial discrimination charge.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title I ADA plaintiff, through § 12117’s incorporation, to file an EEOC complaint before bringing suit.

Alberti v. City & County of San Francisco Sheriff's Department · filed 1998-11-25(e)(1)

Alberti’s Title I claim is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As discussed above, before filing a civil suit under Title I, plaintiffs are first required to file an administrative complaint with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). Alberti failed to do so.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII claim omitted from an EEOC charge to proceed in federal court when it is reasonably related to the claims in that charge.

Shah v. New York State Department of Civil Service · filed 1999-02-19(e), (f)

In all the circumstances, we conclude that Claims 8 and 9, alleging retaliation by NKI, are reasonably related to the allegations of employment discrimination in the 1990 administrative complaint. Accordingly, we vacate so much of the district court’s judgment as dismissed Claims 8 and 9 for lack of jurisdiction.

A Title VII plaintiff must exhaust a discrimination claim through an EEOC charge that gives the employer notice of that claim.

Hunt v. D.C. Department of Corrections · filed 1999-03-26(f)(1)

Dr. Hunt has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her gender discrimination claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In her 1996 EEOC claim form, Dr. Hunt specifically checked the boxes for age discrimination and retaliation, but she did not check the box for gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely EEOC charge and limits a later Title VII suit to claims reasonably within the scope of that charge.

Murray v. John D. Archbold Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1999-03-31(e)-(f)

Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants’ weight policy constitutes an unlawful employment practice under Title VII should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the administrative prerequisites to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)-(f).

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII complaint to include allegations omitted from an uncounseled administrative charge when investigation of those allegations would reasonably flow from the charge.

Caesar v. Hartford Hospital · filed 1999-04-06

However, an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies where a plaintiff has filed the administrative charge without the benefit of counsel and an investigation into the claims not raised would have reasonably flowed from an investigation into the claims alleged in the administrative charge. ... Therefore, an investigation into these claims would have reasonably flowed from the investigation into the charges of discriminatory employment practices and retaliation filed in Ms. Caesar’s administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge before suing; the civil complaint is limited to claims in the charge and those reasonably expected to arise from its investigation.

Avci v. Donahoe · filed 2018-01-16(f)

Title VII requires an employee to file a charge with the EEOC before commencing a civil action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to bring claims beyond the administrative charge when they developed in, or reasonably grew out of, the investigation of that charge.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sunshine Raisin Corporation · filed 2023-11-16(f)(1)

The EEOC’s complaint need not be limited to the allegations made in the administrative charge. EEOC v. California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1268 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Rather, the EEOC may raise additional claims if the supporting facts were “developed in, or reasonably grew out of, the investigation of the . . . charge made by the charging party.” EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976). ... Thus, the inquiry is limited to areas of the complaint which Select’s counsel have a good faith basis to believe did not grow out of the investigation of the original charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows temporary injunctive relief before the usual 180-day EEOC waiting period when a plaintiff shows irreparable injury and a likelihood of success.

Golden v. Lutheran Family Services in North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1984-12-04(f)(1)

Although Title VII normally requires that a charge be lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for 180 days prior to the time litigation can be instituted, the weight of authority allows plaintiffs who are suffering irreparable injury and who can demonstrate the likelihood of success to obtain appropriate temporary injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctions and affirmative relief, including back wages and reinstatement, for an intentional unlawful employment practice.

Andres v. Southwestern Pipe, Inc. · filed 1971-01-27(g)

then the court may enjoin the practice or take other affirmative action, such as awarding back wages and reinstatement.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes a court to order appropriate relief for an intentional unlawful employment practice, including wage adjustments.

Quarles v. Philip Morris, Incorporated · filed 1968-01-04(g)

The court finds that the company’s discrimination against Briggs and Mrs. Oatney is an intentional, unlawful employment practice. Relief under § 706(g) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)] bringing their wage rates to $2.55 per hour is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order appropriate affirmative relief to end discrimination and its continuing effects.

Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Paul Vogler, Jr. · filed 1969-01-15(g)

In formulating relief from such practices the courts are not limited to simply parroting the Act’s prohibitions but are permitted, if not required, to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) does not authorize a temporary injunction on an individual claim before a final determination on the merits.

Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1969-01-17(g)

In such posture, the court concludes that the remedy of temporary injunction is inappropriate for individual relief and nowhere authorized by the Act.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not warrant an injunction against an alleged discriminatory practice that has ended when the record shows no need for that relief.

Leo Rosen, Utility Co-Workers Association and Morgan Sweeney v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company · filed 1969-04-01(g)

All we decide today is that on the record in this appeal the powerful remedy of injunction is not warranted to provide protection from the discriminatory practice, alleged in the original complaint, which has already been eliminated.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a willful and knowing violation before a court may award relief; good faith reliance on a state regulation does not satisfy that requirement.

Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills · filed 1969-05-05(g)

This provision of the Act requires a finding that “the respondent has intentionally engaged * * in an unlawful employment practice” before the court “may” award relief. I interpret “intentionally” to mean wilfully and knowingly. I do not find an intentional violation in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides relief when a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

United States by Clark v. Local 189, United P. & P., Afl-Cio, Clc · filed 1969-06-26(g)

The defendants have intentionally engaged in the unlawful employment practices described herein within the meaning of Sec. 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require proof of a specific intent to discriminate before a court may grant injunctive relief for an unlawful employment practice.

Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1969-07-25(g)

Defendant argues that, in order to be subject to injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), supra, page 1118, the court must find specific intent or purpose to discriminate against Mr. Dewey. This is not what the statute requires, either for the substantive violation or the imposition of injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to enjoin discriminatory employment practices and order relief that eliminates them.

Lea v. Cone Mills Corporation · filed 1969-07-29(g)

The Court is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) to enjoin the discriminatory employment practices engaged in by defendant with respect to Negro female employees -at its Eno Plant, and the plaintiffs, and the class they represent, are entitled to an order which will effectively eliminate such discriminatory practices.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief for an employer’s intentional discrimination, including relief for employees still affected by earlier discriminatory hiring.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. · filed 1970-01-09(g)

Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits injunctive relief to situations in which an employer or a union has “intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in” an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief that gives employees affected by past racial discrimination an opportunity to transfer to jobs for which they qualify.

Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Company · filed 1970-01-12(g)

In providing for injunctive relief in this case, the decree will provide that all Negroes employed by the company before September, 1966, who now work in the Janitorial Department 30 of Division “A” and who work in Division “B” shall be given an opportunity to transfer to the other Divisions “C” and “D” to fill vacancies as they exist, should they elect to .transfer and are qualified for the jobs they seek.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order appropriate affirmative action to address continuing effects of past discrimination.

United States v. Hayes International Corp. · filed 1969-08-19(g)

Furthermore, to the extent that it can be read as limiting the power of courts to order “such affirmative action as may be appropriate,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), to simply barring any further application of discriminatory practices, Whitfield is inconsistent with the words of the statute, its purposes and the thrust of recent cases in this circuit.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits reinstatement, back pay, and other appropriate relief for an unlawful employment practice.

Rush Pettway and Peter J. Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company · filed 1969-10-07(g)

The District Court on remand shall determine the amount of back pay and other relief to be awarded in accordance with | 706(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) : ... Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to grant a temporary injunction and affirmative relief to an individual after a hearing on preliminary relief.

Samuel Culpepper, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. Reynolds Metals Company, Defendant-Appellee-Cross · filed 1970-01-08(g)

The language in § 2000e-5(g) "if the court finds" does not mean only that if the court finds upon a full hearing on the merits. It can also mean if the court finds upon a hearing on the issue of a temporary injunction, the court may temporarily enjoin the employer and grant temporary affirmative relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes relief that provides for participation in a merged union’s leadership during a transition period.

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation · filed 1970-02-25(g)

Under authority of Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(g), provisions relating to Negro participation in the leadership of a merged local union over a two-year transition period are considered appropriate by the Court and are included in the order.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to order appropriate affirmative relief while considering whether a proposed decree would create inequities.

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation · filed 1970-04-13(g)

Indeed, as stated by the Fourth Circuit, "In formulating relief from such practices the courts are not limited to simply parroting the Act's prohibitions but are permitted, if not required to `order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.'" 407 F.2d 1047 at 1052; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, in granting relief, the court must also anticipate collateral effects of a proposed decree to determine if such effects would create inequities so as to render the proposed relief inappropriate under the particular facts of the case.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to enjoin discriminatory employment practices and award backpay as affirmative relief.

Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation · filed 1970-03-12(g)

This Court is authorized by § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(g) to enjoin the discriminatory practices described herein and to order other appropriate affirmative relief in the nature of backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a finding that an employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice before a court may award relief.

Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1970-08-11(g)

This section of the statute requires a finding that the employer has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice before the court may award relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes appropriate affirmative relief when an employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice.

Marcus Jones, Willie B. Hodge, Clifton Nickels and Clarence L. Irving v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1970-08-17(g)

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes the district court to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” In our opinion the no-transfer policy cannot be used to bar these plaintiffs from application for line jobs without surrendering their positions as city drivers. The company must consider such applications and judge them by the same standards as all other applicants.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction and appropriate affirmative relief when the court finds intentional unlawful employment practices.

United States v. Continental Can Company · filed 1970-11-03(g)

Therefore, in short, the Court finds that the defendants have intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), and that the seniority system used by the Company prior to July 3, 1969 was not within the terms of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b). Therefore, the defendants will be enjoined permanently from the use of such a system, and the Court will order such affirmative relief as it deems appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative injunctive relief for unlawful employment practices, with the court considering whether the proposed remedy is feasible.

United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · filed 1970-12-03(g)

In weighing the feasibility of the relief proposed by the Government against the degree of discrimination proved in this case, this Court finds that the disbanding of the existing gangs and the abolition of the gang system would not be appropriate relief here because it would decrease the efficiency of and create hazardous conditions for the work being performed by longshoremen in the Port of Baltimore.

Section 2000e-5(g) covers defendants that intentionally perpetuate a discriminatory seniority system through collective bargaining agreements.

Long v. Georgia Kraft Company · filed 1971-01-08(g)

In that each of the defendants, subsequent to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, negotiated, ratified or became a party to one or more collective bargaining agreements which provided for a seniority system at the Krannert Division of Georgia Kraft Company based substantially on job seniority rather than mill seniority, each has substantially contributed to the continuation of such a seniority system, and has therefore intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices within the meaning of Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad discretion to fashion relief that ensures compliance with Title VII.

United States v. National Lead Company, a Corporation, and Chemical Workers' Basic Union Local 1744, Afl-Cio · filed 1971-02-26(g)

Section 706(g) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) ), which empowers a United States district court to “enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate", vests the district court with a large measure of discretion in modeling a decree to insure compliance with the Act.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits denial of back pay when an employer complied in good faith with a state law before a court resolved its conflict with Title VII.

Ridinger v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1971-03-24(g)

In view of the uncertainty as to whether the Ohio statutes are invalid and the lack of any final court decision invalidating the Ohio statutes, the Court finds that the compliance by General Motors with these statutes until May 1, 1970 does not afford a basis for awarding plaintiffs money damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes an award of past wage differentials discretionary, even when an employer intentionally violates Title VII.

Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1971-03-29(g)

Under the statute the award of damage for lost past differential is a discretionary matter, even on a finding of “intentional” violation. Under the circumstances of this case we do not find such relief appropriate in view of the defendant’s dilemma under threat of state prosecution, and its compliance when the threat of state prosecution was eliminated.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay to compensate employees for economic loss caused by an unlawful employment practice, regardless of the employer’s intent.

Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation (Two Cases) · filed 1971-07-01(g)

The principal answer to both points is that back pay is not a penalty imposed as a sanction for moral turpitude; it is compensation for the tangible economic loss resulting from an unlawful employment practice. Under Title VII the plaintiff class is entitled to compensation for that loss, however benevolent the motives for its imposition.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts a person could have earned with reasonable diligence; another claimant’s earnings may provide a measure of that amount.

Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Company · filed 1971-08-18(g)

While she testified that she undertook some efforts to obtain other employment, we think that Mrs. Jurinko’s successful efforts are a more accurate measure of “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence”. The amount of Mrs. Seibert’s damages, then, are $14,363.00 less $6,478.00, or $7,885.00.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a court to find intentional past discrimination before ordering affirmative action, but does not limit measures the President may require of federal assistance recipients.

The Contractors Association Of Eastern Pennsylvania v. The Secretary Of Labor · filed 1971-04-22(g)

While a court must find intentional past discrimination before it can require affirmative action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), that section imposes no restraint upon the measures which the President may require of the beneficiaries of federal assistance.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad authority to order affirmative relief that remedies past employment discrimination and prevents future barriers to equal job opportunities.

United States v. Ironworkers Local 86 · filed 1971-05-17(g)

There can be little doubt that where a violation of Title VII is found, the court is vested with broad remedial power to remove the vestiges of past discrimination and eliminate present and assure the non-existence of future barriers to the full enjoyment of equal job opportunities by qualified black workers.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes district courts to order appropriate affirmative action to remedy unlawful employment practices.

William E. BING Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1971-06-29(g)

Section 2000e-5(g) ... authorizes the district court to “ * * * order such affirmative action as may be appropriate * * * ” to remedy the effects of a party’s unlawful employment practice. Having determined that Roadway cannot use its no-transfer policy to bar Bing and the members of his class from applying for road driver positions without surrendering their current positions but, instead, must consider the applications and judge them by the same standards as all other applicants, we remand the cause to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives federal courts broad power to grant affirmative relief that ends discrimination and addresses its past effects.

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-07-16(g)

Section 706(g) of the Act (note 9 supra ) grants to federal courts plenary powers to fashion affirmative relief eradicating present discrimination and redressing the adverse consequences of past unlawful conduct.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires courts to order appropriate affirmative relief for intentional employment discrimination, beyond merely repeating Title VII’s prohibitions.

United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. · filed 1971-11-18(g)

The District Court bears the ultimate responsibility for fashioning such relief: it is not limited to simply parroting the Act's prohibitions but is required to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits equitable relief when a defendant intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice; the practice is intentional if the defendant meant to do the acts in question.

Glus v. GC Murphy Company · filed 1971-07-29(g)

... private employment discrimination suits are governed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) which provides for equitable relief upon a finding that a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice. To intentionally engage in a discriminatory practice means that the defendants intended to do what they did, i. e. the practice was not accidental.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require proof of a specific intent to discriminate when an employment practice has racially determined effects; intent to perform the act suffices.

United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. · filed 1971-08-31(g)

If the practices have racially determined effects, proof of subjective intent to discriminate is unnecessary; the Government must show only that the defendant intended to perform the discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits injunctive relief for intentional employment discrimination even when the employer acted without malice.

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. · filed 1971-09-21(g)

While clearly not malicious, the intent with which defendant has and is engaging in this practice is sufficient to justify injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad discretion to fashion relief for discrimination, including reasonable adjustments among affected employees.

United States v. Local 53 of the International Association of Heat · filed 1972-01-12(g)

This appeal concerns the district court's equity jurisdiction to fashion remedies pursuant to Sections 706 and 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... Adequate protection of Negro rights under Title VII may necessitate, as in the instant case, some adjustment of the rights of white employees. The Court must be free to deal equitably with conflicting interests of white employees in order to shape remedies that will most effectively protect and redress the rights of the Negro victims of discrimination. We hold, therefore, that the district court, under the circumstances of the instant case, did not abuse its discretion in making reasonable adjustments between the various classes of white employees.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for an intentional discriminatory discharge.

Lowry v. WHITAKER CABLE CORPORATION · filed 1972-04-24(g)

Under the provisions of Section 2000e-5(g) of the same title, relief in the form of back pay can be granted a plaintiff for a violation of the Act, such as a discriminatory discharge, if the violation has been intentional.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives district courts broad discretion to award or deny back pay in Title VII cases.

Gloria Kendall Leblanc and Helen Jenkins Roig v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, State of Louisiana · filed 1972-05-25(g)

Congress granted broad discretion to the District Court to fashion remedies in Title VII cases as the equities of the particular case compel.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to withhold back pay when the employer did not err in refusing the requested relief and the relevant losses cannot be determined.

United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. · filed 1972-06-13(g)

No back pay will be awarded. In reaching this decision, we have taken into consideration the fact that the train porters (and the Government) took the position that a complete merger of the two crafts was required with full seniority carryover. Since this demand has been denied by this Court, it cannot be said that Frisco acted in bad faith or erred in refusing to voluntarily grant that request. Moreover, it would be impossible to determine on what date those train porters who are now physically unqualified to become brakemen, became physically unable to perform.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay for deliberate discrimination and requires courts to weigh an employer's good-faith reliance on state law against the employee's claim.

Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs · filed 1972-06-20(g)

Liability under Sec. 706(g) only attaches to an employer who intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice. We agree with the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and adopt a broad interpretation of the term "intentionally" to include all employment practices engaged in deliberately rather than accidentally. ... Rather than drawing any hard and fast rule concerning the defense of good faith reliance on a state statute, we believe that in each case the merits of the plaintiff's claim and the public policy behind it must be balanced against the hardship on a good-faith employer.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats back pay as an equitable remedy for the court to decide, rather than a claim for damages triable by a jury.

Williams v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1972-06-27(g)

The demand for back pay under Title VII is not “in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion, and not by a jury.”

Section 2000e-5(g) does not authorize money damages when an employer proves that its reliance on conflicting state law was in good faith and that it did not intentionally engage in an unlawful employment practice.

Garneau v. RAYTHEON COMPANY · filed 1972-04-27(g)

On the basis of the foregoing, I rule that Raytheon has sustained its burden of proving that it did not intentionally engage in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(g), and on the basis of the opinions set out in Ridinger v. General Motors, 325 F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.Ohio, 1971), and Kober v. Westinghouse Electric, 325 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Pa., 1971), I rule that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover money damages in Count 2 of the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad authority to remedy unlawful employment practices, including by ordering reinstatement and back pay and retaining jurisdiction to determine the amount owed.

Francis v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-05-03(g)

Having found that the course of conduct of the defendant’s supervisory personnel in reaction to plaintiff’s complaint violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) grants the Court plenary power to fashion relief which will terminate such discriminatory practices and make the victims of the discriminatory practices whole, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), the Court will order that: ... The Court will retain jurisdiction of the case so that plaintiff may submit, within ten days from this decision, financial data to the Court from which the specific amount of back pay differential to be awarded may be determined.

Section 2000e-5(f)(2) permits preliminary relief pending EEOC disposition but does not authorize permanent relief or a ruling on the discrimination charge’s merits in that action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1972-07-12(f)(2)

In the present action brought under § 706(f) (2) of Title VII, as amended, the preliminary relief which has been granted by the court is, in effect, the final relief the court can order. While the court will of course retain jurisdiction of the matter in order to insure compliance with its injunction, the court cannot, under the statutory scheme set up by Title VII, proceed to entertain a request for permanent relief or for a ruling on the merits of the charge of discriminatory employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(f) and (g) give a federal court power to enjoin violence intended to deter plaintiffs from pursuing a Title VII lawsuit.

Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1972-08-04(f) and (g)

A court must and does have the power under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a) and 5(f) and (g) to enjoin those acts of violence in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process which Congress utilized as the ultimate phase in the federal eradication of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires proof that the employer intentionally engaged in the charged unlawful employment practice before the court grants relief.

Smith v. UNIVERSAL SERVICES, INC. · filed 1972-08-09(g)

The plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The Court finds that the defendant has not intentionally engaged in the unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to enjoin plant-wide discriminatory practices even when the suit is not a class action.

Tolbert v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1972-08-24(g)

If they do, the court has the authority to enjoin such plant-wide practices pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) which provides in part: ... Nothing in Title VII restricts this remedy to class actions.

Section 2000e-5 permits a court to deny back pay when an employer followed state employment laws amid uncertainty about their conflict with Title VII.

Manning v. International Union · filed 1972-09-11(g)

On this appeal we are required only to consider whether the order of the District Court afforded to the plaintiffs the relief to which they were entitled, and whether such relief was "appropriate" within the meaning of Title 42, U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5. ... The defendant, General Motors, did not have the benefit of any judicial determination of the validity of the Ohio female protective laws until 1971, and the enforcing agency had not handed down any definitive administrative interpretation which would assist in resolving the conflict between any such state statutes and the provisions of Title VII until August 19, 1969. Under all the circumstances of this case we cannot conclude that the District Judge abused his discretion in denying back pay to these plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts earnable with reasonable diligence as well as amounts actually earned.

Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1972-09-19(g)

The Court agrees that the memorandum opinion should be amended in accordance with the above provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, said memorandum opinion is amended so that an award of back pay damages shall be reduced by amounts actually earned from other employment or received as unemployment insurance or earnable with reasonable diligence.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows reinstatement and back pay only when the refusal to hire resulted from unlawful discrimination.

Hester v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY · filed 1972-11-01(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), reinstatement and back pay may not be awarded if the refusal to hire was for any reason other than unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5 permits courts to enjoin intentional employment discrimination and grant affirmative relief, including back pay.

Boles v. Union Camp Corp. · filed 1972-11-10(g)

In cases of intentional discriminatory employment practices the court “may enjoin the respondent” and order affirmative relief “which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay as a discretionary remedy for unlawful employment practices.

Stevenson v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, MOBILE, ALA. · filed 1972-12-07(g)

An award of back pay, costs, and attorneys’ fees is discretionary with the Court. The Act provides that they may be awarded, 42 U.S.C., Section 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) ordinarily calls for back pay when a Title VII plaintiff or class obtains an injunction, unless special circumstances make the award unjust.

Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co. · filed 1973-02-20(g)

Thus, a plaintiff or a complaining class who is successful in obtaining an injunction under Title VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to enjoin discriminatory practices and grant affirmative relief to eradicate the effects of past discrimination.

Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co. · filed 1972-11-20(g)

By virtue of the authority vested in the court by Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the Court will enjoin the discriminatory practices and provide affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of the past discrimination, and such other affirmative relief as appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not support an injunction benefiting only nonparties when the plaintiff seeks no prospective relief and the injunction is unnecessary to resolve the case.

Earl H. GREGORY, Appellee, v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., a Corporation, Appellant · filed 1973-02-12(g)

The injunctive benefits for nonparties, therefore, were neither incidental nor necessary to the resolution of the pending litigation.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a causal link between an unlawful employment practice and the claimed injury before a court may grant relief.

Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1973-02-27(g)

In fact, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), necessitates a finding of causation.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes relief that restores victims of employment discrimination to the economic position they would have held without it.

Rosen v. Public Service Electric · filed 1973-03-08(g)

Section 706(g) provides that the court "may enjoin * * * and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." ... The relief is intended to restore those wronged to their rightful economic status absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits compensation for pension losses caused by unlawful sex discrimination.

Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. · filed 1973-03-08(g)

On appeal the plaintiffs argue that compensatory damages should have been awarded to males who retired early under either of the discriminatory plans. With this we agree. Section 706(g) provides that the court “may enjoin * * * and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before a charge is filed with the Commission.

Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1973-04-13(g)

The outer limit with respect to the award of back pay is “two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back seniority and back pay from the discriminatory employment practice until the employees are reinstated.

Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co. · filed 1973-04-17(g)

It is our view that the plaintiffs are entitled to seniority and back pay dating from the time of the discriminatory employment practice up to the time they are actually reinstated.

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves the award or denial of back pay to the district court’s discretion in light of all the circumstances.

Catherine KOBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1973-05-25(g)

The statute says that the court may order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, with or without back pay. It is our determination that this language clearly leaves the award or denial of back pay to the discretion of the district court, to be exercised in the light of all the circumstances of each case.

Section 2000e-5 permits a court to deny back pay when the employer complied with state female protective laws before definitive guidance resolved their conflict with Title VII.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1121, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8654 · filed 1973-06-05(g)

Under all the circumstances of this case we cannot conclude that the District Judge abused his discretion in denying back pay to these plaintiffs. ... We conclude that this appeal is governed by the decision in Manning v. General Motors Corp., supra.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an award of seniority and back pay from the discriminatory practice until actual reinstatement.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 925, 6 Fair empl.prac.cas. 292, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8567, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8843 · filed 1973-06-25(g)

It is our view that the plaintiffs are entitled to seniority and back pay dating from the time of the discriminatory employment practice up to the time they are actually reinstated.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives trial courts discretion to award back pay after finding an intentional unlawful employment practice, with the employer’s good faith reliance on conflicting state law relevant to that decision.

Ada ASH Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOBART MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1973-08-09(g)

Upon the finding of an intentional unlawful employment practice, the fashioning of a remedy, including an award of back pay, is left to the sound discretion of the trial court pursuant to the provisions of Section 2000e-5(g), Title 42 U.S.C. The Court is to fashion the remedy with equitable principles in mind, one such principle being the exercise of good or bad faith on the part of the employer in making compliance with a conflicting state law.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deny back pay against a union that relied in good faith on an apparently valid state law.

Dolores WERNET and Helen Golden, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHERMEN, LOCAL 17, AFL-CIO, D · filed 1973-08-24(g)

If good faith reliance upon the state female protection statute (until found unconstitutional) is a defense which a District Judge may consider in denying money damages as to the employer who created the separate seniority lists, it must likewise serve as a defense for the union from such damages for waging something less than an all-out battle on behalf of its female members in the face of an apparently valid state law.

Section 2000e-5 permits a court to deny back pay when uncertainty about conflicting state and federal employment requirements makes that remedy inappropriate.

United Steelworkers v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1973-06-05(g)

Under all the circumstances of this case we cannot conclude that the District Judge abused his discretion in denying back pay to these plaintiffs. ... We conclude that this appeal is governed by the decision in Manning v. General Motors Corp., supra.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits recovery for psychic injuries caused by employment discrimination.

Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Company · filed 1973-04-12(g)

Accordingly, the Court finds that psychic injuries are proper in Civil Rights Act suits.

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves reinstatement to the court's discretion.

Brito v. Zia Co. · filed 1973-05-18(g)

The Act states that reinstatement may be ordered; it is discretionary with the court. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(g). All of the appellants found other work except one, who could have found work. The Court did not err.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to infer intent from the operation and effect of a deliberately used employment practice.

Brito v. Zia Co. · filed 1973-05-18(g)

“Intentionally” has been interpreted to mean that the practice was used deliberately, not accidentally. ... The use of the performance evaluation test was not accidental and the fact that the test was used with an intent to discriminate may be inferred from the statistics evidencing a greater reduction in the number of Spanish workers than Anglo employees.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an injunction when the court finds intentional discrimination; “intentional” means the respondent intended to do what it did.

Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1973-06-04(g)

Under Section 706(g) of Title 7 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)) the court must find that respondent has intentionally engaged in discriminatory practices. ... The word “intentional” in the Act has been interpreted as meaning the defendant intended to do what it did.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes injunctive relief for intentional unlawful employment practices, including purposeful conduct rooted in past discrimination that has racially determined effects.

Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation · filed 1973-09-14(g)

However, they have fallen short, and since their conduct was purposeful, was rooted in part on past discriminatory practices, and has had racially-determined effects, their conduct individually and collectively was “intentional” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) authorizing injunctive relief, and the Defendants are liable to respond to the Plaintiffs and their class for the unlawful practices.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits affirmative relief when an employer deliberately engaged in an unlawful employment practice; specific present intent to discriminate is unnecessary.

Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 1973-09-27(g)

Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), authorizes the court to grant affirmative relief if it finds that “the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint.” However, the plaintiff need not prove a specific, present intent to discriminate. ... The statute requires only that the defendant meant to do what he did, that is, his employment practice was not accidental.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay for Title VII violations, and a court should award it after finding discrimination unless exceptional circumstances are present.

6 Fair empl.prac.cas. 813, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8876 John Henry Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Company · filed 1973-10-12(g)

The finding of discrimination by the district court, in addition to the nature of the relief (compensatory as opposed to punitive), and the clear intent of Congress that the grant of authority under Title VII should be broadly read and applied mandate an award of back pay unless exceptional circumstances are present.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires back pay to be reduced by earnings from a second job the worker could not keep after obtaining the position sought.

William E. BING, for Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Et · filed 1973-10-15(g)

If a supplemental or moonlight job is one that the diseriminatee cannot perform when he wins his new position, the supplemental job is necessarily temporary, provisional or “interim.” By contrast, if one can hold his supplemental job and his desired full time job simultaneously and there is reason to believe he will do so, the supplemental job assumes a permanent rather than interim nature. Those earnings would be independent of the position sought and should not be taken into account in back pay calculations. Since the trial court found that it would be impossible for Bing to moonlight while working sixty to one hundred hours a week as a road driver, it correctly concluded that his moonlight earnings were interim and deductible from his back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires back pay to be reduced by interim earnings.

Stewards v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1973-12-21(g)

The amount of back pay would be computed separately for each, and reduced by her interim earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay when it finds intentional unlawful employment practices.

Bush v. Lone Star Steel Company · filed 1974-01-16(g)

After consideration of these factors as well as the relevant case law of this circuit, the court is nevertheless persuaded that the defendants have intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices and that the court should exercise its discretion to order an award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides illustrative, rather than exhaustive, remedies that can reach entities controlling access to employment without directly employing the complainant.

Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson · filed 1973-11-29(g)

The statutory enumeration of remedies is by its terms, however, illustrative rather than exhaustive; and it also reaches explicitly beyond the context of direct employment to employment agencies and labor organizations.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to grant a preliminary injunction to a private Title VII plaintiff without a showing of irreparable injury.

Murry v. American Standard, Inc. · filed 1973-12-14(g)

In short, Culpepper determined that Title VII authorizes granting a preliminary injunction requested by a private person. Hayes International and Culpepper determined that where such statutory authorization exists irreparable injury need not be shown. ... The District Court had adequate authority under the statute to issue the injunction attacked here.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a finding of intentional discrimination before the court may order relief; the employer need only have intended its actions, not a violation of the law.

Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Company · filed 1973-12-28(g)

Under the provisions of 42 U. S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), the court must find that the respondent “has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint” in order to issue an injunction or order other affirmative action or reinstatement or hiring with or without back pay. The court has no hesitation in finding that there has .been intentional discrimination at defendant’s plant. Entirely aside from the expressions of management indicating hostility to female employees, we have the general rule as laid down in Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), that the word “intentional” in this Act means that the defendant intended to do what it did, not that there was necessarily a deliberate and intentional violation of the law.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars reinstatement and back pay when an employment decision rests on a reason other than prohibited discrimination; an allegation of discrimination alone does not shield an employee from discipline.

Tomlin v. United States Air Force Medical Center · filed 1974-01-17(g)

Furthermore, the Courts must also be cognizant of the EEOA stricture that : ... No order of the Court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, col- or, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1972). (emphasis added) A plaintiff, therefore, may not immunize himself from discipline by a mere assertion of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for class members without requiring each member to prove an individual application, denial, or act of discrimination.

Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc. · filed 1974-02-26(g)

The court finds that it is not necessary as a prerequisite of an award of back pay to a class plaintiff that such class plaintiff had to apply for a position and be denied a position for discriminatory reasons at a time a position was available. Accordingly, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that proof of discrimination against an individual member of the class is not a prerequisite to an award of back pay to that individual member of the class.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to claims accruing within two years before an EEOC charge is filed.

Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc. · filed 1974-03-21(g)

First, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) limits availability of back pay to claims accruing two years prior to filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats moonlighting income as interim earnings to be deducted from a back pay award.

7 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1245, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9385 J. D. Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight · filed 1974-05-21(g)

This position is contrary to the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Bing (at page 454) that moonlight earnings were 'interim earnings' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). ... In our opinion the Fifth Circuit, in ordering the deduction from the damage claim of the amount of moonlight earnings, correctly applied the statute and reached a just and equitable result.

Section 2000e-5(g)’s intentional violation requirement limits remedies; it does not provide a defense to Title VII liability.

Williams v. General Foods Corp. · filed 1974-02-28(g)

The court below, in granting the Corporation’s motion for summary judgment, concluded that because the Corporation relied on the Illinois Female Employment Act in denying overtime opportunities to female employees, the Corporation lacked the discriminatory intent required by § 706(g) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). That section however, is merely a limitation on forms of remedy; it is not an affirmative defense barring liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s 1972 amendment limits backpay to no more than two years before EEOC charges are filed.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1974-04-03(g)

The 1972 amendment to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), limiting back-pay liability to not more than two years prior to filing of charges with the E.E.O.C. is not applicable to this case.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes courts to order affirmative action, including equitable relief, after finding an unlawful employment practice.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A. · filed 1974-06-24(g)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that upon finding that a respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice the court has the authority not only to enjoin continuation of the practice but also to order “affirmative action” which may include such “equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,” 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not provide enhanced retirement benefits when a retired employee’s past qualification for the position cannot be determined.

John W. NORMAN Et Al., Appellants, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD, a Corporation, Appellee · filed 1974-07-10(g)

Because retrospective qualification for the brakemen craft is impossible to measure in the present, no ascertainable standard exists to govern the past right to have been a brakeman nor to establish a date from which any possible retirement benefits could have been computed.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to require an employer that used discriminatory promotion standards to reevaluate employees under nondiscriminatory, objective, job related standards.

Johnie YOUNG, Appellant, v. EDGCOMB STEEL COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee · filed 1974-07-11(g)

Therefore, the Act grants district courts broad discretion to design appropriate equitable remedies for unlawful employment practices. ... The discreet remedy, we believe, is for the district court to direct the employer to reevaluate its employees using nondiscriminatory, objective, job related standards.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes reinstatement for an employee discharged in violation of Title VII.

Bradford v. Sloan Paper Company, Inc. · filed 1974-07-23(g)

The court directs that he be allowed to return to work at Sloan if he still desires to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires equitable relief sufficient to make a victim of discrimination whole as far as possible.

Harold FRANKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Johnny Lee, Intervenor-Appellant, v. BOWMAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY Et Al., Defendant · filed 1974-09-12(g)

Rather they should order “such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). If an appellate court can determine from the record that the relief granted is not sufficient to make the discriminatee whole as far as possible, then the district court’s order falls outside the bounds of its discretion.

Section 2000e-5 permits recovery of lost earnings with interest for an unlawful employment practice.

Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company · filed 1974-09-26(g)

The Court holds that the plaintiff is entitled to recover his loss of earnings during the period of his termination in the amount of $1,772.45, with interest at 7%% from June 23, 1969, together with his taxable costs.

Section 2000e-5 permits back pay for successful Title VII litigants and reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties; these awards fall when discrimination is not proved.

Dollie W. HESTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1974-10-16(g), (k)

Successful litigants in Title VII suits are eligible for back pay awards under Title 42 U.S.C., Sec. 2000e-5(g). ... Similarly, the “prevailing party” in Title VII litigation is eligible for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees under Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). But in this case the award of back pay and attorneys’ fees falls with the failure to prove discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) bars reinstatement when an employee was discharged for a reason other than prohibited discrimination.

Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., Materials Systems Div. · filed 1974-08-29(g)

Title VII provides that the reinstatement of an employee may not be ordered when the discharge was for any reason besides prohibited discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits preliminary injunctive relief to preserve a federal employee’s potential remedy while agency discrimination proceedings are pending.

Parks v. Brennan · filed 1974-12-17(g)

This Court concludes that it is authorized to grant preliminary injunctive relief in the instant case because : ... Section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (the “Act”) grants this Court jurisdiction over Federal employee employment discrimination claims and establishes the Court’s remedial authority under the same statutory provision applicable to private employers. Section 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g). ... Section 706(g), inter alia,, provides for the grant of equitable relief after trial on the merits “or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g) does not require proof of a discriminatory motive for injunctive relief or back pay; the employment practice need only be nonaccidental.

Rogers v. International Paper Co. · filed 1975-01-07(g)

Notwithstanding the provision in Title VII allowing injunctive relief and back pay only where the respondent has intentionally engaged in unlawful practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e— 5(g), courts have established that proof of discrimination does not require proof of intent to discriminate. All that is required is that the employment practice not be accidental.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a back pay award even when the amount of loss is difficult to determine.

Meadows v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1975-01-24(g)

We believe the District Judge was in error in concluding that the difficulties of ascertaining the amount of damages suffered deprived him of authority to award back pay. The statute relating to back pay is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(g) (1970).

Section 2000e-5(g) does not treat state unemployment benefits as interim earnings deductible from a back pay award.

Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1975-01-30(g)

State unemployment compensation benefits are made to carry out an independent social policy and are, therefore, not to be considered “interim earnings” deductible from a diseriminatee’s back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before an EEOC charge, but does not set a deadline for filing suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Griffin Wheel Co. · filed 1975-04-10(g)

Section 706(g) does specify that “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.” But this is not a prescription as to when suits may be filed. Clearly, Congress simply meant to provide a maximum period during which an employer might be liable for back pay, but it did not thereby intend to modify applicable state statutes of limitations on the ability to bring suit.

Section 2000e-5(g) places the burden on the employer to show that a plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence to mitigate a back-pay claim.

Sprogis v. United Air Lines · filed 1975-06-04(g)

In a Title VII case such as this, once the plaintiff has proven her case and established what she contends to be her damages, the burden of going forward to mitigate the liability, or, to rebut the damages claim, rests with the defendant.