42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file a Title VII lawsuit.

Engstrom v. Air Line Pilots Association, International · filed 2024-12-10(f)(1)

A plaintiff has ninety days from receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to file a Title VII lawsuit. ... Plaintiffs' Title VII claims are not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit, subject to tolling in certain situations.

Nelson v. CMC Packaging Solutions · filed 2024-12-11(f)(1)

The ninety-day period is akin to a statute of limitations which may be tolled in certain situations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file suit within 90 days after receiving adequate notice of the right to sue.

Hill v. North Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation · filed 2024-12-18(f)(1)

As the dismissal occurred more than 90 days after Hill received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims that the court dismissed without prejudice are time-barred and cannot be refiled.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Wilkes v. FedEx Corporation · filed 2024-12-30(f)(1)

A plaintiff alleging Title VII employment discrimination must file his complaint in the district court within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ... Because Wilkes’s lawsuit is untimely the Court must dismiss the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit.

Chauvin v. Town of Franklinton Mayor Gregory Route · filed 2024-12-16(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff has ninety days to bring suit in federal court after receipt of the statutory notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Accordingly, any Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims at issue in Chauvin’s first charge are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complainant to sue the named employer within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Circle Bear v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, KS · filed 2024-12-20(f)(1)

Once a complainant receives a right- to-sue letter, they must file a lawsuit against the named employer within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit runs from the plaintiff's receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue notice.

Thomas v. Graham Packaging Co. · filed 2025-01-09(f)(1)

Second, it's not apparent that October 16, 2023 would be too late. That's 92 days after the EEOC issued the notice of right to sue, but as noted earlier the 90-day limitations period runs from a plaintiff's receipt of the notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claim to be filed within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Efezokhae v. Rocket Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-01-15(f)(1)

Additionally, Rocket Mortgage is correct that Efezokhae failed to assert the Title VII claim within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Efezokhae’s failure to respond has provided the Court with no basis to relieve him from the time bar, and he has seemingly abandoned his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII lawsuit within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling.

Contejean v. Missouri · filed 2025-01-17(f)(1)

Because Plaintiff filed her complaint more than 90 days after she received notice of her right to sue from the EEOC and because equitable tolling is not warranted, the Court dismisses this action as time-barred.

The 90-day period for filing an ADA suit begins when the plaintiff receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Bautista v. Charles Schwab & Co. Inc · filed 2025-01-27(f)(1)

The ninety-day period is triggered by the plaintiff’s receipt of the Right to Sue Notice. ... Because untimeliness of Plaintiff’s action is not clear from the Second Amended Complaint or the attached exhibits, the Court determines that dismissal on timeliness grounds would be improper at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the employee actually receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Davis v. Pete's Fresh Market 4700 Corporation · filed 2025-03-03(f)(1)

However, Title VII’s statutory limitation period only began to run once Plaintiff received actual notice of the EEOC decision, and nothing in her complaint suggests Plaintiff received the EEOC notice immediately. The Court draws the reasonable inference that there was at least a day of ordinary postal delay between when the EEOC printed its notice and when Plaintiff received it by mail. As such, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s harassment claim as untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Morehouse v. Canadian National Railway Co. · filed 2025-03-28(f)(1)

A plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving a dismissal and notice of rights letter from the EEOC. ... That factual question is not one to resolve at the pleading stage. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims on this basis must therefore be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows ninety days after receipt of an EEOC dismissal notice to file a civil action.

Huber v. Darke County Common Pleas Court · filed 2025-05-16(f)(1)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she received “a notice of right to sue... on September 23, 2024[,]” (Doc. #1, PAGEID 2, | 6), meaning that her Complaint was filed within the ninety-day time limit after receiving the EEOC’s dismissal notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the plaintiff receives actual notice of the right to sue.

Kirby v. Gasaway Distributors Inc. · filed 2025-05-20(f)(1)

But that 90-day period begins to run when the plaintiff receives actual ... notice of her right to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII claimant 90 days to bring a civil action after the EEOC dismisses the charge and gives notice.

Bacon v. Woodward · filed 2025-07-11(f)(1)

The First Amended Complaint was filed on April 24, 2025, well beyond 90 days after any Plaintiff achieved compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). See ECF No. 109. The Court may dismiss on that basis alone, as these claims are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to bring a Title VII action.

Reid v. Hard Rock Casino · filed 2025-07-18(f)(1)

Additionally, Reid timely initiated this action on February 27, 2025, within the required 90-day window to do so (as her right-to-sue letter advised).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.

Whitfield v. Pere Antoine, Inc. · filed 2025-07-21(f)(1)

The evidence presented is insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden, and equitable tolling does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving EEOC right-to-sue notice; uncertainty about when notice was received and whether tolling applies can prevent dismissal as untimely at the pleading stage.

MORGAN v. PEPSICOLA METROPOLITAN BOTTLING COMPANY · filed 2025-08-05(f)(1)

A plaintiff filing a civil action under Title VII must file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. ... In sum, Morgan’s Complaint raises questions about when the ninety-day limitations period began to run and whether he is entitled to tolling in the event it expired before he filed this lawsuit. ... For these reasons, the Court will deny Pepsi’s Motion to Dismiss as to Morgan’s Title VII claims, so that the parties may further develop the relevant facts surrounding whether Morgan’s claims were timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complaint to be filed within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Ruano-Orozco v. Compass Group USA, Inc. d/b/a Bon Appetit Management Company · filed 2025-08-28(f)(1)

Any complaint must be filed within 90 days of receipt of the letter, or else the complaint is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving notice of the EEOC’s decision not to pursue the charge.

Hayden v. Allegheny Health Network · filed 2025-09-05(f)(1)

But Hayden did not comply with the ninety-day deadline for filing a complaint after she received notice from the EEOC of her right to sue following her first EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a Title VII lawsuit.

Walls v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. · filed 2020-06-01(f)(1)

Gordon-Fortune can easily assert her rights by filing a separate lawsuit against her former employer, given that the she was issued a right to sue letter by the EEOC and that Title VII’s 90-day filing period has not passed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; delayed service does not bar a timely filed claim when the court extends the time for service.

SCOTT v. MACON BIBB COUNTY GEORGIA · filed 2023-03-08(f)(1)

Thus, Scott’s failure to serve the defendants within 90 days of filing her complaint does not bar her Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Vesterman v. The Department of Education of the City of New York · filed 2025-09-30(f)(1)

Because Plaintiff did not commence this action until March 4, 2024, her Title VII claim must be dismissed as time barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file a Title VII action.

Flippen · filed 2025-10-23(f)(1)

Upon receipt of a notice of right-to-sue, the employee has 90 days in which to bring a federal action alleging violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... He filed this lawsuit on June 4, 2025, which is within the 90-day window mentioned above.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file a Title VII lawsuit within 90 days after receiving notice of the right to sue.

SHIRLEY · filed 2025-10-29(f)(1)

A plaintiff must file his complaint “within ninety days after the giving of such notice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Miller v. Harris Ventures, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-170, 2019 WL 13493418, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2019). ... Even giving Plaintiff an extra day since it was impossible for him to file on October 13, 2025, due to a federal holiday, Plaintiff still missed the filing deadline by one day.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a civil action.

Benjamin · filed 2025-11-13(f)(1)

Finally, the Court notes that upon filing his Complaint on February 7, 2025, Plaintiff duly exercised his right to sue within the 90-day deadline.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a civil action; the period runs from receipt, not the date on the letter.

Lenahan · filed 2025-12-08(f)(1)

Under Title VII, an individual must file their civil action within ninety days after receiving a notice of right to sue letter from the EEOC. ... So the Court concludes that Lenahan’s claim is not time-barred, at least for present purposes.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue.

Murphy v. F.H. Furr · filed 2025-12-22(f)(1)

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, to file suit within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue); ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Bexar County Hospital District D/B/A University Health F/K/A University Health System v. Levine · filed 2026-01-23(f)(1)

Under the ADA, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC; otherwise, suit is barred. ... It is undisputed that Levine filed suit within the required 90-day period—her right-to-sue letter was issued on December 30, 2020, and she filed suit on March 19, 2021, i.e., 79 days later.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit; a disputed receipt date cannot support dismissal on the pleadings.

Thomas · filed 2026-02-05(f)(1)

An ADA claim must be filed within 90 days of the date the plaintiff receives a right- to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117(a). ... The Court finds Defendant’s argument premature, as the factual dispute over when Plaintiff received the right-to-sue letter cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; mailing a complaint by the deadline does not constitute filing.

BOOKER · filed 2026-03-05(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must sue “within ninety days after the giving of” an EEOC right-to-sue notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); ... Because Booker mailed the Complaint, it was not filed until delivered.

The ninety-day period to sue runs from the first right-to-sue notice when a later EEOC charge alleges the same discriminatory act and the EEOC has not revoked the first notice.

Robinson · filed 2026-03-10(f)(1)

As such, Mr. Robinson’s Title VII claim is time-barred because the March 2024 Notice of Right to Sue controls, and Mr. Robinson filed the Complaint 251 days after receipt of that Notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file a Title VII claim in federal court.

Harris · filed 2026-03-10(f)(1)

The Court will grant the defendants’ motion in full: First, the Court will dismiss Harris’s race-related Title VII claims and her ADA claims because the time limit to bring them has expired.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice.

BLAYLOCK · filed 2026-03-16(f)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff must file her action within 90 days after receiving her right-to-sue notice that accompanies the agency's final decision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII civil action within 90 days after the EEOC gives a right-to-sue notice.

Weston · filed 2026-03-09(f)(1)

As an initial matter, Title VII requires a civil action to be filed in federal court within 90 days after the EEOC has given a “right-to-sue” notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Since this case was filed well after the 90 days had elapsed fully—and the right-to-sue letter explicitly informed Plaintiff of the time requirements, Plaintiffs Title VII claims are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an ADA plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit in federal court.

Evans · filed 2026-03-16(f)(1)

Under federal law, a plaintiff must file an ADA discrimination claim in federal court within 90 days of receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file a federal action.

Wolf · filed 2026-03-19(f)(1)

Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter (Doc. No. 7-2 at 2) from the EEOC on February 28, 2025 and timely filed his original Complaint (Doc. No. 1) with this Court on May 27, 2025, within the 90-day timeframe as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after issuance of a right-to-sue letter.

Cubelo · filed 2026-03-23(f)(1)

Both the ADA and Title VII require the plaintiff to file suit “within 90 days after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (Title VII); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a statutory filing deadline that Rule 6(b)(1)(B) cannot extend.

Sedwick · filed 2026-03-24(f)(1)

The limitations period here arises out of a statute: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit in federal court.

Anderson · filed 2026-03-31(f)(1)

After filing a charge of discrimination and receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, a plaintiff has 90 days to file a lawsuit in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when a claimant receives an EEOC email giving notice of and access to a right-to-sue notice in the EEOC portal.

Odunze · filed 2026-03-30(f)(1)

Because the evidence shows that Mr. Odunze had notice of and access to the Determination and Notice of Rights on January 27, 2024, that is the date the 90-day period began under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant receives the EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Ford · filed 2026-03-31(f)(1)

The court thus rejects defendant’s argument, which incorrectly posits that the 90-day period started when the EEOC mailed the letter and not when plaintiff received it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter, subject to equitable tolling.

Crawford · filed 2026-03-31(f)(1)

While a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), equitable tolling allows courts to “toll statutes of limitations, but only upon finding an inequitable event that prevented plaintiff’s timely action.” Just. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII lawsuit within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; a later amended complaint is timely if it relates back to a complaint filed within that period.

Michael V. Smith v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company · filed 2026-04-07(f)(1)

He must file his Title VII lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because the fifth amended complaint relates back to the original complaint and Smith filed the original complaint within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter, his Title VII claims are not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file a civil action within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

McCoy · filed 2026-04-16(f)(1)

After a charge of discrimination is filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), both Title VII and the ADEA require a plaintiff to file his civil action “within ninety days after the giving of” an EEOC right-to-sue notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (ADEA). ... Thus, McCoy is presumed to have received this notice by September 7, 2024; however, he did not file his complaint until more than nine months after this date—well outside the ninety-day statute of limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII discrimination claim to be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

Carter · filed 2026-04-22(f)(1)

Title VII discrimination claims must be filed within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), and that deadline is strictly enforced. ... Thus, there is no basis for equitable tolling, and her claims are barred as untimely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee 90 days to file suit after the EEOC gives notice that it will not act on the claim.

Yomi v. Del Toro · filed 2026-05-26(f)(1)

Yomi then had 90 days to file this claim in federal court.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to sue on behalf of aggrieved employees without complying with Rule 23 class certification.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sunrooms · filed 2026-02-20(f)(1)

Therefore, when the EEOC files a § 706 action, it does not need to comply with Rule 23’s class-certification procedure.

Section 2000e-5’s Commission procedure permits a classwide injunction when the representative’s charge gave the Commission an opportunity to seek compliance, but individual relief requires the Commission to have had that opportunity for each claimant’s injuries.

Hall v. Werthan Bag Corporation · filed 1966-03-03(e)

In regard to the injunctive relief sought in this case, therefore, the purpose of the requirement of resort to the Commission has already been served. In regard to whatever back pay or reinstatement which might be sought as ancillary relief, however, the purpose of the administrative remedies requirement has been satisfied only as to Robert Hall, for the Commission has not attempted conciliation in regard to rectifying any alleged injuries which other Negro employees or would-be employees may claim to have suffered as a result of the defendant’s alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires each plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies and sue within the statutory time, so unnamed plaintiffs who have not done so cannot maintain a class action.

Miller v. International Paper Company · filed 1967-11-09(e)(1)

No class action may be maintained in a situation of this kind where it must be shown that each plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, and has brought the consequent action within the time provided by statute.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a class action when an aggrieved person's charge alleges violations of a general nature that affect others.

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. · filed 1968-08-08(e)

Although Title VII does not expressly provide for class actions and, in fact, provides that suit may be brought only by “the person * * * aggrieved” who has filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, we think that reasonable interpretation and sensible administration of the Act require that class actions be permitted under appropriate circumstances, that is, where the alleged violations complained of to the Commission are of a general nature and raise issues which are not restricted to the one person who sought the aid of the Commission.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits class members to join a Title VII suit without filing individual EEOC charges when they raise issues covered by the representative’s charge.

John Martin Oatis, David Johnson, Sr., and R. T. Young v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation · filed 1968-07-16(e)

Additionally, it is not necessary that members of the class bring a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to joining as co-plaintiffs in the litigation. It is sufficient that they are in a class and assert the same or some of the issues.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not require every class member seeking relief to file an EEOC charge when a charge fairly raises the class’s common grievance.

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1969-09-26(e)

Colgate argues that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that each person seeking recovery must first file a charge with the EEOC and then formally join in or institute suit for recovery. This is not required in order to serve the policy behind that section.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and reinstatement for similarly situated class members who did not file separate EEOC charges when the representative pursued the classwide grievance through the Commission.

Local 186, International Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1969-06-02(g)

Moreover, the limitations urged here by defendant seem even more inconsistent with the reasoning of Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach and its progeny; to wit, that it is wasteful, if not vain, for all employees with the same grievance to file charges with the Commission. If that reasoning be persuasive, and the court finds that it is, then back wages and reinstatement, if appropriate, should be awarded without regard to which employee in fact filed.

Sections 2000e-5(e) and (f) require intervenors alleging completed discriminatory discharges to establish their own jurisdictional basis when the suit is not a proper class action.

Burney v. North American Rockwell Corporation · filed 1969-06-04(e), (f)

As previously stated this Court does not find this ease to be a proper class action and the discrimination complained of here is not continuing. Therefore it is clear that the intervenors are required to establish jurisdiction on an individual basis.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits class members who did not file EEOC charges to seek the same relief as the charging plaintiff when they join the action, subject to the scope of her charge and the court’s discretion.

Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Company · filed 1969-08-13(g)

The Court holds that where members of the class represented in each of the cases sub judice enter the action as co-plaintiffs, they come into the case on the same basis and with the same standing as the original plaintiff, entitled to litigate all issues which plaintiff may litigate, and entitled to seek such relief as plaintiff may seek.

Section 2000e-5 permits class members to receive reinstatement and back pay without filing individual EEOC charges when the representative filed a charge and conciliation failed.

Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1970-07-16(f)

We therefore hold that members of any class which plaintiff represents in this action are entitled to affirmative relief, such as reinstatement and back pay, even if the individuals never filed complaints with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires an EEOC charge to identify the alleged practice well enough to notify the Commission and the respondent; it need not establish a prima facie case.

GRANITEVILLE COMPANY (SIBLEY DIVISION), Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant · filed 1971-02-05(a)

The purpose of the charge under section 706 is only to initiate the EEOC investigation, not to state sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case. The parenthetical clause in section 706(a) only requires a sufficient allegation to give the EEOC notice of what it is to investigate and put the respondent on notice of the practice or violation with which it is charged.

Section 2000e-5(a) does not bar an employee’s suit because the EEOC delayed serving the charge when the employee did not control that delay.

Washington v. T. G. & Y. Stores Co. · filed 1971-04-09(a)

Petitioner should not be prejudiced by failure of prompt service of the charge by the Commission when that in no way was under her control. Further, we do not find, absent a clear and affirmative showing of prejudice, that the delays here are per se unreasonable.

Section 706(a) permits the EEOC to investigate a layperson’s charge that can reasonably be read as alleging an unlawful employment practice.

Dr. N. Jay ROGERS Et Al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant · filed 1972-01-31(a)

Rather, I think that a charge is sufficient to initiate EEOC proceedings if its factual allegations could reasonably encompass, upon a full investigation, an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires the EEOC to charge and investigate an employment agency when it has reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation occurred; the charge may state its factual basis generally without alleging specific acts.

Manpower, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-05-03(a)

The commission has a duty to charge an employment agency with an unlawful employment practice and to conduct an investigation into the charge whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII has occurred. § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). The factual basis for the charge may be stated generally, and the commission need not allege the specific acts which constitute the violation.

In a Title VII class action, class members need not file individual EEOC charges when the named plaintiff has met the Act’s procedural requirements.

Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1972-08-10(e)

Therefore, it is the ruling of this Court that the establishment of the “preferred” group in this cause must commence with the date of the plaintiff’s filing of a charge with the EEOC alleging a denial of his rights under Title VII of the Act (April 17, 1967), without regard to whether other members of the class filed charges with the EEOC after that date, and shall continue to and include the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion.

Section 2000e-5(g)'s remedial discretion does not allow a Title VII class action to bypass Rule 23's requirements.

Baham v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-04-19(g)

Citing Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), plaintiffs suggest that it is within the power of the Court to fashion whatever appropriate affirmative action it deems necessary in its discretion, Rule 23 notwithstanding. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears to have rejected this view in Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971). ... The decision must, therefore, be made in conformity with Rule 23.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing requirement can be satisfied by a union's charge on behalf of employees when the EEOC processes the charge and issues a right-to-sue notice.

LOCAL 179, UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant, v. FEDERAL PAPER STOCK COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1972-07-19(e)

A charge was filed concerning their alleged injury, the EEOC made the appropriate administrative determinations, conciliation was attempted and the statutory notice was given. Under these special circumstances, we view the fact that it was the Union, and not the female employees, who filed the charge insignificant.

Section 2000e-5 permits class certification when only one named plaintiff received an EEOC right-to-sue notice before filing, if the charges allege a general discriminatory policy affecting the class.

Leisner v. New York Telephone Company · filed 1973-03-02(e)

Finally, that, prior to the filing of the complaint in this Court, only one of the named plaintiffs had received notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that it had been unable to secure voluntary compliance, a prerequisite to the filing of a civil suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, does not bar class action certification.

Section 2000e-5’s charge-filing requirement is satisfied for similarly situated class members when plaintiff members file and process EEOC charges on their behalf.

Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp. · filed 1973-12-26

It is well settled that the filing and processing of charges by plaintiff members of the class on behalf of those similarly situated is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

Section 2000e-5 does not require unnamed class members to file separate EEOC charges to receive back pay.

Rush Pettway, Etc. v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervenor · filed 1974-05-22(a)-(e)

Title VII does not exclude unnamed or non-filing class members from a back pay decree because of failure to exhaust remedies, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a)-(e) (1972), with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not impose the Social Security Act’s jurisdictional restrictions on unnamed class members.

Predmore v. Allen · filed 1976-03-16(f)(3)

In this case, however, the exhaustion rationale of Salfi is inapplicable. Jurisdiction exists herein pursuant, inter alia, to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) (3) and 2000e-16(e), (d), ... which contain none of the jurisdictional restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h).

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII class representative from representing people whose time to file an EEOC charge had expired when the representative filed her charge.

Lamphere v. Brown University · filed 1976-07-21(e)

While a plaintiff may bring a class action on behalf of those who have not filed charges with the E.E.O.C., since his or her action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the class, see Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, 508 F.2d at 246, this court agrees with Wetzel and similar decisions that have held that such plaintiffs cannot represent those who could not have filed a charge with the E.E.O.C. at the time plaintiffs filed their charges.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits Title VII class membership to people who could have filed a timely EEOC charge when the representative plaintiff filed hers; only the representative must actually file.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1977-01-24(e)

Although the representative plaintiff alone needs to meet the jurisdictional requirement, only persons capable of having met it, i. e. persons employed on and after the 300th day prior to the date plaintiff filed her charge (October 24,1972) are eligible for class membership.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims when the claimant files an EEOC charge more than 180 days after the claims arose.

Hazelgrove v. FORD MOTOR CO., FORD PARTS DIV. · filed 1977-02-01(e)

The plaintiff’s claims referenced above are time barred in this action. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427, 45 U.S.L.W. 4068 (1976) does not alter this conclusion as Ms. Hazelgrove’s claims concerning commencement of her maternity leave and benefits arose more than 180 days prior to her filing a charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC charge-filing limit does not allow a later refusal to rehire to revive older discrimination claims without a continuing wrong.

Wallace v. International Paper Co. · filed 1977-02-18(e)

We will hear Ms. Wallace’s claim that an act of discrimination was committed against her on September 3, 1972, by not rehiring her, and we will allow evidence of alleged prior discriminatory acts to show possible motive for defendants to discriminate; but we will not permit plaintiff to sue for acts which allegedly occurred more than 180 days prior to September 26, 1972, the date Ms. Wallace filed a charge with EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period applies to an EEOC charge that was filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination and remained pending when the 1972 amendment took effect.

Crook v. Penn Central Transportation Co. · filed 1977-03-03(e)

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff’s charge, filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory occurrence, and pending before the Commission on March 24, 1972, was timely.

Under § 2000e-5(e), the Title VII limitations period is suspended for eligible class members once one member initiates the grievance process.

Coppotelli v. Howlett · filed 1977-04-04(e)

The statute of limitations in Title VII actions is suspended once one member of the class initiates the grievance mechanism.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits class relief and preserves an employer’s defense that an individual employment decision was made for a reason other than discrimination.

EEOC v. American Telephone · filed 1977-04-22(g)

But the sentence does not speak at all to the showing that must be made by individual suitors, or class representatives on behalf of class members, or the EEOC on behalf of class members. The sentence merely preserves the employer's defense that the non-hire, discharge, or non-promotion was for a cause other than discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits relief for a class without requiring each member to prove individual discrimination, while preserving an employer’s defense that an employment decision had a reason other than discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1977-04-22(g)

But the sentence does not speak at all to the showing that must be made by individual suitors, or class representatives on behalf of class members, or the EEOC on behalf of class members. The sentence merely preserves the employer’s defense that the non-hire, discharge, or non-promotion was for a cause other than discrimination.

Section 2000e-5’s filing deadlines do not bar an unnamed class member from intervening after judgment solely to appeal denial of class certification when the class action was timely commenced and the intervention motion is filed within the appeal period.

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald · filed 1977-06-20(e), (f)(1)

Success in that review would result in the certification of a class, the named members of which had complied with the statute of limitations; the respondent is a member of that class against whom the statute had not run at the time the class action was commenced.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows similarly situated intervenors to seek back pay without filing individual EEOC charges when an original plaintiff has satisfied the charge and notice requirements.

Carole Wheeler v. American Home Products Corporation (Boyle-Midway Division) v. Bonnie Boss, Intervenors-Appellants · filed 1977-12-01(f)(1)

While in Oatis, the action was a class action, the same reasoning would apply wherever similarly situated persons intervene in an action and one or more of the original plaintiffs had satisfied the jurisdictional requisites.

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII class to people who could have filed an EEOC charge when the representative filed hers.

Hodgin v. Jefferson · filed 1978-03-13(e)

The better reasoned cases have held that the filing of charges with the E.E.O.C. tolls the statute of limitations for a Title VII claim by the representative plaintiff and her putative class. ... But the plaintiff cannot represent persons who could not have filed a charge with the E.E.O.C. at the time she did.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a timely EEOC charge by one class member to satisfy the filing requirement for the class, but it does not revive former employees’ claims that were already time-barred.

Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp. · filed 1978-07-12(e)

In a class action, the timely filing by any member of the class satisfies the filing requirement for the entire class. The filing does not operate, however, to bring into the class persons whose claims were time-barred when the filing occurred. Since the statute runs against former employees as of the date of their termination, it follows that they cannot be members of the class unless they were employed within the appropriate time limit preceding the representative filing, even if “continuing violations” are alleged.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to seek relief for a class without complying with Rule 23.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Singer Controls Co. of America · filed 1978-08-17(f)(1)

For the reasons stated above, the Court holds that compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 is not required when the EEOC brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5 permits a private Title VII plaintiff to seek to bring a class action while the EEOC pursues pattern and practice remedies.

BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION · filed 1978-08-15(f)(1)

In contrast to § 709(e), which plainly evinces Congressional intent to limit the use of information gathered in Commission investigations, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that a private party with a right to file an action may not attempt to do so on behalf of a class.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC filing period limits how far back a Title VII class may recover; a class member’s timely charge can suspend the period for the class.

18 Fair empl.prac.cas. 711, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8697 Liane Buix McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., Liane Buix McDonal · filed 1979-01-25(d)

The record (as supplemented on September 26, 1978) shows that class member plaintiffs Mary O’Connor Whitmore and Terry Baker Van Horn filed their EEOC charges on January 25, 1966. Therefore, the temporal limits of this class will date from October 27, 1965 (90 days before the EEOC charges) to November 7, 1968, when the no-marriage rule was withdrawn.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to seek relief for a class without Rule 23 certification.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF the NORTHWEST · filed 1979-06-27(f)(1)

Similar procedural safeguards are available in a class action brought by the EEOC even though it is not certified under Rule 23.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to seek relief for a class without obtaining Rule 23 class certification.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. General Telephone Co. of Northwest, Inc. · filed 1979-06-27(f)(1)

It is clear that a compliance with Rule 23 is not expressly mandated by either the Rule itself or the 1972 Amendments authorizing the EEOC to bring a civil suit under § 706. ... Similar procedural safeguards are available in a class action brought by the EEOC even though it is not certified under Rule 23.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to bring class actions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank · filed 1979-10-31

Thus, despite the partial redundancy apparent in such an interpretation of Title VII’s statutory scheme, the Court accepts the view that the EEOC may utilize § 706 to bring class actions.

Section 706 requires the EEOC to satisfy Rule 23(a) to represent a class; its ability to meet commonality and typicality depends on the claims of the individual complainant.

Local 194, Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc. · filed 1979-12-06

With respect to numerosity, commonality, and typicality, however, the Court believes that the EEOC can satisfy Rule 23(a) only to the extent that the private individual whose interest the agency seeks to represent could comply with the rule.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to bring a class action based on discrimination uncovered during an investigation even when it finds no reasonable cause on the original charge.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BROOKHAVEN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-04-02(f)(1)

We hold that dismissal was improper because the EEOC could meet the membership requirement of Rule 23 in this section 706 suit although the Commission found no reasonable cause on the original charge undergirding the suit.

Title VII class claims may relate back to an individual complaint when they concern the same employment practices and adding them does not prejudice the employer.

Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co. · filed 1980-06-18

The relevant time limitations with respect to the assertion of a claim under Title VII require that a claimant must file his claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination and that the claimant’s civil action must be brought within 90 days of his receipt from the EEOC of a right to sue letter. ... As stated above, however, the facts of this case coupled with the important policies of Title VII lead this Court to the conclusion that plaintiff’s class claims should relate back to the time of the filing of her original complaint.

An intervenor need not file a separate EEOC charge when an original plaintiff filed one and their discrimination claims are so similar that a separate charge would serve no conciliatory purpose.

Foster v. Albert Gueory, Ronald Dorsey, and Rudolph J. Thornton v. Local 2311 of the United Brotherhood of Carpen · filed 1981-06-19(f)(1)

We conclude that the appellants have asserted claims of racial discrimination that are so similar to those asserted by the original plaintiffs that no purpose would be served by requiring appellants to file independent racial discrimination charges with EEOC.

Under § 2000e-5(e), a plaintiff who did not file an EEOC complaint cannot rely on another plaintiff’s complaint unless it was timely as to the filing plaintiff’s own claim.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1293, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,338 Dorothy Allen, Cross-Appellees v. United States Steel Corp., C · filed 1982-01-11(e)

Thus, we further conclude that plaintiffs like Byram, Globet-ti and Green, who have not themselves filed timely EEOC complaints, cannot rely upon the EEOC complaint of another, when the latter complaint itself is not timely as to the filing party’s own individual claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a plaintiff who filed a timely EEOC charge to represent class members whose claims were still timely when that charge was filed, even if they filed no charges of their own.

Domingo v. New England Fish Co. · filed 1984-03-13(e)

It follows, then, that Domingo may represent all class members whose claims were not already time-barred at the time he filed his charge, irrespective of whether the class members had filed charges of their own.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows class members to benefit from the 300-day filing period even if they did not individually initiate state agency proceedings.

Domingo v. New England Fish Co. · filed 1984-03-13(e)

Although Title VII seems to say that the longer period is to be used only for claimants who have instituted proceedings with an appropriate state agency, we have held the 300-day period applicable to the class.

In a deferral state, a Title VII claimant has 300 days to file an EEOC charge; a class may include only people whose claims were timely when the first class representative filed.

Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. · filed 1984-11-07(e)

In a class action, the class can include only those persons who could have filed a timely claim at the earliest date that any class representative filed a claim.

Employees need not each file an EEOC charge before suing under Title VII when their discrimination claims are sufficiently similar and right-to-sue letters were issued for reasons applicable to all of them.

Snell v. Suffolk County · filed 1985-06-05(f)(1)

All plaintiffs need not file administrative charges as a prerequisite to suit so long as the claims of discrimination are sufficiently similar and “right to sue” letters have been issued for reasons applicable to all plaintiffs.

Members of a proposed Title VII class may proceed without individually exhausting administrative remedies when other members have done so.

Ramos v. Flagship International, Inc. · filed 1985-06-19(e)

The parties concede that Messrs. Diaz, del Rosario and Millet have not exhausted the administrative procedures required by Title VII. These plaintiffs, however, are members of a proposed class, three of which, Ramos, Garcia and Mendez, have assertedly exhausted their administrative remedies. ... On the above-indicated authorities, defendants’ motion to dismiss the actions of Diaz, del Rosario and Millet under Title VII must be and the same hereby is denied.

Section 2000e-5 permits plaintiffs with sufficiently related discrimination claims to join a Title VII suit without each filing a separate EEOC charge.

Snell v. Suffolk County · filed 1986-01-22(e)

We adopt the "single filing" rule, and, on the evidence before us we cannot say the district court's finding that the claims were sufficiently related was erroneous.

Section 2000e-5 requires an individual Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge and receive a right-to-sue letter, but members of a properly certified class may seek backpay through a named plaintiff's claim without filing their own charges.

McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. · filed 1989-11-08(f)(1)

Filing a charge and receiving a right to sue letter are prerequisites to an individual's bringing suit under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), -5(f)(3). However, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the Supreme Court held that class members need not have filed their own charges in order to be entitled to relief in a class action. See id. at 414 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. at 2370 n. 8. Consequently, to the extent that the class was properly certified, a question not raised in this appeal, the other female employees and former employees of Crown Cork may piggy-back their backpay claims on McNasby's claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge-filing period is tolled for individual claims while a Title VII class action is pending, even if class certification is later vacated.

Griffin v. Singletary · filed 1994-03-29(e)

Therefore, we hold that the charge-filing period for the individual claims asserted in the Platt litigation was tolled during the pendency of the class action in Griffin--that is, from the time the lawsuit was filed until this Court published its opinion vacating the order certifying the class on September 23, 1987.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing period is tolled during a pending Title VII class action for class members bringing individual suits, but not for those bringing another class action.

Griffin v. Singletary · filed 1994-03-29(e)

This case presents the question whether the pendency of a Title VII class action tolls the administrative charge-filing period for the class members when class certification is vacated because the representative failed to make a timely filing with the EEOC. We hold that it does toll the period for those wishing to bring individual suits but does not for those wishing to bring class action suits.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge is tolled for potential class members by an earlier charge alleging classwide discrimination.

Binion v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority · filed 1995-09-12(e)(1)

Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, the Crown, Cork & Seal holding applies not only to suspend the 90-day limitation period following receipt of a right-to-sue letter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1), but also to suspend the 300-day limitation period for filing an initial EEOC charge alleging elasswide injury, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5 allows the EEOC to sue on behalf of a class of unidentified individuals without obtaining class certification.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service · filed 1996-08-23(f)(1)

Further, because the EEOC represents the public interest in a non-discriminatory market for employment, it need not obtain class certification to bring an action on behalf of a class of unidentified individuals.

A person seeking to represent a Title VII class before certification must have filed a timely EEOC charge; members of an existing class action need not each file one.

Robinson v. Sheriff of Cook County · filed 1999-02-08(e), (f)(1)

It might even be someone like Taylor who had not filed a timely claim with the EEOC, because once a Title VII class action is up and running the class members are not required to inundate the EEOC with what amount to meaningless requests for right to sue letters. ... But there was no class action when Taylor was added to the suit. There was no class representative who had dropped the baton for her to pick up; Robinson had never been approved as the class representative. Taylor's suitability as class representative had thus to be determined independently of him.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge supporting a Title VII class action to give the employer and the EEOC notice of the alleged class-wide discrimination and the proposed class’s scope.

Marquis v. Tecumseh Products Co. · filed 2002-03-20(e)

To qualify as representative, thereby satisfying the exhaustion of remedies precondition to the commencement of a Title VII class action, an EEOC charge must alert the employer and the EEOC of alleged class-wide discrimination, and must provide adequate notice of the scope of the proposed class, so that the parties may engage in meaningful conciliation efforts in advance of suit.

Section 2000e-5 permits an injunctive relief class action when the representative has presented a claim to the EEOC, without requiring each class member to do so.

Gutierrez v. Quinn & Co. · filed 1972-08-22

It seems that the courts have taken the position that if one person has followed the statute with regard to presentation of his claim to the E.E.O.C., that no requirement should be made that others comply with the statute in that regard, insofar as the class action is concerned, and insofar as any injunction is concerned. ... 1. This action is maintainable as a class action insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, but not otherwise.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s EEOC charge filing period is tolled for a class member until summary judgment resolves the class claims.

Womack v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2004-02-09(e)(1)

This court concludes that the tolling of any limitations periods ended on June 26, 2000, when the Morgan court granted summary judgment against the class claims.

Section 2000e-5 does not categorically bar an ADA class action at the motion to dismiss stage merely because the initial EEOC charge lacks class allegations.

Branum v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2005-12-23

The court concludes that there is no per se rule that would preclude, at a motion to dismiss stage, an ADA class action merely for failure to have class allegations set forth in the initial charge filed with the EEOC.

A timely EEOC charge can exhaust related Title VII class claims when the claims would reasonably fall within the investigation prompted by the charge.

Velez v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 2007-07-31(e)(1)

It would similarly have been reasonable here for the EEOC to investigation pay and promotion claims, because Velez’s complaint specifically references being denied a merit pay increase. ... Thus, defendants’ arguments are without merit, and there is no exhaustion-related reason why the class period cannot open on July 15, 2002.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit after a right-to-sue notice remains tolled for a putative class member while class certification remains unresolved.

Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Incorporated · filed 2014-03-31(f)(1)

For Odle, as a member of the putative Rule 23(b)(3) class of former Wal-Mart employees, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc Dukes opinion was not a “final adverse determination” within the meaning of Taylor, so tolling did not cease as to her when the mandate issued. Because Odle filed this lawsuit before the California district court’s October 28, 2011 filing deadline expired, her action was timely.

The 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge resumes for a claim when the plaintiffs in a class action abandon that claim at the certification stage.

Smithson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2022-05-11(e)(1)

The Court agrees with Union Pacific and concludes that American Pipe tolling ended for Smithson when the Harris Plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned the class-wide disparate-impact claim at the certification stage.

Section 2000e-5 provides for a de novo district court trial of the alleged unlawful employment practice, rather than review of how the Commission formulated an interpretive ruling.

Air Transport Association of America v. Hernandez · filed 1967-02-21(f)

Again, the legislative history as well as the over-all purpose of the Act indicates Congress intended the District Court to try de novo the unlawful employment practice issue only.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge requirement does not apply to an employer's contribution claim against a union for participating in an agreement that led to alleged discrimination.

Blanton v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1970-02-27(e)

The court notes, however, that while 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is applicable as to any charge that an employer, employment agency, or labor organization has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, it does not by its terms apply to a situation such as the present one where the employer claims that the union is liable because it participated in the agreement which led up to the allegedly unlawful practices.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a civil action to include claims within the scope of an EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.

Celia SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1970-08-17(e)

Thus it is obvious that the civil action is much more intimately related to the EEOC investigation than to the words of the charge which originally triggered the investigation. Within this statutory scheme, it is only logical to limit the permissible scope of the civil action to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.

A civil action may include a discrimination claim within the scope of an EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge.

MacK v. General Electric Company · filed 1971-06-28(f)

Where 16 employes have complained of discrimination in upgrading, we consider it reasonable to expect the EEOC to investigate alleged incidents of promotional discrimination. ... We therefore conclude that Mack can maintain an action on at least one of his individual claims and that the adequacy of his representation of the class will not be lessened by jurisdictional obstacles.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a private Title VII action based on a single instance of discrimination; a pattern or practice is not required.

Ward King v. Laborers International Union of North America, Union Local No. 818 · filed 1971-05-13(e)

Whereas it should have charged the jury in accordance with the statutory standards set out in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5. The jury should have been instructed that a single instance of discrimination may form the basis of a private suit.

Section 2000e-5(a) limits a Title VII lawsuit to claims within the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the discrimination charge.

Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co. · filed 1973-07-05(a)

If parties were given complete freedom to litigate claims of discrimination never presented to the EEOC for investigation and conciliation, it would result in the frustration of the statutory scheme and policies favoring informal persuasion and voluntary compliance.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a Title VII claim when the administrative charge sufficiently raises related discrimination for investigation.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1974-02-20(e)

The court believes that the Representative Plaintiffs have properly employed the administrative procedures of Title VII which are a prerequisite to suit in the district court, they have properly raised the issue of sex discrimination in the “terms and conditions” of employment, that they specifically raised allegations of discrimination in respect to marital status and family planning sufficient to satisfy the administrative investigation requirement for raising the specific question of sex discrimination in maternity leave and pregnancy disability income policies in the present lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a civil complaint to include discrimination reasonably related to the EEOC charge or growing out of it while the charge is pending, if the complainant has standing to raise it.

Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals Company · filed 1974-05-01(f)

The correct rule is that the complaint in the civil action is confined to those issues which the original complainant has standing to raise, but may properly encompass any such discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge or growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission.

Section 2000e-5 limits an EEOC civil action based on a charge to claims the charging party might have raised.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. General Electric Co. · filed 1974-05-22(f)(1)

This court is of the opinion that since a suit under Title VII brought by the EEOC must be based on a charge, the issues raised in the suit must be limited to claims which might have been raised by the charging party.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require dismissal of later alleged discriminatory acts solely because the plaintiff did not file a separate formal charge covering them.

Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission · filed 1974-05-17(f)(1)

Defendants’ final point is that plaintiff’s failure to file a formal Charge of Discrimination covering the alleged discriminatory acts in 1972 deprives this court of jurisdiction over the 1972 claim. This contention has no merit in a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(4) and (5) requires a judge to be designated to hear a Title VII case and permits appointment of a master if the judge has not scheduled trial within 120 days after issue is joined.

Robert FLOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROUCH-WALKER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-01-13(f)(4)-(5)

Against the background just cited, we think it plain that, as here applied, and indeed apparently as applied under all cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Rule 1, subd. D(2)(b)(i) of the Local Magistrates Rules adopted by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is invalid because it is so plainly repugnant to the letter and the spirit of § 706(f)(4) and (5) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-5’s procedural rules for civil actions apply to federal employment discrimination suits through § 2000e-16(d).

Sylvester v. U. S. Postal Service · filed 1975-04-23

Second, Section 2000e-16(d) provides that those provisions of Section 2000e-5 concerning procedural matters, such as venue, appointment of a special master, the types of relief available, appellate procedure, etc., will be specifically applicable to an action against a federal agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s stay provision implies that judicial and administrative proceedings may continue concurrently in private employment discrimination cases.

Violet Davis Grubbs, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Earl L. Butz, Individually and as S · filed 1975-06-23(f)(1)

If the filing of a civil action automatically terminated all non-judicial jurisdiction over a discrimination dispute, this provision would be meaningless since no occasion could ever arise in which to apply it. Thus the existence of concurrent jurisdiction is apparently implicit in § 2000e — 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)-(k) provides for a trial de novo in federal court in civil actions involving state or local government employment discrimination.

Hackley v. Richard L. Roudebush, Administrator of Veterans Affairs · filed 1975-09-29(f)-(k)

Since these civil actions are explicitly covered by the various provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k) (subsections 706(f)-(k) of Title VII), these civil actions are clearly trials de novo.

Section 2000e-5(f)(5) permits a court to appoint a master to expedite a Title VII case when practicable.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local Union No. 3, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1975-11-26(f)(5)

Although under rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reference to a master shall be the “exception rather than the rule,” to be made only upon a showing of some “exceptional condition,” § 706(f)(5) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5), specifically provides for the appointment of a master in keeping with the policy of expediting Title VII cases whenever practicable. Here, where a hearing could take several weeks, and where on sight visitation would appear necessary, reference to a master seems particularly appropriate. However, in the interest of limiting the expense of such a hearing, and because it would be desirable to have a formal record developed, reference will be made to a United States magistrate rather than a special master.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not allow a separate suit on a charge the EEOC has fully settled by consent decree, even when the claimant received late notice of the EEOC’s suit.

McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp. · filed 1975-12-30(f)(1)

There is nothing in section 2000e-5(f) (1)' which would authorize the Commission to issue a “Right to Sue” letter to a claimant after submitting and obtaining approval of a consent decree which on its face is in full settlement of that claimant’s charge. The Commission’s alleged failure to notify plaintiff of the pendency of its suit until over a year and a half after that suit had been settled is a factor which must be taken into consideration in passing upon plaintiff’s motion to intervene, but does not create in the plaintiff a separate cause of action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(5) requires judges to schedule Title VII cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date and expedite them.

Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp. · filed 1976-01-16(f)(5)

The court was operating under an explicit statutory mandate to handle this Title VII case, already several years old, as expeditiously as possible.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit on a discrimination claim omitted from the EEOC charge when the claim is like or related to the facts stated in that charge.

Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas · filed 1976-03-12(f)(1)

Where the facts plead to the EEOC reveal the possibility of more than one type of discrimination, the complainant will not be barred from bringing suit on any basis “like or related to” the facts stated to the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 allows an EEOC civil action to include additional discrimination discovered through a reasonable investigation of the original charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hearst Corp. · filed 1976-06-30

However, we regard EEOC v. Occidental as broad enough to allow minority discrimination if it arises out of a reasonable investigation of the charge filed.

Section 2000e-5 allows a Title VII suit to encompass related charges filed during pending EEOC proceedings when they grow out of the original charge.

Angeline OSTAPOWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNSON BRONZE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1976-09-29

The additional charges filed during the pendency of the administrative proceedings may fairly be considered explanations of the original charge and growing out of it.

A Title VII civil action may include acts before or after the EEOC charge if the allegations could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge or the EEOC investigation.

King v. New Hampshire Department of Resources & Economic Development · filed 1976-10-27(f)

This court does not find any essential difference between prior and subsequent acts in terms of whether they can be alleged in a judicial complaint so long as the allegations in the complaint could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC charge or the EEOC investigation.

Section 2000e-5 permits plaintiffs to litigate allegations raised in their EEOC charge even if the Commission did not investigate them.

Chappelle v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. · filed 1976-10-18(f)

If the Commission failed to investigate some of the allegations, fault does not lie with these plaintiffs and they will not be precluded from litigating those issues raised in the charge but not actually investigated.

Section 2000e-5 permits an EEOC suit to include discrimination discovered during a reasonable investigation of the original charge if the EEOC includes it in its reasonable cause determination and follows conciliation procedures.

EEOC v. Hearst Corp. · filed 1977-04-20

In other words, the original charge is sufficient to support EEOC administrative action, as well as an EEOC civil suit, for any discrimination stated in the charge itself or discovered in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge, provided such additional discrimination was included in the EEOC "reasonable cause" determination and was followed by compliance with the conciliation procedures of the Act.

The scope of a Title VII suit is evaluated using the factual statement in the EEOC charge, rather than the notice sent to the employer.

Groves v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1977-04-29(e)

It is not the “Notice of Charge of Discrimination” that contains the factual statement; this document is merely a standard form sent by the EEOC to the employer, advising him that the Commission has received a complaint against him. Rather, the factual statement is contained in the document entitled “Charge of Discrimination.”

Section 2000e-5 does not require every similarly situated coplaintiff to file a separate EEOC charge when other plaintiffs have filed charges about the same continuing discrimination.

Ben ALLEN Et Al., Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 788, Appellee · filed 1977-05-09(e)

Under such circumstances, particularly where the discrimination is continuing ... it would be nonsensical to require each of the plaintiffs to individually file administrative charges with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit to include a retaliation claim arising while an EEOC charge is pending when the claim is reasonably related to the acts alleged in that charge.

Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute · filed 1977-06-23(f)(1)

This rule is broad enough to include claims arising from new acts occurring during pendency of the EEOC charge and reasonably related to or growing out of acts alleged in the charge. ... Claims of retaliation for filing the charge are within this category. ... Applying this rule, I reject defendants’ contention that I do not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory conduct.

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII civil action to claims raised with the EEOC or reasonably related to the EEOC charge.

Eastwood v. Temporaries · filed 1977-10-03(f)(1)

In summation, the allegations of harassment, intimidation, and retaliation cannot be permitted because they were not first raised with the EEOC. They cannot be permitted under the charge as filed or amended with the EEOC because it is nowhere alleged that the harassment, intimidation, and retaliation is the product of sex discrimination. There is no reasonable relationship between these allegations and the charge as filed with the EEOC nor did these acts “grow out of” acts enumerated in the charge.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination must demonstrate compliance with Section 2000e-5’s prerequisites to a civil action.

Marsh v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. · filed 1977-11-21

Assuming for purposes of this motion that the plaintiff is alleging sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, she has failed to demonstrate that she has satisfied the prerequisites to a civil action as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge that gives the agency an opportunity to investigate and conciliate alleged discrimination before those allegations may be included in a federal lawsuit.

Smith v. Joseph Horne Co. Inc. · filed 1977-10-14(f)

Since the EEOC cannot have had the opportunity to investigate and conciliate events occurring subsequent to the February 18, 1975 charge filed with it, allegations regarding incidents occurring after the EEOC charge and after the filing of the complaint do not meet the jurisdictional prerequisite to this federal court action.

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII civil complaint to issues within the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow from the administrative charge.

Kenneweg v. Hampton Township School District · filed 1977-10-20(f)

What has not been part of an EEOC investigation cannot be part of a conciliation attempt. The civil action must be limited to the range of issues that would have been the subject matter of the conciliation efforts between EEOC and the employer in order not to circumvent the primary emphasis of Title VII, i. e. an emphasis upon voluntary settlement of all issues without an action in the district court.

Section 2000e-5 permits class claims that are like or related to the named plaintiff’s EEOC charge.

Markey v. Tenneco Oil Co. · filed 1977-10-21(e)

Given this liberal standard, I believe Judge Boyle was correct in rejecting defendant’s argument that the class claims were not “like or related to” Markey’s EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5 permits a civil action to include claims reasonably within the scope of the EEOC charge, even if the EEOC did not investigate those claims.

Harry Daniel HICKS, Appellant, v. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee · filed 1978-01-19(f)(1)

We believe the correct rule for the scope of the civil complaint which may follow a notice of the right to sue from the EEOC, irrespective of the actual content of the Commission's investigation, is that in Ostapowicz. ... The district court must further find that the sex discrimination claims which would have been uncovered were reasonably within the scope of the charge filed with the EEOC.

A Title VII plaintiff may not raise a distinct basis of discrimination in court unless it was included in the EEOC complaint.

Saad v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. · filed 1978-03-15(e)

The Court concludes that under Title VII, plaintiff may not raise in Court a basis for discrimination which was not included in his EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5 permits people who did not file EEOC charges to join a civil action, but limits the suit to issues the charging parties had standing to raise.

Muka v. Nicolet Paper Co. · filed 1978-06-14(f)

Although persons who have not filed charges before the commission may join as co-plaintiffs or as class members in a civil action with the plaintiffs who have filed charges before the commission, the only issues which may properly be considered in the suit are those which the charging parties before the commission had standing to raise.