42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim arising from arrest or confinement accrues on the date of arrest or, at the latest, release from confinement.

Young v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1990-08-21

As applied to the facts of this case, plaintiffs § 1983 claim accrued on the date of her arrest in January 1988, or at the latest, on the date of her release from confinement in February 1988.

A § 1983 takings claim does not accrue for limitations purposes until the state courts deny just compensation.

Biddison v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-01-09

His federal claim will ripen, and the statute of limitations will begin to run, if and when Biddison is denied just compensation by the state courts.

A § 1983 constructive discharge claim accrues when the employee loses employment, rather than when the employee is suspended.

Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia · filed 1991-01-22

Here, the limitations period on plaintiffs claim of constructive discharge did not begin to run with his suspension. The constructive discharge claim did not accrue until the loss of employment occurred.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which the claim is based.

Johnson v. Johnson County Commission Board · filed 1991-02-19

Section 1983 claims accrue, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, “ ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’ ” Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1368, 67 L.Ed.2d 347 (1981), (quoting Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied 444 U.S. 842, 100 S.Ct. 83, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979)).

Section 1983 claims accrue when a plaintiff becomes aware of both the injury and its causal connection to the defendant.

PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department · filed 1991-02-22

Thus, for example, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be deemed to have accrued as to each plaintiff only when he or she became aware of both the fact of injury and its causal connection to the defendant.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the claim.

Okundaye v. City of Chicago, Richard Rowan, and Fred Rice · filed 1991-02-27

Thus, a cause of action is said to accrue under section 1983 when "a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Henderson, 661 F.2d at 110 (emphasis added); Singleton, 632 F.2d at 191; Rubin, 621 F.2d at 116.

A § 1983 taking claim does not accrue for limitations purposes until the property owner has sought and been denied just compensation through available state procedures.

Biddison v. City Of Chicago · filed 1991-02-28

Not having availed himself of the inverse condemnation action provided in Illinois, Biddison's federal taking claim is not ripe and has not yet accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations. His federal claim will ripen, and the statute of limitations will begin to run, if and when Biddison is denied just compensation by the state courts.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which it is based.

Street v. George Vose, Etc. · filed 1991-06-19

“The accrual period for a Section 1983 action begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” ... As Street’s transfer, detention in segregation, and mail losses were all completed by March 1982, all his claims accrued by then, and the limitation period expired in March 1985.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1991-07-08

Federal law which governs the accrual of section 1983 claims establishes that the limitations period begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Muriente v. Alicea · filed 1991-08-05

The accrual period for a section 1983 cause of action is governed by federal law, ... and begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which forms the basis of the action.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Williams v. Olathe, Kansas Police Department, and William Sullivan · filed 1991-09-26

For purposes of the statute of limitations, § 1983 actions accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.

A Section 1983 claim for denial of a pretermination hearing accrues when the employee receives unequivocal notice that the termination is final and no further process will follow; absent such notice, it accrues on the last day of employment.

Hoesterey v. The City of Cathedral City Jack R. Smith · filed 1991-09-27

Instead, to trigger the statute of limitations, Hoesterey needed to have received notice, not only of the termination decision, but also that the decision was final and that it would be followed by no further process. To alert Hoesterey to the accrual of his claims, this notice would need to be unequivocal, and communicated in a manner such that no reasonable person could think there might be a retreat or change in position prior to the termination of the employment decision. In the absence of such unequivocal notice, it would only be on the last day of employment that Hoesterey could become aware that the decision was final and that no further process could be forthcoming prior to termination. Accordingly, it would be only on this date that the statute of limitations period would begin to run.

Section 1983 claims borrow a state limitations period, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

National Advertising Company v. City of Raleigh, North Carolina, Southern Environmental Law Center, Amicus Curiae · filed 1991-10-25

While the statutory limitations period for § 1983 actions is borrowed from state law, “[t]he time of accrual of a civil rights action is a question of federal law.”

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and who caused it.

Stewart v. Parish of Jefferson · filed 1992-01-28

The statute of limitations period commences once the plaintiff acquires possession of two critical facts: (1) an injury has occurred; and (2) the identity of the person who inflicted the injury.

A section 1983 claim for wrongful deprivation of employment accrues when the employee receives clear notice of termination, even if the notice is informal or unwritten.

Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea · filed 1992-03-23

It is the clarity of the notice received, not whether it is memorialized on official stationery or reduced to writing, that determines the accrual of causes of action premised upon wrongful deprivation of employment under section 1983.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury underlying the claim.

Knight v. City of Missoula · filed 1992-04-02

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows of the injury which is the basis for the action. Harvey v. Pomroy (D.Mont. 1982), 535 F. Supp. 78, 81. In regards to Knight's claims arising from the creation of the road, the cause of action accrued when the road was created.

A § 1983 claim based on police officers’ failures to act accrues when the plaintiff can recognize the resulting compensable injury and identify the officers, rather than when later physical harm occurs.

Eagleston v. County of Suffolk · filed 1992-04-22

Assuming that plaintiff’s rights were violated in this way, this Court holds that the officers’ allegedly improper failures to act were sufficient to enable plaintiff to realize that she had suffered a compensable injury at that time. Moreover, as plaintiff knew or could easily have discovered the identities of Officers Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly at the time she sought their assistance, her cause of action against them accrued as of that time, not at the later date when she was physically injured by her estranged husband.

A § 1983 claim arising from an illegal search accrues when the search occurs, rather than when the related criminal case is dismissed.

Holland v. Davenport, Iowa, Police Department Officer Knaack · filed 1992-08-10

The claim accrued at the time of the search, not when the criminal case was dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim based on repeated denials of medical care accrues separately for each distinct denial, and the limitations period begins when that denial occurs.

Pensel v. Bryan · filed 1992-08-14

Thus, each alleged denial of necessary medical care, to the extent it can be distinguished from the initial denial of care, constituted a separate cause of action, and the two-year statute of limitations began to run when such a denial of care occurred.

A § 1983 claim arising from a search and seizure accrues when officials search and seize the property, rather than when related state court proceedings conclude.

Kaster v. Iowa · filed 1992-09-24

Kaster’s cause of action arose when the state officials searched and seized his property, ... not when Kaster’s state court action concluded, ... Thus, the statute of limitations expired before Kaster filed this suit.

A Section 1983 claim arising from a search and seizure accrues when officials search and seize the property, not when related state-court proceedings conclude.

Kaster v. State Of Iowa · filed 1992-10-23

Kaster's cause of action arose when the state officials searched and seized his property, see Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir.1991), not when Kaster's state court action concluded, see Lown v. Brimeyer, 956 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 176, 121 L.Ed.2d 122 (1992).

For a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim, each injurious overt act accrues separately when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the resulting injury.

Harris v. Henry · filed 1992-11-16

This court uses the "last overt act" doctrine to determine the accrual of civil conspiracies under section 1983 for limitations purposes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). Under this doctrine, a cause of action runs separately from each overt act that is alleged to have caused damage to the plaintiff. Id. Each cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury resulting from each act.

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 cause of action accrues.

Gartrell v. Gaylor · filed 1993-01-19

Although we look to Texas law to determine the applicable limitations period, federal law governs when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues.

A Section 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Gartrell v. R.S. Gaylor · filed 1993-01-21

Although we look to Texas law to determine the applicable limitations period, federal law governs when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues. ... Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

A false arrest claim under Section 1983 accrues when the alleged wrongful arrest occurs, even if the resulting conviction is reversed later.

Jones v. County of Inyo, a Municipal Corp. J.P. Jones, Individually and as a Peace Officer Don Dorsey, Sheriff · filed 1993-02-22

Thus, a cause of action for false arrest under section 1983 accrues at the time of the alleged wrongful arrest, and not when the subsequent conviction is reversed.

A § 1983 claim for a temporary regulatory taking does not accrue when the owner sells the property before state proceedings over the zoning ordinance conclude.

New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County · filed 1993-03-17

NPL's injury may have ended when it sold the property, but, under Corn III, NPL's claims did not accrue until the state proceedings had concluded.

A § 1983 claim based on liquor-license revocation accrues when the license is revoked, and later closure of the bar or pursuit of state judicial review does not postpone accrual.

Quentin Kelly, Jerry Smith, Ray B. Hill v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Michael Collins, Gene Dem · filed 1993-10-13

The date the consequences of that violation became painful — when the bar was closed because it was operating without a liquor license — was not the date of accrual. ... The injury occurred at the time of the revocation; tellingly, it is that very injury which caused the bar owners to avail themselves of the state appeals process. ... Because the deprivation of property took place at the time the state revoked the liquor license, the section 1983 claim was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the state's personal-injury limitations period and accrue when the alleged discriminatory act causes injury, without postponement for a state appeal.

Lapsley v. Unemployment Insurance Review Board of the Indiana Department of Employment and Training Services · filed 1993-10-15

The applicable limitations period for a Sec. 1983 action is the state statute of limitations for personal injury suits. ... That is, the accrual date is when the alleged discriminatory act occurred. ... The availability of a state appeals process had no effect on the accrual date.

A Section 1983 wrongful-arrest claim is time-barred when filed beyond the applicable limitations period measured from the arrest, absent a basis for tolling.

Gibson v. City of Detroit · filed 1993-10-21

Upon consideration, we find that the district court properly held that plaintiff's claim is time-barred because it was filed beyond the statutory period taken from the date of his arrest, see McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir.1988), and plaintiff has cited nothing which would operate to toll the limitations period. See Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div. Nat'l Steel Corp., 803 F.2d 250, 253-54 (6th Cir.1986).

A § 1983 claim for an unlawful search, arrest, or questioning accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury.

Darryl J. Woods v. Candela · filed 1994-01-06

Woods’s alleged injuries occurred, and Woods gained knowledge of them, when Candela conducted the search, arrest and questioning; therefore, the cause of action accrued on September 25, 1989.

A § 1983 claim continues to accrue while the threat of immediate application of a challenged policy persists.

Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga. · filed 1994-01-14

Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiffs cause of action continues to accrue so long as the threat of immediate application of the policy exists.

A § 1983 claim for wrongful issuance of arrest warrants accrues when the last warrant is issued.

Bowen v. Frederick County Planning Commission John R. Riley Wayne Miller Bray Cockrill · filed 1994-04-01

Bowen's cause of action for the wrongful issuance of arrest warrants accrued when the last warrant was issued.

A § 1983 claim arising from an allegedly wrongful prosecution accrues no later than conviction, rather than when later consequences such as imprisonment or loss of a professional license are felt.

Smith v. Lafollette · filed 1994-04-20

We agree with the district court that Smith's Sec. 1983 claims accrued no later than the date of his conviction, ... and not when the consequences of that conviction (loss of his professional license and imprisonment) were felt, ... so Wisconsin's six-year statute of limitations period barred relief against Attorney General Bronson LaFollette and his employee, Walter Gayan, Assistant Attorney Generals Matthew Frank and Jeffrey Gabrysiak, and M & I Bank, ...; ... and the $3,000 sanction against Smith was imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, not 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, so Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), is irrelevant.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the alleged conduct causes harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of both the conduct and the harm; knowledge acquired by the claimant’s attorney is imputed to the claimant.

Veal v. Anthony Geraci, Detective, New York City Police Department and John Doe, Police Officer, New York Cit · filed 1994-05-05

Rather, the claim accrues when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the resulting harm. ... Thus, whether or not Veal himself heard Geraci’s testimony, Veal’s attorney plainly had knowledge of the conduct giving rise to Veal’s present claim, and under traditional principles of agency the attorney’s knowledge must be imputed to Veal.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Allen v. City of Aurora · filed 1994-06-16

Plaintiff contends that, under § 1983, malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until the underlying criminal convictions are terminated in the plaintiffs favor. In essence, plaintiff argues that because favorable termination is a necessary element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, he neither knew nor had reason to know of the injury that constituted the basis of the claim until such termination. We agree.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a conviction accrues when the charges are formally dismissed if they remained pending after the conviction was vacated.

Girdler v. Dale · filed 1994-07-25

Because charges remained pending against Girdler until December 18, 1991, when the state court issued a formal order dismissing all charges against him, that is when his § 1983 claims accrued.

A § 1983 challenge to a zoning ordinance accrues when the ordinance takes effect and causes concrete injury to property.

Capital Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Raleigh · filed 1994-07-29

The alleged wrongful state action that forms the basis for plaintiffs’ § 1983 action is the City’s adoption of the October 1983 ordinance. ... We hold that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on the effective date of the October 1983 ordinance and was thus time-barred.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Workman v. Jordan · filed 1994-08-16

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.

A Section 1983 claim over pension benefits terminated upon remarriage accrues at remarriage; missed later monthly payments do not constitute a continuing tort that extends the limitations period.

Leonard v. Sieler · filed 1994-08-22

If plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, the claim arose at the time of her remarriage. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations expired before she filed her federal court action. See Russell v. Board of Trustees of Firemen, Policemen & Fire Alarm Operators' Pension Fund, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1266 (1993). We reject plaintiff's argument that defendants' failure to pay each monthly installment after her remarriage constituted a continuing tort.

A section 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Alfred Martin Baxter, Jr. v. Reed · filed 1994-08-29

However, federal law determines when a section 1983 cause of action accrues. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.1984). Under federal law, "[t]he statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Id. at 273.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.

Brownlow v. Chavez · filed 1994-10-25

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 1983 damages claims whose success would invalidate a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Hooper v. Lance Anderson Anthony Wallace · filed 1995-01-10

A Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of both the injury and its probable cause.

Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction · filed 1995-02-08

The district court understood that in order for Nasim's cause of action to have accrued, Nasim must have been aware of his injuries. However, it is unclear whether the court further understood that in order for the cause of action to have accrued, Nasim must also have been aware of the probable cause of those injuries.

A § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implies a conviction was unlawful does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

Darryl J. Woods v. Candela · filed 1995-02-09

As made evident by that decision, Woods’s present Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, which rest on the very same grounds, necessarily imply that his conviction was unlawful, and thus could not have been raised prior to the Appellate Division’s reversal of his conviction on January 19, 1993. Therefore, under Heck, Woods’s § 1983 cause of action for damages arising from Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations did not accrue before that date.

A section 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Loree v. Justice · filed 1995-02-28

A section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Federal law governs accrual of a § 1983 claim; an equal protection claim based on unequal restitution charges may accrue when the plaintiff learns or should learn of the disparate charges.

Fratus v. Deland · filed 1995-03-07

While state law governs limitations and tolling issues, federal law determines the accrual of section 1983 claims. ... Consequently, his equal protection claim did not necessarily accrue on Jan. 4, 1989, when the prison delivered the restitution order to Mr. Fratus; it may have accrued at some later date when Mr. Fratus learned, or should have learned, that the prison arbitrarily charged him more than other prisoners for similar damage.

Section 1983 damages claims attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence do not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Jones v. Maricopa County · filed 1995-03-13

A section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Wilson v. Carmen Danny Clem Christian C. Casad Irene Kiyoko Asai Gayle Wakefield · filed 1995-03-13

A section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 claim based on withheld exculpatory evidence accrues when the plaintiff learns of the nondisclosure, rather than when the conviction is overturned.

Jackson v. City of Memphis Memphis Police Department Director of Memphis Police Department Jim D. Music Lee A · filed 1995-03-21

Jackson's injury accrued for purposes of Sec. 1983 when he learned of the non-disclosure of the favorable evidence, not when his conviction was overturned.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

DePugh v. Smith · filed 1995-03-22

Under federal law, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

A Section 1983 damages claim attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Norris v. Stark County, Ohio · filed 1995-04-04

A Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages (or a RICO claim) attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim for unlawful imprisonment does not accrue until the sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

Brandt v. Del Ray Holm Daniel Sharp Olivia Craven Ida Leggett Pete Rodriquez Frank Chidichima Sondra Johnson · filed 1995-04-04

A prisoner's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to unlawful imprisonment does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or imprisonment has been invalidated.

Tripati v. Gunn McKay Los Angeles District Attorney's Office · filed 1995-04-10

A prisoner's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim for deprivation of a fair trial that challenges a conviction accrues when the conviction is reversed, expunged, vacated, or otherwise nullified.

Smith v. Wambaugh · filed 1995-05-15

The Court’s analysis in that case led this court to conclude that the cause of action for the deprivation of a fair trial recognized in Heck, supra, does not ripen until the underlying conviction is reversed, expunged, vacated, or otherwise rendered a nullity.

A Section 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

1120 Cent. Condominiums Owners Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach · filed 1995-06-21

Federal law determines when a Sec. 1983 claim accrues. Gowin v. Altmiller, 663 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1981). In this circuit, "[t]he touchstone for determining the commencement of the limitations period is notice: a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Gerritsen v. Consulado General de Mexico, 989 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).

A § 1983 claim over an employee’s termination accrues when the employee receives notice of termination, even if employment ends later.

Hall v. State of Tenn. · filed 1995-06-27

Therefore, the statute of limitations began running on February 5, 1993, the day Hall received notice of his termination. The complaint, filed February 10, 1994, was filed more than one year after the notice and therefore was untimely.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction or imprisonment has been invalidated.

Carter v. Mary Ellen Ramey Dennis O'leary, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney · filed 1995-06-30

A prisoner's civil rights claim for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply an unlawful revocation of prison credit do not accrue until the revocation is invalidated.

Bryant v. Robert Borg C.J. Johnson v. Valdez S. Larson M.F. Martel P. Kennedy and J. Bauer · filed 1995-08-07

Because Bryant's allegations necessarily imply that the defendants unlawfully revoked 360 days of prison credit (making his sentence unlawful) and because Bryant has not shown that the revocation has been invalidated by a state or federal court, his claims have not yet accrued.

A § 1983 claim accrues for limitations purposes when the plaintiff becomes aware of the critical facts showing the injury.

Webster v. TX · filed 1995-08-25

Accordingly, Webster's cause of action against the defendants under § 1983 accrued during the summer of 1990 when she became aware of the "critical facts" that she had been hurt.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the claim or has enough notice of the injury and its cause that reasonable inquiry would reveal a colorable claim.

Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction · filed 1995-09-15

Thus, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, a cause of action accrues either when the plaintiff has knowledge of his claim or when he is put on notice--e.g., by the knowledge of the fact of injury and who caused it--to make reasonable inquiry and that inquiry would reveal the existence of a colorable claim.

A Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim tied to an outstanding conviction cannot be brought until the conviction is set aside, and its limitations period begins then.

Jalili-Khiabani v. Oakland County Oakland County Sheriff's Department Oakland County Prosecutor Stupka, Officer S · filed 1995-09-21

Upon review, we conclude that the entry of summary judgment for the defendants was inappropriate; the continuing validity of Mr. Jalili-Khiabani's conviction means that he cannot yet articulate a Sec. 1983 claim. As we held in Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (6th Cir.1995), a conviction must be set aside as a precondition to a Sec. 1983 suit based on Fourth Amendment claims. Only if Mr. Jalili-Khiabani is able to have his conviction set aside or expunged may he bring this action. Id. at 1087 n. 5. Moreover, because a Sec. 1983 claim for relief does not exist until the conviction is set aside, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful arrest pursuant to a warrant based on false allegations accrue when the criminal prosecution ends in acquittal.

Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron · filed 1995-10-17

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that— for purposes of determining the appropriate accrual rule — both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims more closely resemble the common law tort of malicious prosecution. Consequently, appellants’ section 1983 claims did not accrue until their respective criminal prosecutions ended in acquittals.

A § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

William W. Roche Steven J. Henry v. Town of Darby Martha Bethel · filed 1995-10-20

Because Henry's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because Henry did not show that the conviction has been invalidated, Henry's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims have not accrued at this time.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Hosier v. Baily · filed 1995-12-11

A prisoner's civil rights claim for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions the unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

A § 1983 due process claim that would invalidate a prison disciplinary ruling accrues when that ruling is reversed.

Theadore Black v. Coughlin III · filed 1996-02-09

Under the principle announced in Heck, Black’s cause of action for denial of due process in the disciplinary proceedings did not accrue until he succeeded in having the disciplinary ruling reversed by the state court in 1991.

A § 1983 claim challenging a coerced confession accrues despite an outstanding conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate that conviction.

Simmons v. O'Brien · filed 1996-03-04

Because harmless error analysis is applicable to the admission at trial of coerced confessions, judgment in favor of Simmons on this § 1983 action challenging his confession will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction do not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

Mayer v. Jeffrey A. Heims, Town of Winamac, Indiana · filed 1996-03-25

If Mayer prevails, the result would clearly indicate that his conviction is invalid, as it would show that his crime of conviction never took place. ... A review of the adequacy of Mayer's allegations is unnecessary, as his cause of action will not accrue until he successfully invalidates his conviction.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Sellars v. Perry · filed 1996-04-04

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.

A Section 1983 damages claim attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Rodriguez v. County of Alameda · filed 1996-05-06

A section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence therefore does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim based on an administrative license revocation accrues no later than the board’s final revocation decision.

Murray v. Henry Cramblett Peter Vitucci John Rohal Joan Fishel Charles Clark the State Medical Board of Ohio · filed 1996-05-08

Because the final decision to revoke Murray's license was entered by the Medical Board on October 13, 1989, his cause of action accrued no later than that date. Thus, the statute of limitations period expired before he filed his federal complaint in 1994.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Kukes v. Candance J. Grubbs Carole J. Caldwell L. Gerald · filed 1996-05-29

A prisoner's civil rights claim for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim based on a Fourth Amendment seizure at the start of a prosecution may be filed when the prosecution ends in the plaintiff’s favor.

Whiting v. Traylor · filed 1996-06-19

When the seizure is part of the institution of a prosecution (that is, when the Fourth Amendment violation is of the kind making a section 1983 claim based on the violation analogous to the tort of malicious prosecution), the plaintiff may properly wait to sue until the prosecution terminates in his favor.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction on a pending criminal charge is not cognizable and does not accrue while the prosecution may still produce a judgment.

Smith v. Holtz · filed 1996-06-26

Because of these concerns, we hold that a claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction on a pending criminal charge is not cognizable under § 1983. ... It necessarily follows that so long as success on such a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution, such a claim does not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.

A § 1983 claim challenging a criminal prosecution does not accrue until the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Corthron v. Riley · filed 1996-07-08

Corthron’s denial-of-access-to-the-court claims related to the improper prosecution of his criminal case were properly dismissed by the district court because his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action does not accrue until his conviction has been invalidated.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim challenging a disciplinary penalty does not accrue until the state or a writ of habeas corpus invalidates the disciplinary result.

Slaton v. Debruyn · filed 1996-07-18

Under Miller, such injury is not compensable to Slaton under § 1983 until either the state or a writ of habeas corpus invalidates the result of the disciplinary hearing. See Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2373 n. 7 ("actual, compensable injury ... does not encompass the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned (until [the] conviction has been overturned).") Consequently, because Slaton's cause of action under § 1983 has not accrued, the district court should have dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

A § 1983 damages claim that would call into question the validity of confinement does not accrue until the inmate has succeeded in invalidating the sentence or conviction.

Rooding v. Peters · filed 1996-08-13

Heck instructs us that § 1983 claims for damages like the one pursued by Rooding in this case are analogous to malicious prosecution claims in that they do not accrue until after the inmate’s sentence or conviction has been invalidated.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging the duration of confinement accrues only after the prisoner successfully invalidates that confinement.

Rooding v. Peters · filed 1996-08-13

Rooding's § 1983 claim for damages, challenging the duration of his confinement, is the type of § 1983 claim that would necessarily implicate the validity of his incarceration. Therefore, Rooding's cause of action under § 1983 did not accrue until he prevailed in the mandamus action--he could not have joined the state habeas/mandamus action with his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims that would call prison disciplinary sanctions into question do not accrue until those sanctions are invalidated through appeal, executive action, an authorized state tribunal, or habeas relief.

James P. Clayton-El, A/K/A Carmichael Morrison v. Dwayne Fisher · filed 1996-09-12

To make these claims accrue under § 1983, Clayton-EL must prove that his disciplinary sanctions have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues, and in the Sixth Circuit accrual occurs when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the injury.

Holdsworth v. Najeway · filed 1996-10-17

In a § 1983 action, federal law determines the date of accrual. ... In this circuit a claim accrues on the date a party claiming injury knew or reasonably should have known of the injury on which his claim is based.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury underlying the action.

Duke Street Ltd. P'ship v. BOARD OF CTY. COMMISSIONERS CALVERT CTY. · filed 1996-11-01

The time of accrual of a § 1983 civil rights action, however, is a question of federal law. ... A claim will accrue when the affected party knew or should have known of the injury which is the basis of the action.

A § 1983 claim challenging an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until the criminal proceeding ends finally in the plaintiff’s favor if success on the claim would imply the invalidity of an outstanding or potential conviction.

Michaels v. State of NJ · filed 1996-11-08

Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this court that in order to maintain a § 1983 claim for an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment where success on such a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding or potential conviction, there must first be a “final” termination of the criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the alleged conduct causes harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of both the conduct and the harm.

Heaning v. York · filed 1996-11-12

Ah action accrues under § 1983 when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the resulting harm.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Walter G. Finch, Esquire v. Board of Trustees, Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University, a Maryland Corporation · filed 1997-01-03

For a § 1983 action, the time of accrual is when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Finch v. Board of Trustees · filed 1997-01-03

For a § 1983 action, the time of accrual is when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.

A Section 1983 claim for delayed medical treatment accrues when the prisoner knows the recommended treatment was not provided on time; later treatment does not postpone accrual.

Hill v. Godinez · filed 1997-02-06

Once Dr. Brewer failed to ensure that the surgery was performed within the recommended time frame, the die was cast— Hill’s claim had accrued, and the lapse of more time before the actual surgery took place became irrelevant.

A § 1983 claim accrues when a reasonable person should have been alerted to protect their rights.

Hartfield v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools · filed 1997-02-14

A cause of action accrues under section 1983 at the time a reasonable person should have been alerted to protect his or her rights.

For a § 1983 claim alleging arrest without probable cause, awareness of the alleged lack of probable cause at the arrest starts the limitations clock.

Sisk v. Shelby County, Tenn. · filed 1997-04-01

Sisk does not allege that he was arrested without probable cause. To the extent that he does so allege, he was aware of any lack of probable cause on the date of his arrest. Consequently, any probable cause claim is untimely.

A prisoner’s § 1983 due-process claim arising from disciplinary proceedings does not accrue until the prisoner succeeds in having the disciplinary ruling reversed by the state court.

Hynes v. Lieutenant Drake, Hearing Officer, Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections · filed 1997-04-10

Subsequent to the decision of the district court, we held in Black that a “cause of action for denial of due process in ... disciplinary proceedings d[oes] not accrue until [the prisoner] succeed[s] in having the disciplinary ruling reversed by the state court.” 76 F.3d at 75. ... After considering the briefs submitted by the parties and hearing argument, we hold, in light of Black, that the decision of the district court denying Hynes’s request for leave to amend his complaint to add Fierro because the claim was time-barred was erroneous.

A § 1983 claim accrues, starting the borrowed limitations period, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Raineri v. Donovan, et al. · filed 1997-04-17

Under federal law, a plaintiff's § 1983 cause of action accrues, and the borrowed limitations period begins to run, when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Lara v. California Youth Authority William B. Kolender Peter A. Marchi Vivian Crawford · filed 1997-04-23

A cause of action for damages under § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful conviction does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated. Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Because Lara's allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and he has not shown that his conviction was invalidated, his cause of action under § 1983 has not accrued.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal judgment does not accrue until that judgment is overturned.

Aulvin v. Wabash County, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1997-06-16

It appears that Aulvin's challenge to the seizure of his money would have necessarily impugned the validity of the criminal judgment. Such a cause of action would not have accrued until the overturning of the criminal judgment in 1992-less than two years before the filing of the complaint. Thus we reverse the dismissal of Aulvin's § 1983 claims under the statute of limitations, and remand for further proceedings on those claims.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim based on malicious prosecution accrues when the wrongful conviction is invalidated.

Newsome v. James · filed 1997-07-01

A claim for malicious prosecution does not accrue until a wrongful conviction is invalidated. ... He could not have recovered damages for the malicious prosecution until that date, and so his claim for conspiracy based on malicious prosecution did not accrue until then either.

Mental incapacity may delay accrual of a § 1983 deprivation-of-liberty claim arising from involuntary medical or psychiatric confinement.

Ormiston v. Nelson · filed 1997-07-03

Because, as we hold, mental incapacity may delay the accrual of a section 1983 claim for deprivation of liberty, we believe plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege mental incapacity at the time of his confinement.

A Section 1983 claim accrues, starting the borrowed limitations period, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury caused by the defendant.

Snyder v. Eno, et al. · filed 1997-09-30

Under federal law, a plaintiff’s § 1983 cause of action accrues, and the borrowed limitations period begins to run, when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, that he or she has been injured by the defendant’s conduct.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the violation if success would not necessarily invalidate a potential conviction on a pending criminal charge.

Washington v. John Summerville, Detective 16520, P. Foley, Detective 12215, J. Capesius, Detective 11093 · filed 1997-11-13

Washington’s success on either his unlawful arrest or excessive force claim would not have necessarily implied the invalidity of a potential conviction on the murder charge against him. Accordingly, the statute of limitations on Washington’s claims began to run when he knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had been violated — the date of his arrest, March 9,1991.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim does not accrue until the plaintiff has been exonerated of the charges.

Hutchinson v. Wichita Falls Police · filed 1998-04-15

Because Hutchinson has not been exonerated of the charges, his claim has not accrued, and he thus has no cause of action under § 1983.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues; a claim alleging that legislation impaired a contract accrues when the amendment becomes law, rather than when its consequences take effect.

Smith v. City of Enid · filed 1998-07-15

Thus, the constitutional injury, the injury which triggers the statute of limitations for purposes of § 1983, occurred when the 1990 amendment became law, not when the consequence of that constitutional injury--here, Mr. Smith's termination by the City and System--manifested itself.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Marbi Corp. of New York v. Puhekker · filed 1998-07-24

Under the applicable federal law, a § 1983 or § 1985 claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know” of the injury that is the basis of the action.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Williams v. City of Montgomery · filed 1998-10-16

Section 1983 actions do not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has been injured.

A § 1983 claim challenging denial of Medicaid assistance accrues when final unfavorable administrative action is taken, rather than when the application is filed.

Randall ex rel. Liskey v. Lukhard · filed 1983-06-08

We think it clear, however, that the date that plaintiffs' cause of action arose was the date that final unfavorable administrative action was taken, not the date that initial applications for assistance were filed.

A § 1983 claim challenging a parole revocation accrues when the revocation is invalidated.

Mathis v. Bd Pardon & Parole · filed 1999-02-12

Mathis’s cause of action for the unconstitutional revocation of his parole accrued when that revocation was invalidated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on May 31, 1995.

Section 1983 claims accrue when a plaintiff knows or should know that his constitutional rights have been violated.

Roberts v. Roe · filed 1999-10-05

Section 1983 claims arise when a plaintiff knows or should know that his constitutional rights have been violated.

A Section 1983 discriminatory discharge claim accrues when the employee receives notice of termination.

Torres v. Gonzalez · filed 1999-10-14

It is clear to the Court that the event that triggers the accrual of a cause of action for discriminatory discharge, such as the one being averred by plaintiff, is the notice of termination, such as the letter of dismissal that plaintiff received on March 4, 1994.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or should know that her constitutional rights have been violated.

Turner v. McQuarter · filed 1999-12-13

While state law establishes the statute of limitations and any applicable tolling provisions, federal law determines the accrual of her claims. ... “Civil rights claims, therefore, accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” ... Turner’s claims under § 1983 must be dismissed as untimely.

A Section 1983 claim accrues under federal common law, which treats the discovery rule as an accrual doctrine rather than a tolling doctrine.

Cloud v. Summers · filed 1999-12-13

The federal court was required to apply federal common law to decide when Darrell’s section 1983 claim accrued — and for federal claims, the discovery rule is a supplemental accrual doctrine, not a tolling doctrine.

Section 1983 claims challenging the constitutionality of a conviction have not accrued while that conviction remains valid.

Hagans v. Cruezot · filed 2000-02-17

Hagans’ claims under § 1983 concerning the constitutionality of his conviction have not yet accrued.

A § 1983 claim alleging an illegal search and seizure of evidence underlying criminal charges does not accrue until the charges are dismissed or the conviction is overturned.

Harvey v. Waldron · filed 2000-04-25

We believe that the Second and Sixth Circuits have taken the better approach and therefore hold that a § 1983 action alleging illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based does not accrue until the criminal charges have been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned.

A § 1983 claim challenging the validity of parole revocation proceedings has not accrued while the revocation remains valid.

Wallace v. Brumfield · filed 2000-06-19

Wallace’s cause of action under § 1983 concerning the validity of his parole revocation proceedings has not yet accrued.

A § 1983 claim does not accrue if success would necessarily call an outstanding conviction into question, unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Salts v. Moore · filed 2000-06-27

Thus, Salts’ success in his claims against the Defendants would necessarily draw into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. He must, therefore, demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated in order for the cause of action to accrue.

A § 1983 claim that necessarily challenges a conviction accrues when the conviction is invalidated, and the limitations period begins then.

Smith v. Gonzales · filed 2000-07-25

Thus, a § 1983 claim necessarily challenging the validity of a conviction does not arise until the conviction itself has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply a conviction’s invalidity do not accrue unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

McDade v. Thomas · filed 2000-12-13

Dismissal of McDade’s complaint as frivolous is supported by the record because his claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and there is no indication that the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Accordingly, McDade’s claims have not accrued.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is reversed or otherwise called into question; the claim may be dismissed while a post-conviction challenge is pending.

Hedrick v. Flores · filed 2000-12-26

However, in providing that a § 1983 claim does not accrue until a conviction is reversed or otherwise called into question, Heck clearly contemplates that dismissals may occur while post-conviction challenges are pending.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Nieves v. McSweeney · filed 2001-02-27

Consequently, a section 1983 claim accrues at the moment the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that is the basis for the claim.

A Section 1983 claim based on continued retention of property may accrue after the criminal proceedings end, rather than when the property was initially taken.

Manos v. Caira · filed 2001-03-30

Thus, Manos’ section 1983 claim accrued after the conclusion of Skoufis’ criminal proceedings and not on the date the initial retention of his firearms began.

A § 1983 claim arising from an allegedly illegal arrest generally accrues at the time of arrest.

Hall v. Geary County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-06-12

We are not persuaded by Mr. Hall’s argument. In Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Department , 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999), this circuit applied “the general rule that causes of action relating to an allegedly illegal arrest arise at the time of arrest.” Mr. Hall has failed to establish that any exception to that rule is applicable here.

A § 1983 claim accrues each time a renewed pension waiver causes a new injury, even if the plaintiff knew of the policy earlier.

Connolly v. McCall · filed 2001-06-14

Similarly, here Connolly, notwithstanding the fact that he knew in advance of this requirement, was forced every two years to give up accrual of Task Force pension benefits in order to retain his NYPD pension. As a result, a new claim accrued each time.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction accrues when that conviction is reversed, even if an unrelated conviction remains outstanding.

Potts v. Oshp Trooper M.E. Hill · filed 2001-08-16

Because a § 1983 claim relating to the concealed weapon conviction would not affect the validity of the outstanding speeding conviction, the two convictions, for purposes of Heck and Sha-maeizadeh are unrelated. Because the Fourth Amendment violation found in this case turned on the invalidity of the concealed weapon conviction, and not on the invalidity of the speeding conviction, the reversal of the concealed weapon conviction, under Heck and Shamaeizadeh, started the running of the limitations period.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply a conviction is illegal does not accrue until the conviction is reversed or vacated.

Shaw v. Mangione · filed 2001-10-23

In that case, the Supreme Court held that an action for monetary damages could not be brought if it would imply that a conviction was illegal, until the conviction had been reversed or vacated on appeal or collateral review. In this case, Shaw has alleged a conspiracy to wrongfully convict him, part of which included the defendants’ alleged action rendering him unable to participate in his defense at trial. However, it does not appear that Shaw’s conviction has been reversed or vacated. Accordingly, Shaw’s alleged claim has not accrued.

Federal law governs when a Section 1983 claim accrues: the claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury. State law supplies the filing period.

Rolax v. Whitman · filed 2001-11-01

While state law dictates the time within which a suit must be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is federal law that governs the date of the accrual of a cause of action. A federal civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the action.

Section 1983 claims for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution arising from a criminal prosecution may accrue if the prosecution ends in the claimant’s favor; if it ends in a conviction, the conviction must first be overturned.

Parker v. Phillips · filed 2001-11-07

The prosecution has not yet terminated in Parker’s favor, and thus any claims he may possess may yet accrue if the prosecution is indeed resolved in his favor. If any such prosecution ends in a conviction, Parker must have the conviction overturned on direct appeal or via collateral attack before any claims can accrue.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when a plaintiff knows or should know that their constitutional rights have been violated.

Brown v. Finzel · filed 2001-12-06

Federal law, however, governs the time for the accrual of § 1983 claims, which this court has determined to be “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Commission, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir.1998).

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues, generally when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Thomas v. Colonial Penn Insurance · filed 2002-01-08

However, for § 1983 claims, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues. ... Under federal law, a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Freeman v. State · filed 2002-01-23

A § 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F. 2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980).

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply a conviction is invalid do not accrue until the conviction has been set aside or overturned.

Melendrez v. Seib · filed 2002-02-22

The district court correctly determined that Melendrez’s § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Melendrez’s damages all arise from his alleged wrongful prosecution and imprisonment, so that his present action necessarily implies that his conviction is invalid. Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Melendrez was required to show that his conviction had been set aside or overturned in order for his civil rights action to accrue.

A Section 1983 coerced-confession claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction does not accrue until the plaintiff is exonerated.

Johnson v. Village of Riverdale · filed 2002-04-02

And that being the case, a judgment for Johnson in an attempted Section 1983 action that his “confession” was a nullity “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [any] conviction.” ... That alone is enough to defer the accrual of the claim that is now under consideration to the date in 2001 when Johnson was in fact exonerated.

A § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim accrues when the arrest occurs.

Nesbitt v. City of Champaign · filed 2002-04-04

The district court thus correctly determined that Nesbitt’s cause of action accrued when he was arrested.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Wells v. Jefferson County Sheriff Department · filed 2002-04-25

A civil rights claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights were violated.

Licari v. City of Chicago, Miriam Santos, Richard J. Jones, Walter K. Knorr and Charles R. Loftus, in Their Indivi · filed 2002-08-01

Additionally, such claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights were violated. ... Accordingly, his cause of action accrued when the City placed him on unpaid leave on May 28, 1997. Because his complaint was not filed until October 30, 2000, Licari's claim against the City is time barred.

A § 1983 retaliation claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action; a threat or proposed firing does not start the limitations period.

Hitt v. Connell · filed 2002-08-26

While Texas’s two-year statute of limitations applied to Hitt’s constitutional injury claims, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001), the date a § 1983 claim accrues is governed by federal, not state law. ... But neither the perception of a threat to one’s job, nor fear of being fired, nor even the proposed notice of firing constitutes an actionable injury. ... Hitt was injured, and his cause of action accrued, when his employment was terminated on March 5, 1997.

A § 1983 false arrest claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction accrues when that conviction is invalidated.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2002-09-16

Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim accrued in June 2000, not on the date of his arrest (July 7, 1995).

A § 1983 damages claim relating to a conviction cannot be brought until the conviction has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Evans · filed 2002-10-15

Accordingly, Johnson’s claim for monetary damages relating to his conviction could not have been brought pursuant to § 1983 until March 2000, a date well within the statutory period for bringing suit.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury underlying the claim.

Duff v. Yount · filed 2002-10-22

Duffs claims accrued on June 26, 2000, the day his requested transfer was canceled, because he knew of the injuries that were the basis for his legal action.

A § 1983 claim does not await the plaintiff’s discovery of the full extent of harm caused by a known constitutional violation.

Coleman v. Morall · filed 2003-04-04

Furthermore, because the relevant injury in a civil rights action is the violation of a constitutional right, it would be analytically incorrect to link accrual of a cause of action under § 1983 to a plaintiff’s knowledge concerning the extent of the harm the constitutional violation might have caused.

A Section 1983 claim for illegal search and seizure and malicious prosecution tied to pending criminal charges is not cognizable until the possibility of conviction has been extinguished.

Rosas v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2003-05-05

Hence, based on Harvey, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 action asserting claims for illegal search and seizure and malicious prosecution in filing the criminal action was not cognizable until the potential for Epifanio to be convicted of the concurrent criminal charges had been extinguished.

A § 1983 claim for denial of access to the courts accrues when the claimant sustains a relevant actual injury.

Shabazz v. Johnson · filed 2003-05-09

A cause of action for denial of access to the courts does not accrue until the claimant sustains a “relevant actual injury.”

A § 1983 procedural due process claim concerning a demotion is time barred when the grievance was denied outside the limitations period, even if the salary decrease occurred later.

Bell v. City of Dallas · filed 2003-07-18

Regarding their demotion-related claims, Bell and Andrade maintain: the limitations period for a procedural due process action did not begin until their salary was decreased, even though their grievance concerning the claimed demotions had been denied two years earlier; and the City’s charter entitled those demoted (pursuant to the city-wide reclassification) to an appellate hearing. Essentially for the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned opinion, these contentions are without merit.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the facts supporting them are apparent; an arrest and transport are discrete acts that do not support a continuing violation theory.

Tibbs v. State of Texas · filed 2003-10-03

This action accrued when Mr. Tibbs was arrested in 1992 and transported to Texas, as the facts were apparent. Although it is unclear whether a continuing violation theory may be applied to § 1983 claims, see Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994), it is clear that Mr. Tibbs’ arrest and transport to Texas are discrete acts for which a continuing violation theory would not apply.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim does not accrue until the conviction is invalidated when success on the claim would undermine that conviction.

Gauger, Gary A. v. Hendle, Beverly · filed 2003-10-30

We think that in these circumstances Gauger’s false-arrest claim did not accrue until his conviction was reversed, and so it was not untimely; therefore this part of the judgment for the defendants must be vacated and the case remanded.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction does not accrue while related criminal charges are pending.

Foti v. County of San Mateo · filed 2003-12-23

A finding of no probable cause would necessarily imply the invalidity of his potential conviction. Therefore, for any period in which charges were pending against Mr. Foti, his section 1983 claim was not cognizable, and did not accrue until the charges were dismissed.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Brademas, Thomas v. Indiana Housing Fin · filed 2004-01-12

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Brademas v. Indiana Housing Finance Authority · filed 2004-01-12

The accrual of a cause of action under § 1983 is a question of federal law, not state law.

A § 1983 claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a potential conviction does not accrue while the criminal charges remain pending.

Doggett v. Perez · filed 2004-02-27

Accordingly, their § 1983 claims did not accrue until sometime after April 6, 2000 and therefore, those claims contained in the complaint filed August 2002 are within the three year statute of limitations and are timely.

For a § 1983 employment claim, administrative review does not postpone accrual after the challenged employment decision is made.

Rogers v. Clevinger · filed 2004-03-19

Although Rogers engaged in an administrative review process following the adverse employment action, this process does not change the accrual date; the limitations period begins to run when the employer’s decision is made.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and its connection to the defendant’s actions.

Edwards v. Jasper County Youth Court · filed 2004-04-09

A cause of action for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and its causation “that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant’s actions.”

Section 1983 damages claims arising from land use decisions accrue when the relevant government authorities make a final decision about the property.

Chang v. Sonoma County · filed 2004-04-29

In land use cases such as this, claims for damages under § 1983 do “not accrue until the relevant governmental authorities have made a final decision on the fate of the property.”... The approval of the architectural plan was a final decision of the relevant government authority regarding the construction of the dwelling, placed Appellants on notice of their injury, and began the running of the California one-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation from an arrest made as part of a prosecution accrues when the prosecution ends in the plaintiff's favor.

Joseph v. Kimple · filed 2004-05-10

But where a § 1983 claim for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is based on an arrest that is made as part of a prosecution, it does not accrue until that prosecution terminates in the plaintiffs favor.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know her rights were violated; attempted election fraud does not start the clock before it causes the alleged injury.

Hileman, Susan C. v. Maze, Louis · filed 2004-05-10

But this is a § 1983 case focusing on injury to Hileman’s rights, not a conspiracy prosecution under § 241 focusing on the wrongful acts of the defendants. Under Chardon, it was the decision to return the tainted ballots and commingle them with the untainted versions that was the “operative decision” for accrual purposes.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Didden v. Village of Port Chester · filed 2004-05-24

As stated in my previous opinion, under federal law, a cause of action under § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.