42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(c) does not prohibit a remedial affirmative action plan that does not unnecessarily burden nonminority workers.

of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Hartford · filed 1980-06-13(c)

The Ordinance and Plan before us have a less significant impact on non-minority workers than did the plan in the Weber case, and the Union has not suggested that we give section 703(c) a construction different than that given section 703(a).

Section 2000e-2 permits a voluntary affirmative action hiring plan that uses racial preferences when the plan falls within the limits recognized in Weber.

Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia · filed 1980-01-29

The questions now before me are whether, under the principles of the Weber decision, the defendant CCP could legitimately adopt an affirmative action hiring plan, and if so, whether the plan actually adopted also “falls on the permissible side of the line.” I find that both questions should be answered in the affirmative.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not bar a public employer from voluntarily using race-conscious hiring to remedy discrimination previously found by a federal court.

Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1980-03-20(j)

Appellees insist, nevertheless, that Title VII prohibits the Commission from adopting this remedy voluntarily. We do not accept this view. Rather, we believe such a prohibition on voluntary compliance with the Act to be irreconcilable with the fundamentally conciliatory nature of the federal statute.

Section 703(j) does not bar relief that eliminates discrimination without requiring preferential treatment.

United States v. Building & Const. Tr. Coun. of St. Louis, Mo. · filed 1966-07-26(j)

Also lacking merit is the contention that the relief requested would violate § 703(j) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which prohibits preferential treatment. The relief requested would do no more than eliminate discrimination. If we were to accept defendants' interpretation of preferential treatment, the enforcement provisions of the Act would become a nullity.

Section 2000e-2 does not bar a claim seeking equal benefits and access to a workplace committee when the plaintiffs do not seek proportional representation by race.

Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co. · filed 1968-06-12

In Local 709’s third ground, it contends that to assign membership on the committee governing the Buck-of-the-Month Club on the basis of race would be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and would require preferential treatment to a group of employees on the basis of race. Such a contention is not well taken because the plaintiffs have not asked for proportional representation on the basis of race on the committee, but have merely alleged that plaintiff Evans and other Negro employees have been denied equal benefits from participation in the Club and that Negroes are systematically excluded from membership in the committee governing the Club.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require a labor union to grant preferential treatment to correct racial imbalance caused by discrimination before Title VII took effect.

Dobbins v. Local 212, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1968-10-10(j)

In our view affirmative post-Act action, directed toward a group to correct pre-Act discrimination against that group constitutes the granting of preferential treatment to that group and on that subject Congress has specifically stated that Title VII shall not be construed so as to require a labor union to grant preferential treatment to any group based on race or color.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to grant preferential treatment to correct a statistical racial imbalance.

Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1969-01-17(j)

In such matters, the Act specifically negates any requirement of affirmative correction of a statistical racial imbalance.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to give preferential treatment because of a racial imbalance in its workforce.

Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1969-06-23(j)

Section 2000e-2(j) provides that an employer is not required to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of race on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race employed by an employer.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to adjust a racial imbalance through preferential treatment.

United States v. National Lead Co. · filed 1970-06-01(j)

The Act does not obligate the defendants to adjust racial imbalance which may exist.

Section 2000e-2(j) permits affirmative relief when facially neutral practices continue the effects of past discrimination.

United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 38 Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Train · filed 1970-06-19(j)

When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief authorization above are read in context with § 2000e-2(j), we believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting from present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical effect of continuing past injustices.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not bar an affirmative action plan that sets minority employment goals to remedy past exclusion.

The Contractors Association Of Eastern Pennsylvania v. The Secretary Of Labor · filed 1971-04-22(a)

To read § 703(a) in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs we would have to attribute to Congress the intention to freeze the status quo and to foreclose remedial action under other authority designed to overcome existing evils. We discern no such intention either from the language of the statute or from its legislative history.

Section 2000e-2(j) permits affirmative relief addressing proven discrimination when the relief does not establish racial quotas or preferences.

United States v. Ironworkers Local 86 · filed 1971-05-17(j)

We therefore reject appellants’ contention. The district court neither abused its discretion in ordering the affirmative relief, nor did it in any way establish a system of “racial quotas” or “preferences’” in violation of section 703 (j).

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to give preferential treatment because of a sex imbalance in a job classification or training program.

Frockt v. Olin Corporation · filed 1972-05-23(j)

Section 2000e-2(j) makes it clear that an employer is not required to treat any group or individual preferentially because of sex on account of an imbalance which may exist as to the number or percentage of persons of a particular sex employed by an employer in any particular job classification or training program.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not prohibit a temporary minority training plan with numerical objectives designed to remedy past discrimination.

Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie · filed 1972-12-01(j)

The appellant unions have argued that the Ogilvie Plan, by establishing a ratio of trainees to journeymen for employment on highway construction, has established a quota system for hiring in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. ... We conclude that the plan as implemented and interpreted by the district court constitutionally and lawfully attempts to eliminate past discrimination. ... The plan does not impermissibly prefer black persons nor does it discriminate against white persons.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not bar preferences designed to remedy past discrimination, although quotas solely to attain racial balance are forbidden.

United States v. Wood · filed 1973-01-02(j)

Having agreed to be bound by changes suggested in the report, either consented to or approved by the court, Local 46 cannot now raise Sec. 2000e-2(j) as a bar to the study's implementation. ... However, while quotas merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas to correct past discriminatory practices are not.

Section 2000e-2(j) forbids quotas imposed merely to achieve racial balance but does not bar quotas that remedy past discrimination.

United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union No. 46 · filed 1973-01-02(j)

However, while quotas merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas to correct past discriminatory practices are not.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not forbid remedies addressing the continuing effects of past discrimination.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 212 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, De · filed 1973-01-23(j)

It also appears from the legislative history of certain proposed amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) that it is not the intent of Congress to forbid remedies of the kind used in this case.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not limit a court’s relief to correct the effects of unlawful, intentional racial discrimination.

United States v. Local No. 357 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1973-02-27(j)

The court in ordering relief is not limited by Title VII’s prohibition against preferential treatment, Section 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), since that section has no application when a court seeks to correct the effects of unlawful and intentional racially discriminatory practices.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to give racial preferences solely because its workforce does not reflect the community’s racial makeup.

Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto · filed 1973-11-19(j)

The law, however, does not require that employment, either private or public, must proportionately reflect the community racial population. On the contrary, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), expressly provides that nothing in the Act shall be interpreted to require any employer to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on a racial basis merely because of an imbalance between the percentage of his employees of that race in comparison with the percentage of persons of that race in the community population as a whole.

Section 2000e-2(j) permits racial goals to remedy the effects of past discriminatory practices, but does not require preferences to correct an imbalance unrelated to discrimination.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A. · filed 1974-06-24(j)

It does not prohibit the use of goals “to eradicate the effects of past discriminatory practices.”

Section 2000e-2(j) bars preferential hiring based on racial imbalance, which the court construed to include hiring a group at a rate greatly exceeding its share of the community workforce.

Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., Materials Systems Div. · filed 1974-08-29(j)

To employ any group at a rate that greatly exceeds that group’s composition of the work force in the community is to give discriminatory preference in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(j) permits color-conscious relief for past discrimination, even if unintentional; its restriction concerns racial imbalances unrelated to an employer’s actions.

Boston Chapter, N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher · filed 1974-09-18(j)

Section 703(j) deals only with those cases in which racial imbalance has come about completely without regard to the actions of the employer.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not bar racial hiring quotas used to remedy past discrimination.

Patterson v. Newspaper · filed 1975-03-20(j)

Intervenor also suggests that his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) have been violated. ... It is well settled in this Circuit that this section does not preclude the use of racial hiring quotas to remedy the effects of past discrimination.

Section 703(j) does not bar specific membership or referral goals as affirmative relief under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5 · filed 1975-07-03(j)

The establishment of specific membership or referral goals is a form of affirmative relief authorized by § 707(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), notwithstanding the anti-preferential treatment provision of § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).

Section 2000e-2(j) requires courts fashioning seniority remedies to consider whether the remedy grants preferential treatment because of a protected characteristic.

United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1975-11-05(j)

It must be remembered, however, in fashioning remedies to advance the purposes of Title VII, that section 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), precludes a remedy that grants preferential treatment to any individual or group because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This constraint on the broad powers of the court requires that a proposed remedy be examined to ascertain whether a proscribed preference would result.

Subsection (j) bars a hiring order requiring population parity unless the evidence shows that parity would have been achieved but for the employer’s past discrimination.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana · filed 1976-03-22(j)

There is no basis for an order requiring the defendants to achieve population parity. Such an order would clearly contradict 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) in the absence of a showing that but for the employer’s past practices, population parity would have been achieved.

Subsections (h) and (j) limit what may count as an unlawful employment practice but do not restrict a court’s remedies for a proven Title VII violation.

United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors · filed 1976-07-21(h), (j)

Thus a court could not predicate a finding of violation upon the existence of a bona fide seniority system such as § 703(h) describes, or upon the mere failure to institute an affirmative action program of the kind to which § 703 (j) refers. But the court's remedial powers are not limited by these provisions.

Section 2000e-2(a), (h), and (j) do not bar affirmative action remedies with interim targets and a promotional override.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1977-04-22(a), (h), (j)

Advancing essentially the same argument that we expressly rejected in United States v. Int'l Union of Elevator Const., 538 F.2d 1012, 1019 (3d Cir. 1976), the intervening defendants urge that §§ 703(a), 703(h) and 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (h), (j), prohibit the district court from providing for an affirmative action plan containing interim targets and goals, and prohibit an affirmative action override. As we noted in Elevator Constructors, that argument is foreclosed by Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra, 424 U.S. at 757-62, 96 S.Ct. 1251. Even the Justices who wrote separately in Franks acknowledged that § 703 is not a statutory limitation upon the remedial authority conferred on the district courts by § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require preferential treatment to correct a racial imbalance in employment.

Carson v. American Brands, Inc. · filed 1977-06-02(j)

Indeed, Subsection (j) explicitly states that preferential treatment is not required to rectify racial imbalance.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to use racial hiring preferences to correct a workforce imbalance.

Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-07-15(j)

Again, we find the contrary to be true. Section 703 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j), provides : ... It seems evident that no minority group member may be hired on the basis of race and that the trial court was in error when it concluded that the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act requires a result different from that which would be achieved by adherence to the provisions of the applicable civil service act.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not make racial balancing a lawful reason to deny employment opportunities based on race.

Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young · filed 1978-02-27(j)

Simply put, Section 703(j) requires rejection of defendants’ contention that racial balancing is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the non-selection of the white police officers.

Section 2000e-2(j) bars liability and court-ordered preferential treatment based solely on a racial imbalance when purposeful discrimination is absent.

Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' International Union · filed 1978-05-25(j)

Section 703(j) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), makes clear that employer liability may not be based solely on the existence of a racial imbalance among employees, when the district court has found the absence of purposeful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not permit employer liability based solely on a racial imbalance when purposeful discrimination is absent.

Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' International Union · filed 1978-05-10(j)

Section 703(j) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), makes clear that employer liability may not be based solely on the existence of a racial imbalance among employees, when the district court has found the absence of purposeful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require exact racial balance within each department of an employer’s workforce.

Queen v. Dresser Industries, Inc. · filed 1978-08-02(j)

It goes without saying then that exact racial balance on a departmental level is also not required.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) permits a union to give minority workers priority in job referrals to comply with a lawful affirmative action plan.

Local Union No. 35 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Hartford · filed 1978-12-11(c)(2)

For reasons identical to those stated by the Third Circuit, I hold that section 703(c) of Title VII is not violated when the Union gives a preference to minority workers on its referral list in order to comply with the City’s Plan.

Section 703(j) does not prohibit a private employer and union from adopting a voluntary race-conscious training plan to address racial imbalance.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber · filed 1979-06-27(j)

In view of this legislative history and in view of Congress’ desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses, use of the word “require” rather than the phrase “require or permit” in § 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not categorically prohibit employment quotas favoring minority groups; their legality depends on the facts of the case.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Contour Chair Lounge Co. · filed 1979-04-24(a)

In these circumstances and in view of what has been our consistent line of decision in this area, we decline to hold that affirmative action programs involving employment quotas favorable to members of minority groups are per se unconstitutional or illegal regardless of the facts of particular cases.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not categorically prohibit employment quotas favoring minority groups; such programs are valid at least where actual racial discrimination in employment has been shown.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Contour Chair Lounge Company · filed 1979-05-15(a)

In these circumstances and in view of what has been our consistent line of decision in this area, we decline to hold that affirmative action programs involving employment quotas favorable to members of minority groups are per se unconstitutional or illegal regardless of the facts of particular cases. We adhere to this court's established view that such programs are valid at least where actual racial discrimination in employment situations has been shown.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to use a race-conscious promotion plan to address the lingering effects of its past discrimination.

20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1728, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,313 Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Coleman A. Young, Mayo · filed 1979-10-12(a), (j)

The fact that job-related, non-discriminatory examinations for sergeant were instituted in 1973 did not deprive the City of the power to deal with the lingering effects of past discriminatory practices. ... All claims of the plaintiffs based on the contention that the affirmative action program for promotion to sergeant violates Title VI, Title VII and § 1981 are dismissed.

Title VII’s employment discrimination provisions do not inherently conflict with the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Friedman · filed 1979-12-28(a), (d)

In any event, as discussed ... at p. 711, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that that statute was passed with full congressional recognition of the existence of E.O. 11246 and that the Congress did not consider the affirmative action requirements of that Executive Order to be incompatible with the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to prefer a woman or minority applicant over an equally qualified candidate, so long as the choice rests on lawful criteria.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · filed 1981-03-04(j)

But Title VII does not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require employers to grant racial preferences to correct a racial imbalance.

Hiatt v. City of Berkeley · filed 1982-03-29(j)

Addressing the very problem that is before us, section 703, subdivision (j), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)), provides in equally clear and explicit terms that racial preferences are not required to be granted to any employee or group of employees on account of racial imbalance either.

Section 2000e-2 permits state employers to use voluntary affirmative action plans to remedy past gender discrimination when the plans satisfy the four Weber criteria.

La Riviere v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-05-19(a)

We hold that a state and its official agencies may institute a voluntary, bona fide affirmative action program, such as involved in this case, which is designed to remedy past gender-based employment discrimination. Where, as here, such a plan satisfies the four criteria articulated in Weber, the plan may be utilized consistently with Title VII without giving rise to liability to applicants who are excluded from the program solely because they belong to the opposite sex.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not make an employer’s failure to follow an affirmative action policy a per se Title VII violation.

Cavallari v. Stetson · filed 1982-11-30(j)

First, and most importantly, Title VII neither requires nor encompasses any form of affirmative action or preferential treatment. ... Therefore even if Mr. Murphy consciously ignored affirmative action policies in this case, he cannot be held per se liable for that in a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits using race to control involuntary transfers and school selection through a quota maintained solely to preserve racial balance.

Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia · filed 1983-01-17(a)(1)

Clearly, the expectation of being assigned to a particular school within the District on the basis of seniority constitutes a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Thus, the involuntary transfer of a teacher from a particular school solely on the basis of race and the imposed restriction on the selection of a new school solely on the basis of race constitutes racial discrimination with respect to the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” Such discrimination is prohibited by Title VII under all the circumstances and this Court cannot allow it to stand.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to adopt or follow an affirmative action policy.

White v. Vathally · filed 1983-09-19(j)

Title VII does not require an employer to implement or comply with any affirmative action policy.

Section 2000e-2(j) neither requires nor encompasses affirmative action or preferential treatment.

Hooker v. Tufts University · filed 1983-09-30(j)

Title VII neither requires nor encompasses any form of affirmative action or preferential treatment.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to adopt an affirmative-action program.

Craik v. Minnesota State University Board · filed 1984-03-23(j)

Neither Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires an employer to institute an affirmative-action program, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976); ... but evidence that an employer has failed to live up to an affirmative-action plan is relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to institute an affirmative-action program.

Craik v. Minnesota State University Board · filed 1984-06-15(j)

Neither Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires an employer to institute an affirmative-action program, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(j) (1976); Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), but evidence that an employer has failed to live up to an affirmative-action plan is relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.

Section 703(a) does not treat voluntary race-conscious faculty assignments designed to integrate a public school’s staff as a per se violation.

Kromnick v. School District Of Philadelphia · filed 1984-07-17(a)

Thus although a classification that is overtly race-conscious might under ordinary circumstances signify a per se violation of Title VII, applying a per se analysis to voluntary policies of staff integration designed to further the education of students of de facto segregated public school systems would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress underlying Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to adopt voluntary race-conscious remedies based on a prima facie showing of disparate racial impact without first obtaining a judicial finding of discrimination.

Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission · filed 1984-04-16

We only hold that consistent with Kirkland Lieutenants, 711 F.2d at 1130, and Weber, 443 U.S. at 209, 99 S.Ct. at 2730, a judicial determination of racial discrimination is not a prerequisite to an employer adopting voluntary, race-conscious remedies to comply with Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits rejecting a qualified applicant because of race or sex when the employer cannot justify the decision under a valid affirmative action plan.

Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va. · filed 1985-03-01(a)(1)

By virtue of the facts found by this Court as herein contained, Plaintiff proved a prima facie case of a violation of Title VII by the Defendants by showing that he was protected by the provisions of Title VII, was qualified for the position sought, that he was rejected, that Defendants sought other applicants for the positions available based upon considerations of race and sex which were not in accordance with a bona fide affirmative action plan.

Section 2000e-2 permits a public employer to adopt a voluntary affirmative action program addressing stipulated patterns of discrimination, even when its beneficiaries have not proved individual discrimination.

Deveraux v. William J. Geary, and Plaintiff-Class in Culbreath v. Dukakis, Intervenors-Appellees · filed 1985-06-24

In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Court, we adhere to the precedent upholding the validity of voluntary affirmative action programs instituted by public employers.

Section 703(h) protects bona fide seniority systems but does not bar a collectively bargained affirmative action provision that qualifies seniority rights.

Britton v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 1985-10-21(h)

First, section 703(h), on which the Court relied and which protects bona fide seniority systems that are not the result of an intent to discriminate, is not applicable here.

A voluntary Title VII consent decree favoring minority employees is not unlawful merely because the employer did not admit a prior violation.

Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-American Police v. Boston Police Department · filed 1985-12-20

Finally, here and in Deveraux, the underlying cases involved a complaint of Title VII violation; a voluntary settlement of the complaint; and a consent decree that (arguably) favors minority employees not themselves actual victims of discrimination. ... we are not aware of any convincing legal theory that would resolve that argument on the basis of whether the parties had bothered to negotiate an 'admission' as part of their consensual settlement of the suit. Thus, we find Deveraux dispositive of the present appeal.

Section 2000e-2 does not make a voluntary affirmative action consent decree unlawful merely because the employer did not admit a prior Title VII violation.

Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-American Police v. Boston Police Department · filed 1985-12-20

The only distinguishing feature to which appellants point is the fact that the consent decree in Deveraux contained a stipulation that the MDC had previously violated Title VII, while here the Boston Police Department made no such concession. We find that this distinction is not determinative.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require employers to adopt affirmative action programs to correct workforce imbalances.

E. Marie Holden, (85-3405), (85-3420) v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., (85-3405), (85- 3420) · filed 1986-06-18(j)

Since Title VII does not require the adoption of affirmative action programs, to the extent that plaintiff sought to implement an affirmative action plan which would comply with Executive Order No. 11,246, plaintiff was not opposing a practice that violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a record of discrimination before an employer may use race-conscious hiring preferences as a remedy.

Hammon v. Barry · filed 1987-02-27(a)

The decisional law uniformly holds that a record of discrimination constitutes the crucial condition precedent to the use of racial preferences.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a flexible voluntary affirmative action plan that considers sex as one factor in promotion to reduce an imbalance in traditionally segregated jobs.

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. · filed 1987-03-25(a)

The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the Agency’s work force. Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to consider race among qualified promotion candidates under an affirmative action plan that responds to a manifest imbalance and does not unnecessarily restrict other employees’ opportunities.

Higgins v. City of Vallejo · filed 1987-07-29(a)

The affirmative action plan established by the City of Vallejo is similarly free of rigid quotas and discriminatory exclusions. Only qualified employees are considered for promotions, and all applicants are entitled to compete against all others. Once the pool of qualified applicants is assembled, the City may take race into account in rendering its final decision.

Section 2000e-2 permits race-conscious remedial hiring only when there is a predicate of discrimination, and the remedy must be tailored to that discrimination.

Hammon v. Barry · filed 1987-08-14

In short, it is our view that our earlier holding--that a predicate of discrimination is required before an employer may lawfully employ a race-conscious remedial device--is fully in keeping with Johnson 's clear holding that a "manifest imbalance" in a "traditionally segregated job category" must exist before an employer may engage in preferential hiring (or promotions).

Section 703(a) permits race-conscious promotional relief to remedy proven discrimination when the relief is limited and does not unnecessarily impede other employees’ advancement.

Howard v. McLucas · filed 1987-10-05(a)

Further, to the extent the relief is not victim specific, it is still lawful since it is necessary to provide full relief to class members, it is flexible, waivable, and of limited duration; the number of positions offered is limited to the specific number of jobs statistically proven to have been lost to class members; and, finally, it does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of third parties or create an absolute bar to their advancement since the impact of the relief is relatively diffuse in nature and many promotional opportunities continue to exist for these third parties.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer relying solely on statistical disparities to justify a voluntary affirmative action plan for jobs with minimum qualifications to compare its workforce with the qualified area labor pool.

Janowiak v. The Corporate City of South Bend · filed 1987-12-16(a)

In a case such as this one, in which the City has proffered no evidence of an “inexorable zero” and absolutely no other evidence of past discrimination, any proffered statistical comparison must establish a manifest imbalance between the relevant qualified area labor pool and the employer’s work force.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require affirmative action, so an employer’s failure to follow its voluntary affirmative action program alone is not an unlawful employment practice.

Arthur Manoharan, M.D. v. Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons · filed 1988-03-10(j)

Since section 704(j) of Title VII states that affirmative action in employment practices is not required by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982), an employer’s failure to follow its own voluntary affirmative action program cannot, by itself, constitute an unlawful employment practice within the language of section 708(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit a public employer’s race-conscious promotional relief when that relief satisfies the Fifth Amendment.

Howard v. McLucas · filed 1989-04-27(a)

Our determination that the promotional relief does not violate the Fifth Amendment therefore means that it satisfies § 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin but does not completely prohibit all affirmative action programs.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits race-conscious promotional relief in a public employer's consent decree when the relief satisfies the Fifth Amendment.

Howard v. McLucas · filed 1989-06-02(a)

Our determination that the promotional relief does not violate the Fifth Amendment therefore means that it satisfies Sec. 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a), which makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin but does not completely prohibit all affirmative action programs.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require preferential treatment based on racial imbalance after discriminatory employment practices have been removed.

Dozier v. Chupka · filed 1991-05-15(j)

Yet this argument fails to recognize that once the offending practices have been removed, the mere fact of racial imbalance or adverse impact fails even to state a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to adopt a voluntary plan to address a manifest imbalance in minority representation.

Scelsa v. City University of New York · filed 1992-11-18(a)

Under Title VII, voluntary compliance and achievement of a remedial scheme is preferred. ... An employer is entitled to seek to remedy the under-representation of a minority via the voluntary adoption of schemes designed to increase such representation. A “manifest imbalance” that reflects under-representation of Italian-Americans at CUNY would serve to justify such a program.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not entitle a pregnant employee to an indefinite leave with a guaranteed return when similarly situated employees receive no such benefit.

Lang v. Star Herald · filed 1997-03-06(j)

Title VII requires employers to treat employees who are members of protected classes the same as other similarly situated employees, but it does not create substantive rights to preferential treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to give a protected-class employee preferential treatment in promotion when it treats similarly situated employees alike.

Manse v. Union Electric Co. · filed 1997-04-01(j)

“Title VII requires employers to treat employees who are members of protected classes the same as other similarly situated employees, but it does not create substantive rights to preferential treatment.” Lang, 107 F.3d at 1312 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)). Plaintiff was treated the same as the other twenty-nine UE employees who bid on the building service mechanic position and who were not currently working as journeymen.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require employers to give pregnant employees preferential treatment; they must treat them the same as similarly situated employees.

Lang v. Star Herald · filed 1997-04-03(j)

Title VII requires employers to treat employees who are members of protected classes the same as other similarly situated employees, but it does not create substantive rights to preferential treatment.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require employers to give protected employees special preference or treatment.

Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1997-04-23(j)

Although Title VII protects employees against discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, it does not afford minorities special preference or place upon the employer an affirmative duty to accord them special treatment.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require a covered entity to grant preferential treatment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Coalition For Economic Equity v. Wilson · filed 1997-08-28(j)

Title VII's one command regarding race and gender preferences conclusively demonstrates that Proposition 209 is entirely consistent: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any [entity] ... subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j); see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) ("Title VII ... does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women.").

Section 2000e-2(j) says an employer’s desire to mitigate or avoid disparate impact does not justify preferential treatment for any group.

Biondo, Peter v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-08-27(j)

Congress did not attempt this; to the contrary, it provided in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) that an employer’s desire to mitigate or avoid disparate impact does not justify preferential treatment for any group.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer to prefer a qualified woman over a more qualified man because women are underrepresented in its workforce.

Gaye Levy AYON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur F. SAMPSON, Administrator, General Services Administration, Defendant-App · filed 1976-10-18(j)

We agree with the district court that nothing in the Affirmative Action Plan or the Equal Employment Opportunity Program requires a federal agency to employ a qualified woman in preference to a more qualified man. Title VII was enacted to eliminate sex as a factor in the employment context, not to establish it as a primary consideration.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require preferential hiring based on sex or national origin to correct an imbalance in the workforce.

Torgerson v. City of Rochester · filed 2010-05-21(j)

Commissioner Field’s opinion cannot demonstrate a discriminatory animus because Congress explicitly commands that Title VII shall not be interpreted to require preferential treatment because of sex or national origin on account of an imbalance in the number or percent of those employed, compared to the relevant number or percent in the community.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require preferential hiring of women or minorities to correct an imbalance in a workforce.

Torgerson v. City of Rochester · filed 2011-06-01(j)

Commissioner Field’s opinion cannot demonstrate a discriminatory animus because Congress explicitly commands that Title VII shall not be interpreted to require preferential treatment because of sex or national origin on account of an imbalance in the number or percent of those employed, compared to the relevant number or percent in the community. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j).

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits single-sex job assignments only in limited circumstances and does not justify a blanket requirement that 70% of assignments be female-only.

United States v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2021-06-03(e)(1)

Title VII permits an assignment to be single-sex only under very specific circumstances, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1), and so a blanket mandate that 70% of WHV assignments be female-only cannot be justified.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit a sex-based hiring restriction based on customer preference alone.

Olsen v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 1999-11-22(e)(1)

In noting that courts consistently have rejected a BFOQ based on customer preference, this Court does not disregard or trivialize the Marriott's emphasis on the importance of customer preference to its success in the massage business.

Section 2000e-2(e)(2) permits an honestly and reasonably administered reservation of light work jobs for women and physically restricted men when the reservation serves a bona fide occupational qualification.

Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1966-10-14(e)(2)

We further find as a fact that, in reserving certain jobs for women and restricted men, Firestone and the Local were bona fide in the sense that they acted with honest purpose and acted within reason in their effort to accomplish the end that is expressly recognized as legitimate by Sec. 2000e-2(e) (2) of the Act. Therefore, because of this specific exception in the Act, plaintiff cannot properly claim discrimination when he was not allowed to exercise his seniority to “bump” a woman in this light work category.

Section 2000e-2(e) allows an employer some discretion to use sex as an occupational qualification when reasonably necessary to its normal business operations.

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company · filed 1967-09-12(e)

This exception is couched in extremely broad terms since it leaves to the employer’s bona fide judgment whether selection or deployment of employees on the basis of sex is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of his particular business or enterprise.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits an airline to require stewardesses to be unmarried when that requirement is an occupational qualification necessary to its normal operation.

Cooper v. Doyal · filed 1968-02-02(e)(1)

Delta's policy is simply a reasonable and valid condition of employment based on a logical occupational qualification necessary to maintain the normal operation of the airline. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1).

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to reject female applicants merely because state law sets minimum employment standards for women but not men.

Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare · filed 1968-09-10(e)

As we interpret this provision, the absence of state-imposed minimal standards for male employees is not a bona fide occupational qualification which would permit an employer to hire male applicants and reject females.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not treat state limits on women’s work hours and lifting as a bona fide occupational qualification for a job.

Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company · filed 1968-11-25(e)

The California hours and weights legislation does not create or constitute a bona fide occupational qualification within the meaning of Section 703(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(e)).

Section 2000e-2(e) permits an employer to exclude women as a class from work requiring lifts over forty pounds when selecting those able to do the work would pose a high risk of danger and inefficiency.

Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Company · filed 1968-12-30(e)

Defendant’s policy of excluding women as a class from jobs which require the lifting of weights in excess of forty pounds is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its particular business within the meaning of the Act, even though some women may be able to perform the work without hazard, since the process of selecting those few who may be able to do so involves a high risk of danger and inefficiency. For this reason defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff to perform warehouseman’s work is not a violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer claiming a sex-based bona fide occupational qualification to prove a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women cannot perform the job safely and efficiently.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1969-03-28(e)(1)

Having concluded that Southern Bell has not satisfied its burden of proving that the job of switchman is within the bona fide occupational qualification exception, we must reverse the District Court on this issue and hold that Southern Bell has violated 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring only when the employer shows that all or substantially all women cannot safely and efficiently perform the job.

Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1969-07-31(e)(1)

Weeks requires Employer to show that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the position involved. While it may be that, in terms of lifting weights, the duties of this position begin to approach the outer limits of what women should undertake, this Court firmly concludes that Employer has not satisfied its burden of proof.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits hiring by sex when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.

Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1970-04-08(e)(1)

Having considered the briefs, the arguments and the evidence, the Court finds that at the time of the plaintiff’s application for employment as a flight attendant with Pan Am (April 1967), and at the time of trial (September 1969), being a female was a bona fide occupational qualification for hire as a flight attendant on Pan Am, and that Pan Am’s policy of hiring only females for that position was accordingly not an unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sex under Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(e) requires a finding that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification before sex discrimination may be permitted.

Lansdale v. Air Line Pilots Association International · filed 1970-08-13(e)

The bare ruling of the district court would permit discrimination by sex without the requisite finding which must support such a conclusion — that the same is a “bona fide occupational qualification” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).

Section 2000e-2(e) does not make a state law limiting women’s working hours a bona fide occupational qualification.

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec · filed 1970-09-09(e)

The Illinois Female Employment Act does not create, constitute or provide a “bona fide occupational qualification” within the meaning of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(e)).

Section 2000e-2(e) permits sex-based employment decisions only when sex is reasonably necessary to a particular business; a blanket lifting restriction for women does not qualify.

Local 246, Utility Workers Union of America v. Southern California Edison Co. · filed 1970-12-23(e)

Section 703(e) creates a very narrow exception to the Act; it refers to a particular business or enterprise rather than to broad categories of employment such as industrial or technological occupations. ... We conclude that the classification and discrimination authorized by Section 1251 does not constitute a BFOQ. Since the California statute consequently permits discrimination prohibited by Title VII, it unavoidably conflicts with that Title and is invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Defendant Edison’s conduct pursuant to the invalid statute constitutes an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Act.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to bar women from strenuous jobs based on a general weight-lifting limit without giving each employee a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate her ability to do the work.

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1969-09-26(e)

Accordingly, we hold that Colgate may, if it so desires, retain its 35-pound weight-lifting limit as a general guideline for all of its employees, male and female. However, it must notify all of its workers that each of them who desires to do so will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his or her ability to perform more strenuous jobs on a regular basis. Each employee who is able to so demonstrate must be permitted to bid on and fill any position to which his or her seniority may entitle him or her.

A state law restricting women’s working hours does not itself establish a bona fide occupational qualification for excluding qualified women from a job.

Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1971-03-29(e)(1)

Reliance on the state statute alone to create the bonafide occupational qualification is unavailing.

An employer that denies work because of sex bears the burden of showing that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification; a qualified worker’s sex alone does not meet that burden.

Vogel v. Trans World Airlines · filed 1971-05-10(e)

That burden is hardly met by the facts stipulated in the case at bar, in which it is agreed that plaintiff is a fully qualified mechanic who had the seniority and proficiency to entitle her to work overtime and who was not denied the right to do so because of any physical or mental characteristic peculiar to her as an individual, but only because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2 does not permit a blanket ban on women bartenders when sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the job.

Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby · filed 1971-05-27(e)

Applying these standards to section 25656, we must hold that that statute is not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the operation of a bar and is therefore in direct conflict with section 2000e-2 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit an employer to exclude women from jobs based on generalized assumptions about their physical abilities.

Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, a Delaware Corporation, Leah Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, a Delawa · filed 1971-06-01(e)(1)

Based on the legislative intent and on the Commission's interpretation, sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for the application of the BFOQ exception. See Developments in the Law — Title VII, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1178-1179 (1971). Southern Pacific has not, and could not allege such a basis here, and section 703(e) thus could not exempt its policy from the impact of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not allow an employer to exclude women from a job based on general assumptions about their ability to work long hours.

LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. · filed 1971-10-04(e)

We join with courts across the nation in condemning such “stereotyped classifications” as failing to constitute a bona fide occupational qualification and hence as unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) places the burden of proving the bona fide occupational qualification exception on the defendants if the plaintiff shows sex discrimination.

Parmer v. National Cash Register Company · filed 1972-02-09(e)

This general policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex and of other prohibited categories is subject to the exception contained in 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-2(e) which provides that such discrimination shall not be deemed an unlawful employment practice “ . . .in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” If, at trial, plaintiff makes a showing of sex discrimination, the burden of showing that said discrimination is within the above noted exception will be upon the two defendants.

Section 2000e-2(e)'s occupational qualification exception does not cover women-only rest breaks based on assumptions that women are physically weaker than men.

Burns v. Rohr Corporation · filed 1972-06-20(e)

If restrictions on weight-lifting, which are presumably based upon the traditional notion that women are physically weaker than men, do not constitute a BFOQ, a fortiori a regulation extending rest periods to women cannot constitute a BFOQ, since the rest-period regulation is apparently based upon the same premises as the weight-lifting restriction.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1)'s bona fide occupational qualification exception does not cover sex-based pension vesting differences unsupported by business necessity.

Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1973-10-26(e)(1)

After application of the appropriate legal principles to the facts of the case, the court finds that the F&E plan does not fall within the scope of the “bona fide occupational qualification” exception of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring only when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1974-04-03(e)(1)

17. INJUNCTION AGAINST FUTURE DISCRIMINATION IN THE FILLING OF CABIN ATTENDANT POSITIONS — The Company shall not discriminate on the basis of sex in the filling of cabin attendant positions, irrespective of the title of the position and the job content thereof, unless sex constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification for the position within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1), nor shall the Company perpetuate the effects of past discrimination by according a preference to pursers not warranted by system seniority in the filling of any cabin attendant position which may hereinafter be created.

Section 2000e-2(e) requires an employer invoking the bona fide occupation qualification exception for a weight lifting policy to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that all or substantially all women cannot safely and efficiently perform the jobs involved.

Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., Consumer Products Division · filed 1975-04-28(e)

In order to rely on the bona fide occupation qualification exception set forth in Section 703(e), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(e) with respect to its weight lifting policy, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all or substantially all females would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the jobs involved.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits excluding women from a position only if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that position.

United States of America v. City of Chicago · filed 1977-01-11(e)(1)

These practices could be justified only by proof that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification of those positions from which women have been excluded. ... The City neither asserted nor attempted to prove that only men could perform the full range of police duties.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) requires an employer claiming a sex-based occupational qualification to show a factual basis that all or substantially all members of the excluded sex could not effectively perform the job.

Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. · filed 1977-03-14(e)(1)

In order to succeed in its claim, the defendant will have to prove ... there is a factual basis for its contention that all or substantially all men would be unable to perform effectively the duties of the job of nurses aide.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to exclude women from jobs based on assumed physical limitations.

Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. · filed 1977-05-31(e)

Uniroyal’s conduct is clearly outside the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) which provides an exception to the general prohibitions of Title VII when “sex . is a bona fide occupational qualification” [BFOQ].

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a male-only hiring requirement for prison guard contact positions when the conditions of a particular prison make being male a bona fide occupational qualification for maintaining security.

Dothard v. Rawlinson · filed 1977-06-27(e)

On the basis of that evidence, we conclude that the District Court was in error in ruling that being male is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the job of correctional counselor in a "contact" position in an Alabama male maximum-security penitentiary.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits an airline to bar pregnant stewardesses from flying as a bona fide occupational qualification when the restriction is supported by findings about passenger safety.

Karen Condit and Mary E. Oravec v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-07-28(e)

Karen Condit, a stewardess representing a class composed of herself and all others similarly situated, and Mary E. Oravec, an intervenor, appeal from an order of the district court holding that the maternity leave policy of United Air Lines, Inc., constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification under § 703(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)). We affirm.

Section 2000e-2(e) requires an employer invoking the bona fide occupational qualification defense to prove that its sex-based rule is reasonably necessary to the operation of its business.

MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1977-10-21(e)

From the foregoing, the Court concludes that the defendant has not borne its burden to show that its requirement that all pregnant flight attendants be removed from flight service and placed on maternity leave is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular enterprise” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).

Section 2000e-2(e)’s bona fide occupational qualification exception can defeat a Title VII challenge to an airline’s mandatory maternity leave policy for flight attendants.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-11-08(e)

In Condit, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that the mandatory maternity leave policy of United Airlines, Inc. constitutes a bona fide occupation qualification under Section 703(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). ... Since Delta’s policy is substantially the same as that of United Airlines, and because the compensation question has now been resolved in General Electric v. Gilbert, supra, the court is of the opinion that plaintiffs’ claims with regard to maternity leave must also fail.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not permit an employer to exclude women from a jail identification assistant position when sex is not reasonably necessary to its duties.

Manley v. Mobile County, Ala. · filed 1977-12-12(e)

Without the presence of the key variables that prompted the Dothard Court to find a valid bfoq defense, this court is unable to find that the instant defendants may seize upon the § 2000e-2(e) exception to justify their actions against the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based hiring qualification based on customer privacy only when the employer has a factual basis for it and cannot feasibly assign duties to protect privacy without excluding one sex.

Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. · filed 1978-03-29(e)(1)

I hold, accordingly, that when an employer defends a sex discrimination action by raising the privacy interests of its customers as the basis for a bfoq defense, that employer must prove not only that it had a factual basis for believing that the hiring of any members of one sex would directly undermine the essence of the job involved or the employer’s business, but also that it could not assign job responsibilities selectively in such a way that there would be minimal clash between the privacy interests of the customers and the nondiscrimination principle of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits an employer to treat non-pregnancy as a bona fide occupational qualification for flight attendants on flights lasting more than six hours.

Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1978-09-06(e)

The Court deems it appropriate therefore to conclude that non-pregnancy is a BFOQ with respect to flights of more than six hours duration.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits an English-proficiency requirement for a front-office job when it is bona fide and reasonably necessary to normal business operations.

Mejia v. New York Sheraton Hotel · filed 1978-10-31(e)

There is no factual basis for the suggestion that the hotel training and selection process for front office positions tended to have a disparate impact on the promotional opportunities of Hispanic employees seeking those positions. Even if the requirement of English proficiency did have such an impact, defendants have carried their burden of establishing that the requirement was bona fide and “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based job qualification only when it is reasonably necessary to the employer’s normal operation; speculative safety concerns and scheduling difficulties do not justify excluding women from an entire job classification.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1979-01-05(e)(1)

Defendants have patently failed to bear their burden of proving that a bfoq was reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the Iowa State Men’s Reformatory at Anamosa or that denial of a bfoq would create a reasonable possibility of a breakdown of the legitimate governmental interests discussed above.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) requires an employer claiming a sex-based occupational qualification to show that it cannot reasonably rearrange duties to protect inmate privacy while allowing equal employment opportunities.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1980-01-11(e)(1)

In addition to showing that the hiring of women at Anamosa would undermine the essence of the prison administration, Anamosa must also demonstrate it could not reasonably rearrange job responsibilities in a way to minimize the clash between privacy interests of the inmates, and the nondiscrimination principle of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit an employer to apply a religious bona fide occupational qualification unequally to male and female employees.

Dolter v. Wahlert High School · filed 1980-01-28(e)(1)

To that extent, even where such code of conduct truly constitutes a legitimate religious bfoq, the law nonetheless requires that it not be applied discriminatorily on the basis of sex; that is, unequally to defendant’s male and female lay teacher employees.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) allows a sex-based occupational qualification only when the employer proves it is reasonably necessary to normal operations; a blanket promotion bar does not qualify when duties can reasonably be reassigned.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1980-02-05(e)(1)

What we do hold is that Anamosa's current classification system violates Title VII because it impermissibly attempts to establish a bfoq which has the effect of prohibiting any advancement in a person's chosen field beyond a CO I level because that person is a woman. Advancement to CO III and CO IV levels requires first working as a CO II. Anamosa has failed in its burden of demonstrating that the entire job classification of CO II meets Title VII's "extremely narrow" bfoq exception in employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a pregnancy-based leave rule for flight attendants as a bona fide occupational qualification when the rule is reasonably necessary to passenger safety.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1980-12-23(e)

In light of the district court’s factual findings regarding the significance of the safety risk involved in allowing pregnant flight attendants to continue flying, 435 F.Supp. at 420-23 & nn. 10-15, we conclude that Pan Am has shown its Stop Policy to be “reasonably necessary” to passenger safety.

Section 2000e-2(e)'s national-origin bona fide occupational qualification exception must account for a Japanese company's treaty rights and business needs when applied to that company.

Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America · filed 1981-01-09(e)

Although the "bona fide occupational qualification" ("bfoq") exception of Title VII is to be construed narrowly in the normal context, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2729, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977), we believe that as applied to a Japanese company enjoying rights under Article VIII of the Treaty it must be construed in a manner that will give due weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United States, including such factors as a person's (1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch does business.

Section 2000e-2(e) does not allow an employer to justify race or color discrimination as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Segar v. Civiletti · filed 1981-02-06(e)

Section 2000e-2(e) does not provide this exception for discrimination on the basis of color or race.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based employment decision only when the employer shows that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to its business.

Saunders v. Hercules, Inc. · filed 1981-04-10(e)

The employer relying on the bfoq exception must demonstrate that the normal operation of his business required members of one sex only to perform the duties of the job involved. ... In the case at bar, the defendant established that female guards were necessary to search female employees. However, the defendant failed to establish that business necessity therefore required the company to discharge male guards, retaining less senior female guards.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits an employer to require female labor and delivery nurses when patient privacy makes sex a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to its operations.

Backus v. Baptist Medical Center · filed 1981-04-15(e)(1)

It follows that requiring labor and delivery nurses to be female is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) which is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [its] particular business or enterprise.”

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) makes the bona fide occupational qualification defense available in cases involving intentional as well as unintentional discrimination.

Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. · filed 1981-06-12(e)(1)

The BFOQ defense is available in cases involving intentional as well as unintentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(e)’s bona fide occupational qualification defense applies to employment practices that deliberately distinguish by sex; business necessity addresses facially neutral practices with a discriminatory impact.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways · filed 1981-06-22(e)

The BFOQ defense is applicable to employment practices that purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex while the Business Necessity defense is appropriately raised where facially neutral employment practices run afoul of Title VII only because of their disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(e) requires an employer asserting a sex-based bona fide occupational qualification to prove that the restriction is reasonably necessary to its operation.

Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center · filed 1981-08-06(e)

Moreover, since the evidence indicates that Defendants did not have a factual basis for: (1) concluding that hiring women would undermine the essence either of the rehabilitation specialist position, or the Defendants’ business of rehabilitating prisoners, or (2) for believing that job responsibilities could not be rearranged, the Court finds that Defendants have not sustained their burden of proving that the alleged bfoq was reasonably necessary to the operation of the Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center.

Section 2000e-2(e) excludes race as a bona fide occupational qualification, so assigning an employee a job because of a racial stereotype violates Title VII.

James B. KNIGHT, Appellant, v. NASSAU COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellee · filed 1981-05-18(e)

No matter how laudable the Commission’s intention might be — in trying to attract more minority applicants to the Civil Service— the fact remains that Knight was assigned a particular job (against his wishes) because his race was believed to specially qualify him for the work. This is a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits an employer to require male janitors when a lawful seniority system may assign any janitor to men’s bathhouses where female presence would violate users’ privacy.

Brooks v. ACF Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-04-29(e)(1)

As to the bfoq issue, it being the first one above posed, the court holds that in respect to all employees in the JD, male gender was required as a bfoq reasonably necessary to the normal operation of defendant’s plant and business, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), because in the light of the holding in the two paragraphs next above, even though the privacy factor was present only in the bathhouses and was absent from all other JD workplaces, the seniority system could lawfully operate, as it did, to require those holding the least seniority in the JD, including plaintiff, to be assigned to work in one or the other of the three bathhouses, where females were precluded from working by the privacy factor there present, as was plaintiff, in the same manner as it operated to require defendant to assign plaintiff to do so if she were to work in the JD at all.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits an employer to restrict a job to one sex only when it proves that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the job’s essential functions.

Jatczak v. Ochburg · filed 1982-06-10(e)(1)

It appears to the Court that none of defendants’ reasons for restricting the Child Care Worker 03 to males can be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification. The record developed in this case makes it perfectly clear that gender plays no significant role in the ability of a person to properly supervise the clientele of the Sheltered Workshop.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not allow customer preference to justify racial discrimination in employment.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1553, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,422 Carl Rucker, Cross-Appellee v. Higher Educational Aids Board, · filed 1982-03-18(e)(1)

The customer-preference argument is invariably based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1), which permits employers to make employment decisions on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." Race and color-the other two grounds of discrimination that are made unlawful by Title VII-are omitted, and certainly not by an oversight.

Section 2000e-2(e)’s bona fide occupational qualification defense requires a link between pregnancy risks and impaired job performance; potential fetal harm alone is insufficient.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-08-18(e)

Both aspects of the test focus upon job performance; therefore, in order to successfully assert a BFOQ defense, the defendant must show a nexus between pregnancy risks and impaired ability to perform the job. Potential for fetal harm, unless it adversely affects a mother’s job performance, is irrelevant to the BFOQ issue.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) makes a bona fide occupational qualification an affirmative defense that the employer must support with facts.

Gifford v. Achison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1982-08-31(e)(1)

What the court failed to recognize, however, is that the BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense. Defendants were required to produce facts in support of the BFOQ claim, rather than plaintiff being required to disprove it.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex based hiring only when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification; an employer invoking inmate privacy must show that it cannot rearrange duties to protect privacy while employing women.

Hardin v. Stynchcomb · filed 1982-11-22(e)(1)

We hold only that the bfoq exception to Title VII does not justify defendants' arbitrary practice of funneling deputy sheriffs through positions reserved almost exclusively for males.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) requires an employer invoking the bona fide occupational qualification defense to produce facts showing that the job requirement is reasonably necessary to its business.

Gifford v. Atchison · filed 1982-12-20(e)(1)

What the court should examine, then, is whether heavy lifting capability is a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) for the position of wire chief under the BFOQ exception in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). ... What the court failed to recognize, however, is that the BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense. Defendants were required to produce facts in support of the BFOQ claim, rather than plaintiff being required to disprove it.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) does not permit excluding women from prison guard positions based on some male inmates’ preference for male guards or perceived indignity from searches by female guards.

Bagley v. Watson · filed 1983-07-04(e)(1)

However, the preference of some male inmates for male guards, and the indignity perceived by some male inmates as a result of having women guards perform the kinds of searches and observations at issue in this case, even though deserving of some deference by our societal standards and even though granted constitutional protection by the Oregon Supreme Court, do not justify discrimination against women in employment so as to constitute a BFOQ exception to the nondiscriminatory mandate of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits hiring correction officers exclusively from one sex only in the most unusual circumstances.

Reynolds v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1983-08-19(e)

In the context of hiring correction officers, only the most unusual circumstances will justify the hiring of members of one sex exclusively.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a religious hiring requirement when the religion is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to normal business operations.

Kern v. Dynalectron Corp. · filed 1983-10-19(e)

5. The requirement that an individual be a Moslem to perform the duties of a helicopter pilot in certain portions of Saudi Arabia is a bona fide occupational qualification within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).

Section 2000e-2(e) provides a bona fide occupational qualification defense, which an employer need not prove when it denies sex discrimination and does not raise the defense.

Darris V. Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Youth Services · filed 1984-02-15(e)

Plaintiff has erroneously characterized defendant’s burden as one of proving a BFOQ existed. Defendant has never admitted to a practice of sex discrimination, especially in plaintiff’s case, and consequently never raised the affirmative defense of BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a bona fide occupational qualification defense to a facially discriminatory fetal-protection policy only when the policy relates directly to a pregnant or fertile woman’s ability to perform her job.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital · filed 1984-03-16(e)

We hold that when a policy designed to protect employee offspring from workplace hazards proves facially discriminatory, there is, in effect, no defense, unless the employer shows a direct relationship between the policy and the actual ability of a pregnant or fertile female to perform her job.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits sex-based hiring to protect clients’ or guests’ privacy when the employer proves a factual basis for the policy and shows that no reasonable alternative exists.

Norwood v. Dale Maintenance System, Inc. · filed 1984-06-06(e)(1)

Because Dale and Standard Oil’s bfoq defense arises in the context of privacy considerations of clients and guests, their burden at trial consisted of proving that a factual basis exists for the daytime washroom attendant policy and that no reasonable alternatives to the policy are available. The court finds that defendants have satisfied both elements of their burden of proof.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based hiring qualification only when the employer shows that it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.

Garrett v. Okaloosa County · filed 1984-06-18(e)

To prove a BFOQ, the employer must show that sex is a qualification "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(e). ... Yet, defendants argue, in effect, that the same women who apparently are working out well as correctional officers today would not have worked out prior to 1981, with the same qualifications. We cannot accept that argument.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based job restriction only when the employer proves that sex is necessary to perform the essential duties of the job.

Edwards v. Department of Corrections · filed 1985-07-25(e)(1)

In light of this fact and others to be described, the Department has failed to prove that femaleness is a bfoq for the position of shift commander at Tutwiler.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based bona fide occupational qualification only when the employer shows that feasible administrative alternatives cannot avoid the discrimination.

Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services · filed 1986-05-16(e)

The Court finds as a matter of law that before an employer-defendant can overcome the strong policy against sex discrimination and avail itself of the narrow exception of a BFOQ it must establish that no administrative alternatives are available or feasible that can avoid overt sex discrimination. The Court finds as a fact that the defendants did not attempt to utilize administrative alternatives or procedures to accomplish their institution goals without violating the national policy against sex discrimination.

Patient privacy can justify a sex-based bona fide occupational qualification for same-sex personal hygiene care in mental health facilities.

Local 567 American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Michigan Council 25, American Federation of Sta · filed 1986-02-27(e)(1)

The privacy rights of mental health patients or residents in mental health facilities can justify a BFOQ to provide for same-sex personal hygiene care.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a sex-based restriction on a military position when combat risk is a bona fide occupational qualification mandated by federal statute.

Hill v. Berkman · filed 1986-05-15(e)(1)

Because combat risk is an occupational qualification mandated by statute, it is an appropriate BFOQ exception to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(e) permits a sex-based bona fide occupational qualification only if the employer establishes that no feasible administrative alternative would avoid the discrimination.

Torres v. WIS. DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 1986-05-16(e)

The Court finds as a matter of law that before an employer-defendant can overcome the strong policy against sex discrimination and avail itself of the narrow exception of a BFOQ it must establish that no administrative alternatives are available or feasible that can avoid overt sex discrimination. The Court finds as a fact that the defendants did not attempt to utilize administrative alternatives or procedures to accomplish their institution goals without violating the national policy against sex discrimination. Failure to do so destroys one of the requirements for a BFOQ defense.

Section 2000e-2(e)(1) permits a university to reserve a reasonable number of faculty positions for members of a religious order when their presence is reasonably necessary to its normal operation.

Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago · filed 1986-10-16(e)(1)

Yet it seems to us that here the evidence supports the more general proposition that having a Jesuit presence in the Philosophy faculty is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the enterprise, and that fixing the number at seven out of 31 is a reasonable determination.