42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest on vague and conclusory allegations of its essential elements.

Loritz v. Pfingst · filed 2004-01-20

The district court properly dismissed Loritz’s claims that Paul Pfingst and Gregory Thompson conspired to commit various constitutional violations because Loritz supports the essential elements of his claim with only vague and conclusory allegations.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require a predicate violation of a right guaranteed by law.

Rodriguez v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2004-06-07

A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a predicate showing that a right guaranteed by law was violated.

Section 1983 permits a claim when a public defender conspires with judges to deprive an inmate of federally protected rights.

Deck v. Lenzie L. Leftridge, Jr. And Donald Hager · filed 1985-09-03

Allegations that a public defender has conspired with judges to deprive an inmate of federally protected rights may state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require an agreement between a state actor and a private party, concerted action to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Kelly v. Marchiano · filed 2004-08-29

In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a complaint must allege (1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying deprivation of constitutional rights and specific facts showing an agreement among the alleged conspirators.

Marino v. Mayger · filed 2004-12-07

Therefore, their § 1983 conspiracy claim must also fail. In addition, the Marinos’ complaint is unsupported by specific facts showing an agreement among the alleged co-conspirators to drive the Marinos out of the community.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires factual allegations of concerted action with a state actor; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Legat v. Hubbs · filed 2005-02-08

However, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a § 1983 conspiracy action.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement, concerted action to cause an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Gonzalez v. Narcato · filed 2005-03-24

To prove a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show “1) an agreement between two or more actors or between a state actor and a private entity; 2) an act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and 3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Conway v. Garvey · filed 2005-06-22

Moreover, Conway lacks standing to assert any claim under the criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and he failed to allege any factual basis to support his conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 treats municipalities as persons and permits conspiracy claims against them.

Bauss v. Plymouth Township · filed 2005-07-27

To bring a conspiracy claim under § 1983 against Defendants Plymouth and McKenna, Plaintiff must show that: 1) the government can be a “person” for purposes of 1983; and, 2) 1983 supports a conspiracy claim. Plaintiff has met both of these requirements.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific material facts; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Jackson v. Madery · filed 2005-11-17

Jackson’s conspiracy claims are vague and conclusory.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require more than vague and conclusory allegations to state a claim for relief.

Denton v. Garcia · filed 2006-04-17

The district court also properly dismissed Denton’s conspiracy claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

D'Angelo-Fenton v. Town of Carmel · filed 2007-01-17

Accordingly, to succeed in a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove not only a conspiracy, but an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not make violations of state law or police procedure independently actionable.

Medina v. Cram · filed 2001-06-12

We have, of course, recognized that claims based on violations of state law and police procedure are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on prison officials’ failure to follow prison policy.

Spicer v. Collins · filed 1998-05-14

He merely alleges the defendants failed to follow prison policies. Such a claim is not actionable under Section 1983.

A violation of prison regulations alone does not support a claim under Section 1983.

McKinnon v. Perry · filed 1992-05-13

We conclude that McKinnon's contention that defendants violated their own regulations in disciplining him for failing to obey an order does not rise to the level of a section 1983 claim.

A violation of internal prison regulations, by itself, does not establish § 1983 liability.

Miller v. Emery Leathers, Officer · filed 1989-09-12

Miller contends in his brief that Leathers acted in violation of prison regulations by removing Miller from his cell outside the supervision of a higher authority. If such is the case, it is a matter between Leathers and his supervisors. It is not dispositive, however, of the present action. Indeed, if violations of internal prison regulations were conclusive of § 1983 liability, prison authorities might either be reluctant to promulgate strict rules of conduct for prison guards or be prone to cover up infractions.

Section 1983 does not protect rights and privileges that arise solely under state law.

Dupont v. Kember · filed 1980-11-14

As to the claims under Section 1983, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits alleging denial of rights and privileges which are derived solely from state laws.

Section 1983 provides relief only for violations of federal law or the Constitution, so a violation of a state administrative code alone does not suffice.

Griffin v. James Fairman, Mary Flannigan, Jim Greer · filed 1993-10-27

Griffin completely fails to explain how the alleged violation of section 504.80(b)(6) violated federal law or the Constitution, which is of course the only basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for the mere violation of a state statute or local ordinance.

Kornblum v. St. Louis County, Mo. · filed 1993-11-01

Nevertheless, it is well established that the mere violation of a state statute or ordinance does not give rise to claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state statutory or decisional law alone.

Hughes Anderson Bagley, Jr., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Russell Rogerson and Patsy Bozarth, Appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 1993-11-16

We take this occasion to emphasize again that an allegation of a violation of state law, statutory or decisional, does not, in itself, state a claim under the federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides redress for violations of federal rights, not violations of state law or regulations alone.

Canell v. Bradshaw · filed 1993-11-23

Section 1983 affords redress only for violation of rights guaranteed by federal law. Violations of state law or regulations are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims based on federal law, not claims based only on state law.

Steve Newton, Jr. v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees · filed 1997-04-03

If he elects to amend the complaint, plaintiff must recognize that § 1983 permits litigation only of claims based on federal law.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal or constitutional law; violating a county police policy alone is not actionable.

Smith v. Tolley · filed 1997-04-04

And, for that reason alone, any violation of those policies would not be actionable under Section 1983, which provides a remedy only for violations of federal or constitutional law.

Section 1983 does not support a damages claim based on allegations that defendants violated DCF guidelines.

Nichols v. State of Florida · filed 2006-11-06

As a matter of law, allegations that defendants violated DCF guidelines do not support a claim for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations; violating state law or police regulations alone does not establish a claim.

Thompson, Lee v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-12-19

42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an officer’s departure from police training protocols without a violation of federal law.

Manigault v. King · filed 2009-07-13

Although the officers were trained to maintain a distance of at least 21 feet when facing a suspect carrying a knife, their abandonment of this protocol cannot form the basis for a remedy under § 1983 or deprive them of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate a purported state-law right to use marijuana for medical purposes.

Allen v. Kumagai · filed 2009-10-23

Although Allen cannot use § 1983 to vindicate his purported state-law right to use marijuana for medical purposes, the officers’ knowledge of his medical authorization may be relevant to whether they had probable cause to believe he had committed a crime.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of certain federal rights and does not make violations of state law cognizable.

Alston v. Read · filed 2010-01-14

Section 1983 is a remedy for violations of certain federal rights. Violations of state law (including a state constitution), however, are not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief solely because a plaintiff is entitled to relief under a state statute.

Winchester v. Illinois Republican Party · filed 2019-09-27

But as previously noted, Winchester’s entitlement to injunctive relief pursuant to a state statute does not entitle him to relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of rights conferred by state law.

TORRES v. CITY OF TRENTON · filed 2020-05-27

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for vindication of rights conferred by state law.

A § 1983 claim requires a breach of duty and cognizable legal harm to the plaintiff.

Doe v. George C. Welborn, Warden, Austin Randolph, Unit Manager, and M. Mifflin · filed 1997-06-18

All of this presumes a critical condition precedent to the plaintiffs case has been satisfied: proof of actual injury. Section 1983 is a tort statute, ... which means that the defendant must breach a duty owed to the plaintiff, who must suffer cognizable legal harm.

Section 1983 generally prevents recovery without a showing of actual prejudice.

Jenkins v. Michael P. Lane, James A. Chrans, Michelle Clark · filed 1992-09-24

By determining that we will not waive part two of the test, we simply apply the general rule under § 1983, which prevents recovery without a showing of actual prejudice.

Section 1983 does not compensate a person merely for being charged under an ordinance, even one that improperly shifts the burden of proof, when the charges are dropped without a sufficient deprivation of liberty or property.

Rolfes v. The City of Oklahoma City · filed 1991-07-17

The law is clear that one who is accused under a constitutionally valid statute or ordinance, but who is later acquitted or has the charges dropped, is not entitled to assert a Sec. 1983 claim based simply on the fact that he has been charged. ... The result is no different if the ordinance is unconstitutional because it improperly shifts the burden of proof.

A Section 1983 claimant must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury, and an emotional-harm claim based on excessive force requires culpable intent.

Albert Lewis Williams, Jr. v. Davis · filed 1985-09-17

In a Sec. 1983 action, a party must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury. ... Excessive force could give rise to a claim for emotional harm under Sec. 1983. ... The appellant, however, made no allegation concerning the culpable intent required to state that type of claim; thus, he failed to state a claim under the constitution.

A Section 1983 claimant must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury, and a claim for emotional harm from excessive force also requires culpable intent.

Kinley v. Warden Herman C. Davis · filed 1985-08-27

In a Sec. 1983 action, a party must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury. ... Excessive force could give rise to a claim for emotional harm under Sec. 1983. ... Kinley, however, made no allegation concerning the culpable intent required to state that type of claim; thus, he failed to state a claim under the constitution.

A Section 1983 claimant must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury, and a claim for emotional harm from excessive force also requires culpable intent.

Holliday v. Herman C. Davis, Warden · filed 1985-08-29

In a Sec. 1983 action, a party must allege and prove a distinct and palpable injury. ... Excessive force could give rise to a claim for emotional harm under Sec. 1983. ... Salaam, however, made no allegation concerning the culpable intent required to state that type of claim; thus, he failed to state a claim under the constitution.

Section 1983 requires a claimant seeking monetary relief for deprivation of the right to a fair trial to establish that the alleged improper conduct actually caused that deprivation.

Holloway v. Bruton · filed 1980-11-17

The lower court correctly reasoned that in order to receive monetary relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the deprivation of the right to a fair trial, a petitioner must establish that the alleged improper conduct in fact had that effect.

In a § 1983 action, nominal damages are appropriate absent proof of actual injury; when actual injury is shown, more than nominal damages is required.

Wheatley v. Beetar · filed 1980-12-31

It is clear that at least some actual injury was suffered, cf., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (in the absence of any proof of actual injury from the constitutional violation found, nominal damages will be appropriate relief in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions), and a new trial on the issue of damages resulting from the use of force is thus required.

Section 1983 treats a constitutional tort as actionable only upon injury, and whether harassment causes enough injury to cross that threshold is a question of fact.

Bart v. Telford · filed 1982-05-12

Section 1983 is a tort statute. A tort to be actionable requires injury. ... It is a question of fact whether the campaign reached the threshold of actionability under section 1983.

In a Section 1983 action, a constitutional-rights violation supports only nominal damages unless the plaintiff proves actual injury.

Solis v. Rio Grande City Independent School · filed 1984-06-18

Absent proof of actual injury, however, only nominal damages may be awarded for violation of constitutional rights.

Damages under § 1983 compensate a plaintiff only for actual injury caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, so a bare constitutional violation entitles a plaintiff to nominal damages only, not general damages, absent proof of actual injury.

Taxpayers For The Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy District · filed 1984-07-11

The basic purpose of an award of damages under Sec. 1983 is to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). The deprivation of constitutional rights, standing alone, does not entitle a plaintiff to general damages. See Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 344 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). A plaintiff must show actual injury in order to recover more than nominal damages.

Section 1983 permits nominal and punitive damages without proof of actual damage, and those viable claims preserve an Article III controversy after injunctive relief becomes moot.

Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist. · filed 1984-11-02

Nominal and punitive damages are recoverable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without proof of actual damage. ... Therefore, even though plaintiffs have graduated, their viable claims for nominal and punitive damages satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III.

Section 1983 compensatory damages require proof of actual compensable injury, but a proven substantive constitutional violation supports nominal damages without such proof.

Smith v. Coughlin, III · filed 1984-11-16

Since the central purpose of the damage provision of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is to compensate persons for injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights, a court may not award compensatory damages absent proof of actual compensable injury. ... However, even when a litigant fails to prove actual compensable injury, he is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of violation of a substantive constitutional right.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must prove them rather than rely on the jury's generosity.

Charles Brooks Taliferro v. William Augle and Kenneth Hoffman · filed 1985-03-13

A plaintiff is not permitted to throw himself on the generosity of the jury. If he wants damages, he must prove them.

A prisoner need not allege lasting harm to state a Section 1983 claim when alleged unconstitutional confinement caused pain, suffering, and mental anguish.

Foulds v. Corley · filed 1987-12-01

Finally, we note that Foulds’ failure to allege “lasting harm” is not fatal to his § 1983 claim. He did allege pain, suffering, and mental anguish, sufficient to warrant relief.

Section 1983 actual damages compensate proven injury caused by a constitutional deprivation, not the abstract or intrinsic value of the violated right itself.

Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream · filed 1988-01-14

In Stachura, the Supreme Court reiterated that Sec. 1983 is designed to compensate persons for actual injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. Consequently, a party may not be compensated solely for the bald deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to allege an injury caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Silverfine v. Town of Bakersfield · filed 1990-12-14

In order to claim damages in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of a constitutional right caused an injury.

Section 1983 does not make a claim based on possible exposure to AIDS actionable without actual injury or an identified situation that increases exposure to the virus.

Michael W. Janik, Alvin Eugene Wakefield v. Richard F. Celeste, Governor George Wilson David L. Baker, Warden Herbert Es · filed 1991-03-26

Moreover, plaintiff's claims are not actionable under Sec. 1983 because he did not suffer any actual injury as he has not contracted AIDS nor has he identified any situation that he has been placed in which would increase his exposure to the AIDS virus.

Section 1983 requires a showing of significant injury to recover damages for unconstitutional prison conditions.

McCord v. Ross Maggio, Jr. · filed 1991-04-02

Second, a showing of significant injury is a prerequisite to recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 recovery for a constitutional infringement is not necessarily barred by the extent of the plaintiff’s injury.

Talib v. A. Hope, Deputy Moody, and A. Winston, R. Robertson · filed 1991-06-20

Although, the extent of injury does not necessarily preclude recovery in Sec. 1983 actions, where a constitutional infringement has occurred, the lack of verifiable injury is relevant in determining whether excessive force has been used.

Section 1983 does not require a finding of specific intent to award nominal or actual damages.

Brooks v. Charlotte Cook Mark L. Mechanic County of Los Angeles · filed 1991-07-22

Brooks next argues that the judge improperly instructed the jury that specific intent was required to find a § 1983 violation. Brooks interprets the instructions incorrectly. The instruction to which Brooks points refers to punitive damages. ... It was clear from this instruction that a finding of specific intent was not required in order to award nominal or actual damages.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages for the abstract value of a constitutional right without proof of actual injury.

Bernadou v. Purnell · filed 1993-01-05

Thus, the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages, and no compensatory damages may be awarded under § 1983 in the absence of proof of “actual injury.”

Section 1983 does not require proof of physical injury for an excessive-force claim; injury affects actual damages, and a plaintiff may receive nominal damages without proving actual injury.

Johnny Gray v. Detective Spillman Detective Bishop Detective Riggs, and Detective Cartner · filed 1993-05-17

In Gray's earlier appeal, we made clear that injury was not an element of a section 1983 action alleging excessive force. ... Gray's testimony of the slaps and shoves gives a reasonable jury a sufficient basis to find the violation and award at least nominal damages.

Compensatory and exemplary damages under Section 1983 for a school-advertising regulation are unavailable without a showing of resulting monetary loss.

Berger v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education · filed 1993-10-01

The Complaint contains a prayer for damages, but plaintiff has made no showing that he has suffered monetary loss resulting from the application of Standard 7.2 to his proposed advertisements in the past. Therefore, plaintiffs claim for compensatory and exemplary damages is denied.

A § 1983 damages claim based on prison disciplinary proceedings cannot rest on an abstract loss of rights when the discipline was reversed before punishment and no actual injury was shown.

Ellis v. Evans · filed 1993-10-15

A section 1983 action requires actual injury as opposed to abstract suffering of loss of rights. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986). We agree with the magistrate judge that Ellis failed to show actual injury.

Compensatory damages under § 1983 require proof of actual harm and are not presumed.

Odaka v. Welborn · filed 1993-12-22

Because compensatory damages are appropriate only to redress actual harm, see Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986), the court's treatment is appropriate. Damages are not presumed; they must be proven; and the judge did not commit clear error in concluding that Odaka had not proven any.

Section 1983 permits recovery for injury to reputation when that injury results from an independently actionable constitutional violation.

Dishnow v. School District of Rib Lake, Ramon Parks, and Paul Peterson · filed 1996-02-28

So if the infringement is incidentally defamatory, as it was here, the plaintiff can obtain the sort of damages that he would obtain in a defamation case.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking compensation for a procedural due process violation to prove injury caused by the denial of process.

McManus v. Cheshire County, NH · filed 1997-11-24

Even though McManus’s procedural due process rights were violated by lack of a pretermination hearing, this court is not convinced McManus suffered any injury, which is an essential element of his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; an attempted violation alone is not actionable.

Holt Cargo Systems, Inc. v. Delaware River Port Authority · filed 1998-03-23

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for an attempted constitutional violation; only a claim of actual deprivation is cognizable under the statute.

Section 1983 allows actual damages for a denial of procedural due process only if the denial caused the loss.

Nolt v. Isadore · filed 1984-05-31

As plaintiff points out, the denial of procedural due process rights does not give rise to a recovery for actual damages unless the plaintiff can meet a “but for” test.

Section 1983 damages claims require an injury caused by the alleged deprivation; dismissing a permit appeal with prejudice can prevent a plaintiff from alleging that injury.

Littlefield v. Town of Colchester · filed 1988-08-12

In the instant case, plaintiff can no longer allege — by virtue of his voluntary dismissal with prejudice — the injury necessary to make out a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege actual injury to state a claim.

McCray v. Williams · filed 2005-02-15

Defendant correctly notes in his motion that actual injury is a prerequisite to any claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for the abstract value of a constitutional right without proof of actual injury.

Jacobs v. Clark County School District · filed 2005-06-10

Therein, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are premised on a tort standard of liability and, consequently, the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages absent proof of actual injury. Such proof being absent here, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process clause fail.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages for actual injury caused by a constitutional rights violation, but not for the abstract value of the right.

Horina v. City of Granite City, Ill. · filed 2008-08-07

Although a district court may award compensatory damages to a successful § 1983 plaintiff, it may not award damages to account for “the abstract value of a constitutional right.” ... Therefore, a district court may award the plaintiff damages only if he can prove that the denial of his constitutional rights resulted in an actual injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege an actual injury to support a claim about prison conditions.

Skinner v. Quarterman · filed 2013-05-03

However, Skinner fails to brief specific details regarding his claims, nor does he allege an actual injury as required for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a recoverable injury to obtain damages; risk alone is insufficient.

Levi A. Lord v. Beahm · filed 2020-03-13

Lord’s claim fails on the basic proposition that he has sued for damages under § 1983 and alleged a constitutional tort (an Eighth Amendment violation) without then developing evidence of a recoverable injury.

Section 1983 requires an actual injury before a plaintiff can receive compensatory damages.

Taylor v. Nurse · filed 2020-07-20

“Because a § 1983 action is a type of tort claim, general principles of tort law require that a plaintiff suffer some actual injury before he can receive compensation.”

Section 1983 requires a recoverable injury for a claim seeking money damages.

TAYLOR v. GILMORE · filed 2020-12-01

First, Mr. Taylor has sued for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged a constitutional tort (an Eighth Amendment violation). However, he has not alleged a recoverable injury.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for a constitutional tort must develop evidence of a recoverable injury.

Braithwaite v. Smelcer · filed 2021-01-12

Lord merely emphasized the “basic proposition” that a plaintiff who “sue[s] for damages under § 1983 and allege[s] a constitutional tort (an Eighth Amendment violation)” must “develop[] evidence of a recoverable injury.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a prison sentence; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

(PC) Maraglino v. State of California · filed 2020-06-30

Accordingly, Plaintiff may not challenge his life sentence by way of section 1983, as such claim must be brought solely by way of a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not provide relief from a criminal sentence; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Braden v. Stuart · filed 2019-09-19

Plaintiff cannot obtain relief from a criminal sentence in this § 1983 action; his federal remedy is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to modify a criminal sentence; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

WENK v. UYL · filed 2019-09-10

Thus, this civil-rights action cannot result in any modification of Wenk’s sentence.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging confinement may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, while a request for release from confinement belongs in a habeas proceeding.

Rudolph Resendez, Jr. v. State of Texas · filed 2011-09-02

To the extent that he is seeking money damages, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). To the extent that he is seeking release from confinement, his action is in the nature of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding, but he has already unsuccessfully sought relief under § 2254, and he has not moved for authorization to file a successive § 2254 application.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the plaintiff shows that the conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated.

Johnson v. Pottawotomie Tribal Police Department · filed 2011-02-09

Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot assert a § 1983 claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of the prior conviction or sentence.

A § 1983 claim challenging a probation condition imposed by the sentencing court is not barred by Heck, but it does not state a claim against officials who did not impose the condition.

Schwartz v. New Mexico Corrections Department Probation & Parole · filed 2010-06-24

This claim is not barred by Heck because it is not actually a claim against the defendants, because they did not impose the probation condition about which Mr. Schwartz complains; instead, the sentencing court did.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would invalidate the prisoner’s sentence unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

Moore v. Williams · filed 2001-11-14

If successful, Moore’s suit would render his sentence invalid and is therefore barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner’s claim that would necessarily invalidate his sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated through an appropriate proceeding.

Sloan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2001-06-19

To the extent that Sloan seeks to attack the constitutionality of his sentence, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983. A state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his sentence invalid, unless his sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable action for allegations challenging the validity of a sentence.

St. Amand v. Angelone · filed 1998-04-22

Because the allegations made in St. Amand's section 1983 complaint challenge the validity of his sentence, his section 1983 action is not cognizable.

A § 1983 action may be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey.

Wafer v. Long · filed 1997-02-27

Wafer argues that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). We have reviewed the record and found no error in the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit claims challenging a state conviction unless the conviction has been declared infirm by a state tribunal or in a federal habeas corpus action.

Piercy v. Bentley · filed 1997-02-18

While the complaint appears best read as attempting to assert a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claims asserted are not cognizable under § 1983 because the state court conviction for custodial interference has not been declared infirm by a state tribunal or in a federal habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for confinement when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of that confinement, unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Manley v. Ashcroft · filed 1995-07-05

Since the district court's ruling, we have held that inmates cannot maintain a section 1983 challenge to the application of the 1990 amendment unless their convictions or sentences are reversed, expunged, or called into question because if they prevailed, "the result would necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] continued confinement." ... Because a successful outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement, the complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Harper v. Robert Castignetti Larry Schaffer Sandy Williams Andrew Alperstien · filed 1995-06-30

When a state prisoner seeks damages in a Sec. 1983 suit, "the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated."

Section 1983 damages for a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Spears v. Judge · filed 1995-06-27

To the extent that Appellant sought monetary damages, the court properly denied the claim because Appellant failed to demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply a conviction is invalid require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Frost v. Fox · filed 1995-04-26

Because Frost's allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and he did not show that his conviction had been invalidated, we affirm the district court's dismissal of these claims.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is barred until the conviction is successfully challenged, and the claim does not accrue before then.

William D. Robertson, Susan G. Robertson v. Wilkerson · filed 1995-04-26

Since appellant William Robertson's conviction has not as of yet been successfully challenged, either directly or collaterally, this action is barred by Heck. A statute of limitations analysis is not necessary, because no Sec. 1983 action accrues until the underlying conviction is successfully challenged.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that calls a criminal conviction into question until that conviction has been invalidated.

Carl Redmond, Jr. v. Schockweiler · filed 1994-11-23

It follows that Redmond has no cause of action under Sec. 1983 until he first proves that his conviction has been invalidated.

A pardon based on uncertainty about guilt that substantially discredits a conviction invalidates it for § 1983 claims that would imply the conviction’s invalidity, and those claims accrue on the pardon date.

Snyder v. City of Alexandria · filed 1994-11-30

(2) Such a pardon also invalidates a conviction, within the Supreme Court’s meaning in Heck, allowing the pardon’s recipient to recover on § 1983 claims that, if proven true, would render the conviction invalid. Snyder’s § 1983 claims (Counts I and II) that challenge his conviction’s validity accrued on the date of the pardon, and are timely raised, while his § 1983 claims that do not necessarily imply his conviction’s invalidity are time barred.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Trudell v. Snohomish County John E. Oswald Steven Henley Russ B. Juckett · filed 1994-11-21

The district court properly dismissed Trudell's action without prejudice because a judgment in his favor "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction" and his conviction has not been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for allegations that necessarily imply an invalid conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

Evans v. Castro, District Attorney · filed 1994-11-21

Because Evans' allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because Evans did not show that his conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court, the district court properly dismissed his claim for damages under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when a judgment for the claimant would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Patterson v. Robert W. Duling, Jr. Joseph D. Morrissey Gary R. Hershner Reno S. Harp, III William H. Hauser Lar · filed 1994-08-16

Because a judgment in Appellant's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, his claim is not cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim implicating the lawfulness of incarceration when the underlying conviction has not been invalidated.

Knight v. Norfolk City Jail David Mapp Isle of Wight County · filed 1994-08-12

We also note that because Appellant's conviction has not been invalidated, any claim implicating the lawfulness of his incarceration is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not provide the proper vehicle for deciding entitlement to credit for time spent on escape status; that claim is properly considered under Section 2254.

Wheeler v. Norma B. Gluckstern, Director Patuxent Institution · filed 1989-09-20

We have addressed only Wheeler's claims regarding the denial of procedural rights under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Wheeler's other claims regarding whether he is entitled to credit for time while on escape status are properly considered under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a constitutional claim that does not challenge the validity of a conviction.

Doe v. Russotti · filed 1980-11-06

This claim does not challenge the validity of his conviction and was properly brought pursuant to § 1983 rather than as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages action challenging the legality of a state sentence before those challenges are adjudicated in the plaintiff’s favor through post-conviction relief.

Snapp v. Hon. James J. Kelley · filed 1988-09-27

As a result those matters may not serve as the basis of a civil rights action for damages without first having been adjudicated in plaintiff's favor in the context of an appropriate proceeding for post-conviction relief such as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit if ruling on its claims would imply that a state conviction is or would be illegal.

Collins v. Blanchard · filed 1988-10-18

The federal courts may not entertain a Sec. 1983 suit where a ruling on the claims would imply that a state conviction is or would be illegal.

Section 1983 cannot be used to invalidate a conviction.

Dangler v. State of Maryland · filed 1988-10-21

A plaintiff may not seek to invalidate his conviction by bringing an action under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner must challenge his conviction through habeas corpus before pursuing a § 1983 civil rights action based on that conviction.

Lefonza A. Lee v. State of Ohio, John E. Shoop, David E. Farren · filed 1988-10-24

The court held that Lee must challenge his conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding before he could precede with this civil rights action. ... We agree with the conclusions of the district court for the reasons stated in its order.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a state prisoner challenging the length of his sentence; the claim must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Karstetter v. Robert L. Tucker, Chairman, Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles · filed 1992-12-08

Corey A. Karstetter, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief. ... First, a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for challenging the length of a state prison sentence. ... Accordingly, Karstetter's claim should have been brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state conviction or sentence when a favorable ruling would imply its illegality; a prisoner seeking speedier release must pursue habeas corpus.

Taylor v. State of Tennessee Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Corrections Howard Carlton, Warden · filed 1994-05-02

Generally, if a prisoner challenges the duration of his confinement and seeks a speedier release, his sole remedy is in habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121, 124-25 (6th Cir.1984). A federal court should not entertain the merits of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 where a ruling would imply the illegality of a state conviction or sentence.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Hunter v. City of Beaumont · filed 1994-10-06

Until the underlying convictions are reversed, expunged, or declared invalid, no § 1983 action will lie.

Section 1983 requires a conviction to be invalidated before a plaintiff may recover damages for conduct whose unlawfulness would render the conviction or sentence invalid.

Voth v. Steven B. Herrell Keith Meisenheimer · filed 1994-10-21

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction has been invalidated in order to state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Cornett v. Longois · filed 1994-12-08

A claim for damages based on a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated does not state a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a conviction to be invalidated before a plaintiff may bring a claim implicating the procedures underlying that conviction.

Walton v. Davis · filed 1994-12-20

Specifically, Appellant has not stated a claim because his conviction has not been invalidated, a prerequisite to a Sec. 1983 action implicating the procedures underlying the conviction.

Section 1983 permits damages for confinement whose invalidity the claim would imply only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Saunders v. Margarette Ghee Ohio Adult Parole Authority · filed 1995-03-09

In order to recover damages in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for "other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," a prisoner must show that the conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

Section 1983 claims that implicate the validity of a conviction are not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Luther Carter Spain, Jr. v. The City of Virginia Beach Leslie Lilley, City Attorney · filed 1995-03-30

We also note that Appellant's Sec. 1983 action implicates the validity of his conviction, which has not yet been invalidated in any manner. Thus, the claims are not cognizable for that reason also.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Lee v. Diddy · filed 1995-05-12

We agree with the district court that a judgment in Lee's favor in his section 1983 action for damages-concluding that defendants fabricated and falsified evidence against him-would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence"; therefore, Lee's section 1983 claim is not cognizable and must be dismissed unless and until "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254." Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

A § 1983 plaintiff has no cause of action for a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction until the conviction has been invalidated.

Lawson v. Molder · filed 1995-07-11

If a claim falls under Heck, a would-be § 1983 plaintiff has no cause of action until he can show that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to pursue a claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been invalidated through an appropriate proceeding.

Vice v. George Moore Patty Tipton · filed 1996-04-04

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his conviction or sentence invalid, until his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for a state prisoner to challenge an underlying conviction or sentence by seeking injunctive relief.

Charles Wayne Johnson, Sr. v. Frank A. Brown Penelope Ann Lavenders Susie Esqueda · filed 1996-06-17

A section 1983 claim is not the appropriate vehicle for Johnson to challenge his underlying state conviction and sentence by seeking injunctive relief.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Williams v. Schario · filed 1996-08-23

We agree with the district court that a judgment in Williams's favor on his damages claims that defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and presented perjured testimony would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence"; therefore, Williams's claims are not cognizable and must be dismissed unless and until Williams shows his "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success on a state prisoner’s challenge to a parole decision would necessarily invalidate the length of the sentence and the sentence has not been invalidated.

Hembree v. Whitley County Circuit Court · filed 1996-09-27

Hembree failed to state a claim under § 1983 as his challenge to the parole board's decision is, in essence, a challenge to the length of his sentence. A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his conviction or sentence invalid, until his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 cannot be used to attack a conviction based on counsel’s alleged misadvice; that claim must be presented through habeas corpus.

Garcia v. Gomez · filed 1996-10-02

Garcia does not advance his cause with his claim that because his attorney misadvised him regarding conduct credits he should be able to attack his conviction. Even if that claim is correct, he must present it by means of a petition for habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). A § 1983 action will not lie against these defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim to a state prisoner whose success would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated through an authorized procedure.

Hodges v. John S. Wilder Jimmy Naifeh State of Tennessee · filed 1997-01-29

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would render his conviction or sentence invalid, until his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Martinez v. Ensor · filed 1997-03-27

Mr. Martinez’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages necessarily imply the invalidity of, and amount to an attack on, his state court conviction and sentence. These § 1983 claims must be dismissed because Mr. Martinez does not allege and has not demonstrated that his conviction or sentence already has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

McCaslin v. Campbell · filed 1997-04-02

As to these eleven grounds, the district court concluded they were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (§ 1983 damages claim which would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless conviction has already been invalidated), and dismissed them without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in its dismissal of these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit claims implicating the validity of a state-court conviction until the conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a grant of habeas corpus.

Hodgin v. Farris · filed 1997-05-12

Hodgin may not pursue his claims in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until his conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would require invalidating part of an outstanding criminal conviction; the claim may be dismissed without prejudice.

Delaney v. Metelski · filed 1997-06-03

Because Delaney must invalidate this part of his conviction to establish that Metelski's use of force was excessive, the district court properly dismissed without prejudice Delaney's § 1983 action for damages.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence do not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Moore v. Garrette · filed 1997-07-16

His complaint must be dismissed without prejudice2 as any § 1983 claims will not accrue until he can “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ ... of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Neilson v. Kern County, California Dudley Dunham William Thresher Rod Parker Larry Garratt Ted James · filed 1997-12-19

The district court properly dismissed Nielson's action because his claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence and Neilson has not demonstrated that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A plaintiff cannot recover damages under § 1983 for a claim that implicates the validity of a sentence unless an authorized entity has invalidated or questioned that sentence.

Saiz v. Henderson · filed 1999-08-09

In Heck, the Supreme Court stated a plaintiff cannot recover damages in a § 1983 action implicating the validity of a criminal conviction or sentence without proof that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or questioned by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... For this reason, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Saiz’s § 1983 complaint without prejudice, and DISMISS the appeal.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Watt v. Rodriguez · filed 1999-10-21

Watt’s suit is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid require the plaintiff to show that the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Arizona Hall v. Romines · filed 2000-04-12

The district court1 dismissed without prejudice most of Mr. Hall’s claims as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (in order to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid, plaintiff must prove that conviction or sentence has been overturned). ... Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons set forth in the orders Mr. Hall challenges on appeal.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim attacking the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Parchman v. Harper · filed 2001-05-01

As Parchman is attacking the validity of his conviction, the complaint was dismissable pursuant to Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for damages arising from an allegedly invalid conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Estrada v. Dominguez · filed 2002-01-16

Unless an authorized tribunal or executive body overturns or otherwise invalidates Estrada’s sentence or conviction, his breach-of-contract claim and the consequential damages flowing therefrom are "not cognizable under [section] 1983."

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Thomas v. Pleasant · filed 2002-01-24

By now it is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff may not raise a claim that, if correct, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence unless and until that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a prisoner’s conviction or sentence must first be pursued through habeas relief.

Harmon v. Davidson · filed 2002-01-30

We conclude that Mr. Harmon’s § 1983 claims, if true, would implicate his conviction and sentence and must thus be first pursued via a habeas action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Brown v. State · filed 2002-03-28

We hold that Brown’s claims, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are therefore not cognizable under § 1983 unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to a state prisoner whose success would necessarily invalidate a sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated through an appropriate proceeding.

Walker v. Altena · filed 2002-05-07

A state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his sentence invalid, unless his sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of a state conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Miles v. Dailey · filed 2002-10-28

Claims which challenge the validity of a state conviction or sentence are not cognizable under § 1983 in the absence of a demonstration that the criminal conviction or sentence in state court “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional criminal sentence, even when the plaintiff seeks an injunction.

Wooten v. Bates · filed 2004-04-28

The district court’s conclusion that plaintiff is precluded from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional sentence by a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is correct, even when the relief sought is an injunction.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim whose success would imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Robinson v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-07-26

A prisoner cannot recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or sentence invalid” unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would imply a sentence is invalid unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Seville v. Martinez · filed 2005-05-10

Because he has not proven “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed . . . , expunged . . . , declared invalid . . . , or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for harm that would render a conviction or sentence invalid must show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Brown v. Wall · filed 2005-05-25

In an action for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a wiit of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Margheim v. Pyatt · filed 1998-02-18

The problem in this case, as observed by the district court, is that although Margheim has styled his suit as a civil rights action seeking only monetary damages, he is essentially attacking the legality of his conviction and the sentence he is currently serving.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been set aside.

McGann v. Eaton · filed 2006-08-21

Having failed to show that his conviction or sentence was set aside in a separate, antecedent proceeding, appellant's current action "necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The Heck decision therefore required that the district court "deny the existence of [this] cause of action" and dismiss the complaint.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim challenging incarceration until the incarceration has been reversed or declared invalid.

Hall v. Attorney General of Texas · filed 2008-02-20

Further, because he is currently incarcerated for failure to register, Hall’s constitutional challenge to the registration requirement also is an indirect challenge to his incarceration. Hall’s claims are thus not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he proves that the incarceration has been reversed or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for imprisonment under an allegedly unlawful sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Rowann v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania · filed 2008-12-17

Rowann’s claim is precisely the type that must be dismissed under Heck because he seeks compensation for imprisonment under an illegal sentence but has not demonstrated that his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim whose success would necessarily affect the fact or length of a prisoner’s detention.

Telepo v. Martin · filed 2009-12-29

After considering the record below, we conclude that Telepo’s claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action. ... Heck and Balisok foreclose § 1983 claims only in a “narrow subset of actions,” where the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily affects the fact or length of detention.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Akers v. Watts · filed 2010-03-10

Where, as here, “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” id., the court must dismiss the complaint “unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Plaintiff makes no such showing, and his claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence; those challenges must be brought in habeas.

Davis v. Beals · filed 2010-11-30

The portions of Davis’s complaint that allege malfeasance by the prosecutor and trial judge, charge his attorney with constitutionally inadequate representation, and challenge his sentence fall squarely within Preiser and cannot be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim that challenges the validity of a conviction or sentence.

Wells v. Attorney General, State of Florida · filed 2012-04-16

In this case, the district court did not err in dismissing Wells’s claims challenging the Florida statutes under which he was convicted and sentenced because the claims effectively were a challenge to the validity of his conviction and sentence and were not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional sentence unless the sentence has first been invalidated through a recognized process.

Woods v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2014-01-30

At best, the plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for an alleged unconstitutional sentence that he does not claim has been invalidated via a writ of habeas corpus or some other recognized authority.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Wright El v. State of North Carolina · filed 2014-05-28

The Court "rnust consider whether a judgment in favor of the [petitioner] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the [petition] must be dismissed unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been set aside.

Ziehl v. Counts · filed 2014-07-31

The Complaint does not allege that Ziehl’s conviction or sentence has been set aside, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, and thus his allegations of illegal sentence and ineffective assistance of counsel fail to state claims cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for a claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Hughes v. United States of America · filed 2014-08-22

Here, l the plaintiff does not show that his conviction or sehtence has been invalidated, and his “claim for damages bearing [a] relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek a sentence reduction because habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for challenging the fact or length of confinement.

Henderson v. Sergeant Lambert · filed 2014-10-03

We also conclude that the magistrate did not err in denying Henderson leave to amend to add claims challenging his conviction, as he requested a sentence reduction and thus the claims would be barred by Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (habeas corpus is exclusive remedy for prisoner challenging fact or length of confinement).

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a probation revocation unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Stewart v. Roderick · filed 2016-08-25

The district court properly dismissed the action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on Stewart’s claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his probation revocation, and Stewart failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Lee v. Brier Police Department · filed 2017-03-23

The district court properly dismissed Lee’s claims related to his arrest and criminal conviction because success on those claims “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” and Lee has not “demonstrate[d] that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide relief to challenge the validity of a state conviction or sentence.

Weakley v. Connolly · filed 2018-03-05

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge his state conviction and sentence, no such relief is available under section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge conditions imposed as part of a criminal sentence unless those conditions have been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Blizzard v. Thoreson · filed 2019-08-30

If the conditions Mott seeks to challenge were imposed by the court that sentenced him, he cannot use §1983 to challenge those conditions unless he can show that the conditions have been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.