42 U.S.C. § 1983

Federal common law governs whether a release-dismissal agreement can waive § 1983 claims.

Kandil v. Yurkovic · filed 2013-06-14

Although the enforceability of release-dismissal agreements waiving § 1983 claims is a question of federal common law, the enforceability of such agreements releasing state law claims depends on state law.

A release-dismissal agreement bars a § 1983 action only if it was voluntary, there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and enforcement will not adversely affect relevant public interests.

Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills · filed 2014-08-27

A release-dismissal is enforceable only if a court “specifically determine[s]” that: (1) it was entered into voluntarily; (2) there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) enforcing the agreement “will not adversely affect relevant public interests.”

A party invoking a release-dismissal agreement to defend against a § 1983 claim bears the burden of proving the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.

Patterson v. City of Akron, Ohio · filed 2015-07-22

At summary judgment, it is the Defendants-Appellees’ burden to prove the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by a voluntary release in a plea agreement when there is no prosecutorial misconduct and enforcement does not harm relevant public interests.

Francis v. City of Athens · filed 2020-11-30

Because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, enforcement of the Release would not be adverse to any public interest, and no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily accept the Release, the Release is enforceable and bars Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Defendants.

Section 1983 permits money damages and injunctive relief, but does not provide parole or release from confinement.

Cooper v. Scanlan · filed 2019-12-09

Money damages and injunctive relief are available remedies under § 1983. Parole and release from confinement are not.

Section 1983 does not provide relief in the form of dropping or reducing criminal charges; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Tillotson v. McCoy · filed 2014-06-13

The district court dismissed Tillotson’s § 1983 complaint without prejudice, concluding the remedy Tillotson seeks is only available to him in an action for a writ of habeas corpus. ... Having reviewed the record, Tillotson’s appellate brief, and the applicable law, we conclude the dismissal of Tillotson’s § 1983 complaint without prejudice was proper.

Section 1983 permits expungement of records as an equitable remedy for a civil rights violation.

DeMarco v. Sadiker · filed 1996-09-25

While § 1983 makes no specific provision for ex-pungement, that equitable remedy is part of federal common law and has been applied in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not provide habeas relief, a new trial, or a grand jury investigation as remedies.

Allen v. Rudy Briggs, Garry Huggins, and Larry Langley · filed 1991-11-26

Joel W. Allen appeals from a district court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... He also seeks remedies not properly cognizable under federal jurisdiction in this type of action, including habeas relief, a new trial, and a grand jury investigation against defendants.

Section 1983 permits expungement of unconstitutional prison disciplinary entries when the prisoner does not challenge the fact or duration of confinement, while a later request for release or sentence recalculation must proceed through habeas corpus.

Hall v. Unknown Named Agents of the New York State Department for Correctional Services for Appu Unit at Clinton Prison · filed 1986-11-14

At this time, under the power granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court remedies the effects of a state action now found unconstitutional. If at some later date the inmate seeks release or a computation of the duration of his confinement, then the appropriate posture will be a petition for habeas corpus.

A legitimate § 1983 damages claim accompanying a habeas claim should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, although the federal court may stay the damages action until habeas exhaustion is complete.

Harper v. Donald Jeffries, and Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole · filed 1986-12-31

However, when a state prisoner brings, along with his petition for release from confinement, a legitimate action for damages pursuant to the federal civil rights laws, the damage claim should not be dismissed. ... To accommodate these concerns, it would be proper for the district court to stay Harper’s § 1983 action until he has had an opportunity to exhaust all state remedies on his habeas corpus claim.

A federal court should dismiss without prejudice a § 1983 damages action whose resolution would imply that an outstanding state conviction is unconstitutional, permitting refiling if habeas relief later establishes the conviction's invalidity.

Gabbard v. Kopowski · filed 1987-02-24

In Hadley V. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), we held that a federal court should refrain from deciding a civil rights action for damages where disposition would involve a ruling implying that a state conviction is or would be illegal. We held that a claimant in such an action should be directed to pursue relief through a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition for habeas corpus. ... We must modify this judgment, however, to permit plaintiff to refile this action should he establish, through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that his homicide conviction was constitutionally infirm.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prisoner challenging the fact of imprisonment; the prisoner may refile a Section 1983 claim after establishing a constitutional violation through habeas corpus.

Bonafonti v. Commonwealth Attorney · filed 1988-03-18

Because this prisoner essentially challenges the fact of his imprisonment, his sole relief is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). Thus, the district court's dismissal is without prejudice to appellant's right to refile his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if he can establish through a writ of habeas corpus that he was denied a constitutional right.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass exhaustion of state remedies when the claim is essentially a challenge to unlawful detention.

Curry v. Clerk of Court · filed 1988-10-06

We find, as did the district court, that this transparent attempt to circumvent the Sec. 2254 ruling cannot succeed because Curry merely raises a slight variation on his "core complaint" of unlawful detention and thus, he must exhaust his Virginia remedies before the federal courts will entertain his claims.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim challenging parole decision-making procedures without habeas exhaustion when the claimant seeks no present or future release.

Messer v. Rader · filed 1989-03-22

While we acknowledge that construction of these complaints often involves an " 'ambiguous borderland' between habeas corpus and section 1983," McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir.1982), we conclude that Messer's complaint is more properly viewed as a Sec. 1983 action because he seeks monetary relief and not any entitlement to release, now or in the future. ... Therefore, we conclude that Messer's complaint is properly viewed as a Sec. 1983 action and not subject to the exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment and seeking immediate or speedier release; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Sam Barley Charles J. Duncan v. Charles E. Hawk E. Eugene Eblen · filed 1989-10-13

Plaintiffs' displeasure with the progress of their state habeas petitions cannot form a basis for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiffs are attempting to expand the scope of a proper action under Sec. 1983. When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 actions seeking relief that would undermine a conviction are treated as habeas petitions.

Prather v. Norman · filed 1990-05-18

In this circuit, section 1983 actions are treated as habeas petitions if the relief requested under section 1983 would undermine the conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow equitable relief from parole revocation, and a damages claim that implies a state conviction is unlawful must be dismissed without prejudice until habeas relief establishes the constitutional violation.

Silverburg v. Stewart · filed 1990-11-13

Upon review, we conclude that Silverburg cannot obtain equitable relief for his parole revocation through a Sec. 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121, 124-25 (6th Cir.1984). Rather, his only proper remedy is to pursue a writ of habeas corpus. 411 U.S. at 490; 741 F.2d 1245. 5 Additionally, a federal court must stay its hand where disposition of a money damages action would involve a ruling which implies that a state conviction is or would be illegal. Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam). However, a dismissal of such a claim should be without prejudice to Silverburg's opportunity to refile his Sec. 1983 claim if and when he establishes, through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that he was denied his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for reinstatement of a prisoner’s good time credits; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Clayton v. James Blogett, Superintendent Ken Jurgensen Rick Queen · filed 1992-01-14

To the extent a prisoner seeks reinstatement of his good time credits, his exclusive federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

A section 1983 complaint seeking relief available in habeas corpus should be construed to that extent as a habeas petition, while the section 1983 action is stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Belmarez v. Kathryn Bail, Chairman, Isrb · filed 1992-09-22

When a prisoner files a section 1983 complaint that seeks relief available in habeas corpus, the district court should construe the complaint to that extent as a habeas petition and require exhaustion of state remedies. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347 n. 13 (9th Cir.1984); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, the district court should stay, rather than dismiss the section 1983 action until state remedies are exhausted.

A prisoner may proceed under § 1983 without exhausting state habeas remedies when a disciplinary challenge has only a speculative or incidental effect on confinement; habeas corpus is the proper remedy when restoring good time credits would automatically shorten confinement.

Massey v. James K. Rowland, Warden · filed 1993-01-19

If the prisoners are serving indeterminate sentences, like the inmates in Sisk, and the disciplinary procedures have only a "speculative and incidental effect" on the ultimate duration of their confinement, exhaustion of state remedies is not required. However, if the length of the sentences is fixed, and if the restoration of good time credits automatically leads to a reduction in the time of confinement, habeas corpus is the proper avenue for the complaint.

A court should stay a prisoner’s § 1983 action pending exhaustion of state remedies for related claims that must proceed in habeas corpus.

Ennis E. White v. Figueroa · filed 1993-02-24

Moreover, the district court should have stayed the section 1983 action pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for prospective relief requiring a state to change its procedures, without exhaustion of state remedies.

Lee v. John Husz and Unknown Parole Board Members · filed 1993-03-10

If, as Lee's papers in this court imply, he is seeking only prospective relief that would require the state to change its procedures in some way, then § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle, and exhaustion is unnecessary.

A § 1983 claim cannot be raised in a federal habeas corpus petition under § 2254.

Oyler v. Allenbrand · filed 1993-03-25

Petitioner next claims that the action of the State of Kansas violated his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such a claim is improper in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and must be dismissed.

A Section 1983 challenge to prison discipline need not await exhaustion of state habeas remedies when restoring good time credits would not affect sentence duration; habeas is the proper avenue if restoration would automatically shorten a fixed sentence.

Teddie v. Rowland · filed 1993-04-09

In Massey, this court held that, if the plaintiffs were serving fixed sentences and the restoration of good time credits revoked as a result of the disciplinary action would automatically lead to a reduction in the duration of the sentence, habeas corpus would be the proper avenue for relief. If the sentences were indeterminate, however, or otherwise unaffected by the restoration of good time credits, then the district court abused its discretion in requiring the plaintiffs to exhaust state habeas corpus remedies. ... Consequently, this appeal presents the identical issues addressed in Massey, and leaves the same questions unresolved. Therefore, for the reasons stated in Massey, the district court's stay order is reversed and this appeal is remanded for further findings consistent with these dispositions.

A section 1983 complaint seeking relief available only through habeas corpus must be construed to that extent as a habeas petition.

Young v. Richard J. Thompson, Director, Department of Social and Health Services David Weston · filed 1993-04-29

Where a section 1983 complaint seeks relief available only under habeas corpus, the district court should construe the complaint to that extent as a habeas corpus petition.

A habeas petition alleging excessive delay in a direct criminal appeal may be recast as a Section 1983 damages complaint when lack of prejudice to the appeal forecloses habeas relief.

Wallace v. Leonardo · filed 1993-06-30

Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to grant leave to amend the petition to recast it as a complaint for damages based on a violation of his right to speedy appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's access-to-courts claim, which is not cognizable under habeas corpus section 2254.

Smith v. Farley · filed 1993-07-27

This court also notes that the petitioner sent a letter to this court focusing on access to the court. This court cannot deal with an issue of that nature under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An issue of that nature is only cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

A complaint under § 1983 that attacks the fact or duration of confinement is properly construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief.

Marshall v. State of Virginia 4th Judicial District Circuit Court · filed 1993-08-05

Since Marshall attacked the fact or duration of his confinement, the court properly construed his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.Sec. 2254 (1988).

A request for declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983 may be construed as a habeas corpus action requiring exhaustion of state court remedies.

James D. Haburn, Sr. v. Tommy Umphries Person County Clerk of Court · filed 1995-01-19

We agree that, to the extent Appellant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, this action is properly construed as a habeas corpus action which requires Appellant to exhaust state court remedies.

A request for declaratory or injunctive relief brought under § 1983 may be treated as a habeas action requiring exhaustion of state court remedies.

Emerson v. Franklin Freeman Lynn Phillips Juanita H. Baker · filed 1995-12-15

To the extent Appellant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, this action is properly construed as a habeas corpus action which requires Appellant to exhaust state court remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1973).

Section 1983 does not provide the proper vehicle for claims that must be brought in a § 2254 proceeding.

Neff v. Roxbury Correctional Inst. · filed 1996-01-25

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. As to those claims which the district court properly held must be brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) proceeding, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 does not provide habeas corpus relief.

Jenkins v. McBride · filed 1996-06-03

He essentially requests habeas corpus relief that is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain habeas corpus relief from imprisonment.

Jenkins v. Wilson · filed 1996-06-03

The allegations are legally frivolous and constitute another attempt by this plaintiff to obtain habeas corpus relief in a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 complaint that raises a habeas claim may be dismissed without prejudice.

Singleton v. Lisa Torras Gary Burger · filed 1996-08-05

Because the district court concluded that Singleton's 1983 complaint raised a habeas claim, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

Section 1983 may be the proper form of action for a petition presented under § 2254.

Vogeney v. Zeb Crews State of North Carolina · filed 1996-08-20

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying reconsideration of the court's prior order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 petition, which the court properly construed as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

A request for declaratory and injunctive relief in a § 1983 action that is properly construed as a habeas corpus action requires exhaustion of state court remedies.

James v. Thickens · filed 1997-01-06

We also note that although the district court did not address Appellant's request for declaratory and injunctive relief, this action is properly construed as a habeas corpus action which requires Appellant to exhaust state court remedies.

Section 1983 cannot be used to evade habeas corpus procedural requirements when the relief sought is to set aside convictions and sentences.

Schneider v. Bowersox · filed 1997-01-24

In addition, as the District Court aptly observed, a § 1983 action cannot be used to evade the procedural requirements of petitions for habeas corpus. The relief requested in the § 1983 action is precisely the same as that requested in the habeas petition--that the convictions and sentences be set aside.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction, sentence, or parole determination.

Berry v. Scafe · filed 1999-02-23

Because this is not a case in which a judgment favorable to Mr. Berry would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, sentence, or parole determination, we hold that Mr. Berry’s action is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for forfeited disciplinary credits that would shorten a prisoner’s imprisonment; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Bullock v. McGinnis · filed 2001-02-14

To the extent that Bullock challenges the forfeiture of disciplinary credits, which would have shortened his term of imprisonment, his remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a forum to seek habeas corpus relief from a probation revocation through an appeal of a dismissed civil rights complaint.

Castillo v. Hebert · filed 2003-08-19

To the extent that Castillo seeks habeas corpus relief with respect to his probation revocation proceeding, this appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is not the proper forum within which to seek such relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a judgment or continuing confinement; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Chappell v. Reed · filed 2003-12-18

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Chappell’s claims that defendants’ conduct resulted in the revocation of his good time credits, see Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.1997), because a challenge to the validity of a judgment or continuing confinement must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a section 1983 action, see Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023,1024 (9th Cir.1997).

Section 1983 permits relief moving a prisoner out of administrative segregation without requiring exhaustion of state remedies when the relief does not shorten imprisonment.

Joseph Toussaint, Plaintiffs/appellees/cross-Appellants v. Daniel McCarthy Defendants/appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 1986-09-30

The defendants argue that the district court lacks jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to order prisoners released from administrative segregation. ... Here, the district court did not restore credits nor release any prisoner from prison. The court, in essence, authorized the Monitor to move individual prisoners from one location to another within the prison. We do not believe that such relief falls within the traditional core of habeas corpus. Consequently, the plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before seeking relief in federal court. The district court did not exceed its jurisdiction by authorizing the release of prisoners from administrative segregation.

A D.C. prisoner’s § 1983 challenge to parole procedures must first be brought in habeas only if success would necessarily imply or automatically result in speedier release.

Fletcher v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-06-18

This case is therefore controlled by our holding in Anyanwutaku v. Moore that a D.C. prisoner’s § 1983 claim ‘‘must first be brought in habeas only when, if successful, it would ‘necessarily imply,’ or automatically result in a speedier release from prison.’’ 151 F.3d at 1056. Hence, Fletcher may bring his claim pursuant to § 1983.

A claim for prison good time brought in a § 1983 action is treated as a habeas corpus claim and must be exhausted in state court.

Hayes v. Lockhart · filed 1985-02-08

Hayes brought this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging that he was denied due process when he was assigned to administrative segregation without a preassignment hearing. ... Hayes also contends that he was unconstitutionally denied the class promotion and good time he earned during his stay in Florida. Although the district court properly recognized that this claim was more in the nature of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the Court dismissed the claim as meritless. ... Because this is a habeas corpus claim, and because the claim was not exhausted in state court, we vacate this portion of the district court's opinion to give Hayes an opportunity to claim this good time in state court.

Section 1983 does not provide an injunction requiring a state trial court to consider a resentencing motion; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Cummings v. Thurbert Baker · filed 2005-05-09

As an initial matter, the only relief that Cummings sought in his complaint was an injunction to force the trial court to consider a motion for resentencing, which must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding, and not in a § 1983 action.

A federal prisoner’s § 1983 damages action that requires a finding that his conviction is invalid must await exhaustion of habeas corpus remedies.

Marchetti v. Bitterolf · filed 1992-07-02

We also hold that a federal prisoner who contends that his conviction is invalid because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights must exhaust his habeas corpus remedies before he may prosecute an action for damages to redress the alleged violation of his civil rights.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a judgment or continuing confinement; those challenges must be brought through habeas corpus.

Brammer v. Rocha · filed 2007-03-21

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Brammer’s claims that defendants’ actions resulted in the loss of good-time credits, see Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.1997), because a challenge to the validity of a judgment or continuing confinement must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a section 1983 action, see Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir.1997).

A § 1983 claim challenging parole interview procedures without seeking release does not require exhaustion of state remedies as a habeas petition.

Williams v. Cecil McCall Chairman, Etc. · filed 1976-02-04

In the instant case, the complaint does not seek the plaintiff’s release. It merely seeks procedural amenities believed to have been arbitrarily withheld. Preiser does not require exhaustion in this circumstance.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for claims that belong in a habeas petition under § 2254.

Grooms v. Johnson · filed 2007-09-10

Robert L. Grooms, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying without prejudice relief on his complaint styled as an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Because the complaint raised habeas claims, we find the district court properly construed the claims as more appropriately presented in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition.

A court may construe a Section 1983 action as a habeas petition when the plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of his incarceration.

Pressly v. Gregory · filed 1987-10-21

Merely because a plaintiff is "flying the banner of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983," however, does not prevent a court from construing the action as one for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, particularly when the goal of the plaintiff is to challenge the validity of his incarceration.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to recover good time credits forfeited in a disciplinary proceeding.

Muse v. Ouachita Parish · filed 2010-12-21

Additionally, Muse’s challenge to the loss of good time credits fails because he cannot recover in a § 1983 action the good time credits forfeited in his disciplinary proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a way for a state prisoner to obtain release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Jackson v. Scalia · filed 2011-04-29

The relief that the plaintiffs demand sounds in habeas and therefore is not available by means of a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek habeas relief challenging the execution of a sentence through parole proceedings.

Robledo-Valdez v. West · filed 2014-11-20

To the extent Mr. Robledo-Valdez is challenging the execution of his sentence and seeking habeas corpus relief, the parole-related claims may not be raised in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... After reviewing the record, we conclude that Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s claims are frivolous, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims challenging the fact or duration of a prisoner’s sentence should be construed as habeas petitions when the complaint clearly seeks habeas relief.

El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md · filed 2016-08-12

Our circuit’s case law directs district courts to construe § 1983 claims challenging the fact or duration of the plaintiff’s sentence as a petition for habeas corpus when the “complaint evince[s] a clear intention to state a habeas claim.” Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995); see Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1991).

Section 1983 claims and § 2254 habeas claims must be filed as separate actions.

Riggs v. Brooks · filed 2019-03-08

Finally, although claims under § 2254 may not be raised jointly in a claim brought under § 1983, as these are discrete actions addressing different types of claims and offering different modes of relief, both actions may be brought in this Court, albeit separately.

A court may decline to convert a § 1983 action into a habeas petition when conversion would require changes to the parties, relief, procedures, and claims.

Visner v. Gatza · filed 2019-08-21

And because the differences between a § 2254 petition and a § 1983 action will likely require a change in the parties, change in the relief requested, and some changes to the procedures governing the action and the claims raised, the Court declines to resurrect Visner’s § 1983 complaint and convert it to a § 2254 petition.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek restoration of revoked good time credits when success would necessarily shorten confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Williams v. Dixon · filed 2020-07-01

Here, Plaintiff is alleging a due process violation in connection with a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the revocation of good time credits. If he succeeds in this action and the good times credits are restored, that would “necessarily spell speedier release.” Id. Accordingly, this action should be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking earlier release on parole; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

(PC) Uhuru v. Mancusi · filed 2020-11-17

In other words, to the extent plaintiff challenges the denial of parole and seeks earlier release under the elderly parole program, a civil rights action under § 1983 is not the proper vehicle.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of incarceration; those claims must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Pierre v. Local Rule Policy Maker · filed 2020-12-10

Moreover, to the extent that Pierre ultimately seeks another opportunity to appeal his conviction and ... sentence, any claims that challenge the fact or duration of his incarceration must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide termination of a defendant’s employment or expungement of a criminal record as remedies.

Ezebuiroh v. Doe 5 · filed 2021-01-20

Termination of the defendant and expungement of Plaintiff’s criminal record are not available under Section 1983, so the two requests for relief are considered dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims to proceed alongside IDEA claims arising from the same facts.

D.D. Ex Rel. Davis v. Chilton County Board of Education · filed 2009-09-17

The Plaintiffs § 1983 claims in Counts I and II of the Complaint are for violations of the constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Accordingly, the Plaintiff may proceed on both the IDEA and the § 1983 constitutional claims.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations even when the same allegations also support an IDEA claim.

D.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Waukee Community School District · filed 2008-09-26

Accordingly, the Court understands the weight of persuasive authority to preserve constitutionally based § 1983 claims even if the underlying factual allegations also support an IDEA claim.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim to secure a hearing when state conduct makes the Education of the Handicapped Act’s procedures unavailable.

BONAR ON BEHALF OF BONAR v. Ambach · filed 1984-12-28

I have also concluded, in light of Smith, that this is a proper case for asserting a due process claim under section 1983 and for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 claims based on IDEIA violations require an underlying violation, exceptional circumstances that frustrate IDEIA relief, a municipal custom or practice causing the violation, and inadequate IDEIA remedies.

Robinson Ex Rel. DR v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-02-26

Applying the four-part test here, to base their Section 1983 claim on violations of IDEIA plaintiffs must show: (1) that the school system violated one or more provisions of IDEIA, (2) that “exceptional circumstances exist, such that the conduct of DCPS that caused the IDEA violations was persistently egregious and prevented or frustrated [D.R.] from securing equitable relief under the IDEA,” (3) “that the District of Columbia has a custom or practice that is the moving force behind the alleged IDEA violations,” and (4) why the normal IDEIA remedies, such as compensatory education, are inadequate to compensate for the harm suffered.

IDEA does not preempt a parallel Section 1983 claim; the 1986 amendment preserves other federal statutory and constitutional causes of action.

Hamilton v. BD. OF SCHOOL COM'RS OF MOBILE COUNTY · filed 1996-06-19

Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court finds that IDEA does not preempt other federal statutory or constitutional causes of action.

Section 1983 may accompany an IDEA claim, but relief requires a constitutional violation outside the IDEA’s scope.

Evans v. Board of Education of the Rhinebeck Central School District · filed 1996-06-10

While such a claim is not precluded because it is brought simultaneously with a claim under the IDEA, in order to obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a constitutional violation outside the scope of the IDEA has occurred.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for violations of the EHA when the allegations and proof support it, even if the complaint does not expressly plead a separate § 1983 claim alongside the EHA claim.

George Yakubek and Nancy Yakubek v. Rex · filed 1992-05-15

Although plaintiffs' poorly drafted complaint obscures the legal claims, it can be read to state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the EHA. That plaintiffs failed to specifically allege a § 1983 claim in conjunction with their EHA claim cannot preclude them from recovering on a § 1983 claim, should the allegations show and the proof support such a claim.

Section 1983 due-process and equal-protection claims may proceed alongside claims under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in a case pending when the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act took effect.

Edward B. v. Brunelle · filed 1986-11-17

No “manifest injustice” will occur if plaintiffs are allowed to reinstate their claims for violations of due process and equal protection brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the court’s order (Doc. #61) in this action of October 17, 1986 is vacated.

Section 1983 may enforce a favorable final administrative decision under the Education of the Handicapped Act when that Act supplies no mechanism for enforcing such a decision.

Robinson v. Pinderhughes · filed 1987-01-30

In our case, while the EHA was available to the child to have his substantive rights established, it was not available to him to have them enforced. Thus, we are of opinion that Thiboutot and Middlesex require that the plaintiffs be permitted to pursue their remedy under Sec. 1983 for deprivation of a right secured by the laws of the United States.

A Section 1983 special-education action seeking relief also available under the EAHCA generally requires exhaustion of the EAHCA’s administrative procedures before suit.

Davenport Ex Rel. Davenport v. Rockbridge County School Board · filed 1987-04-01

In accordance with the foregoing subsection, it appears beyond dispute that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required prior to resorting to a court proceeding brought either under the EAHCA, other statutes or the Constitution, or a combination thereof.

The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act’s preservation of other federal remedies applies retroactively and permits a § 1983 claim protecting handicapped children’s rights to proceed.

Dodds v. Simpson · filed 1987-05-19

I find that section 3 applies retroactively to this action. Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim will proceed to trial.

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce a final special-education administrative placement decision when the Education of the Handicapped Act itself supplies no enforcement avenue.

Parents of Child, Code No. 870901W v. Coker · filed 1987-12-21

If the right has been established with a favorable final administrative decision, and if the EHA is not available to enforce the right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an avenue for enforcement.

Section 1983 permits a claim for damages based on alleged procedural violations of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act.

Hiller v. Bd. of Educ. of Brunswick Cent. Sch. D. · filed 1988-06-02

Given the Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 1415(f), a section 1983 action clearly is a viable cause of action for this plaintiff. Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint accordingly, is therefore granted because such amendment would not be futile.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for discrimination based on a handicap despite the availability of remedies under the Rehabilitation Act.

Cordero-Martinez v. Aponte-Roque · filed 1988-06-02

The question before us then, is whether the Rehabilitation Act is a law within the meaning of Section 1983 or whether the Act itself contains the exclusive or primary remedies for its own enforcement. ... Lower courts continue to find a cause of action under Section 1983 for allegations of discrimination by reason of a handicap. ... The remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a school district’s failure to comply with EHA requirements and a hearing officer’s decision.

Hollenbeck v. Board of Educ. of Rochelle Tp. · filed 1988-06-08

The court finds as a matter of law that the MDC was inadequate to meet the requirements of the EHA and the hearing officer’s decision and, thus, is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Filing a claim against Ohio in its Court of Claims waives § 1983 claims against state officers or employees based on the same act or omission.

Hopkins v. Ohio Department of Corrections · filed 2003-12-04

It further appears from the documents attached to Hopkins’s objections to the report and recommendation that this lawsuit is barred because Hopkins filed a claim in the Ohio Court of Claims based on the same facts alleged here. Ohio conditions the filing of suit against it in the Court of Claims on the plaintiff waiving any cause of action based upon the same act or omission that might be filed against a State officer or employee. ... To the extent that the defendants were acting as State officers or employees, Hopkins’s § 1983 claims against them are barred.

A plaintiff who voluntarily accepts Kansas criminal diversion and stipulates to facts supporting the charge may waive a § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure or arrest.

Swanson v. Fields · filed 1993-02-17

These policy considerations in combination with the conviction-like nature of diversion in Kansas persuades this court that the plaintiff Kenneth Swanson by taking diversion has waived his section 1983 claims for unlawful seizure or arrest.

A waiver of a Section 1983 claim is valid only if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. Bible · filed 1986-11-17

A waiver of a section 1983 claim is valid only if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

A release-dismissal agreement waiving a § 1983 action is not invalid per se and may be enforced when entered voluntarily and supported by legitimate prosecutorial and public interests.

Town of Newton v. Rumery · filed 1987-03-09

Because release-dismissal agreements may further legitimate prosecutorial and public interests, we reject the Court of Appeals’ holding that all such agreements are invalid ... per se.

A voluntary covenant not to sue can bar a § 1983 claim when there is no prosecutorial overreaching and enforcement serves the public interest.

Berry v. Peterson · filed 1989-11-08

... we find that the Berrys’ Covenant Not to Sue was consistent with the public interest and enforceable. The covenant provided a complete defense to Hancock County and its officials.

A covenant releasing a Section 1983 claim in connection with pending criminal charges is enforceable when voluntarily made, free of prosecutorial overreaching, and consistent with the public interest.

Berry v. Peterson · filed 1989-12-27

Pursuant to the tripartite considerations enunciated in Rumery for evaluating settlements of Sec. 1983 claims in the face of pending criminal prosecution, we find that the Berrys' Covenant Not to Sue was consistent with the public interest and enforceable. The covenant provided a complete defense to Hancock County and its officials.

A person may waive a § 1983 cause of action by stipulation if the waiver is freely, knowingly, and openly made without coercion or duress.

Wilson v. Jackson · filed 1990-05-14

Provided the waiver is freely, knowingly, and openly arrived at, without taint of coercion or duress, a party may, by stipulation, waive her right to the procedural due process to which she is otherwise entitled under New York State Civil Service Law (see, Matter of Abramovich v Board of Educ., 46 NY2d 450; Matter of Shannon v State of N. Y. Dept, of Correctional Servs., 131 AD2d 915; Matter of Miller v New York State Dept, of Correctional Servs., 126 AD2d 831, affd 69 NY2d 970), and any cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Jones v Taber, 648 F2d 1201).

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim seeking work release as a change in the conditions of confinement.

Graham v. Broglin · filed 1991-01-07

But lines are lines, and we place work release on the civil rights side.

A knowing and voluntary general release can waive § 1983 claims against a city and its employees or agents.

Dwyer v. City of Middletown, Ohio · filed 1991-03-18

A general release knowingly and voluntarily made will be enforced as a waiver of section 1983 claims.

Filing the same claim in the Ohio Court of Claims waives a related § 1983 action in federal court.

Ledger v. John Horn Mona Parkes Emanuelle Turkson · filed 1991-11-13

Keith Ledger filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he contended that he received substandard health care while incarcerated at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in 1987. ... The parties agree that Ledger sought relief on the same claim in the Ohio Court of Claims prior to filing the federal action on review. The district court accurately noted that Ledger's Court of Claims filing acted as a waiver of all other similar actions in state or federal court.

A release of § 1983 claims can bar claims against all officers and municipalities involved in an incident when the parties intended that scope, even if the release names only some of them.

Cain v. Darby Borough · filed 1992-01-17

Here, the release provides for the discharge of .liability for certain named officers and the Darby Borough Police department in connection with the July 4, 1989 incident. ... The evidence- shows that the parties intended the October 18, 1989 release to extend to and cover all of Diane Cain’s claims of civil liability arising from police conduct on July 4, 1989. Accordingly, the release, as asserted, is a complete bar to the present action.

A release of § 1983 claims is valid only when the claimant’s decision is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Hisel v. Upchurch · filed 1992-04-16

A release of claims under § 1983 is valid only if it results from a decision that is “voluntary, deliberate, and informed.”

Federal law governs whether a release waiving a right to sue under § 1983 is enforceable.

Staggs v. Ausdenmoore · filed 1993-04-27

Because, therefore, it purports to waive a right to sue under § 1983--a federal statute--the question of its enforceability is a question of federal law.

Filing a related damages action against a state agency in the Ohio Court of Claims waives the corresponding Section 1983 claims in state or federal court.

Egesimba v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Loraine Correctional Institution Norm F. Hills Mind · filed 1993-07-08

The district court accurately noted that plaintiff's Court of Claims filing acted as a waiver of all other similar actions in state or federal court. ... Rather, plaintiff's § 1983 claims were dismissed pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2743.02(A)(1) because she opted to bring a related action against a state agency in the Court of Claims.

A plaintiff need not return or offer to return consideration received under a valid release agreement before bringing a Section 1983 action based on the violations purportedly released.

Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Oregon · filed 1993-10-07

We hold that a civil rights plaintiff is not required to return or offer to return consideration received pursuant to a valid release agreement as a prerequisite to initiating a § 1983 action premised on the violations purportedly released by the agreement.

Defendants invoking a release of § 1983 claims bear the burden of proving that it bars the claims.

Rose v. Village of Peninsula · filed 1995-01-27

This Court agrees that defendants bear the burden of proof on the issue of whether Becker’s release bar's his present claims. The Court concludes that defendants have satisfied that burden, and that Becker has offered nothing to rebut defendants’ showing. Accordingly, because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the legal effect of Becker’s release, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims brought by plaintiff Becker (docket no. 51) is GRANTED.

An inmate may voluntarily settle and release Section 1983 claims, barring a later action on those claims.

Chambers v. Warren · filed 1995-12-01

In this case, however, Chambers voluntarily released his claims and is therefore barred from pursuing this action.

Section 1983 claims against a state employee may be waived by filing suit against the state in the Ohio Court of Claims under Ohio’s statutory waiver provision.

Stanos v. Richard Cooley, Ohio Department of Natural Resources · filed 1996-11-22

His argument that the state of Ohio may not restrict him from seeking restitution for a violation of his constitutional rights was rejected in Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Development Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946, 952 (6th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988), where we held that the state could provide that civil rights claims against a state employee would be waived in exchange for allowing a suit against the state in the Court of Claims. ... Accordingly, we decline the invitation to overrule this court's earlier decision, see id. at 1320, or to certify this question to the Ohio Supreme Court.

A person who agrees not to sue the police in exchange for dismissal of criminal charges waives a § 1983 claim concerning the arrest.

Lindsay v. City of Pontiac, Dept. of Police · filed 1996-12-05

As to Lindsay's arrest, because she expressly agreed not to sue the defendants in exchange for the dismissal of her criminal charges, Lindsay has waived her right to bring any action against the defendants concerning the arrest.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim when success would entitle the prisoner to accelerated release.

Farrel v. Johnson · filed 1999-07-16

Thus, because a favorable determination in this action would result in an accelerated release for Farrel, his action was properly brought and construed as a § 2254 claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis when a party asserts that they were waived by a release.

Eddins v. Excelsior Independent School District · filed 2000-03-15

The parties have not cited, and the court’s independent research fails to reveal that Congress has enacted special rules regarding waiver in Section 1983 cases, or in acting under IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the general “totality of circumstances” analysis is appropriate.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred by a release signed in exchange for reduced criminal charges if the agreement was voluntary, involved no prosecutorial overreaching, and did not adversely affect public interests.

Gram v. Hoebelheinrich · filed 2001-03-30

Upon de novo review, see Larson v. City of Fergus Falls, 229 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2000), we agree with the district court that the release was enforceable because Gram voluntarily agreed to it, there was no prosecutorial overreaching, and public interests were not adversely affected, see Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 claims arising from employment may be barred by a knowing and voluntary release covering those claims.

Mount v. Village of South Elgin · filed 2003-02-05

Mount knowingly and voluntarily executed a valid release. The Village did not fraudulently induce Mount into signing the agreement. The agreement releases any and all claims against the Village resulting from Mount’s employment with and separation from the Village; thus, Mount’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution may not proceed.

A release of Section 1983 claims is governed by federal common law and may be enforced when it is voluntary, free of prosecutorial misconduct, and consistent with the public interest.

Penn v. City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 2003-07-17

Thus, the validity of the release of federal statutory claims, such as Plaintiffs claims pursuant tO’ Section 1983, is determined by reference to federal common law, not state law. ... Thus, in evaluating the release-dismissal agreement, this Court will examine whether Defendants have sufficiently shown that the agreement is enforceable because (1) it was voluntary; (2) there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) enforcement of the agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.

A release of a Section 1983 claim negotiated after a determination of guilt but before sentencing is enforceable if the decision to release was voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Bushnell v. Rossetti · filed 1984-12-21

This is not to hold, however, that all such releases are, on the contrary, entitled per se to enforcement. Because the claims released are constitutionally based, agreements to release them can only be enforced if the decision to release was "voluntary, deliberate, and informed."

A release of a § 1983 claim negotiated after a determination of guilt but before sentencing can be enforced if the decision to release was voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Bushnell v. Rossetti · filed 1984-12-21

We see no comparable public policy concerns in relation to releases given in exchange for post-conviction sentencing recommendations. ... Here the record clearly supports the determination that Bushnell’s decision to release was voluntary, deliberate, and informed, and so entitled to enforcement.

A waiver of a Section 1983 claim is valid only if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. Bible · filed 1986-09-30

A waiver of a section 1983 claim is valid only if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

A plaintiff who files suit against Ohio in its Court of Claims may waive a Section 1983 claim against a state employee based on the same acts.

Dr. William T. Nichols v. Dr. Hilton T. Bonniwell · filed 1989-05-12

In this case, plaintiff, like Leaman, sued a state agency in the Ohio Court of Claims and brought a Sec. 1983 action based on the same alleged acts against a state employee in federal court. 2 We hold therefore that under Leaman the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's action on the ground that under Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2743.02(A)(1) plaintiff waived a cause of action against defendant by filing an action against the University of Akron in the Ohio Court of Claims.

A valid release of civil claims in exchange for dismissal of criminal charges can bar a § 1983 claim.

Penn v. City of Montgomery · filed 2004-08-17

Accordingly, we conclude that the release agreement was valid and is a bar to Ms. Penn’s pursuit of civil claims against the Appellees.

A parolee does not waive a § 1983 due process claim by failing to raise it at a final parole violation hearing after the alleged violation and harm have occurred.

Alvarado v. City of New York · filed 2007-03-26

However, that proposition does not extend to support a waiver of a § 1983 claim alleging a constitutional due process violation by failing to raise it in the parole violation hearing, particularly when the violation and resulting harm has already occurred by the time the final hearing began.

A clear release in a commercial agreement can encompass potential § 1983 claims.

Yu-Hwa Pa v. Doyle · filed 2007-07-11

First, the scope of the release here clearly encompasses all claims and potential claims, including any claims Pa might bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A disputed release of a § 1983 claim requires a hearing on whether the claimant signed it voluntarily.

Sexton v. Ryan · filed 1986-10-23

We are unable to determine whether the release was in fact executed by Sexton voluntarily. On the issue of coercion plaintiff is at least entitled to a hearing.

A plaintiff who stipulated only to facts in an administrative proceeding did not thereby waive a § 1983 claim challenging the probable cause for his arrest.

Bakri v. City of Daytona Beach · filed 2010-05-07

Finally, the Court declines to hold that an unrepresented beverage licensee can "stipulate” to probable cause in an administrative action and thereby waive his right to bring a constitutional claim against a police officer under § 1983.

A settlement does not bar a Section 1983 claim unless the plaintiff knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives it.

Murray v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 2012-01-06

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his rights to assert the present constitutional claims. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs claims under Section 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights are not barred by the Settlement Agreement.

A release of claims arising from prior employment can bar a Section 1983 claim based on that employment.

Petersen v. West Michigan Community Mental · filed 2012-04-09

The district court granted their motion, concluding that the release barred Petersen’s § 1983 claim. ... After carefully considering the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we agree with the judgment of the district court. ... Accordingly, the judgment rendered by the Honorable Janet T. Neff, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, is AFFIRMED on the basis of the reasoning detailed in her Opinion and Order dated August 10, 2010.

A person may waive a § 1983 discrimination claim if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.

Rozenfeld v. Department of Design & Construction · filed 2012-07-12

Taking these factors and evaluating them under a totality of the circumstances, this Court finds Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights to bring claims under Title VII and § 1983.

A claim brought under § 1983 that seeks to advance a prisoner's release date sounds in habeas.

Morton v. Fulwood · filed 2014-01-30

He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Chair of the United States Parole Commission and two Commission staff members, demanding not only a court order directing the United States Parole Commission to grant him an early parole hearing but also an award of $120,000 as compensation for earnings he must forgo if he were to remain incarcerated. lnsofar as the plaintiff seeks to advance his release date, his claim sounds in habeas.

Traditional common-law principles govern whether a document limits a person’s right to sue under § 1983.

Kuhne v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2014-02-10

In a § 1983 action, the validity of a document which purports to limit a person’s right to sue is resolved “by reference to traditional common law principles[.]” Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (1987) (analyzing enforceability, under § 1983, of “release-dismissal” agreement in which arrestee agreed not to sue town or its officials if criminal charges against him were dropped).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a federal court claim for deprivation of federal rights, but a state court filing may waive that claim only through a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice.

Kajfasz v. Haviland · filed 2003-01-15

However, Leaman and Turker are distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike Leaman and Turker, Kajfasz is proceeding pro se. As such, there can be no presumptive finding that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his § 1983 claim in federal court when he filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims. ... Because the district court made no factual finding as to whether Kajfasz knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to proceed in federal court by filing in the Ohio Court of Claims and the record supports no such finding, we find it necessary to remand the matter to the district court for a determination of whether Kajfaz acted knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Pursuing relief before a state labor board did not waive a Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the board could not provide the relief sought in court.

Meade v. Moraine Valley Community College · filed 2016-03-03

Meade has also shown that she was only able to obtain certain relief before the IELRB and that the relief she seeks in the instant action was not available with the IELRB. ... Thus, there has not been any waiver of rights by Meade that would preclude her from pursuing her Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

Section 1983 claims against officers may be waived through a voluntary plea agreement when no prosecutorial or police misconduct induced the agreement and enforcement does not adversely affect public policy.

Arucan v. Cambridge E. Healthcare Center · filed 2019-02-12

Even assuming the district court erred in holding that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity, her claims against them fail because she waived them. In her plea agreement, Arucan specifically agreed to “release the City, its officers, employees and agents from any claims, damages, or causes of action of any kind that may be associated with the incident resulting in the prosecution of this case.” That agreement is enforceable because Arucan entered into it voluntarily, there is no evidence that prosecutorial or police misconduct led to the agreement, and enforcement of the agreement would not adversely affect public policy interests.

Section 1983 claims arising before a general release may be barred when the release was knowing and voluntary.

Valdiviezo v. The City of New York · filed 2020-05-29

Becausethe release constitutes a valid knowing and voluntary waiver of Valdiviezo’s constitutional rights, it releases the City and its employees from the remaining claims in this action, which arise from incidents that predate the May 23, 2015 release.

A release of § 1983 claims does not support dismissal when the plaintiffs plausibly allege that the release is unenforceable.

Roberts v. City of Fairbanks · filed 2020-10-01

At this point, what the court can conclude is that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the settlement agreements are not enforceable, which means that it is plausible that the settlement agreements do not bar their claims.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a school authority’s decision when the plaintiff alleges that the decision violates a specific constitutional provision.

Liberty Curtin Concerned Parents v. Keystone Central School District · filed 1978-12-29

However, the Court did state that when a specific constitutional provision is allegedly violated by such actions, a § 1983 Plaintiff should be permitted to demonstrate the existence of such a constitutional violation. .As the Court noted above, where actions of a school authority are challenged on the basis that they violate constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which is applicable to all actions taken by state agencies which subdivide the subjects of those actions into groups and treat them differently according to that provision, a cognizable constitutional claim is presented.

A Section 1983 claim brought alongside an Education of All Handicapped Children Act claim requires a constitutional violation outside the scope of that education statute.

Taylor Ex Rel. Holbrook v. Board of Education of the Copake-Taconic Hills Central School District · filed 1986-12-10

While such a claim is not precluded merely because it is brought simultaneously with an EAHCA claim, in order to obtain relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and establish that a constitutional violation ... outside ... of the scope of the EAHCA has occurred. ... Such a violation has neither been alleged nor established' in the instant case.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act or the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.

Sharon Digre, for Herself and as Parent and Next Friend on Behalf of Sean Digre, a Minor v. Roseville Schools Independen · filed 1988-03-09

Thus, Mrs. Digre was entitled to bring a section 1983 action based on alleged violations of the EHA or the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief about future parole revocations, but relief for past due-process violations must be sought through habeas corpus.

Witzke v. Withrow · filed 1988-11-09

Finally, the court concurs in the propriety of the recommended declaratory relief in the section 1983 case (case G87-944) and in the impropriety of injunctive relief. Any relief for past violations of petitioner’s due-process rights is properly brought by habe-as corpus petition.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by election of remedies when a plaintiff chooses a forum able to consider the facts underlying the alleged constitutional violation and obtains substantially what was lost.

Robert Haphey and Carl J. Bondietti v. Linn County Linn County Sheriff's Office Art Martinak, Sheriff, Acting in His Off · filed 1991-02-05

In summary, as applied in Punton and in the case at bar, the election of remedies doctrine prohibits a plaintiff from pursuing a subsequent section 1983 claim for damages in federal court where the plaintiff: 1) chooses to seek relief in a forum which can consider the facts allegedly constituting a violation of his constitutional rights, and 2) obtains a remedy which gives him substantially what he lost.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by election of remedies when a state or local government employee first seeks reinstatement before a state administrative agency.

Robert Haphey and Carl J. Bondietti v. Linn County Linn County Sheriff's Office Art Martinak, Sheriff, Acting in His Off · filed 1992-01-09

We hold that when an employee of a state or local governmental entity presents a claim for reinstatement to a state administrative agency, that is not an election of remedies which will preclude the later pursuit of claims for violation of federal constitutional rights in federal court.

Section 1983 provides a compensatory remedy for an unconstitutional seizure after the claimant has received a hearing, rather than permanently voiding the seizure.

Odom v. Raypress Corp. · filed 1992-06-10

But as Underwood instructs, the remedy for the unconstitutional seizure in the case sub ju-dice is not a judgment which permanently voids the seizure of the press; rather, the remedy is compensatory as provided under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief for an improperly motivated termination despite later-discovered misconduct that would have led to termination, but reinstatement is unavailable and interim backpay or damages may be awarded.

McClung v. Hajek · filed 1996-02-15

He cannot be reinstated, but he may be entitled to backpay for the interim between his actual termination and the time his misconduct was discovered, or to damages as determined by a trier of fact.

Section 1983 relief for a teacher dismissed for protected speech may include reinstatement and backpay reduced by earnings since dismissal.

Gieringer v. Center School District No. 58 · filed 1973-05-23

John Gieringer, in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks reinstatement to his teaching position in the appellee-school district and compensatory and punitive damages against members of the appellee-school board in their official and private capacities. ... The case is remanded for the entry of judgment reinstating Gieringer and awarding him loss of backpay, subject to mitigation by Gieringer’s earnings since his dismissal and without any award for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory relief and nominal damages for violations of constitutional rights.

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District · filed 2005-12-20

Defendants’ actions in violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights as guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 subject Defendants to liability with respect to injunctive and declaratory relief, but also for nominal damages and the reasonable value of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ services and costs incurred in vindicating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides actual damages and, in some cases, punitive damages for claims against state actors.

Martinez-Velez v. Rey-Hernandez · filed 2007-10-23

The usual vehicle for such claims against state actors is section 1983, whose remedy embraces actual and (sometimes) punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees.

Section 1983 makes a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of constitutional or statutory rights liable for redress through an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding.

Atcherson v. Siebenmann · filed 1978-09-07

The language of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a person violating the statute “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,” establishes a form of tort liability.

Section 1983’s broader remedies remain available after an Article 78 proceeding awards reinstatement and back pay.

Sorano v. Taggart · filed 2009-07-29

Sorano’s counsel is correct. Litigation under a more restrictive statute does not foreclose the more capacious remedies under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Brown v. Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office · filed 2013-03-12

First, release from custody is not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides equitable remedies aimed at making victims of illegal discrimination whole.

Todaro v. County of Union · filed 2007-04-19

The relief available under the statute for violations includes equitable remedies, ibid., with the overarching goal to make victims of illegal discrimination whole.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to dismissal under section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Swain v. Hutson · filed 2009-10-08

For these reasons, like the Houston (14th District) and San Antonio courts, we hold that section 101.106(e) of the civil practice and remedies code, which applies to only suits brought under the Tort Claims Act, does not apply to federal section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits legal and equitable remedies, but a refund claim against a union’s general treasury seeks legal damages rather than equitable restitution.

Mooney v. Illinois Education Associatio · filed 2019-11-05

Section 1983 allows for remedies either at law or in equity. ... Her claim is against the general assets of the union, held in its treasury, and can only be characterized as legal.

A stepfather and siblings have no Section 1983 claim for the incidental deprivation of companionship caused by the government’s alleged killing of their adult relative.

Ortiz v. Melquiades Burgos, Pablo Robles Robles · filed 1986-12-12

The narrow question before us is whether his stepfather and siblings have a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship of their adult son and brother, deprivation of which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we conclude that they do not, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner’s spouse or child to bring a personal claim based solely on prison conditions that harmed the prisoner rather than being directed at the family member.

Velazquez-Martinez v. Colon · filed 1997-03-31

Although they did not rule on the rights of a spouse and a child, we find that the general requirements of section 1983 are stringent enough to exclude even their close family rights.

Section 1983 does not give children a cause of action for temporary loss of family association resulting from their father's wrongful imprisonment.

Garcia v. Reyes · filed 1997-08-21

In addition, the text of section 1983 itself suggests that the statute was designed to protect the person whose constitutional rights have been violated rather than someone who may have been indirectly affected by state action. ... We are reluctant to recognize a section 1983 cause of action for deprivation of family association under circumstances where no court in the nation has ever done so.

Section 1983 generally does not let family members sue for violations of a relative’s civil rights.

Garcia v. Royal Bank of Canada · filed 2001-12-17

Noriega is correct: absent an exception not applicable here, family members cannot rest a § 1983 claim on the violation of a relative’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not allow family members who were only incidentally affected by state action against a relative to recover damages for that relative’s injury.

Figueroa-Lopez v. Hilerio-Padilla · filed 2002-04-30

Thus, only Mirella Figueroa, and not co-plaintiffs Tamaris, Guillermo and Myrelys Jusino Figueroa, may recover damages for a § 1983 violation.

Family members have an independent claim under § 1983 only when the constitutionally defective conduct or omission was directed at the family relationship.

Gonzalez v. Garced · filed 2005-09-08

Family members do not have an independent claim under § 1983 unless the constitutionally defective conduct or omission was directed at the family relationship.

Relatives cannot bring individual § 1983 claims without a personal constitutional deprivation, but Puerto Rico law permits heirs to assert a decedent’s claim on the decedent’s behalf.

Santiago v. AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPALITY OF PONCE · filed 2006-09-27

In this particular case, none of the named plaintiffs personally suffered constitutional deprivations for which reason they may not assert individual § 1983 claims. However, when there is evidence of decedent having suffered as a result of the constitutional deprivation, Puerto Rico law allows for his/her heirs to assert this claim on decedent’s behalf.

Family members have an independent claim under § 1983 only when the challenged conduct is directed at the family relationship.

Natal-Rosario v. Puerto Rico Police Department · filed 2009-04-02

Only when the constitutionally defective conduct or omission is directed at the family relationship do family members have an independent claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a family member to seek damages only when the unconstitutional conduct was aimed at the familial relationship.

De La Mata v. Puerto Rico Highway & Transportation Authority · filed 2012-06-29

Under the law of this circuit, section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for family members’ damages “unless the unconstitutional conduct was aimed at the familial relationship.”

Section 1983 requires allegations of government action or that the defendants are a governmental entity or governmental employees.

Wilson v. Northern Quest Resort/Casino · filed 2020-01-31

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claimed Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violations failed as a matter of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff did not allege government action or that Defendants were a governmental entity or governmental employees.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must establish deprivation of a federally secured right by a person acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Levester Thompson Carol Green · filed 1986-12-12

In order to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must establish that 1) there was a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or other law of the United States; 2) the deprivation was done by a "person"; and 3) the person was acting under color of state law.