42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire a job applicant because of race.

Tureaud v. Grambling State University · filed 2008-09-30(a)(1)

The plain language of Title VII states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire “any individual” because of such individual’s race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The term “any individual” easily encompasses job applicants and prospective employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to show that she was qualified for an available position and that the employer filled it with someone outside her protected class.

Beal v. CSX Corporation · filed 2009-01-21(a)(1)

Although Beal satisfies the first prong of test, as she is a member of a protected class, she has not presented evidence demonstrating that she was qualified for the positions for which she applied. Additionally, Beal has not demonstrated that CSX filled the positions for which she applied with individuals outside of her protected class.

For a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim, a plaintiff must show that the position remained open after rejection and that the employer continued seeking similarly qualified applicants.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2009-07-02(a)(1)

A plaintiff in a discriminatory failure-to-hire context must establish as part of a prima facie case that the position remained open after plaintiff was rejected, and the employer continued seeking applicants who shared the same qualifications. ... Accordingly, Katanakis fails to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted dismissing her claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire an applicant because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; an applicant challenging a stated nondiscriminatory reason must show that it was false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Atanus v. Sebelius · filed 2009-09-10(a)(1)

Plaintiffs discrimination claim fails because she has not shown that defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting her were invalid or false.

A plaintiff challenging a refusal to hire under Title VII must produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated lawful reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Cook v. PC Connection · filed 2010-01-13(a)

Given the ambiguous nature of the statement, it is not, standing alone, sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude, by a preponderance, that PC Connection’s proffered explanation for its decision is merely a pretext for unlawful gender-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) forbids an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of race; a failure-to-hire claimant must show that she was qualified and that the position remained open or went to someone with similar qualifications.

Lara v. DHHS · filed 2010-03-05(a)(1)

An employer’s failure to hire a job applicant because of his or her race is a discriminatory act expressly forbidden by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Lara has produced no evidence to establish either the second or fourth elements of her failure-to-hire claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to show that she applied for and was qualified for an available position.

Childress v. Caterpillar Logistics Services, Inc. · filed 2010-03-11(a)

So, because Childress cannot show that she applied for an available hourly position or qualified for the human resources position, she failed to make a prima facie case of failure-to-hire.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to consider coaching suitability when hiring a teacher, absent evidence that the reason is a pretext for race discrimination.

Godfrey v. Katy Independent School Dist · filed 2010-09-13(a)

Hiring a teacher based on a suitability for a coaching position is not racially discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a failure-to-hire claim by an employee who never applied for an open position.

Ahern v. Shinseki · filed 2010-12-13(a)

None of them applied — let alone applied unsuccessfully — for any open position during Khatib's tenure and, thus, none of them can maintain a failure-to-hire claim.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a failure-to-hire plaintiff must challenge the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason as illegitimate or pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

Lane v. Broward County, Florida · filed 2011-01-28(a)

Here, even assuming that Lane established a prima facie case of race discrimination, she did not argue before the district court that the County’s proffered reason for not hiring her -- that it reclassified and never filled the position -- was illegitimate or a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory hiring; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, the applicant must show that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Amini v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2011-07-05(a)(1)

Our analysis thus turns to whether Amini presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that the City’s proffered reason was mere pretext for discrimination. We conclude that Amini failed to meet his burden.

A dispute over applicants’ relative qualifications alone does not establish pretext in a Title VII failure-to-hire claim.

Luta v. Delaware, Department of Health & Social Services · filed 2012-03-05(a)(1)

The ultimate problem with plaintiff’s argument is that she presents nothing more than a dispute about relative qualifications. More is required in order to show pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-hire claim to allege facts connecting the hiring decision to a protected trait; irregularities in the hiring process alone are insufficient.

Budik v. United States · filed 2013-03-07(a)

The plaintiff’s complaint and opposition brief not only fail to connect her membership in a protected class with Malcolm Grow’s failure to hire her, but also allege conduct that is neither facially discriminatory nor lends itself to an inference of discrimination. While the plaintiff might be correct that the hiring process was somewhat irregular, she has not pled facts suggesting that she was not hired because of her race, sex, color, or age. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

A Title VII failure-to-hire claimant cannot establish a prima facie case by applying for a position that was already filled and did not reopen.

Tartt v. Wilson County · filed 2013-11-13(a)(1)

Because the last opening for an Animal Control Officer position was filled at least two months before Tartt applied for it, and because there have been no openings since then, Tartt cannot show that “he applied ... for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants.”

A failure-to-hire claim may present a factual dispute when evidence suggests an employer applied education or experience substitutions discriminatorily.

Bibbs v. New River Community & Technical College · filed 2013-12-02(a)(1)

With respect to these three positions, the Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether substitutions for relevant experience or education were made in a discriminatory manner. Whether Mr. Bibbs’ experience is sufficiently related to qualify for a substitution is a distinctly factual inquiry to be decided by a jury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects prospective employees, but a refusal-to-hire claim requires an actual job for which the applicant was passed over.

Wilson v. Cook County · filed 2014-02-10(a)(1)

Accordingly, although we agree with Almaguer that a plaintiff need not be presently employed by an employer to invoke Title VII, a plaintiff must at least have been passed over for a job that actually existed before she can claim an “unlawful employment practice” has occurred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2 bars race-based hiring decisions, but a plaintiff must show that an employer’s legitimate reason for rejecting an applicant was pretext for discrimination.

Thompson v. Bridgeton Board of Education · filed 2014-03-27

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to show sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretext. Plaintiffs Title VII claim will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race discrimination in hiring, and an applicant may establish a prima facie case by showing that similarly or less qualified applicants outside the protected class were hired instead.

Whitfield v. International Truck & Engine Corp. · filed 2014-06-06(a)(1)

Under this method, Whitfield must establish a prima facie case consisting of four elements: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for an open position for which he was qualified; (3) he did not receive the position; and (4) those who were hired were not in the protected class and had similar or lesser qualifications.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to hire must show that the position remained unfilled or was filled by someone outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

Blackmon v. Escambia County School Board · filed 2014-06-12(a)(1)

Although Blackmon, an African-American, established that, in 2012, the Board twice refused to offer her positions as a school bus driver, she failed to establish that the Board filled the positions with drivers who were not African-American.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to show that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants.

Tartt v. Wilson County, Tennessee · filed 2014-12-03(a)(1)

However, Tartt does not show that he “applied and was qualified for a position for which [Wilson County] was seeking applicants,” and thus fails to establish the second prong of the test.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an applicant to bring a failure-to-hire claim even if the applicant is not already an employee, when the position sought is an employment position.

Suri v. Foxx · filed 2014-12-19(a)(1)

The relevant' employment status inquiry in a failure-to-hire claim is the status of the position an applicant is seeking rather than the current relationship between the applicant and the would-be employer.

A Title VII failure-to-hire claim based on circumstantial evidence requires a comparable applicant outside the protected class or other evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Jenkins v. Footlocker, Inc. · filed 2015-01-14(a)(1)

Without any non-African-American comparators (or any other sign of racism), no jury could reasonably infer race discrimination based on the company’s decision not to hire her after the job fair.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer acted because of the applicant’s race or sex.

McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway Administration · filed 2015-03-13(a)(1)

While she did allege that the Highway Administration failed to hire her, she did not allege facts sufficient to claim that the reason it failed to hire her was because of her race or sex.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must allege facts supporting a plausible inference of discrimination, including facts showing the applicant was qualified.

Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Institute · filed 2015-05-28(a)(1)

The district judge properly dismissed Pouyeh’s discrimination claims, since Pouyeh did not provide sufficient factual matter to suggest discrimination.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2 must allege facts supporting a reasonable expectation that discovery will show the employer considered a protected characteristic.

Alja-Iz v. United States Virgin Islands Department of Education · filed 2015-08-28

As a result, Alja-Iz’s allegations did not raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would show that the Department did not hire him based on improper consideration of any protected characteristic.

For a Title VII failure-to-hire claim, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that he belongs to a protected class, applied and was qualified, was rejected, and the employer hired someone outside his protected class.

Suarez v. School Board · filed 2016-01-19(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case under Title VII for a failure-to-hire claim, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for the position; (3) he was rejected; and (4) an individual outside his protected class was hired for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring; a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that rejection occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Byers v. Alamance County, NC · filed 2016-02-16(a)(1)

We have reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions and find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Byers failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination, as he could not demonstrate that he was rejected from either position under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

An employer may rely on subjective hiring assessments supported by a clear, reasonably specific factual basis; the applicant must present sufficient evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Ire Gene Grovner, Jr. v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources · filed 2016-03-28(a)(1)

While Hay’s reasons for scoring Grovner lower than Thompson and Durant were subjective, Hay gave a clear and reasonably specific factual basis to support his opinions, largely based on first-hand knowledge of the candidates. ... Overall, we agree with the district court that Grovner did not present sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue on whether the DNR’s asserted reasons for not hiring him were a pretext for racial discrimination.

A Title VII failure-to-hire plaintiff must show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

Meyer v. State of New York Office of Mental Health · filed 2016-03-28(a)(1)

Here, there is no evidence in the record from which a rational factfin-der could infer gender-based discrimination in Defendants’ failure to hire Plaintiff in 2011.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race-based failure-to-hire claim without an existing employment relationship with the employer that refused to hire the plaintiff.

Starks v. City of Chicago Board of Education · filed 2018-07-02(a)

Obviously, a plaintiff can prevail under Title VII on a claim that an employer failed or refused to hire her without establishing she had an employee-employer relationship with the employer who refused to hire her.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires plausible allegations that the applicant belongs to a protected class and that someone with similar or inferior qualifications was hired.

Santiago v. ABCD - Boston · filed 2018-10-31(a)(1)

Mr. Santiago does not allege a plausible failure-to-hire claim, because he does not assert that he is a member of a protected class or that a person possessing similar or inferior qualifications was hired for the position he sought.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to hire under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead facts supporting a reasonable inference that she applied for and was qualified for the position.

Davis v. Texas Workforce Commission · filed 2019-03-21(a)(1)

Davis cannot survive the motion to dismiss because she has not pleaded facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that she applied for and was qualified for the position that ultimately went to her colleague.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer’s choice of a more qualified applicant is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a hiring decision unless the rejected applicant shows that reason was pretextual.

Monds v. Georgia · filed 2019-03-29(a)(1)

The City articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Ms. Hudson over Mr. Monds, a reason Mr. Monds failed to rebut. Thus, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to the City of Quitman.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim without a formal application when the employer’s discriminatory practice deters applying and the person would have sought the job.

Starks v. City of Chicago Board of Education · filed 2019-05-02(a)

The Court does not entirely agree; by itself, the failure to allege that she applied for a job does not defeat Turner’s claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring; a rejected applicant must show that the employer’s stated qualification-based reason was pretextual.

BOYLAN v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY · filed 2019-07-31(a)(1)

Dr. Boylan has not identified any designated evidence that could support the contrary finding that Ball State’s articulated reason for not offering him the tenure-track accounting position was pretextual so there is no triable issue. Therefore, summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim under Title VII (Count I) is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers refusal to hire because of sex, and a claim may survive dismissal when the allegations plausibly support discriminatory intent.

Troise v. NY · filed 2019-08-14(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has provided “at least minimal support for the proposition that [SUNY Cortland] was motivated by discriminatory intent,” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311, with respect to Plaintiff’s sex. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a failure-to-hire race discrimination claim to proceed when an interviewer’s comments plausibly support an inference of discriminatory intent.

Adenji v. New York State · filed 2019-09-03(a)(1)

Given who made the alleged comments, when they were made, and the context in which they were made, Adeniji has “plausibly allege[d] facts that provide ‘at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.’” Vega, 801 F.3d at 86-87 (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311).

A failure-to-hire plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretext for race discrimination.

Brooks v. Mobilitie Management, LLC · filed 2019-09-19(a)(1)

Moreover, Plaintiff’s conclusory and speculative allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue about whether the real reason for Mobilitie’s hiring decisions was race discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to hire under Title VII may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when relying on indirect or circumstantial evidence.

MCEADY v. CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2019-10-07(a)(1)

Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to each of Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADEA and Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason must show it was pretext for discrimination.

Brown v. First Community Bank · filed 2019-10-23(a)(1)

Title VII and Section 1981 both prohibit employers from not hiring a person for racially discriminatory reasons. ... The court thus concludes that no reasonable jury could find that racial bias was the real reason that First Community did not hire Brown, based on the evidence submitted.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a) cannot survive summary judgment on a pretext theory when the evidence does not support an inference of race or sex discrimination.

Chapple v. Texas Hlth and Human Svc Cmsn · filed 2019-11-20(a)

This alternative nondiscriminatory reason is insufficient to raise an inference that HHSC’s reasons for not hiring him were pretext for discrimination. ... For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment rejecting Chapple’s claim of race and sex discrimination in failing to hire him for the DLC position in 2014.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its hiring decision, the plaintiff must show that reason was pretextual.

Deere v. XPO Logistics · filed 2020-01-09(a)(1)

Because Mr. Deere has not shown pretext, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of XPO on his Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims.

A failure-to-hire plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual; a statement about available positions does not establish pretext if it does not undermine the employer’s reason for declining to hire the plaintiff.

Brown v. Keystone Learning Services · filed 2020-02-11(a)(1)

Even if Mr. Brown raised an issue of fact regarding the accuracy of Principal Coughlin’s statement, no reasonable jury could infer that the statement undermined Keystone’s reasons for failing to hire him for the 2016-17 year.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race or color, and a failure-to-hire claim must plausibly allege discriminatory treatment.

Wright v. Asurion · filed 2020-02-24(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire any individual because of her race or color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The complaint therefore fails to allege that Plaintiff was treated differently than others because of her race or color.

An applicant who fails a required background check may lack the qualifications needed to establish a prima facie failure-to-hire discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Aljarah v. Citigroup Global Market Inc. · filed 2020-03-31(a)(1)

Plaintiff was not qualified for the positions for which she applied because she did not pass the required background check. Because there is no genuine dispute of fact as to this element, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a rejected applicant to allege facts supporting a plausible inference that race caused the employer’s decision not to hire him.

Freeman v. Beverly · filed 2020-05-27(a)(1)

To state a discriminatory non-selection claim, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to make plausible that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied for a specific position for which he was qualified and (3) his non-selection gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to plausibly allege facts supporting discriminatory intent.

Azaria Ting v. Adams & Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-08-21(a)(1)

The district court properly dismissed Ting’s failure-to-hire claim because she failed to plausibly allege that Adams’ adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a claim fails when the evidence would not permit a reasonable factfinder to attribute the decision to race.

Chatman v. Board Of Education City Of Chicago · filed 2020-08-31(a)

A reasonable factfinder cannot conclude from the evidence that BOE did not hire Chatman because of her race or age.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race; a claimant who cannot show an inference of discrimination or pretext cannot establish a violation.

Phillips v. Loudoun County Public Schools · filed 2021-01-19(a)(1)

Phillips has not shown that this explanation was a pretext for discrimination.

A race discrimination failure-to-hire claim can be plausible when an employer chooses less qualified applicants of another race, even if it employs someone of the plaintiff’s race.

Williams v. CARSON CONCRETE CORPORATION · filed 2021-04-20(a)(1)

Even if Defendants did employ one Black tower crane operator, it is still plausible that their decision to fill the positions sought by Plaintiff with allegedly less-qualified Caucasian men is indicative of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an available position for a failure-to-hire discrimination claim.

Arnold v. Independent Health Corp · filed 2021-07-01(a)

Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie claim with respect to the Senior Application Developer and Data Reporting Analyst positions because, although Plaintiff applied for both jobs, the positions were not available.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a claim fails at summary judgment when the evidence cannot support a finding that race caused the hiring decision.

Chatman v. Board of Education of the City · filed 2021-07-20(a)(1)

When we put the evidence in “a single pile” and evaluate it “as a whole” we cannot say that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Chatman’s age or race led to the Board’s hiring decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on religion and gender, including a refusal to hire on those grounds.

Altimonte v. Leboz · filed 2021-07-21(a)

Discrimination in ... employment based upon religion and gender are prohibited ... under section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).

A failure-to-hire plaintiff must rebut each of the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons and show that race motivated the hiring decision.

Keith v. Gadsden Regional Physician Group Practice, LLC · filed 2021-08-25(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment, Keith must show that all three reasons were pretextual. Keith cannot do so for two reasons: she neither presents evidence that the Clinic’s third proffered reason was false nor does she show that race—rather than some other reason, legitimate or illegitimate—motivated the Clinic’s decision to not hire her.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer refused to hire an applicant because of sex.

MARTIN v. WAFFLE HOUSE · filed 2021-10-05(a)

He does not allege any facts from which the Court could conclude that Waffle House failed to hire him because he was a man.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to plead facts supporting an inference that race or sex motivated the hiring decision.

Stalling v. Finra · filed 2021-11-05(a)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that FINRA did not hire him, but he does not plead any facts that give rise to an inference that his race or sex were motivating factors in that decision. ... Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, whether under Title VII or Section 1981.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; evidence that could let a jury disbelieve the employer’s stated reason can defeat summary judgment.

Williams v. CARSON CONCRETE CORPORATION · filed 2021-11-29(a)(1)

While this anomaly would not necessarily lead a jury to conclude that Carson’s reason is pretextual, that is not the standard, Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728: Given the circumstances a jury could reasonably conclude that Carson’s assertion that Williams is too unreliable to be employed is unworthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of national origin; a failure-to-hire plaintiff must show that the employer hired a less qualified person outside the protected group.

Williams v. Sam's East Inc · filed 2022-03-29(a)(1)

There is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the defendant hired less qualified individuals over the plaintiff. The defendant did not do so, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a failure-to-hire claim may proceed when the evidence permits a jury to find that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Brownlee v. Kyocera SGS Precision Tools, Inc. · filed 2022-03-29(a)(1)

But reading the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, he has produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that despite his over two decades of work as a machinist, KSPT refused to interview/hire him because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire complaint to allege facts making race discrimination plausible.

Cobb v. Arc Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31(a)(1)

Similarly, to state a claim under Title VII, Plaintiffs are required to allege that Arc failed or refused to hire them because of their race. ... Accordingly, the court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections, adopts the Report’s finding that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts giving rise to a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination, and dismisses Plaintiffs’ individual discrimination claims.

A failure-to-hire claim under Section 2000e-2(a) must plausibly allege that race was a motivating factor in the hiring decision.

Stalling v. T3 Trading Group LLC · filed 2022-04-15(a)

These allegations are insufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that race was a motiving factor in the employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer refused to hire someone because of a protected characteristic; repeated rejections alone do not suffice.

Golub v. Berdon LLP · filed 2022-04-26(a)

The mere fact that she was repeatedly turned down for employment, without more, does not establish that the plaintiff was turned down “because of” her religious belief, gender, national origin, or genetic information, as required by the language of the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a), 2000ff–1(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, when the employer offers a legitimate reason, to show evidence of pretext.

Benoit v. Sikorsky Aircraft · filed 2022-08-02(a)(1)

In the instant action, although Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination is de minimis, Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005), Plaintiff fails to meet his burden. Even if Plaintiff were able establish a prima facie case of discrimination, however, Defendant has offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff. Plaintiff in turn has failed to offer any evidence showing such a reason was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers an employer’s refusal to hire as well as termination.

RAYFORD v. AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC. · filed 2022-09-02(a)

Section 2000e-2(a) provides that an unlawful employment practice for an employer includes the refusal to hire an individual as well as termination.

A discriminatory failure-to-hire claim requires the applicant to show she was qualified for the position.

Sanders v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

Sanders cannot establish a prima facie case of failure-to-hire because she was not qualified for the position of HPD police recruit.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire race-discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretextual after the employer offers them.

Adeniji v. Office of the New York State Comptroller · filed 2022-10-31(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Because Adeniji has not met his burden under McDonnell Douglas, summary judgment in favor of OSC is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach sex discrimination in how an employer shares information about which job postings it intends to fill.

Paugh v. Lockheed Martin · filed 2023-01-26(a)(1)

We reverse the district court on this claim, holding that Paugh has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether critical hiring information was meted out discriminatorily in violation of Title VII.

A discriminatory failure-to-hire complaint must plausibly allege that the employer continued seeking comparable applicants after rejecting the plaintiff.

Morgan v. Becerra · filed 2023-03-31(a)(1)

The absence of any allegation addressing the fourth element of discriminatory failure to hire means that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and should be dismissed.

In a race discrimination failure-to-hire claim, an employer is not entitled to summary judgment when its own evidence raises a genuine dispute about its stated nondiscriminatory reason.

Taylor v. City of New York(Department of Sanitation) · filed 2023-03-31(a)

Because Defendants’ own evidence makes clear there is a genuine dispute about Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire Taylor, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Taylor’s Title VII race discrimination claim.

A failure-to-hire claim requires the plaintiff to show that the employer denied him a position.

Hossain v. Job Service North Dakota · filed 2023-04-11(a)(1)

It therefore follows that JSND did not deny him a position and that Hossain has not stated a prima face case with respect to this failure to hire claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race or national origin; a claim requires evidence that could support a finding that either trait caused the hiring decision.

Akpa v. Northwestern Memorial Healthcare · filed 2023-08-21(a)(1)

Considering the evidence as a whole, the Court concludes no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Akpa was not hired because of his race or national origin.

A failure-to-hire plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Qiu v. Board of Education of Woodford County Public Schools · filed 2023-09-27(a)(1)

Qiu is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she has failed to demonstrate that she was a qualified applicant.

A failure-to-hire discrimination claim requires evidence that the applicant applied for and was qualified for the positions at issue.

Saliego v. SRP · filed 2023-11-07(a)

Plaintiff’s argument falters from the start, however, because she either did not apply or was not qualified for the positions she identifies, and she has not offered evidence that the individuals who filled those positions were similarly situated, in that they too either did not apply or were not qualified.

Section 2000e-2 requires a failure-to-hire discrimination complaint to allege facts supporting an inference that the applicant was rejected because of a protected characteristic.

McMillen v. Electric · filed 2023-11-30(a)(1)

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that she was not hired because of her protected status, Plaintiff’s race, color, sex, and age discrimination claims must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a race or sex discrimination claim for failure to hire when the applicant lacks the experience required for the job.

Pitts v. Maryland Department of Transportation · filed 2023-12-20(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim based on alleged racial and/or sex discrimination cannot survive as a matter of law. ... The undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position because he did not have the requisite one (1) year of experience of customer service work in an airport environment or a large facility handling a high volume of customer requests.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring, but a claim fails when the applicant does not rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire him.

Jones v. Gadsden County School Board · filed 2024-02-06(a)(1)

Jones’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims both fail because they fail to rebut the same legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire him: Jones’s poor classroom management.

A national origin failure-to-hire complaint must plausibly allege that the applicant meets the job’s objective hiring criteria.

Sol v. City of Dallas Texas · filed 2024-02-26(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not plausibly shown that he was qualified for the job. To be qualified, the applicant must demonstrate that he “meets objective hiring criteria” for the position.

A discriminatory failure-to-hire claim requires allegations that the employer hired someone outside the applicant’s protected class or continued considering comparably qualified applicants after rejecting the applicant.

Palmer v. Rancho Sahuarita Management Company LLC · filed 2024-04-09(a)

However, Plaintiff does not allege the position he applied for was filled by an employee not of Plaintiff’s class or that Rancho Sahuarita continued to consider other applicants whose qualifications were comparable to Plaintiff’s after rejecting him. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to hire to plead facts showing that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the hiring decision.

Richards v. City of New York · filed 2024-04-11(a)

Because he has not alleged facts sufficient to show that at least one of those characteristics has been a motivating factor with respect to the City of New York’s decision not to hire him, he has failed to state a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII.

A Title VII failure-to-hire claim fails when the employer gives nondiscriminatory reasons and the applicant presents no evidence of pretext or other evidence that race or national origin caused the decision.

Lin v. Drummond · filed 2024-04-17(a)(1)

As set forth below, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reasons for Purdue and Drummond not hiring her were a pretext for discrimination based on her race or national origin and has otherwise failed to point to evidence that as a whole shows unlawful discrimination.

A Title VII failure-to-hire or rehire claim needs plausible facts that the applicant was qualified, was rejected, and the employer continued seeking applicants for the position; speculation about whether it was filled is insufficient.

Moretti v. Luxury Cars of Westchester LLC · filed 2024-04-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than conjecture and cannot support a plausible claim of failure to hire or rehire.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to allege facts plausibly linking the hiring decision to a protected characteristic covered by Title VII.

Windley/Edwards v. NYC Dept. of Education · filed 2024-05-29(a)

She also makes no allegations suggesting that she was not hired, or that she suffered some other type of adverse employment decision, because of a protected characteristic. Accordingly, the facts alleged do not comply with Rule 8 or give rise to a plausible claim of employment discrimination under any of the federal antidiscrimination statutes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory refusals to hire; evidence of bias in an earlier employment decision must be connected to the challenged hiring decision.

Ismail v. Honeywell International Inc. · filed 2024-06-17(a)(1)

Such does not evidence discrimination in the decision not to hire him in 2018 unless there is also evidence connecting the alleged discrimination in 2015 to the events at issue here, the decision not to hire him in 2018.

A failure-to-hire claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant employer rejected the plaintiff’s application for a position.

Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2024-07-10(a)(1)

An essential element of a failure to hire claim under Title VII is the allegation that the plaintiff applied for a position with the defendant employer and was rejected.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) limits failure-to-hire discrimination claims to entities that were potential employers of the plaintiff.

Jenkins v. Office of the South Carolina Governor · filed 2024-08-27(a)(1)

Title VII and ADEA claims based on failure to hire can be brought only against entities who are Plaintiff’s potential employers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a discrimination claim must plausibly allege membership in a protected class.

Buchanan v. Doris Duke Foundation - Shangri-La Museum of Islamic Art · filed 2024-09-11(a)(1)

As such, because Buchanan has failed to provide sufficient factual information to state even the most basic element of a Title VII claim—membership in a protected class—the Court cannot find that she has plausibly shown that she is entitled to relief.

A Title VII failure-to-hire claim must plausibly allege that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class, was qualified, was rejected despite those qualifications, and that the position remained open.

Kim v. University of Guam · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

As adapted to fail-to-hire claims, a plaintiff must show the following to plausibly allege a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII: (a) she belongs to a protected class; (b) she was qualified for the position; (c) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (d) the position remained open.

A failure-to-hire discrimination claim requires the applicant to show that he met the job’s reasonable, objective, consistently applied qualifications.

Morgan v. Becerra · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

The only reasonable conclusion to draw from the evidence is that the Gallup Center does, in fact, require all its physicians to prove they completed residency and that Morgan’s tentative job offer was rescinded because he did not. His case thus fails on the qualifications element.

A failure-to-hire claim requires evidence from which a jury could find that race caused the hiring decision.

Mansfield v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC · filed 2024-12-03(a)(1)

Because Mansfield has failed to show a genuine issue that McLaughlin’s decisions were because of Mansfield’s race, summary judgment is granted on Mansfield’s discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment decision for a religious failure-to-hire claim; an applicant’s voluntary withdrawal before that decision does not establish a failure to hire.

Crandall v. New Mexico Seventh Judicial District Court · filed 2024-12-23(a)(1)

Consequently, Plaintiff Crandall cannot demonstrate that Defendants failed to hire her, as she withdrew from the hiring process before Defendants made an employment decision regarding her application.

A failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer denied a qualified applicant a position because of a protected characteristic.

Dawson v. Red Robbins · filed 2025-01-22(a)(1)

Plaintiff wants the Court to presume that he was not interviewed due to discrimination, but he fails to plead sufficient facts permitting such an inference.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly showing that an employer refused to hire an applicant because of sex or national origin; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Henderson v. Department of the Army · filed 2025-02-06(a)(1)

While plantiff asserts discrimination in these instances based on “sex,” “national origin,” and “age, disability, retaliation,” (id. ¶ 6), these assertions are a “formulaic recitation of the necessary elements—[and] no more than conclusions and therefore do not suffice.”

A race-based failure-to-hire claim must allege facts plausibly connecting the hiring decision to the applicant’s race.

CALLOWAY v. VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY · filed 2025-02-07(a)(1)

Calloway’s Complaint alleges discrimination on the basis of her race, but she does not plead facts that plausibly connect her race to the determination not to hire her, nor does she plausibly allege that she engaged in protected conduct and that Villanova refused to hire her because she did so.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race or national origin; a failure-to-hire claim must allege facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Liu v. Becerra · filed 2025-02-25(a)(1)

For a failure-to-hire claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must aver some facts that show he is a member of a protected category; he applied for the position in question; he was qualified for the position; and he was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

A failure-to-hire race-discrimination claim requires evidence of an adverse employment action and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Akins v. Sysco Lincoln Inc. · filed 2025-07-03(a)(1)

Because Akins has not established a prima facie case of race discrimination on his failure to hire claim, Sysco is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For a Title VII disparate-treatment failure-to-hire claim, an applicant must offer specific, substantial evidence of pretext after the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Rogers v. City of San Francisco · filed 2025-07-17

Consequently, Rogers must offer “specific, substantial evidence of pretext” to avoid summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to plausibly allege that she was qualified and was rejected because of a protected trait.

Kim v. University of Guam · filed 2025-09-05(a)(1)

Even when the court assumes the facts of the Amended Complaint are true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts to support Plaintiff’s claim for disparate treatment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a failure to hire based solely on deafness; the claim must plausibly allege discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Ramos v. Vishay Dale Electronics, LLC · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for failure to hire in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a protected class or describe any circumstances that would give rise to an inference of discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim to allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the applicant was rejected because of a protected trait.

Abdelbaki v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

As such, Abdelbaki must allege facts raising a plausible claim that he was not hired because of his race, religion, or national origin. The Court finds that he has not alleged such facts.

Section 2000e-2 does not bar an employer from enforcing an antiharassment policy that defines harassment more broadly than Title VII does.

Ervington v. Ltd. Commodities, LLC · filed 2014-02-13

But Title VII does not prohibit employers from enforcing an antiharassment policy that defines harassment more broadly than does Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an inadequate antiharassment policy or complaint procedure a violation by itself.

Brown v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2022-12-09(a)(1)

Because the failure to have an adequate antiharassment policy and complaint procedure is not itself a violation of Title VII, it appears highly unlikely that each and every member of the putative class suffered a Title VII violation in light of Plaintiffs’ disclaimer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on gender stereotyping, but a complaint must allege facts supporting that claim rather than merely label the conduct gender discrimination.

Candina v. University of Miami · filed 2015-10-15(a)(1)

The allegations of the Complaint fail to set forth any plausible basis to support the Plaintiffs claim of gender stereotyping, and the mere conclusory label of “gender discrimination” or “gender stereotyping” cannot fill this void.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits workplace harassment of a man because he fails to conform to masculine stereotypes.

Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-07-16(a)(1)

Sanchez contends that the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too feminine. We agree.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers workplace harassment based on sex stereotypes, even when sexual orientation also plays a role.

Centola v. Potter · filed 2002-01-29(a)(1)

Stated in a gender neutral way, the rule is: If an employer acts upon stereotypes about sexual roles in making employment decisions, or allows the use of these stereotypes in the creation of a hostile or abusive work environment, then the employer opens itself up to liability under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a sex-stereotyping claim when the employer did not challenge the employee’s appearance.

Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc. · filed 2003-01-30(a)

Therefore, insofar as Plaintiffs appearance was not challenged by her employer, the Court finds, that Plaintiff does not state a valid claim for sex-stereotyping as that practice has been interpreted by Price Waterhouse and its progeny.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits denying a woman a promotion based on stereotypes about her family obligations.

Lust v. Sealy, Inc. · filed 2003-08-19(a)(1)

Denying a woman a promotion because of a stereotypical belief about her obligation to her family is discrimination because of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination based on gender non-conforming conduct or identification as a transsexual.

Smith v. City of Salem · filed 2004-06-01(a)(1)

Relying on Price Waterhouse – which held that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” bars gender discrimination, including discrimination based on sex stereotypes – Smith contends on appeal that he was a victim of discrimination “because of . . . sex” both because of his gender non-conforming conduct and, more generally, because of his identification as a transsexual. We find both bases of discrimination actionable pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes, including when the employee is transsexual.

Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio · filed 2004-06-01(a)

Having alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants' actions, Smith has sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on a person's failure to conform to sex stereotypes about how a man should look and behave.

Smith v. City of Salem · filed 2004-08-05(a)

Having alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on a person’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes, including when that person is transsexual.

Schroer v. Billington · filed 2007-11-28(a)(1)

Sehroer’s transsexuality is not a bar to her sex stereotyping claim. Title VII is violated when an employer discriminates against any employee, transsexual or not, because he or she has failed to act or appear sufficiently masculine or feminine enough for an employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects transgender applicants from discrimination based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes.

Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc. · filed 2008-04-03(a)(1)

There is nothing in existing case law setting a point at which a man becomes too effeminate, or a woman becomes too masculine, to warrant protection under Title VII and Price Waterhouse.

Sex stereotyping supports a disparate treatment claim only when the treatment disadvantages one sex compared with the other.

Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, LLC · filed 2008-11-13(a)(1)

Thus, as an initial matter, the Court clarifies that the mere existence of sex stereotyping is not enough, in and of itself, to support an actionable claim under Title VII. To make out a Title VII disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must show that the treatment to which she was subjected is such that it puts her sex at a disadvantage compared to persons of the opposite sex.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from denying a promotion based on a sex-based assumption that a mother will neglect her work because of childcare responsibilities.

Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc. · filed 2009-03-26(a)

However, an employer is not free to assume that a woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of family responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination based on stereotypes about women’s family responsibilities, but a remark about an employee caring for her sick children, standing alone, does not establish such discrimination.

Bonilla v. Electrolizing, Inc. · filed 2009-04-15(a)(1)

A statement such as Richards’ alleged comment could (as the Court will discuss with respect to the FMLA retaliation count) reflect an impermissible and unlawful reaction to taking family leave, but as it stands alone it cannot support the higher burden a Plaintiff must bear to prevail in a claim of gender discrimination based on sex-stereotyping in the termination decision.

An employment decision based on an invidious sex stereotype can support an inference of discriminatory intent under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Sassaman v. Gamache · filed 2009-05-22(a)(1)

When employment decisions are based on invidious sex stereotypes, a reasonable jury could infer the existence of discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers adverse employment actions based on gender stereotypes, but a complaint must allege facts linking the action to the employee’s sex.

MORALES-CRUZ v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2011-03-31(a)(1)

In sum, because we find that plaintiff failed to plead facts that would create an inference that any adverse action taken by defendants was based upon her gender, her sex discrimination claim under Title VII is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination complaint to plausibly allege an adverse employment action based on gender; gender-neutral descriptions alone cannot support a gender-stereotyping claim.

Morales-Cruz v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2012-04-10(a)(1)

To state a claim to relief, a complaint asserting sex discrimination must plausibly allege that the plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action taken on the basis of her gender. ... By definition, terms that convey only gender-neutral meanings are insufficient to anchor a gender-stereotyping claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment based on harassment for failing to conform to gender stereotypes.

Davis v. Vermont, Department of Corrections · filed 2012-04-16(a)(1)

The facts alleged allow the Court to reasonably infer that abuse directed at Plaintiff reflected the harassers’ belief that he did not act in conformity with his coworkers’ gender norms.

A man’s adoption of his spouse’s surname can support a sex stereotyping claim under § 2000e-2(a) if his employer treats him adversely for that choice.

Koren v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. · filed 2012-08-14(a)

And Koren has evidence that Ohio Bell discriminated against him because Koren took his husband’s last name — failing to conform with the male stereotype.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusal to hire because of sex, including when gender stereotyping influences the hiring decision.

Gage Elon Hunter v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-09-17(a)(1)

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Gender stereotyping can violate Title VII when it influences employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes.

Terveer v. Billington · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

Under Title VII, allegations that an employer is discriminating against an employee based on the employee’s non-conformity with sex stereotypes are sufficient to establish a viable sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-discrimination claim when an employer fires an employee for failing to conform to sex stereotypes, including when the employee is transgender.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. · filed 2015-04-23(a)(1)

This Court concludes that, having alleged that Stephens’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force behind the Funeral Home’s decision to fire Stephens, the EEOC has sufficiently pleaded a sex-stereotyping gender-discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because an employee does not conform to sex stereotypes.

Lishamer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2018-01-30(a)(1)

Given that there was apparently nothing unusual or inappropriate about plaintiff’s attire for an inventory control specialist performing warehouse work, a reasonable factfinder could interpret Kehrees’s comment as an admission that he refused to promote plaintiff based on her failure to dress or behave in a traditionally feminine manner, as in Price Waterhouse, and therefore that Kehrees intentionally discriminated against plaintiff because she was a woman.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on a person's failure to conform to sex or gender stereotypes.

Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co. · filed 2018-04-04(a)(1)

Actionable sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination against those who do not conform to sex or gender stereotypes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects transgender applicants from hiring decisions based on gender nonconformity.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. A & E Tire, Inc. · filed 2018-09-05(a)(1)

In other words, Title VII protects all persons, including transgender persons, from discrimination based on gender nonconformity.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to stereotypes about how a woman should look.

Friday v. Magnifique Parfumes and Cosmetics, Inc. · filed 2019-07-11(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination because of an individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Courts have held that this cause of action applies “when an adverse action is taken because of an employee’s ... failure to conform to sex stereotypes.” Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). ... A jury could conclude that Mr. England valued attractiveness more in females and that he fired Ms. Friday because she no longer fit the stereotypic appearance for her sex. Thus, the Court denies summary judgment on the claim for sex discrimination too.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions based on sex-role stereotypes, including assumptions that women prioritize family over work.

Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools · filed 2020-03-20(a)(1)

Basing an employment decision on an employer’s notions of how women do or ought to behave—the employer’s sex- role stereotypes—is discrimination “because of sex.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers hostile work environment harassment of a man based on his departure from masculine stereotypes.

Cloutier v. Ledyard Board of Education · filed 2021-12-17(a)(1)

But the principle that discrimination may be based on gendered stereotypes of masculinity applies with equal force where, as is the case here, a man is punished for straying from gender norms established in that environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make favoritism toward a coworker actionable sex discrimination without evidence that the employer treated others adversely because of their sex.

Riggs v. County of Banner · filed 2001-08-24(a)(1)

It may be that Schleicher was abusing her employment privileges, but this does not provide the basis for a Title VII claim by her co-workers.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit preferential treatment of a supervisor’s consensual romantic partner because the preference does not discriminate based on sex.

DOYLE,et al v. ADVANCED FRAUD SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2020-03-19

Courts, and the EEOC itself, almost universally declare that relationships such as Reaves’, and the conduct with the female employee, are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat favoritism based on a sexual relationship or potential romantic interest as sex discrimination.

Howard v. Cherokee Health Systems · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

Assuming the examples could reasonably be characterized as “protecting” these females, favoring an employee because of a sexual relationship, or potential desire for one, is insufficient to establish discrimination on the basis of sex.

University-wide salary statistics can support a Title VII sex discrimination claim even if they do not separately analyze the plaintiff’s specialty or supervisor.

Siler-Khodr v. University of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio · filed 2001-08-24(a)(1)

Thus, although both reports do not study faculty salaries by medical sub-specialty or study Pauerstein’s individual conduct, they are sufficient to prove discrimination under a Title VII claim according to Supreme Court and this Court’s precedent.

Statistical evidence alone does not establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination when it fails to eliminate common nondiscriminatory explanations for a disparity.

Hilbert v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections · filed 2005-02-04

As a result, these statistics alone are, as the district court determined, insufficient to make a prima facie case of intentional discrimination against Hilbert.

Bare statistics and unsupported allegations do not establish pretext in a Title VII race-discrimination claim.

Ivy v. Oxford Municipal Separate School District · filed 2011-06-29(a)(1)

Given that Plaintiff has presented only unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations of race discrimination, her statement that Defendant employs a low number of African Americans does not in itself show pretext.

Statistical evidence may support an inference of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a).

Moccio v. Cornell University · filed 2012-08-27(a)

Although Moccio is right that statistical evidence may give rise to an inference of gender discrimination, the evidence in this case does not support such an inference.

In a Title VII reduction-in-force claim, a sample of nine laid-off employees is too small to support an inference of discrimination.

Akhigbe v. University of Akron · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

In this case, the College of Business Administration sample size of 9 suffers the same fate. ... Accordingly, the only statistics provided do not provide evidence to support an inference as to Dr. Balasubramnian.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats unwelcome sexual advances as a form of sex discrimination, and an employee’s verbal objections can establish that the advances were unwelcome.

Lewis v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2002-08-16(a)(1)

Here, Ms. Lewis’s consistent verbal protestations readily establish the unwelcomeness of Mr. Scholl’s conduct.

An employee’s failure to confront alleged sexual harassment does not mean she welcomed the conduct under Title VII.

Morton v. Steven Ford-Mercury of Augusta, Inc. · filed 2001-09-26(a)(1)

Failing to respond to abuse does not equate to solicitation or incitement of such activity.

Voluntary participation in a relationship does not defeat a sexual harassment claim if the sexual advances were unwelcome.

Rodriguez v. City of Houston · filed 2003-02-27(a)(1)

But the appropriate inquiry is not whether Rodriguez participated voluntarily in a friendly, or even a sexual, relationship with Jackson. Rather, the question is whether his “alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.”

Failure to report sexual harassment is one factor in deciding whether the conduct was unwelcome; it does not by itself defeat a hostile work environment claim.

Otu v. Papa John's USA, Inc. · filed 2005-09-16(a)(1)

Finally, the fact that Plaintiff did not report Ms. Brown’s harassment is not dispositive; failure to report is just one factor in determining whether the conduct was unwelcome in light of the totality of the circumstances.

In a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim, whether conduct was unwelcome can be a factual question when the employee’s words or actions could show offense.

Madrid v. Homeland Security Solutions Inc. · filed 2015-09-30(a)(1)

Given remaining questions regarding whether Plaintiff verbally or in some other manner expressed to Defendant the alleged harassment was unwelcome, Defendant’s assertion there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the unwelcome nature of alleged harassing conduct fails.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a hostile-work-environment plaintiff to show that the alleged harassment was unwelcome.

Elkins v. Miller County, Arkansas · filed 2019-10-22(a)

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment.

A worker’s friendliness toward a coworker does not prevent a finding that the coworker’s sexual advances were unwelcome under Title VII.

Vaughn v. Commonwealth Of Virginia · filed 2019-11-27(a)(1)

A jury could reasonably find that Vaughn’s friendliness toward Granger does not preclude a finding that his actions were unwelcome.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect an employee’s objection to vaccination when it rests on medical concerns and an isolated moral teaching rather than a religious belief.

Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania · filed 2017-12-14(a)(1)

His objection to vaccination is therefore not religious and not protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect an employee’s refusal to be vaccinated when the refusal rests on personal, political, sociological, or economic views rather than a sincere religious belief.

Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania · filed 2016-08-09(a)(1)

In sum, Fallon clearly fails to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII. He does not belong to a religious congregation, nor does he claim that his reasons for refusing to be vaccinated are based on “religious beliefs,” sincerely held or otherwise. To the contrary, Fallon’s stated opposition to vaccinations is entirely personal, political, sociological and economic—the very definition of secular philosophy as opposed to religious orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employee sincerely held a belief that conflicted with a work requirement.

EEOC v. Chemsico, Inc. · filed 2002-05-07(a)(1)

The Court finds that a genuine dispute as to whether Ms. Brown had a sincere religious belief precluding Saturday work exists. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth evidence of the first element of the prima facie case for unlawful religious discrimination, and summary judgment cannot be granted on this point.

A religious discrimination claim based on failure to accommodate requires a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; a medical objection presented as religious does not satisfy that requirement.

AUKAMP-CORCORAN v. LANCASTER GENERAL HEALTH · filed 2022-02-18(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must show: (1) she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement. ... Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff had a sincerely held religious objection to the influenza vaccine. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden and make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, her claim must be dismissed.