42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 action requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Cobb v. Stringer · filed 1987-06-03

There are two essential elements of a 1983 action which have been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court. These two elements are (1) whether the ... conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead both deprivation of a federal right and that the defendant caused the deprivation while acting under color of state law.

James T. Sullivan, Plaintiff-Apellant v. Kryscio · filed 1987-06-11

Specifically, in order to state a claim under that statute, a plaintiff must plead that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the defendant deprived him of that right while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 liability requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Brewer Ex Rel. Brewer v. City of El Cerrito · filed 1987-07-31

A defendant is liable for a civil rights violation when, acting under color of .state law, he deprives another individual of a federal right secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege both deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state or territorial law.

Quiñones Vazquez v. de Cruz · filed 1987-11-30

Two allegations are essential for a successful Section 1983 claim. “First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.”

Section 1983 liability requires a deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and that deprivation, and state action.

Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset · filed 2010-02-26

Section 1983 requires three elements for liability: deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the defendant’s alleged conduct and the deprivation, and state action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of state procedure that does not violate federal law.

Laney v. Farley · filed 2007-08-28

Similarly, a § 1983 claim may not be based upon a violation of state procedure that does not violate federal law.

Section 1983 requires a conspiracy claim to allege that defendants acting under color of state law conspired to deprive, and did in fact deprive, the plaintiff of a federal right.

Klupt v. Blue Island Fire Department · filed 1980-05-06

The elements of a conspiracy to violate § 1983 were discussed in this court’s previous order, wherein it was stated that there must be an allegation that the defendants, acting under color of state law, conspired to deprive (and did in fact deprive) the plaintiff of a federal right.

Section 1983 can reach a private person alleged to conspire with public officials when the conspiracy permits treating that person as acting under color of state law.

White v. Lackland Bloom Daniel Murphy Robert J. Walsh · filed 1980-04-30

Section 1983 affords equitable and monetary relief against any person who deprives the plaintiff of constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law, and section 1985 affords monetary relief against persons who conspire, with a racial or otherwise class-based animus, to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. ... Assuming a conspiracy with public officials has been adequately pleaded, however, Walsh may be regarded as acting under color of state law, his own capacity as a private party notwithstanding.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private individual when the individual conspires with officials acting under color of law.

Mandelkorn v. Patrick · filed 1973-05-08

The law is clear, however, that a claim under § 1983 can be against even a private individual where it is alleged that the private individual engaged in a conspiracy which also involved officials acting under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a deprivation under color of state law, but a complaint must allege an intentional and purposeful deprivation with particularized supporting acts rather than conclusory conspiracy allegations.

Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Board · filed 1964-01-23

Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. gives a cause of action to any person who, under color of state law, is made to suffer a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws. ... A complaint in a case like this must set forth facts showing some«intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights. ... But plaintiff was bound to do more than merely state vague and conclusionary allegations respecting the existence of a conspiracy. It was incumbent upon him to allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy. ... For all of these reasons we affirm, though on grounds different from those relied on by the court below, the dismissal of the complaint.

Section 1983 targets official abuse of power causing deprivation of federally protected rights; a private hospital’s alleged failure to provide medical care, without state action or a conspiracy with police, does not state a claim.

Rogers v. Provident Hospital · filed 1965-05-13

... The Federal Civil Rights Act was never intended to supersede state law regarding recovery for breach of an individual’s duty to render necessary medical care and treatment. Rather, it is designed to correct official abuse of power resulting in a deprivation of federally protected rights. Monroe v. Pape, supra. ... Even if the Court were to assume jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 in order to determine whether the complaint states a valid cause of action under the substantive provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act, Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospital, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 27 (D.Minn.1963); C.O.R.E. v. Clemmons, 323 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963), it is clear that Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985 or § 1986.

Section 1983 reaches state or municipal officers acting in an official capacity and, according to this opinion, abrogates their official immunity when they violate or conspire to violate constitutional or federal rights.

Birnbaum v. Trussell · filed 1965-06-17

The statutory condition of defendant’s acting “under color” of state or territorial law contemplates that he act in an official capacity. To the extent that state or municipal officers, such as the defendants Trussell and Man-gum, violate or conspire to violate constitutional and federal rights, the Civil Rights Laws, §§ 1979 and 1980(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), abrogate the doctrine of official immunity.

Section 1983 generally shields prison guards from liability for custodial acts performed under a valid commitment, unless they join a conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rhodes · filed 1968-10-22

In the few cases in which § 1983 actions have been brought specifically against jailers, guards, or other institutional keepers, the shield of immunity afforded, although not absolute, has been held to be broad and sweeping in its coverage. Francis v. Lyman, 1st Cir., 216 F.2d 583; Hoffman v. Halden, 9th Cir., 268 F.2d 280; Delaney v. Shobe, D.C., 235 F.Supp. 662; Belveal v. Bray, D.C., 253 F.Supp. 606; Black v. Stanley, D.C., 270 F.Supp. 993. Cf. Jobson v. Henne, 2nd Cir., 355 F.2d 129. It has been said that the privilege of the jailer to impose confinement is as time honored in the Anglo-American common law as is the immunity of judges and members of the legislature from civil liability for acts done within the sphere of their judicial activities. Francis v. Lyman, supra 216 F.2d at 588, 589. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has extended the doctrine of immunity to cases involving alleged malice on the part of the jailer. Hoffman v. Halden, supra. The reasoning behind the broad scope of immunity accorded a prison guard is that he is required by law to keep custody of persons delivered to him for safekeeping, and is normally subject to criminal penalty if he voluntarily allows such a prisoner to escape. See § 28-718, R.R.S.Neb.1943. Certainly a jailer should not be expected to go behind a court order of commitment to determine whether a person presented for safekeeping has been convicted as a result of some denial of his constitutional rights. This is not a ease of police brutality as was Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. We conclude that the trial judge was manifestly correct when he instructed the jury that, as a prison guard, Edmondson was immune from liability unless the jury found that he joined in a conspiracy to deprive Rhodes of his civil rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a properly pleaded conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.

Safeguard Mutual Insurance v. Miller · filed 1979-05-02

I hold, therefore, that a cause of action for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights exists under section 1983, and, if properly plead, is available to the plaintiffs in the instant case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private persons for conspiring with a state official who is absolutely immune, absent another basis for state action.

Sparkman v. McFarlin · filed 1979-05-02

Upon remand, under our Circuit Rule 19, all parties have briefed the issue left undecided by the Supreme Court. ... The majority of judges in regular active service affirms the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 allows a claim against court-appointed public defenders when a sufficiently pleaded conspiracy with state judges makes them act under color of state law.

Smith v. Bacon · filed 1983-02-10

The district court's apparent holding that public defenders never act under color of state law, and hence cannot be sued under section 1983, is erroneous. ... If such a conspiracy is adequately pleaded, the court appointed attorneys may be regarded as acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim based only on conclusional allegations.

Fontenot v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-27

The district court also correctly concluded that Fontenot’s conspiracy allegations were conclusional and do not support an actionable claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest on bald allegations based on the plaintiff’s personal belief.

Brown v. Davis · filed 1999-02-23

To the extent that Brown presents his conspiracy claim pursuant to § 1983, his bald allegations based upon his own personal belief are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than conclusory allegations that defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Molina v. Kaye · filed 1996-07-22

Molina has not met the pleading requirements for maintaining a § 1983 action. Section 1983 claims must be supported by “more than conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal of a claim predicated on a conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of his constitutional rights.”

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual denial of due process, not merely an allegation that an illegal agreement was formed.

Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt · filed 1983-07-01

To maintain successfully a conspiracy action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there must have been an actual denial of due process. ... Here, more must be alleged than the formation of an illegal agreement.

A Section 1983 claim against a private party must specifically allege a mutual understanding with state officials, supported by facts suggesting a meeting of the minds.

Obeda v. Connecticut Board of Registration for Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors · filed 1983-08-12

A plaintiff must allege not merely that the private party acted “in concert” with public officials, or “with a common goal”; rather, the plaintiff must allege a “mutual understanding” between the private and public defendants, supported by “factual allegations suggesting such a ‘meeting of the minds.’ ”

A § 1983 conspiracy requires at least an implied agreement among the alleged conspirators and cannot survive summary judgment without admissible evidence supporting a reasonable inference of agreement.

Ellis v. Francis Kneifl, Individually and as Judge for the State District Court of Nebraska, Cedar County · filed 1987-11-25

Of course, there can be no conspiracy without at least an implied agreement among the conspirators. ... in this case Ellis has shown no admissible evidence that would warrant submitting his conspiracy claim to a jury.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must allege a mutual understanding to take unconstitutional action and facts suggesting a meeting of the minds.

Haley v. Dormire · filed 1988-05-02

In order to state a conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must at least allege that " 'the defendants had directed themselves toward an unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding,' and [provide] some facts suggesting such a 'meeting of the minds.' " White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d at 561, citing Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir.1979) (banc).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a federal right; police misconduct that does not violate a constitutional right cannot support the claim.

Earle v. Benoit · filed 1988-06-29

We do not think the above, individually or collectively, arise to the level of deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution required for a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even supposing Benoit and Rem-biszewski overstepped their authority on some of these occasions, not every transgression by a police officer violates the due process clause (or another provision) of the Constitution.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights, an overt act in furtherance of it, and resulting injury.

Boone v. Mingus · filed 1988-09-26

In order to recover under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove (1) that there was a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) that the plaintiff was injured thereby.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts supporting an inference that the defendants agreed to deprive someone of federally protected rights.

Michael David Manis, Roy D. Forshee and Ronnie Dethrow v. Peter Sterling, Sidney Pearson and Robert Godfrey · filed 1988-12-02

Allegations of conspiracy, however, must be pled with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest a “meeting of the minds.”

A § 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights; a private party does not become a conspirator merely by accepting a government-imposed business arrangement.

Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-01-11

The suburban livery companies here were not voluntary participants in a joint venture with the City. They were forced to accept the City’s decision to implement some form of livery dispatch system.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims must plead specific material facts; vague and conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

Baggett v. Wigginton · filed 1989-05-18

It is well established that "conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir.1987). We do not believe the allegations here are sufficient to support Baggett's conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts suggesting that the defendants reached an understanding to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Nelson v. The City of McGehee Rosalie S. Gould Jim D. Harris · filed 1989-05-26

To create a genuine issue of conspiracy, Nelson had to point to at least some facts which would suggest that appellees “reached an understanding” to violate [his] rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts suggesting a meeting of the minds among defendants; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Kurt B. Knight, William C. Andrews v. Armontrout · filed 1989-08-17

To support their claim, appellants asserted in conclusory statements that the various defendants “used their office invidiously to deprive” appellants of their constitutional rights. We conclude the allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to suggest a “meeting of the minds.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims must allege specific supporting facts; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Carter v. Betsy Farr, Lpn Cpl. Darrell Renfro Cio. Herk McCartt Cio. Glen Hensley Cpl. Sam Chaplin · filed 1990-02-08

It is well established that "conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir.1987). Under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe the allegation here is sufficient to support Carter's conspiracy claim even under the Neitzke standard of review.

A plaintiff seeking recovery under a § 1983 conspiracy theory must plead and prove both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

Dixon v. City of Lawton · filed 1990-03-08

Thus, we join those courts which have recognized that to recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires evidence that the defendants reached an understanding to inflict injury on the plaintiff.

Carson v. Moody · filed 1990-08-07

We find that the plaintiff has failed to show that defendants Moody, Berry and Nelson had a “meeting of the minds” and thus reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives, that is, to inflict injury upon him.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim when defendants agree to deprive a person of constitutional rights and overt acts in furtherance of the agreement actually deprive that person of those rights.

Flood v. O'GRADY · filed 1990-09-17

The elements of a § 1983 conspiracy are well-settled in the Seventh Circuit. ... There are two requirements. First, it must be shown that there existed “an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights”; and, second, that such agreement resulted in “actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an express or implied agreement to deprive a person of constitutional rights and overt acts that deprive the person of those rights in furtherance of the agreement.

Carreon v. Baumann · filed 1990-10-16

To plead a § 1983 conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege (1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights and (2) deprivation ... of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of an agreement.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Carino v. Town of Deerfield (Oneida County, NY) · filed 1990-11-23

A § 1983 conspiracy necessitates proving “ ‘an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.’ ”

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment on conclusory allegations without specific proof of a conspiracy.

Jackson v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, Dolores Rozzi · filed 1990-11-23

Application of those standards to this case indicate that the district court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment in regard to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Other than those conclusory facts, originally advanced in the complaint and merely restated in the response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff provided no specific proof to substantiate her claim of an existence of a conspiracy. Under Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1539, those conclusory allegations are not sufficiently probative to allow a jury ultimately to find in her favor on her claim that defendants conspired to violate her civil rights.

In a section 1983 conspiracy claim, an officer retains qualified immunity when the alleged harmful state action was objectively reasonable, so the court need not decide whether a conspiracy existed.

Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, Doyle Elliot and James A. Pearce, Mike Earl, Harvey Faulkner and Waldon Boecker, · filed 1990-12-12

In a section 1983 action claiming that plaintiff was injured by state action as the result of a conspiracy which includes private persons, the defense is still available to the qualifiedly immune actor. ... Only if that state' action is determined not to be objectively reasonable should we look to whether the officer’s actions were taken pursuant to a conspiracy.

A section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiracy involving state action and a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of that conspiracy.

Pfannstiel v. City of Marion · filed 1991-02-12

In order to prevail on a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.

Smith v. Turner · filed 1991-03-25

A claim for relief from a conspiracy under § 1983 must allege both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.

Section 1983 does not make a conspiracy actionable without an underlying violation of constitutional rights.

Temple of the Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams · filed 1991-04-05

These findings that the State defendants did not violate appellants’ constitutional rights by issuing the subpoenas or pursuing the investigation thus bar appellants’ conspiracy claim in the district court, since “[i]t is the wrongful act, not the conspiracy, which is actionable.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require proof that the defendants agreed to act unlawfully against the plaintiff or for an unlawful purpose.

Schowengerdt v. United States · filed 1991-09-06

To prevail on this claim Schowengerdt must show that the defendants agreed among themselves to act against him unlawfully, or for an unlawful purpose.

Section 1983 conspiracy allegations require facts tending to show an agreement and concerted action.

Arney v. Hayden · filed 1992-03-13

In order to allege a conspiracy, plaintiff must present factual allegations which tend to show an agreement and concerted action.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires sufficient allegations of a mutual understanding or agreement among the defendants.

Smith v. Robert Erickson, Helene Haworth, Richard Craven, Rudy Kohler, Robert L. Aufderhar, James J. Ryan, H · filed 1992-04-20

Regarding the conspiracy claim, he failed sufficiently to allege that a mutual understanding or agreement existed among the defendants.

Section 1983 permits claims for conspiracies to deprive a person of constitutional rights without requiring racial or class-based discrimination.

Duff v. Coughlin · filed 1992-07-27

Conspiracies to deprive a person of his constitutional rights are cognizable under § 1983, which does not require a showing of racial or class-based discrimination as a prerequisite to liability.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim must allege specific facts showing that the defendants reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp. · filed 1992-07-31

Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging conspiracy to violate § 1983 must allege specific facts of the conspiracy. ... However, there are no allegations that Dade County reached any understanding with the Mortons or the Robbies, at any point in time, to work together to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts suggesting that the defendants reached a mutual understanding to pursue unconstitutional action.

Webster v. Duke · filed 1992-08-06

Webster further failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain the claim. See Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (plaintiff must allege defendants directed themselves toward unconstitutional action by virtue of mutual understanding, and provide facts suggesting meeting of minds).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of rights; proof of a conspiracy alone is insufficient.

Trafford v. Penno · filed 1992-09-14

Allegations of conspiracy, however, do not relieve Plaintiff of the obligation to prove an actual deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to equal protection. Conspiracy is merely a method of obtaining the necessary state action or imposing liability on one defendant for acts performed by other defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not support an action under § 1983.

Wilson v. Budney · filed 1992-11-03

Wilson's allegations of a conspiracy are merely conclusional and do not support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must allege facts showing a meeting of the minds.

Jones v. Ashcroft · filed 1992-11-24

In order to sufficiently plead a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Jones was required to allege facts showing a meeting of the minds.

An officer’s acquiescence in another officer’s open misconduct can establish the agreement needed for a § 1983 conspiracy.

Hafner v. David Brown Gary Reininger Jonathan Pease Terry Ressin, and David Hahn · filed 1992-12-22

Acquiescence can amount to a conspiracy agreement when, as here, one police officer watches an open , breach of the law and does nothing to seek its prevention.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement between defendants to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Smith v. Sublett · filed 1993-01-14

To prove the existence of a conspiracy, Smith must demonstrate that there was an agreement between defendants to violate his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires more than vague and conclusory allegations to state a conspiracy claim.

Raske v. Dugger · filed 1993-04-20

More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires competent evidence of an agreement among defendants to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Schmidt v. Borough of Stroudsburg · filed 1993-06-03

Nowhere in any document, affidavit, deposition testimony or other filings do the plaintiffs provide competent evidence that an agreement existed among the defendants, either explicitly or implicitly, to improperly assist Nevil in obtaining certification and, therefore, to deny plaintiffs their constitutional right to employment as patrolmen.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 must allege specific facts suggesting a mutual understanding among the conspirators to take actions directed toward an unconstitutional end.

Ersek v. Township of Springfield, Delaware County · filed 1993-06-17

To plead conspiracy under the civil rights statute, a complaint must allege specific facts suggesting that there was a mutual understanding among the conspirators to take actions directed toward an unconstitutional end.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires factual allegations suggesting a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds among the defendants.

Cooper v. Delo · filed 1993-06-21

Cooper’s conspiracy claim lacked an arguable basis in fact because he did not allege facts suggesting a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds.

Section 1983 does not create an independent cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a constitutional right; an actual deprivation is required.

Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon · filed 1993-07-12

The plaintiffs conspiracy allegation meets the same fate because “8 1983 does not provide a cause of action per se for conspiracy to deprive one of a constitutional right.” Defeo v. Sill, 810 F.Supp. 648, 658 (E.D.Pa.1993). Until there has been a deprivation, one has no cause of action under 8 1983.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators.

Pittman v. Banks · filed 1993-07-29

To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Pittman must assert "specific facts showing '[a] meeting of [the] minds' among alleged conspirators." Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 977 (1993). Pittman failed to provide sufficient facts to show a meeting of the minds among the appellees, or to show how the appellees conspired against him when they filed and enforced the conduct violations.

A conspiracy claim under section 1983 requires factual allegations suggesting a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds among the defendants.

Cooper v. Delo · filed 1993-07-30

Cooper's conspiracy claim lacked an arguable basis in fact because he did not allege facts suggesting a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an inference of agreement and concerted action; merely alleging responsibility for subordinates and agents is insufficient.

Beasley v. Marquez · filed 1993-08-09

In the alternative, we agree that the complaint failed to allege a conspiracy with well-pleaded factual contentions. Our cases have emphasized the importance of pleading and proving a conspiracy as well as a constitutional deprivation in this type of case, Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1622 (1991), Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir.1990); merely alleging that the Defendant is responsible for subordinates and agents in his control, I R. doc. 3 at 5 (complaint), will not suffice as facts that support an inference of an agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for conspiracy alone; an actual deprivation of a civil right is required.

Arnold v. Truemper · filed 1993-08-26

The Seventh Circuit has made clear that § 1983 does not punish conspiracy alone. ... Rather, an actual denial of a civil right is necessary before a cause of action arises. ... Therefore, plaintiffs have not stated a claim under § 1983 for conspiracy.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims must allege more than vague and conclusory assertions to survive a motion to dismiss.

Allen v. Josephine County · filed 1994-01-12

In addition, Allen's claim of conspiracy against U.S. West is vague and conclusory and cannot withstand the motion to dismiss.

A claim that defendants conspired to violate constitutional rights may state a cause of action under § 1983.

Lee v. Riverside County District Attorneys Office Grace Brouilette Christine Albertine · filed 1994-02-17

This court has recognized that a claim of a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights may state a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 requires a civil rights conspiracy claim to show that at least two defendants agreed to violate civil rights; unsupported conclusions or inferences of conspiracy do not suffice.

Bailey v. Town of Smithfield, Virginia Claiborne v. Havens Mark Marshall K. E. Beach · filed 1994-03-04

To establish this claim, Bailey must show that at least two of the defendants conspired to violate his civil rights, see Thomas v. New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir.1982), and he cannot rest his case on unsupported conclusions or inferences of conspiracy, see Richardson v. Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual denial of a federally protected right.

Gray v. Laws · filed 1994-04-07

More specifically, to maintain a conspiracy action under Section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate an actual denial of a federally protected right.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement among the alleged conspirators; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Sales v. Murray · filed 1994-08-02

Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy under § 1983 or § 1985 and fails to allege facts suggesting an agreement or meeting of the minds among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss the complaint.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim only when the conspiracy results in a deprivation of civil rights; conspiracy alone is not actionable.

Brown v. City of Galveston, Tex. · filed 1994-11-30

The Fifth Circuit has clearly held that conspiracy claims for the violation of § 1983 can be brought, but a conspiracy itself is not actionable under § 1983. ... Having already decided that no underlying violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has occurred in this case, it is axiomatic that Plaintiffs conspiracy contention is without merit.

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of constitutional rights as well as a conspiratorial agreement.

Kim I. Schaper D/B/A St. Croix Enterprises and H. Joseph Slater v. Wallace · filed 1994-12-21

Because the plaintiffs have failed to show any constitutional deprivation, they cannot make out a prima facie case of civil conspiracy which requires, in addition to a showing of a conspiratorial agreement, an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim only when the underlying claim for a constitutional violation is viable.

Mastroianni v. Deering · filed 1994-12-30

Mastroianni’s conspiracy claims, however, are contingent upon the viability of the underlying § 1983 claims. Accordingly, based on the above discussion, Mastroianni’s conspiracy claims will be dismissed except with regard to false arrest.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a violation of federal rights resulting from an agreement among defendants and an actionable wrong.

McMillian v. Johnson · filed 1995-01-17

To support a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, McMillian must show (1) that his federal rights were violated, (2) that such violation occurred as the result of an agreement among the defendants to violate the plaintiffs federal rights, and (3) an actionable wrong.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the plaintiff has no right to recover for the underlying civil-rights claims.

West v. Carson · filed 1995-03-03

That is irrelevant now, because the jury concluded that West had not established a right to recover on the underlying civil-rights claims. His conspiracy theory must, then, as a matter of law, also fail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a conspiracy without an actual deprivation of civil rights.

McMican v. Samuel A. Lewis, and David Gonzalez, Art Rubin Cso Watkins and Lt. Basurto · filed 1995-03-10

This contention lacks merit. ... Moreover, "conspiracy allegations, even if established, does not give rise to liability under section 1983 unless there is an actual deprivation of civil rights." Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require factual support; conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not suffice.

Housley v. Sheriff, Lipscomb · filed 1995-04-18

Merely conclusional allegations of conspiracy, however, will not support an action under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts suggesting a mutual understanding to pursue unconstitutional action and a meeting of the minds.

Hay v. Helen Jennings Cathy Short Patrick Sullivan John Kelly Martin · filed 1995-05-12

After a careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that Hay failed to allege "defendants had directed themselves toward an unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding," and failed to provide "facts suggesting a meeting of the minds."

Conclusory allegations alone cannot support a Section 1983 conspiracy claim or survive summary judgment.

Morales v. Mayer · filed 1995-05-25

Mere conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, without more, are insufficient to support a Sec. 1983 claim or withstand summary judgment.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual denial of due process or equal protection by someone acting under state law.

Rindley v. Gallagher · filed 1995-06-21

Additionally, to state a claim for conspiracy under Section 1983, “it is necessary that there has been an actual denial of due process or of equal protection by someone acting under state law.” ... The undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy are sufficient to meet the standards set forth above.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy requires an agreement to deprive constitutional rights and an actual deprivation through overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.

Libbra v. City of Litchfield, Ill. · filed 1995-07-20

In order to establish a prima facie ease of a civil conspiracy, “a plaintiff must show (1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require factual allegations supporting the conspiracy; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Hunt v. Budd · filed 1995-08-01

Plaintiff fails to proffer alleged facts pertaining to conspiracy and racial discrimination that would support the Fourteenth Amendment and conspiracy claims. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and finds Plaintiffs claims conclusory insofar as they allege that the Defendants’ conduct was the result of a conspiracy and/or racial animus.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of a conspiratorial plan or a shared conspiratorial objective.

Hartsfield v. Gary West and Peter Isaacson · filed 1995-08-03

Hartsfield's conspiracy claim fails because he has not provided any evidence of a conspiratorial plan or that the defendants shared a general conspiratorial objective.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of an actual violation of a federal right.

Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff · filed 1995-08-09

The district court dismissed this claim on the ground that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 conspiracy claim must prove an actual violation of constitutional rights. In this we agree. Section 1983 is only a grant of a right of action; the substantive right giving rise to the action must come from another source.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing that the defendants agreed to violate the plaintiff’s federal rights; conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Malsh v. Austin · filed 1995-10-20

The plaintiff has not pleaded a conspiracy because he has not pleaded the facts showing that the defendants actually entered into such an agreement. Conclusory, vague and general allegations of conspiracy such as those in this case are insufficient.

Section 1983 allows a conspiracy claim to proceed when the alleged facts support a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights.

Shoemaker v. City of Lock Haven · filed 1995-10-24

Plaintiff asserts a conspiracy claim in Count TV under section 1983, not section 1985, as assumed by defendants in framing their argument for dismissal. The facts alleged are sufficient at this stage to support a claim that defendants conspired to violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights, the only constitutional claim which remains under today’s decision.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an actual deprivation of civil rights.

Menefield v. D.J. Helsel T. Jewell v. Baker L. Anderson S.E. Rodriguez Charles D. Marshall · filed 1996-03-12

A conspiracy allegation does not give rise to § 1983 liability unless there is an actual deprivation of civil rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim need not be considered separately when it duplicates a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim.

Park v. City of Atlanta · filed 1996-03-28

Plaintiffs presumably plead conspiracy to deprive them of their equal protection rights also under § 1983. No separate consideration of such a claim is necessary in this order because such a claim is duplicative of the § 1985(3) claim.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires proof of an agreement or conspiracy between actors.

Jackson v. Holdridge · filed 1996-04-09

As Dixon properly notes, however, state action is a component of claims under § 1983, and not of claims under § 1985. Id. at 1447. In any event, the district court correctly states the pertinent point, that a plaintiff asserting a conspiracy claim under either section must prove an agreement or conspiracy between actors. See id. at 1447-49. Jackson offered no facts sufficient to create a material issue of fact on this essential element.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim when a conspiracy involving state action causes a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Bullard v. City of Houston · filed 1996-07-11

A plaintiff may assert a conspiracy to deprive him of protected constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires a conspiracy to deny constitutional rights; a conspiracy to conceal conduct that was not unconstitutional does not suffice.

Hill v. Shobe · filed 1996-08-23

For liability under § 1983 to attach to a conspiracy claim, defendants must conspire to deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights: there is no constitutional violation in conspiring to cover up an action which does not itself violate the constitution.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right.

Gaylor v. Thompson · filed 1996-09-13

Without deprivation of a constitutional right, plaintiffs cannot succeed on a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

A section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of civil rights.

Blake v. Kernan · filed 1996-10-10

Because Blake did not show that prison officials actually deprived him of his civil rights, Blake's section 1983 conspiracy claim lacks merit.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a federally protected right in addition to an agreement.

William W. Ritchie, a Minor, by and Through His Mother and Next Friend, Stacy L. Ritchie Frank Brown v. Daniel Jackson A · filed 1996-10-11

To prove a conspiracy under § 1983, "it is necessary that there have been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. 'Mere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.' " Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.1980) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 622 (7th Cir.1979), rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). As we found earlier, both arrests were made on probable cause; therefore, no constitutional deprivation occurred.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Estate of Emmons v. Peet · filed 1996-12-30

Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiffs claim of a conspiracy to violate Emmons’s civil rights and to cover up a violation of Emmons’s civil rights is without merit.

A § 1983 conspiracy between private actors and county officials requires an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.

Stiglich v. Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors · filed 1997-01-17

To establish a conspiracy between Local 1230 and county officials under § 1983, Stiglich must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim has no basis when all underlying § 1983 claims have been rejected.

McCormack Sand Co. v. Town of North Hempstead Solid Waste Management Authority · filed 1997-03-27

Since all of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims have been rejected, the plaintiffs have no basis for their “constitutional conspiracy” claim; this claim is accordingly dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement and an actual deprivation of a federally protected right.

Caughey v. Snow · filed 1997-04-14

"[F]or a conspiracy to be actionable under section 1983 the plaintiff has to prove that 'there [has] been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and its laws.'"

Section 1983 permits a claim that state actors conspired to deprive someone of constitutional rights even when a conspiracy claim is unavailable under § 1985.

Ahlers v. Schebil · filed 1997-04-30

It is well-established that the unavailability of a conspiracy claim under § 1985 does not preclude a conspiracy claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an agreement to violate federally secured rights.

Hameed v. Pundt · filed 1997-05-20

To support a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Hameed must prove that defendants “acted in a wilful manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding or ‘meeting of the minds,’ that violated [his] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal courts.”

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Lizana v. Puckett · filed 1997-05-27

Lizana’s conclusional allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes no liability for conspiracy without an actual deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Miller v. Dale · filed 1997-07-02

A conspiracy allegation does not give rise to § 1983 liability unless there is an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989). Because Miller's underlying constitutional claims do not survive summary judgment, his conspiracy claim fails as well.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim must plead specific facts showing an agreement among the conspirators and action taken to further it.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc. · filed 1997-11-20

Pleadings asserting a section 1983 conspiracy must set forth specific facts tending to show (1) an agreement between coconspirators and (2) action taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual denial of constitutional rights.

GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia · filed 1998-01-05

However, to sustain a conspiracy action under § 1983 (as distinguished from § 198511) a plaintiff must show an underlying actual denial of its constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires particularized allegations that a conspiracy existed.

GJR Investments v. Cty. of Escambia · filed 1998-01-05

Moreover, the complaint fails to make any particularized allegation that a conspiracy existed, another prerequisite of a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment when the alleged agreement rests on speculation rather than evidence from which a jury could find a conspiracy.

Fioriglio v. City of Atlantic City · filed 1998-03-05

Plaintiff simply cannot maintain a claim of civil conspiracy in violation of § 1983 on the unsubstantiated theory that defendants conspired against him in the process of formulating the new promotional criteria. He has presented this Court with no proof of improper conduct by the defendants upon which a jury could base a finding in his favor.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require material facts showing an agreement to deprive someone of civil rights; allegations that a judge issued erroneous orders are insufficient.

Margolis v. Ryan · filed 1998-04-09

Further, a party cannot rely merely on allegations that a state judge issued erroneous orders to support a conspiracy claim under § 1983. Rather, the party must provide material facts that show an agreement among the alleged conspirators to deprive the party of his or her civil rights.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement between two or more people to advance the conspiracy.

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-05-06

In order to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Rowe must allege that there is or was an agreement between two or more individuals to act in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a willful agreement with another person to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

N.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston · filed 1998-08-07

In any event, as for Chil Soung’s § 1983 conspiracy claim, the Court holds, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In order to establish a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiffs must prove that the City entered into a willful agreement with another person to deprive Plaintiffs of a constitutional right.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires allegations of both a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Martin v. Stites · filed 1998-11-16

Plaintiffs also claim that all defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights in violation of § 1983. In order to succeed on this claim, plaintiffs must allege both the existence of a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims may be sufficiently alleged when defendants’ joint acts support an inference of mutual understanding.

Samuel v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-03-09

The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are sufficient to allege the existence of a conspiracy. The Amended Complaint describes in detail, the actions of Defendants Callahan and Mullen which were undertaken together, and the alleged acts are sufficient to raise the inference of mutual understanding.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing a meeting of minds; bare allegations of conspiracy do not state a claim.

Beers v. Hendren · filed 1999-10-12

After careful review of the record, we conclude dismissal was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Mr. Beers’s allegations failed to state a conspiracy claim. See Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (mere allegations of conspiracy without specific facts showing meeting of minds do not state claim).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations of an agreement; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights Ex Rel. Perez v. City of New York · filed 1999-10-20

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 conspiracy complaint must contain more than mere conclusory allegations. ... Because a meeting of the minds has not been alleged, plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is dismissed as to all defendants.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof that defendants agreed or reached an understanding to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

D'ANDREA v. Hulton · filed 1999-11-08

Plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants “agreed” or “reached an understanding” to violate his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement involving a state actor, concerted action to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Pangburn v. James Culbertson, Court Clerk John M. York, Sheriff, & Sheriff's Property Clerk · filed 1999-12-21

To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiracy to deprive someone of a constitutional right, an overt act furthering it, resulting injury, and an actual constitutional deprivation.

Searcy v. Donelson · filed 2000-02-23

As to the County defendants, we also agree Searcy failed to allege a conspiracy to deprive him of a constitutional right. See Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999) (to prove § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiff must show defendant conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional right, at least one co-conspirator engaged in overt act in furtherance of conspiracy, and the overt act injured plaintiff; must show constitutional deprivation has occurred).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the alleged underlying conduct caused no constitutional injury.

Cefalu, William v. Village Elk Grove · filed 2000-04-13

The jury’s conclusion that the Cefalus suffered no constitutional injury thus forecloses relief on the conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires allegations that defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Searcy v. Donelson · filed 2000-04-25

As to the County defendants, we also agree Searcy failed to allege a conspiracy to deprive him of a constitutional right. See Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999) (to prove § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiff must show defendant conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional right, at least one co-conspirator engaged in overt act in furtherance of conspiracy, and the overt act injured plaintiff; must show constitutional deprivation has occurred).

A civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the defendants.

Gunderson v. Uphoff · filed 2000-06-28

We agree with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983 because he did not “allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants.” Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998).

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Romer v. Morgenthau · filed 2000-09-26

A valid claim of conspiracy under § 1983 to violate a complainant’s constitutional rights must contain allegations of (1) a conspiracy itself, plus (2) actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Conclusional allegations of a conspiracy do not state a claim under § 1983.

Jones v. Miles · filed 2000-10-18

Jones’ allegations of a conspiracy between Sergeant Castro and Officer Botello are conclusional and, thus, fail to give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires evidence of an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Nettles v. Gavia · filed 2001-01-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim because Nettles failed to show that there was an agreement between defendant and any person to deprive him of his rights.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest on wholly conclusional allegations that defendants conspired.

Maness v. Fuller · filed 2001-03-05

The district court did not err in determining that any alleged threats made by city officials in connection with Maness's renovations did not amount to a constitutional deprivation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Lamar v. Steele, 698 F.2d 1286, 1286 (5th Cir. 1983). Maness's allegation that defendants conspired against her in connection with her home renovations are wholly conclusional and do not support a conspiracy claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiratorial agreement and an actual violation of a federally secured right.

Nagy v. Town of Andover, et al. · filed 2001-10-19

“In order to make out an actionable conspiracy under section 1983, a plaintiff has to prove not only a conspiratorial agreement but also an actual abridgment of some federally-secured right.” Nieves v . McSweeney, 241 F.3d 4 6 , 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Earle, 850 F.2d at 844; Landrigan v . Cit of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980)). Here, the Nagys have failed to allege “an actual abridgment of some federally- secured right,” Nieves, 241 F.3d at 5 3 , for the reasons given in the discussion of Count I . Accordingly, their § 1983 conspiracy claim must necessarily fail, as well.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of a specific, single plan to deprive the plaintiff of federal rights.

Williams Ex Rel. Allen v. Cambridge Board of Education · filed 2002-01-18

First, while the Defendants may have relied on the actions and statements of one another to bring about the detention of Durbin and Williams, the Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of a specific, single plan to detain the Plaintiffs in contravention of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges concerted action to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Santana v. Calderon · filed 2002-02-14

However, the Court finds that at this point in the litigation, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to bring suit for conspiracy under Section 1983. For this reason, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of conspiracy under Section 1983.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires a claim for an underlying wrong.

Beaudoin v. Michigan Racing Inc. · filed 2002-03-12

To the extent that Beaudoin asserted this claim under § 1983, it still lacks merit because Beaudoin has not stated a claim for any underlying wrong.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement, concerted action, or overt conduct; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Webb v. Goord · filed 2002-03-28

Specifically, with regard to plaintiffs’ claim of conspiracy to violate their civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court found that they “offer no factual basis of any agreement, action in concert or overt conduct by any of the defendants that falls within the scope of conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights.” ... Because plaintiffs have chosen not to provide any more than the conclusory allegations of conspiracy ... made in their Amended Complaint, the present claim of conspiracy also fails.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific material facts supporting the alleged conspiracy; conclusory accusations are insufficient.

Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat · filed 2002-05-07

In sum, although the Amended Complaint asserts that the three co-Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff Torres of her civil rights, it is devoid of any specific references to material facts pertaining to the alleged conspiracy necessary to establish a valid claim against any of the co-Defendants under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim involving private parties and state actors requires joint participation, an agreement, or a meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.

Martin v. Stites · filed 2002-05-16

To prove a conspiracy between private parties and state actors to violate constitutional rights actionable under § 1983, Plaintiffs must show a joint participation, agreement, or meeting of the minds to violate such constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts from which a conspiracy between defendants can be inferred.

McAlister v. County of Riverside · filed 2002-06-13

McAlister faded to allege any facts from which a conspiracy between defendants could be inferred, and her mere allegations do not set forth a constitutional deprivation under any cognizable theory.

A jury verdict for the alleged arresting officer on a wrongful-arrest § 1983 claim defeats § 1983 conspiracy claims against others based on that arrest.

Afrasiabi v. Harvard University · filed 2002-07-02

The jury returned a verdict for Mederos on the substantive § 1983 claim for wrongful arrest. This verdict “fatally eviscerated” Afrasiabi’s conspiracy claim against the remaining defendants based on wrongful arrest.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts showing agreement and concerted action among the defendants.

Butler Ex Rel. Butler v. Rio Rancho Public School Board of Education · filed 2002-07-22

To state a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive one of constitutionally protected rights, one must allege specific facts showing .agreement and concerted action among the defendants.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim only when there is an actual constitutional or statutory violation.

Tittle v. Raines · filed 2002-08-29

Liability may be imposed under § 1983 based upon a conspiracy; however, a conspiracy claim is not actionable unless there is an actual constitutional or statutory violation. ... Since there is no constitutional violation, there is no derivative conspiracy claim, and it fails as a matter of law.

A Section 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement to injure someone in violation of that person's civil rights.

Basu v. Brogan · filed 2002-09-04

A principal element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong or injury upon another in violation of that person's civil rights.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of an agreement between the defendants.

Myers v. Gomez · filed 2002-09-19

The district court’s summary judgment on Myers’s claim of conspiracy was proper because Myers failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was an agreement between the defendants.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights conspiracy claim when defendants agree to deprive someone of a constitutional right, an overt act injures the plaintiff, and a constitutional deprivation occurs.

Slusarchuk v. Hoff · filed 2002-10-31

In order to prove a conspiracy to violate civil rights, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant conspired with others to deprive him or her of a constitutional right; (2) at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (3) the overt act injured the plaintiff; and (4) actual depravation of a constitutional right occurred.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Cook v. Tadros · filed 2002-11-25

In the absence of a violation, there is no actionable conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a conspiracy to violate a clearly established right, but not for the conspiracy alone.

Kunz v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-12-05

Section 1983 only authorizes recovery for a conspiracy to violate a clearly established right, not for the conspiracy itself.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than wholly conclusional allegations of a conspiracy to violate civil rights.

Webb v. County of Coryell · filed 2002-12-27

Because Webb’s conspiracy allegations are wholly conclusional, they do not support an actionable claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

McCormick v. City of Lawrence, Kansas · filed 2003-03-31

He has failed to allege specific facts from which it could be inferred that there was an agreement and concerted action amongst the three defendants. Instead, he merely makes conclusory allegations regarding the conspiracy. Conclu-sory allegations will not suffice on a § 1983 claim.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not support a claim under § 1983.

Edmon v. Dallas Cty Shrf Dept · filed 2003-04-22

Edmon’s conclusional suggestion that the defendants conspired against him does not support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy and retaliation claims cannot be established through personal beliefs and conclusory allegations alone.

Blackstock v. Johnson · filed 2003-05-20

Blackstock’s personal beliefs and conclusional allegations are not sufficient to establish actionable claims of conspiracy and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment when the evidence of an agreement rests solely on conjecture.

Byrd v. Hopson · filed 2003-05-23

Plaintiffs claim of a conspiracy rests solely on conjecture — because Defendant Street was present at the hearing and because he conducted the search of Byrd, she concluded that Cynthia and Street had conspired to the events alleged.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence that the defendants shared a plan to violate the plaintiff’s federal rights.

Francis Spadafore and Carol Spadafore v. Gardner · filed 2003-06-03

The Spadafores have submitted no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, suggesting that the defendants had a single plan when they made the allegedly false statements. We thus conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants regarding the Spadafores’ § 1983 conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims may proceed when circumstantial evidence permits a jury to infer a tacit agreement to cause an unconstitutional injury.

Stein v. Janos · filed 2003-06-04

To establish a conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove either by direct or circumstantial evidence (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more state actors (or a state actor and a private entity); (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of the goal. ... A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that the State and Village Defendants reached an agreement, at least tacitly, whereby the State Defendants would allow the Village Defendants to work through the Peekskill office if they disciplined Stein.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific factual allegations supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Curtis v. City of Bullhead · filed 2003-06-19

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice the Curtises’ conspiracy claim because the complaint was devoid of specific factual allegations regarding defendants’ alleged conspiracy to conceal pollutants and harmful bacteria.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an actual abridgement of a federally secured right.

Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat · filed 2003-07-02

To demonstrate conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must show "an actual abridgement of some federally-secured right."

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim is adequately alleged by an agreement to violate federal rights and at least one act in furtherance of that objective.

Small v. City of New York · filed 2003-07-30

Plaintiffs’ complaints allege: 1) an agreement; 2) with the express objectives of violating plaintiffs’ due process right to be free of state created danger and to deny plaintiffs’ access to the courts; and 3) at least one act in furtherance of each objective. I therefore find that plaintiffs have adequately alleged Section 1983 conspiracies in relation to both of their substantive federal claims.

A claim styled as a conspiracy to violate civil rights under § 1983 should be stated as a claim under § 1985.

Webb v. Goord · filed 2003-08-13

The plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is styled "Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights," should actually be stated as a claim under Section 1985, which applies specifically to conspiracies.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than alleging that an entity acted as the State’s agent under lawful state regulations.

Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, Inc. v. Novello · filed 2003-10-09

The circumstance that the Foundation was the State’s agent, and in that capacity acted pursuant to lawful regulations promulgated by the State, does not allege a conspiracy under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 (3).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an inference of an agreement to violate constitutional rights; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Elwood v. Morin · filed 2004-01-02

We have reviewed the complaint, with particularly careful attention to those paragraphs to which Elwood has directed our attention, and see no factual basis upon which to infer that Boyle is tied into an agreement to violate Elwood’s constitutional rights. Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Elwood v. Morin · filed 2004-01-02

Elwood’s complaint fails to set forth facts showing that the fathers, social workers, and therapist Robert Boyle agreed upon a common plan to deprive Elwood of continuing custody of her children in violation of her constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must allege an agreement to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

Estate of Morris Ex Rel. Morris v. Dapolito · filed 2004-01-12

To survive a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 conspiracy claim must allege: “(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” ... We conclude that the Amended Complaint more than satisfies this time, place and effect pleading standard.