42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious discrimination claim to proceed when an employee plausibly alleges that a religious belief conflicts with a job requirement and that the employer terminated the employee for noncompliance.

GLOVER v. THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2024-01-25(a)(1)

His beliefs that (1) the use of aborted fetal cells in vaccines is gravely wrong, and (2) his body is “God’s temple” satisfy the three-part inquiry in Africa and are sufficiently religious in nature under Title VII to survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not protect an employee’s personal medical judgment as a religious belief.

Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc. · filed 2024-02-22(a)

No reasonable juror could plausibly find this belief “religious.”

A religious-discrimination claim requires an inquiry into whether the employee’s belief arises from religion rather than other values.

Munroe v. Boston Medical Center · filed 2024-09-16(a)(1)

Some level of inquiry must therefore be undertaken to assess whether a belief arises from a religion, as opposed to some other set of values or beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects sincerely held religious beliefs, and their sincerity is ordinarily a factual question unsuited to summary judgment.

Pinner v. American Association of Orthodontists · filed 2024-09-19(a)(1)

Defendant’s argument fails for several reasons. First, whether a professed religious belief is sincerely held is ordinarily a factual determination not capable of resolution at the summary judgment stage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits religious discrimination claims based on a failure to accommodate or disparate treatment when the employee plausibly alleges a sincere religious belief.

Morrison v. The E.W. Scripps Company · filed 2024-11-26(a)(1)

Morrison has pled facts sufficient to establish a “sincere religious belief” in support of both his failure-to-accommodate and disparate-treatment claims for religious discrimination (Counts I, II & IV).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee seeking a religious accommodation to show that the conflicting belief is sincerely held and religious in nature.

Stynchula v. INOVA Health Care Services · filed 2024-11-19(a)(1)

To be entitled to a religious accommodation under Title VII, a plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to show that his stated beliefs are both sincerely held and, in his own scheme of things, religious in nature.

An employee plausibly states a religious discrimination claim when she alleges that a sincerely held religious belief conflicts with an employer’s vaccination requirement.

Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2025-01-16(a)(1)

At this nascent stage of the litigation, Thornton need allege no more facts -- nor more specific ones -- to show that she holds sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with ... the vaccination requirement.

A religious accommodation claim can satisfy the sincerity element when the evidence leaves no genuine dispute that the employee’s religious beliefs are sincerely held.

Leonhartt v. MedStar Health, Inc. · filed 2025-03-07

Here, however, the record presents no genuine dispute of material fact as to the sincerity of Plaintiff’s Catholic belief and anti-abortion convictions.

An employee can satisfy the notice element of a Title VII religious discrimination claim with evidence that an exemption request and supporting affidavit informed the employer that the objection was religious.

Wright v. Honeywell International · filed 2025-08-05(a)(1)

His discussion in his exemption request form of a religious reason for his vaccine objection—specifically, his belief in God-given bodily autonomy and freedom of choice—and his daughter’s third-party affidavit constitute sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict finding that Wright informed Honeywell that his belief was religious.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make requiring employees to agree to arbitration of employment discrimination claims an unlawful employment practice.

Kimbrough v. Harden Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2002-05-22(a)

We find nothing in the statutory text of Title VII, the ADEA or the ADA which identifies compulsory arbitration agreements to be an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to avoid liability for supervisor sexual harassment when it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to use corrective opportunities.

Collette v. Stein Mart, Inc., et · filed 2005-02-08(a)(1)

We need not consider the district court’s holding that Collette failed to make a prima facie case of hostile work environment sex discrimination and constructive discharge, because even if she had, SM had a meritorious Ellerth-Faragher defense.

Reduced work hours can be a tangible employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1), but a sexual harassment claimant must show that the harassment caused the reduction.

Kourtney Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old County Store · filed 2006-01-04(a)(1)

A reduction in an employee’s hours, which reduces the employee’s take-home pay, qualifies as a tangible employment action. ... Cotton had to prove more than the mere reduction of her hours; Cotton had to prove that the reduction was causally related to the incident of harassment.

A supervisor’s harassment does not amount to a tangible employment action through constructive discharge when the employee cannot show that intolerable discriminatory conditions forced him to quit.

Hardage v. CBS · filed 2006-02-07(a)(1)

Thus, Hard- age has failed to establish a material factual dispute as to whether he was constructively discharged, and he has not alleged any other “tangible employment action.”

An employee’s unreasonable failure to use an employer’s anti-harassment complaint procedure can establish the employer’s affirmative defense to a Title VII hostile work environment claim.

Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie · filed 2006-08-30

However, the evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly supports a finding that plaintiff acted unreasonably when she admittedly failed to utilize the complaint procedure outlined in the City’s anti-harassment policy. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense.

An employer may assert the Ellerth/Faragher defense to a supervisor hostile work environment claim when it took no tangible employment action against the employee.

Reed v. Cedar County · filed 2007-02-08(a)(1)

In sum, the court concludes that Sheriff Hannes never inflicted economic harm on Reed, and Defendants took no “tangible employment action” against her. Therefore, Defendants may assert the El-lerth/Faragher affirmative defense as to Reed’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.

The employer could not obtain summary judgment on its Faragher/Ellerth defense to this sexual harassment claim.

Hernandez-Payero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2007-04-27(a)(1)

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s request for summary judgment based on its defense under the Faragher/Ellerth doctrine is DENIED.

An employer may avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when it reasonably prevents and corrects harassment and the employee unreasonably fails to use available safeguards.

Minix v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. · filed 2007-06-27(a)(1)

The Faragher/Ellerth vicarious-liability defense “comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit an employer to raise the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense when a supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action.

Huff v. Sheahan · filed 2007-07-16(a)(1)

On the contrary, if Ms. Huff can demonstrate that a supervisor’s harassment culminated in a tangible employment action, the Sheriff may not raise an affirmative defense; his liability will be strict.

An employer that establishes both elements of the Ellerth-Faragher defense can obtain summary judgment on a supervisor harassment claim.

Adams v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2008-08-15(a)(1)

Having successfully established both elements of the Ellerth-Faragher defense as a matter of law, we hold that O’Reilly was entitled to summary judgment.

An employer’s defense to a Title VII hostile work environment claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when the evidence raises a factual dispute over whether the employee unreasonably failed to use available corrective opportunities.

KERCADO-CLYMER v. City of Amsterdam · filed 2009-04-10(a)(1)

The court finds ample evidence to support a finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s position that plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise” pursuant to the second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth doctrine.

Section 2000e-2(g)’s exemption is limited to employment decisions made in the interest of national security.

Jones v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-03-03(g)

While this Court does not hold that section 2000e-2(g)’s exemption is necessarily limited only to security clearance determinations, it must be limited to employment decisions made in the interest of national security, and that does not appear to be the case here.

Section 2000e-2(g) exempts an employment action denying access to secure premises when that access is governed by a national security program under a statute or executive order.

Bobbi-Anne Toy v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-29(g)

Subsection (g) applies to Toy’s building access revocation, and review is therefore barred.

Section 2000e-2(g)’s national security exemption does not bar review of alleged retaliation in an employer’s administration of a required security qualification test.

Gautney v. Tennessee Valley Authority Board of Directors · filed 2014-03-31(g)

In light of the statute and limited case law, the court concludes that the national security exemption does not apply so as to preclude its review of Gautney’s claim that TVA caused her to fail the TWQC in retaliation for her EOC complaint.

Section 2000e-2(g)'s national security exception does not warrant dismissal when the evidence leaves unresolved whether loss of access to classified information caused the discharge or followed it.

Johnson v. Southwest Research Institute · filed 2016-09-28(g)

Therefore, the Court hereby accepts, approves, and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the Report and Recommendation (docket #28). ... In sum, the evidence before the Court can be read to support Plaintiffs claim that her termination was based on reasons other than the revocation of access to classified information, and that the revocation was simply the result of her discharge. If so, Plaintiffs retaliation claim may be considered without violating either Egan or § 2000e-2(g). ... Given this state of evidence, dismissal is not warranted at this time either under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1).

Section 2000e-2(g)’s national-security exemption does not apply to Rehabilitation Act claims.

Hale v. Johnson · filed 2016-12-29(g)

Therefore, we hold that the national- security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

Section 2000e-2(g) limits the national security exception to hiring and firing decisions involving a person who has not met a required security condition.

Francisco J. Reyes Caparrós v. William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2019-04-25(g)

It expressly limits the national security exception to hiring and firing decisions.

Section 2000e-2(g) permits an employer to deny a position subject to national security requirements when an applicant has not fulfilled those requirements.

MOWERY v. NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY · filed 2021-07-26(g)

Separate and apart from Egan and its progeny, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g), a provision of Title VII, independently precludes judicial review of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. ... Thus, for this additional reason, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(g) exempts a discharge from Title VII when a national security requirement applies to the position and the employee no longer meets it.

Ramos v. Garland · filed 2023-07-14(g)

This conclusion is “fortified by Title VII’s express language exempting employment actions based on security clearance possession.” Ryan, 168 F.3d at 524 n.3; see 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(g) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual from any position . . . if (1) the occupancy of such position . . . is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program . . . and (2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.”). Here, Ramos cannot succeed on a Title VII claim challenging her termination because, as alleged, “the FBI fired Ramos because she needed to retain [her security] clearance as a condition of her employment.” Am. Compl. ¶ 38.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits different employment terms for employees in different locations absent an intent to discriminate.

Ramos v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. of Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2004-03-08(h)

In other words, different treatment in different locations is permissible absent an intent to discriminate.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits different employment terms for employees in different locations when the differences do not result from intentional discrimination, including decisions about staffing and facility closure.

Abril-Rivera v. Johnson · filed 2015-07-30(h)

That safe harbor statutory provision in § 2000e-2(h) defeats both of plaintiffs' disparate impact claims, as to the Puerto Rico employees being rotated while the facility was repaired and as to the closing of the facility after the lease expired.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on military status.

Gourdine v. Cabrini Medical Center · filed 2004-03-09(a)(1)

Finally, the Court finds no merit to Gourdine’s claim that she was discriminated on the basis of her military status. Title VII does not include military status as a basis for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects lawful aliens employed in the United States from discrimination in all aspects of employment.

Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc. · filed 2004-06-01(a)(1)

It is beyond dispute- that legal aliens employed in the United States are protected from discrimination in all aspects of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a significant relationship to support an associational discrimination claim; an employee’s acquaintance with a customer is insufficient.

Baker v. Wilmington Trust Co. · filed 2004-06-04(a)

Here, Plaintiffs associational discrimination claim is not well founded because it is based on their acquaintance as bank tellers with the Patels as customers, and the courts have recognized that associational discrimination claims must have as their basis a much more significant relationship.

A romantic relationship with someone who filed a discrimination charge does not, by itself, bring an employee within § 2000e-2(a)'s protection.

Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP · filed 2004-08-24(a)

This court has found association with a protected party to be relevant under § 2000e-2(a) in just two situations; neither avails Bell’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a discrimination claim based solely on an employee’s relationship with a spouse who filed a discrimination charge when the employee’s own protected status was not the basis of the employer’s action.

Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP · filed 2006-06-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, Thompson is not a member of a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and this claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support the associational sex discrimination theory asserted against the employer.

Partners Healthcare System, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 2007-06-25(a)(1)

MCAD Defendants’ amendment of the charge of discrimination before the MCAD indicates that it is pursuing its theory of associational sex discrimination pursuant to Ch. 151B and Title VII. In the above section, the court concluded that this charge fails to state a claim under Title VII, and that, therefore, the state discrimination claim is preempted.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees who face racial discrimination because of their association with members of a protected class.

Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2008-02-12(a)

Title VII protects not only individuals who themselves are members of a protected class, but also those individuals who, though not members of a protected class, are nevertheless “victims of discriminatory animus toward third persons with whom the individuals associate.”

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from discrimination based on their association with members of a protected class, regardless of how close that association is.

Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2009-02-23(a)

Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in requiring a certain degree of association before a non-protected employee may assert a viable claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of an employee’s race; an interracial association claim requires animus directed at the employee because of that association.

Floyd v. Amite County School District · filed 2009-08-28(a)(1)

The association cases are predicated on animus against the employee because of his association with persons of another race. ... Although Davis’ statements reflect clear racial animus, nothing in these statements supports a conclusion that the animus was directed at Floyd on the basis of his race. ... Since Floyd’s proof fails to raise a genuine issue of fact that he was terminated on the basis of his race, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims under Title VII and § 1981.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employee to show national origin discrimination through association with people of a protected national origin when that association extends beyond language alone.

Morales v. NYS Department of Labor · filed 2012-03-30(a)

Language “by itself’ may not identify members of a suspect class, id., but a jury could find that plaintiffs “advocacy” for Hispanic customers did extend beyond language by virtue of the content of her workplace complaints, her private advocacy and interests, and her family membership.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an associational race discrimination claim to implicate the employee's own race, directly or indirectly.

Rivera v. Townsquare Media Broad., LLC · filed 2018-02-22(a)

Because Rivera has not pointed to any evidence suggesting his associational discrimination claim implicates his own race in any way, the Court finds Rivera has failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a).

An associational discrimination claim based on unequal pay fails when the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity and the employee cannot show pretext.

Persson v. Boston University · filed 2019-02-25(a)(1)

This court need not decide whether working in the same office as African-American coworkers, without more, is enough to establish an association sufficient to create a claim under Title VII, because the defendant has provided a nondiscriminatory rationale for the plaintiff’s pay disparity and the plaintiff has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an associational discrimination claimant to allege discrimination based on race rather than race-related messaging.

Frith v. Whole Foods Market, Inc. · filed 2021-02-05(a)

A plaintiff advancing an associational discrimination claim, however, still must allege that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, rather than on the basis of race-related messaging.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination against an employee because of an interracial association, including a relationship with a distant relative.

Kengerski v. Harper · filed 2021-07-29(a)(1)

On the merits, we agree with our sister circuits that associational discrimination is well grounded in the text of Title VII. In a practical sense, the name is a misnomer because, when you discriminate against an employee because of his association with someone of a different race, you are in effect discriminating against him “because of [his own] race” in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from discrimination based on association with members of a protected class, but the employee must plausibly connect the adverse action to that association.

Moody v. MyMichigan Medical Center-Midland · filed 2022-07-22(a)

That prohibition extends to discrimination against employees who associate with members of a protected class. ... Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a causal connection between her association with African American patients and the reduction in her hours, her associational-discrimination claim will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discrimination because of the plaintiff’s own protected characteristic, while subsection (m) permits an associational discrimination claim to proceed when sex is alleged as a motivating factor.

MACDONALD v. BREWER SCHOOL DEPARTMENT · filed 2023-01-12(a)(1), (m)

This argument is clearly foreclosed by Frith and, as such, the Plaintiff’s § 2000e-2(a)(1) claim must be dismissed. ... Further briefing might clarify the extent to which the wording differences in various provisions of Title VII affect protected class status, but based on a textual reading, I find that the Plaintiff’s associational discrimination claim can proceed under § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a racial association discrimination claim without requiring a particular degree of association when the adverse action was because of the employee’s race.

Mintner v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation · filed 2024-09-25(a)

There is no need to consider an objective “degree of association;” the key inquiry is whether the employee has been discriminated against and whether that discrimination was “because of” the employee’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of an employee’s own sex, including pregnancy, but does not cover discharge based solely on a spouse’s pregnancy.

Ronen v. RedRoute, Inc. · filed 2025-01-24(a)(1)

But adverse employment actions based on someone else’s sex (or pregnancy) are not within the narrow category of employment actions that Title VII prohibits.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sexual harassment claim to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting it.

Lambeth v. CAROLINA PERSONNEL CO., INC. · filed 2005-01-25(a)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed for failing to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and for failing to state a claim for sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge under Title VII. Although perhaps not concisely or thoroughly developed, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges and forecasts evidence supporting her claim to withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss on these stated grounds.

An alleged harasser qualifies as a supervisor for Title VII harassment liability only if the employer empowered that person to effect a significant change in the victim’s employment status.

Haws v. Draper City · filed 2023-03-22(a)(1)

Three days of control over an employee’s schedule and duties hardly entails a significant ability to change her employment status. Given the facts presented by the parties, no reasonable juror could conclude that Carpenter was Haws’ supervisor at the time of her alleged assault.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits plaintiffs to pursue intentional sex discrimination claims on a single-motive theory.

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-06-21(a)

While neither party has cited cases applying the “mixed motive” defense in a class action context, Defendant’s argument completely lacks merit since, in any event, Plaintiffs have elected “to pursue their claims solely under [a 42 U.S.C.] § 2000e-2(a) [single-motive theory].”

A Title VII plaintiff who alleges and argues only a single-motive discrimination claim proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Perry v. SHINSEKI · filed 2011-05-10

Plaintiff has neither alleged nor argued that she has a mixed motive claim. ... The Court will therefore limit its analysis to the single-motive, McDonnell Douglas framework.

A plaintiff pursuing a single-motive discrimination claim must prove that discrimination was a but-for cause of the adverse employment decision.

Mayorga v. Merdon · filed 2019-06-28(a)(1)

Because Mayorga argues his case as a single-motive claim and at oral argument forfeited any potential mixed-motive claim he could have made, he bears the burden of showing the alleged animus was a but-for cause of the decision not to promote him.

A Title VII discrimination claim alleging only unlawful motives is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Silver v. CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES · filed 2022-07-15(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s case is not mixed-motive in nature and the McDonnell Douglas framework applies.

A failure to train does not establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) unless it is an adverse job action.

Freeman v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. · filed 2004-08-25(a)(1)

Plaintiff, however, has not shown that defendant’s failure to train her was an adverse job action. Plaintiff therefore has not established a prima facie case of failure to train. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A race discrimination claim based on denial of training fails without evidence that race played a role in the training received.

Story v. Fiat Chrysler Automotive · filed 2022-06-24(a)(1)

The Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of race discrimination in relation to his training on the OP-50, OP-60, or OP-70 machines, nor has he offered any evidence that his race played a role in the training he received.

A separate Title VII discrimination claim based on failure to train is treated as a discrete act, so the continuing violation doctrine does not apply.

Tassy v. Buttigieg · filed 2022-10-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, to the extent Tassy seeks to assert a discrimination claim premised on something other than a hostile work environment, that claim is properly analyzed as a discrete act claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not override a church’s freedom to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.

Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc. · filed 2004-11-16(a)

Title VII cannot and does not override that fundamental constitutional freedom.

Section 2000e-2(j) permits affirmative relief to remedy the continuing effects of past employment discrimination.

United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union 46 · filed 1972-03-28(j)

Even upon an initial grant of injunctive relief, the courts have found it perfectly consistent with § 703(j), and plainly required to prevent broad nullification of Title YII, to grant “affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting from present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical effect of continuing past injustices.”

A trade association that acts as an agent of covered employers and influences employment practices may be a defendant in a discrimination action under § 2000e-2(a).

United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, I · filed 1973-06-21(a)

Defendant MCA has moved to dismiss the Rios complaint against it on the grounds that it is neither an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) nor an “employment agency” within the meaning of § 2000e-2(b), and that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against it. ... Section 2000e(b) includes within the definition of “employer” both a person “who has twenty-five or more employees” and “any agent of such a person.” MCA, as a trade association for purposes of unified collective bargaining, performs the functions of an agent for its member contractors. ... Though there is no hiring hall for steamfitters in the New York area, there is sufficient uniformity of employment conditions, at least with respect to the employment of nonwhites, to support the conclusion that MCA is a proper party defendant in the Rios action.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff to allege a direct or indirect employment relationship with the defendant to bring a Title VII claim against it.

Henderson v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2008-08-01

The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Henderson’s Title VII claims against Mellon Bank because he failed to allege that he was a direct or indirect employee of Mellon Bank.

Section 2000e-2 applies only to private employers; federal agency discrimination claims are governed by § 2000e-16(a).

Gray v. Lahood · filed 2014-11-10

Title VII contains a separate provision that applies to federal agencies because § 2000e-2 applies only to private employers.

A Title VII plaintiff must plausibly allege an employment relationship with the defendant; facts showing the defendant controlled the plaintiff’s work or access to employment opportunities can satisfy that requirement.

Halcomb v. Black Mountain Resources, LLC · filed 2014-11-21(a)(1)

By finding that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint cures the defects in his original Complaint, this Court has raled as a matter of law that the Plaintiff has adequately pled an employment relationship with the Defendants sufficient to state a claim under Title VII and that the alleged tortfeasors are the Defendants’ employees for purposes of state-law vicarious liability.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts plausibly showing that the defendant played a role in the plaintiff’s employment or shared employment decisions.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2017-05-19(a)

... the Court finds that Plaintiffs Title VII claims against UBNS fail for the basic reason that the amended complaint lacks any factual allegations about the degree to which UBNS played a role in any aspect of his employment or shared employment decisions with the University and/or Kaleida.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a gender discrimination claim against an entity that is not the plaintiff’s employer.

Stinnett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2017-09-30(a)(1)

In any event, Plaintiffs gender discrimination claim against Quest is meritless because Quest is not Plaintiffs employer and, thus, is not covered by the statute.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employment-discrimination claim only against a defendant with enough control over the worker to qualify as an employer.

Simmons v. Illinois Bell Telephone Compan · filed 2019-03-18

None of the remaining defendants on this claim—neither AT&T, its CEO, nor Simmons’s immediate supervisor—had the requisite control over Simmons to qualify as an employer within the meaning of the statute.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in hiring by employers; a claim under it must be brought against the employer, not individual employees.

Butler, Jerry v. Eschalante, Jim · filed 2022-08-04(a)

Rather, defendants assert that plaintiff has not named proper defendants for his claims under Title VII and the ADEA because these statutes only authorize suits brought directly against employers. Legally, defendants are correct.

Separate public entities are presumed to be separate employers under Title VII, but a plaintiff may rebut that presumption.

Musson v. Jones · filed 2023-03-21(a)(1)

Because both PAC and the County are public entities distinct from the DA’s office, the Court should “begin with the presumption that . . . [they] should not be aggregated for purposes of Title VII.” Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1345. However, this does not automatically bar Musson’s claims, as a plaintiff may still rebut this presumption.

Section 2000e-2 permits employment discrimination claims only against employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.

Patterson v. Mississippi Department of Mental Health · filed 2023-06-28

In her Response [25], Patterson concedes that MDMH was not her employer. See [25] at p. 1. “Both Title VII and the ADEA permit suits only against ‘employers,’ ‘employment agencies,’ and ‘labor organizations.’” ... Therefore, Patterson’s Title VII and ADEA claims against MDMH must be DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Emrit v. Grammy Awards, The · filed 2023-11-29(a)(1)

Claims brought under Title VII “cannot go forward” unless the defendant qualifies as the plaintiff’s employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim to plausibly allege an employer-employee relationship with the defendant.

Emrit v. Grammy Awards on CBS · filed 2023-12-11(a)

Because Emrit has not plausibly alleged an employer-employee relationship, he has not stated a claim for race discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Herman v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Health and Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) · filed 2023-12-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed, does not allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Plaintiff and Scheinman Arbitration. Therefore, while Plaintiff’s action against NYCDOHMH may proceed, her claims against Scheinman Arbitration are dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on a licensing exam administrator that neither employs the plaintiffs, performs delegated core employer duties, nor procures jobs for test takers.

Alameda v. Association of Social Work Boards · filed 2024-09-25

Therefore, because ASWB is not an employer or employment agency within the definition of Title VII, it is not subject to suit under this statute.

Section 2000e-2 permits relief for past employment discrimination that allows affected employees to compete with laid-off drivers for vacancies based on full employment seniority.

United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. · filed 1975-08-08

Nevertheless, we believe that to allow LDs a three-year priority right on future openings would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimination. ... Therefore we modify the decree to provide that when a vacancy which is not a purely temporary one arises in the LD position at a T.I.M.E.-D.C. terminal, any LD on layoff at that terminal may compete against members of the affected class on the basis of full employment seniority.

Section 2000e-2 permits a court to modify a facially neutral seniority preference when it would impede relief for employees harmed by past discrimination.

United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. · filed 1975-08-08

We recognize that the Union contract provision granting laid-off LDs a three-year period in which they may move into vacancies at their home terminal without competition was not adopted for discriminatory purposes. Nevertheless, we believe that to allow LDs a three-year priority right on future openings would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in a termination must produce evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual or that race was another motivating factor.

Brown v. Mississippi State Senate · filed 2013-12-09(a)(1)

At the third stage, the burden shifted back to Brown to “create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) the employer’s reason is a pretext or (2) that the employer’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor’ is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discharge to be because of a protected characteristic; firing an employee for refusing to remove a symbol does not establish discrimination merely because the employee associates it with his national origin or religion.

Storey v. Burns International Security Services · filed 2004-12-09(a)(1)

Although Storey attempts to alchemistically spin the discharge into illegal employment discrimination under Title VII, it is clear that he is not alleging that he was discharged because of his claimed national origin or his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a discharge for refusing to remove workplace symbols when displaying them is not required by the employee’s religion or inherent in the employee’s claimed national origin.

Storey v. Burns Intl Security · filed 2004-12-09(a)(1)

Nothing in Storey’s complaint suggests that Burns’ requirement conflicted with a sincerely held belief that was endemic to his professed national origin or religion claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits termination because of race, but a plaintiff must present evidence of racial discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

Collins v. Sailormen Inc. · filed 2007-03-08(a)(1)

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Collins has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Accordingly, Sailormen’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Collins’ race discrimination claims under Title YII and the LEDL is GRANTED.

An employer defeats a Title VII race-discrimination termination claim when it gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the employee cannot show that reason is pretextual.

Flynn v. AT & T YELLOW PAGES · filed 2011-01-21(a)(1)

Even if I assume Flynn presents a prima-facie case of discrimination, Southwestern Bell has presented undisputed evidence that it had a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason to terminate Flynn, and Flynn presents no evidence that this proffered reason is mere pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected status, including race and national origin, but does not cover personality conflicts or other unprotected bases.

Giwa v. City of Peoria · filed 2013-01-08(a)(1)

Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 USC § 2000e-2. Title VII prohibits only discrimination based on protected status; it does not prohibit discrimination based on personality conflicts or other non-protected bases.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; an employee challenging the employer’s stated reasons for termination must present evidence from which a jury could find pretext or gender bias.

Blom v. Wellstar Health System, Inc. · filed 2014-03-27(a)

Because we conclude that Blom has failed to present evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that WellStar’s reasons for her termination were pretextual or motivated by gender bias, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on her Title VII gender discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race caused an employee’s termination; documented performance problems and no evidence of more favorable treatment for similarly situated employees do not establish that claim.

JACKSON-NIBBS v. UNITED WAY OF CENTRAL INDIANA · filed 2021-09-20(a)(1)

The designated evidence considered as a whole shows that Jackson-Nibbs was terminated because of work performance issues, not because of her race, and since she cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in her termination, this claim fails at summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits firing an employee because of race or national origin; a discriminatory termination claim requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Lopez v. City of New York · filed 2021-10-20(a)

In sum, I find that plaintiff has not presented a prima facie case of discrimination because he has not met his burden of showing that his termination occurred under conditions giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that employment harm occurred because of a protected trait; unfair treatment alone is insufficient.

West v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-08-20(a)(1)

But under Muldrow, and under the plain terms of Title VII, a plaintiff must still show that the harm he suffered occurred “because of” his protected status.

A discriminatory termination claim must plausibly allege that the employee was terminated because of a protected characteristic.

Castro v. IKEA · filed 2025-03-14(a)(1)

It does not “plausibly allege” that Plaintiff was terminated on the basis of her “race, color, or sex.”

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination in hiring based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

Feldman v. Nassau County · filed 2004-12-10(a)(1)

As noted above, age discrimination is not covered by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Cole v. YOUTH VILLAGES, INC. · filed 2006-08-22(a)(1)

However, in any event, because Title VII does not provide a cause of action for claims of discrimination based on age, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion with respect to that contention.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

Carlisle v. St. Charles School Dist. · filed 2007-05-11(a)

Carlisle brings his complaint solely under Title VII which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Age discrimination claims are not actionable under Title VII and therefore defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim is properly granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusal to hire based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; an allegation of age discrimination alone does not state a claim under it.

Dunleavy v. New Jersey · filed 2007-10-16(a)

Dunleavy did not state a claim for an unlawful failure to hire in violation of the Civil Rights Act because he did not allege discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. He claimed discrimination on the basis of age.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex but does not prohibit age discrimination.

Musgrove v. District of Columbia Public Schools · filed 2011-04-07(a)(1)

Unlike the DCHRA, see infra Section III.C, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of age.

Section 2000e-2 does not provide a Title VII claim for age discrimination.

Brewer v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-09-20(k)(1)(A)(i)

The plaintiff also alleges that he was discriminated against in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Yet there is no basis for alleging an age-based discrimination claim within the ambit of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The plaintiff thus does not make out a viable Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover age discrimination.

Thorpe v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc. · filed 2013-02-22(a)(1)

In addition, age discrimination claims cannot be brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover age discrimination; age discrimination claims belong under the ADEA.

Chhim v. University of Houston Clear Lake · filed 2015-09-09

An age discrimination claim is properly brought under the ADEA, not Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not prohibit age discrimination.

Hamilton v. McDonald · filed 2017-03-27(a)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). It does not prohibit age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age.

Nance v. NBC Universal Entertainment · filed 2018-04-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s claim fails because Title VII protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, but not age.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit age discrimination.

Davis v. Palos Health · filed 2019-06-27

To clarify the issue, Title VII does not proscribe age discrimination; the ADEA does.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Jackson v. St. Charles Parish Housing Authority Board of Commissioners · filed 2020-02-21(a)(1)

Title VII, however, does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover employment discrimination based solely on age.

Brown v. The Professional Group · filed 2021-08-27(a)(1)

And she may not bring any age-based claims pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover age discrimination.

Harper v. University of Toledo · filed 2022-09-30

Defendants move to dismiss only part of Count II – the allegation of age discrimination. ... “Title VII does not cover age or disability discrimination claims.” ... As such, this part of Count II is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make age or disability discrimination actionable under Title VII.

Clapper v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2022-10-25(a)(1)

Plaintiff concedes that her claims for age and disability discrimination aren’t actionable under Title VII. [81] at 7; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2013). The motion for summary judgment is granted as to the Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover discrimination or harassment based on age.

Carranza v. Shelton & Valadez, P.C. · filed 2023-01-10(a)(1)

Age-based discrimination and harassment claims are not cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age.

Leech v. Mississippi College · filed 2023-01-17

Title VII does not prohibit age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-plus-age discrimination claim based at least in part on sex, and a genuine dispute over the employer’s stated reasons can defeat summary judgment.

Stainsby v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority · filed 2023-02-08

The difficulty in this case is that Defendant has offered only post-hoc explanations and testimony that is specifically disputed by Plaintiffs’ testimony. Viewing the record as a whole, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor as the Court must, there is a material factual dispute as to whether Defendant’s proffered reasons are pretextual. ... Summary judgment on the Title VII claims is denied.

Section 2000e-2 does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Gaumond v. The City of Dallas Texas · filed 2023-02-15(a)

However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit age discrimination.

Barnett v. Louisiana Department of Health · filed 2023-03-10(a)

However, there is no claim for age discrimination under Title VII. Instead, an employee claiming age discrimination under federal law must proceed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover age discrimination.

Downing v. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP · filed 2023-07-20(a)(1)

This may be in recognition that age discrimination in employment does not fall under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). To the extent Plaintiff intended to bring a claim for age discrimination under Title VII, that claim is also dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

HENRY v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC. · filed 2023-12-15(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff’s claims undisputedly relate solely to his age, the Court will dismiss the Title VII claims set forth in Counts II and V with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit employment discrimination based on age.

Heriveaux v. Junior · filed 2024-04-03

But Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on age. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment discrimination based on “race, color, religions, sex, or national origin”).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover age discrimination.

Young-Trezvant v. Lone Star College · filed 2024-05-31(a)

Title VII, of course, also does not encompass age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover age discrimination.

Price v. Amazon Retail LLC · filed 2024-07-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s age discrimination allegation in Count I is not cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit employment discrimination based on age.

Golubovych v. Saks 5th Avenue, Inc. · filed 2024-09-10

However, Title VII does not encompass claims for employment discrimination on the basis of age.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-plus-age discrimination claim when sex contributes to the employment decision.

Metzger v. The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2024-10-01(a)(1)

Based on this precedent, I find that Metzger’s claim that she was discriminated against because she is a 61-year old woman is independently cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a cause of action for age discrimination.

Abajian-Salon v. City of San Antonio, Texas · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

Because age is not a protected class under Title VII, Abajian-Salon cannot assert a cause of action for age discrimination under Title VII as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect against age discrimination.

Beasley v. Thornburgh Companies · filed 2025-03-03(a)(1)

Title VII does not provide protection from age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits an employer from giving biological mothers caregiving leave while denying equal leave to fathers.

Johnson v. University of Iowa · filed 2004-12-16(a)(2)

If the University were to provide biological mothers caregiving leave not based on disability, and did not provide equal leave to fathers, that would violate Title VII.

A biased subordinate’s recommendation does not establish employer liability when the final decision maker independently investigates and lets the employee respond.

Natay v. Murray School District · filed 2005-01-11(a)(1)

A cat’s paw claim cannot be maintained when the ultimate decision maker conducted an independent investigation and also allowed the plaintiff a chance to respond directly to the reasons for the decision.

A sex discrimination claim may proceed when evidence could show that a supervisor’s gender bias influenced otherwise neutral decisionmakers to fire an employee.

Harlow v. Potter · filed 2005-01-27(a)(1)

In sum, whether Mr. Brydon and Ms. Pointer’s decision to fire Ms. Harlow was tainted by Mr. Parker’s alleged gender-based prejudice against her must be resolved by jury resolution of questions of fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from considering sex in employment decisions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. TXI Operations, L.P. · filed 2005-01-13(a)(1)

Rather Title VII prohibits the employer from considering certain criteria, in this case sex, when making that employment decision.

A plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in a discharge fails to establish a prima facie case when he cannot show that his replacement was outside his protected class.

Martin v. Patrick Industries, Inc. · filed 2007-03-13(a)(1)

In this case, the evidence offered by Plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. ... Defendant, however, filled the position created by Plaintiffs departure with two males. Such a decision does not lead to the conclusion that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions based on sex; an action unrelated to sex is not a sex-based violation.

Parada v. Great Plains International of Sioux City, Inc. · filed 2007-04-11(a)(1)

When an employer’s action is not based on a sex classification, however, it is not a sex-based violation of Title VII.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence follows the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.

Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2007-04-27(a)(1)

W here, as here, an employee’s sex or age discrimination claim relies exclusively on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence, we apply the burden- shifting scheme of M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; an employee challenging a firing must show evidence of prohibited discrimination, not merely dispute the employer’s reasons.

Schoonover v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc. · filed 2007-06-26(a)(1)

As a result, this Court cannot and will not serve as a conduit through which an employee wishes to protest the reasons for her firing, except to the extent the employer’s practices exhibit some species of prohibited discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sufficient evidence that sex motivated an adverse employment decision.

Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates of Joliet, Inc. · filed 2007-07-05(a)(1)

Because we agree with the decision of the trial court judge and are convinced that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant terminated Hossack’s employment because she is a woman, the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in this case Is Affirmed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether an employer excluded an employee from an assignment because of her sex.

Lewis, Donna L. v. Chicago Police Dept · filed 2007-07-26(a)(1)

Lewis has provided sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to satisfy the direct method of proof on this issue. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendants discriminated against Lewis on the basis of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to reach trial when the evidence as a whole could support a finding of intentional discrimination.

Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. · filed 2010-04-09(a)(1)

In this case, it is not any single piece of evidence but rather the evidence taken in its entirety that leads us to believe Merritt deserves a trial.

A sex-discrimination claim fails when the challenged practice does not affect the plaintiff’s employment differently from male employees.

Beasley v. Tuscaloosa County School System · filed 2022-04-26(a)(1)

The court therefore agrees with the School System and the Board that Ms. Beasley and Ms. Kennedy have not stated a claim of sex discrimination because they have not alleged how this new employment practice affected their employment in ways that it did not affect male teachers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require discriminatory or harassing conduct to be explicitly sexual in nature.

Benson v. Lincoln · filed 2023-07-31(a)(1)

Nevertheless, Benson is correct that the incidents in question do not need to be explicitly sexual in nature.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence, viewed in the employee’s favor, permits a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination.

Smith v. The Florida Gulf Coast University Board of Trustees · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

The Court finds that collectively this evidence is sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion as to the Title VII discrimination claim.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 seeking only equitable restitution for denied work requires evidence of the work performed and wages earned by comparable employees.

Boynton-Burns v. University of Oregon · filed 2005-02-02

We agree that plaintiff presented no evidence of the amount of standby work, if any, that the male electricians performed during the relevant period nor of the wages that they may have earned for such work. Indeed, plaintiff does not contend that she did present any evidence of damages, nor does she offer any argument about why that failure is not dispositive of her claims. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-discrimination claim to proceed when evidence could show that an employee was selected for termination during a reduction in force for discriminatory reasons.

Kelley v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. · filed 2007-11-08(a)(1)

The court believes that Kelley has provided evidence to demonstrate pretext and preclude summary judgment. The court does not doubt that Sun could have had legitimate business reasons for implementing its RIF. Nevertheless, whether Sun had legitimate reasons for an RIF is not dispositive here. The question is whether Kelley was selected for termination during the RIF based upon information that was the result of wrongful discrimination.

A sex discrimination claim arising from a reduction in force requires evidence that the employer treated sex nonneutrally or retained lower-performing men; without an inference of discrimination, the employee fails to establish a prima facie case.

Andrezyski v. Kmart Corp. · filed 2005-03-01(a)(1)

Based on the record before me, I find that the plaintiff has not met her prima facie burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that Kmart based its decision to reduce her hours on discriminatory criteria illegal under either the AJDEA or Title VII.

After a reduction in force, a qualified employee considered for an available position can establish a prima facie discrimination case when the employer selects someone outside the employee’s protected group.

Tippie v. Spacelabs Medical · filed 2006-04-27(a)

We conclude Tippie met her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination based on either her national origin or her gender, and the district court erred in finding otherwise. Following the reduction-in-force, Tippie was qualified for and considered for an available position within the company, but Spacelabs offered the job to Carrillo, who was not American or female. Although this is not strong evidence, it is sufficient to raise an inference of intentional discrimination based on either national origin or gender.

In a reduction in force, a Title VII gender discrimination plaintiff must present evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in deciding whom to discharge.

Irene Lawver, M.D. v. Hillcrest Hospice, Inc. · filed 2008-11-24(a)(1)

Lawver failed to establish a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence because she did not show that Hillcrest eliminated her position based on discriminatory intent.

In a reduction in force suit, a Title VII plaintiff can establish an inference of discrimination by showing that the employer retained similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Y. Wood v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 2010-09-23(a)(1)

In a reduction in force suit, a plaintiff satisfies the fourth element by demonstrating that the employer retained similarly situated employees who were not within the protected class.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a laid-off employee can establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in a mini-reduction in force by showing that an employee outside her protected class absorbed her duties.

Tyler v. Trustees of Purdue University · filed 2011-07-18(a)

Tyler has also established that her duties were absorbed by employees not in the protected class. ... Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that Tyler has established a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

In a reduction in force, a Title VII discrimination plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were retained to establish an inference of discrimination.

Jackson v. Temple University Hospital, Inc. · filed 2012-10-18(a)

To satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case where, as here, the basis of a plaintiff’s claim is an employment termination conducted in the context of a reduction in force, she must present evidence that similarly situated persons outside of her protected class were retained.

A plaintiff challenging a reduction-in-force discharge under Title VII can establish a prima facie case by showing that the employer intended to discriminate based on race.

Elzie Fuller, III v. Edwin B. Stimpson Co. Inc. · filed 2015-01-23(a)(1)

In situations involving a reduction in force, a modified prima facie formulation may apply, which allows a case of discrimination to be established by presenting evidence showing, not dissimilar treatment, but that the employer intended to discriminate against the plaintiff in making the discharge decision. ... Thus, Fuller failed to establish the requisite discriminatory intent for a prima facie case of discrimination in a RIF.

A Title VII plaintiff laid off in a reduction in force must show she was qualified for another position available at the time of termination to establish a prima facie discrimination case.

Crisman v. Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees · filed 2016-10-03(a)(1)

Under that standard, the judge correctly concluded Crisman failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because she did not show she was qualified to assume another position available at FAU at the time of her termination.

In a reduction in force, a Title VII discrimination claimant must show that the employer retained similarly situated employees outside the claimant’s protected class.

Anderson v. Boeing Co · filed 2017-06-19(a)

Anderson’s gender- and race-based discrimination claims fail because she has not fulfilled the fourth criterion of the prima facie showing: retention of similarly situated employees outside of her protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to select a position for elimination based on cost and job performance when the employee fails to show those reasons are pretext for sex discrimination.

Trigiani v. New Peoples Bank, Inc. · filed 2022-04-20(a)(1)

The Bank has met its burden to show that it conducted the RIF to reduce headcount and debt, and that it based its selection criteria on cost and job performance — both valid, non-discriminatory bases. ... Unfortunately for the plaintiff, she has not put forth sufficient evidence to meet her pretext burden.

In a reduction in force, retaining a white employee does not by itself establish that an employer selected a Black employee for discharge because of race.

Henning v. City of Jackson, Tennessee · filed 2022-08-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, the fact that Walker or the unidentified employee was retained fails to establish a disputed fact regarding whether Henning was singled out because of her race.

In a reduction in force, an employee claiming race discrimination must offer evidence that the employer singled him out for termination because of race.

Hightower v. Keystone Automotive Industries · filed 2023-01-31(a)(1)

Having failed to come forward with evidence that he was singled out for termination on the basis of his race, his race claims must fail.

In a reduction in force, a Title VII plaintiff must offer additional evidence that the employer singled her out for discharge because of a protected characteristic.

Li v. University of Akron · filed 2023-06-22(a)(1)

The duty to present a prima facie case is somewhat heightened in the context of a RIF because, “[a]s long as employers do not act with discriminatory intent, they may eliminate positions in the name of economic necessity or efficiency, even when those positions are held by [persons in a protected class].”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin or religion; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for eliminating a position, the employee must show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Torbica v. Horizon Bank · filed 2023-11-02(a)

Mr. Torbica claims that this business decision was motivated not by a decision to cut costs based on objective criteria, but by discriminatory animus based on his national origin and religion. But he presents no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find such animus or any evidence that would tend to disprove that Horizon was motivated by a desire to cut costs. Mr. Torbica has not demonstrated a triable issue as to Horizon’s legitimate business motive for eliminating his position.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race discrimination in employment; an employee challenging a layoff must offer sufficient evidence of pretext when the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason.

Zou v. Linde Engineering North America, Inc. · filed 2025-01-21(a)

For these reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Zou has not presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Linde’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for his lay off was pretextual. Thus, Linde’s motion for summary judgment on Mr. Zou’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims is granted and Mr. Zou’s motion is denied.

A rank-ordered promotion process can be treated as a specific employment practice under § 2000e-2(k), with promotion rates used to measure its adverse effect.

Howe v. City of Akron · filed 2013-07-22(k)(1)(B)(i)

Because we agree with the district court that the promotional process in this case constitutes a specific employment practice, we must also agree that the outcomes of that practice—promotion rates—are the proper metric for determining “adverse effect” or lack thereof.

In a disparate impact claim, the court must define the relevant labor market before analyzing statistical evidence of a discriminatory hiring pattern.

Meditz v. City of Newark · filed 2011-09-28(a)(1)

Before the District Court can reach the statistical analysis, it must make a determination as to the parameters of ... the relevant labor market.

A disparate impact plaintiff must show a significant racial disparity among employees qualified for the benefit at issue to establish a prima facie case.

Lonnie B. Lee v. State of Florida · filed 2005-04-27(k)(1)(A)(i)

Without asserting a legally cognizable statistical disparity, the Employees have failed to establish a prima facie case.