42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a prison disciplinary punishment when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a good-time-credit revocation that has not been invalidated.

Roberts v. Wilson · filed 2007-12-13

Roberts has never had the disciplinary adjudication invalidated. Therefore, his § 1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok. Unlike the claim in Muhammed, Roberts’s claim necessarily would be at odds with the revocation of his good time credits and with the State’s calculation of the time he has left to serve on his sentence.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned on direct appeal or in collateral proceedings.

Sherratt v. Braithwaite · filed 2008-01-23

Thus, Heck barred Sherratt’s civil rights complaint absent a showing Sherratt’s conviction had been overturned on direct appeal or in collateral proceedings. Id. at 483-87. ... That review demonstrates the district court’s resolution of Sherratt’s civil rights complaint is clearly correct. Accordingly, we AFFIRM for substantially those reasons set out in the order of the district court dated July 11, 2007.

Heck’s favorable termination rule applies to a section 1983 claim even when the plaintiff cannot obtain habeas relief.

Rarity Abdullah v. Weinzeirl · filed 2008-02-04

Finally, Abdullah’s inability to obtain habeas relief does not preclude application of Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary proceedings that cost good time credits unless the disciplinary results have been invalidated.

Crane v. Wheeler · filed 2008-03-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crane’s claim that his due process rights were violated by disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of good time credits because Crane failed to show that the results of the disciplinary hearings were invalidated.

Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims are barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction that has not been invalidated.

Piskanin v. Hammer · filed 2008-03-18

Here, we agree with the District Court’s threshold determination that Piskanin’s Fourth Amendment claims, if successful, would have the effect of rendering his criminal convictions invalid. ... His conviction thus has not been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim challenging a search is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Palmer v. City of Harrisburg · filed 2008-04-25

To the extent that Palmer intended the instant civil rights action to include a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of his pants, said challenge is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on such a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, which have never been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim to proceed despite a prison assault conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate that conviction.

Lockett v. Suardini · filed 2008-05-14

But such a finding would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Lockett’s misconduct conviction for assault because Lockett could have unlawfully assaulted the officers in the course of the altercation by using force beyond that necessary to defend himself, even if the incident was precipitated by the officers’ own retaliatory conduct. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Lockett’s First Amendment retaliation claim is analytically distinct from whether he was guilty of assault and therefore does not implicate Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Von Schlichten v. County of Northampton · filed 2008-05-30

Moreover, as the district court also determined, to the extent that appellants’ claims imply the invalidity of the conviction and sentence, they are not cognizable under § 1983 absent a showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

A § 1983 action cannot proceed if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Saunders v. Gwendolyn Bright · filed 2008-06-03

We conclude that there is no arguable basis for disagreeing with the District Court’s conclusion that relief could not be granted in his civil rights action without collaterally rendering Saunders’ convictions effectively invalid. Furthermore, his convictions have never been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and he, therefore, has not satisfied Heck’s favorable termination rule.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment that would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Johnson v. Ozmint · filed 2008-06-20

Plaintiff is apparently seeking damages from his alleged unconstitutional imprisonment, but Plaintiff has not shown his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The court accordingly concludes that the rule from Heck v. Humphrey applies in this situation, and applying this rule, Plaintiffs claim cannot proceed.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner seeking damages for past confinement to proceed without satisfying Heck’s favorable termination requirement when habeas relief is unavailable.

Wilson v. Johnson · filed 2008-07-25

We believe that the reasoning employed by the plurality in Spencer must prevail in a case, like Wilson’s, where an individual would be left without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred.

Section 1983’s favorable termination rule bars a claim challenging a parole revocation when success would undermine the revocation’s validity.

Wilson v. McVey · filed 2008-09-08

The rule applies to criminal convictions and parole revocations alike, and inmates may not predicate a civil rights action upon the revocation of their parole if the action would impugn the validity of the revocation.

Section 1983 requires a favorable termination before a person may challenge the duration of confinement; vacating parole revocation decisions without reversing them does not satisfy that requirement.

Connolly v. Arroyo · filed 2008-09-18

The two Appeals Unit decisions vacating the Board’s revocation decisions do not constitute favorable terminations because they were not reversals of the Board’s decisions.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement when the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was ineligible for habeas relief.

S.E. Ex Rel. A.E. v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2008-10-10

Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineli-gible, we hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 claims by a plaintiff who was neither convicted nor sentenced and was ineligible for habeas relief are not barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

S.E. v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2008-10-10

Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a parole revocation affecting the fact or duration of confinement unless the resulting sentence has been invalidated.

Waller v. Collier · filed 2008-10-20

Waller’s complaint attacked the validity of his parole revocation, thereby calling into question the fact and duration of his confinement. Consequently, the district court was correct that Waller had to show that the sentence imposed as a result of the revocation proceedings had been invalidated by a state or federal court. McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995). No such showing was made. His damages claim therefore is not cognizable under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim challenging the duration of detention must satisfy the favorable termination rule.

Wilson Ex Rel. Estate of Wilson v. Taylor · filed 2009-02-13

In order for a plaintiff to have a valid § 1983 claim based on the duration of his detention, he must meet the “favorable termination rule” established in Heck: the conviction or sentence must have “been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that implies the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Reger v. Walker · filed 2009-02-26

His claim, whether for damages, declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief, is similarly not cognizable in a § 1983 action because it implies the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown his conviction to have been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Buckingham v. State of Texas · filed 1995-05-08

Therefore, Buckingham cannot seek damages under § 1983 as he cannot demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 bars damages claims based on an allegedly unconstitutional sentence unless the sentence has been reversed on appeal or in a postconviction proceeding.

Armant v. Kennedy · filed 2009-04-30

As the district court found, Armant’s claims are barred because he is seeking to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional sentence that has not been reversed on appeal or in a postconviction proceeding.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily challenge prison discipline lengthening a sentence require a favorable termination of the disciplinary result before they can proceed.

Thompson v. Thalacker · filed 1996-12-24

Thompson’s impartial factfinder claims in his § 1983 action are an indirect attack on both the procedure and result of the disciplinary proceedings, thus bringing those claims within the sphere of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for confinement unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Misu v. Department of Justice · filed 2009-06-05

Insofar as plaintiff seeks to recover damages by means of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for time she was ... incarcerated, her claim must fail because she has not shown that her confinement has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, declar[ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or . . . a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); accord White v. Bowz`e, 194 F.3d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (table).

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck’s favorable-termination requirement until the underlying conviction or sentence is favorably resolved.

Domotor v. Wennet · filed 2009-06-30

Although Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and likely unable to bring a habeas action, this Court holds that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement bars Plaintiff from bringing the § 1983 claims alleged in the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed until the claimant obtains a favorable resolution of a challenge to it.

Kuperman v. State of NH, et al. · filed 2009-07-01

Therefore, the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey bars Kuperman's § 1983 claims raised in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Bryant v. Mostert · filed 2009-07-07

The Court concludes that a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. Plaintiff seeks damages directly attributable to his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. However, he has not alleged or otherwise demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated; consequently, the instant claim is not cognizable under section 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction that cost good-time credits until the conviction has been set aside.

Thomas v. Quarterman · filed 2009-07-09

Because a favorable judgment on Thomas’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction for which he was sentenced to the forfeiture of 730 days good-time credits, Thomas’s claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until his conviction in the disciplinary proceeding has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 bars damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated; inability to seek habeas relief alone does not remove that requirement.

Randell v. Johnson · filed 2000-10-13

Because Randell is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits a person released from custody to challenge the duration of confinement despite Heck when habeas relief is unavailable and the claim does not challenge the conviction's validity.

Huang v. Johnson · filed 2001-05-17

Based on these authorities, we conclude that Heck does not bar Huang's Section 1983 action. While Huang's challenge is aimed at the duration of Yu's confinement, she does not challenge the validity of Yu's conviction. Furthermore, Yu has no habeas remedy because he has long since been released from OCFS custody.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to recover damages on a claim that would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Farrell v. Keys · filed 2001-07-06

Mr. Farrell’s § 1983 claim for compensatory damages is barred as premature at this stage by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”).

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of probation terms are subject to dismissal unless those terms have been invalidated.

Gould v. Patterson · filed 2002-01-16

In the present case, the trial court dismissed Gould’s 42 USC § 1983 suit after consideration of the merits. We conclude, however, that most of the suit was subject to being dismissed because the claims were not ripe for consideration under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (114 SC 2364, 129 LE2d 383) (1994). ... In the present 42 USC § 1983 suit, most of Gould’s claims, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the probationary portion of the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Sanders v. Detroit Police Department · filed 2009-08-28

To recover monetary damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a deferred adjudication cannot proceed until the plaintiff satisfies Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Kastner v. State of Texas · filed 2009-09-18

If Kastner prevails, he would establish that his deferred adjudication lacks any basis. Accordingly, he may not bring his claims until he satisfies the conditions of Heck.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would imply the invalidity of prison disciplinary proceedings unless those proceedings have been invalidated.

Slack v. Jones · filed 2009-10-05

Heck and Edwards make clear that Mr. Slack does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim unless he can show that the prison proceedings have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the loss of good-time credits while the underlying disciplinary proceedings remain in force.

Randell Orange v. Ellis · filed 2009-10-14

Because the disciplinary proceedings have not been overturned administratively or through habeas proceedings, Orange is barred from asserting a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim challenging disciplinary sanctions that affect only the conditions of confinement, because the favorable termination rule does not bar that claim.

Arango v. Winstead · filed 2009-11-19

Because Arango’s due process claim implicated only the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of her confinement, the District Court erred in ruling that the claim was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The favorable termination rule applies to § 1983 claims concerning parole revocation, but does not bar a claim when the plaintiff has completed the term of imprisonment.

Miner v. Goord · filed 2009-11-25

Although the favorable termination rule applies to § 1983 claims regarding parole revocations, the doctrine is not implicated on these facts. In this case, there is no danger that § 1983 is being utilized in a manner that would allow Plaintiff to engage in an end-run around the requirements for bringing a habeas corpus petition because he has completed his term of imprisonment.

Section 1983 claims challenging pretrial diversions are not barred by Heck when the diversions produced no underlying convictions.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks · filed 2009-12-16

Here, there is no related underlying conviction that could be invalidated by Mr. Vasquez’s § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary convictions and seeking expungement are barred by Heck unless the convictions have been invalidated.

Johnson v. Livingston · filed 2010-01-08

Because Johnson challenged the validity of his ... disciplinary convictions in his § 1983 complaint and sought expungement, his claims were barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim challenging criminal proceedings cannot succeed unless those proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Garey, Jr. v. Romero · filed 2010-01-20

As the district court correctly noted, Mr. Garey’s § 1983 complaint cannot succeed on its merits because there has been no termination of the challenged criminal proceedings in Mr. Garey’s favor.

Section 1983 requires favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding for a claim based on a seizure violating the Fourth Amendment.

Richardson v. Counts · filed 2010-02-02

Although Richardson’s claim that Defendant Counts made false representations in his application for an arrest warrant falls under the Fourth Amendment exception noted in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994), termination favorable to the plaintiff in the prior criminal proceeding is an essential element of a § 1983 claim based on a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1996). We accordingly affirm the district court’s dismissal of Richardson’s constitutional claim on the ground that Richardson made no allegation of such a favorable termination.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when pretrial diversion ends without a conviction and the plaintiff has no habeas remedy.

Medeiros v. Merced County Sheriff Deputy Clark · filed 2010-05-05

Here, because Plaintiff was never convicted of any crime, he could not challenge the misdemeanor pretrial diversion through appeal or habeas corpus. Plaintiff was never incarcerated and suffers no collateral consequences as a result of the misdemeanor pretrial diversion. ... Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action as barred by Heck is DENIED.

A prisoner cannot seek § 1983 damages or expungement that would invalidate a disciplinary decision resulting in lost good-time credits unless that decision has been overturned.

Taylor v. Gunnels · filed 2010-05-18

Because he has not shown that the disciplinary decision has been overturned, he cannot maintain a § 1983 action for damages or the expungement of the disciplinary report from his record.

A § 1983 damages claim that would invalidate a parole revocation cannot be pursued until the revocation has been set aside.

Alvillar v. Utah State Board of Pardons · filed 2010-05-28

Thus, Mr. Alvillar is correct that his 2002 claims are not time-barred to the extent that he seeks damages for conduct that would render his parole revocation unconstitutional. But by the same token he cannot pursue such claims until that revocation has been set aside, which has not occurred.

Section 1983 requires favorable termination before a prisoner may bring a damages claim that would undermine disciplinary findings affecting the length of the sentence.

Clyde v. Schoellkopf · filed 2010-06-01

That rule precludes a § 1983 action based on alleged constitutional violations in connection with a prisoner’s disciplinary proceedings, where the sanction imposed in those proceedings could affect the overall length of the inmate’s sentence, unless the inmate has succeeded in obtaining a favorable result in state court (or through federal habeas relief) in challenging the administrative findings.

A § 1983 claim for money damages that would necessarily call a conviction into question cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Critten v. Yates · filed 2010-06-16

As Critten failed to allege that his convictions or sentence had been invalidated, his § 1983 claims for money damages are not cognizable, and the district court properly dismissed them.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that call a civil commitment into question unless the commitment has been invalidated.

Thomas v. Schmitt · filed 2010-06-17

Thomas may not sue for damages under § 1983 unless and until his commitment has been invalidated.

A plaintiff seeking damages under Section 1983 for unlawful confinement must first show that the confinement has been invalidated.

Stewart v. Herring · filed 2010-06-17

Because plaintiffs claims go to the fact of his incarceration, he cannot recover damages in this civil rights action without showing that his confinement has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, declar[ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or . . . a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

Section 1983 claims that would invalidate a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated, even when the claimant is no longer in custody but previously had access to habeas relief.

Bush v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2010-07-19

Although Bush is no longer in custody, because he properly could, and previously did, avail himself of the habeas corpus remedy, Heck applies to him even though he has since been released.

Section 1983 permits claims that would imply the invalidity of a juvenile adjudication once that adjudication has been vacated.

Clark v. Conahan · filed 2010-08-25

As Raul has received a favorable termination of these adjudications, he is not barred by Heck and may bring actions pursuant to § 1983 for any injury arising from the actions taken against him after January 1, 2003.

A prisoner alleging retaliation under § 1983 need not show a favorable outcome in a disciplinary case to avoid the Heck bar.

Williams v. Hinyard · filed 2010-09-14

Because an inmate is not required to demonstrate a favorable outcome of a disciplinary case if he is alleging a retaliatory motive, the district court erred in dismissing Williams’s retaliation claim as barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily invalidate forfeitures of good time credit until the relevant convictions have been reversed.

Tyson v. Tanner · filed 2010-10-29

The district court correctly determined that Tyson’s claims for relief based on the retroactive application of L A. R EV. S TAT. A NN. 15:571.4(B)(4) are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until the relevant convictions have been reversed.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that would undermine a parole revocation until the revocation has been reversed, expunged, set aside, or called into question.

Norwood v. O'Hare · filed 2010-12-20

Norwood seeks relief based on the alleged unconstitutionality of his parole revocation; a grant of relief would necessarily undermine the validity of Norwood’s revocation proceeding. Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), he has no cause of action for damages until he can demonstrate that the parole revocation decision “has been reversed, expunged, set aside, or called into question.” Littles v. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995). Norwood has not done so.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding when success would not necessarily result in the prisoner’s speedier release.

Fernandez v. T.D.C.J. · filed 2010-12-22

Fernandez’s suit challenges the propriety of the prison disciplinary proceeding against him for possession of contraband. Success, if any, in this suit will not necessarily result in his speedier release from prison on the sentence he is serving for his underlying conviction.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence or parole determination unless the prisoner has obtained a favorable termination.

Glenn v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2011-01-04

A prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 claim “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless he or she can show a favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding. ... This analysis also applies to parole determinations. ... For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that Heck bars Glenn’s action.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Ramos, Jr. v. Shepherd · filed 2011-02-11

Despite Mr. Ramos’s arguments to the contrary, his suit is precisely of the kind barred by Heck. There is no evidence that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question. Additionally, a judgment in favor of Mr. Ramos in the case before us would certainly “imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See id. at 487. As a result, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Ramos’s suit.

Section 1983 bars a claim that calls a conviction’s validity into question unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Darryl Bell, Sr. v. Ehrlich · filed 2011-02-23

A plaintiff may not pursue a claim under § 1983 that calls into question the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction requires favorable termination of that conviction; failure to allege it is a failure to state a claim.

Smith v. Veterans Administration · filed 2011-03-01

Our result in Davis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck that the favorable termination of a habeas case is an essential element of a prisoner’s civil claim for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that necessarily implies the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction. ... Mr. Smith’s failure to allege this essential element of his § 1983 claim in Smith 2 was a failure to state a claim and follows from the limited analysis set forth by the district court.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding when success would not necessarily affect the duration of confinement.

Taylor v. Lantagne · filed 2011-04-05

Because Taylor was not eligible for good-time credits, his major misconduct violation did not affect the duration of his confinement and should not bar his § 1983 claim. Accordingly, we find his claim may proceed and remand the case for further proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a sentence calculation affecting the length of confinement unless the sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by federal habeas relief.

Abbott v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2011-05-04

We agree with the District Court that this claim is barred by Heck. ... His claim is therefore not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Walthour v. Miller · filed 2011-06-10

Upon consideration of the purpose and reasoning behind Heck, it is clear that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is not viable. Plaintiff has not met Heck’s requirement that his conviction was invalidated through available state or federal remedies.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Holly v. Gotcher · filed 2011-06-13

Nonetheless, we conclude that any error by the district court in characterizing Holly’s petition was harmless because Holly’s § 1983 claims are barred under the rule of ... Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 bars a suit challenging a criminal conviction that has not been favorably terminated, even if habeas relief is unavailable.

MOLINA-AVILES v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-23

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Heck precludes any § 1983 suit challenging a criminal conviction that has not already been favorably terminated, regardless of the availability of habeas-type relief.

Section 1983 damages claims that would undermine a conviction are premature under Heck if the conviction has not been overturned.

In Re Jones · filed 2011-08-12

When Jones filed the four prior section 1983 civil rights damages lawsuits, three of which were dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, his conviction had not yet been overturned. To that extent, his section 1983 claims were premature under Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 permits a former inmate who can no longer seek habeas relief to pursue a damages claim challenging confinement without satisfying Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Pickens v. Moore · filed 2011-08-26

Hence this Court holds that Pickens, like the plaintiff in DeWalt, should be entitled to proceed under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising from criminal charges are barred when the plaintiff resolved those charges through Pennsylvania’s A.R.D. program, which is not a favorable termination.

Dennis v. DeJong · filed 2011-09-30

Regarding the claim against District Attorney Green in Count VI for relying on Dr. DeJong’s medical opinion in bringing criminal charges against Mr. Dennis, and the similar claims against Deputy District Attorney Galantino and District Attorney Green in Counts IX and XII, I conclude that Mr. Dennis’ ... section 1983 claims in those counts are barred because Mr. Dennis entered the A.R.D. program.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for unlawful incarceration unless the confinement has first been invalidated.

Muhammad-El v. United States · filed 2011-11-01

Furthermore, insofar as plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and demands monetary relief for his alleged unlawful incarceration, the claim fails. Absent a showing that his confinement has been invalidated by "revers [al] on direct appeal, expunge [ment] by executive order, declar[ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or ... a federal court's issuance ofa writ of habeas corpus," Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), plaintiff is not entitled to damages.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for detention until the plaintiff invalidates the basis of that detention through habeas corpus or another official act.

Jones, Jr. v. Fulwood · filed 2011-11-09

In addition, plaintiff cannot recover the monetary damages he seeks without first invalidating the basis of his detention via a writ of habeas corpus or some other official act.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a parole revocation are barred unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Hudson v. Mason · filed 2011-11-09

A § 1983 complaint for damages caused by an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment “must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. ... Because his parole revocation has not been invalidated, the district court correctly concluded Heck bars his claims.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of an existing conviction that has not been reversed or invalidated.

Taylor v. Carmack · filed 2011-11-16

Nevertheless, because Taylor ultimately was convicted of obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 -- which requires an officer to be engaged in the lawful performance of his duties -- and Taylor fails to demonstrate that his conviction was reversed or invalidated, his claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are now barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims are barred when granting relief would necessarily invalidate a conviction or a mandatory term of a plea agreement.

Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. v. Raphael · filed 2011-11-23

The Heck rule is simple: “if finding in favor of a § 1983 plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the complaint must be dismissed.” ... The DTSC orders are clearly a mandatory term of Plaintiffs’ plea agreement. Heck, as explained by Szajer and Price, bars Plaintiffs’ federal claims against Defendants.

Section 1983 bars claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Pineda v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 2011-11-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Pineda’s access- to-courts and access-to-counsel claims because the success of these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Pineda’s conviction or sentence, which have not been previously invalidated.

A Section 1983 excessive force claim is barred by Heck when an unvacated conviction arising from the same episode forecloses the claim.

Enriquez v. City of Baldwin Park · filed 2011-12-08

With respect to Defendant Parnell, Enriquez’s excessive force claim is barred by Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. ... This conviction has not been set aside and therefore bars Enriquez’s claim against Defendant Parnell.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging an allegedly unconstitutional conviction to show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated before recovering.

Nathaniel Banks, Jr. v. Kohn · filed 2011-12-13

To recover for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, “a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Banks’ § 1983 claims allege actions that, if true, would necessarily invalidate his conviction. But his conviction has not been overturned, expunged, or declared invalid. For this reason, Banks’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a conviction require favorable termination even when the plaintiff never had access to federal habeas review.

Barnes v. City of Dothan · filed 2012-01-31

In sum, a thorough review of the applicable case law, combined with the reasons discussed above, persuades this Court that Heck’s favorable termination rule applies to § 1983 claims brought by a plaintiff who never had access to federal habeas review.

Under § 1983, completing New Jersey’s Pre-Trial Intervention program does not count as a favorable termination of criminal charges for purposes of the Heck bar.

Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth · filed 2012-03-15

Hence, we find that the District Court did not err in ruling that Fernandez’s participation in the PTI program, and the subsequent dismissal of the charges against him was not a favorable termination.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for unlawful imprisonment unless the challenged incarceration has been invalidated through a favorable termination.

Marlowe v. Fabian · filed 2012-04-19

It neither invalidated nor reversed the period of incarceration for which he now seeks damages. Since Marlowe has not met the requirements of Heck, he has no cause of action for unlawful imprisonment under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary loss of time credits unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Horbert v. B. Curry · filed 2012-08-13

The district court properly dismissed Horbert’s action because Horbert failed to allege that the results of the disciplinary hearing had been invalidated.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge a gang validation when success would not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s confinement.

Mendez v. Ryan · filed 2012-08-14

Dismissal of Mendez’s claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), was improper because a successful challenge to Mendez’s gang validation would not necessarily shorten the length of his confinement.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary punishment affecting good-time credits unless that punishment has been invalidated.

Morrison v. C. Hill · filed 2012-09-25

Dismissal of Morrison’s due process claims was proper because the record shows that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time credits, have not been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary deprivation unless that deprivation has been invalidated.

Smith v. Reyes · filed 2012-11-06

The Court agrees that the allegations made by Plaintiff necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits for unlawfully resisting a correctional officer during the performance of the officer’s duties. Thus, the favorable termination doctrine applies and bars Plaintiffs suit unless Plaintiff first proves his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... As such, Plaintiff claims for money damages based on allegations of excessive force and failure to protect Plaintiff during this incident are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims that would render a conviction invalid unless the plaintiff shows that the conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated; release from supervision alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Morris v. McAllester · filed 2012-12-05

Under Heck, a § 1983 plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” until he has shown that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” ... Accordingly, we hold that the district judge properly concluded that Morris’s claims were barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims remain subject to Heck’s favorable termination requirement when a plaintiff let an earlier opportunity for collateral relief lapse, even if that relief is now unavailable.

Burd v. Sessler · filed 2012-12-17

In agreement with those circuits that already have had to address the situa- tion, we hold that Heck applies where a § 1983 plaintiff could have sought collateral relief at an earlier time but declined the opportunity and waited until collateral relief became unavailable before suing.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Rohn v. Horton · filed 2013-01-04

Until Rohn can demonstrate that his “conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus,” he has no cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging an arrest under a warrant as a Fourth Amendment violation to show that the criminal proceedings ended in his favor.

Harris v. Falls · filed 2013-01-30

And, like a claim for malicious prosecution, a § 1983 plaintiff — claiming a Fourth Amendment violation arising from his arrest pursuant to a warrant — must allege and prove that the legal proceedings terminated in his favor.

Section 1983’s exception to the Heck favorable termination rule for prisoners unable to seek habeas relief does not apply when the prisoner had sufficient time to pursue post-conviction relief.

Ballenger v. Owens · filed 2013-03-05

Wilson indicated that Heck does not bar a § 1983 action where “a prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief.” ... Unlike the plaintiff in Wilson, who had a window of only four months to meet the favorable termination requirement, which he pursued until his release, Appellant here pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Not only was this sufficient time to pursue post-conviction relief, Appellant actually did so and was unsuccessful. ... In short, the concern that drove our court in Wilson to find an exception to Heck -- that a habeas-ineligible former prisoner lacked access to a federal forum -- is simply not present here.

Section 1983 bars an excessive force claim that would invalidate an outstanding conviction, even when the conviction resulted from a no contest plea.

Velarde v. Duarte · filed 2013-03-19

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs § 1983 action is barred by Heck despite being the result of a nolo contendere plea.

A § 1983 claim is barred when its success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Rogers v. Mills · filed 2013-04-02

Because the amount of cocaine base sold by Rogers directly impacts Rogers’ conviction and the calculation of his sentence, the success of Rogers’ § 1983 claim would necessarily imply their invalidity.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction is overturned.

Carbajal v. Hotsenpiller · filed 2013-04-23

We agree with the district court that Carbajal’s abuse of process, false imprisonment, and conspiracy claims are barred by Heck. All three claims rest on Carbajal’s allegation that the charges for which he entered an Alford plea were false. Accordingly, success on these claims “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] conviction” and cannot proceed “until the conviction has been overturned.”

Section 1983 search and seizure claims remain subject to Heck’s favorable termination requirement when the plaintiff’s own lack of diligence prevents habeas relief.

Radwan v. County of Orange · filed 2013-05-21

Moreover, even though Radwan could not pursue habeas corpus relief, Heck bars his § 1983 search and seizure claim because he failed to meet Heck’s favorable termination requirement due to his own lack of diligence.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would call a conviction into question unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Washington v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2013-07-22

The District Court concluded that: (1) Washington’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (to recover damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question), see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (absent prior invalidation of conviction of sentence, § 1983 action is barred, regardless of remedy sought); ... We conclude that there is no arguable basis to challenge the District Court’s decision to dismiss Washington’s complaint for the reasons set forth in its memorandum.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim is barred by Heck when a completed pretrial intervention program counts as a conviction and success on the claim would undermine it.

Elphage v. Gautreaux · filed 2013-09-03

Considering the foregoing, the court concludes that Ms. Elphage’s claim for false arrest is barred under Heck. Because Ms. Elphage’s § 1983 false arrest claim is barred under Heck, the court need not address whether Deputy O’Connor is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the claim.

Section 1983 bars claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction until the plaintiff obtains a favorable termination of that conviction.

Spuck v. Clearfield County Pennsylvania · filed 2013-09-04

Spuck filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various civil rights infractions against past and present Clearfield County officials. ... These claims would all “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” – which Spuck is still litigating. ... Spuck is barred from bringing them unless and until he gets a favorable termination of the related state criminal conviction and proceedings.

Section 1983 claims are barred when their allegations necessarily challenge a conviction that has not been reversed or invalidated.

Dawn Daigre v. City of Waveland, Mississippi, et a · filed 2013-12-18

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Daigre’s excessive-force claim under Heck solely on the basis of Daigre’s allegations, because they necessarily challenge the validity of her conviction for resisting arrest. Heck prohibits a plaintiff from using a § 1983 suit to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has in some way been reversed or invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when they necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Aguilera v. Wright County · filed 2014-01-06

To put it slightly differently, § 1983 claims are barred by Heck when such claims necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction or sentence. ... Thus, Heck v. Humphrey does bar this claim against Brown.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule when success would not invalidate an outstanding criminal judgment.

Coleman v. Rock Hill Municipal Court · filed 2014-01-16

However, we agree with Coleman that the favorable termination rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar his pro se § 1983 action against Judge Long.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed if it necessarily challenges a conviction or sentence that has not been reversed or invalidated.

Dawn Daigre v. City of Waveland, Mississippi, et a · filed 2014-01-20

Heck prohibits a plaintiff from using a § 1983 suit to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has in some way been reversed or invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Bell v. City of Boise · filed 2014-01-27

On the facts of this case, the favorable termination requirement of Heck is a bar to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 suit attacking the legality of confinement cannot proceed while the underlying conviction or sentence remains valid.

Payano v. Potter · filed 2014-02-13

But, as the district court correctly observed, Payano may not pursue a § 1983 suit attacking the legality of his confinement “unless [he] can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Heck’s favorable termination rule does not bar a § 1983 action while related criminal proceedings remain pending.

Jackson v. Baltimore City Police Dep't · filed 2014-04-01

We agree with Jackson that the favorable termination rule announced in Heck did not bar his action while criminal proceedings in the state court remained pending.

Section 1983’s favorable termination rule does not bar a claim when an authorized state tribunal has invalidated the sentence it challenges.

Powell v. Weiss · filed 2014-07-08

His civil rights claim, therefore, cannot be dismissed pursuant to Heck because his sentence was invalidated by an appropriate state tribunal.

Section 1983 requires favorable termination before a plaintiff may seek damages that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, even if the plaintiff is no longer in custody.

Tony Newmy, Sr. v. Johnson · filed 2014-07-14

As the Third Circuit recently recognized, the Eighth Circuit—like the First, Third, and Fifth—has “interpreted Heck to impose a universal favorable termination requirement on all § 1983 plaintiffs attacking the validity of their conviction or sentence.” ... The district court correctly followed circuit precedent in dismissing Newmy’s claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Walker v. State of Pennsylvania · filed 2014-09-08

If the conviction has not been invalidated, the claim is not cognizable under section 1983 and must be dismissed. ... Consequently, his claims are barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim seeking recalculation of a prisoner’s minimum eligible parole date is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily lead to earlier release or invalidate continued confinement.

Andrews v. Torres · filed 2015-03-02

The district court erred in determining that Andrews’s § 1983 claims were Heck-barred because Andrews sought only the recalculation of his minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”), an outcome that would not necessarily result in earlier release or imply the invalidity of Andrews’s continued confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Farland v. Wall · filed 2015-03-12

Farland does not allege that the revocation of his parole has been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. For that reason, under Heck, Farland’s Section 1983 claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 claims challenging a state parole revocation that would invalidate the confinement are barred by the favorable termination rule.

Dabrieo v. Massachusetts Parole Board · filed 2015-03-26

Because “a § 1983 suit like the present, contending that a state parole revocation was constitutionally invalid, challenges the ‘fact or duration of [the plaintiffs] confinement.’ ” White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 481, 114 S.Ct. 2364), it is barred by the favorable termination rule. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts II and III is ALLOWED.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would imply an outstanding conviction or sentence is invalid unless it has been favorably terminated.

Black v. Hathaway · filed 2015-04-10

However, Heck’s favorable-termination rule does not bar a § 1983 suit when “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff.” ... Therefore, Black’s argument that Heck does not bar his § 1983 suit is unavailing.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for an allegedly wrongful conviction or imprisonment must show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Calderon v. Brown · filed 2015-06-22

It appears that the plaintiff has been convicted of a crime notwithstanding his claim of self-defense, and he brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 demanding damages as compensation for his wrongful conviction and custody. ... The plaintiff does not demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated, and, therefore, his claim for damages fails.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a supervised release revocation unless the revocation has first been invalidated.

Reilly v. Herrera · filed 2015-07-27

If the defendants did engage in such actions, then the arrest would be unlawful and the revocation itself would be invalid. Such a claim falls squarely within the purview of Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary punishment unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Emmanuel Bull v. J. Brown · filed 2015-09-08

The district court properly dismissed Bull’s due process claim regarding the April 2003 disciplinary hearing because Bull failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the denial of parole, have been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (explaining that a claim relating to a prison disciplinary hearing “that necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983”).

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a sentence may proceed under Heck when a state appellate court has vacated the judgment of sentence, even if its order does not expressly address the plaintiff’s challenges.

Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny · filed 2015-09-22

We hold that Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims arising from the January 2011 proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas are not barred by Heck because Bronowicz has demonstrated that the judgment imposed was invalidated on appeal.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Johnson v. Cain · filed 2015-10-20

Because Johnson has not shown his conviction has been invalidated, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a civil rights suit that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Nicholas v. Evans · filed 2007-03-28

According to the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Heck, when a plaintiff brings a civil rights suit that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at ... 487.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a prison disciplinary result that has not been invalidated when success would imply the result’s invalidity.

Campbell v. Beard · filed 2016-01-25

To the extent that Campbell seeks to challenge the results of his prison disciplinary hearing, the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s claims because, notwithstanding Campbell’s acquittal in a related criminal case, he has not demonstrated that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time credits, have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of an adverse parole decision unless that decision has been invalidated by an appropriate tribunal.

Brown v. Williams · filed 2016-03-16

Because neither of the Parole Board’s decisions in Brown’s case have been invalidated by an appropriate tribunal, Brown may not attack them in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of lost good-time credits unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Anderson v. Cahlander · filed 2016-08-05

Dismissal of Anderson’s action as Heck-barred was proper because, notwithstanding the dismissal of a related criminal case, Anderson has not demonstrated that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time credits, have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to recover damages for a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Talbert v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2016-08-09

The Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the prisoner can show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. ... Talbert has made no such showing here.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Curry v. Yachera · filed 2016-09-01

Accordingly, under what we have termed Heck’s “favorable termination rule,” Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2015), a section 1983 action for damages must be dismissed unless there was no conviction or sentence or “the plaintiff can demonstrate that [a] conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 claims challenging the validity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been overturned.

Colon-Montanez v. Keller · filed 2016-09-06

First, he asserts at various points that his imprisonment is unlawful because his conviction is invalid. Any claims in this regard lack merit because he has not succeeded in overturning his conviction, as he has attempted to do most recently in M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 3-15-cv-02442.

Section 1983 bars claims that would imply a criminal conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been overturned.

Blenman v. Dover Police Department · filed 2016-10-12

The final termination rule announced in Heck bars those § 1983 claims that have the effect of impugning the underlying criminal conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of lost good-time credits unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Moe v. Northern Nevada Correctional Center · filed 2016-11-04

Dismissal of Moe’s action as Heck-barred was proper because Moe has not demonstrated that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time credits, have been invalidated.

A prisoner cannot avoid § 1983’s favorable termination requirement by waiving a challenge to the duration of confinement.

Haywood v. Hathaway · filed 2016-11-29

Nothing in Heck, Edwards, or any of the Court’s later decisions suggests that the “favorable termination” element that the Court thought essential can be elided by a plaintiffs disavowing a kind of relief that Preiser holds is never available under § 1983 in the first place.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge that would necessarily invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Fields v. Venable · filed 2016-12-27

Accordingly, because the Parole Board’s decision in Fields’ case has not been invalidated by an appropriate tribunal, Fields may not attack it in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction through a due process claim until that conviction has been overturned.

Robinson v. Allen · filed 2017-01-19

To the extent that Robinson is attempting to raise a due process challenge to the second disciplinary proceeding, he may not do so until his disciplinary conviction has been overturned.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine the validity of a plaintiff’s pretrial probation disposition are barred by Heck’s favorable-termination requirement.

Cabot v. Lewis · filed 2017-03-15

That conclusion does not fully answer the question of whether that requirement bars plaintiffs § 1983 claims. The rule bars only those claims that would undermine the validity of his pretrial probation.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to allege that the original action terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Lessard v. Cravitz · filed 2017-04-25

In order to state a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the original action terminated in his favor.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for an allegedly invalid sentence unless the sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by habeas corpus.

TAYLOR v. CITY OF BIXBY · filed 2017-05-01

Consequently, Taylor "has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until [his] . . . sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus."

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation or underlying conviction has first been invalidated.

Webster v. Himmelbach · filed 2017-09-27

Since Plaintiff has not established that the parole revocation has been invalidated, or that his underlying conviction has been set aside, Plaintiff cannot assert a § 1983 claim as an- improper collateral attack upon the validity of his August 21, 2014, parole revocation.

A § 1983 claim is not barred under Heck by a conviction that has been vacated through federal habeas relief.

Blumberg v. Hewitt · filed 2017-10-02

Therefore, Blumberg’s § 1983 claims do not implicate the validity of that conviction, as it has already been “called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily invalidate confinement or its duration unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Knox v. Kate Brown · filed 2017-11-17

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Claims One and Three challenging defendants’ deferral of Knox’s parole release date because success on these claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Knox’s confinement or its duration, and Knox failed to allege that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Ahmadi v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2017-12-04

A claim for damages related to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless that sentence has been invalidated.

Austin v. Wasden · filed 2017-12-20

The district court properly dismissed Austin’s action as Heck-barred because success on the claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, and Austin failed to show that his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims remain subject to Heck’s favorable-termination rule when the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.

Ausler v. Bradford · filed 2018-01-10

Further, we find that Ausler’s argument on appeal--that, because he was not incarcerated when he filed his complaint, his claims for damages were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)--is precluded by circuit precedent. See Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that Heck’s favorable-termination rule applies when § 1983 plaintiff is no longer incarcerated).

A § 1983 damages claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an uninvalidated court order authorizing confinement.

Provost v. Department of Correction (DOC) · filed 2018-01-12

As a result, a favorable ruling against the alleged misconduct of defendants would necessarily imply the invalidity of the superior court order. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred under Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims may avoid the favorable termination rule when the claimant diligently pursued habeas or similar relief, or had too little time in custody to pursue habeas relief.

Opperisano v. Jones · filed 2018-02-26

In practice, the " Jenkins / Leather " exception appears to provide claimants two ways to avoid Heck's favorable-termination rule: (1) due diligence in pursuing habeas or similar relief; or (2) too brief a period in custody to pursue habeas relief as a matter of law.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence remain barred under Heck despite Justice Souter’s proposed exception in Spencer.

Reilly v. Herrera · filed 2018-04-03

Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Spencer did not overturn Heck’s bar on § 1983 actions challenging the validity of the claimant’s conviction or sentence.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover unlawful-arrest damages when success would necessarily invalidate a still-valid resisting-arrest conviction, including one based on a no-contest plea.

Johnson v. Thibodaux City · filed 2018-04-17

Every is precluded from seeking damages under § 1983 for her allegedly unlawful arrest because she pleaded no-contest to resisting arrest.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Ebuzor-Onayemi v. Union County Police Department · filed 2018-06-05

Heck precludes § 1983 claims like Ebuzor-Onayemi’s whose success “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 487.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison discipline are subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule only when the discipline affects the fact or duration of confinement.

Davis v. Eberling · filed 2018-07-31

The favorable termination rule in Heck applies only where prison disciplinary outcomes implicate the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement; here, the discipline imposed on Davis had no bearing on his underlying conviction or the duration of his sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or confinement unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Tyrone Singleton v. Superintendent Camp Hill SCI · filed 2018-08-27

Singleton’s argument, which challenges the duration of his confinement, is barred under Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, which holds that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 if it implies the invalidity of his conviction or confinement, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

A section 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence requires a prior invalidation; resentencing by stipulation under a later vacated conditional writ does not satisfy that requirement.

Olson v. Amatuzio · filed 2018-08-27

Similarly here, by issuing the conditional writ pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court did not invalidate or call into question the legality of Olson’s imprisonment. Instead, the Court directed resentencing based on the parties’ stipulation and later vacated the writ and dismissed Olson’s habeas petition with prejudice. Therefore, the Court concludes that Olson’s section 1983 claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims arising from a parole revocation are subject to the Heck favorable termination rule.

Woodson v. Jenkins · filed 2018-09-13

Regarding the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Woodson’s claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacities, we discern no error in light of Woodson’s failure to comply with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction resulting in lost good-time credits are barred unless the disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Everett v. M. Black · filed 2018-09-20

To the extent that success on Everett’s due process claims stemming from his 2008 disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, Everett’s claims are barred by Heck, because Everett failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 challenges to conditions of release imposed as part of a sentence are subject to Heck’s favorable-termination rule.

Jackson v. Axtell · filed 2018-11-08

The Court is persuaded by those cases holding that § 1983 challenges to conditions of release imposed as part of a sentence are subject to Heck’s favorable-termination rule.

Section 1983 does not permit damages that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has first been expunged, reversed, or set aside through collateral relief.

Cowan v. Hunter · filed 2019-02-01

Though the requests for money damages fell outside the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, the district court could not award money damages until Mr. Cowan separately obtained expungement, reversal, or collateral relief.

A § 1983 claim challenging prison discipline does not accrue if success would imply the punishment is invalid; waiving challenges to lost good-time credits does not avoid this rule.

Morgan v. Schott · filed 2019-02-05

If a prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary hearing implies the invalidity of the resulting sanctions, no § 1983 claim has accrued.

Section 1983 does not permit relief for an arrest that would necessarily cast doubt on a criminal judgment that has not been vacated or expunged.

Smith v. Leslie · filed 2019-03-06

Because Plaintiff’s criminal judgment has not been expunged or vacated, Magistrate Judge Rau properly concluded that Plaintiff cannot seek relief from his arrest under § 1983.

A dismissal of state charges is not a favorable termination for a Section 1983 claim when a sustained federal conviction stems from the same conduct.

Corley v. Vance · filed 2019-03-27

Therefore, since Plaintiff was convicted on federal charges stemming from the precise conduct underlying his dismissed state charges, the dismissal of the state charges was not a favorable termination.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of a conviction or the length of imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through an authorized process.

Vogel v. Roy · filed 2019-05-03

A plaintiff cannot successfully challenge under Section 1983 the validity of a conviction or the length of imprisonment unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”