42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 governs unlawful employment practices and requires an employment relationship or one that fairly approximates employment for a Title VII claim.

Smith v. Noahr · filed 2020-03-11

Title VII liability attaches to unlawful employment practices of employers, employment agencies, labor organizations or the joint actions of these entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim that defendant Noahr has violated Title VII in connection with her supervision of Plaintiff’s probation.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment and does not apply to allegations unrelated to employment.

Davis v. Milton Police Department · filed 2020-05-11(a)

Inter alia, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any of its employees based on race “with respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This is not an employment case, it is unclear what possible bearing Title VII could have on Plaintiff’s underlying allegations, and dismissal is well warranted.

Section 2000e-2(a) governs discriminatory employment practices; a claim fails when the plaintiff alleges no employment relationship or other covered employment practice.

Jones v. Thomas · filed 2020-08-27(a)

Plaintiff does not allege that he is or was an employee of any of the defendants. The Court therefore dismisses his claims under Title VII for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint that alleges neither employment by the defendants nor discrimination on those grounds fails to state a Title VII claim.

Briley v. Barreca · filed 2020-10-26(a)

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not state a claim under Title VII because Plaintiff does not allege that he was employed by Defendants or that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant for a discrimination claim.

Notz v. Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities · filed 2021-02-13(a)(1)

But Title VII only provides recourse to plaintiffs in the context of an employment relationship, by making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). ... Notz conceded at oral argument that defendants are not her employer, so she cannot maintain a Title VII claim against them.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts showing an employment relationship to state an employment discrimination claim.

Schroeder v. Wichita Police Department · filed 2021-02-22(a)(1)

The Complaint simply alleges nothing about plaintiff ever having entered or sought an employment relationship with any defendant.

Section 2000e-2 does not support an employment discrimination claim based on mail delivery by someone who was not employed by the USPS.

Babino v. United States Postal Service · filed 2021-03-08

It should be noted, however, that Plaintiff was not an employee of the USPS so this cannot be a case based on employment causes of action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship; administering an employee’s health insurance alone does not establish one.

Doe v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania · filed 2021-03-31(a)(1)

Doe’s Title VII, ADA, and PHRA claims against Highmark are based on his allegation that Highmark “exercised significant control over an important aspect of the employment relationship” because it administered Doe’s health benefits. (See Doc. 25 ¶¶ 19, 20, 28). Each of these statutes requires an employment relationship, so we address them together. ... We therefore reject this theory without leave to amend, as we can conceive of no facts that would allow it to go forward.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship to support a claim of employment discrimination.

Quintero II v. Merced Unified School District · filed 2021-04-12(a)

Plaintiff cannot state a claim under Title VII, Section 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff does not allege ... an “employer-employee relationship” with MUHSD.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for a Title VII discrimination claim; an independent contractor relationship does not qualify.

Evans v. Prince George's Community Television, Inc. · filed 2021-07-19(a)

Title VII circumscribes employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis on race, sex, and religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As apparent from its plain text, Title VII applies only to employment relationships.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; a prison’s security oversight of a contractor’s nurse does not by itself make the prison her employer.

PUSKAR v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY · filed 2021-08-27

The undisputed evidence does not support a conclusion that Westmoreland County could be considered an employer of Puskar.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in employment and does not cover conduct unrelated to an actual or potential employment relationship.

Phillips v. Metro Transit Agency · filed 2021-09-23(a)(1)

Here, Phillips alleges nothing even that simple; this case is not about an employment relationship, real or potential.

Section 2000e-2 provides a remedy for discrimination only in an employment relationship.

Casanova v. Cook · filed 2021-10-06

But Title VII only provides recourse to plaintiffs in the context of an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to allege discrimination connected to employment to state a claim.

Bowens v. Russell · filed 2021-10-25(a)

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was ever employed by NYTS, or that NYTS discriminated against him with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to discrimination in employment, not discrimination outside the employment context.

Beyan v. CATS · filed 2022-02-01(a)(1)

Title VII does not apply outside the employment context.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a discrimination claim against a defendant that neither employed the plaintiff nor received an application for employment from him.

Purnell III v. Wilcox & Fetzer Ltd. · filed 2022-02-25

As discussed by State Defendants, the Title VII claim does not apply since Plaintiff does not allege that he was employed by the State of Delaware or that he ever sought employment with the State.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship, including a qualifying joint-employer relationship, for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Welch v. Mazza · filed 2022-04-12(a)

Under these facts, the Court finds that DOCCS was not Plaintiff's employer for purpose of Title VII or the ADA and that there was not a joint-employer relationship.

Section 2000e-2 concerns unlawful employment practices; a claim fails when the plaintiff does not allege that any defendant employed him.

Chattin v. Malik · filed 2022-04-22

Plaintiff's Title VII claims fails as a matter of law. The statute upon which he relies concerns unlawful employment practices. There are no allegations that Plaintiff was employed by any named defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires the alleged discrimination to relate to employment; discriminatory medical treatment alone does not state a Title VII claim.

Miles v. New York-Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2022-05-16(a)

In sum, because the allegedly discriminatory conduct did not relate to Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII claim on which relief can be granted and her sole federal claim must therefore be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 requires a Title VII plaintiff to allege an employment relationship with the defendant or another basis for treating the defendant as an employer.

Kemp v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene · filed 2022-04-29

Because Plaintiff does not allege that she was employed by DCAS, she has not stated a viable an employment discrimination claim against DCAS under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the Rehab Act, and the FMLA, and her employment discrimination claims against DCAS must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an alleged employer-employee relationship to state a Title VII discrimination claim.

Washington v. City of Louisville · filed 2022-05-16(a)(1)

As Plaintiff makes no allegation of an employer-employee relationship, she fails to state a Title VII claim.

A complaint alleging gender discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead facts showing that the defendant employed the plaintiff.

Whitlock v. St. Louis County · filed 2022-08-26(a)(1)

First, while he names St. Louis County as a Defendant, see Doc. [1] at 2, Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that he was employed by St. Louis County.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Jean-Baptiste v. Montway LLC · filed 2022-10-19(a)

Plaintiff’s purported Title VII claim clearly fails as he does not have an employment relationship with Defendants.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Casanova v. Cook · filed 2023-02-06

But he has not alleged any employment relationship, which is a prerequisite for claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 regulates practices by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations; a Title VII claim requires allegations of an employment relationship.

Weaver v. New York State Unified Court System · filed 2023-03-14

Title VII regulates “employer practices,” employment agency practices”, and “labor organization practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In the absence of allegations of an employment relationship, claims under Title VII must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship; a plaintiff may establish that relationship through formal employment or the single or joint employer doctrines.

Byron v. Bronx Parent Housing Network · filed 2023-03-20(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful “for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). ... Because the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that the City is liable for the actions of BPHN under a formal employer, single employer, or joint employer theory, Count One, the Title VII claim, is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a restaurant customer’s claim when the customer alleges no employment relationship or adverse employment action.

Mays v. Los Portale's Restaurant · filed 2023-05-12(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff was a customer at Defendant’s restaurant, makes no allegations that he was ever employed or suffered an adverse employment action at Los Portales Restaurant, has failed to produce a right to sue letter, and makes no objections to the Report, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship for a Title VII claim; evidence about hiring, firing, pay, benefits, and the employer’s representations can establish a fact issue about that relationship.

Milteer v. Navarro County Texas · filed 2023-05-19

In the light of Navarro County’s representations and the other components of the hybrid test that are supported by the summary judgment evidence,8 the court holds that a reasonable jury could find that Navarro County was Milteer’s employer for purposes of his claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the TCHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics, and a claim requires an employment relationship with a defendant.

Sanders v. New York Times · filed 2023-05-30(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff fails to state a viable Title VII claim because she does not allege any type of employment relationship with any of the defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to have worked for or sought employment with the defendant.

Gardner v. Risk Management Service Company · filed 2023-06-01(a)

Title VII does not apply unless the plaintiff was either employed by the defendant or was seeking such employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship with the defendant; a discrimination claim cannot proceed against an entity that never employed the plaintiff.

Thomas v. Texas Children's Hospital · filed 2023-06-14(a)(1)

A Title VII claim “cannot be brought against a non-employer.” ... Dismissal is appropriate because Thomas and the Hospital did not have an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; formal, single, or joint employment may satisfy that requirement.

Taylor v. Bronx Parent Housing Network · filed 2023-06-14(a)(1)

Because the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege an employer-employee relationship between the City and Plaintiff under a formal, single, or joint employer theory, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against the City is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for a discriminatory employment decision when the employer controlled that decision; a factual dispute over control can preclude summary judgment.

Vincent v. Jefferson County Board of Education · filed 2023-06-22(a)(1)

Only an “employer” can be liable under Title VII for any alleged discrimination or retaliation against an employee. ... Because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether ATI had control over the decision to remove Ms. Vincent from her position at ATI, the court will not grant summary judgment on this ground.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Leftridge v. Judicial Branch · filed 2023-06-30(a)

Because Leftridge does not allege that he had an employment relationship with any of the defendants, his Title VII claim fails.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim requires an employer-employee relationship; a franchisor may qualify as an indirect employer if the economic realities of the relationship show sufficient control.

Teague v. Quad Cities Retail · filed 2023-07-10(a)(1)

The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 7-Eleven was not Plaintiff’s employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to discrimination connected to an employment relationship.

Rodriguez v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 2023-07-20(a)(1)

“[T]here must be some connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply.” Assoc. of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 580 (9th Cir. 2000).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII race discrimination claim.

Karupaiyan v. CVS Health Corporation · filed 2023-09-05(a)(1)

To be held liable under Title VII and the NYSHRL, an employer-employee relationship must have existed between the parties at the time of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship for a Title VII claim against an employer; appearing as a litigant before a judicial district does not suffice.

Idlibi v. New Britain Judicial District · filed 2023-09-25

But Idlibi does not allege that he was an employee of the two judicial district defendants. He claims only that he was a litigant in these judicial districts. Accordingly, I will dismiss Idlibi’s Title VII claim against the two judicial district defendants.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer and discriminated against the plaintiff.

Linn v. Louisiana Workforce Commission · filed 2024-01-10(a)(1)

To succeed under this claim, the Louisiana Workforce Commission must have been Linn’s employer. Further, the complaint must plausibly allege that the Louisiana Workforce Commission violated Linn’s rights under Title VII. However, Linn failed to plead any facts that he was employed by the Louisiana Workforce Commission or that the Louisiana Workforce Commission violated his rights.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover alleged race discrimination in membership when the plaintiff alleges no employment relationship.

Emrit v. The Grammys Awards on CBS · filed 2024-01-16(a)

Plaintiff has simply not alleged an employment relationship with the Grammys as contemplated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As such, this action is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Section 2000e-2(d) requires a plaintiff bringing a training-program discrimination claim to allege an employment relationship with the defendant.

A.S. v. OCEAN COUNTY FIRE ACADEMY · filed 2024-01-17(d)

In sum, because Plaintiff does not allege that she ever had an employment relationship with the Ocean County Defendants, she fails to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) governs an employer’s conduct toward its employees and prospective employees; the court found no Title VII remedy against defendants who did not employ the plaintiff.

Logan v. Rolling Greene Village · filed 2024-01-22(a)

Therefore, Plaintiff does not have a remedy against Defendants under Title VII or the SCHAL for their alleged conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship with the defendant for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Gaylord v. State of Kansas · filed 2024-01-31(a)(1)

Even under the most liberal reading of the complaint, Plaintiff pleaded no such employment relationship. And without that relationship, Plaintiff states no Title VII claim against Defendant upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Idlibi v. Connecticut Department of Public Health · filed 2024-03-04

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimination by an employer against an employee on the ground of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... But Idlibi does not allege that he was an employee of the defendants. Nor—as discussed above—does he plausibly allege that he was discriminated against because of his national origin or religion. Accordingly, I will dismiss Idlibi’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship for a discrimination claim against an employer.

Anderson v. Sunridge Management Group, Inc. · filed 2024-03-19(a)(1)

But Anderson and Edwards cannot establish a valid claim under Title VII because they have never been employed by SunRidge or Grand Fountain.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses discrimination in employment; a claim requires that the plaintiff was employed by or sought employment with a defendant.

Artemov v. City of New York · filed 2024-04-03(a)(1)

There is no indication that Plaintiff was ever employed by or sought employment with the named Defendants. As such, Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII is dismissed without leave to amend.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination in employment practices and requires a prospective or actual employment relationship.

MCCOY v. BIOMAT USA, INC. · filed 2024-07-31

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, but there is no allegation that Mr. McCoy and Biomat had a prospective or actual employment relationship.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship with the defendant.

Idlibi v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health · filed 2024-11-01

It also correctly dismissed Idlibi’s Title VII and ADEA claims because Idlibi did not — and could not — allege an employment relationship with any of the defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant for an employer discrimination claim.

Naseri v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2024-11-13(a)

Because the City was not Mr. Naseri’s employer, he cannot bring a Title VII claim against it.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship for its protections against employer discrimination to apply.

Iliya v. United States Marshalls Service · filed 2024-12-20

However, Title VII forbids discrimination by employers based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. As such, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he does not allege any employment relationship between himself and USMS.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible employment relationship with the defendant; control over the workplace alone is insufficient.

Price v. Southern Ale House LLC · filed 2024-12-27(a)(1)

Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... This court finds that Ms. Price’s factual allegations are insufficient to plead a plausible employment relationship between Pi Kappa Phi and Ms. Price.

A Title VII discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship with the defendant; student status and unspecified future employment opportunities do not establish one.

DIAMONTE v. HENDERSON · filed 2025-04-03(a)(1)

To bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff “must allege an employment relationship with the defendants.” ... Diamonte has not, at any time, alleged an employment relationship with defendants; to the contrary, she specifically alleges that she was a student: “a PhD candidate in the division of Global Affairs (DGA) at Rutgers University, Newark.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8, 38.)

Section 2000e-2 concerns discriminatory employment practices and does not support a claim challenging expungement eligibility without an alleged employment relationship.

Prince v. Nessel · filed 2025-07-09

Congress enacted Title VII to combat discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... The problem for Prince is that the complaint does not plausibly allege that he ever held state employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant for a claim of employment discrimination.

Shih v. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund · filed 2025-08-04(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The trouble for Mr. Shih, however, is that he may only bring such a claim “against his . . . employer.” Young v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D.D.C. 1990). Mr. Shih nowhere alleges that he was employed by Defendants; to the contrary, he alleges that he is “the founder and owner of The Set International LLC,” which is “a minority-owned small business dedicated to serving the interests of Newark NJ among other areas.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 18. In the absence of an employment relationship, Mr. Shih has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claim requires allegations of an employment relationship and discrimination on one of those bases.

WILLOUGHBY v. WEST · filed 2025-09-22(a)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Amended Complaint lacks any allegations regarding an employer-employee relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” id., or discrimination by Defendant against Plaintiff at all, let alone on any of those bases.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employment discrimination by a plaintiff’s employer, so a claim against someone who is not the plaintiff’s employer fails.

Vaughn v. Oktibbeha County, Mississippi · filed 2025-09-19(a)

Vaughn concedes that Farmer, individually, is not her employer under Title VII. This claim is therefore dismissed as to Farmer.

Title VII requires an employer-employee relationship; a licensing exam administrator does not qualify as an employer merely because employers require applicants to be licensed.

Alameda · filed 2025-09-25(a)

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have not established an employer-employee relationship with ASWB, their Title VII claim must be dismissed.

A Title VII discrimination complaint must allege facts supporting an employment relationship with a defendant.

LYON · filed 2025-11-10

And Genera11 does not allege that he was employed by any of the defendants or provide any other facts relating to an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits national-origin discrimination by an employer against its employees; a claim against an entity that was not the plaintiff’s employer when the alleged adverse action occurred fails.

Uminski · filed 2025-10-20(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of national origin, inter alia. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... CCSO was not Plaintiff’s employer at the time of the alleged adverse employment action. The Court thus concludes Plaintiff cannot cure the “basic flaw[s]” in his pleading and dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claims and ADEA claim without leave to amend.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a Title VII claim against an entity that was never the plaintiff’s employer.

Hudson · filed 2025-12-27(a)

However, the statutes under which Ms. Buehler has sued in her proposed amended complaint—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act; the Fair Labor Standards Act; the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act; and the Illinois Human Rights Act—all impose prohibitions upon "employers." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (FLSA); 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (USERRA); 775 ILCS 5/2-102(a) (IHRA). Ms. Hudson does not contend that Finkbiner, Arrow, or Armstrong were ever her employer. Rather, she alleges that they owned or operated warehouses where she picked up or dropped off shipments that she was hauling and that she experienced harassment or other misconduct from the workers at these locations. Ms. Hudson does not have viable claims against these non-employers under Title VII or the other statutes referenced in her amended complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits summary judgment on a sex discrimination claim when the employer offers legitimate reasons for its actions and the employee offers no evidence disputing them.

Jones v. America's Auto Auction Bowling Green, Inc. · filed 2021-03-08(a)

Assuming Jones established a prima facie case for gender discrimination, America’s Auto has met its burden of proffering legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. See Laster, 746 F.3d 714 at 730. Jones has not offered evidence to dispute these stated reasons. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on Jones’ gender discrimination claim.

When a Title VII race discrimination claim lacks direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.

Johnson v. NYS Dept of Correctional Sus · filed 2021-02-26(a)(1)

When, such as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies.

Once an employee establishes a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim, the employer must offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.

Greenberg v. State University Hospital · filed 2019-09-29(a)(1)

Once a prima facie case has been established the burden shifts to the defendant, which is required to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its actions.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Whitfield v. PSN · filed 2019-09-05(a)(1)

Title VII claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting evidentiary framework created in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which a plaintiff must first provide competent evidence of a prima facie case.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Gilson v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2016-03-30(a)(1)

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer then has the burden of articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer to offer a facially nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie discrimination case.

Herrera v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2017-12-05(a)(1)

At this stage, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a facially nondiscriminatory reason for taking adverse employment action against Herrera.

When a plaintiff has no direct evidence of race discrimination, a claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Watson v. Dc Water and Sewer Authority · filed 2018-11-15(a)(1)

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination based on race, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies.

In a race discrimination claim concerning a hiring decision, an employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision after the applicant establishes a prima facie case.

Turner v. McDonough · filed 2020-09-08(a)(1)

Defendant has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not selecting Plaintiff.

A race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence follows a burden-shifting framework: after the employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, the employee must show that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Palzer v. Cox Oklahoma Telcom · filed 2020-10-23(a)(1)

The burden of production then shifted to Palzer to show that Cox’s performance-based reason for his termination was pretextual.

Workplace rule violations can provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Naraine v. City of Hollywood · filed 2022-08-19(a)(1)

Here, the record contains legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions taken by the City against Plaintiff (i.e., her termination).

Discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(a) are analyzed under the three-part McDonnell Douglas framework.

Alvarado v. United Hospice, Inc. · filed 2022-09-27(a)

Claims of discrimination under all three statutes are analyzed pursuant to the familiar three-part framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Claims under § 2000e-2(a) are subject to a burden shifting analysis for proving employment discrimination.

(PS) Ramirez v. Haaland · filed 2023-01-03(a)

Such Title VII claims are subject to the burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonald Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex; after an employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, the employee must produce evidence that the reason was pretextual.

Panarello v. Haaland · filed 2023-03-28(a)

As a result, the burden shifts to Panarello to produce evidence that a reasonable factfinder could rely on to conclude the Park Police’s justifications for her removal were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 failure-to-promote claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Bradley v. County of Sacramento Dept. of Human Assistance · filed 2023-03-29

In reviewing employees’ claims that their employers have engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VII and/or FEHA, courts rely on the three-part burden-shifting framework enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

In a Title VII discrimination claim, once the employer gives a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the court proceeds to pretext without deciding whether the employee made a prima facie case.

Risch v. Cardona · filed 2023-08-18(a)(1)

When the employer properly presents a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action, the district court “need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Because Defendant asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for the challenged actions, the Brady shortcut applies.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Arora v. Miami-Dade County, Florida · filed 2024-09-25(a)(1)

Therefore, this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to Mr. Arora’s Title VII and FCRA discrimination and retaliation claims.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), once an employer produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, the employee must show a genuine factual dispute about whether that reason was a pretext for race discrimination.

Brunson v. Benedict College · filed 2024-09-25(a)(1)

The Magistrate Judge therefore correctly concluded that the burden shifted to Plaintiff to create a genuine dispute as to a material fact regarding whether the asserted reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for termination and the employee cannot show pretext.

Willmore v. Savvas Learning Company LLC · filed 2024-11-22(a)(1)

Savvas offers legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons for terminating Willmore, and Willmore has not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that Savvas’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. Accordingly, Savvas’s motion is granted.

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ford-Kee v. Mississippi Valley State University · filed 2024-12-17(a)(1)

Thus, the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas applies.

Title VII discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting framework and may be analyzed with NYSHRL and Section 1981 claims governed by the same approach.

DeGroat · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

Title VII claims are evaluated under “the three-step burden shifting analysis of” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... As the same approach applies to claims under Title VII, NYSHRL, and Section 1981, the Court evaluates the substance of those claims concurrently.

An employer’s preference for English-speaking workers is not necessarily a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination when English is unnecessary for the job.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wisconsin Plastics, Inc. · filed 2016-05-05(a)(1)

Thus, I conclude the Defendant has not established, as a matter of law, that its policy of favoring English-speakers is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not give an employee a sex discrimination claim based solely on discrimination against her nonemployee child and the resulting emotional or financial harm.

Tovar v. Essentia Health · filed 2016-05-11(a)(1)

Tovar has not alleged that Essentia’s actions discriminated against her and caused her direct injuries; like Glass, she has suffered no discrimination or injury just because her son was the object of discriminatory conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discrimination by an employer affecting an individual’s employment; harassment of someone who does not work for that employer is outside its scope.

Stimson v. Stryker Sales Corporation · filed 2020-11-30(a)(1)

Stimson’s argument ignores the fact that to be an unlawful employment practice the discrimination must be perpetrated by an employer and it must involve the individual’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by employers and does not cover an allegedly discriminatory tax audit.

Clark v. Alabama Department of Revenue · filed 2022-06-06(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer and is not applicable to the facts presented in the complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects job applicants from discriminatory hiring decisions even if they never become employees.

Cuela · filed 2025-12-10(a)

However, Title VII is not so narrow as to only apply to bona fide employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... The Seventh Circuit has held Title VII also affords protections to applicants. See Wilson, 742 F.3d at 784. Thus, contrary to the Defendant’s proposition, there remains a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff was an employee; and, even if she was not, it is not determinative of the instant cause of action. The Court therefore denies the Motion as to Count One.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s prohibition on religious employment discrimination is subject to the exemption for religious corporations employing individuals of a particular religion.

Crotteau v. St. Coletta of Wisconsin · filed 2016-08-03(a)(1)

Because defendant qualifies for the religious exemption to Title VII under § 2000e-2(a)(1), I will grant defendant summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that she was discriminato-rily terminated by defendant.

A party invoking the religious educational institution exemption bears the burden of proving it qualifies; dismissal is premature without facts needed to assess that qualification.

FERENCE v. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF GREENSBURG · filed 2023-05-08(e)

There is nothing in the record, though, regarding the “religious organization” factors mentioned above. Further, there’s nothing in the record regarding the specific doctrines and beliefs at issue and whether the employment decision was rooted in those religious doctrines and beliefs. ... For these reasons, it would be premature for the Court to consider the merits of the Diocese’s arguments right now.

Under Section 2000e-2, a plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove gender discrimination must show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.

Wilcox v. TMCFM, Inc. · filed 2025-07-25

Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework because she failed to show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably by Defendant.

When a discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a) relies on comparators, the complaint must allege enough facts to show they were similarly situated in all material respects.

Gildyard v. Children's Network of Southwest Florida, L.L.C. · filed 2025-04-10(a)

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to provide the Court with enough facts to determine whether they were “similarly situated in all material respects.”

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence for a Title VII race or sex discrimination claim must identify a similarly situated employee to establish a prima facie case.

Bailey v. Maryland Department of Human Services · filed 2024-03-08

However, regardless of whether there is a genuine dispute as to Plaintiff’s job performance, Plaintiff’s race and sex discrimination claims still fail because she has not identified a valid comparator.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to prove discriminatory termination must show that the proposed comparator was similarly situated; otherwise, the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.

Wagner v. Saint Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

Therefore, since she failed to show that Hart is a similarly situated comparator, Wagner has not made out a prima facie case of wrongful termination.

A discrimination complaint under § 2000e-2(a)(1) that relies on comparators must plausibly allege how those employees were similarly situated and treated more favorably.

Mallory v. Gartner, Inc. · filed 2021-08-30(a)(1)

But Mallory does not allege how she and the proffered comparators were similarly situated. So, Mallory has not plausibly alleged that any similarly situated employees were treated differently.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on a comparator to show gender discrimination must show that the comparator engaged in similar conduct but received different treatment.

Anderson v. Target Stores, Inc. · filed 2021-06-25(a)(1)

Even so, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he failed to demonstrate that the two engaged in the same relevant conduct.

A plaintiff using comparator evidence to establish a prima facie race-discrimination claim must show that the comparators are similarly situated in all material respects.

Lewis v. Hubble Power Systems Inc · filed 2021-06-11(a)(1)

Accordingly, the court finds that Mr. Lewis has not met his initial burden of establishing that he and his proffered comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1229.

A race discrimination claim based on disparate treatment fails without evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

White v. Foods · filed 2021-07-07(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s inability to identify a comparator or to proffer any evidence for the Court’s consideration regarding Defendant’s dissimilar treatment of similarly situated employees is fatal to his claim of race discrimination under Title VII.

A sex-discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that employees outside the protected class who received better treatment were similarly situated in all material respects.

Johnson v. Airbus Defense & Space Inc. · filed 2021-05-26(a)(1)

A comparator must be “similarly situated in all material respects.”

A sex discrimination claim based solely on comparator evidence requires a comparator whose misconduct and disciplinary history are materially similar to the plaintiff’s.

Tinsley v. City of Charlotte · filed 2021-05-05(a)(1)

We therefore conclude that, without a comparator, the evidence Tinsley presented was legally insufficient to support a finding of sex discrimination under Title VII, and that the district court erred in failing to grant the City’s motions for judgment as a matter of law.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to show race or national origin discrimination must identify an employee subject to the same workplace standards who engaged in comparably serious conduct.

Percoco v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC · filed 2016-09-22(a)(1)

Given these material differences between the conduct of Plaintiff and Resso, no reasonable juror would find them to be comparable. Without a comparator, Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to raise a triable question of fact. The Court thus enters summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s federal and state claims for race and national origin discrimination.

Inconsistent treatment of employees of different races for comparable misconduct can support an inference of race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Jackson v. Pennsylvania · filed 2016-10-31(a)(1)

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and recognizing the light burden Plaintiff faces at this stage, the Court concludes that the inconsistent treatment of Plaintiff and Rathburn is enough to raise an inference of discrimination.

A discrimination plaintiff who relies on comparator employees must show they are similar in relevant respects, but they need not be identical.

Emami v. Bolden · filed 2017-03-10(a)(1)

Comparators need not be identical; rather, they must be similar in all relevant aspects, “such as conduct, performance, and qualifications.”

In a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), discipline given to employees who were not similarly situated does not show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Denine Hood v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania · filed 2017-06-09(a)(1)

The gravamen of Hood’s appeal is that the District Court erred when it granted Citizens summary judgment on her claims of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. § 955. ... But so long as those employees were not “similarly situated” to Hood, Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1998)—and we agree with the District Court that they were not—the discipline they received is not probative of pretext as to Hood.

At the pretext stage of a race-discrimination claim, comparator employees must be similarly situated in all relevant respects, including the nature of their misconduct.

Edwards v. Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co. · filed 2017-06-27(a)(1)

While each instance of compared misconduct involved a varying allegation of time theft, Hiland Dairy perceived Smith’s and Edwards’s violations, but not Turbes’s and Rezac’s, to involve dishonesty. And Smith and Edwards worked in concert to deceive Hiland Dairy. These reasons are significant and sufficient distinctions making the situations not similarly situated in all relevant respects, and they support the district court’s conclusion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; different treatment of coworkers does not show pretext unless they were similarly situated to the plaintiff.

Eyob v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 2018-08-09(a)(1)

In short, MCFA’s treatment of Uy and Hilgert cannot support an inference of pretext because neither is similarly situated to Eyob.

A plaintiff relying on a comparator to show discriminatory discharge must establish that the comparator was similarly situated and treated differently.

Lusco v. DAE Industries · filed 2019-09-16(a)(1)

Without showing that Tuttle was treated differently—that is, that Tuttle was not also disciplined—Lusco cannot establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

A factual dispute over whether an employer investigated a male employee’s similar conduct can preclude summary judgment on a Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Hill v. Kerr County · filed 2020-01-13(a)(1)

Given the competing accounts—indeed, a genuine dispute—of the relevant events, the Court cannot make such a determination. Whether Hierholzer investigated Mr. Hill’s alleged affair is material in determining whether Mr. Hill and Plaintiff were treated equally, and whether a male and female were treated equally is crucial in a gender discrimination suit.

A race-discrimination plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Owen v. GE Aviation · filed 2020-01-14(a)(1)

Owen does not argue that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class, so the Court will focus on whether Owen was treated differently than similarly situated individuals. ... No reasonable jury would determine that Owen has met her prima facie case for proving race or age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee creates a genuine dispute about pretext.

Spratt v. FCA US LLC · filed 2020-05-13(a)

Because Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he would have been terminated if he were Caucasian instead of African American, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

A Title VII race discrimination claimant cannot establish disparate treatment using a comparator whose relevant history the hiring decisionmaker did not know.

HOLLEY v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-05-23(a)(1)

Since Payne didn’t know about Franklin’s probationary history when he made the hiring decision, it follows that Payne, the decisionmaker, did not treat similarly situated candidates differently.

A sex discrimination claimant relying on a comparator must show that a similarly situated employee outside the claimant’s protected class was treated more favorably.

Harris v. City of Schertz · filed 2020-08-17(a)(1)

O’Brien, because she reported to Harris, is not similarly situated to Harris. Therefore, she is not an appropriate comparator. Thus, Harris has not shown that a similarly situated employee outside his protected class was treated more favorably.

A Title VII race-discrimination plaintiff cannot use an employee whose misconduct was materially different as a comparator.

Steele v. Birmingham Jefferson Civic Center Authority · filed 2021-03-11(a)(1)

This misconduct is not the same as the unprofessional management style for which Steele was terminated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to present evidence that they are outside the plaintiff’s protected class; speculation does not suffice.

Naji v. Fluor Federal Services LLC · filed 2021-05-03(a)(1)

Naji’s conclusory and speculative allegations that Washington, Hallums, and Poole are outside of her protected class do not suffice.

A plaintiff alleging racially discriminatory discharge cannot show pretext through different treatment of another employee without showing that employee was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Brown v. US Department of Veterans Affairs, Secretary · filed 2021-07-14(a)(1)

Because Brown has not presented a suitable comparator, I cannot infer that the Board’s finding was a pretext for discrimination.

A race discrimination claim that relies on comparators must connect their more favorable treatment to an adverse employment action.

Thweatt v. Prince George County School Board · filed 2021-09-03(a)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for relief on Count I because the Complaint does not sufficiently relate similarly situated comparators to any adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a proposed comparator to be similar in relevant job duties and misconduct before different discipline can support an inference of discrimination.

Cooper v. American University · filed 2021-09-23(a)

Consequently, the court concludes as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could find Sifri and Plaintiff to be similarly situated.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on a comparator to show disparate treatment must identify an employee similarly situated in all material respects.

Lanier v. Sizemore, Inc. · filed 2021-09-27(a)(1)

Given the Lewis court’s standard, Lanier has failed to identify a “similarly situated” comparator, and, thus, failed to establish his prima facie case of discrimination.

A disparate treatment plaintiff cannot establish pretext by comparing herself with an employee whose circumstances differ in a material way.

Horn v. United States Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-09-28(a)(1)

The two outside work activity requests are dissimilar, and thus Horn cannot pass the “rigorous” test to show she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to establish discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) must show that the comparators are similarly situated in all material respects.

Wilson v. Pettway · filed 2022-02-14(a)

To establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff “must show that [they] and [their] comparators are ‘similarly situated in all material respects.’” Id. at 1226; see also Knox v. Roper Pump Co., 957 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2020).

A Title VII sex-discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably in nearly identical circumstances.

Saketkoo v. Admin Tulane Educ · filed 2022-04-21(a)

We therefore agree with the district court that the male physicians Dr. Saketkoo presented were not valid comparators for establishing a prima facie case, and she has not otherwise demonstrated that she was discriminated against because of her sex.

A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII race discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework cannot survive summary judgment without evidence of a similarly situated comparator.

Motton v. Kohler Co Inc · filed 2022-04-15(a)(1)

Because Mr. Motton does not proffer any similarly-situated comparators, he cannot survive summary judgment under the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.

A plaintiff relying on a comparator to prove circumstantial race or sex discrimination must show that the comparator was similarly situated and engaged in nearly identical conduct.

Hardison v. Skinner · filed 2022-07-11(a)(1)

Hardison’s barebones statements, with nothing more to support them, are insufficient to establish that she was “similarly situated” to Solomon, or that her “conduct that drew the adverse employment decision” was “‘nearly identical’ to that of [Solomon’s].”

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to establish Title VII discrimination must show more favorable treatment of a similarly situated person outside the protected class.

Harris v. Sheriff Theodore Jackson · filed 2022-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s conclusory and speculative testimony does not come close to meeting his burden of showing he was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must show that the proposed comparators were similarly situated in all relevant respects, including their job duties.

Pryor v. Trident Medical Center, LLC · filed 2022-10-28(a)(1)

The Magistrate Judge properly relied on these distinguishing factors in finding that Pryor was not similarly situated in all relevant respects to Harlan, Wickenhoefer, and Dennis. Therefore, the court overrules Pryor’s objections regarding the fourth element of her race discrimination claim.

Speculative allegations about unidentified male employees do not establish valid comparators for a Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Carey v. Baltimore City Board of Schools Commissioners · filed 2022-11-28(a)(1)

Thus, the unidentified male employees cannot serve as valid comparators.

Comparator evidence is not required to prove discrimination, but a plaintiff alleging different treatment must offer evidence that others were treated better under similar circumstances.

Mack v. International Paper Company · filed 2023-02-09(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient because she fails to connect these generalized statements of disparate treatment to any specific action taken by Defendant’s employees. Although comparator evidence is not required to establish a claim of discrimination, if Plaintiff is going to allege she was treated differently than other employees, Plaintiff bears the burden at this stage to offer evidence of others being treated better than her under similar circumstances.

For a race discrimination claim based on a more favorably treated coworker, the employees’ misconduct records must be comparable, though their infractions need not be identical.

Walker v. Harmony Public Schools · filed 2023-02-27(a)(1)

While each employee’s track record does not need to comprise an identical number of infractions, the records must be comparable. Walker presents no evidence that Ms. Huff holds a comparable track record.

A plaintiff using a comparator to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination must show that the comparator is similarly situated.

Stevenson v. Frontier Florida, LLC · filed 2023-03-28(a)(1)

To the extent Stevenson seeks to establish the fourth prong by claiming Britto was treated more favorably than he was, he would have to establish, at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework, that Britto is similarly situated.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to prove race discrimination must show that an employee outside the protected class engaged in comparable misconduct and received better treatment.

Alston v. HolyCross Health-Trinity Health Care · filed 2023-03-31(a)(1)

Without any evidence of a comparator who was “engaged in the same type of misconduct attributed to” him, Alston cannot rely on comparator evidence to satisfy his burden to show circumstances of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support an inference of race discrimination from different treatment of employees who engaged in materially different conduct.

Evans v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Company Inc. · filed 2023-05-02(a)(1)

Because “[a]n employer is well within its rights to accord different treatment to employees . . . who engaged in different conduct,” Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1228, no reasonable inference of discrimination can be drawn based on a comparison to Abbott.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to establish race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the comparator was similarly situated in all material respects and treated more favorably.

Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety · filed 2023-05-31(a)(1)

Here, the district court did not err in finding that Anthony did not establish a prima facie case for race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, we disagree with the district court’s finding that McMillan, the comparator, was similarly situated to Anthony at the investigation stage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a racial discrimination plaintiff to allege less favorable treatment than a similarly situated person outside her protected class; discovery may be needed to determine whether an identified person is a viable comparator.

Olson v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. · filed 2024-01-23(a)(1)

To allege a Title VII racial discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside her protected class. ... Discovery is needed to determine whether Davis truly is a viable comparator. The motion to dismiss is denied as to this ground, but this issue may be revisited at summary judgment with a more developed factual record.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim must identify employees similarly situated in all material respects.

Flanagan v. Trader Joe's East, Inc. · filed 2024-02-08(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff is unable to identify similarly situated comparators, the Court finds that she has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of gender.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

GRISWOLD, MD MPH v. DREXEL UNIVERSITY · filed 2024-03-01(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination in relation to her termination, she has not provided sufficient evidence to support an inference of discrimination. As such, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim premised on her termination is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination; more favorable treatment of coworkers with different supervisors and duties did not establish that inference here.

Johnson v. Connecticut · filed 2024-03-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish that the failure to afford her training opportunities occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent as her comparators were not, in fact, sufficiently similarly situated.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Ford v. Memphis-Shelby County Schools · filed 2024-04-29(a)(1)

What is more, Plaintiff failed to show an essential element of a Title VII discrimination claim for these claims: that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably than she was. ... But Plaintiff still fails to identify any such employee or provide evidence of how they were treated more favorably. ... Having conducted a de novo review, the Court agrees with Judge Christoff and ADOPTS her recommendation on this point. The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s discrete sex discrimination claims.

A race discrimination claim based on comparator evidence requires facts showing that the employees had the same supervisor and were subject to the same requirements.

Carroll v. Regency Management Services, LLC · filed 2024-07-02(a)(1)

Here, Carroll fails to meet the first element of the claim because he does not identify whether this unnamed co-worker who was allowed to sit down “at will” reported to the same supervisor. Next, Carroll fails to meet the second element because he concedes that he was allowed to sit once he produced a doctor’s note and fails to show his co-worker was not subject to the same requirement. (Compl. at 2). Carroll thus cannot state a claim for discrimination based on comparator evidence.

A racial discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator must show that the other employee was similarly situated in all material respects and treated more favorably.

Futch v. Libby · filed 2024-07-17(a)(1)

Absent such comparator evidence, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination.

A Title VII race or sex discrimination claim relying on comparator evidence must plausibly allege that the coworkers were similarly situated.

Moreno-Livni v. Afl-Cio Housing Investment Trust · filed 2024-09-11(a)

Ultimately, Moreno-Livini’s failure to plausibly allege that her white, male coworkers were similarly situated to her dooms both her § 1981 and Title VII claims.

A national origin termination claim relying on comparator evidence must plausibly allege that the employees engaged in similar conduct.

Isaac v. Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

Even without that declaration, the Court finds that the Complaint, as drafted, by not including the postings for which plaintiff was fired, fails to make out a plausible claim that plaintiff was terminated due to his national origin.

A Title VII race discrimination claim must plausibly connect an adverse employment action to race; a proposed comparator must be similarly situated and outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

Spencer v. McDonough · filed 2025-01-23(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to their “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The Department argues that Ms. Spencer fails at the last step of the Title VII inquiry, see ECF No. 17 at 15-16, and the court agrees.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on comparators must show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.

Smith v. Kittle Property Group, INC. · filed 2025-01-27(a)(1)

For Ms. Smith to make a prima facie case using comparators, she must designate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Kittle treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class more favorably.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination through comparator evidence must show that the comparators are similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Williams v. Harmony Grove School District · filed 2025-02-27(a)(1)

Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that she is similarly situated with the comparators in all relevant respects.

Comparator evidence can support a race or color discrimination claim when a similarly situated employee outside the protected class committed comparably serious misconduct but received less severe discipline.

PARRISH · filed 2025-12-05(a)(1)

Here, a reasonable jury could conclude from Ms. Parrish's designated comparator evidence that Buy Rite treated Ms. Parrish less favorably than white employees who committed comparable policy violations such that the stated reason for Ms. Parrish's termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of differential treatment to offer some relevant comparator evidence, though an exact match is unnecessary.

Jolena Brown v. FCA US LLC · filed 2025-12-17(a)(1)

Yet even if our standard is “easily met,” it requires at least some relevant comparator evidence in circumstantial cases like Brown’s.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on a comparator to show that the comparator was similarly situated to support a religious disparate treatment claim.

ROBINSON · filed 2025-12-19(a)(1)

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment through a comparator, this court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish that the comparator was similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) makes a union liable for attempting to cause an employer to discriminate, even if the attempt does not cause an adverse employment action.

Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company · filed 2025-05-08(c)(3)

Although there is little caselaw interpreting what “to cause or attempt to cause” discrimination means, the plain language of § 2000e-2(c)(3) makes clear that “attempt[ing] to cause” an adverse employment action is sufficient to establish Title VII liability against a union.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits labor unions from discriminating based on race, color, or sex; a Title VII claim against a union must plausibly allege a breach of its duty of fair representation and discriminatory animus.

Bledsoe v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2024-03-07(c)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the Union breached its DFR. Specifically, he has failed sufficiently to allege that any action or omission on the part of the Union was arbitrary, discriminatory, or done in bad faith. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims against Local 726 must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) limits a union discrimination claim based on representation to a claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation.

Drinks-Bruder v. Niagara Falls Police Club · filed 2023-02-16(c)(1)

A Title VII action against a union that is not based on a member’s exclusion or expulsion is “limited” to a claim that the union “fail[ed] to discharge its duty of fair representation.”

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) requires a union to instigate or actively support an employer’s discrimination; passive acquiescence is insufficient.

Sledge v. Liuna Local 11 · filed 2022-03-02(c)(3)

Under Subsection 2(c)(3), a labor union can be liable where it “instigates or actively supports” an employer’s discrimination. ... “[A]ctive participation” by the union is required; “passive acquiescence” is not enough. ... Ms. Sledge has not adequately pleaded that Local 11 instigated or supported discrimination by Ms. Sledge’s employer.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) applies to labor unions; when a union fails to file a grievance, a Title VII claim requires proof of an employer violation of the collective bargaining agreement, a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, and discriminatory animus.

Cummings v. American Postal Worker's Union - AFL-CIO · filed 2021-03-08(c)(1)

Accordingly, to establish a prima facie Title VII claim against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must show (1) the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the plaintiff, (2) the union permitted the violation to go unrepaired, thereby breaching the union’s duty of fair representation, and (3) there was some indication that the union’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus.

A discrimination claim against a union over its handling of workplace complaints requires a breach of the duty of fair representation motivated by animus toward the member’s protected status.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 2019-09-18(c)(1)

To bring a Title VII discrimination claim against a union concerning the manner in which the union handled a member’s workplace complaints, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the Union breached its duty of fair representation (“DFR”) to plaintiff; and (2) that the Union’s conduct was motivated by animus toward the plaintiff’s protected status.