42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Statistical proof of disparate impact must examine employees eligible for the challenged benefit, or use a reliable proxy if eligibility data are unavailable.

Carpenter v. The Boeing Company · filed 2006-08-07(k)(1)(A)(i)

Thus, a statistical analysis cannot establish a plaintiff’s prim a facie case unless it is based on data restricted to qualified em ployees, or (1) reliable data with respect to that group are unavailable and (2) the plaintiff establishes that the statistical analysis uses a reliable proxy for qualification.

Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie disparate-impact case, the employer bears the burden of proving that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Bradley v. City of Lynn · filed 2006-08-08(k)(1)(A)(i)

Once the plaintiffs prove a prima facie case that withstands the head-on attacks by the defendants, the burden of production and persuasion shifts to the defendants to prove that “the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i), (m); see Steamship Clerks, 48 F.3d at 601-02.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires statistical evidence offered to show disparate impact to connect a particular employment practice to a significant disparity.

United States v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2006-09-11(k)(1)(A)(i)

Although the litigation was settled before an adjudication as to whether the United States had sustained its burden, these statistics serve to satisfy the requisite evidentiary showing by the Board in the face of the Brennan intervenors’ own Title VII claim challenging the Agreement, except as it relates to the testing claim involving Exam No. 8206.

Statistical evidence alone can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact if it shows a substantial disparity caused by a particular employment practice.

United States v. Vulcan Soc. Inc. · filed 2009-07-22(k)(1)(A)(i)

Statistics alone can make out the prima facie case.

Statistics showing that an employment practice caused a substantial racial disparity can establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2010-08-04(k)(1)(A)(i)

These statistics are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) permits analysis of an entire hiring process when its elements cannot be separated, but it does not excuse statistical proof of causation.

Onyewuchi v. Mayorkas · filed 2011-02-24(k)(1)(B)(i)

Nothing in this amended provision suggests that a plaintiff is excused from demonstrating causation through statistical evidence simply because the effect of the specific practices cannot be analytically distinguished.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) permits analysis of an overall hiring process when its parts cannot be separated, but plaintiffs must still prove causation through statistical evidence.

Onyewuchi v. Gonzalez · filed 2011-02-24(k)(1)(B)(i)

This provision, however, merely authorizes employees to demonstrate causation by showing the discriminatory effect of an overall hiring process, rather than the discriminatory effects of specific, isolated practices playing a role in the process, when the effects of those isolated practices cannot be analytically separated.

A plaintiff may prove a significant disparate impact without statistical evidence.

Lewis ex rel. Estate of Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2014-03-31(k)(1)(A)(i)

Hence, statistical evidence is not required.

Section 2000e-2 requires specific evidence that an employment practice caused a disparate impact; EEOC guidance alone does not establish a prima facie case.

Lyons v. Washington State Department of Social and Human Services · filed 2020-02-19

But, as DSHS correctly points out, deference to EEOC guidance does not replace the need for specific evidence for a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Once plaintiffs show that an employment practice causes a racial disparate impact, the employer must show that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 2020-02-25(k)(1)(A)(i)

Once Plaintiffs make this showing, the burden shifts to the Board to show the practice is “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i)).

A disparate impact claim based on statistical evidence requires a sufficiently significant disparity; raw results without an analysis of statistical significance do not establish a prima facie case.

BOYLE v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-08-04(k)(1)(A)(i)

Plaintiffs offer no analysis of statistical significance whatsoever with regard to the record evidence of exam results and promotions. That failure alone is enough to grant the City’s Motion on plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim.

A disparate impact plaintiff relying on national statistics must plausibly explain why they reflect the qualified applicant pool affected by the challenged employment practice.

Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc. · filed 2020-09-21(k)(1)

In short, if a Title VII plaintiff intends to rely on national statistics to plead a disparate impact claim, she must explain why those statistics can plausibly be expected to hold true for the qualified applicant pool in question.

Agency-wide statistics comparing eliminated and preserved positions can provide evidence of the impact of challenged layoff practices.

Davis v. District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency,et Al · filed 2020-10-19(k)(1)(B)(i)

Whether the two employment practices are considered together or separately, the relevant statistical inquiry remains the same: an analysis of eliminated positions relative to preserved positions. Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the two practices are not capable of separation for analysis (the Court concludes below Plaintiffs do so demonstrate), the Court finds that Dr. Munro’s reports provide probative statistical evidence of the racially disparate impact of the two identified employment practices.

A disparate impact claim requires proof that an employment practice actually caused an adverse impact on a protected group; a risk of such an impact is insufficient.

GREEN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-12-28(k)(1)(A)(i)

But Mr. Green cannot make out a prima facie case by establishing a latent risk that the policy will cause a disparate impact. He must show that the policy has actually had such an impact.

A Title VII disparate impact claim requires statistical evidence that a specific employment practice caused a disparity affecting a protected group.

Harris v. Department of Children & Families, Office of the Inspector General · filed 2022-01-27(a)(1)

Next, based on the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting DCF’s motion for summary judgment because Harris failed to support her disparate impact claim with any statistical evidence.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not cover retaliation claims.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Avecia, Inc. · filed 2005-10-13(m)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) does not reach retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not permit an award of attorneys’ fees in a dual motive retaliation case.

Garner v. MO Dept. of Mental · filed 2006-03-13(m)

However, in Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000), we agreed with five other circuits that § 2000e-2(m) does not permit an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs in dual motive retaliation cases. ... As a panel, we are obliged to follow Norbeck unless overruled by the court en banc or by the Supreme Court. ... That decision did not overrule our construction of § 2000e-2(m) in Norbeck.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor standard does not apply to retaliation claims.

Carrington v. City of Des Moines · filed 2007-04-06(m)

This Court held in Norbeck, 215 F.3d at 852, that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) – which Carrington cites – does not apply to retaliation claims. ... At summary judgment, Carrington must show a "genuine issue of material fact" that the City's stated reason for the discharge is pretextual and that retaliation was a determinative – not merely a motivating – factor. The record does not support such an inference, and this court declines to adopt Carrington's weakened standard.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination; Title VII addresses retaliation in a separate provision.

Douglas v. City of Waterbury · filed 2007-06-29(a)

Section 704 of Title VII does, in fact, prohibit wrongful retaliation; however, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(l) is not the codification of this prohibition against retaliation, but rather the codification of § 703 of Title VII, which prohibits wrongful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) makes sex discrimination, including a sexually hostile work environment, an unlawful employment practice distinct from retaliation.

Bergbauer v. Mabus · filed 2013-03-27(a)

The Court holds, at least in this case, that it is more appropriate to address Bergbauer’s hostile work environment claim as two distinct claims. Retaliation and sex discrimination are made unlawful employment practices in separate sections of Title VII and appear to be distinct unlawful practices despite both being actionable as hostile work environment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects an employee from sex discrimination affecting that employee’s own employment conditions, but does not protect a third party’s employment conditions.

Bolin v. Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 2005-10-21(a)(1)

The plain text of Title VII requires that the person whose employment conditions are adversely affected also be the person who is discriminated against on the basis of sex. Specifically, the statute’s use of the pronoun “his” limits the scope of protection to the employment of the individual facing sexual harassment. Therefore, even assuming, for the purposes of summary judgment only, that a reasonable person could find Moss’ conduct was of a sexual nature, plaintiff incorrectly assumes that Title VII protects conditions of her husband’s employment. This Court rejects plaintiffs proposed extension of the statute. Rather, the Court adheres to the plain language of Title VII, thus precluding third-party protection.

For a failure-to-reclassify claim, an employee may establish a prima facie case by showing that comparable white employees’ positions were upgraded or that race caused the difference in grades.

Johnson v. Auburn University · filed 2005-11-17(a)(1)

In order to prove a prima-facie case for failure to reclassify, the employee may prove that: (1) positions held by comparable white employees were reclassified and upgraded; or (2) the difference in the grades was the result of racial considerations.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a sex discrimination claim over job reclassification without evidence that the decision was motivated by sex or that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Johannes v. Monday Community Correctional Institution · filed 2006-06-21

In addition, Plaintiffs failure to re-classify claim fails because there is no evidence of motivation based on sex nor evidence to disprove the asserted motivation to better organize MonDay. Johannes has produced no evidence that the decision not to re-classify her position was a pretext for sexual discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence connecting a denied position reclassification to discrimination; speculation alone does not establish a prima facie claim.

Chieke v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2019-10-30(a)(1)

Without evidence of a causal connection to discrimination and with a reasonable nondiscriminatory explanation for denying the reclassification, Chieke has not established a prima facie case of discrimination.38 I therefore grant summary judgment to Defendants on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not cover retaliation claims, even when retaliation is a motivating factor.

Carter v. Luminant Power Services Co. · filed 2013-04-03(m)

Retaliation does not violate § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive rule applies to Title VII claims and does not extend to claims under § 1981.

Aquino v. Honda of America, Inc. · filed 2005-11-18(m)

But Congress inserted the specific statutory provision analyzed in Desert Palace only into Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m); it did not amend § 1981 in an analogous fashion.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor rule applies to the listed Title VII categories, but not to ADEA claims.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2008-05-14(m)

We conclude, however, that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to claims arising under the ADEA. By its terms, the new section applies only to employment practices in which “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not apply to age discrimination claims under the ADEA.

Ambrosio Rouse v. II VI Inc · filed 2009-05-14(m)

Section 2000e-2(m) has no application to ADEA claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits motivating-factor claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not extend that standard to retaliation claims.

Hayes v. Sebelius · filed 2011-02-02(m)

The text of the Act provides the limited universe of factors to which its analysis applies, and the Court concludes that Congress precluded its application to any other factors, including retaliation.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a motivating-factor claim based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not extend that rule to retaliation.

Hayes v. Leavitt · filed 2011-02-02(m)

The text of the Act provides the limited universe of factors to which its analysis applies, and the Court concludes that Congress precluded its application to any other factors, including retaliation.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor standard applies to Title VII claims and is not incorporated into ADA claims.

Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc. · filed 2012-05-25(m)

The part of Title VII that contains the “motivating factor” test—§ 2000e-2—is not included in the list of enforcement provisions identified in the ADA but appears (unsurprisingly) in a section of Title VII captioned “Unlawful employment practices.”

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor standard does not apply to Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims.

Palmquist v. Shinseki · filed 2012-08-02(m)

The Rehabilitation Act borrows its remedial scheme from Title VII, but it does not borrow the causation standard set out in section 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) does not permit an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in dual motive retaliation cases.

Garner v. Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 2006-03-13(m)

However, in Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.2000), we agreed with five other circuits that § 2000e-2(m) does not permit an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs in dual motive retaliation cases. ... As a panel, we are obliged to follow Norbeck unless overruled by the court en banc or by the Supreme Court.

A plaintiff can establish Title VII discrimination by showing that protected status was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Haymer v. Racine Family YMCA · filed 2022-06-22(m)

Rather, she need prove only that her protected status was a “motivating factor” for the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a protected trait to be a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Hittle v. City of Stockton · filed 2023-08-04(m)

Under Title VII, the plaintiff need only “demonstrate[] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the [unlawful employment] practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). Thus, Hittle must demonstrate that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims, see id., and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” for his firing with respect to his FEHA claims, Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 232 (2013).

Section 2000e-2(m) sets a standard of proof; it does not itself prohibit an employment practice.

Mohammed · filed 2025-12-16(m)

Furthermore, § 2000e-2(m), which does exist, does not prohibit any employment practices.

Section 2000e-2(l) prohibits using different employment test cutoff scores based on race or sex, including at later stages of applicant selection.

Dean v. The City of Shreveport · filed 2006-01-25(l)

This method of selection between phase one and phase two violates the plain language of section 2000e-2© because it has the practical effect of requiring different cutoff scores, based solely on race and sex, for continuing further in the hiring process.

Section 2000e-2(l) prohibits using different test-score cutoffs based on race or sex when selecting job applicants.

Dean v. City of Shreveport · filed 2006-02-10(l)

This method of selection between phase one and phase two violates the plain language of section 2000e-2(l) because it has the practical effect of requiring different cutoff scores, based solely on race and sex, for continuing further in the hiring process.

Harassment following a woman’s sexual harassment complaint can constitute sex discrimination if a jury could infer that a man making the same complaint would not have faced similar harassment.

Jensen v. Postmaster General · filed 2006-01-31(a)

In reality, however, when a woman who complains about sexual harassment is thereafter subjected to harassment based on that complaint, a claim that the harassment constituted sex discrimination (because a man who made such a complaint would not have been subjected to similar harassment) will almost always present a question that must be presented to the trier of fact. In such a situation, the evidence will almost always be sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the harassment would not have occurred if the person making the complaint were a man.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit an employer from firing an employee because of the employee's admitted, consensual sexual conduct with a supervisor.

Tenge v. Phillips Modern AG · filed 2006-04-28(a)(1)

As a result, this case presents the limited question of whether Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of "sex" includes a termination on the basis of an employee's admitted, consensual sexual conduct with a supervisor. Although this circuit has not yet decided a case presenting this specific legal question, for the reasons stated below, we conclude that it is not illegal under Title VII for an employer to discharge an employee on such grounds.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sexual harassment claimant to show that the challenged employment action was because of sex; termination after a consensual affair ends does not, by itself, establish that link.

Chenault v. AmeriPride Linen and Apparel · filed 2006-07-12(a)(1)

Even if Brantley fired Chenault, not for her November 5 absence, but because--as she claims--she ended their affair, Chenault has presented no evidence that she was fired because of her sex.

When the same person hires and fires an employee within a relatively short time, that supports a strong inference that the employer’s stated reason for firing the employee is not pretextual.

Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc. · filed 2006-08-16(a)(1)

W e take this opportunity to join our sister circuits and announce that in cases where “the employee was hired and fired by the same person within a relatively short time span,” 4 there is “a strong inference that the employer’s stated reason for acting against the employee is not pretextual.” Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.

In a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), the jury decides whether to draw a same-actor inference and how much weight to give it.

Barthelus v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc. · filed 2015-09-24(a)(1)

In other words, the jury decides whether to make the inference at all (even if it makes the predicate finding of fact) and what weight to give the inference.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim alongside a § 1981 claim based on the same facts.

Chellen v. John Pickle Co., Inc. · filed 2006-08-22(a)(1)

Both § 1981 and Title VII afford a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, and both these causes of action may be prosecuted by the same plaintiff based upon the same facts.

Race discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(a) use essentially the same analysis as claims under § 1981.

Perdue v. Pilgrim Pride · filed 2007-06-01(a)

We have recognized that the analysis of claims under both of these laws is essentially the same.

A knowing and voluntary agreement can waive a claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without specifically naming Title VII.

Snowden v. Zinke · filed 2020-12-09(a)(1)

Given the breadth of this waiver, the fact that the LCA does not reference Title VII claims in particular is of no moment, and, indeed, Snowden does not provide any support for the proposition that the agreement’s lack of specificity in this regard matters.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a significant change in employment status for supervisor harassment to constitute a tangible employment action.

Arnold v. Tuskegee University · filed 2006-12-19(a)(1)

Thus, even assuming that these actions were taken because of Arnold’s sex, these actions, independently or collectively, did not constitute a tangible employment action within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat an investigation that recommends termination as a tangible employment action in a sexual harassment claim.

Rademakers v. Scott · filed 2009-10-28(a)

Although the investigation led to a recommendation to terminate Rademakers, the investigation itself was not a tangible employment action.

Section 2000e-2(b) allows sexual harassment claims against employment agencies.

Wilborn v. SOUTHERN UNION STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE · filed 2010-03-30(b)

Even on this narrow reading, however, the court finds that § 2000e-2(b) authorizes sexual harassment claims against employment agencies.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexual harassment claim when an employee’s refusal of a supervisor’s sexual demands results in a tangible employment action, which can include an undesirable reassignment.

Gardner v. Aviagen · filed 2011-11-30(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... A tangible employment action refers to “a discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. at 1245 n.4. ... The record shows that Gardner may not have been qualified for the new position. ... We cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this alternative ground.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers workplace sexual assault, but rape without an official employer act is not a tangible employment action that bars the employer’s Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Kramer v. Wasatch County Sheriff's Office · filed 2014-02-25(a)(1)

While rape is inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, on the facts here it is not a “tangible employment action” in the sense meant by Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, and Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9.

Loss of regular voluntary overtime that supplies a significant share of an employee’s income can be a tangible employment action in a supervisor harassment claim.

Ray v. International Paper Company · filed 2018-11-28(a)(1)

We conclude that the record before us could support a jury determination that Ray suffered a tangible employment action when McDowell eliminated her voluntary overtime work.

An employee pursuing a tangible employment action sexual harassment claim must show a genuine factual dispute over whether the harassment caused the action to survive summary judgment.

Odom v. Coastal States Automotive Group Management, LLC · filed 2022-08-22(a)(1)

Therefore, in order to survive summary judgment, an employee relying upon a tangible employment action theory must create a genuine dispute of fact as to causation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible employment sexual harassment claim to involve an employment action linked to the employee’s refusal of sexual advances.

WALKER v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC · filed 2022-09-26(a)(1)

As nothing more than Plaintiff’s co-worker, Sanks did not have the authority to make decisions impacting any tangible aspect of Plaintiff’s employment. And, even if Sanks was Plaintiff’s supervisor, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his termination had any direct link to his refusal to accept Sanks’ sexual advances. Plaintiff accordingly cannot make out a prima facie case of tangible employment sexual harassment, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal link between sexual harassment and a tangible employment action.

Pasley v. Relogio, LLC · filed 2023-09-11(a)(1)

Specifically, he did not demonstrate a causal link between his termination and the sexual harassment.

An employer seeking summary judgment under the Faragher/Ellerth defense must establish that the employee unreasonably failed to use preventive or corrective opportunities or otherwise avoid harm.

Ferguson v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. · filed 2007-01-10(a)(1)

The Court cannot find as a matter of law that plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm at AWG.

When sexual harassment causes no tangible employment action, an employer can avoid hostile work environment liability by exercising reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment if the employee unreasonably fails to use available safeguards.

Nurse "BE" v. Michael Chaparro, M.D. · filed 2007-07-06(a)(1)

Because Palms West met its burden under Faragher/Ellerth, O’Brien failed to set forth a viable sexual harassment claim as a matter of law. ... Therefore, the substance of O’Brien’s complaint coupled with the fact that she requested Stowers not to report it was insufficient to place Palms West on notice of the sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to avoid hostile work environment liability by establishing the Faragher/Ellerth defense when the employee suffered no tangible employment action.

Nurse "Be" v. Columbia Palms West Hospital Ltd. Partnership · filed 2007-07-06(a)(1)

Because Palms West met its burden under Faragher/Ellerth, O’Brien failed to set forth a viable sexual harassment claim as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to assert the Faragher defense to supervisor harassment, but the defense fails when the employee reasonably sought to avoid the harm.

Rodriguez-Rivas v. Police Dept. of Puerto Rico · filed 2010-03-12(a)

Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiffs actions in seeking to avoid harm were reasonable. Therefore, Defendant fails to establish the second prong of Faragher. Consequently, the Faragher defense is inapplicable in this case.

An employer may avoid liability for a supervisor’s hostile work environment harassment by establishing the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.

Clark v. DHL Supply Chain · filed 2021-09-02(a)(1)

As to Mr. Akligoh’s conduct, DHL has established by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to an affirmative defense to employer liability.

An employer can defeat a Title VII racial harassment claim by showing that it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to use available reporting procedures.

Salgado v. West Colorado Motors, LLC/Autonation, Inc. · filed 2025-08-01(a)(1)

The Court finds the undisputed material facts raise no genuine issue for trial regarding Defendant’s entitlement to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) survives summary judgment only if a reasonable jury could find discrimination.

Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc. · filed 2007-02-26(a)(1)

The touchstone of the inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination. If not, the claim cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.

A gender discrimination plaintiff must raise a genuine factual issue that discrimination caused the challenged employment action.

Dr. P.K. Ebert v. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia · filed 2011-07-21(a)

Ebert has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that unlawful discrimination was the reason for her performance evaluation and eventual termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race or sex discrimination claim to proceed when the employee presents enough evidence to withstand summary judgment.

Coleman v. Donaho · filed 2012-01-06(a)(1)

Plaintiff Coleman has offered enough evidence of race and sex discrimination and retaliation to with- stand summary judgment.

A national-origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can withstand summary judgment when the evidence raises a material factual dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Barthelus v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc. · filed 2014-05-27(a)(1)

We have considered the court’s decision that the evidence failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether G4S’s decision to terminate Barthelus’s employment was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. We conclude that material issues of fact are present regarding pretext—especially when Barthelus’s performance reviews are considered in light of the TSA audits.

An employee alleging race discrimination can survive summary judgment with evidence from which a jury could find the employer’s stated reason false or race a motivating factor.

Stoddard v. West Telemarketing, L.P. · filed 2007-07-31(a)

Rather, the Court must determine if Stoddard “tendered factual evidence that could lead a jury to reasonably conclude” either that the reason is false or that his race was a motivating factor.

A race or sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 survives summary judgment when the evidence raises a genuine issue of fact about whether the employer’s stated reason for an adverse action was pretextual.

Perkins v. Management & Training Corporation · filed 2022-12-01

Although the Court does not conclude that the general absence of pre-demotion reprimands demonstrates pretext, Plaintiff’s allegations create genuine issues of material fact as to pretext that pretermit summary judgment of the Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination, and evidence that an employer’s stated reason for firing an employee was pretextual can create a genuine dispute for trial.

Evans v. Valley Electric Association, Inc. · filed 2023-01-13(a)(1)

In sum, Evans has presented the minimal evidence required to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether VEA’s alleged reason for firing her was pretextual. Therefore, this Court denies VEA’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Evans’ Title VII Discrimination Claims (Claims 1-3).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) race discrimination claims are evaluated at summary judgment under the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Baker v. MTA Bus Company · filed 2023-08-01(a)(1)

At the summary judgment stage, race discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the NYSHRL are evaluated under the three step, burden-shifting framework set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits claims for discriminatory termination and sexual harassment, but those claims cannot survive summary judgment without a triable issue of fact.

Taylor v. William Donaldson Correctional Facility · filed 2023-09-13(a)

Ms. Taylor has not created triable issues of fact on her Title VII claims for discriminatory termination and sexual harassment against the ADOC; her ADA claim against the ADOC; or her § 1983 equal protection claim against Lt. Watts.

A criminal conviction hiring policy can satisfy Title VII’s business necessity standard if it accurately distinguishes applicants who pose an unacceptable risk.

El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") · filed 2007-03-19(k)

If a bright-line policy can distinguish between individual applicants that do and do not pose an unacceptable level of risk, then such a policy is consistent with business necessity.

Section 2000e-2(a) can apply to a staffing agency’s client when the client exercises substantial control over a temporary worker’s employment.

Parker v. Golden Peanut, LLC · filed 2015-07-15(a)

Based on the facts detailed above, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant’s status as Plaintiffs “employer” for purposes of Title VII liability, thus precluding summary judgment on this ground.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make one joint employer liable for another employer’s actions merely because they share control over employment conditions.

Torres-Negron v. Merck & Company · filed 2007-05-23(a)(1)

Thus, a finding that two companies are an employee's "joint employers" only affects each employer's liability to the employee for their own actions, not for each other's actions, as Torres would have us hold.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employee to bring a Title VII claim against an employer; allegations that another entity also employed the plaintiff do not defeat a plausible claim against the defendant.

Krause v. Turnberry Country Club · filed 2008-04-17(a)

In general, an employee can only bring a Title VII claim against the employee’s employer. ... At this time, however, Krause has provided sufficient allegations to plausibly suggest that Turn-berry employed Krause.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex discrimination claim against an entity alleged to be the plaintiff’s joint employer.

Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am. · filed 2009-03-26

Given that this Court must construe the allegations in the amended complaint liberally and draw all inferences favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, plaintiff has stated a claim against the District under Title VII because she has alleged that the District and CCA were her joint employers.

Section 2000e-2(a) can impose liability on distinct entities for the same Title VII violation when they jointly employ the plaintiff or one acts as the other's agent.

Myers v. Garfield & Johnson Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2010-01-14(a)

I conclude that, in the Third Circuit, two distinct entities may be liable for the same Title VII violation not only when they constitute a “single employer” but also when they are joint employers of the plaintiff or when one entity acted as the agent of the other.

An employee leasing company may be liable for employment discrimination as a joint employer when it retains control over essential terms and conditions of the worker’s assignment, including termination.

Fulton v. People Lease Corp. · filed 2010-03-05(a)(1)

If we assume them to be separate entities, we agree with Plaintiff that Peo-please has potential liability under the joint employer test, because it retained control over the essential terms and conditions of her assignment to EFI, including termination and employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege an employment relationship; a conclusory allegation that a parent company jointly employed the plaintiff needs supporting facts.

Martin v. ReliaStar Life Insurance · filed 2010-05-10(a)

To state a claim for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the MHRA or the MCRO, Plaintiffs must allege an employer/employee relationship. ... In light of the strong presumption dictated Brown that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees, 494 F.3d at 739, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs must make additional factual allegations to support their legal conclusion of joint employment.

A company’s decision to bar a contractor’s employees from its premises for violating work rules does not, by itself, make the company their joint employer under Title VII.

Boutin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. · filed 2010-07-30

Similarly, ExxonMobil’s policy barring from the premises a contractor’s employees who violated certain work rules does not as a matter of law make ExxonMobil a joint employer of the contractor’s employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) can apply to a joint employer, but joint employer status alone does not establish liability for discrimination.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Horizons, Inc. · filed 2012-03-16(a)

Joint employer status merely establishes the employment relationship necessary for Title VII protections to apply to the Moving Defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a joint employer that exercises sufficient control over the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment.

Kaiser v. Trofholz Technologies, Inc. · filed 2013-03-28(a)(1)

These allegations demonstrate that while Booz Allen might not have hired Plaintiff, assigned her to a work location, received her complaints, or fired her, Booz Allen did have sufficient control, authority, and influence over the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs employment to support the contention that it was Plaintiffs joint employer with Trofholz for purposes of Title VII liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination by an employer, including a joint employer that controls the terms and conditions of employment.

Clayton v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-11-21(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits “an employer” from discriminating against “any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of sex. ... Thus, because Clayton has amply pled that the DCNG maintained control over Clayton’s employment, she has sufficiently pled facts that permit her to sue the DCNG under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a joint employer only when it shares control over essential terms and conditions of employment.

Elkin v. McHugh · filed 2014-01-07(a)(1)

Given SERCO’s contractual requirements for hiring, firing, compensation and performance evaluation of Plaintiff as well as the Army personnel’s restricted access to information necessary to evaluate Plaintiffs work as a victim advocate, the Court concludes that the majority of the factors under the common law test for joint employer under Title VII do not favor a finding that the Army was a joint employer of the Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship; a related company may be liable as a single or joint employer if the evidence supports that relationship.

Shiflett v. Scores Holding Co. · filed 2015-02-19(a)(1)

After conducting an independent review of the record and the case law, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Shiflett has not raised a material issue of fact as to whether Scores Holding can be deemed her employer for purposes of Title VII under either the single employer doctrine or the joint employer doctrine.

A Title VII joint employer inquiry considers which entities control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship as a whole; payroll and budget functions alone do not establish employer status.

Jeff Peppers v. Cobb County, Georgia · filed 2016-08-25(a)(1)

But, more fundamentally, Peppers’s joint employer argument founders because the focal point of the inquiry is not which entity controlled the specific aspect of the relationship giving rise to a discrimination claim, but rather which entity or entities controlled the fundamental and essential aspects of the employment relationship when taken as a whole.

Section 2000e-2(a) uses the common-law agency test to determine whether an entity is a joint employer.

Eeoc v. Global Horizons, Inc · filed 2019-02-06(a)

We conclude that the common-law agency test should be applied in the Title VII context as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a joint employer that shares control over essential terms and conditions of employment, including hiring, discipline, compensation, and supervision.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Skanska USA Building, Inc. · filed 2013-12-10(a)(1)

To determine whether an entity is the plaintiff’s joint employer, we look to an entity’s ability to hire, fire or discipline employees, affect their compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise their performance. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record here is enough to support a determination Skanska jointly employed the operators.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and a defendant before that defendant can be liable for discrimination.

Obinyan v. Prime Therapeutics LLC · filed 2021-03-17(a)

Because Obinyan has failed to produce evidence of any of the joint-employer factors, and because he has otherwise failed to create a fact issue on the question whether there was an employment relationship between him and WSPH, the court grants WSPH’s motion for summary judgment on Obinyan’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) limits discrimination liability to an employee’s employer, which may include a parent company that jointly controls the terms and conditions of employment.

John v. Core Brace, LLC · filed 2021-07-26(a)

Under Title VII, liability only attaches for discrimination if an entity is the “employer” of the plaintiff. ... In sum, the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SME is a joint employer of John.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows two entities to be liable as joint employers when they share control over essential terms and conditions of employment.

Delarosa v. Comsource Management, Inc. · filed 2021-08-30(a)

The Court finds such a joint employer relationship exists here.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows discrimination liability against a joint employer that shares control over the terms and conditions of employment.

Haro, III v. Thomas Keller Restaurant Group · filed 2022-03-30(a)

Under Title VII, an entity can be held liable for discrimination if it is the plaintiff’s “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Taking these allegations and all reasonable inferences as true, Haro has plausibly alleged that TKRG was a joint employer.

An entity may qualify as a worker’s employer under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) when it controls her working environment, even if another entity hires and pays her.

Howard v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 2022-05-04(a)(1)

After assessing all of the Knight factors, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that the CCSO is the plaintiffs' employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits liability against a joint employer only if that entity exercises sufficient control over the worker to qualify as an employer.

Tucker v. Maximus, Inc. · filed 2022-07-28(a)(1)

The record is insufficient to permit a finding of joint employment.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim against a joint employer that exercises sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment.

Gordon v. Maryland State Police · filed 2023-09-21

In light of these facts, which we accept as true under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as the liberal construction extended to the definition of an “employer” under Title VII, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint creates at least a plausible inference that MSP was the Plaintiffs’ joint employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discrimination claim against a staffing agency as a joint employer when it exercises immediate control over the worker, including control over hiring, firing, pay, records, or supervision.

Cela v. NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2023-09-25(a)

Together, these facts plausibly allege a commonality of hiring, firing, discipline, pay, records, and supervision, and that Della maintained immediate control over Cela. Therefore, the Court concludes that Cela has pleaded sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case that Della and NYP were Cela’s joint employers.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a religious discrimination claim against a joint employer only when that entity exercises sufficient control over the worker’s employment.

Harris v. PeaceHealth · filed 2023-09-28(a)

This falls far short of establishing the requisite degree of control necessary to show that PeaceHealth was Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of Title VII. As an employer-employee relationship is essential to the Title VII claim, PeaceHealth’s motion to dismiss is granted and this claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship with the defendant; a joint employer must exercise sufficient control over the plaintiff’s work.

Williams v. Delta Zeta Sorority · filed 2024-03-26(a)(1)

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege the above-mentioned elements with respect to the allegation that Defendants are Plaintiff’s joint employer. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the employer status of Defendants as required under Title VII, and accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to this claim is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship, including joint employment, before a defendant can be liable for employment discrimination.

BIRD v. MASTERY CHARTER SCHOOLS · filed 2024-06-10(a)(1)

Examining the record in this case under the Darden rubric, I find Bird has failed to establish she was a Mastery employee, notwithstanding her assertion that she was “hired” by Mastery when it “forced” her to take RRM status.

An employment discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires the defendant to be the plaintiff's employer, including under a joint-employer theory.

Circle Bear v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, KS · filed 2024-12-20(a)(1)

In order for someone to state a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was their employer. ... We agree with the district court that the Unified Government cannot be Circle Bear's joint employer as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim against a joint employer that controls the worker’s duties and schedule and has authority to end or extend the employment.

SITTER v. ALLEGHENY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2025-01-02(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Sitter has adequately alleged that AHN was her employer because she pleaded that it had authority to fire her or extend her contract, it paid her salary, and it controlled her daily tasks and work schedule.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires an entity to have some control over the challenged employment practice before it can be held liable for sex discrimination.

Vincent v. ATI Holdings LLC · filed 2025-09-24(m)

Absent a theory of vicarious liability, which Vincent does not allege, it would make no sense to hold ATI liable for an unlawful employment practice mo- tivated by sex if ATI had no control whatsoever over that practice.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits liability against a separate company as a joint employer when it controls the plaintiff’s terms and conditions of employment.

Aityahia v. Envoy Air Incorporated · filed 2025-10-09(a)

The FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to show that American exerted control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a Title VII claim against a joint employer only when facts establish an employment relationship.

Sharp · filed 2025-10-16(a)

Claims under Title VII, ADA, MFEPA, and for wrongful termination can only be filed against one’s employer. ... Plaintiff does not allege that AMII was involved in her hiring or training with either Franchisee Studio, that AMII was aware of her workers’ compensation claim and instructed AMDS Baltimore to terminate her employment, that AMII was in possession of her employment records from Franchisee Studios, or any other allegation that would establish that AMII exerted sufficient control over Franchisee Studios to constitute a joint employer. Therefore, the Court will dismiss all claims against AMII, without prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits intentional racial segregation of employees even without a loss of tangible benefits, because it adversely affects their workplace status.

Hunter v. Army Fleet Support · filed 2007-12-21(a)(2)

The defendants’ intentional racial segregation of the plaintiffs, if true, would “discriminate ... with respect to ... conditions ... of employment” and it would “segregate ... in a[ ] way which would ... adversely affect ... status as an employee,” because such segregation would be inherently and greatly demeaning to the plaintiffs: indeed, with such conduct, the defendants would relegate the plaintiffs to second-class status in the workplace merely because of their race.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff bringing a gender-plus discrimination claim to show that similarly situated men with the same additional characteristic were treated more favorably.

Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Department · filed 2008-01-15

Because Plaintiff is unable to identify any specific male firefighters who are short and were not required to undergo a driving position evaluation, Plaintiff fails to carry her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Her “gender plus” claim therefore fails as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of an adverse employment action because of sex to sustain a gender discrimination claim.

Franklin v. Potter · filed 2009-03-04(a)(1)

Title VII “establishes two elements for an employment discrimination case: (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” ... The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove either element of his gender-based disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee claiming a gender-discriminatory demotion to show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason.

Gresham v. City of Florence Alabama · filed 2009-03-19(a)

Upon review of the record and the briefs of the parties, and assuming without deciding that Gresham established a prima facie case, we conclude that Gresham has not shown that all of the City’s stated reasons for her demotion were so weak or contradictory that a reasonable factfinder could find all of them unworthy of credence. In addition, she has not pointed to sufficient evidence that would tend to show that discrimination was the real reason for her demotion. Accordingly, we conclude that Gresham failed to establish that the City’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a gender discrimination claim to proceed when evidence could allow a jury to find that discriminatory animus motivated the employer’s decision.

Gerving v. Opbiz, LLC · filed 2009-04-29(a)

Making all reasonable inferences in favor of Gerving, as is required on summary judgment, a jury could conclude that her poor reviews were motivated, at least in part, by Lauster’s discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a claim fails when no reasonable jury could find that the employer acted because of gender.

Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc. · filed 2010-04-09(a)

On the record before us, no reasonable jury could find that Gaujacq was a victim of discrimination based on her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when alleged unequal treatment of female and male employees supports an inference of discrimination.

Artz v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 2010-06-22(a)(1)

There is no assertion that Mr. Wanner, who had just returned from a two-month paid leave of absence, was given any such ultimatum. These circumstances give rise to an inference, as required at the fourth element of the prima facie case, of unlawful discrimination, i.e., that the defendant treated Miss Artz differently than a male co-worker based on her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an adverse employment action occurred because of the employee’s sex.

New v. Board of County Commissioners for Tulsa County · filed 2020-01-17(a)(1)

The Court finds that plaintiff has not alleged facts that would support an inference that she was treated differently than similarly situated male employees because of her gender, and her gender discrimination claim should be dismissed.

A gender discrimination claim requires facts showing that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably.

Simmons v. Nevada System of Higher Education · filed 2020-02-06(a)(1)

However, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support the fourth element of his claim—that individuals outside his class were treated more favorably. Therefore, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action on this ground.

A gender discrimination claim can survive a motion to dismiss when the employee alleges that male officers on administrative duty retained equipment that she was denied.

Reed v. City of Decatur, Alabama · filed 2020-08-20(a)(1)

Those allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss her gender discrimination claim.

A gender-discrimination plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated legitimate reason for termination is a pretext for discrimination.

Patterson-Eachus v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2020-12-09(a)(1)

I find that Plaintiff has not met her burden of persuasion in establishing that these two explanations of Defendant’s decision are pretextual for discrimination.

A gender discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the complaint does not plausibly allege different treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Powell v. Nash Edgecombe Economic Development, Inc. · filed 2021-05-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff Blue fails to state a claim for gender discrimination, where she fails to plausibly allege different treatment from similarly situated employees outside of the protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on transgender status, but a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must plead facts supporting an inference of less favorable treatment.

Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA · filed 2021-05-12(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing]” against any individual with respect to employment “because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. Accordingly, a plaintiff who alleges transgender discrimination is entitled to the same benefits—but also subject to the same burdens—as any other plaintiff who claims sex discrimination under Title VII.

A gender discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that the employee was qualified and similarly situated men received more favorable treatment.

Walker v. Idaho State Police · filed 2021-05-19(a)(1)

Taking the facts set forth in the first amended complaint as true, the Court finds Walker has set forth a plausible claim of actionable gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on gender identity; a complaint alleging such a discharge need not plead every element of a prima facie discrimination case to survive dismissal.

BINKS v. US TECH SOLUTIONS · filed 2021-06-30(a)(1)

The obvious import of the allegations is that US Tech fired Binks because of her gender identity. At this stage, Binks need not allege anything more.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a gender discrimination claim to allege that the employer treated the employee adversely because of gender.

Young v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City · filed 2021-08-27(a)(1)

By her own allegations, the denial of overtime opportunities was premised on her complaint against Reeves, not on her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits termination because of gender; when an employer offers a legitimate reason, the employee must present evidence that gender was a motivating factor.

Carter v. TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-06-05(a)(1)

At the final step, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for gender discrimination or whether gender was in fact a motivating factor behind its decision to terminate Plaintiff.

A gender discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual and gender was a motivating factor.

Szittai v. CenturyTel Service Group, LLC · filed 2023-08-16(a)(1)

Boiled down, Szittai falls short on pretext because he has no evidence that CenturyTel’s reasons for his firing and lost leads were false, and that gender was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was because of sex; a comparator must have engaged in similar conduct to support an inference of discrimination.

BACON v. MERAKEY · filed 2023-08-31(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff cannot establish that his female colleagues engaged in the same type of conduct that prompted his termination, he has failed to point to similarly situated comparators who received preferential treatment to satisfy the fourth element of his prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based discharge; under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Jenkins v. CACI Inc - Federal · filed 2023-10-23(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... As a result, the court finds that CACI is entitled to summary judgment on Shaffer’s Title VII gender discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment terms; requiring a woman to verify physical therapy attendance when male colleagues need not do so can plausibly support a gender discrimination claim.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2024-03-21(a)(1)

Both Title VII and the DCHRA make it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of the individual’s race and sex. ... Although this barely survives plausibility review, defendant’s motion to dismiss the gender discrimination claims in Counts III and IV, under Title VII and the DHCRA, on this basis is thus denied.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits firing an employee because of gender; a claim fails when the evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find that gender caused the termination.

Ontiveros v. Exxon Mobil Corporation · filed 2025-08-05

But the evi- dence Ontiveros presents is insufficient for a jury to reach a different conclusion altogether: that her gender caused her termination.

A claim under § 2000e-2 may be released through a settlement the employee enters knowingly and voluntarily.

Vinnett v. General Electric Company · filed 2008-03-31

An employee may release a cause of action for employment discrimination if, under the totality of the circumstances, the employee’s consent to the settlement was knowing and voluntary. ... Because Vinnett released all of his discrimination and retaliation claims arising before the settlement agreement was executed, his claims of discrimination and retaliation arising during his employment with GE are barred.

An employee may release a Title VII discrimination claim if the release is valid under state law and is knowing and voluntary.

Hampton v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2009-04-06(a)(1)

An employee may waive or release a Title VII claim. ... For a release affecting a federal right to be valid, it must not only be valid under state law, but it must also be knowing and voluntary.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from declining to renew an employment arrangement because of an employee’s religion, whether the employment is at-will or for a fixed term.

Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter School Inc. · filed 2008-04-09(a)(1)

The failure to renew an employment arrangement, whether at-will or for a limited period of time, is an employment action, and an employer violates Title VII if it takes an adverse employment action for a reason prohibited by Title VII, such as religious discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, including sex-based stereotyping about caregivers, but does not prohibit discrimination based on caregiving responsibilities alone.

Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc. · filed 2008-05-02(a)

In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress prohibited employment discrimination based upon sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It did not prohibit discrimination based upon caregiving responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit discrimination based solely on caregiving or family responsibilities.

Boyd v. Advanced Physicians · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

More precisely, the plain language of Title VII does not prohibit discrimination solely based upon caregiving responsibility or family responsibilities.

A religious discrimination claimant who did not apply for a job must prove that the alleged discriminatory practice deterred the application; after-the-fact statements and common sense alone are insufficient.

Johnson v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. · filed 2008-05-14(a)(1)

While common sense may indeed support his assertion that he was interested in the slab yard job, at least from his perspective, we are not prepared to find that Johnson met his burden of proving that he would have applied for the position but for how Dunfee advertised it by relying solely on his own after-the-fact statements and common sense.

An employee who does not formally apply for a position must make every reasonable attempt to convey interest in it to prevail on a discrimination claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Audrain Health Care, Inc. · filed 2014-06-30(a)(1)

In light of this evidence, Lunceford did not make “every reasonable attempt to convey” his interest in the OR position and the district court did not err in concluding that the EEOC did not establish a claim of employment discrimination.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim generally requires the employee to apply for the position; workforce statistics alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Crain v. Metropolitan Security Services, Inc. · filed 2019-09-17(a)(1)

Even so, these statistics alone do not supplant the Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that he applied for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a failure-to-hire or promotion claim to proceed without a formal application when the employer’s prior hiring practice creates a factual dispute over whether an application was required.

GOODMAN v. NORRISTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2021-12-22(a)(1)

Therefore, whether viewed as a failure to promote or as a failure to hire, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s decision not to select Plaintiff for the open full-time position constituted an adverse employment action, even though she did not submit an application.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory hiring claim to proceed without a formal application when a job requirement may reasonably have led an interested worker to believe she was ineligible.

Azzam v. District of Columbia · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1)

At the very least, whether such an assumption would have been reasonable enough to justify Plaintiff’s decision not to apply for the position is a fact which must be decided at trial. Under such circumstances, Plaintiff’s failure to apply for the position does not end her claim.

A plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie race or national origin discrimination claim without evidence that the employer’s decisionmakers knew the plaintiff’s protected status.

Holloway v. Freemont County RE-1 · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

Any evidence of a pattern of discrimination against Hispanic employees cannot apply to plaintiff without evidence defendant knew plaintiff is Hispanic.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the hiring decisionmaker knew the applicant’s race to support a claim of intentional race discrimination.

Washington v. Chao · filed 2008-09-09(a)(1)

It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot be found to have discriminated against a plaintiff on the basis of race where the defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiffs race.

A failure-to-hire race discrimination claim requires evidence that the hiring decisionmaker knew the applicant’s race.

Perry v. Pediatrix Medical Group of Georgia · filed 2021-01-20(a)(1)

Critically, Dr. Perry also had to show that the decisionmaker knew he was a member of a protected class.

A pregnancy discrimination claim must plausibly allege that the employer knew of the pregnancy when it terminated the employee.

Mason v. The Derryfield School et al. · filed 2022-11-07(a)(1)

Thus, the court agrees with the defendants that Mason must allege that defendants knew that she was pregnant when they terminated her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a discrimination claim must plausibly allege protected-class status.

Cobbs v. Walmart · filed 2024-10-18(a)(1)

Membership in a protected class is therefore an essential element of a claim under Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision. Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Cobbs, however, does not allege that he is a member of any protected class. (Compl. ¶6.) Accordingly, the Complaint does not state a plausible claim for discrimination under Title VII.

An employee who lacks a professional license required for the position cannot establish that she was qualified for it in a race discrimination claim.

Murphy v. University Health Shreveport L L C · filed 2022-01-27(a)(1)

Without this license, Murphy cannot point to any evidence that she was qualified for her role.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require an individual to be qualified for employment for proven discrimination to be unlawful.

Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2009-07-23(a)

Thus, inquiry into an individual’s employment qualifications may be integral to a court’s assessment of whether discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has occurred; it is not likewise necessary to a determination of whether such discrimination against that individual, once proven to have occurred, is unlawful under the statute.

A Title VII race-discrimination plaintiff must satisfy the employer’s objective job qualifications to establish a prima facie case.

Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint · filed 2010-05-20(a)(1)

As to the second element—that he was qualified for the job—Anderson must show only that he satisfied Embarq’s objective employment qualifications. ... Accordingly, because Anderson has failed to satisfy at least one of the elements of his prima facie case, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Embarq’s favor on the Title VII discrimination claim.

A plaintiff whose required corrections officer license is suspended cannot establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim for actions taken during the suspension because he is not qualified for the position.

Reid v. Aransas County · filed 2011-04-06(a)(1)

Plaintiffs lack of a license precludes him from making a discrimination claim during the pendency of that suspension.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge can plead qualification by alleging the basic skills needed for the job.

Ramirez v. Hempstead Union Free School District Board of Education · filed 2014-07-16(a)(1)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs favor, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he possessed the basic skills necessary to perform his job as the Director of Technology and Chief Information Officer and therefore was qualified for his position.

A plaintiff using the indirect method to prove race or national origin discrimination must show that the employee met the employer’s legitimate job expectations.

Nehan v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. · filed 2014-07-23(a)(1)

Tootsie Roll’s rules state that far fewer citations can be grounds for discharge, so it is plain that these myriad violations suffice to establish that he was not meeting Tootsie Roll’s legitimate expectations concerning its employees’ conduct — and Nehan offers no affirmative argument that he was meeting Tootsie Roll’s expectations despite his disciplinary record.

In a Title VII promotion claim, a jury may find an applicant qualified when the evidence supports a reasonable reading of an employer’s ambiguous experience requirement.

Pace v. Livingston Parish School Board · filed 2014-08-15(a)

In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience, and found she did.

An employee using the indirect method to prove race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate employment expectations.

Preddie v. Bartholomew County Consolidated School Corp. · filed 2014-08-27(a)(1)

A requirement of showing a prima facie case of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981 is evidence that the plaintiff was meeting the employer’s legitimate employment expectations. As previously discussed, the undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Preddie was not meeting BCSC’s legitimate employment expectations for the relevant time period, based upon his negative reviews at CSA-Fodrea for both semesters of the 2010-2011 school year, and his acknowledgement that he had problems with classroom management.

A plaintiff pursuing a race discrimination claim under the indirect method must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations when the adverse employment action occurred.

Anderson v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court · filed 2014-09-03(a)(1)

The relevant question is not whether Anderson had met JPD’s legitimate expectations in the past, but whether in light of her unexcused absences in late July and most of August, Anderson was meeting JPD’s legitimate expectations when JPD terminated her in late August. In light of her unauthorized and lengthy absence, no reasonable jury could conclude that she was.