42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a Title VII discrimination claim against a union acting as a worker’s representative to proceed on sufficient allegations.

Manigault v. Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. · filed 2024-03-06(c)

Notably, Plaintiff may assert claims against a labor union in its capacity as his representative under Title VII and the ADEA. ... And so, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining Title VII and ADEA claims against ILA.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a discrimination claim against a labor organization even when the organization is not the plaintiff’s employer, but the plaintiff must show discriminatory conduct by the organization.

Percy v. State of New York (Hudson Valley DDSO) · filed 2022-03-09(c)(1)

Accordingly, although the Court concludes that CSEA is not Plaintiff's employer for the purposes of Title VII, Plaintiff’s claims are not facially deficient for this reason alone because CSEA can still be sued solely based on its status as a labor organization. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of Title VII discrimination, and CSEA’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim is granted.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits labor organizations from denying work referrals because of race or national origin; a discrimination claim requires evidence of less favorable treatment of a similarly situated worker outside the protected group.

Atencio v. Torres · filed 2021-03-31(c)

Because Atencio does not identify a non-Hispanic, non-Venezuelan longshoreman of a similarly situated background who received more work assignments than he did, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

A union member claiming race discrimination must offer evidence that the union treated him less favorably than similarly situated members.

Mayes v. Rayfield · filed 2019-12-02(c)(1)

Here, Mr. Mayes has provided no evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. He has failed to introduce any evidence to show that the Union singled him out or treated him less favorably than a similarly-situated probationary union member.

A discrimination claim against a labor union under § 2000e-2(c) does not require proof that the union breached its duty of fair representation.

Walter Irving Banks v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 99 · filed 2016-07-27(c)

For the reasons set forth in Green, this court agrees with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that a plaintiff is not required to show a breach of a union’s duty of fair representation in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating because of race or sex, and claims under it follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

United Steel Workers Local 12-369 v. United Steel Workers International · filed 2013-09-06(c)(1)

Under § 703(c)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is “an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization . . . to discriminate against [] any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1). The well-established burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to a Title VII action against a labor union. Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007). ... After reviewing the record and the district court’s analysis of the specific incidents underlying Green’s claims, we are unable to conclude that this determination was “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1263.

Section 2000e-2(c) does not impose an affirmative duty on unions to investigate and remedy discrimination by an employer.

Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit · filed 2002-09-30(c)

Though the Unions were prohibited from causing or assisting unlawful discrimination by Thorn’s employer, nowhere in either statute do we find language imposing upon unions an affirmative duty to investigate and take steps to remedy employer discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) makes a labor organization liable when its actions cause an employer to discriminate.

Byars v. Jamestown Teachers Ass'n · filed 2002-03-17(c)(3)

In addition, union liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~2(c)(3) is not premised on whether the union, through its officers and members, discriminated on the basis of gender-related bias, but whether its actions caused the School District to discriminate.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a labor organization from discriminating based on gender or causing an employer to do so.

Rainey v. Town of Warren · filed 2000-01-10(c)

Under § 703(c) of Title VII, a “labor organization,” such as the Local Union, may not discriminate on the basis of gender and may not cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual because of gender.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires evidence of a union’s gender animus to establish a sex discrimination claim against the union.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 2002-03-29(c)

Plaintiffs must bring forth evidence of the Union’s gender animus in order to make out its Title VII case against the Union. The issue does not even get to a jury if Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden. Here, there is no evidence of Union animus.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) allows a Title VII claim against a union that, for discriminatory reasons, breaches its duty to represent a member fairly in handling complaints and grievances.

Maegdlin v. Intl. Assoc of · filed 2002-11-05(c)(1)

Indeed, a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII and the MHRA if his union, for discriminatory reasons, breaches its duty to represent him fairly in the handling of his complaints and grievances. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(2); see, e.g., Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 703-04 (8th Cir. 1999); Marquart v. Lodge 837, 26 F.3d 842, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1994).

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a claim against a union that, for discriminatory reasons, fails to represent a member fairly in handling complaints and grievances.

Maegdlin v. International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers, District 949 · filed 2002-11-05(c)(1)

Indeed, a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII and the MHRA if his union, for discriminatory reasons, breaches its duty to represent him fairly in the handling of his complaints and grievances.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating on protected grounds; a claim against a union requires allegations of prohibited conduct by the union.

Simmons v. Ohio Civil Service Emp. Assoc. · filed 2003-04-10(c)

The Court finds Plaintiffs pleadings void of any statement alleging discriminatory conduct on the part of AFSCME that is prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits unions from discriminating against members based on race or sex; direct union liability requires conduct by union representatives while they are union agents.

Henderson v. International Union · filed 2003-06-06(c)

Title VII prohibits a union from discriminating against its members of the basis of race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c). ... With respect to allegations of union discrimination, only acts or comments committed or made by union representatives — during the time period when those individuals were agents of the union — may properly support claims against the union on a theory of direct liability.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a labor union from discriminating based on sex when applying a collective bargaining agreement.

Scott v. Graphic Communications International Union, Local 97-B · filed 2004-03-17

A union therefore cannot discriminate in the application of the terms of its collective bargaining agreement.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits union discrimination; a claim based on grievance handling requires evidence that the union acted for a prohibited reason.

Valdez v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 7 · filed 2005-02-16(c)(1)

The district court granted summary judgment on Ms. Valdez’s Title VII claim because she presented no evidence that the Union’s reasons for handling her grievances the way it did were pretextual, and no evidence of any conduct from which the court could infer that the Union’s actions were based on her race, gender, or national origin. R. Doc. 43 at 6-7. Ms. Valdez’s appeal presents no cogent argument or evidence sufficient to disturb the district court’s ruling.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claimant alleging that a union refused to pursue a grievance because of race or national origin to prove intentional discrimination, discriminatory motivation, and resulting damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

Blair-Corrales v. MARINE ENGINEERS'BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION · filed 2005-02-28(c)

In order to prove that the Union breached its duty to fairly represent Corrales by refusing to further process his grievance against CSX because of his race and national origin, Corrales must prove all of the following essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that defendant Union intentionally discriminated against him by breaching its duty of representing him fairly in processing his grievance; (2) that Corrales’ race and national origin were motivating factors in the Union’s decision not to pursue it beyond the steps described by Krupa in his August 28, 2001 letter; and (3) that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of that decision.

A sex discrimination claim against a union requires evidence that the union treated female members differently from similarly situated male members.

Perez v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2005-02-24(c)(1), (c)(2)

Thus, plaintiff has failed to show that she (or any other female union member) was treated differently by the union than- were similarly situated male union members, and therefore she fails to make out a prima facie case on this part of her claims.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a labor union from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual.

Major v. Plumbers Local Union No. 5 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen · filed 2005-03-29(c)(3)

The only direct obligation that Title VII imposes on the Union is a prohibition from “causing] or attempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose hostile work environment liability on labor organizations.

Hout v. City of Mansfield · filed 2008-04-23(a)(1)

However, Courts do not impose liability on labor organizations for hostile work environment claims because hostile work environment claims emerge from the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) specifically attaching liability to employers’ discriminatory actions.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from declining to pursue a member's claim because of the member's sex.

Casamento v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2008-12-16(c)(1)

In addition to its proscription against gender discrimination by employers, Title VII renders it unlawful for "a labor organization . . . to discriminate against[] any individual because of . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1). A union will be found to have violated Title VII when "it deliberately declines to pursue a member's claim because of the member's gender." Beck v. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a labor organization from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual.

Perez v. St. John Medical Center · filed 2010-11-05(c)(3)

But he cites no evidence showing that the Union encouraged or caused Hurst to terminate Mr. Perez on account of discriminatory animus.

A union can face a Title VII discrimination claim for a single discriminatory refusal to pursue a grievance; the employee need not prove a pattern or practice.

Young-Smith v. Bayer Health Care, LLC · filed 2011-03-03(c)(1)

Applying Hubbell in this case, the undersigned concludes that Young-Smith need only demonstrate one act of discrimination to succeed on her claim, not a pattern or practice by the Union of ignoring requests to file race-based grievances.

A Title VII claim against an international union must allege facts showing that the union committed an unlawful employment practice or is liable for its local affiliates’ acts.

Watson v. Department of Services for Children, Youths & Their Families Delaware · filed 2013-03-26(c)

Count I contains no facts to support a claim against AFSCME Int’l. Instead, the allegations are directed towards Watson’s employer and the local unions, not AFSCME Int’l. Even were the Court to consider the allegations as directed towards AFSCME Int’l, the allegations fail to demonstrate that AFSCME Int’l itself committed any unlawful employment practices. Finally, as discussed below, the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege any basis for holding AFSCME Int’l vicariously liable for the alleged acts of its local affiliates. Therefore, the Court will grant AFSCME Int’l’s Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) does not require a worker suing a labor union for discrimination to show that the union or employer also violated a statute or contract.

Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604 · filed 2014-01-23(c)(1)

Neither §2000e–2(c) nor §2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits race discrimination by a labor organization even when neither the union nor the employer has violated another statute or a contract.

Green v. American Federation of Teachers · filed 2014-01-23(c)(1)

A claim against a labor organization under § 2000e-2(c)(l) or § 2000e-3(a) does not depend on showing that either the employer or the union violated any state statute or contract. Such a requirement cannot properly be added as part of the prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) does not require a worker alleging union discrimination to prove that the employer or union breached a contract.

Stahly v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 996 · filed 2014-03-03(c)(1)

Accordingly, “[a] claim against a labor organization under § 2000e-2(c)(l) or § 2000e-3(a) does not depend on showing that either the employer or the union violated any state statute or contract. Such a requirement cannot properly be added as part of the prima facie case,” and so the claim must be evaluated under a straight Title VII analysis.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits sex discrimination by a labor organization against its members; allegations concerning only a person's role as a union employee do not state a union-membership claim.

Luna v. North Babylon Teacher's Organization · filed 2014-04-07(c)(1)

The only nonconclu-sory allegations of discrimination against the Plaintiff in the complaint relate to her status as a Union employee, rather than her status as a Union member. ... Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs Title VII claim, against the Union, as a member of a “labor organization.”

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from denying fair representation because of race or sex.

Princess Wells v. Chrysler Group LLC · filed 2014-05-15(c)(1)

Additionally, Title VII makes it unlawful for a union to deny fair representation based upon race or sex.

A race-based claim that a union refused to refer a member for work fails when the member produces no evidence that the union referred members outside his protected class during the relevant period.

Bland v. O.P. & C.M.I.A. · filed 2014-09-24(c)(2)

As Bland failed to produce evidence that the union referred union members outside the protected class for work during the time in question, he failed to support his Title VII claim that the union "fail[ed] or refuse[d] to refer [him] for employment" on account of his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2); c.f. Jackson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 643 F.3d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 2011).

A labor organization is not liable for discrimination by its members at an employer merely because they belong to the union; the union must itself instigate or actively support the discrimination.

Edwards v. PAR Electrical Contractors, Inc. · filed 2019-07-01(c)

Edwards was required, but failed, to plead that Local 53, “as an organization, instigated or actively supported” the discrimination at PAR.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a race discrimination claim against a labor union when the complaint plausibly alleges that the union treated the plaintiff worse than similarly situated white employees.

Dunkley v. AFSCME · filed 2020-03-06(c)

While Dunkley’s complaint is not clearly written, Dunkley clearly alleges that AFSCME treated her worse than similarly situated white employees, which meets the threshold of discriminating against an individual because of her race in violation of Title VII (Doc. 38).

Section 2000e-2(c) makes a labor organization liable for discrimination in membership practices or for causing an employer to discriminate.

Domino v. California Correctional Health Care Services · filed 2020-05-08(c)

In particular, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant AFSCME Local 2620 discriminated or retaliated against her in a membership practice. She also does not specify how Defendant AFSCME Local 2620 caused her prior employer, Defendant California Correctional Health Care Services, to discriminate or retaliate against her.

Section 2000e-2(c) bars a union from discriminating against its members because of sex; union liability requires evidence that the union took an active role in the discrimination.

WILLIAMS v. DAVIDSON · filed 2020-07-01(c)

Without any evidence raising the inference of discriminatory action by Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to make out her prima facie case of discrimination, and Defendants are entitled to judgement as a matter of law on this basis alone.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating on protected grounds or causing an employer to do so.

Nweke v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1998-10-29(c)

Title VII provides that a labor organization shall not discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or cause or attempt to cause an employer to so discriminate against an individual.

Section 2000e-2 requires allegations supporting an inference that a labor union discriminated because of a protected characteristic; unreturned calls alone do not suffice.

Chatterjee v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 2001-10-02(c)(1)

Notwithstanding the latitude afforded a Title VII plaintiff, Dr. Chatterjee has failed to allege facts from which the inference could be drawn that the Federation discriminated against him. He alleges that Federation officials failed to return his calls after he was discharged, but nowhere does he suggest that these omissions were based on his national origin or race.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a labor organization from refusing to process a member’s grievances because of race.

Webb v. AFSCME Council 31, Local 654 · filed 2020-09-16(c)(1)

Title VII prohibits labor organizations from discriminating against their members on the basis of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1). ... Based on these allegations, Webb has failed to plead particularized factual content that would allow the Court to plausibly infer the Union defendants are liable race discrimination in relation to the filing of his grievances.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits liability when a union knows that a benefit plan discriminates against its members and fails to address it in its role as their agent.

Jimenez v. Laborers' Welfare Fund of the Health and Wefare Department of the Construction and General Laborers' District · filed 2020-10-08(c)

As explained below, the Court finds that Local 225, as a labor organization, is liable under Title VII insofar as it fails to fulfill its function as an agent of its members, and that Jimenez has plausibly alleged such a failure here.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a labor organization from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Jenkins v. Transport Workers Local 234 · filed 2021-08-26(c)

As for Jenkins’s Title VII claim, we agree with the District Court that this claim fails because, inter alia, the amended complaint does not allege that the Union discriminated against her based on her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c); see Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that under either the pretext or mixed-motive theory of discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff “must establish that her protected status was a factor in the . . . challenged action”).

A Title VII discrimination claim against a labor union fails when the plaintiff cannot show that the union’s stated reason for refusing to pursue grievances was pretext for discrimination.

Cummings v. American Postal Worker's Union · filed 2022-06-17(c)(1)

That is because even if she established a prima facie case under the traditional test, she cannot show the Union’s proffered reason for refusing to process her grievances—its interpretation of the CBA and the 2014 MOU—was pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires facts plausibly showing that a union’s failure to represent a worker was because of race.

Leonard v. Sage Hospitality The Westin Cleveland Downtown Hotel · filed 2023-08-29(c)

Even though plaintiff alleges that Smith “allowed” the suspension, plaintiff does not allege that this was on the basis of race or that the Union failed to represent him because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits claims against labor organizations, but a union’s failure to address complaints about another member’s harassment alone does not establish discrimination by the union.

Wilkerson v. Crusto · filed 2024-01-25(c)

Wilkerson has not alleged that she was excluded, expelled, or otherwise discriminated against pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1).

A union’s refusal to provide legal representation does not violate § 2000e-2(c)(1) when the union has a legitimate reason and the member cannot show that reason was a pretext for race or sex discrimination.

Brown v. Kansas City Police Department · filed 2024-01-17(c)(1)

Under Section 703(c)(1) of Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization . . . to discriminate against[ ] any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(c)(1)(emphasis added). ... Because the FOP has established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason which Solomon cannot demonstrate was pretext for race or sex discrimination, the FOP is entitled to summary judgment on Solomon’s race and sex discrimination claims in Counts XV, XVIII, and XIX.

Section 2000e-2(c) bars a union from discriminating against its members based on race or national origin.

Cruz v. 32BJ SEIU · filed 2024-02-20(c)

Here, no reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that the Union’s articulated reasoning was pretextual or that Cruz’s race or national origin was a motivating factor in the Union’s decision-making.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim against a labor organization when its adverse action and more favorable treatment of comparable men support an inference of sex bias.

Pauwels v. Allied Pilots Association · filed 2024-02-14(c)(1)

Based on these pleadings, the Court can reasonably infer that APA did not support Plaintiff’s accommodation request on account of her sex. In light of this finding on disparate treatment, Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly establish the third and final element of sex discrimination.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim against a union requires facts supporting an inference that the union intentionally discriminated.

Jones v. Local 798 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of t · filed 2024-03-26

To establish a prima facie Title VII claim against a union for a disparate treatment, a plaintiff must allege intent.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a union from selectively declining to act because of an employee’s religion, even when the union has no affirmative duty to act.

Engstrom v. Air Line Pilots Association, International · filed 2024-08-16(c)

And, contrary to ALPA's assertions in its motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the union had an affirmative duty to act on the plaintiffs' behalf; it is sufficient to show that the union based its decision to act or to do nothing based on a protected characteristic such as an employee's race or religion.

Section 2000e-2(c) does not make a union vicariously liable for an employer’s alleged failure to accommodate an employee’s religion.

Oka v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-08-20(c)

As the Court has previously explained, however, ALPA is not vicariously liable for United's alleged failure to accommodate.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires facts plausibly showing that a union’s action or inaction was motivated by religion; conclusory allegations that it failed to help obtain an accommodation are insufficient.

Nealon v. Teamster Local 700 · filed 2025-02-24(c)(1), (3)

But Nealon does not include any facts in the amended complaint to plausibly allege that the Union’s action or inaction was for the purpose of discriminating on the basis of religion.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) permits liability when a labor organization causes or attempts to cause an employer to discriminate; passive acquiescence is insufficient.

Butcher v. AFSCME Council 5 · filed 2025-03-07(c)(3)

AFSCME International, then, could only be liable if “the union itself instigated or actively supported the discriminatory acts.”

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a race and sex discrimination claim against a union that allegedly withholds assistance it would provide to white male members.

Kasso v. Police Officers' Federation of Minneapolis · filed 2025-05-09(c)

Ultimately, the Court construes these allegations as a straightforward claim that the Federation both undermined her employment with the MPD after a medical episode and then failed to assist her in re-securing her employment in the manner it would have done for a white, male officer—even one facing far more serious employment disputes. These allegations state a claim for race and sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that a union discriminated in carrying out its agency function.

Nealon v. Teamster Local 700 · filed 2025-09-22(c)

Accordingly, Nealon has not pleaded enough facts to give rise to the plausible inference that the Union discriminated against Nealon in carrying out its agency function, and Nealon cannot pursue her claim under the labor organization theory of liability.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a discriminatory failure-to-rehire claim when no opportunity to bid for the position arose.

Paumer v. Crown Cork and Seal · filed 2000-01-27

Because Paumer had self-disqualified from the forklift position, she lost all bumping rights. Paumer only had the right to bid into the forklift position. No opportunities to bid into the position arose during the relevant time period, thus Paumer has no claim that Crown Cork discriminatorily failed to rehire her.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff claiming discriminatory failure to rehire to have sought the position she says she was denied.

McCullough v. Houston County Texas · filed 2008-10-17(a)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination where the alleged adverse employment action is failure to rehire, the plaintiff must have actually sought the position she alleged to have been denied.

A union member claiming racial discrimination based on a failure to refer must show that jobs were available and that he was qualified for them; time on a referral list alone does not establish an adverse employment action.

Jenkins v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Union Local No. 614 · filed 2013-09-06(a)

Although Jenkins claims adverse action because he was not referred for over eighteen months while his name was on the List, he has not provided any evidence that jobs became available during that time or, if so, whether he was qualified for those jobs.

Section 2000e-2 allows a discriminatory refusal to reinstate claim, but a disparate treatment claim requires facts showing that a similarly situated person outside the protected class was reinstated.

Jones v. Douglas County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2019-02-06

Jones did not plead any facts showing that candidate was similarly situated or went through a reinstatement process. Her threadbare allegation does not survive a motion to dismiss.

A religious discrimination claim for failure to rehire fails when the employee cannot show adequate job performance.

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District · filed 2021-03-18(m)

Pursuant to Title VII, “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . religion . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... However, he did not show that he was adequately performing his job. Instead, the record reflects that Kennedy refused to follow BSD policy and conducted numerous media appearances that led to spectators rushing the field after the October 16 game, disregarding his and BSD’s responsibilities to ensure students’ safety. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BSD on Kennedy’s failure to rehire claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit mistreatment following a consensual breakup when there is no evidence that it was because of sex or followed unwanted sexual advances.

Novak v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor · filed 2013-03-01(a)(1)

Where, as here, however, there is no evidence that the spurned supervisor made any sexual advances towards Novak following their breakup, or engaged in other efforts to renew the relationship, there is no actionable Title VII violation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make discharge following the end of a consensual workplace affair actionable sex discrimination.

Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Intl. · filed 2000-03-08(a)(1)

Participation in a consensual office affair does not constitute actionable gender discrimination when the termination of the affair results in discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an adverse employment action based on a consensual romantic relationship discrimination because of sex.

Benders v. Bellows and Bellows · filed 2008-02-12(a)(1)

Thus, we see again that Benders’ complaint centers not around her sex, but her consensual sexual relationship with Mr. Bellows. This, as we discussed, is an insufficient basis for a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, including a demotion.

Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc. · filed 2000-04-21(a)(1)

Robinson has set forth sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether his demotion in connection with the 1995 reorganization of the Department was based on discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee challenging a demotion to present evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretext or that racial discrimination motivated the decision.

Roberson v. Game Stop, Inc. · filed 2005-02-08(a)

Plaintiff, however, fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a racially discriminatory animus was a motivating factor of the decision to eliminate the Lead RTV position and demote Plaintiff.

A discriminatory demotion claim can fail when the employer gives a legitimate reason and the employee lacks sufficient evidence that the reason is false.

Harris v. The Home Sales Company · filed 2012-12-14(a)(1)

In sum, Harris can establish the four elements of a prima facie case of race discrimination with respect to his demotion. ... Unfortunately for Harris, he has failed to put forth sufficient evidence showing that Apartment Services’s explanation for his demotion was false.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory demotions; when an employer gives legitimate reasons for a demotion, the employee must show those reasons are pretextual.

Walker v. St. Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc. · filed 2013-02-04(a)(1)

We will assume that Walker established a prima facie case. In response, St. Joseph’s has given legitimate business reasons for demoting Walker. With this background, we focus here on Walker’s showing of pretext. ... Walker’s arguments fail to support her claim of a discriminatory demotion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a discriminatory demotion claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Reaves v. City of Montgomery · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

Thus, because Reaves failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, or a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence to allow a reasonably jury to find unlawful discrimination, the City’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted on Counts IV and VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an affirmative action official to claim employment discrimination based on advocacy for women and minorities, even when that advocacy is part of the official’s job.

Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, Joseph A. Steger, and Donald C. Harrison · filed 2000-06-01(a)

Contrary to the district court's assertion, Plaintiff's status as a high-level affirmative action official does not change the fact that his advocacy on behalf of women and minorities is protected activity or that he is a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2 can protect an affirmative action official who advocates nondiscriminatory hiring practices, even when that advocacy is part of the official’s job.

Johnson v. UC · filed 2000-06-01(a)

However, when the action undertaken by the official is the advocacy of hiring practices that do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity — such as Plaintiff’s advocating a nondiscriminatory hiring practice in line with the A-900 process — the advocacy can indeed be considered protected conduct under Title VII and § 1981, and a jury should decide whether a defendant employer has discriminated or retaliated against the high-level affirmative action official for this advocacy.

A supervisor’s discriminatory animus may be imputed to a final decisionmaker when the supervisor influences a recommendation that the decisionmaker adopts.

Jackson v. Frisco Indep School District · filed 2015-06-15

Therefore, because Smith and Palacios had influence over the examiner’s recommendations, which the board adopted, there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Smith’s and Palacios’ allegedly discriminatory animus may be imputed to the board.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer liable for a tenure committee’s possible discrimination when independent review prevents that discrimination from affecting the final decision.

Falcon v. Trustees · filed 2000-06-19(a)(1)

To the contrary, the record shows that Frazee, Vice President Peer, President Fulkerson, and Interim President Motz independently reviewed Plaintiff’s tenure application and evidence folder. ... The alleged discrimination at the committee level, if any, can not be attributed to Defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for a biased subordinate’s role in an employment decision when the subordinate was the actual decisionmaker or principally responsible for the decision.

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc. · filed 2004-01-05(a)(1)

Regarding adverse employment actions, an employer will be liable not for the improperly motivated person who merely influences the decision, but for the person who in reality makes the decision.

An employer does not violate § 2000e-2(a)(1) because of a biased employee’s misconduct accusation if the decision maker independently investigates the accusation before acting.

Brewer, Lonnell v. Bd Trustees Univ IL · filed 2007-03-21(a)(1)

The line of cases addressing this particular situation is univocal, and indicates that even where a biased employee may have leveled false charges of misconduct against the plaintiff, the employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker independently investigates the claims before acting.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer liable for a biased employee’s false misconduct accusation when the decision maker independently investigates before acting.

Lonnell Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2007-03-21(a)(1)

The line of eases addressing this particular situation is univocal, and indicates that even where a biased employee may have leveled false charges of misconduct against the plaintiff, the employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker independently investigates the claims before acting.

A discriminatory termination claim based on a supervisor’s bias fails when the evidence does not show sex bias and the person who made the termination decision independently evaluated the employee.

Roberts v. Randstad North America · filed 2007-05-16(a)(1)

Roberts cannot show that Harding-Baker’s animus was discriminatory in nature. Moreover, Whitehead’s decision to terminate Roberts was sufficiently independent to preclude Roberts from successfully raising a “cat’s paw” theory of liability.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim under the cat’s paw theory when a biased employee causes an unwitting decision-maker to take adverse action.

Taleyarkhan v. Trustees of Purdue University · filed 2015-04-07

A plaintiff can prevail under the “cat’s paw” theory of employment discrimination if he can show that an employee with discriminatory animus caused an unwitting decision-maker to take adverse action. ... But there is no evidence of causation in this case. ... At all events, the investigation committee independently substantiated Tsoukalas’s initial suspicion, so whatever motive he had for contacting the dean—even unlawful animus—was irrelevant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits cat’s paw liability when a human resources employee influences an employment decision, but the claim requires evidence of discriminatory animus.

Voltz v. Erie County · filed 2015-06-16(a)(1)

While it was error for the district court to conclude that cat’s paw was inapplicable, we take no issue with the district court’s dismissal of this claim. As a predicate to cat’s paw, Voltz was required to establish that the record supports discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can hold an employer liable for a racially discriminatory termination when a biased employee’s investigation causes the termination, even if that employee did not make the final decision.

Mason v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2015-09-18(a)(1)

For purposes of summary judgement, if Blankley’s investigation was tainted by racial bias, and her investigation was the basis for Plaintiffs termination, then her bias can be deemed a causal factor in his termination.

Under Title VII, independent tenure reviews can break the causal link between a supervisor’s alleged discriminatory bias and a denial of tenure.

Min Li v. Jiang · filed 2016-02-29(a)(1)

YSU’s tenure review procedure fits within Staub’s conception of an independent investigation that breaks the causal chain.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; a cat’s paw theory fails without evidence that the employee who allegedly influenced the decisionmaker had discriminatory animus.

Del Dennis v. Academy, Limited · filed 2019-12-11(a)(1)

Even if Dennis could establish that Hampton-Bean exerted influence over Stewart, Dennis has not established that Hampton-Bean exhibited discriminatory animus. Accordingly, no discriminatory animus can be imputed to Academy, and this argument fails.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim to proceed under a cat’s paw theory when a supervisor’s racial animus may have influenced the decisionmaker to take an adverse employment action.

Gamble v. Charles County, Maryland · filed 2021-08-09(a)(1)

A jury may see things differently, of course, but at this procedural stage there is enough to allow the claims against Sheriff Berry to proceed under a cat’s paw theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using a cat’s paw theory to show that a supervisor acted with discriminatory motive and proximately caused an adverse employment action.

Todd v. JB for Governor · filed 2021-08-17(a)(1)

Based on the evidence before the Court, a reasonable jury could conclude neither that Sands’ behavioral reports were discriminatory in motive or content nor that Sands’ transphobic bias was the proximate cause of the Campaign’s decision to include Todd in the post-primary layoffs.

A national-origin discrimination plaintiff cannot establish cat’s paw liability when an unbiased manager independently reviews the employee’s conduct and decides to terminate employment.

Thompson v. Little America Hotel · filed 2022-10-19(a)(1)

We have consistently held plaintiffs cannot rely on the cat’s paw theory of liability when an unbiased third party independently reviews an employee’s performance and makes the decision to terminate her employment.

An employer may be liable for discrimination when biased employees’ evaluations influence a termination decision, even if the final decisionmaker made no discriminatory remarks.

Chery v. Enfield Police Dept. · filed 2023-01-23(a)(1)

Plaintiff argues that the same people who were making discriminatory remarks were the officers writing daily and weekly reports of Plaintiff’s performance in field training, which in turn were the basis for Sergeant Parent’s weekly evaluations and his memorandum recommending that Plaintiff be dismissed from field training. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim based on a biased subordinate’s influence when the subordinate harbored discriminatory animus and caused the adverse employment action.

Sizyuk v. Purdue University · filed 2023-02-15(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment on a cat’s paw theory, “the plaintiff must provide ‘evidence that the biased subordinate actually harbored discriminatory animus against the victim of the subject employment action, and evidence that the biased subordinate’s scheme was the proximate cause of the adverse employment action.’” Milligan-Grimstad, 877 F.3d at 711 (quoting Johnson, 726 F.3d at 914).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of discriminatory animus to hold an employer liable under a cat’s paw theory.

Williams v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 2024-03-13(a)(1)

Because the record does not show that Barbo’s report was “based on [racial or gender] discriminatory animus,” Staub, 562 U.S. at 421, and because Williams does not contend that Defendant’s decision to place him in the reassignment room, investigate the harassment complaint, or impose sanctions was motivated by discriminatory animus, the District Court correctly concluded that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when evidence allows a jury to impute a biased supervisor’s influence to the termination decision.

Sharpe v. Norfolk Southern Corporation · filed 2024-04-04(a)(1)

Put differently, there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Yeager merely rubber-stamped Mr. Morton-Black’s biased recommendation for Mr. Sharpe’s termination such that the evidence permits a jury to impute Mr. Morton-Black’s discriminatory animus to the decisionmaker, Mr. Yeager.

A single-motive race-discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a but-for link between discriminatory animus and the firing decision.

Mosley v. Preston Cycles West, LLC · filed 2024-06-07(a)(1)

His single-motive Title VII claim requires the same but-for link as the ADEA. ... The Staub cat’s paw theory does not fit here.

A race discrimination claim based on a subordinate’s bias requires evidence that the bias actually caused the adverse employment decision.

Tolliver v. Birmingham, City of · filed 2025-06-11(a)(1)

Even assuming arguendo that this evidence is sufficient to create a jury question regarding whether Lieutenant Snider and Captain Quigley-Vining harbored racial animus, Sergeant Tolliver’s claim still fails because he failed to show that Chief Thurmond disciplined, and thus disqualified, him “because of” his race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) protects job applicants from racial discrimination even if they do not intend to accept the job.

Kyles, Kyra v. JK Guardian Security · filed 2000-07-05(a)(2)

Title VII does not limit its protection to bona fide job seekers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) protects job applicants from racial discrimination that tends to deprive anyone of employment opportunities, even if an applicant did not intend to accept the job.

Kyra Kyles and Lolita Pierce v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc., D/B/A Guardian Security Services · filed 2000-07-05(a)(2)

As individuals who applied for work with Guardian Security and allege that they were treated in a discriminatory fashion, Kyles and Pierce have standing to sue the firm under Title VII. The statute confers upon all individuals a right to be free from racially discriminatory practices in employment. If the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, then Guardian violated that right and the plaintiffs suffered an actual injury that gave them the right to sue, whether or not Kyles or Pierce were truly interested in employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for employer liability; indirect employer status depends on control over the worker’s employment.

Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc. · filed 2013-09-13(a)

Title VII imposes liability upon the complaining employee’s “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff must prove the existence of an employment relationship in order to maintain a Title VII action. ... In conclusion, the undisputed evidence shows that Cullen was not Love’s employer for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant for an employment discrimination claim.

Delbert v. Duncan · filed 2013-02-14(a)(1)

Nowhere in his complaint does plaintiff allege to have been an employee of either the Department of Education or DDS. Absent a direct employment relationship, plaintiff’s Title VII claims against these agencies must fail.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a sex discrimination claim against an employer to allege an employment relationship with that defendant.

Covington v. International Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials · filed 2013-03-14(a)

In order to state a Title VII claim, Covington must allege an employment relationship with the defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a) authorizes a Title VII discrimination claim against an employer; a Georgia county is not the employer of a deputy employed by the sheriff’s department.

Jordan v. Gwinnett County · filed 2011-10-03(a)

The district court was correct that Jordan could not assert his ADEA and Title VII claims against Gwinnett County, because those statutes authorize suit against an employer, and Jordan was employed by the Sheriff’s Department, which, under Georgia law, is a separate entity from the County.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits sexual harassment claims only against an employer and does not preclude common-law claims against a nonemployer.

Garcia v. Shell Oil Company and Gustavo Pennilla D/B/A Quality Turbo Services · filed 2011-09-08(a)(1)

Because Garcia’s claims against Shell are not actionable under Title VII, Title VII cannot preclude any common-law causes of action against Shell.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires the defendant to be the plaintiff's employer for an employment discrimination claim.

Griffith v. Louisiana · filed 2011-08-10(a)

Thus, crucial to a claim under Title VII is whether the defendant was the plaintiffs employer. Here, Griffith never alleges that the State of Louisiana was her employer. Therefore, any claim against the State of Louisiana under Title VII must be DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship for a sex discrimination claim; a plaintiff who does not allege that the defendant controlled her work fails to state a claim against it.

Smith v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2011-05-23(a)(1)

Neither Plaintiffs complaint, nor her formal statement provide support for her allegation that the USACE controlled the manner and means by which she performed her work. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employee to bring a discrimination claim against an employer that controls access to the employee’s work opportunities with another employer.

Hunt v. State of Mo., Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-30(a)(1)

The more difficult question is whether the Plaintiffs must be employees of the Department in order to bring a Title VII complaint against it. ... Because the Court finds the reasoning of Sibley and its progeny persuasive, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims.

An employer covered by Title VII can be liable for interfering with a person’s employment even if it does not directly employ that person.

Vogan v. US Oncology, Inc. · filed 2003-10-30(a)(1)

The question is whether Vogan must be an employee of USO before it can be liable under Title VII. The answer is no. If USO interfered with Vogan’s employment in contravention of Title VII, USO can be liable even though it did not directly employ Vogan.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for a discrimination claim against a defendant.

Ford v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-12-06(a)

In any event, because Unum was never the employer of Ms. Ford, she cannot establish a discrimination claim against Unum under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII claim against an employer; a claim against an entity that did not employ the plaintiff fails.

Muller v. Culbertson · filed 2011-02-01(a)

They fail for the simple reason that Title VII claims lie against an “employer,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and Mr. Muller was not an employee of the NMLB.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not authorize an attorney to sue the EEOC over sanctions imposed by its administrative judges when the EEOC was not the attorney’s employer.

Muset v. Ishimaru · filed 2011-04-30(a)(1)

Title VII simply does not authorize actions against the EEOC for sanctions imposed upon attorneys who appear before its administrative judges.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to an employer, so a department with no employment relationship with the plaintiff is not liable under it.

Cooper v. State of Hawaii Department of Taxation · filed 2019-06-20(a)

Title VII only applies to Plaintiff’s employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII employment discrimination claim to be brought against the plaintiff’s employer; an affiliated entity needs a separate basis for liability.

MARSHALL v. ASCENSION HEALTH · filed 2019-07-25(a)

An action under Title VII must be brought against a plaintiff’s employer. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a). ... Still, under the aforementioned standards, the Court affirms that Ascension and SVMG are not proper defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination by an employer, so a complaint about bias by someone with no employment relationship to the employee does not oppose conduct made unlawful by that section.

Yee v. Garland · filed 2022-06-07(a)

This does not support a retaliation claim because what Title VII outlaws is discrimination by “an employer,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), and plaintiff does not allege the existence of any employment relationship between herself and the agency lawyer.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a Title VII discrimination claim against an employer, so the plaintiff must plead facts showing that the defendant was her employer.

Jennings-Jones v. Sylacauga Health Care Authority(MAG+) · filed 2024-07-10(a)

That means Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)) does not allow Jones to sue anyone for her firing or retaliation except her “employer” or former “employer.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by an employer; a claim against an entity must allege that the entity employed the plaintiff.

IN RE: JAMES A. DEBREW, JR · filed 2024-07-15(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To the extent DeBrew seeks to assert claims under Title VII, the ADEA, or Ordinance § 27-3 against Ogletree, the failure to allege he was ever employed by that entity means that his claim must be dismissed as not plausible.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship with the defendant; administering an employee’s insurance benefits alone does not make a third party the employee’s employer.

DOE v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2024-08-02(a)

Therefore, as alleged in her Second Amended Complaint, IBX cannot be considered Doe’s “employer” under Title VII. Her claims against IBX under that statute will be dismissed with prejudice in that amendment would be futile.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege an employer-employee relationship with the defendant to bring a Title VII discrimination claim.

Zhornitsky v. Yale School of Medicine · filed 2024-11-25(a)

As Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an employer-employee relationship with CMHC, Counts Three and Four are dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employee to bring a workplace discrimination claim against the employer, not a facility that lacks authority over the employment relationship.

Tunstall v. William E. Donaldson Correctional Facility · filed 2025-01-08(a)(1)

The court finds that for purposes of any Title VII claim here, Plaintiff’s employer is either the ADOC or Commissioner Hamm. Donaldson cannot be Plaintiff’s employer because it has no authority over him as it is merely his workplace. It is Commissioner Hamm who heads the ADOC and who has the authority to appoint and dismiss ADOC employees; Donaldson has no such power.

Section 2000e-2(l) forbids banding test scores to make lower scores for a racial group appear higher, but does not forbid banding itself.

Chicago Firefight 2 v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-05-03(l)

We have no doubt that if banding were adopted in order to make lower black scores seem higher, it would indeed be a form of race norming, and therefore forbidden. But it is not race norming per se.

Section 2000e-2(l) prohibits altering employment test scores or using different cutoff scores based on race, but permits race-neutral adjustments to testing procedures.

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte · filed 2009-03-12(l)

However, here and elsewhere in their presentation, the Movants conflate permissible adjusting of civil-service hiring procedures with impermissible race norming which violates § 106 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075. That provision, which amended § 703 of Title VII and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(Z), makes it unlawful for employers “to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

A motivating factor instruction depends on whether the evidence supports it; the plaintiff need not concede that the employer’s stated reason played a part in the decision.

Rapold v. Baxter International, Incorpo · filed 2013-06-03(m)

Instead, once either party requests a motivating factor instruction, the district court should simply determine whether the evidence supports the instruction.

A race discrimination instruction under § 2000e-2 may ask whether race was a motivating factor without a separate pretext instruction when the jury can consider evidence of pretext.

Moore v. Robertson Fire Protection District · filed 2001-05-09

Applying this standard of review, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its broad discretion by declining to give an instruction on pretext. The instructions provided by the District Court presented the proper legal standard for the jury's consideration, namely, whether Moore's race was a motivating factor in his non-selection. In deciding the "motivating factor" question, the jury was free to consider Moore's evidence of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive instruction when the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, permits a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment practice.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa · filed 2003-06-09(m)

In order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes sex discrimination when sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Rowland v. Amer Gen Finance · filed 2003-08-12(m)

Moreover, since 1991, Title VII has also outlawed employment discrimination in mixed-motive cases, that is, cases where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employ- ment decision. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (providing that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice"). ... We conclude, therefore, that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the mixed-motive instruction.

Section 2000e-2(m) supports a mixed motives jury charge when sufficient evidence would let a reasonable jury find that a protected trait motivated an employment practice.

Jones v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2004-06-14(m)

In an employment discrimination case, a “mixed motives” charge is proper where a plaintiff presents “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.’” Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Plaintiff offered such a charge in her proposed instructions, but the request was properly denied because it was in many respects an incorrect statement of the law.

A mixed motives jury charge requires enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in an employment practice.

Jones v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2004-07-09(m)

Plaintiff offered such a charge in her proposed instructions, but the request was properly denied because it was in many respects an incorrect statement of the law.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive jury instruction when sufficient evidence allows a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Barnes v. Cincinnati · filed 2005-03-22(m)

In order for an instruction to be proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).

A sole-factor instruction is proper in a Title VII promotion claim when the evidence supports either discrimination or a legitimate reason, but no mixed motive.

Townsend v. Nike, Inc. · filed 2007-05-23(a)

Because the only reasonable conclusions the jury could have reached were either that discriminatory motives were the reason Townsend did not get the full-time position, or that he didn’t get the position because of poor interview scores, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a “sole factor” rather than “motivating factor” instruction.

In a Title VII discrimination trial, instructing the jury on each step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is error, though the error may be harmless.

Mobasher v. Bronx Community College · filed 2008-03-13

The District Court’s instructions were indeed erroneous. Fust, those instructions took the jury through each step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which we have said “undoubtedly constitutes error.”

Section 2000e-2(m) supports a mixed-motive instruction when the evidence permits both legitimate and discriminatory causes for an employment decision; the employee need not concede the employer’s stated reason.

Rapold v. Baxter International · filed 2013-01-30(m)

The relevant question then is not a plaintiff’s concession but whether the case overall is one where either the plaintiff or the defendant’s evidence lends itself to co-existing dual causes for an adverse employment action.

Including McDonnell Douglas factors on a Title VII verdict form does not, by itself, require reversal, though it can confuse the jury.

Craddock v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc. · filed 2024-05-22(a)(1)

Indeed, as this case and the concurrence illustrate, inclusion of the McDonnell Douglas factors on a verdict form, on its own, does not amount to reversible error, but can be inadvisable, as instruction on McDonnell Douglas’s first two steps risks confusing the jury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of race; a claim may proceed when the evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to find that race caused the refusal.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Scion Dental Inc. · filed 2018-05-07(a)(1)

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the EEOC has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Scion refused to hire Ms. Leija because she is African American. Scion's motion for summary judgment will therefore be denied.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory refusal to hire under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that she was qualified for the positions at issue.

Bennett, Valerie v. Roberts, Mary · filed 2002-07-02(a)(1)

Ms. Bennett simply has failed to allege sufficient facts to prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination with regard to these positions. In particular, although Ms. Bennett contends that she was qualified for nineteen positions that were filled while her name was in the database, she provides us with no indication as to the specific hiring criteria for these positions.

A failure-to-hire plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that she applied for an open position, unless discriminatory conduct prevented her from applying or made applying futile.

Syvongxay v. Henderson · filed 2001-06-22(a)(1)

To make a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show (1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she applied for and was qualified for an open position, (3) that she was rejected for that position, and (4) that, after she was rejected, the employer continued to seek applications from persons with the plaintiffs qualifications. ... Here, Plaintiff fails to offer evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case of employment discrimination. In particular, Plaintiff does not satisfy the second element of a prima facie case, i.e., that she applied for an “open” position.

In a failure-to-hire claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff must show as part of the prima-facie case that the employer continued seeking applicants after rejecting the plaintiff.

Ben-Kotel v. Howard University · filed 2001-08-15(a)(1)

The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendant continued to seek applicants for the part-time position. Because the plaintiff has failed to provide the requisite showing with respect to his prima-facie case, the court need not address the defendant’s remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff challenging a hiring decision as race discrimination to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Burbank v. OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF STATE OF CONNECTICUT · filed 2003-01-21

The Court concludes that, even assuming without deciding that Burbank has satisfied the minimal burden of proof required to support a prima facie case, the Office of the Attorney General has demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its failure to hire Burbank and Burbank has not demonstrated that its reason was a pretext for discrimination.

A failure-to-hire claimant cannot establish the fourth element of a prima facie case if the employer never fills the position and cancels the vacancy or eliminates the position.

Beams v. Norton · filed 2003-03-04(a)(1)

Thus, a plaintiff cannot prove the fourth prong if the employer never fills the position for which the plaintiff applies and the vacancy is cancelled or the position is eliminated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to show that the employer was seeking applicants for the position; without evidence of an available position, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case.

Morgan v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-05-09(a)(1)

Having thus failed to raise a genuine issue that the Business Support position for which he applied was one ‘‘for which the employer was seeking applicants,’’ McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation, and summary judgment on this claim was therefore appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based refusals to hire. A plaintiff bringing such a claim must show qualification for the job and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Coger v. Connecticut · filed 2004-03-12(a)

For refusal to hire claims arising under Title VII, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the position sought, (3) an adverse employment action (failure to hire), and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. ... This court finds that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he neither proved that he was qualified for the position, nor demonstrated that there were circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

A failure-to-hire claimant must show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for race or national-origin discrimination; evidence suggesting retaliation alone does not meet that burden.

Diaz v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-06-30(a)(1)

Although this is probative evidence of pretext, Diaz must point to evidence that demonstrates discriminatory motive based on race/national origin, not discriminatory motive based on protected activity. He has failed to do so here. Failure to hire based on racial discrimination is a separate and distinct cause of action from failure to hire because one has engaged in protected activity. Without more, this Court must GRANT summary judgment in favor of the defendant with respect to Diaz’s claim of racial/national origin discrimination.

A Title VII plaintiff alleging a failure to hire need not show that the employer hired someone outside the plaintiff’s protected class to establish a prima facie case.

Teneyck, Lillie v. Omni Shoreham Hotel · filed 2004-05-07(a)(1)

Therefore, to require a Title VII plaintiff to show that someone outside of her protected class was hired or promoted in her stead ... would be to graft an additional element onto the McDonnell Douglas model of the prima facie case. Stella forecloses this possibility.

A failure-to-hire plaintiff using the indirect method must identify a similarly situated applicant outside her protected class who was hired, or show that the position remained vacant.

Koszola, Kathleen v. Bd Educ City Chicago · filed 2004-10-08(a)(1)

Treating this as a straightforward Title VII case, Koszola also loses. She has not identified a nonwhite comparator who was hired by the schools to which she applied and who is similarly situated to her in all material respects.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a prima facie failure-to-hire discrimination claim when the selected candidate’s relevant experience means the candidates are not similarly situated.

Young v. Oakland County · filed 2004-12-29(a)

A candidate with criminal justice experience is simply more qualified than a candidate with no such experience, and the two are not similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2 allows a failure-to-hire sex discrimination claim to reach a jury when changing hiring standards and explanations could show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Peterson v. Scott County · filed 2005-05-06

Evidence of a changing hiring process and fluid standards for applicants, taken together with the defendant’s evolving explanation of its hiring decision, would allow a reasonable jury to infer that the County’s explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

An employer’s decision not to create a new position can be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire an applicant.

McKenzie v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. · filed 2005-07-21(a)(1)

Even if the Court accepts Mrs. McKenzie’s assertions regarding Comcast’s ability to produce a show of the type she desired, and she is therefore deemed to have met the second required showing under McDonnell Douglas, the fact that Comcast did not currently have such a show constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a race discrimination claim when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its hiring decision and the applicant fails to show that reason masked discrimination.

Summers v. Harvard University · filed 2005-08-04(a)(1)

After review of the relevant papers, and having received no objections to the Report and Recommendations, the Report and Recommendations is adopted and the motion for summary judgment is granted. ... Summers has not provided sufficient evidence for a jury to disbelieve Harvard’s reasons for its hiring decision, “let alone that those reasons masked racial discrimination.”

A Title VII failure-to-hire plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case must still offer evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Pyne v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-03-16(a)(1)

Furthermore, and most detrimental to the plaintiff, is the fact that plaintiff has offered no evidence that the defendant's explanations for its decisions are merely pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to choose the candidate it genuinely considers more qualified, even when another candidate ranked first, absent proof of discriminatory pretext.

Mmubango v. Leavitt · filed 2006-04-21(a)(1)

Accordingly, Hamper was entitled to act on his belief that John Parks was more qualified than Mmubango, so long as this belief was genuine.

A race-based failure-to-hire claim fails without evidence supporting a prima facie case or showing that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Wright v. Duval County School Board · filed 2007-05-24(a)(1)

Wright has failed to come forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that she has made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Moreover, Wright has failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the school board’s asserted reasons for not hiring her were in fact pretexts for prohibited retaliation or discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a failure-to-hire claim requires evidence that the applicant was qualified, was rejected, and was rejected under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Concrete Applied Construction Technologies Corp. · filed 2007-08-30(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory racial treatment, or in refusing to hire based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a group protected by Title VII; (2) he applied and was qualified for the job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected for employment; and, (4) the rejection occurred “in circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,” based on the plaintiffs race.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory nonselection under Title VII must show that he applied for an available position.

Thomas v. Gandhi · filed 2007-11-30(a)(1)

Therefore, because Thomas did not apply for the SAD and LLMS positions, he cannot claim discrimination in his non-selection.

A failure-to-hire claim based on sex discrimination cannot survive summary judgment when the applicant fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated reason for choosing someone else was pretextual.

Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co. · filed 2008-02-01(a)(1)

Accordingly, as Ms. Peck has not raised a genuine issue of fact that the Foundry’s rationale for selecting another applicant over her for the Chipper and Grinder position was pretextual, the Foundry is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Peck’s sex discrimination claim.

Once a hiring discrimination plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must show a genuine factual dispute over pretext.

Longo v. Chao · filed 2008-02-28(a)(1)

Having found both a prima facie case for discrimination and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiffs non-selection, the Court’s inquiry focuses exclusively on determining whether Plaintiff has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists that the stated reason is pretextual.

A national origin discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the applicant cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for rejecting the application was pretextual.

Malu v. City of Gainesville · filed 2008-03-26(a)

Because Malu failed to put forth sufficient evidence that the stated reason not to advance his application—his failure to sign the waiver—was a pretext for discrimination, the district court did not err in granting the City’s motion for directed verdict on his national origin discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff to allege facts supporting an inference that national origin motivated the hiring decision.

Dolgaleva v. Virginia Beach City Public Schools · filed 2008-04-03(a)(1)

Ms. Dolgaleva has not alleged, nor can she allege, any facts (as opposed to legal conclusions) that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination by VBCPS. Because the successful applicant was of the same national origin as Ms. Dolgaleva (both hail from the former Soviet Union), she cannot allege facts suggesting that her national origin was “a motivating factor” in VBCPS’s decision not to hire her for the immediate opening of a Russian teaching position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats reposting a position and then hiring someone else as a single discriminatory failure-to-hire claim.

Finizie v. Peake · filed 2008-04-16(a)(1)

The alleged discrimination was not complete until Lyons was hired. Thus, these two claims merge into a single claim for discriminatory failure to hire.

Section 2000e-2 allows a failure-to-hire discrimination claim to reach a jury when the evidence supports an inference that the employer acted because of sex, race, or color.

Framularo v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT · filed 2008-04-30(a)(1)

Because a reasonable jury could conclude based on the facts at hand that plaintiff was not hired due to his age, gender, race or color, summary judgment is inappropriate.

A Title VII refusal-to-hire claim requires a job for which the employer is seeking applicants; distributing an employee’s hours to other employees does not establish one.

Enwonwu v. The Fulton-DeKalb Hospital · filed 2008-05-12(a)

By her own admissions, the Hospital distributed the hours that Dale had worked to other employees, and, therefore, Enwonwu failed to show that “[s]he was qualified for and applied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants.”

A failure-to-hire discrimination claim requires evidence that equally or less qualified people outside the plaintiff’s protected class were considered or hired.

Washington v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2008-07-08(a)

Washington provided no evidence establishing that “equally or less qualified individuals outside of [his] protected class were considered or hired for [his] position”—a key element of a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to hire.