42 U.S.C. § 1983

A retired officer cannot maintain a Section 1983 due-process claim over denial of a concealed-weapons certificate when the state's good-cause standard does not create a protected property interest.

Association Of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates · filed 1983-09-23

This court finds, as did the court below, that the requirement of "good cause" prior to the denial of a weapons certificate does not create a constitutionally protected interest, because it is not a "significant substantive restriction on the basis for [the] agency's action."

Section 1983 does not protect a public employee’s asserted interest in publicly reimbursed counsel of the employee’s choice when state law and agreements create no entitlement beyond an abstract desire.

Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. County of Suffolk · filed 1984-10-18

The plaintiffs do not have any property interest in reimbursed representation of their choice that is secured by more than an abstract need or desire which would support an action under § 1983.

An eligible applicant for privately owned Section 8 housing has no property entitlement supporting a Section 1983 due-process claim until a private owner accepts the application.

Eidson v. Pierce · filed 1984-12-06

They are entitled to housing, as opposed to eligible for it, only after a private owner accepts their applications.

Section 1983 does not turn every arbitrary license or permit denial into a due-process claim; an applicant needs a protected property interest shown by certainty or a very strong likelihood that the application would otherwise have been granted.

Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 1985-03-20

Section 1983, upon which plaintiffs depend, does not guarantee a person the right to bring a federal suit for denial of due process in every proceeding in which he is denied a license or a permit. ... For these reasons the question of whether an applicant has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the issuance of a license or certificate should depend on whether, absent the alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood that the application would have been granted.

Whether a section 1983 due-process plaintiff has a protected property interest may be decided as a matter of law when the state law creating the asserted interest permits a legal determination.

Malcak v. The Westchester Park District · filed 1985-04-08

To state the rule clearly: The determination of whether a plaintiff has a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause may be made by the court as a matter of law if the state law from which the interest derives would allow the determination to be made as a matter of law.

A section 1983 property interest is determined by state law, and a void employment policy creates no protected interest in continued public employment.

Koppi v. Board of Control of Whiteside Area Vocational Center · filed 1985-05-31

The existence of such a constitutionally protected interest is determined by reference to State law. ... We hold that the old policy of the board did not create a protected property interest. As we held above, that policy was void. The statutory policy controlled. Koppi had no protected property interest in further employment by the board or any member district.

A constitutionally protected property interest in certificates of occupancy may support a § 1983 due-process claim.

Acorn Ponds v. Incorporated Village of North Hills · filed 1985-07-22

Accordingly, APNH had a property interest in the right to C of O’s that was protected by the Constitution. ... Since these claims, if proven, would constitute a violation of plaintiff’s right to due process, they are, therefore, cognizable under § 1983.

A procedural personnel memorandum does not create a constitutionally protected employment property interest enforceable under § 1983.

Rafferty v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1985-09-06

It is not the type of departmental policy statement which can become a “property interest” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

A public employee fully paid through the end of his contract has no protected property interest in continuing to perform the job itself.

Royster v. Board of Trustees of Anderson County School District No. Five · filed 1985-10-03

We are convinced that any constitutionally protected property interest Royster had as a result of his employment contract has been satisfied by payment of the full compensation due under the contract.

A plaintiff alleging deprivation of property under § 1983 must possess a property interest recognized by state law.

Staheli v. University of Mississippi · filed 1985-11-04

In order to prevail under either the fourteenth amendment or section 1983, the plaintiff must possess a property interest under the law of the state.

A willful, coercive denial of lawful property use by city officials rises to a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983.

Mindich Developers, Inc. v. Hunziker · filed 1985-12-02

The willful violation shown rises to the level of a Constitutional violation which may be redressed under § 1983.

State statutes granting prisoners wages and authorizing only specified deductions create a property interest that prison officials cannot deny without due process, supporting a § 1983 claim for unauthorized deductions.

Turner v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners · filed 1985-12-13

Accordingly, because we find that no statutory authority for maintenance deductions prior to the new amendment existed and that Nevada statutes established the plaintiffs’ right to compensation for work performed, defendants could not deny that right to plaintiffs without affording them due process of law.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural-due-process claim over accumulated compensatory time when state rules clearly limit accrual and create no protected property entitlement beyond that limit.

Jackson v. Department of Public Safety for Louisiana · filed 1985-12-27

Applying these legal principles to the undisputed facts in this matter, the court must conclude that the plaintiff has not demonstrated a constitutionally protected interest in this instance.

Section 1983 provides no procedural-due-process claim for denial of a discretionary liquor license when state law creates no protected property interest in obtaining the license.

Cheek v. Glen Gooch, as Sole Commissioner, Union County, Georgia · filed 1986-01-13

Because state law does not grant Cheek a property interest in the opportunity to acquire a license, Gooch’s failure to establish standards for the granting of a license does not violate Cheek’s due process rights.

A municipal business license does not create a property right to use public sidewalks for private commercial activity and therefore does not support a Section 1983 claim when that use is revoked.

Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls · filed 1986-02-19

Although in the instant case Kleiber may have been issued a business license, such license did not confer upon him any property right to use the public sidewalks for the conduct of his business. Therefore, the city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A Section 1983 zoning claim requires a legitimate entitlement to a protectable property interest in a permit before the challenged rezoning.

Gusley v. City of Cleveland · filed 1986-03-20

In the zoning context, they must show that they had a protectable property interest in a permit prior to the rezoning action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deductions from prison wages when state law makes payment discretionary and expressly conditions the wages on repayment of court costs.

Hrbek v. Harold Farrier Crispus C. Nix Bruce McDonald Neal Boeding · filed 1986-03-27

In similar fashion we hold today that the warden’s deduction of a part of Hrbek’s wages pursuant to section 218.43 does not amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property right.

A state-created right to public education does not create a property entitlement to receive that education in a particular setting, such as an all-girls school.

Jones on Behalf of Michele v. Board of Educ. · filed 1986-04-11

Accordingly, because plaintiffs possess no entitlement to education at an all-girls school, conversion of W.I.H.S. to a coeducational school deprives them of no property interest and triggers no due process rights.

Section 1983 provides no due-process claim over prison officials’ disposal of property when reasonable prison regulations leave the inmate without a protected property interest.

Bryant v. Barbara · filed 1986-04-17

We conclude that, even if the petitioner could state a claim for a civil rights violation under § 1983, no violation of due process took place in this case because petitioner had no property right which was infringed upon by the action of the respondents.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when state law gives a licensing applicant no entitlement to the certificate before passing the required examination.

Thomas v. Board of Examiners, Chicago Public Schools · filed 1986-11-19

Thus, the defendants had the power to refuse to give plaintiff a principal’s certificate after she failed the examination because, having never passed it, at no time before, during, or after the examination did she acquire a property interest in a principal’s certificate.

Employment rules allowing discharge only for just cause create a protected property interest enforceable under Section 1983, requiring notice and an opportunity to respond before termination.

Nowak v. City of Calumet City · filed 1986-12-10

We hold that Nowak had a property interest in her position as a City reserve police officer, and that defendants deprived her of that interest without due process of law as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 protects a tenant's state-created property interest in preventing constructive eviction through termination of water service, requiring pretermination notice sufficient to seek an injunction.

DiMassimo v. City of Clearwater · filed 1986-12-19

Therefore, under the definition of "property interest" commonly used for section 1983 purposes, see, e.g. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the actual users of water utilities service may have protectable interests. ... Consequently, we hold that the district court was correct in holding that pretermination notice to the tenant is necessary to prevent the City from destroying rights granted him by state law.

A § 1983 due-process claim requires a state-law property entitlement; contributors to a public pension fund have no protected interest in particular investment earnings when state law grants only pension-payment rights.

Crown v. Trustees of the Patrolmen's Variable Supplements Fund · filed 1987-01-15

As a result, plaintiffs lack a property interest in the investment earnings of the Pension Fund, as well as in the Supplements Funds, upon which due process could attach. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to state a federal constitutional claim in their complaint, and their suit must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires a property interest grounded in an independent source such as valid state law; an ordinance invalidated by controlling state law creates no protected property interest.

Robinson v. The City of Montgomery City · filed 1987-01-27

Property interests are not created by the Constitution itself. They must find their basis in some independent source, such as state law, and here state law negatives the theory upon which plaintiff attempts to proceed.

A lowest responsible bidder may have a state-created property interest enforceable under § 1983 when procurement law directs officials to award the contract to that bidder and materially limits their discretion.

Andersen-Myers Co., Inc. v. Roach · filed 1987-02-25

When a state has this type of statute, one who submits the lowest bid and fulfills all the requirements of being a “responsible” bidder certainly has more than a unilateral expectation of being awarded the bid. ... These constitute “rules or understandings that secure certain benefits,” ... through which the State of Kansas has created a legitimate claim of entitlement within the United States Supreme Court’s definition of a property interest.

An alleged decline in real-property value caused by a zoning decision is not itself a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation supporting Section 1983 relief.

Fusco v. Connecticut · filed 1987-03-26

Plaintiffs’ second claim — that the value of their real property will decline absent relief — fares no better. Assuming the truth of the claim, the Fuscos have failed to allege a ... deprivation ... cognizable under the fourteenth amendment.

A mandatory taxicab-license transfer procedure creates a protected property entitlement that a city cannot suspend without legal authority, notice, or a hearing.

Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte · filed 1987-03-27

Given the mandatory language of the ordinance, plaintiffs clearly possessed a legitimate claim of entitlement to these transfers. ... The Commissioner’s abrogation of the assignment procedure, which provided neither a pre- nor a post-deprivation hearing clearly violated plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process.

A state creates a protected liberty interest in parole only when substantive criteria and mandatory language require release once the criteria are satisfied.

Dace v. George Mickelson, Harold Shunk, and Jon Erickson · filed 1987-06-19

If the statute, rule, or regulation only mandates that the state officials follow certain procedures or take into account certain factors, but specifically provides that the prisoner’s release is nevertheless discretionary with the board, as evidenced by the use of discretionary language, then no protected liberty interest has been created.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires an identified property right, governmental deprivation of that right, and deprivation without due process.

Fusco v. The State Of Connecticut · filed 1987-07-07

Where, as here, a party claims a deprivation of property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment, the second Parratt element embraces the following inquiry: (a) whether a property right has been identified; (b) whether governmental action with respect to that property right amounts to a deprivation; and (c) whether the deprivation, if one be found, was visited upon the plaintiff without due process of law.

Section 1983 remedies a deprivation of constitutional rights, but the existence of a protected public-employment property interest is determined by state law.

Hartley v. Human Resources Administration · filed 1987-07-27

While 42 USC § 1983 provides a means to redress a deprivation of constitutional rights, whether or not the petitioner has a protected property right in her employment must be determined under State law.

A failed government contract creates no protected property interest for a § 1983 due-process claim when no enforceable contract was formed.

Saipan Secretarial/Employment Services, Inc. v. Commonwealth · filed 1987-10-13

This conclusion readily dismisses plaintiff's §1983 claim against the Government. Since there was no contract, there was no protectible interest.

A first-time license applicant has a protected property interest for a § 1983 due-process claim only when there is certainty or a very strong likelihood that the license would issue absent the challenged lack of process.

Bradfield v. Blesma · filed 1987-11-25

Generally, an applicant for a license will only be held to have a legitimate, Fourteenth Amendment claim of entitlement to the issuance of that license on a finding that, absent the alleged denial of process, there is a certainty or very strong likelihood that the permit or license would have been granted.

A prisoner cannot state a Section 1983 due-process claim over a reduced wage grade following transfer unless state law or a settled understanding creates a legitimate entitlement to retain that grade.

Salahuddin v. Coughlin · filed 1987-11-30

Plaintiff has not been able to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of transferring his wage grade to a new facility. Barring that expectation, he has no legally cognizable property right in that wage grade which can survive transfer to a different facility. Thus, plaintiff has not made the threshold showing requisite for a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Revoking an invalidly issued building permit without notice or a hearing does not support § 1983 relief when state law recognizes no property right in that permit.

Calvin L. Gunkel and Mildred A. Gunkel v. City of Emporia, Kansas and Russell Schoenberger · filed 1987-12-29

Since the permit was not validly issued there is no property right in it under Kansas law. Thus, revocation of the permit without notice or hearing does not amount to a harm for which section 1983 provides a remedy.

A transitory public employee’s subjective expectation of continued annual reappointment does not create a property interest enforceable under Section 1983 when the appointment expires, absent a provable act of political discrimination aimed at the employee.

Vazquez v. Roque · filed 1988-01-21

However, where, as here, a transitory employee is discharged at the time his transitory position expires, a mere subjective expectancy that his employment would continue from year to year indefinitely, creates no property interest in employment absent a provable direct political discriminatory act aimed at the given citizen.

For a bidder's § 1983 due process claim, state law determines whether a protected property interest exists, and an ordinance allowing the city to reject any or all bids creates no such interest for an unsuccessful bidder.

MC Thomas Const. Co. v. City of St. Louis, Mo. · filed 1988-02-19

Plaintiffs have filed their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants have deprived plaintiff M.C. Thomas of its constitutional right to due process. ... L & H Sanitation clearly directs the Court to look to state law to determine whether a property right exists. ... This language does not create any property rights in the unsuccessful bidders. The Court does not believe the likelihood of success on the merits is very great.

For a Section 1983 procedural due process claim, state law can create a protected property interest in a government contract through an administrative claims process despite a bar on judicial enforcement.

Medical Laundry Service v. The Board Of Trustees Of The University Of Alabama · filed 1988-03-23

The scope of plaintiff's property interest under Sec. 1983 is defined by state law. ... We conclude that the provisions whereby the Board of Adjustment "adjusts" claims is just such a set of rules securing plaintiff's interest in the instant contract.

A state contract can supply a protected property interest for a § 1983 procedural due process claim when state rules provide an administrative process to secure the contract claim, even if the contract cannot be enforced in court.

Medical Laundry Service v. Board of Trustees · filed 1988-03-23

The scope of plaintiff’s property interest under § 1983 is defined by state law. ... We conclude that the provisions whereby the Board of Adjustment “adjusts” claims is just such a set of rules securing plaintiff’s interest in the instant contract.

A corporation’s contract to supply medical services to the state does not by itself confer a constitutionally protected interest enforceable under § 1983.

San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, Board of Supervisors for San Bernar · filed 1987-08-26

We do not rule that a corporation can never avail itself of section 1983 to protect its purely contractual rights; we are unable to anticipate every type of contract to which a corporation or similar entity might be party. It is enough to hold that Physicians’ Group’s contract to supply medical services to the state does not confer any constitutionally protectible interest on Physicians’ Group.

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief when a state actor deprives them of a protected liberty or property interest without due process.

Grey v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2008-02-14

This Court has stated that “mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest.” ... We find that Grey lacked a protected property interest in his DISD employment and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Grey’s § 1983 property interest claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for redress when a person acting under color of state law wrongfully deprives someone of constitutional or statutory rights, including property rights, and its claims use the applicable two-year limitations period.

Dutoit v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs · filed 1983-07-15

The plaintiffs’ claims under the federal statute do state claims upon which relief may be granted. ... The plaintiffs’ § 1983 action has been timely filed. ... Dutoits do have a right under § 1983 to protect their property rights. The statute provides relief to the landowner if the Board acting under the color of the law wrongfully deprived them of their property.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state-contract bidder’s claimed property interest in a contract that was not awarded to it.

Estey Corp. v. Matzke · filed 1976-08-06

Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff has been deprived of a property interest, such an interest may not be vindicated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, a nonsettling defendant may not deduct a codefendant’s settlement from the judgment when the court adopts state law that disallows the credit.

Johnson v. John Rogers, County of Meeker of the State of Minnesota · filed 1980-05-07

Adopting Minnesota law as the federal rule of decision for this issue, we hold that the sheriff may not deduct from the judgment obtained against him the amount of the settlement negotiated between the plaintiff and the County of Meeker.

In a § 1983 civil-rights action, § 1988 directs courts to apply federal law where suitable and otherwise use state law unless it is inconsistent with federal law or the purposes of § 1983, which include compensating victims of federal-rights deprivations and preventing abuses of state power.

Miller v. Apartments And Homes Of New Jersey, Inc. · filed 1981-04-22

Since this is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1988 determines choice of law. As construed by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), § 1988 instructs that if federal law does not cover an issue, then state law should provide the rule of decision unless "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." In the instant case, as federal law does not answer the question of the effect of a plaintiff's settlement with one defendant on an award of damages against a non-settling defendant, state law should serve as the federal rule of decision unless inconsistent with the policies underlying a § 1983 cause of action. Among the principal objectives of § 1983 are "compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law." Robertson v. Wegmann, supra, 436 U.S. at 590-91, 98 S.Ct. at 1995. Neither of these concerns would seem to be hindered by adoption of the Minnesota Court's approach.

Section 1983 does not specify whether a settlement offsets actual damages; an award may be reduced by the amount received in settlement under law that fills that gap.

Big Elk v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-01-31

As a preliminary matter, we note that § 1983 does not contain any provision as to the propriety of offsetting an actual damages award because of a settlement. ... For purposes of this case, whether we are guided by federal law or state law is not important because, under either, there would be a reduction in the plaintiffs’ actual damages award because of the money received as part of the settlement agreement.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek a new parole hearing under constitutionally proper procedures.

Farmer v. McVey · filed 2009-10-19

The United States Supreme Court has held that materially indistinguishable claims may be brought under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the District Court erred in determining that this aspect of the complaint is frivolous.

Section 1983 is a proper vehicle for a prisoner’s suit even when the ultimate goal is release on parole.

Grennier, Richard L. v. Frank, Matthew · filed 2006-07-05

Grennier’s suit rests on 42 U.S.C. §1983, which is proper even though the end in view is release on parole.

Section 1983 covers prisoner claims challenging procedures used to make parole decisions rather than seeking release on parole.

Richards v. Sondalle · filed 2001-06-14

We think that Richards’s original choice was correct-that this case arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge procedures for future parole hearings when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Lynch v. Hubbard · filed 1999-04-15

Accordingly, the rule of Heck does not apply, and the plaintiffs may rely on section 1983 to assert their claims.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to seek damages and declaratory relief for impermissible parole decisions, and potentially an injunction against future denials.

Texas Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake · filed 1981-01-08

To the extent that these prisoners seek damages, a declaratory judgment, and possibly an injunction enjoining the prospective denial of paroles for impermissible reasons, they may properly bring a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek parole consideration when the prisoner does not claim a right to release.

McCray v. Dietz · filed 1980-12-11

Petitioner McCray does not assert that he is entitled to parole and should be released. His argument is that the parole board should consider his eligibility. Thus, this court believes that petitioner’s claim for relief must be treated as a suit under § 1983 and not as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional denial of parole unless the prisoner alleges that the sentence has been reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Jihad Caliph Muhammad v. James Gomez Daniel E. Lungren P.L. Kernan Pete Wilson · filed 1997-07-17

Insofar as Muhammad seeks damages for the allegedly unconstitutional denial of parole, his claim must be dismissed because he failed to allege that his sentence has been reversed, expunged, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits challenges to parole decision procedures; challenges to the results of those decisions must be brought in habeas corpus.

Metheny v. Hammonds · filed 1999-03-24

Attacks on procedures used in parole decisions are cognizable under § 1983. However, attacks on the results of such decisions are not and must instead be brought pursuant to a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 permits a parole challenge when success would improve eligibility for early release without entitling the prisoner to immediate parole.

Reed v. Mosley · filed 1999-09-03

Because Reed’s challenges, if upheld, will enhance his eligibility for early release but will not entitle him to an immediate parole, the challenge within a § 1983 lawsuit is proper.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would only improve eligibility for earlier release.

Sinclair v. Ward · filed 1999-12-28

Because a successful resolution of his claim may only enhance his eligibility for an enhanced accelerated release, his pleadings were properly construed as a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would result in a new hearing rather than immediate or speedier release.

Seagroves v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2002-06-25

Upon review, we vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for further consideration because Seagroves’s challenge to the statutes and procedures applied during his parole hearing is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek an injunction requiring a parole board to use constitutionally valid procedures in future hearings.

Reed v. McKune · filed 2002-07-26

Because Reed contends that the parole board is improperly requiring him to complete the SATP in violation of the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses, his action seeking injunctive relief to compel the board to abide by constitutionally acceptable procedures in the future is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would yield only a new discretionary hearing whose outcome cannot be predicted.

Dotson v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Rogerico Johnson v. Margarette Ghee · filed 2003-05-19

Thus, where a prisoner does not claim immediate entitlement to parole or seek a shorter sentence but instead lodges a challenge to the procedures used during the parole process as generally improper or improper as applied in his case, and that challenge will at best result in a new discretionary hearing the outcome of which cannot be predicted, we hold such a challenge cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to the procedures a state uses to make parole determinations.

Gaines v. John B. Metzger, III James S. Gilmore, III Ron Angelone John Jabe George Allen · filed 1996-07-26

Because Appellant could amend his complaint to specify only challenges to parole procedures under § 1983, see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because we find that portion of the order is not appealable.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures, including through an ex post facto claim.

Brown v. Dretke · filed 2006-06-06

Thus it appears that the district court erred by not treating Brown’s parole-procedure claim as a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a due process challenge to parole board procedures.

Swihart v. Wilkinson · filed 2006-11-21

Although Swihart’s due process challenge to the procedures used by the parole board is cognizable under § 1983 pursuant to Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), Swihart failed to state a violation of due process.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action to challenge execution procedures, but not an inmate’s death sentence or the death penalty generally.

Emmett v. Johnson · filed 2007-09-20

The permissible scope of a constitutional challenge to execution procedures brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is narrow. A civil rights action is not an appropriate vehicle to contest either an inmate’s sentence of death or the constitutionality of the death penalty generally. In this case, Plaintiff does neither. The United States Supreme Court has held that the boundaries of civil rights litigation in this context are wide enough to encompass medical procedures incident to the execution process and the chemical formula used in carrying out the lethal injection.

Section 1983 allows an inmate to challenge state parole procedures when success would only make the inmate eligible for discretionary parole.

Bartley v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2007-12-06

But Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005), makes clear that an inmate may challenge state parole procedures in an action under § 1983 when success would merely mean becoming eligible for a discretionary grant of parole, as opposed to being released immediately from prison or having one’s release date bumped up.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would lead at most to a new eligibility review, rather than immediate release or a shorter sentence.

Ellibee v. Feleciano, Jr. · filed 2010-03-23

The district court first properly differentiated between Mr. Ellibee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights complaint and his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. As the district court ... recognized, success on a prisoner’s civil-rights claims would “mean[] at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new parole application.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). In contrast, a § 2241 habeas petition is appropriate where a prisoner seeks “either immediate release from prison or the shortening of his term of confinement.” Id. at 79 (quotation omitted).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s confinement, but it does not permit claims that would invalidate a parole revocation or shorten imprisonment.

Thorne vs Florida Parole Commission · filed 2011-05-24

Therefore, the district court properly concluded that those particular claims were not cognizable under § 1983. ... The district court correctly recognized that Thorne’s other challenges to Florida's parole procedures were cognizable under § 1983, as success on those claims would not necessarily lead to Thorne’s release from custody.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against their prospective application in future proceedings.

Smith v. Franklin · filed 2012-03-07

It’s true that an inmate may challenge parole procedures through § 1983 “[w]hen seeking injunctive or declaratory relief” against the prospective application of challenged procedures in future parole proceedings.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner challenging execution procedures to show more than the potential for something to go wrong.

Thorson v. Epps · filed 2012-11-14

The nature of a § 1983 claim thus forces the prisoner to show more than just the potential for something to go wrong.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to parole procedures when success would not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s confinement.

Richard Wershe, Jr. v. Combs · filed 2014-08-13

Because “success in [his] § 1983 claim would not necessarily affect the duration of his sentence because prison officials would retain discretion regarding whether to grant him parole,” the habeas exception does not bar Wershe’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to seek consideration for parole when success would not necessarily lead to release.

Kerlin v. Barnard · filed 2018-11-09

Mr. Kerlin’s claim in this case—that Georgia officials failed to consider whether he should be paroled—could be asserted under § 1983, and, therefore, cannot be brought in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 provides a claim for relief against a parole board for allegedly unconstitutional parole procedures.

People of Michigan v. Johnson · filed 2019-06-18

The appropriate vehicle in which to seek redress of the alleged wrong done by the parole board is a claim for relief under 42 USC § 1983 filed against the parole board.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole board procedures in a civil rights action after exhausting available state remedies.

Richards v. Lesatz · filed 2019-09-30

The Court notes that a prisoner may challenge the procedures used by a parole board to deny him parole under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after exhausting available state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek equitable relief challenging the accuracy of parole board findings when the prisoner does not challenge the sentence or seek immediate or speedier release.

Jacob v. Cotton · filed 2021-01-14

Plaintiff is not challenging the legality of his sentence or seeking immediate or speedier release—claims that can only be pursued through a habeas action after exhausting state remedies. Rather, Plaintiff is challenging the accuracy of the parole board’s factual findings, making this case one in “the narrow class of cases in which a prisoner can file a section 1983 action seeking equitable relief.” Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 is not a proper avenue to seek recusal of a state-court judge.

Taylor v. Puryear · filed 1997-08-20

Section 1983 is not a proper avenue to pursue the recusal of a state-court judge.

In Mississippi, a state employee who pursues a Section 1983 termination claim in state court must use the Employee Appeals Board process and its appeals rather than file an original circuit-court action.

East Mississippi State Hospital v. Callens · filed 1999-10-26

For that reason, we conclude that, once Callens exercised his own unfettered option to pursue Section 1983 relief in a state forum rather than in federal court, he was bound to pursue the claim under the procedural rules as defined by existing Mississippi Supreme Court case law and that, under those precedents, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain this original action seeking to redress those grievances set out in Callens's complaint.

Section 1983 does not preempt neutral state procedural rules governing interlocutory review of claims brought in state court.

Sloan v. Toler · filed 2001-03-14

We do not agree that section 1983 preempts state procedural rules.

Section 1983 actions filed in state court follow the state’s rules of civil procedure.

Charron v. Holden · filed 2003-08-05

When an action under Section 1983 is filed in state court, the state’s rules of civil procedure apply, not the federal rules.

Section 1983 permits liability for a police officer who fails to intercede to prevent an unlawful arrest.

Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority · filed 1997-08-21

Failure to intercede to prevent an unlawful arrest can be grounds for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits liability against a police officer who fails to intercede to prevent another officer’s unlawful arrest.

Ricciuti v. Transit Authority · filed 1997-08-21

Failure to intercede to prevent an unlawful arrest can be grounds for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 liability for failure to intercede cannot stand when the jury finds no constitutional violation.

Allan v. Cummings · filed 2006-07-27

Because the jury concluded there was no constitutional violation, Allan cannot show that these officers failed to intercede or were accessories to a crime. Judgment in their favor was therefore proper.

Section 1983 permits liability for failing to intercede only when an officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent a fellow officer’s constitutional violation.

Arias v. Amador · filed 2014-11-21

However, a law enforcement officer may only be held liable for failing to intercede if he had a “realistic opportunity” to do so.

Expert witness fees are not recoverable in suits under § 1983.

McLaughlin Ex Rel. McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee · filed 1997-08-29

Plaintiffs application for $14,050 for Prof. Thernstrom is denied because expert witness fees are not recoverable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Prof. Thernstrom did not testify.

Section 1983 claims against state National Guard officers for service-related constitutional injuries are barred by the Feres doctrine to the same extent as comparable Bivens claims against federal military personnel.

Bowen v. Keith Oistead United States of America Hugh L. Cox, III Dan E. Dennis, Kenneth M. Taylor State of Alask · filed 1997-09-12

We agree with the First Circuit and believe that insofar as the Feres doctrine extends to the state National Guard units, it shields state military officers from constitutional claims brought under section 1983 to the same extent that it protects federal military personnel from defending ... against Bivens actions raising the very same claims.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against the military or National Guard officers for claims arising from military service.

Bartley v. U.S. Department of the Army · filed 2002-08-07

Because the military and National Guard officers are immune from money damages under § 1983 and Bivens, and Plaintiffs seek only compensatory and punitive damages, the ING, Austin, Gebhardt and Harris, are immune from damages whether they arise from § 1983 or Bivens.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against fellow officers to proceed when their alleged agreement to retaliate falls outside the police force’s lawful interests, despite the intercorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Wheeler v. Piazza · filed 2019-03-05

The Court is skeptical that the ICD applies at all in this case. But if it does, the first or second exception likely applies, given that conspiring with a group of fellow officers to retaliate against another officer in violation of the First Amendment cannot be fairly described as within the lawful interests of the ISOS Police. Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claim is not barred by the intercorporate conspiracy doctrine and Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim against a police department and its employees for conspiring among themselves because they constitute a single legal entity.

Thompson Ex Rel. Sustaita v. City of Galveston · filed 1997-09-19

Therefore, for the purposes of Plaintiffs § 1983 conspiracy claim, the Galveston Police Department and its employees constitute a single legal entity which is incapable of conspiring with itself.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims are barred when the alleged conspirators are employees of the same entity acting within the scope of their employment.

Ajamu v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-05-20

We join the Eleventh Circuit and hold that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies in § 1983 suits to bar conspiracy claims where two or more employees of the same entity are alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly conspired together to deprive the plaintiff of his rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against employees of the same agency is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine unless they acted outside the scope of their employment.

Brown 708862 v. Beaudry · filed 2019-08-20

As a consequence, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under § 1983 is barred under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars a Section 1983 conspiracy claim against correctional officials acting within the same agency.

Baltas v. Rivera · filed 2019-08-21

As all defendants are correctional officials, the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is dismissed under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when a city knowingly continues a mutual aid policy that empowers an officer with a history of constitutional violations to respond to dangerous situations, and that policy directly causes a constitutional violation.

Drain v. Galveston County · filed 1997-10-07

Although the mutual assistance ordinance itself is not unconstitutional, Plaintiff alleges facts which would establish that League City deliberately continued a policy of empowering Constable Cooper to respond to potentially dangerous and explosive situations knowing that he had a history of constitutional violations. These factual allegations clearly meet the threshold necessary to preclude Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.

An informal city protocol may qualify as municipal policy under § 1983 when the evidence shows it was adopted as policy rather than offered as legal advice.

Ross v. Early · filed 2011-02-25

In their motions to dismiss, the City Defendants contended this protocol constituted only “legal advice,” rather than municipal policy, so they could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... They have not presented facts that would lead me to conclude they were only providing legal advice, and their argument that the Protocol did not constitute municipal policy remains unconvincing.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the officers acted contrary to a municipal policy and that policy did not cause the injury.

Sonia v. Town of Brookline · filed 2012-09-27

Because their actions were not authorized by the “always on duty” policy, the policy could not have caused the plaintiffs injury.

A police chief’s directive can count as municipal policy under § 1983 when the city has delegated police policymaking authority to the chief.

Jornaleros de Las Palmas v. City of League City · filed 2013-05-17

Special Order 09-07 is a municipal policy for the purpose of plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against League City.

A county cannot defeat a § 1983 municipal-policy claim by asserting that state law required its conduct when no state law was being applied.

Panzella v. Sposato · filed 2017-07-18

The County also argues that its adherence to New York law regarding the treatment of the firearms did not constitute a “policy” as required for a county to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Vives v. N.Y.C., 524 F.3d 346, 353–56, 358 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that city’s enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a “city policy” because the city was required to follow state law). Leaving aside the fact that we are here dealing with an injunction and not liability, this argument has no application here, because there was no state law being applied.

A § 1983 claim against a municipal entity must name the entity itself or officers in their official capacities; a sheriff’s department may be sued when state law permits it.

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department · filed 2006-01-06

A plaintiff wishing to bring a § 1983 action against a municipal entity must sue the entity itself or the individual officers in their official capacities, not municipal departments. Under Illinois law, the Sheriffs Department is a suable entity under § 1983.

A municipality sued under § 1983 has only an official capacity and need not be expressly designated as an “official capacity” defendant.

Walston v. City of Port Neches · filed 1997-10-17

The fact that the Complaint does not name the City as a defendant in its “official capacity” does nothing to affect the propriety of Plaintiffs claims against it. If the City is named, it is joined.

Section 1983 authorizes claims only against persons, and New York State is not a person under the statute.

Oppenheimer v. State of New York · filed 2017-07-20

Addressing next claimant’s federal constitutional free exercise cause of action, it is well settled that federal constitutional claims may not be asserted in the Court of Claims, given that the statutory basis for such claims, 42 USC § 1983, authorizes claims only against a “person” and defendant is not a person within the meaning of this statute (see Haywood v Drown, 556 US 729, 734 n 4 [2009]; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 184-185 [1996]; Blake v State of New York, 145 AD3d 1336, 1337 [2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 908 [2017]).

Section 1983 damages may be recovered from individuals, but not the State.

O'Donnoghue v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration · filed 2018-08-01

Third, § 1983 damages may be recovered only from individuals, not the State.

A state is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Pacheco-Lopez v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-08-26

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Gwin v. McWherter · filed 2019-10-23

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or its employees acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Martin v. Department of Children and Family Services · filed 2020-11-13

Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs’ Petition asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DCFS and against Gilbert, Trosclair and Bordelon in their official capacity, the claims must be dismissed because Defendants are not considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state, its parole board, or parole board members in their official capacities.

Wortman III v. State of Tennessee Board of Parole · filed 2020-04-03

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages from the Parole Board, the state of Tennessee, or any Parole Board member in his or her official capacity, such a request is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and does not fall within the purview of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or its officials sued in their official capacities.

Archer v. Retter · filed 2020-03-18

Third, the California Correctional Health Care Services and its officials sued in their official capacities are not subject to claims for damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a governmental entity liable for a judgment against an official in his personal capacity without a sufficient claim against the entity.

Aruanno v. Caldwell · filed 2016-01-12

Aruanno did not name the detention center or state as defendants, nor did he include sufficient allegations to support an official capacity claim. See id. at 166 (governmental entity liable under § 1983 only when entity itself is moving force behind deprivation of rights).

Section 1983 does not treat states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages as persons.

Jones v. Kentucky State Police · filed 2019-06-19

Additionally, states, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Unitt v. Spencer · filed 2018-04-10

A state, a state agency, or a state official sued in his or her official capacity is not subject to suit under § 1983, because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state prison or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Story v. Mechling · filed 2006-02-01

Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity as the Supreme Court has held that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons" under § 1983. ... Therefore, SCI-Waynesburg and the individual defendants acting in their official capacity are not subject to liability under § 1983 even absent their Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state corrections department or a state official sued in an official capacity.

Taylor v. Roper · filed 2003-12-12

PCC Superintendent Don Roper was not named in his individual capacity, and the Missouri Department of Corrections and Mr. Roper in his official capacity are not subject to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff who does not specify the capacity in which state officials are sued is treated as suing them in their official capacities and cannot recover monetary damages.

Berry v. Traughber · filed 2002-08-14

Because Berry did not specify the capacity in which he sues the individual defendants, the complaint is construed as suing them in their official capacity as employees of the state and Berry’s claim for monetary damages must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against state officials in their official capacities because the State is not a person potentially liable under the section.

Asquith v. Volunteers of America · filed 1998-03-20

Asquith's suit against Fauver and Keller in their official capacities must be dismissed because it is no different from a suit against the State itself and the State is not a "person” potentially liable under § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, a suit against a sheriff in his official capacity is a suit against the county, which cannot assert qualified immunity.

Big Elk v. Kastning · filed 1998-04-01

We note that the sheriff is sued in his official capacity. Thus the suit against him is a suit against the county. ... The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Campbell v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1998-08-28

The district court correctly ruled, however, that they may be sued in their official capacities for prospective, injunctive relief.

An official-capacity § 1983 suit against an Illinois county sheriff is treated as a suit against the county sheriff’s department rather than the county board.

June Franklin and Karen Huff v. John Zaruba, Dupage County Sheriff, in His Official Capacity and as an Agent of Dupage C · filed 1998-08-28

Furthermore, as Ryan held, the lack of identity between the county sheriff’s department and the general county government indicates that § 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the county sheriff’s department rather than the county board.

Section 1983 permits a suit for prospective relief against a state official in his official capacity.

Carillo v. DuBois · filed 1998-09-10

Section 1983, however, does permit suit for prospective relief against DuBois in his official capacity.

A § 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against an official requires that official to have authority to perform the requested act.

El-Ghori v. Grimes · filed 1998-09-24

Although it is true that a claim for prospective injunctive relief may fall outside the bar of the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiff fails to address the defendants’ contention that President Wefald does not have the authority to perform the acts requested. ... Because of that failure, and because it appears from the record that only the Kansas Board of Regents has the authority to grant tenure (Depo.Exh. 19 at 23), the court finds that the defendants’ are entitled to judgment on the claims against them in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state actors in their official capacities and damages against them in their personal capacities.

Marsh v. Kirschner · filed 1998-09-30

Section 1983 does permit individuals to seek injunc-tive relief against state actors in their official capacities, ... and to seek damages against them in their personal capacities.

State officials may be sued in their official capacities under § 1983 for prospective injunctive relief.

Campbell v. Arkansas Department Of Correction · filed 1998-10-14

The district court correctly ruled, however, that they may be sued in their official capacities for prospective, injunctive relief.

A § 1983 suit against Puerto Rico National Guard officers in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the Commonwealth, but the Eleventh Amendment permits prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against the officers.

Roig v. Puerto Rico National Guard · filed 1999-04-28

A § 1983 suit against the Puerto Rico National Guard and its officers in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. ... Since plaintiff is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as opposed to damages, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude his action before this court.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Ratliff v. Fields · filed 1999-06-11

Some of the allegations in the district court were clearly efforts to sue defendants in their official capacities as Department of Corrections officials. These claims are all barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A damage suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is an action against the state.

Section 1983 does not allow a district attorney to claim absolute prosecutorial immunity in an official-capacity suit.

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany · filed 1999-08-25

Consequently, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the District Attorney in his official capacity on the basis of his absolute prosecutorial immunity because that form of personal or individual immunity is not available in an official capacity suit.

Official-capacity claims under § 1983 are treated as suits against the government entity that employs the official.

Hall v. McGuigan · filed 1999-09-10

It is well settled that official capacity actions under § 1983 are treated as suits against the government entity employing the official.

Section 1983 claims against municipal officials in their official capacities are redundant when the municipality is also named as a defendant.

Wallikas v. Harder · filed 1999-10-25

In general, claims against municipal officials in their official capacities are really claims against the municipality and, thus, are redundant when the municipality is also named as a defendant.

An official-capacity claim against a sheriff under § 1983 is treated as a claim against the county.

Daniels v. Glase · filed 1999-11-03

Ms. Daniels’ claim against Sheriff Glase in his official capacity as sheriff is simply another way of suing Pontotoc County itself.

Section 1983 excludes states and state officials sued in their official capacities from the persons who may be sued under the statute.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 1999-11-16

The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which authorize suits against “persons” who act under the color of state law have been interpreted to exclude both the government and government officials when sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state employees sued in their official capacities.

El Ahkeen v. Parker · filed 2000-01-10

A suit for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, cannot be maintained against states, state agencies, or employees of the state in their official capacity.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity suit against a city employee as a suit against the city itself.

Rucker v. City of Kettering, Ohio · filed 2000-02-07

A suit against an individual in his "official capacity” is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity for which he works. ... Thus, Rucker's inclusion of City employees as Defendants adds nothing of substance to her Complaint.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against local officials may be dismissed as redundant when the plaintiff also sues the government entity.

Malone v. Fayette County, Tenn. · filed 2000-02-15

Defendants also move to dismiss all claims against Defendants Robinson and Kelly in their official capacities. ... Because Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims are redundant, they are DISMISSED.

An official-capacity § 1983 suit against a school superintendent is equivalent to a suit against the school district, making it duplicative to name both.

Shrum Ex Rel. Kelly v. Kluck · filed 2000-02-23

The naming of Wade as a defendant in this action is duplicative, since a suit against him in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against Elwood.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state agent sued in his official capacity.

Leslie v. Lacy · filed 2000-03-29

Since defendant Williams was acting as an agent of the state, the plaintiffs claim for monetary damages against defendant Williams in his official capacity is not cognizable under § 1983, Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, and defendant Williams is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity suit against county officers as a suit against the county.

McMillan v. Jackson Cty Bd Supr · filed 2000-04-11

Thus, the suit against the officers in their official capacities is in reality a suit against Jackson County.

Official-capacity § 1983 claims against prosecutors are claims against their office and are effectively dismissed when claims against that office are dismissed.

Comardelle v. Hernandez · filed 2000-07-26

When the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and entered an order dismissing their claims against the DA’s office, the court effectively dismissed the claims brought against Morel and Sins in their official prosecutorial capacities.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against individuals in their official capacities, but the Eleventh Amendment bars damages in those suits.

McKay v. Thompson · filed 2000-09-18

The district court correctly determined that the Eleventh Amendment permits prospective injunctive relief, but not damage awards, for suits against individuals in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Samuels v. Tschechtelin · filed 2000-10-13

The foregoing tenets also bar an action against Dr. Tschechtelin and the Trustees in their official capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against a municipal board or its members are not barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Turner v. Houma Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board · filed 2000-10-18

As there is no absolute quasi-judicial immunity defense available to the Board or to its members sued in their official capacity under § 1983, we affirm the district court’s partial denial of summary judgment.

An official-capacity suit under § 1983 is against the entity the official represents; when the official has been replaced, the successor is substituted for the official-capacity claim.

Figueroa v. Gates · filed 2000-11-03

An official capacity Section 1983 suit is really asserted against the entity represented by that official. Thus, where an official is replaced in the period preceding suit or during the pendency of the suit, it is appropriate to substitute the name of the replacement in place of the prior official, only with regard to the official-capacity basis for suit.

State employees sued in their official capacity are not persons liable for damages under § 1983.

Chenault v. Tennessee Department of Mental Health · filed 2001-03-07

The complaint did not indicate that the remaining defendants were being sued personally. Thus, it must be assumed that they were sued in their official capacity as state employees, and in that capacity they are not persons who may be liable for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity suits against state officials because they are not persons amenable to suit under it.

Roberson v. Hayti Police Dept. · filed 2001-03-09

State officials in their official capacity are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Thus, Sheckell and Riggs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims, and any failure in notice to Roberson was at most harmless error.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity suits against state officials because they are not persons amenable to suit under the section.

Roberson v. Hayti Police Department Paul Sheckell, Lt. Chris Riggs · filed 2001-03-09

State officials in their official capacity are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat officials sued in their official capacities as “persons” who may be sued.

Vinson v. Vinson · filed 2001-03-20

Officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their official capacities are treated as claims against the governmental body.

Paquet v. Pace, the Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority · filed 2001-03-30

Claims against state officials in their official capacity are, in reality, claims against the governmental body itself. ... Thus, the analysis that follows, discussing the claims against Pace, applies with equal force to the claims against DiJohn.

Section 1983 permits official capacity suits seeking only injunctive relief.

Dupuy v. McDonald · filed 2001-03-30

Official capacity suits like this one, however, that seek only injunctive relief, are permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment.

A § 1983 claim against a government employee in an official capacity is treated as a claim against the government entity; the official-capacity claim may be dismissed when the entity is also named.

United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union 1099 v. City of Sidney · filed 2001-05-02

Because Miller has been sued in his official capacity, the lawsuit is, in essence, against the municipality, namely Sidney City Schools. Since this municipal entity has been named as a Defendant in this litigation, Miller is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against him in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against Puerto Rico officials sued in their official capacity.

Placido Serrano Velez Y Otra v. E.L.A. De Pr. Y Otros · filed 2001-06-18

Es decir, las recurrentes sólo podían ser demandadas en su carácter personal al amparo de la sec. 1983 y conforme a su jurisprudencia interpretativa. Sin embargo, nos vemos forzados a desestimar la causa de acción del recurrido al amparo de dicha sección ya que surge de la demanda que las recurrentes fueron demandadas en su carácter oficial.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity suit against a county officer as a suit against the county itself.

Allen v. Leis · filed 2001-06-19

Specifically, a section 1983 action against a city official in his or her official capacity is treated as an action against the City entity itself. ... Accordingly, for the purposes of the official capacity claims herein, Hamilton County is the only true Defendant at issue in this case.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials seeking only injunctive relief.

Linnemeier v. Indiana University—Purdue University Fort Wayne · filed 2001-07-20

However, official-capacity suits against state officials that seek only injunctive relief are permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Here, it is clear that the Plaintiffs are suing solely for injunctive relief. Thus, the members of the Board of Trustees fall under this exception. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the members of the Board of Trustees in their official capacities is DENIED.

In a § 1983 suit, the school board is the real party in interest when its members are sued only in their official capacities and are not alleged to be personally responsible for the challenged conduct.

Downing v. West Haven Board of Ed. · filed 2001-08-24

Where an individual member of a school board is sued only in his or her official capacity, and there are no claims that the member was directly and personally responsible for the alleged conduct, courts in this Circuit have held that the Board, and not that individual member, is the real party in interest. ... Accordingly, the Board is the real party in interest, and summary judgment is granted in favor of the above-referenced members of the Board.

Section 1983 treats a suit against a municipal official in an official capacity as a suit against the municipality.

Mrosek v. Kraatz · filed 2001-09-30

For purposes of § 1983, a suit against individuals in their official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the municipality.

Section 1983 treats a suit against a government employee in an official capacity as a suit against the municipality itself.

Breeding v. Board of Trustees, Unpublished Decision (11-16-2001) · filed 2001-11-16

Breeding fails to state any actions taken by Wilcox and Neal in their individual capacities that violated Section 1983. Therefore, we will confine our discussion to violations of Section 1983 in their official capacities, and we note that when governmental employees are sued in their official capacities, the suit is construed as being against the municipality itself.

A § 1983 official-capacity claim against a school official is redundant when the school district is also named as a defendant.

Goins v. Hitchcock I.S.D. · filed 2002-03-20

Consequently, Plaintiffs claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are simply a reformulation of her claims against HISD. Given that Plaintiff has named HISD as a Defendant in this action, her official capacity claims for relief as to the remaining Individual Defendants are redundant.

Section 1983 claims against an officer in his official capacity duplicate claims against the municipality when the municipality is also named as a defendant.

LaForge v. Howard, Town of Hooksett · filed 2002-04-30

Claims against Chief Howard in his official capacity would be duplicative of the claims against Hooksett. To the extent that LaForge brings claims against Chief Howard in his official capacity, those claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 treats a state official sued in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief as a person acting under color of law.

Board of Trustees SABIS International School v. Montgomery · filed 2002-06-14

A state official, sued in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief, is a person acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983.