42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the claimant is not qualified for the position on which the claim is based.

Keslosky v. Borough of Old Forge · filed 2014-12-11(a)

Each of Plaintiffs claims under the PHRA and Title VII fail due to Keslosky’s lack of qualification for the position upon which he bases his claim, specifically, a police officer in the Old Forge Borough.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff must show that she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case.

Jenkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. · filed 2019-02-26(a)(1)

Thus, there is no genuine issue regarding whether Jenkins’ numerous performance issues made her unqualified for the promotional transfer to the Administrative Assistant Associate or any other position. Consequently, Jenkins fails to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff need only show the necessary qualifications for the job; performance may bear on whether the plaintiff has the required skills.

Singh v. Knuckles, Komosinski & Manfro, LLP · filed 2020-11-16(a)

Upon analyzing the case law, it is clear that Plaintiff need only demonstrate she possess the necessary qualifications for the position. However, Plaintiff’s performance can be a factor in determining whether she is qualified for the position because performance reveals whether she has the requisite skills.

For a race discrimination claim, an employer’s discretionary review of a prior conviction does not necessarily make an applicant unqualified at the prima facie stage.

Rembert v. Swagelok Company · filed 2022-05-27(a)

Because Defendant individually reviews every background report and makes discretionary employment decisions based on its review, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s conviction renders him unqualified as a matter of law.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff must show satisfactory job performance up to the time of termination; evidence of satisfactory performance in the past alone is insufficient.

Iwebo v. Sheppard Pratt Health System, Inc. · filed 2022-08-24(a)

While plaintiff provides some evidence of satisfactory performance in the past (ECF No. 73-1 at 1, 74-2), plaintiff provides no evidence that her job performance remained satisfactory until her termination.

A plaintiff using the Title VII prima facie framework must show that her job performance met her employer’s legitimate expectations when the adverse employment action occurred.

Johnson v. Garland · filed 2022-08-30(a)

The “satisfactory job performance” prong requires that plaintiff show “she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action.”

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination must show she was qualified for the job; an employer may set physical fitness requirements, and failing them defeats that element of the claim.

Crivelli v. Emer · filed 2023-04-07(a)(1)

Because she failed MCESD7’s physical fitness assessment, Crivelli was not qualified for the position at issue. ... MCESD7 was free to establish new physical assessment standards and require its employees meet those standards.

A Title VII race discrimination claim requires plausible allegations that the plaintiff was qualified for the position at issue.

Ivey v. County of Albany · filed 2023-07-18

Because Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded that he was eligible for the position at issue, Plaintiff has failed to make a successful Title VII discrimination claim against Defendant.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff cannot establish that he was qualified for a position if he cannot maintain access authorization required for the job.

Chambliss v. Entergy Corporation · filed 2023-10-27(a)(1)

His inability to establish fitness for duty and obtain UAA renders him unqualified for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege that she was qualified for her position; an employee who did not meet an applicable vaccination requirement was unqualified.

Bandalos v. Stony Brook University Medical Center · filed 2025-08-18(a)(1)

The plaintiff did not get the vaccine, and the defendant denied her request for an exemption. Accordingly, she did not meet the requirements for her position and was not qualified for her position at the time of her suspension in October 2021.

Section 2000e-2(n) provides affected third parties an opportunity to make their views known at a fairness hearing.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2010-01-21(n)(2)(C)

The provision cited by the Federal Government relating to the Fairness Hearing, however, is designed to provide an opportunity to affected third parties — rather than claimants — to make their views known. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n); see also § 2000e-2(n)(2)(C).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits claims of discrimination based on the combination of race and sex, including claims by African-American men.

Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development · filed 2010-02-25(a)(1)

African-American men, like African-American women, may bring intersectional claims.

Section 2000e-2 does not require employers to maintain internal procedures for receiving sexual harassment complaints or prescribe how those procedures must work.

Entrekin v. City of Panama City FL · filed 2010-04-29

Title VII sets forth a list of unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a). Title VII does not, however, establish requirements for an employer’s internal procedures for receiving sexual harassment complaints, or even require that employers must have an internal procedure for receiving such complaints.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious harassment claim against a religious employer when the alleged harassment is separate from an employment decision.

Kennedy v. Villa St. Catherine's, Inc. · filed 2010-04-30(a)(1)

To be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), discrimination need not be “economic” or “tangible.” ... Although the underlying merits of Plaintiffs harassment claim are not raised in this motion, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a religious institution may be liable for religious harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment.

Dediol v. Best Chevrolet · filed 2010-07-20(a)(1)

Title VII is violated “when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” ... Under the totality of circumstances, Dediol fails to provide sufficient evidence that he suffered any actionable religious harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious hostile work environment claim when unwelcome harassment based on religion affects employment and the employer knew or should have known of it but failed to take prompt remedial action.

Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 2011-09-12(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of harassment based on religion, a plaintiff must produce evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on religion; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. ... Dediol has pointed to certain instances of acrimony based on religion that, based on our standard of review, support our conclusion that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue is reversible error.

Religious harassment requires conduct sufficient to make the work environment objectively hostile or abusive.

Bloomfield v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2013-11-27

A jury could not reasonably conclude Osting’s conduct was sufficiently severe to- create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.

Religious harassment under Title VII must occur because of the employee’s religion; a factual dispute about the harassment’s religious character or purpose can preclude summary judgment.

Parker v. Side By Side, Inc. · filed 2014-06-27(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as the Court must at the summary judgment stage, a genuine issue exists regarding whether the harassment Plaintiff suffered had a religious character or purpose.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment based on religion for a quid pro quo religious harassment claim; a neutral vaccine mandate that forces employees to choose between their beliefs and continued employment does not alone establish one.

VAN GORP v. LILLY USA, LLC · filed 2023-08-24(a)(1)

Allegations that, absent an accommodation, a neutral mandate forced Plaintiffs to choose between their deeply held beliefs and their continued employment does not amount to quid pro quo harassment.

Religion need only be a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice; evidence that harassment centered on an employee’s religious hijab can create a factual dispute on that issue.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chipotle Services, LLC · filed 2024-12-03(m)

To maintain a claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must show that defendant discriminated against Saifan based on religion, which need only be a “motivating factor” in the unlawful employment practice. See Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1251; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs have easily demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact whether Garcia’s harassment was based on Saifan’s religion.

Each use of a hiring practice that causes disparate impact must be justified as job related and consistent with business necessity.

Lewis v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILL. · filed 2011-05-13(k)(1)(A)(i)

But the conclusion does not follow, because under the Supreme Court’s analysis the question is not whether a list, test, or criterion is lawful, but whether each use to which it is put was justified under the criteria in §2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i).

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) permits a disparate impact claim when an employer uses a practice that causes a prohibited disparate impact, even if the employer adopted the practice earlier.

Lewis v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-05-24(k)(1)(A)(i)

By enacting §2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i), Con gress allowed claims to be brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes disparate impact, what ever the employer’s motives and whether or not he has employed the same practice in the past.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits assigning employees by race to accommodate patients’ racial preferences.

Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center · filed 2010-07-20(a)(1)

Just as the law toler- ates same-sex restrooms or same-sex dressing rooms, but not white-only rooms, to accommodate privacy needs, Title VII allows an employer to respect a preference for same-sex heath providers, but not same-race providers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based shift changes that deny an employee the privileges of seniority.

Threat v. City of Cleveland, Ohio · filed 2021-07-26(a)(1)

When an employee’s race is a basis for a shift change that denies the privileges of that employee’s seniority, the employer has discriminated on the basis of race in the terms and privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a bilingual hiring preference solely because an applicant does not speak Spanish; a language requirement can violate the section if discrimination is its purpose or result.

Chhim v. Spring Branch Independent School District · filed 2010-09-22(a)(1)

A person’s language is not a listed category. We once noted that language requirements could be used as “a covert basis for national origin discrimination,” but also required evidence that discrimination was the purpose or result. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1980). Spring Branch’s preference for bilingual employees did not discriminate on the basis of race or national origin.

An employer may be liable for sex discrimination when a subordinate with discriminatory animus intended to influence the decisionmaker and proximately caused an adverse employment action.

Vicino v. Maryland · filed 2013-11-08(a)(1)

In view of the Fourth Circuit’s application of Staub to Title VII cases in Young, this Court finds that a complaining party may demonstrate that discrimination motivated an adverse employment action if (1) the individual with the discriminatory animus “possessed such authority as to be viewed as the one principally responsible for the [adverse employment] decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer,” under Hill; or (2) the subordinate with discriminatory animus intended to influence the person with decisionmaking authority and was a proximate cause of the ultimate adverse employment action, under Staub.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a jury to find discriminatory termination when a biased supervisor decisively influences the decision, even if the formal decisionmaker lacks racial bias.

Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park District · filed 2011-02-08(a)(1)

Because a reasonable jury could have found that Adams’s influence over the termination decision was singular, we must reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when evidence supports an inference that a biased supervisor caused the employee’s termination.

King v. Volunteers of America, North Alabama, Inc. · filed 2012-12-19(a)(1)

We believe the evidence that Tucker was Stephenson’s cat’s paw is sufficient under Staub to survive summary judgment.

A supervisor’s racial bias can support liability for a discharge if the supervisor influences the final decision, even when an unbiased official reviews it.

Coats v. Duncan · filed 2017-02-08(a)(1)

Because a “reasonable jury could find” that Canellos’s “decision was swayed by [Juengst’s] subjective judgments,” id., the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Canellos’s review renders Juengst’s motivation immaterial.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a detention facility to restrict an officer’s presence while an opposite-sex inmate showers to protect the inmate’s privacy and dignity.

Gethers v. Harrison · filed 2014-06-12(a)(1)

In employment of this type, a policy prohibiting women from being in the shower area while a male prisoner showers is simply not discriminatory. The nature of the employment requires some gender-specific policies designed to protect the privacy and dignity of the inmates.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not protect marital status as a class.

Kvech v. Holder · filed 2011-09-19(a)

The FBI correctly argues that “marital status” is not a class protected by federal anti- discriminations laws.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect against discrimination based on marital status.

Gaub v. Professional Hospital Supply, Inc. · filed 2012-01-10(a)(1)

Nowhere, however, does he claim, or even suggest, that this was because of his sex. Rather he claims that his workplace was hostile because his supervisor had sex with his wife. Title VII does not protect from discrimination on account of one’s marital status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a claim based on marital status or a spouse’s protected status.

Ninying v. NYC Fire Dep't · filed 2020-04-17(a)(1)

Moreover, Title VII does not provide a cause of action based on marital status or the protected status of one’s spouse.

Section 2000e-2 does not list marital status as a protected class, though a marital status rule may constitute sex discrimination if it disproportionately affects one sex.

Hill v. Human Rights Commission · filed 1990-01-16

While marital status is not specified as a protected class under Title VII, ... discrimination based ostensibly upon marital status, usually through anti-nepotism or head-of-household rules, may be cognizable as sex discrimination where there is a disparate impact upon one sex.

Section 2000e-2(n) bars a nonparty who received notice and a reasonable opportunity to object from later challenging a court-ordered Title VII remedy.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2012-10-26(n)

The process undertaken by the parties and the court is sufficient to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)’s requirements for notice and a reasonable opportunity to object. Therefore, the Final Relief Order may not be challenged by any nonparty who received the notice discussed above.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make cancellation of a vacancy announcement discriminatory by itself; the employer’s motivation determines whether it violates Title VII.

Mulrain v. Donovan · filed 2012-10-29(a)(1)

However, the mere fact of cancelling a Vacancy Announcement does not give rise to an inference of discrimination; it is “[t]he motivation behind the vacancy cancellation [that] determines whether the [employer’s] action violates Title VII.”

Section 2000e-2(n) does not bar a challenge to a hiring test used independently of a discrimination judgment merely because the judgment requires applicants to take the test.

Godfrey v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-09-25(n)(1)(A)

The PAT does not “implement” the Lewis injunction. It is a required element of the City’s hiring process for firefighters that exists independent of the remedial plan created by the injunction.

Section 2000e-2(d) can reach an employer’s agent that provides mandatory job training delegated by the employer.

Pathan v. Connecticut · filed 2014-05-15(d)

Given that DEP, Plaintiffs employer, had outsourced Plaintiffs officer training to POST as required by Connecticut law, it is entirely consistent both with the Second Circuit’s decision in Gulino and with the language of Title VII to consider POST a liable party under Title VII for purposes of this action.

A prior claim of total disability is evaluated under the Cleveland framework when deciding judicial estoppel in a Title VII discrimination action.

Robinson v. Concentra Health Services, Inc. · filed 2015-03-24(a)(1)

We agree with the district court that Cleveland provides the proper framework for evaluating whether judicial estoppel bars Robinson’s Title VII and Section 1981 claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Tarpley v. City Colleges · filed 2015-04-10(a)(1)

But Title VII only covers unlawful employment practices and retaliation on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Disability does not fall under any of these categories but instead is protected by its own separate statute, the ADA, under which Tarpley also seeks recovery.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit discrimination based on disability, including an accent that reflects disability rather than race or national origin.

White v. Relay Resource · filed 2019-10-31

Yet, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on a person’s disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. And in this case, Plaintiff’s “deaf accent” serves as a proxy for (or is a part of) her disability—not her race or national origin. As a result, Count V fails to state a claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover disability discrimination.

Bryant v. Wilkie · filed 2020-01-22(a)

Title VII does not cover disability discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit disability discrimination.

Taylor v. Wolf · filed 2020-10-05(a)(1)

Disability discrimination, which is the focal point of Mr. Taylor’s amended complaint, is not protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make disability discrimination actionable under Title VII.

Smith v. McDonough · filed 2021-11-15(a)(1)

Disability is not a basis for suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Salas v. University of Utah Health Center · filed 2022-01-19

Title VII does not support claims for disability discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover employment claims based on an employee’s disability.

Lyansky v. Coastal Carolina University · filed 2022-08-01(a)(1)

Second, Plaintiff’s claims concern his alleged disability, and Title VII does not apply to claims of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment based on the employee’s disability. ... Thus, finding no objection to this portion of the Report or clear error, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover disability discrimination.

Schmidt v. Blue Valley Community Action · filed 2023-08-11(a)

Title VII, however, does not apply to disability-discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover disability discrimination because disability is absent from its list of protected traits.

Fowler v. Hannibal Central School · filed 2023-09-26(a)(1)

Because disability discrimination claims, as Plaintiff has alleged, are not actionable under Title VII, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover employment discrimination based on disability.

Spokoiny v. University of Washington Medical Center · filed 2024-01-05(a)(1)

Therefore, the court grants UWMC’s motion for summary judgment to the extent Ms. Spokoiny alleges disability discrimination claims under Title VII and Title IX.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit discrimination based on disability.

King v. DFW Intl Airport Board · filed 2024-09-10

King also alleged a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. But it is axiomatic that “Title VII does not proscribe discrimination on the basis of disability.” Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits hiring discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; an allegation that an employer refused to hire someone because he is deaf does not, by itself, state a claim under that provision.

Ramos v. Columbus Hydraulics Company · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1)

He alleges only that he was not hired because he is deaf. Filing No. 1 at 5. This allegation does not support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was discriminated against in violation of Title VII, nor does it provide fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for such a claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover disability discrimination or disability accommodations.

Jean v. The Department of Education of the City of New York · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

With respect to Plaintiff Comack’s failure to accommodate claim, the Court recognizes that, as an initial matter, Title VII does not cover disability discrimination, nor disability accommodations.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on disability.

Feuer · filed 2025-10-31(a)(1)

“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.” ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claims made on the basis of her medical conditions with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(d) applies to a joint labor-management committee only if it has a labor component.

Salas v. Independent Electrical Contractors Inc. · filed 2015-05-14(d)

Under Title VII, IEC is not a “joint labor-management committee” because IEC does not have a labor component.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes in appearance, behavior, or mannerisms at work.

Reed v. South Bend Nights, Inc. · filed 2015-12-22(a)(1)

The Court finds Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence in support of her allegation that she was discriminated against because she did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in terms of her appearance, behavior, or mannerisms at work.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats discrimination based on gender stereotypes as sex discrimination.

Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2016-06-20(a)

Gender stereotype discrimination is, of course, a cognizable form of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes, including stereotypes about a woman’s appearance.

Ellingsworth v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2017-03-23(a)(1)

The above allegations are the precise sort of “gender stereotyping” that is prohibited by Title VII and Price Waterhouse. Ms. Ellingsworth alleges she was harassed because of her masculine—according to Ms. Ferrier—tattoo, how she dressed, how she looked, and how she presented herself as a woman. Such conduct is clearly proscribed by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on gender stereotypes, including firing a man because he is perceived as insufficiently masculine.

Creese v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-11-20

Considering all the facts alleged, the Court finds that the Complaint makes out a plausible case that Mr. Creese’s termination was motivated by discrimination based on sexual stereotyping.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats discrimination for failure to conform to gender stereotypes as discrimination on the basis of sex.

Kelly v. AES Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2020-06-11(a)(1)

Also as discussed above, Kelly’s claim that she was discriminated for failure to conform to gender stereotypes is a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-discrimination claim based on harassment for failing to conform to male gender stereotypes.

Ianetta v. Putnam Investments, Inc. · filed 2001-02-20(a)(1)

Ianetta claims that he was discriminated against for failing to meet the male gender stereotype. The First Circuit’s language in Higgins, uncontradicted by Hamner, recognizes .that such an allegation states a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.

Gender stereotyping can support a sex discrimination claim when it plausibly motivates an adverse employment action.

Alessa v. Phelan · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

The Court can reasonably infer from Alessa’s allegations that Boone pushed for her termination because she did not conform with his gender stereotypes—a form of unlawful gender discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not apply when an employment complaint alleges no discrimination based on a protected class.

MISSOURI v. FITZGERALD · filed 2020-02-06(a)

Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 12112). Nothing in Mr. Missouri’s Complaint suggests that he was discriminated against as a result of his membership in a protected class, so these laws are not implicated in this case.

A claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the complaint does not allege membership in a protected class.

Pena v. Lewis · filed 2020-02-12(a)(1)

Here, Peña’s complaint fails at the first step because he never states that he is a member of a protected class. ... Without this first element, there can be no discrimination claim. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover an employment discrimination claim based solely on filing a workers’ compensation claim without alleging membership in a protected class.

Bennett v. Project Renewal, Inc. · filed 2015-12-30(a)

These facts do not, however, resolve the defect identified by the district court: Bennett’s claims of discrimination and retaliation based on her filing of a workers’ compensation claim do not allege membership in any class or engagement in any activity protected by Title VII or the ADA.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits union discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; disability is not a protected class under Title VII.

Garity v. Apwu National Labor Org. · filed 2016-07-05(c)

Garity’s amended complaint pleads her disability discrimination claims as Title VII violations, but disability is not a protected class under that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (prohibiting discrimination by unions based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, including Hispanic and Mexican-American identity and dark skin.

Escalera v. Bard Med. · filed 2019-03-14(a)(1)

First, despite Bard Medical's argument to the contrary, Escalera is a member of a protected class, being Hispanic, Mexican-American, and dark-skinned.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit age discrimination.

Iazzetti v. Town of Tuxedo · filed 2020-07-27(a)

Age is not included as a protected class under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age, medical conditions, or physical disabilities.

Simmons v. Modly · filed 2020-08-18(a)(1)

Medical conditions, physical disabilities, and age are not protected under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Murphree v. Potter · filed 2002-03-18(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment decisions on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not protect convicted-felon status as a basis for an employment discrimination claim.

Tate v. Spartanburg Regional Healthcare System · filed 2021-01-29(a)

Because “status as a convicted felon is not a protected class under Title VII,” Plaintiff’s claim must fail.

Section 2000e-2 does not protect against age discrimination.

Sternquist v. Humble Hearts LLC. · filed 2021-07-23

Sternquist cannot recover under Title VII because age is not a protected class under the statute.

Section 2000e-2 does not make disability a protected class under Title VII.

Corey v. Aldora Aluminum and Glass Products Inc. · filed 2021-09-13

However, disability is not a protected class covered by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; age and medical conditions are not protected classes under it.

Vargas-Santos v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2021-10-12(a)(1)

Unfortunately, neither age nor medical conditions are protected classes for Title VII purposes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to make out a Title VII claim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit discrimination based on disability.

Lewis-Davis v. Baltimore County Public Schools Infants & Toddlers Program · filed 2021-10-13(a)(1)

Disability is not a protected class under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (listing protected classes as “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”), so I will focus on the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claimant must allege membership in a protected class.

Nelson v. Intuit · filed 2021-12-08(a)(1)

Plaintiff fails to allege that he is a member of a protected class as contemplated by Title VII. It is unclear whether Plaintiff can or will allege a claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Moreover, Plaintiff does not indicate if or how any similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. Therefore, Count One is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Stubbe v. Wilkie · filed 2022-03-09

Stubbe’s Title VII claim fails because he has not alleged any discriminatory act based upon his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat rural residence, marriage, or parenthood alone as protected classes.

Catala-Torres v. Lifelink Foundation, Inc. · filed 2022-05-23(a)(1)

However, being from a rural community, alongside being married or a mother to a minor child, is not a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover generic workplace harassment without alleged discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Gaines v. Stenson · filed 2022-06-14(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege any harassment predicated on any animus relating to a class protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover unfair treatment unrelated to those traits.

Tracy v. Vail Resorts · filed 2022-11-01(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on five protected classes—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Khalik, 671 F.3d ... at 1192. It does not prohibit other forms of unfair or discriminatory conduct.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover employment discrimination based only on disability or perceived disability.

KITTRELL v. INDIANA WOMEN'S PRISON · filed 2022-11-21

While Title VII claims, unlike ADA claims, are excepted from the State's sovereign immunity, Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 303 F.3d 817, 831 (7th Cir. 2002), Title VII prohibits only discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination claim to allege facts connecting an adverse employment action to membership in a protected class.

HENDERSON v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY "PHA" · filed 2023-01-05(a)

Here, the Amended Complaint fails to state a discrimination claim under both Title VII and the PHRA because Plaintiff does not meet the first element—that she is a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age or disability.

McCutcheon v. United States of America Department of Interior, National Parks Service · filed 2023-03-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff raises no allegations concerning discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; disability alone does not establish membership in a protected group under Title VII.

Brockington v. The School Board of Miami Dade County · filed 2023-07-19(a)(1)

Disability-based discrimination does not fall under this class.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment discrimination claim to be based on a trait protected by Title VII.

HERRING v. OCEAN COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 2023-09-25(a)

First, Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain any allegations that the Individual Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on one of the traits enumerated in Title VII: she has thus failed to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; alleging only disability and “other” does not state a claim under it.

Urban v. Walmart · filed 2024-03-13(a)(1)

Her Complaint only indicates that she was discriminated against in the categories of “disability” and “other” and does not allege any facts that she was a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect employees from discrimination based solely on a criminal record.

Barfell v. Team Honey Badger Dominos · filed 2024-06-14(a)(1)

Even assuming Defendant did not employ Plaintiff because he had a criminal record, having a criminal record is not a protected class under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Harris v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of · filed 2024-06-14(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). The Court therefore does not consider Plaintiff’s general acts of whistleblowing about training, recordkeeping, and disciplinary decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability.

Swinton v. Exel Inc. · filed 2024-07-24(a)(1)

“But Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, not disability.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a facial tattoo is not a protected characteristic.

DODSON v. ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY COMPANY · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no allegation that he is a member of any protected class under the Civil Rights Act or NJLAD, neither of which protect against discrimination based on tattoos. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for employment discrimination under either the Civil Rights Act or NJLAD.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a plaintiff must allege membership in a protected class to state a Title VII claim.

Edgar v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2024-09-19(a)

Title VII designates race, color, religion, sex, and national origin as protected classes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege his membership in any protected class, an omission which is fatal to his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2 protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and a discrimination complaint must allege membership in a protected class.

Gilmore-Bey v. Ketty · filed 2024-09-30

Nevertheless, to adequately plead her Title VII discrimination claim, Gilmore-Bey must allege membership in a protected class. The statute does not prohibit all discrimination, but only discrimination based on certain protected classes: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit hiring discrimination based on veteran status.

Cora v. Amgen Manufacturing, Limited · filed 2025-01-23(a)(1)

However, veterans are not a protected class under Title VII and the statute leaves no room for a veteran preference.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect registered sex offender status from employment discrimination.

McPherson v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2025-02-06(a)(1)

“Registered sex offenders are not afforded protected status under Title VII.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Title VII and KCRA, and these claims must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 does not protect a person solely because of a felony conviction.

Prince v. State of Michigan · filed 2025-01-28

And, what is more, Title VII “was not designed” or “intended to protect convicted felons.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a discrimination claim must allege a protected characteristic.

Cotton v. Heritage Square Health Care · filed 2025-02-05(a)

The plaintiff has not alleged the first element of the prima facie case under any of the three statutes because she has not alleged that she is a member of a protected class. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat prior EEO activity or disability as a protected class for discrimination claims.

Bruce v. Becerra · filed 2025-05-13(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on an “individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). ... Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership of a protected class. ... Plaintiff’s EEO activity is not a protected class under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on economic background.

(PS) Habibi v. Orange County, Social Services Agency · filed 2025-06-04(a)(1)

Even if the court were to construe this allegation as claiming discrimination based on her economic status, economic background is not a protected category under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff to plead membership in a protected class to state an employment discrimination claim.

Taylor · filed 2025-12-04(a)

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 that she is a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against specified forms of employment discrimination without requiring membership in a disfavored group.

Hickles · filed 2026-01-28(a)

Title VII does not limit its protections to disfavored groups or classes of people.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint about salary inequity that identifies no protected category does not oppose conduct prohibited by the section.

Flores · filed 2026-01-21

Protected activity, as defined under Title VII, must oppose conduct that is violative of Title VII—namely, employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... The email in question does not mention race, national origin, or gender, nor does it mention another protected category. ... The Court holds that the email is therefore not a protected activity.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination or hostile work environment claim to allege treatment based on a Title VII-protected characteristic.

PELENAH · filed 2026-01-27(a)

Pelenah’s failure to plead that he is a member of any protected class in his Second Amended Complaint is fatal to his Title VII claim alleging discrimination that resulted in his termination and his hostile workplace claim.

Section 2000e-2(l) prohibits different cutoff scores for employment tests based on sex.

Bauer v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-11(l)

That proscription against sex discrimination also extends to the use of “different cutoff scores for . . . employment related tests.” Id. § 2000e-2(l).

Section 2000e-2(l) prohibits using different cutoff scores on employment tests based on race or sex, including separate eligibility lists that let some applicants qualify with lower scores.

Alexander v. Bahou · filed 2021-01-12(l)

It can hardly be disputed that the separate eligibility lists use different cutoff scores, and therefore violate the 1991 amendment, because their purpose is to ensure that an African American or female candidate who would not otherwise have scored within the top three eligible applicants for a position would still be hirable.

A Title VII disparate pay claim may proceed when evidence would allow a reasonable juror to find that the employer’s stated reason for the pay difference was unworthy of belief or that discrimination more likely motivated it.

Woodard v. Medseek, Inc. · filed 2016-04-08(a)(1)

The defendant’s articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the pay differential shifts the burden to plaintiff to show that the reason either is not worthy of belief, or that, in the light of all the evidence, a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the decision than the proffered reason. ... Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII disparate pay claim also is due to be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make a wage difference unlawful merely because an employee believes seniority should outweigh the employer’s education and experience criteria.

Woods v. FacilitySource, LLC · filed 2016-02-03(a)(1)

However, Woods’s belief that seniority should have been given equal or greater weight than educational and experiential accomplishments does not mean that the defendants were guilty of wage discrimination simply because they viewed other criteria as more germane to their salary-determination decision.

An employer that proves an Equal Pay Act affirmative defense to a wage differential can defeat a Title VII wage discrimination claim based on that differential.

Perkins v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc. · filed 2016-06-06(a)(1)

Because Defendant has established an affirmative defense to the EPA claim, it is also entitled to summary judgment as to any claim for wage discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based pay discrimination; unfair pay alone does not establish a violation without evidence of racial discrimination.

Robertson v. Interactive College of Technology/Interactive Learning System, Inc. · filed 2018-07-16(a)(1)

And while it may have been unfair that Robertson had more management responsibilities than Spyers, yet was paid less for a period of time, unfair treatment, absent racial discrimination, is not an unlawful employment ... practice under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses into Title VII wage discrimination claims.

Black v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. · filed 2019-05-23(h)

Through legislation known as the “Bennett Amendment,” Congress expressly incorporated the four affirmative EPA defenses into Title VII wage-based claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race-based wage-discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to show a higher-paid employee outside the protected class worked in nearly identical circumstances, and to show pretext if the employer gives a legitimate reason for the difference.

Bradford v. Jackson Parish Police Jury · filed 2019-10-23(a)

Further, even assuming arguendo that Bradford established a minimal prima facie case, the Hospital has met its burden of production to show legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity in Cripps’ and Bradford’s salaries. Bradford has not responded with any evidence at all to show that these reasons were pretext for race discrimination. Accordingly, the Hospital’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her race-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII and the LEDL is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires more than a bare allegation that a worker earned less than men and workers of another race to state a wage discrimination claim.

Moore v. Target Logistics Management · filed 2019-10-29(a)

Absent more, such a conclusory allegation does not constitute the basis for cognizable wage discrimination claim under either the EPA or Title VII.

A Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence requires the employee to show that the employer’s stated reason for a pay difference was pretextual.

Reddy v. Department of Education, The State of Alabama · filed 2020-04-02(a)(1)

Finally, where the employer meets its burden, “the plaintiff must then ... prove that the legitimate reason offered was a mere pretext for an illegal motive.” ... For the same reasons, the district court also did not err in granting DOE’s motion ... for summary judgment as to Reddy’s and Sellman’s Title VII pay discrimination appointment claim.

An employer that proves an Equal Pay Act defense for a wage disparity is also entitled to judgment on a Title VII wage-discrimination claim based on that disparity.

Nazinitsky v. Integris Baptist Medical Center Inc · filed 2020-04-23(a)(1)

Here, Integris has proved one of the EPA affirmative defenses—that the wage disparity was based on a factor other than sex. Accordingly, Integris is entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Nazinitsky’s Title VII wage-discrimination claim.

A Title VII pay discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case.

DRUMMER v. HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-04-21(a)(1)

Therefore, because on the basis of the unchallenged evidence Drummer cannot make out a prima facie case, summary judgment will be granted on the Title VII and § 1981 claims.

A Title VII wage discrimination claim based on a comparator requires evidence that the plaintiff’s job was similar to the higher-paid comparator’s job.

Lee v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc. · filed 2020-07-06(a)(1)

With respect to Title VII, which asks whether a plaintiff’s job is “similar” to the job held by her comparator, Belvac produced overwhelming and unrebutted evidence as to the complete dissimilarity between Lee’s Controller position and DiTomasso’s.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits wage discrimination based on sex, and a claim requires admissible evidence that the wage difference was based on sex.

Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of America · filed 1995-11-22(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits wage rate discrimination based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Standing alone, the Bishop’s statement that “Mr. Fukuma’s feelings would be hurt,” does not indicate wage discrimination on the basis of plaintiffs gender. Thus, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of submitting admissible evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this claim.

A Title VII wage discrimination plaintiff must show that her job was similar to higher-paid jobs held by employees of another gender; this standard is less stringent than the Equal Pay Act’s substantial equality standard.

Clark v. Vivint Solar · filed 2020-11-23(a)(1)

However, as Defendant concedes, job similarity requirements under Title VII are less stringent than under the Equal Pay Act. See ECF No. 91 at 36. Thus, the court’s Equal Pay Act conclusion concerning the substantial equality between Strong’s and Allred’s positions and Clark’s positions also applies to the analysis for Plaintiff’s Title VII wage discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court denies summary judgment on these claims.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sex-based wage discrimination claim to allege facts supporting a comparison between the plaintiff’s work and that of better-paid employees outside her protected class.

Boudreau v. Nokia of America Corporation · filed 2020-12-18(a)(1)

Here, Boudreau’s very general allegations provide no basis to compare the skill, effort, and responsibility demanded by her position and the positions of the males listed in the Third Amended Complaint or that their circumstances were nearly identical.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-based wage discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that men doing similar work received higher pay.

Wiler v. Kent State University · filed 2021-03-03(a)(1)

For now, Plaintiff alleges facts consistent with the Rule 8 standard that male comparator coaches exist and do similar work, yet were paid more than her. ... Because at this stage, the analysis under Title VII tracks that under the Equal Pay Act, the Court also denies Defendant’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII to the extent it alleges wage discrimination.

Under Title VII, an employer’s supported explanation for a wage disparity shifts the burden to the employee to show pretext; evidence that could rebut that explanation can defeat summary judgment.

Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati · filed 2021-08-26(a)(1)

Although UC has not met its burden under the EPA of proving that the wage disparity was based on a factor other than sex, it has satisfied its lower Title VII burden of articulating a legitimate business explanation for the disparity, supported by some evidence. The burden accordingly shifts to Briggs to demonstrate that the reason is pretextual. ... The record here contains evidence that defeats UC’s motion on the Title VII claim; the grant of summary judgment must be reversed.

A Title VII wage discrimination claim based on a comparator requires evidence that the better-paid employee was similarly situated to the plaintiff.

Noonan v. Consolidated Shoe Company, Inc. · filed 2021-11-18(a)(1)

Noonan has failed to make out a prima facie case under either the EPA or Title VII. Specifically, she has failed to identify a better-paid male comparator who performed equal work (EPA) or who was similarly situated (Title VII) to her.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie Title VII wage discrimination case by showing lower pay than a similarly situated employee of a different sex; differences in sports revenue and conference participation do not necessarily defeat comparability.

Wiler v. Kent State University · filed 2022-10-28(a)(1)

In any event, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Coach Marinaro is not similarly situated to Coach Wiler based on the differences to which Defendant points, though a jury might find for Plaintiff or Defendant on that question.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in compensation; when a Title VII unequal pay claim rests on the same facts as an Equal Pay Act claim, failure of the Equal Pay Act claim defeats the Title VII claim.

Goley v. Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC · filed 2024-06-18

“[W]hen an Equal Pay Act claim and a Title VII claim arise out of the same set of underlying facts, both stating a charge of wage discrimination, the standards of liability under the two statutes are sufficiently similar that the disposition with respect to the two claims should be the same.” ... Having determined that Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act, they have failed to establish a violation of Title VII.

A sex-based wage discrimination claim requires a higher-paid comparator who is similarly situated in all material respects.

Pruitt v. Universal Protection Service, LLC · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

Nevertheless, even under a relaxed standard, we have held that employees held up by plaintiffs as comparators for purposes of establishing a prima facie case under Title VII must be “similarly situated in all material respects” to the plaintiff.

A Title VII wage discrimination claim based on comparators requires evidence that the plaintiff was paid less than employees in similar jobs.

Burnett v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP · filed 2024-12-09(a)(1)

If a Title VII prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than the comparator in a “similar” job under Title VII, rather than an “equal” job under the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a discrimination claim based on denied training when the denial plausibly blocks advancement or improvement in employment status.

Williams v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc. · filed 2020-02-18(a)(2)

Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action for failure to train as set forth above, it is not necessary for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she was constructively discharged as her “adverse employment action”.

A claim of race discrimination based on denial of training must plausibly allege that the employee was eligible for the training and was denied it under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Glenn v. Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore Inc. · filed 2024-02-26(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to satisfy the elements of discriminatory denial of training on the basis of race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race discrimination in promotions and other terms and conditions of employment after hiring.

James L. HARDING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-04-29(a)(1)

Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to, inter alia, "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Yet the district court viewed Harding as claiming that "all of a sudden they developed a racial animus against him and discharged him for reasons of discrimination after he worked there 10 years" (Tr. 4), and it expressed the view that "[o]rdinarily ... if someone is going to be discriminated against, that discrimination usually takes place at the point of hire or prior to the point of hire" (id. at 18). Since these views neither accurately characterize Harding's claim nor accurately reflect Title VII analysis, the court's effort to weigh Harding's right to due process against the court's concern for calendar congestion was flawed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying an employee a benefit of employment because of race.

Eady v. Big G Express · filed 2021-06-28(a)(1)

Eady has plausibly alleged that this benefit is afforded based upon an employee’s race and, if true, this would violate Title VII. Accordingly, Eady’s Title VII racial discrimination claim will not be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats opportunities for promotion and additional pay as terms or conditions of employment.

David v. City of Richmond Police Department · filed 2022-05-13(a)(1)

An employee’s opportunities for promotion and additional pay qualify as terms or conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim based on denied credit hours when those hours plausibly affect compensation or vacation time.

Bell v. Carson · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

While Bell offers no further details as to the significance of credit hours, it is logical, and thus plausible, that they could be tied to her compensation or vacation time. Because those benefits are among the terms and conditions of employment, this claim may proceed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Jones v. Sansom · filed 2023-01-27(a)(1)

Title VII and CFEPA prohibit an employer from discriminating in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory restrictions on telework and changes to a flexible schedule because they alter the terms or conditions of employment.

Moore-Davis v. U.S. Department of the Navy · filed 2023-09-26(a)(1)

Moore-Davis alleges that the Navy “delay[ed] and deni[ed]” her telework, “requir[ed] telework formalities in excess of those required by law,” and “cancelled her [flexible] schedule.” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 165. All these actions affected where and when Moore-Davis worked and so, as a matter of ordinary English, altered the “terms” and “conditions” of her “employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination affecting compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, which may include removal of paid coaching duties.

Julien v. St. John the Baptist Parish School System · filed 2023-12-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, this Court cannot state at this stage of the litigation that relieving Plaintiff of his duties as a coach did not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover race-based security scrutiny that plausibly affects an employee’s terms or conditions of employment without a separate showing of tangible harm.

Doe v. Department of Defense · filed 2024-02-29(a)(1)

On the other hand, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s allegations that she was made to attend several security meetings and forced to sign a sworn statement could satisfy Chambers, even though the contours of the law remain unsettled. In the context of Plaintiff’s sensitive role in the intelligence community, this unwarranted scrutiny based on her race and national origin very well could implicate the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some injury to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment for a sex discrimination claim, but does not require a significant or material injury.

Lowry v. Hwaseung Automotive USA, LLC · filed 2024-09-13(a)(1)

But the Plaintiff’s claim that she was disciplined for the same actions her male counterparts engaged in without repercussion sufficiently alleges discrimination based on sex which, in some capacity, altered the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from changing an employee’s terms or conditions of employment because of sex.

O'Sullivan v. Strategus RG, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(a)

Third, as Defendants well know, they did not have an unrestricted right to change the terms and conditions of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination in employment terms and privileges, including time reporting requirements and break times.

Campbell v. Michael Buongiorne Construction Ink · filed 2025-06-27(a)(1)

Construed liberally, Campbell’s complaint alleges discrimination with respect to the terms (time reporting requirements) and privileges (break times) of his employment.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII employment claim.

ANSAGH v. UPMC MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2025-08-08

An employment relationship must be established to proceed with each of the various employment claims proffered by plaintiff. Title VII prohibits an “unlawful employment practice” by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Given this backdrop, plaintiff has not shown that defendants were her employer for the purposes of establishing the threshold requirement of an employment relationship in the preceding employment-based claims and as such those claims also will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 requires a connection to employment for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Mason v. University of Alaska - Anchorage · filed 2025-03-24

In order to bring a claim under Title VII, there must be some connection to employment. Mason has not and cannot assert that her allegations have any connection to employment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a defendant to be the plaintiff’s employer; common ownership alone does not make two companies an integrated enterprise.

Ray v. Core Carrier Corporation · filed 2021-03-30

Given the balance of all four factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Sharkey qualifies as her employer under the “integrated enterprise” test for the purposes of her Title VII and KAAD claims.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination and requires an employer-employee relationship with a defendant.

Talley v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed 2019-10-23

Considering Title VII is designed to prohibit discrimination by an employer and plaintiff has failed to indicate an employer-employee relationship with any defendant, we shall adopt Judge Mehalchick’s R&R, and the plaintiff’s Title VII claims shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for a Title VII discrimination claim; revoking a professional license does not itself make a licensing agency the licensee’s employer.

Uppal v. NYS Department of Health · filed 2019-09-27(a)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that NYSDOH employed her; only that it terminated her license in a discriminatory manner.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment-related discrimination, so a Title VII claim requires an employment relationship.

Mottram v Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2016-03-08(a)(1)

Title VII thus prohibits only employment-related discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant for a Title VII claim.

David v. Neumann University · filed 2016-04-11(a)

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII claim against all Defendants because she has not alleged an employment' relationship with any Defendant.

Section 2000e-2 requires a Title VII claimant to allege an employment relationship with a defendant.

Willliams v. Brooks Trucking Company, Inc. of Memphis · filed 2018-11-13

Plaintiff did not allege that any Defendant employed him and his Title VII claim fails for at least that reason.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees based on protected characteristics.

Kaul v. Christie · filed 2019-02-25(a)

Title VII prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against their employees on the basis of protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination and requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.

Jones v. Southern University · filed 2019-08-16

There are absolutely no allegations that Plaintiff was the employee of any of the named Defendants, or that any Defendants were Plaintiff’s employer, and Title VII is wholly inapplicable to the facts alleged in this case.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII claimant to have an employment relationship with the defendant.

Rawls v. Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2019-09-03(a)

For a plaintiff to bring an action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the plaintiff must have an employment relationship with the defendant. See Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Title VII is available only against an employer.”). A plain reading of the statute itself makes such requirement clear. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . .” (emphasis added)).