42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the validity of a state sentence; that challenge must be brought in habeas corpus.

Justice (ID 74505) v. Carpenter · filed 2019-09-17

Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages that would imply a prisoner’s sentence is invalid unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

Harris v. Ricci · filed 2014-03-28

Here, Plaintiffs application for the grant of damages exceeding one dollar is ... inviting this Court to violate the Heck-Balisok bar by entering a quasi-habeas ruling that Plaintiff might be entitled to avoid serving his full term.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a criminal sentence that has not been invalidated.

(PC) Smith v. Municipality of Fresno County · filed 2019-12-05

Plaintiff has filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, which is not the proper mechanism to challenge a criminal sentence that has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Elias v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2020-02-07

When judgment for a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. Because Plaintiff has not made this showing, his claim for damages cannot proceed in this action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Jambri Johnson, Sr. v. Edmund Brown, Jr. · filed 2020-04-16

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success would necessarily imply the invalidity Johnson’s conviction or sentence, and Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge parole conditions when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence that has not been overturned through habeas corpus.

Newell, Donald v. Wisconsin Department Of Corrections · filed 2020-08-18

Therefore, habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy when, as in this case, a ruling in plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the illegality of his custody or the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages for unconstitutional incarceration only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Herd v. Daniel · filed 2020-09-09

To the extent Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for his alleged unconstitutional incarceration, he first must prove his “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Plaintiff has not made this showing.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Davis v. Shinn · filed 2020-09-16

The district court properly dismissed Davis’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success in this action would necessarily imply the invalidity of Davis’s conviction or sentence, and Davis failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim challenging a state prisoner's sentence.

Lowry v. Kagay · filed 2020-09-25

As stated in the MOSC, any claim challenging Plaintiff’s state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenging the validity of a state sentence; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus.

Belles v. Lasswell · filed 2020-10-09

Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for unconstitutional confinement when the conviction or sentence has not been invalidated.

Higginbottom v. Gravely · filed 2020-11-12

Thus, he cannot sue for damages under § 1983 based on his alleged unconstitutional confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for confinement when success would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Hagler v. Heitman · filed 2020-12-11

Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence have not been invalidated; indeed, he is currently incarcerated under that sentence. Thus, he cannot sue for damages under Section 1983 based on his alleged unconstitutional confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Charlene Terry-Ann Walker Rosa v. Finkelstein · filed 2020-12-11

Any award of damages based on her conviction and sentence would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,” so Rosa’s claims are “not cognizable under [Section] 1983.”

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity to child protective services workers for placement and supervision decisions made as part of their quasi-judicial duties under a court order.

DeBiaso v. Spitz · filed 2013-07-02

In continuing C.D.’s placement with DeBiaso’s brother until June 25, 2010, and in continuing supervised visitation until his return home, Defendant was exercising her discretion pursuant to the Circuit Court’s Shelter Order. This conduct is protected by absolute immunity because making placement and supervision decisions is a quasi-judicial function.

Jurors are absolutely immune from a § 1983 civil suit for their actions as jurors.

Sligar v. Jack Holt, Marilyn Newman · filed 1993-05-06

The district court dismissed Sligar's complaint on the ground that jurors are entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit, citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976). We agree.

Section 1983 does not give a police officer absolute immunity for initiating a baseless prosecution, even though the officer is immune for trial testimony alone.

Green v. Saenz · filed 1992-06-15

Moreover, there is no absolute immunity for a police officer who “play[s] a role in initiating a prosecution,” a part that must be differentiated from that played by an officer “whose role was limited to providing testimony.”

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity from damages for state agency officials acting within the scope of their administrative authority.

Zapiler v. Robbins · filed 1981-02-25

Because the defendants were acting within the scope of their administrative authority, both in initiating the investigation of the Birchwood Pavilion Care Center and in entering into the Stipulation for Entry of Final Agency Action, they are absolutely immune from suit for damages which the Stipulation allegedly caused the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a prosecutor for actions taken in the course of performing official prosecutorial duties.

Gale A. Rachuy v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1981-11-06

Further, any allegations against DeSanto arose from actions taken by him in the course of performance of his official duties as a prosecutor. Consequently, he enjoys immunity from this suit, see, e. g., Keating v. Martin, 638 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), and the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint as to him.

Section 1983 gives state officials the same absolute immunity as federal officials when they act in an adjudicative capacity.

Johnston v. Herschler · filed 1982-01-21

In this regard, no distinction exists between a federal official and a state official sued under § 1983. Id. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 2909. The need to preserve independent judgment without fear of monetary liability exists in each situation, Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 2914, and requires absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages actions are barred by absolute immunity for prosecutors, judges, and witnesses acting in those roles.

Osborne v. Adam · filed 1982-04-12

Plaintiff’s allegations related to State’s Attorney Carey and Judge Olson must be dismissed as these parties enjoy absolute immunity from damage actions under § 1983 in the performance of their responsibilities as prosecutor and judge respectively. ... Just as prosecutors and judges enjoy absolute immunity in § 1983 actions, witnesses, including police officers, also are entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity for state prosecutors' actions that constitute an integral part of the judicial process.

DeBoer v. Martin · filed 1982-04-30

Therefore, a state prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 for actions which constitute an integral part of the judicial process.

Section 1983 gives parole-board officials absolute immunity from damages suits for their official activities in processing parole applications.

United States of America Ex Rel. Monty Powell v. Irving · filed 1982-08-17

We hold that appellants are absolutely immune from section 1983 suits for their official activities in processing parole applications.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against judges or justices for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Michaelis v. Krivosha · filed 1983-05-06

Furthermore, it is well established that judges and justices are absolutely immune from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 shields state parole-board officials performing adjudicatory functions from damages liability.

Trotter v. Klincar · filed 1983-05-26

As a result, we hold that defendants Klincar, Kauffman, Ewers, Everett and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board are immune from Trotter’s claim for damages relief pursuant to § 1983.

A prosecutor is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages claims based on using false or misleading evidence or concealing exculpatory evidence in connection with a prosecution.

Hauptmann v. Wilentz · filed 1983-08-11

Defendant Wilentz is absolutely immune from suit on all claims that he violated Hauptmann’s constitutional rights (or plaintiff’s own constitutional rights) by using false, perjured or misleading evidence or by concealing exculpatory evidence, before, during, or after trial.

An official responsible for continuing an administrative prosecution may receive absolute immunity under Section 1983 when appellate review supplies an adequate check on agency zeal.

Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Willkom · filed 1983-10-21

Thus, formality of process and absolute independence are not necessary before immunity can be successfully asserted. It is enough that the process provides for appellate review. The fact that the preliminary process may not be insulated from abuse matters not at all.

An attorney for a county social-services department is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for actions within the scope of prosecutorial duties in family-court proceedings.

Walden v. Wishengrad · filed 1983-11-10

Accordingly, I hold that defendant Wishengrad is entitled to absolute immunity when acting within the scope of her duties as an attorney for the Monroe County Department of Social Services and thus, grant her motion for summary judgment.

Social-service officials have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for deciding to initiate parental-rights termination proceedings and participating in them.

Pepper v. Alexander · filed 1984-11-01

Assuming that the plaintiff does wish to pursue this issue, defendants are immune from damage liability for their decision to apply for termination of parental rights and for their participation in that proceeding.

Court-appointed therapists have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for acts within the scope of their appointments.

Doe v. Hennepin County · filed 1985-12-12

Court-appointed therapists are entitled to absolute immunity for acts committed within the scope of their appointments.

A social worker’s child-protective role is functionally comparable to a prosecutor’s role and warrants absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability.

Mazor v. Shelton · filed 1986-02-18

Applying the reasoning of ... to the present case, this court concludes that the role of a social worker in the care of minors is sufficiently analogous to the role of a prosecutor to warrant absolute immunity.

Officials who investigate and prosecute attorney-discipline matters are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages when they act within their disciplinary jurisdiction.

Eisenberg v. Sternberg · filed 1986-08-25

I conclude that the administrator and the members of the Board of Attorneys’ Professional Responsibility are entitled to absolute immunity. Plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants took any of the challenged actions outside their jurisdiction.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge, sheriff, and deputy for their alleged attempt to conduct a judicial sale are barred by absolute immunity.

Mahlerwein v. Henry Bruewer Robert R. Walton, Sr. Robert D. Wright 50 John Does 50 Jane Does · filed 1988-02-17

This Ohio plaintiff moves the court to stay the execution of a state foreclosure judgment pending his appeal of the district court's judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Plaintiff filed the underlying civil rights action seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief against an Ohio judge, a sheriff, and a deputy. ... Upon review we conclude that dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) was proper. Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages.

Section 1983 does not give public utility officials absolute prosecutorial immunity for regulatory actions that are not quasi-judicial in nature.

Diana G. Schlegel and Central Pacific Freight Lines, an Oregon Corporation v. William Bebout and Bob Russell · filed 1988-03-08

Despite the broad statutory language of § 1983 and the absence in the legislative history of any attempt to narrow it, it is well established that certain classes of public officials enjoy at least some type of immunity from § 1983 suits. ... We, therefore, find that even though they were acting within the scope of their authority, these PUC officers were not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are not entitled to the absolute immunity afforded to judges, persons performing judge-like roles within federal agencies, or prosecutors.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a witness for testimony at preliminary or suppression hearings because the witness has absolute immunity.

Williams v. Hepting · filed 1988-04-18

We therefore conclude that witness Stewart is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for his testimony at Williams’ preliminary hearing and suppression hearings. The district court did not err in dismissing Williams’ claims against Stewart for allegedly giving perjured testimony at these hearings.

Section 1983 gives police officers absolute immunity from damages liability based on their testimony at adversarial pretrial proceedings.

Daloia v. Rose · filed 1988-06-10

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), held that law enforcement officers are entitled to absolute immunity from liability in actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) for monetary damages resulting from the officer's testimony at criminal trials. This appeal presents a question arguably left open in Briscoe: whether absolute immunity also attaches to officers for their testimony at pretrial adversary proceedings. We join the other courts who have considered the issue in holding that it does.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on Michigan prison hearing officers for acts in their judicial capacity because they have absolute judicial immunity.

Shelly v. Perry M. Johnson, Jack Bergman, Marjorie Vanochten, William O'connor, and Jerry Sherman · filed 1988-06-14

In a careful opinion, Chief Judge Hillman denied the relief sought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants after concluding from a review of the file exhibits and uncontradicted affidavits that there was no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated. Of particular interest was Chief Judge Hillman’s conclusion that recent changes in Michigan statutory law embodied in 1979 Mich.Pub.Act No. 140 conferred upon prison hearing officers the type of independence and responsibility which was consistent with the grant to them of absolute immunity from liability with respect to their judicial acts. ... Accordingly, for the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Hillman in his opinion in the District Court published at 684 F.Supp. 941 (W.D.Mich.1988), the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state assistant attorney general for introducing evidence in court while defending state officials because that advocacy function is absolutely immune.

Murphy v. Terry D. Morris, Kelly Mescher, and Unknown M.T.C.M. Mail Room Personnel · filed 1988-07-27

The introduction of evidence in a judicial proceeding constitutes a normal and regular advocacy function of an assistant attorney general, and may not, therefore, form the basis of a claim pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a police officer absolute witness immunity from a malicious prosecution claim when the officer acted as a complaining witness by initiating a baseless prosecution, even if the officer did so through testimony in a judicial proceeding.

White v. Richard Frank, Freeman Marshall, City of Poughkeepsie · filed 1988-08-24

Where, however, the constitutional tort is the action of a police officer in initiating a baseless prosecution, his role as a “complaining witness” renders him liable to the victim under section 1983, just as it did at common law, and the fact that his testimony at a judicial proceeding may have been the means by which he initiated the prosecution does not permit him to transpose the immunity available for defamation as a defense to malicious prosecution.

District of Columbia probation officers are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for alleged errors in investigating and preparing presentence reports.

George Turner, II v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor · filed 1988-09-16

Accordingly, we hold that District of Columbia probation officers are absolutely immune from liability for damages in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged errors in the investigation and preparation of presentence reports.

A parole officer who performs a prosecutorial role in parole revocation proceedings is absolutely immune from a § 1983 damages claim.

Miller v. Garrett · filed 1988-09-26

Thus, Blum performed a role comparable to a prosecutor in a criminal case, and therefore also is entitled to absolute immunity.

State probation officers have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims arising from their preparation and submission of presentence reports.

Shelton v. McCarthy · filed 1988-11-01

It is thus apparent that the frameworks in which both federal and state probation officers operate, with respect to presentence reports, are very similar and that all of such officials should be afforded the protection guaranteed by absolute immunity.

Prosecutors and magistrates acting within the scope of their official capacities are absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability for a transfer without a requested pretransfer hearing.

Jasper L. Swain v. George E. Hunt, Alamance County District Attorney Jane Doe, Alamance County Magistrate · filed 1988-12-02

The defendants named by Swain, however, are absolutely immune from such liability because they were acting within the scope of their official capacities.

Parole officials considering parole applications are absolutely immune from individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983.

Duncan v. Ponder · filed 1988-12-13

Duncan sued the parole officials in their individual capacities but they were never served because the district court dismissed the suit as frivolous. Even if they had been served, however, they would be entitled to absolute immunity under Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir.1975).

In § 1983 suits, social workers have absolute immunity for initiating child abuse proceedings in their prosecutorial role.

Fanning v. Montgomery County Children & Youth Services · filed 1988-12-29

On balance, I conclude that absolute immunity should cloak social workers with respect to their initiation of child abuse proceedings.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against New Jersey municipal planning board members in their individual capacities for constitutional violations arising from site plan review conducted within their authority.

Bass v. Attardi · filed 1989-02-14

We therefore conclude that members of municipal planning boards in New Jersey are absolutely immune in their individual capacities from damage actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging equal protection and first amendment violations arising out of site plan review conducted pursuant to N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 40:55D-25(a)(2) (West Supp.1988).

Section 1983 damages claims against a state agency adjudicator are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts in proceedings with available legal safeguards.

Scott v. Central Maine Power Co. · filed 1989-03-13

By virtue of the legal safeguards available to Scott in those proceedings, Bradford was clothed with absolute immunity for “judicial acts” taken in the course of the section 296 proceedings after October 15, 1982.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges and prosecutors in their individual capacities are barred by absolute immunity when they provide parole boards with information connected to their sentencing and parole roles.

Johnson v. Joe Kegans and John Holmes · filed 1989-04-24

Whether we label these acts judicial and prosecutorial or a quasi-judicial equivalent to a witness or probation officer, they are functionally the sort of actions that deserve the protection of absolute immunity. To the extent that judicial immunity does not apply, quasi-judicial immunity does.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges, warrant magistrates, grand jury foremen, or prosecutors for acts protected by judicial or prosecutorial immunity.

Almon v. Gibbs · filed 1989-05-05

We find, without reaching any other issue, that the defendants named in this suit were clearly acting within the boundaries of their capacities as officials of the court, and, therefore, that their actions were absolutely immune from any liability that may arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986.

Section 1983 does not give child welfare workers absolute immunity for an emergency removal of a child from parental custody.

Doe v. Connecticut Department of Children & Youth Services · filed 1989-05-17

On the basis of the better reasoning and the probability that this circuit, which has not decided the issue, would not find a child care worker’s statutory emergency removal protectable by absolute immunity, defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity. Their function in this respect is not so intimately associated with the adjudicative process to be similarly immunized.

Officials charged with executing a facially valid court order have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims challenging conduct prescribed by that order.

Valdez v. City & County of Denver · filed 1989-07-06

In this case, we hold that an official charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order.

Section 1983 damages claims cannot proceed against officials for conduct prescribed by a facially valid court order they are charged with executing, because those officials have absolute immunity.

Valdez v. City And County Of Denver · filed 1989-08-16

In this case, we hold that an official charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order.

Section 1983 affords state racing stewards only qualified immunity when their combined prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles lack safeguards sufficient to justify absolute immunity.

Brumage v. Woodsmall · filed 1989-08-28

In this case, the limited safeguards provided by the administrative rules were obviated, in any event, by the failure of the stewards to conduct the hearing. This failure in and of itself suggests the safeguards are insufficient to justify the risk of an unconstitutional act which is inherent in the grant of absolute immunity. We conclude the stewards are only entitled to qualified immunity, pursuant to the general rule.

A witness who submits an affidavit for use in an adversarial bond revocation hearing is absolutely immune from damages liability under Section 1983 for statements in the affidavit.

Burns v. County of King · filed 1989-08-29

We conclude that Warwick was absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 for the statements in her affidavit.

Section 1983 does not give a police officer absolute immunity for suborning another person’s perjured testimony.

Knox v. Genison · filed 1989-11-01

Accordingly this Court finds the Heidelberg-Geter principle is still good law. No absolute immunity attaches to Ganison.

Section 1983 does not give a police supervisor absolute immunity for suspending an employee in his supervisory capacity, even if he later advocates in the employee’s disciplinary proceeding.

Dobosz v. Walsh · filed 1989-12-28

Whatever role Walsh may have played as an advocate in Dobosz’s disciplinary proceedings, therefore, the dispositive fact is that he was Dobosz’s employment superior and that the suspension was an employment decision undertaken by Walsh in that capacity under Departmental Regulation No. 51. We therefore believe Forrester applies to the suspension, and Walsh does not have absolute immunity with regard to any of Dobosz’s claims so far as they relate to the suspension.

Attorney discipline and grievance officials are immune from § 1983 liability for official actions in investigating and prosecuting disciplinary charges.

Eston v. Van Bolt · filed 1990-01-23

In this instance, defendants are accused of violating plaintiffs civil rights in their acts or omissions as members of the Attorney Discipline Board and the Attorney Grievance Commission. Defendants were acting within their statutory powers and statutory duties as set forth in the Michigan Court Rules, (see M.C.R. 9.109(A) and 9.110(D)). Therefore, this Court finds that defendants are immune from liability for their official actions in the investigation and prosecution of the plaintiff, Leonard Eston.

A Michigan prison hearing officer has absolute immunity from damages claims under Section 1983.

Brown v. Jerry Sherman Paddy Malone · filed 1990-03-13

Next, the district court correctly dismissed the damages claims against the hearing officer. Contrary to Brown's arguments, a Michigan prison hearing officer is entitled to absolute immunity.

A marshal executing a vacated warrant does not perform a quasi-judicial function that gives him absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Ramirez v. Garcia · filed 1990-03-13

In the instant case, Luna was not performing a quasi-judicial function. He was not a court clerk performing a judicial function by issuing a warrant; he was executing a vacated warrant.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims when they act to grant, deny, or revoke parole.

Johnson v. Lewis · filed 1990-05-08

Parole Board members are entitled to absolute immunity “when they act ‘to grant, deny, or revoke parole’,” ... because their tasks are quasi-judicial in nature.

Government attorneys defending a civil suit involving claims like those asserted here have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability equivalent to that of government prosecutors.

Abdul Al-Bari v. Steven Winn and Jimmy Creecy · filed 1990-07-09

Under circumstances involving claims like those asserted in the other litigation, government attorneys who undertake the defense of a civil suit enjoy the same absolute immunity as that enjoyed by government prosecutors.

Section 1983 does not afford officers absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages claims challenging the manner in which they execute a court order.

Martin v. Board Of County Commissioners Of Pueblo · filed 1990-07-18

We conclude that absolute immunity does not protect defendants from damage claims directed not to the conduct prescribed in the court order itself but to the manner of its execution.

Section 1983 does not provide school board members quasi-judicial absolute immunity for a decision to discharge an employee.

Stewart v. Baldwin County Board Of Education · filed 1990-08-15

Although this case involves a school board's decision to discharge an employee rather than an instance of student discipline, as was involved in Wood, we conclude that the function of the school board in this case was substantially similar to the function of the board in Wood. The Court's ruling in Wood therefore precludes an extension of absolute immunity to the defendants in this case.

School board members sued individually for discharging an employee are not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education · filed 1990-08-15

For the following reasons, we conclude that the members of the School Board are not protected by absolute, quasi-judicial immunity.

State officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to absolute judicial or prosecutorial immunity when the limited evidence does not establish that their challenged conduct was protected.

Johnson v. Bob Odom · filed 1990-09-07

We agree that on the basis of the limited evidence available for consideration, the defendants were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity. This also holds true for the absolute prosecutorial immunity asserted by Impson and Calhoun.

Section 1983 does not give child welfare caseworkers absolute immunity from damages for foster placements merely because their duties make them likely targets of civil rights suits.

K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan · filed 1990-09-24

We reject the defendants’ alternative contention that they are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability. ... This is not such a case — there was a juvenile court proceeding, but the defendants have not pointed to any court orders commanding them to place K.H. with particular foster parents — and the suggestion that caseworkers should enjoy absolute immunity merely because they are quite likely to be sued does not distinguish them from police officers or other public officers whose duties require them to interfere with people’s liberty or property and hence make them natural targets of civil rights suits.

A parole officer has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim based on providing allegedly false information to a hearing officer and parole board during parole revocation proceedings.

Brown v. Nester · filed 1990-11-28

In the case at bar, plaintiff’s claims relate to Nester’s performance of his function during the parole revocation process inasmuch as his claims are that Nester provided false information to the hearing officer and the Parole Board. These are precisely the types of claims for which absolute immunity is recognized.

Social workers performing investigative rather than prosecutorial functions are not absolutely immune from § 1983 claims.

Snell v. Tunnell · filed 1990-11-30

Given the facts, we agree with the district court that the three non-attorney defendants challenging the denial of absolute immunity (Sweptson, Sieck and Levingston) were acting in an investigative, rather than a prosecutorial capacity, and accordingly, we affirm the denial of absolute immunity for these defendants.

A local official acting in an administrative rather than legislative capacity cannot claim absolute legislative immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Vacca v. Barletta · filed 1991-05-09

It is well established that for absolute immunity to attach, the individual must have been acting in a legislative rather than administrative capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on parole board members for individual parole decisions made while exercising their decision making powers.

Vinson v. Heckmann · filed 1991-05-22

“[P]arole board members are absolutely immune from liability for their conduct in individual parole decisions when they are exercising their decision making powers.”

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity to medical board consultants for reviewing evidence, interviewing subjects, and reporting their findings to the board as part of its quasi-judicial proceedings.

Kutilek v. Gannon · filed 1991-05-30

Bruner and Baraban are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in reviewing the evidence, interviewing the plaintiffs, and making statements to the Board.

Court reporters are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims arising from non-routine, discretionary acts.

Clayton v. Cherylyn Thompson, Ann Filishio, Christine Rockwell · filed 1991-07-03

The district court correctly dismissed the damages claims against the court reporters on the basis of absolute judicial immunity. The doctrine of judicial immunity shields court reporters from liability for damages arising from non-routine, discretionary acts.

Parole officials are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for actions taken when processing parole applications.

Gamba-Oluwa v. Koenig · filed 1991-08-30

Here the district court correctly determined that the defendant is absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages for actions taken when processing parole applications.

Section 1983 damages claims against state parole officers are barred by absolute immunity for their preparation of parole reports and recommendations on an inmate’s suitability for parole.

Olds v. Hogg · filed 1991-10-15

This Court concludes, as did the court in Chitty, that a parole officer’s function in preparing a parole report and recommendation for the parole board on an inmate’s suitability for parole is a sufficiently adjudicatory function to entitle the officer to absolute immunity for performance of that function.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from damages under § 1983 for decisions whether to release a prisoner on parole.

Hale v. California Board of Prison Terms and Paroles · filed 1991-11-04

Parole board members are absolutely immune from liability for damages, based on their quasi-judicial status, for their decisions whether to release a prisoner on parole.

A probation officer has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for preparing a presentence report when the challenged conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

Gerrish v. Ockey · filed 1991-12-20

Plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 action against only the probation officer who prepared the presentence report in his state case after he had pled guilty. ... The basis for the trial court's dismissal was the absolute immunity of the probation officer for the probation officer's activities involving performance of quasi-judicial functions. It appears from the plaintiff's complaint that the allegations of misconduct by the probation officer involved activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. It was therefore appropriate that the trial court dismissed the action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Parole commissioners are absolutely immune from damages liability under § 1983 for their parole decisions.

Campbell v. Henry Burgess Thomas Craig · filed 1991-12-30

Here, the district court properly determined that the parole commissioners were absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages.

Section 1983 does not give child support enforcement directors absolute immunity from damages for an administrative policy setting support debt.

Jackson v. Rapps · filed 1992-01-09

The directors' policy of setting the amount of the state debt is an administrative function, albeit the results of their decisions may ultimately end up in the court system. ... We cannot conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the directors are not absolutely immune from damage suits.

Absolute immunity bars damages claims under § 1983 against defendants who enjoy it.

Lynn v. Sally Rentiers Donald Zelenka Frank Valenta Attorney General of South Carolina · filed 1992-02-13

Patrick C. Lynn appeals from the district court's order denying relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Upon review of the record, we find that Defendants enjoy absolute immunity from Plaintiff's damages claims. See McClain v. Kitchen, 505 F.Supp. 862, 863 (E.D.Mo.), aff'd, 659 F.2d 870 (8th Cir.1981). We affirm the entry of summary judgment on the basis of immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief against officials protected by absolute immunity for actions performed at the behest of a state supreme court.

Mayfield v. Michael Francks Dennis Path Ariana Herberg Leslie Healy · filed 1992-04-10

Monetary relief is unavailable to Mayfield because the defendants were protected by absolute immunity for the actions that they performed at the behest of the Michigan Supreme Court.

Section 1983 affords a prosecutor's investigator absolute immunity for conferring with potential witnesses in preparation for a criminal prosecution.

Lee v. Ventura County Sheriff's Dept., and Rebecca Dean Riley Will Hammer Thomas Kitchens Bruce McDowell Larry · filed 1992-04-14

Kitchens is absolutely immune. "Investigators, employed by a prosecutor and performing investigative work in connection with a criminal prosecution, are entitled to the same degree of immunity as prosecutors." Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 n. 5 (9th Cir.1989). Conferring with potential witnesses is part of the prosecutor's preparation of the case.

Section 1983 absolute immunity protects court-directed psychiatric diagnoses, hearing testimony, and conspiracies to perform those immune acts.

McArdle v. Michael J. Tronetti and Steven Reilly · filed 1992-04-17

In summary, we hold that the defendants are immune from Section 1983 liability with respect to the claims of false diagnosis, false testimony, and conspiracy.

Judges and court personnel are absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability.

Bertram v. Abraham Gorenfield Frank Zolin Frank Baffa Jay H. Picking · filed 1992-04-27

Second, the judge and court personnel are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on prosecutors for initiating and presenting a prosecution or on judges for their judicial acts, even if those acts exceed their jurisdiction or are alleged to be malicious or corrupt.

Lawrence C. Krain, M.D. v. Ronald M. George, Hon. Laughlin Waters, Hon., U.S. District Judge George Deukmajian, Governor · filed 1992-05-08

The district court properly determined that former Governor Deukmajian is absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 for his actions as the state attorney general "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Similarly, the judges are absolutely immune for section 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts, "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 386 (1978); accord Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc).

Section 1983 does not allow damages against an attorney general for deciding not to initiate criminal or civil actions against other state officials.

Long v. Parke · filed 1992-05-13

Additionally, Cowan is absolutely immune from damages with regard to his decision not to initiate criminal or civil actions against other state officials.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against judges for judicial acts and against prosecutors for initiating and presenting the state's case.

Herman v. James Roper, Judge Kevin Kelly, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney · filed 1992-06-04

Judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts, "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quotation omitted); accord Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.1986). ... The prosecutor, in initiating and presenting the state's case, is immune from civil suits for money damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a police officer for testimony at trial or before a grand jury.

Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans · filed 1992-06-18

Because the district court clearly was correct in finding the police officer absolutely immune for testimony given at trial, ... and before the grand jury, ... we address only the questions concerning probable cause.

Municipal board members acting in a judicial capacity when voting to impeach a mayor have absolute immunity from personal damages liability under § 1983.

Brown v. Edward Griesenauer, Jerry Davis, David London, Kenneth Molloy, Karl Duncan, Theodore Boller, Marvin Coval · filed 1992-07-13

In sum, we hold that defendants acted in a judicial capacity in voting to impeach the mayor and that their function as a board of impeachment was sufficiently comparable to “classic” adjudication so as to justify absolute immunity from personal liability for damages.

An officer who initiates or abets a wrongful prosecution cannot invoke absolute witness immunity against a § 1983 claim merely because the conduct involves a grand jury appearance.

Lewis v. McDorman · filed 1992-07-30

It is difficult, however, to discern how the court risks witness self-censorship by declining to extend such immunity to those who would initiate or abet a wrongful prosecution. Thus, the court finds that defendant may not avail himself of Briscoe immunity in this case.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts within a prosecutor’s duties and absolute witness immunity for testimony in judicial proceedings.

Snelling v. Westhoff · filed 1992-08-03

We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the conspiracy claims against Dowling on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity. ... The District Court also properly dismissed the conspiracy claims against Westhoff, Calloway, Cobb, Smith, and Porter on the ground of absolute witness immunity.

Section 1983 affords court clerks absolute immunity for acts performed at a judge’s explicit direction.

Darrell Kincaid and Donald R. Sceifers v. Vail · filed 1992-08-06

Insofar as those defendants were acting pursuant to explicit judicial direction, they are entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against bar disciplinary counsel for prosecuting disciplinary charges because counsel has absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Forman v. Ours · filed 1992-10-08

Applying the Fifth Circuit’s version of the three-part Butz test, Ours may not be held liable for damages in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 gives prosecutors absolute immunity for helping a grand jury draft an official report as part of their authorized advisory role.

DeCamp v. Douglas County Franklin Grand Jury · filed 1992-11-02

We believe the special prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for helping the grand jury draft an official report permitted by Nebraska law after the grand jury's investigation into possible criminal activity by the managers of a failed credit union ended without indictments.

Grand jurors have absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for issuing reports within the scope of their quasi-judicial authority.

DeCamp v. Douglas County Franklin Grand Jury · filed 1992-11-02

Although we have jurisdiction over DeCamp’s claims, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed DeCamp’s claim against the grand jurors because they possessed absolute immunity against liability arising from their “co-authoring” of the report.

Absolute immunity may cover investigations conducted at prosecutors' behest, but a § 1983 claim may proceed when the plaintiff could show that the defendants' conduct fell outside that protection.

Grant v. Foye · filed 1992-12-16

Furthermore, although we have held that absolute immunity can extend to investigations made at the behest of prosecutors, see Freeman v. Hittle, 708 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir.1983), plaintiffs might be able to survive summary judgment on this basis by demonstrating that defendants' actions are outside the scope of this protection. As such, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate.

CPS caseworkers have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for activities relating to the initiation and filing of child dependency petitions.

Nation v. Colla · filed 1992-12-29

We therefore hold that Colla, in her capacity as a CPS caseworker, is entitled to absolute immunity for her activities relating to the initiation and filing of the dependency petition.

Section 1983 does not give state attorneys absolute immunity for bringing a civil debt collection suit in retaliation against a successful § 1983 litigant.

Canell v. Oregon Department of Justice · filed 1993-01-11

Even assuming government attorneys are ordinarily absolutely immune from suits resulting from their role in initiating civil actions, that defense would still not be available here. ... Few things would frustrate the purposes of § 1983 more than granting absolute immunity to state officials who retaliate against successful § 1983 litigants.

Section 1983 bars monetary-damages claims against a court clerk performing a quasi-judicial function because the clerk has absolute immunity.

Hargis v. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Daniel Thomas Gerald E. Fuerst · filed 1993-02-03

Fuerst is clearly being sued in his capacity as court clerk performing a quasi-judicial function and, as such, is entitled to a grant of absolute immunity from a suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 claims based on a trial witness’s testimony or a government attorney’s trial advocacy are subject to absolute immunity, while an attorney acting in an investigative or administrative role has only qualified immunity.

Jacobs v. John Horn, Mona Parks C.B. Stegeman · filed 1993-02-09

Accordingly, Parks is entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983 action. ... Absolute immunity has been extended to attorneys, like Stegeman, who appear on behalf of the government. ... However, when an attorney acts in an "investigative" or "administrative" role, he or she is entitled to only qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, Stegeman is entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983 action.

A parole officer who issues a violation report is not absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim because that function differs from the work of a parole board.

Jones v. Dick Moore Bob Faith Cranston Mitchell Wendy Mensey G. Vanderhook Doctor Schoenen · filed 1993-02-19

Mensey was not entitled to absolute immunity because a parole officer’s issuance of a violation report is not akin to the activities of the parole board.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a parole agent for alleged improprieties relating to parole revocation because the agent is absolutely immune.

Ronald Rafael Bean, Sr. v. Rick Rimmer · filed 1993-02-24

To the extent that Bean claims any improprieties relating to the parole revocation itself, Rimmer is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.

Absolute witness immunity in a Section 1983 suit extends only to trial or trial-type testimony, not testimony given in pretrial discovery.

Foster v. City of Lake Jackson · filed 1993-02-25

In the Court’s view, the law in this circuit is that a witness is absolutely immune only from suits based on his trial, or trial-type, testimony.

Members of a state dental licensing board may have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their role is materially indistinguishable from that of licensing board members protected by controlling precedent.

Aitson v. Campbell · filed 1993-03-01

Because we decline to reconsider Horwitz, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to the individual members of the Board on the basis of absolute immunity under § 1983.

Under § 1983, a prison warden is absolutely immune from damages arising from a prisoner's incarceration pursuant to a facially valid confinement order, even when the prisoner claims wrongful conviction.

Patterson v. Von Riesen · filed 1993-07-23

We simply conclude that a warden is absolutely immune from damages flowing from the fact of a prisoner's incarceration, when that incarceration occurs pursuant to a facially valid order of confinement. Thus, we hold the defendant wardens absolutely immune from Patterson's claims that the wardens failed to release him in light of his wrongful conviction claim.

Under § 1983, prison wardens are absolutely immune from damages based on the fact of incarceration pursuant to a facially valid confinement order, even when the prisoner claims wrongful conviction.

Patterson v. Von Riesen · filed 1993-07-23

We affirm, but on a different basis, as we conclude that the wardens are cloaked with absolute immunity for continuing to incarcerate a prisoner pursuant to a valid court order in the face of his claim that he was wrongfully convicted. ... Here, the wardens simply confined Patterson pursuant to a facially valid order of conviction.

Under section 1983, prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages for initiating and presenting the state's case despite conclusory conspiracy allegations, and witnesses have absolute immunity for their grand jury testimony.

Hill v. Charles Pyeatte, Deputy County Attorney Bernie Hill, Detective, Scottsdale Police Department · filed 1993-08-03

The prosecutor, in initiating and presenting the state's case, is absolutely immune from suits for money damages under section 1983. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Further, appellant's conclusory allegations of a conspiracy between the prosecutor and the detective-witness do not pierce the prosecutor's absolute immunity. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078; see also Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982) (vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights conspiracy will not withstand a motion to dismiss). Similarly, detective Hill is entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights suits based upon his testimony during the grand jury proceedings. See Holt, 832 F.2d at 125; Blevins, 572 F.2d at 1338.

Judges performing judicial functions, prosecutors initiating and pursuing prosecutions, and witnesses accused of perjury are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims.

Graves v. Hampton · filed 1993-08-26

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. ... A criminal prosecutor also enjoys absolute immunity from ... section 1983 damage claims for presenting the state's case. ... A witness is entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 damage claims, even if it is alleged that the witness committed perjury.

A parole officer acting as a witness is absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability for allegedly perjured statements in an affidavit opposing a petition for state habeas relief.

Sykes v. John James, New York State Parole Officer · filed 1993-12-30

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that James is entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for perjurious statements allegedly made in opposition to Sykes’ petition for state habeas relief; we conclude further that no claim for conspiracy is stated.

Section 1983 damages claims against state medical board staff are barred by absolute immunity when the staff share the board’s adjudicative role.

Howard v. Miller · filed 1994-01-04

As for Watry and Morgan, the court is persuaded that as de jure staff members of the Board they should share its entitlement to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 claims against judges and government lawyers are subject to absolute immunity for conduct closely associated with the judicial process.

Sully v. Lungren · filed 1994-01-19

In addition, the actions of the state attorney general’s office in requesting that plaintiff not be allowed to appear in court, and of the several named judges and justices in dismissing and/or affirming the decision to dismiss plaintiff’s action, are all entitled to absolute immunity.

Medical board members performing quasi-judicial disciplinary functions have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims even when accused of procedural errors.

Richter v. Connor · filed 1994-04-08

This argument has been rejected by other courts because a quasi-judicial official does not lose immunity for committing procedural errors. ... Accordingly, the Board Defendants are absolutely immune for any purported misconduct during the course of Richter's disciplinary hearing.

Probation officers preparing presentence reports for state courts have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages suits for acts within their official duties.

Rawlins v. Jeanne Olson, Probation Officer Adult Probation Department State of Arizona · filed 1994-04-21

Probation officers preparing PSRs for the use of state courts possess absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damage suits under Sec. 1983, so long as their acts are within the scope of their official duties.

Executive officials are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for money damages for promulgating rules as a quasi-legislative act.

Redwood Village Partnership v. Graham · filed 1994-06-09

We therefore hold that executive officials are absolutely immune from suits for money damages under section 1983 for their promulgation of rules, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Officials who initiate and pursue regulatory enforcement actions may have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from those actions.

Davis v. Sabatini · filed 1994-06-14

Davis filed this action against the Maryland officials involved in initiating and pursuing the regulatory enforcement actions which resulted in the loss of his license to practice medicine. Under Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have absolute immunity from liability for their trial testimony and for allegedly conspiring to present false testimony.

King v. Gerald Young and John Patterson · filed 1994-07-06

Finally, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under Sec. 1983 based on their testimony at trial and for allegedly conspiring to present false testimony.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge for conduct in a judicial proceeding and against disciplinary counsel for filing a disciplinary petition are barred by absolute immunity.

Cohn v. Bracy · filed 1994-07-06

His claim against Judge Robinson Rice concerning her allegedly improper inquiry during plaintiff's divorce proceeding is barred by absolute judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). Likewise, plaintiff's claim for damages against Mercer and Bracy based on the disciplinary petition filed against plaintiff is barred by absolute immunity. Ginger v. Circuit Court for Wayne County, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967), confirmed in Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 272 (6th Cir.1992).

A governor’s extradition officer has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 suit when her duties are quasi-judicial in nature.

White v. Armontrout · filed 1994-07-06

We affirm the district court’s holding, therefore, that Ms. Day’s duties are quasi-judicial in nature and, accordingly, that she is entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on personnel hearing officers or personnel board members for quasi-judicial acts performed in their adjudicative capacities when they are entitled to absolute immunity.

Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1994-07-27

In conclusion, the Court finds that Albuquerque Personnel Hearing Officers and the Albuquerque Personnel Board, acting in their adjudicative capacities and performing quasi-judicial acts, are entitled to absolute immunity. ... Absolute immunity merely precludes Defendants from being held personally liable for damages.

Counsel for a state bar committee has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for prosecuting the committee’s unauthorized-practice action in state court.

Green v. State Bar of Texas · filed 1994-08-03

When Ticer prosecuted the UPLC's action in state court, he was undeniably performing a public service, and accordingly, the Supreme Court's reasoning for the necessity of absolute immunity is equally applicable to Ticer's position. Thus, we hold that Ticer, as legal counsel for the UPLC,7 is entitled to the protection of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 civil damages claims are barred against defendants entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts performed as judicial functions within their jurisdiction.

Fariello v. Campbell · filed 1994-08-06

Accordingly, the complaint in this case must be dismissed as a matter of law, because each of the defendants is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from the section 1983 civil suit filed by Fariello.

Section 1983 does not give a prosecutor absolute immunity for participating in a suspect’s detention and questioning when those acts are investigative.

Craig v. St. Martin Parish Sheriff · filed 1994-08-22

The evidence before this court establishes that Haney is not entitled to absolute immunity for his role in the detention and questioning of Craig and the seizure of his property. Haney’s conduct on the morning in question is indistinguishable from that of the sheriffs officers, and is the functional equivalent of police investigation.

Bar admissions officials have absolute judicial immunity from individual-capacity civil rights claims for acts performed in furtherance of their official duties as an arm of a state supreme court.

Diaz v. Moore · filed 1994-08-24

Based on the sound reasoning in Sparks, the Court finds that the actions of which Rodriguez Diaz complains, namely Moore’s and Matthews’ failure to either make a decision on his application or convene a formal hearing with specific charges, were acts performed in the furtherance of then-official duties as an arm of the Florida Supreme Court, and that Moore and Matthews therefore are absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a police officer for testimony at an adversarial pretrial suppression hearing because the officer has absolute witness immunity.

Moore v. McDonald · filed 1994-09-02

Because McDonald's testimony at the suppression hearing was subject to the same procedural safeguards as trial testimony, we hold that McDonald's testimony is absolutely immune from Moore's § 1983 claim.

Court-appointed mediators and case evaluators performing duties within the Superior Court’s ADR process have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages claims under § 1983.

Wagshal v. Foster · filed 1994-09-16

We hold that absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to mediators and case evaluators in the Superior Court’s ADR process, and that Foster’s actions were taken within the scope of his official duties.

Section 1983 gives local officials absolute immunity from damages suits when they act in a quasi-judicial capacity reviewing an employment termination.

Gai v. City of Selma · filed 1994-09-19

We agree with the district court that the individual defendants who were members of the Commission and City Council were acting in quasi-judicial capacities in their reviews of the decision to terminate Gai's employment. As such, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on court-appointed psychiatrists for medical reports they prepare and submit to a state court in a quasi-judicial capacity.

Straub v. Robert F. Cary David Paris · filed 1994-09-27

Court-appointed psychiatrists who prepare and submit medical reports to the state court are immune from liability for damages under section 1983 because their work for the court is performed in a quasi-judicial capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against parole board members for actions taken in performing their duties to grant or deny parole.

Ward v. Jackie Moss · filed 1994-11-23

We agree Moss is entitled to absolute immunity because members of a parole board have absolute immunity from damages liability for actions taken in the performance of their duties regarding the granting or denying of parole.

Section 1983 claims against assistant attorneys general are barred by absolute immunity when the claims concern their advocacy in defending state officers in civil rights suits.

McConnell v. Karen King Andrea Spillars William Webster Jeremiah Nixon John Munich Bruce Farmer · filed 1994-12-14

The assistant attorneys general were absolutely immune from claims related to their advocacy functions in defending state officers in civil rights suits, ... and thus those claims were based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory.”

A prison disciplinary hearing officer paid by and serving at the pleasure of the corrections department is not absolutely immune from a Section 1983 suit.

Payne v. Axelrod · filed 1995-01-04

Here, Patterson conducts disciplinary hearings of the sort that the officer in Selsky reviewed on appeal. He too is paid by and serves at the pleasure of DOCS. His absolute immunity argument therefore must be rejected.

A state assistant attorney general is absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim for actions taken defending state officials in prisoner civil rights litigation.

Weiler v. Purkett · filed 1995-01-23

As to Gunn, the district court correctly determined that she is entitled to absolute immunity. We have previously held that a state assistant attorney general is absolutely immune for her actions when defending state officials in prisoner civil rights litigation. Murphy v. Morris, 849 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988). Weiler failed to allege any facts demonstrating that Gunn was personally involved in the destruction of the package and appears to be suing Gunn solely because she was assigned to defend against his first lawsuit. In these circumstances, it is clear that Gunn is entitled to absolute immunity.

Tax assessors are not entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for their property tax assessments.

General Motors v. City of Linden · filed 1995-02-03

Our conclusion that tax assessors are not entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 is also supported by the decisions of other courts.

Police officers have absolute witness immunity from § 1983 damages liability for testimony at adversarial preliminary and pretrial suppression hearings.

Curtis v. Bembenek · filed 1995-02-23

The district court properly dismissed this case on the grounds that defendant enjoyed absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for his testimony at Curtis’ preliminary hearing and again at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

Under § 1983 as applied in 1995, judicial and prosecutorial absolute immunity did not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Luqman Abdullah, Kaye Douglas Bentley Barbara M. Douglas v. Penny Harrington, Judge Hamilton Gayden, Judge Joseph R. Mou · filed 1995-03-28

Moreover, absolute immunity is not a bar to injunctive or declaratory relief against a judge or prosecutor.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for actions taken in considering parole applications.

Peterson v. Kathryn Bail George Johnson David L. Carlson Kaye Adkins Robert Trimble · filed 1995-07-07

Furthermore, we note that all of the defendants are members of the parole board, and thus entitled to absolute immunity for any actions made in considering parole applications.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for witness testimony in a custody proceeding because that testimony is absolutely immune.

Manzano v. South Dakota Department of Social Services · filed 1995-07-25

To the extent that the testimony of any of the SDDSS or County defendants affected the state court's decision to allow only supervised visitation from October 1991 through May 1992, that testimony was entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights liability and cannot influence our consideration of Manzano's constitutional claims.

A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for actions in the role of witness.

Raymond T. Harris, Jr. v. Frank Whitlow, Individually and as Police Officer for the City of Kenbridge, Virginia · filed 1995-07-28

We note that in his role as a witness before the grand jury, the Appellee was entitled to absolute immunity.

Officials who personally participate in quasi-judicial parole revocation proceedings are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983.

Aldridge v. Windham · filed 1995-10-17

Aldridge alleged the personal participation in his revocations proceedings of parole officers Windham and Sutton, board members McMillian and Beasley, and hearing officer Schever. Because each of these individuals was participating in the quasi- judicial activity of mandatory supervision revocation proceedings, they are absolutely immune from damages.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to absolute immunity for judges and prosecutors performing duties in judicial proceedings and for probation officers performing quasi-judicial tasks such as preparing presentence reports.

Sandles v. Schneider · filed 1995-11-13

In addition, Mr. Sandies’ petition fails to the extent that the defendants, Judge Randa, Magistrate Judge Goodstein and Magistrate Judge Gorence, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), along with defendants, United States Attorney T. Schneider and United States Assistant Attorney P. Kanter are absolutely immune from liability for damages in civil rights actions for the performance of their respective duties in judicial proceedings. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). As to the remaining defendant, Mr. Morgon, his status as a probation officer entitles him to absolute immunity in circumstances which require him to perform quasi-judicial tasks such as preparing a presentence report.

A court clerk has no absolute immunity from § 1983 equitable relief, and a failure to provide a court-ordered transcript may not be discretionary conduct entitled to immunity from damages.

McCullough v. Vernon L. Horton, Clerk Cross County, Arkansas State of Arkansas · filed 1995-11-16

Based on this interpretation of the complaint, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing McCullough’s claim against Horton for equitable relief, for which Horton does not enjoy absolute immunity. ... We also conclude the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing McCullough’s claim against Horton for damages. We cannot say McCullough’s claim lacks an arguable basis in law, because it is not clear that Horton’s failure to provide a transcript when ordered to do so by the court constitutes a discretionary act entitling him to immunity.

Section 1983 absolute immunity protects members of an independent teacher disciplinary hearing panel exercising quasi-judicial functions.

Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free School District · filed 1995-12-02

In light of all of the safeguards provided to ensure the independence of the hearing panel members, and the quasi-judicial powers afforded to the hearing officer, and the necessity for their protection, the Court concludes that panel members serving pursuant to the New York Education Law are protected from civil suit under the doctrine of absolute immunity.

Personnel hearing officers and board members performing adjudicative functions are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from personal liability in a § 1983 action.

Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1996-01-17

Individual appellees respond that: they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity because their functions are similar to those in the judicial process; ... and the district court followed Butz and Hor-witz in concluding that they were entitled to absolute immunity. We agree.

Municipal personnel hearing officers and board members performing adjudicative functions are absolutely immune from personal liability in a Section 1983 action.

Saavedra v. Albuquerque · filed 1996-01-17

We hold that the district court properly applied Butz and Horwitz in granting individual appellees absolute judicial immunity.

A prosecutor has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for acts performed in a prosecutorial capacity during pretrial motions and arguments.

Alexander v. Bret Strand, Jane Garland · filed 1996-03-08

We agree with the district court that Garland's alleged acts, occurring during pre-trial motions and arguments when she was acting in a prosecutorial capacity, fell within the scope of absolute immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); cf. Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (allegations that prosecutor conspired with witness to give false testimony do not defeat immunity), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993).

Absolute immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim seeking only injunctive relief rather than damages.

Patton v. Machado · filed 1996-03-15

The district court's reliance on the doctrine of absolute immunity was inappropriate because Patton's complaint sought injunctive relief only, not damages.

A prosecutor lacks absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when conditioning dismissal of charges on a religious oath is manifestly beyond the prosecutor’s authority.

Doe v. Francis D. Phillips, Ii, Gerald D. D'amelia, Jr. · filed 1996-04-22

Under these standards, the district court correctly ruled, given the undisputed facts and the facts to which D’Amelia himself attested, that D’Amelia’s conduct was not protected by absolute immunity because his demand that Doe swear to her innocence on a bible in church was manifestly beyond his authority.

Absolute immunity does not bar a § 1983 action when the plaintiff does not seek monetary damages.

Smith v. Myers · filed 1996-05-02

To the extent that the district court relied on absolute immunity to dismiss the action, we note that because Appellant did not seek monetary damages, absolute immunity does not apply.

State officials performing prosecutorial or adjudicatory functions in agency proceedings have absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983 for acts performed in those functions.

Rincover v. State, Department of Finance, Securities Bureau · filed 1996-06-04

Thus, the acts by these defendants of which the Rincovers complain were clearly accomplished during the performance of their prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. Consequently, in light of Butz, these defendants are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983, and the decision of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against child protection workers for their participation in state court protective custody proceedings when absolute immunity covers their role.

Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc. · filed 1996-06-11

Finally, Wordlaw and SCAN are absolutely immune from liability for their participation in the ex parte proceedings in state court that led to the award of temporary protective custody of Anthony to the state.

Section 1983 does not provide absolute witness immunity to a police officer who acts as a complaining witness by initiating a baseless prosecution through grand jury testimony.

Crespo v. New York City Police Commissioner · filed 1996-06-17

Police Officer O’Keeffe is not therefore entitled to immunity for his testimony to the grand jury because according to the facts alleged in the complaint he acted as a complaining witness and initiated a baseless prosecution against Crespo.

Section 1983 damages claims against prisoner review board members are barred by absolute immunity for revocation decisions and acts integral to those decisions.

Wilson v. Kelkhoff · filed 1996-06-18

Absolute immunity protects board members not only for the decision to revoke Wilson’s supervised release, but the board members’ actions that are “part and parcel” of the decision-making process.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against prison records specialists for relying on a facially valid state court order to calculate a prisoner’s parole release date.

Moore v. James Gomez George Ingle · filed 1996-08-16

Here, the district court, relying on Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir.1987) and Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam), dismissed Moore's action on the ground that the defendants were absolutely immune from suit for relying on a "facially valid state court order." The district court's analysis is proper insofar as Moore sought damages from the defendants for relying on the abstract of judgment in calculating Moore's parole release date.