42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary convictions that have not been set aside.

Serrano v. Comstok-King · filed 2021-03-11

Because Serrano has not shown that her disciplinary convictions have been set aside, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a supervised release revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Greene v. Osborne-Leivian · filed 2021-03-12

Greene’s success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his supervised release and his resulting sentence of imprisonment. Greene does not allege that the revocation of his supervised release has been declared invalid or any other facts indicating an ability to satisfy the favorable termination requirement. Therefore, this subset of Greene’s claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

SZILAGYI v. MCCLURE · filed 2021-03-12

Because Szilagyi’s conviction and sentence have not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, his damages claims are currently not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred by Heck’s favorable-termination requirement, making an amendment to add those claims futile.

Sifuentes v. Midland County 42nd Circuit Court · filed 2021-03-15

Further, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint fails on similar grounds; this Court has already held that Plaintiff’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. See ECF No. 16, PageID.121. Thus, the inclusion of Plaintiff’s additional claims would be futile.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for damages based on a conviction or sentence unless it has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by a writ of habeas corpus.

Chestra v. State of Kansas · filed 2002-01-08

Given that neither Mr. Chestra’s conviction nor his sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus as required by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994), we affirm the district court’s ... dismissal of his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would undermine an outstanding criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Andrich v. Adel · filed 2021-03-16

As such, his action is Heck-barred because success on Plaintiff’s claims would undermine the integrity of his conviction, which has not been vacated or reversed.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Cass v. The United States District Court, Eastern District of New York · filed 2021-03-24

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to argue that he was falsely arrested and denied a fair trial by the actions of the Officers, his claims call into question the validity of his conviction, and because his conviction has not been overturned or otherwise ... invalidated, the favorable termination rule bars these § 1983 claims.

The Heck favorable-termination rule for § 1983 claims does not bar state-law tort claims.

Northern-Allison v. Seymour · filed 2021-03-25

The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment based on the application of these cases because Northern- Allison filed a “claim under state law, not a § 1983 claim based on an outstanding criminal judgment. Thus, Heck has no application here.” Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Ky. 2007).

A § 1983 fair trial claim requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, and acceptance of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not satisfy that requirement.

Kayo v. Mertz · filed 2021-03-31

Accordingly, because the Court finds as a matter of law that acceptance of an ACD does not constitute a favorable terminationfor purposes of a §1983 fair trial claim, Kayo’s fair trial claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims challenging a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Pinkney v. Ewers · filed 2021-04-01

If the conviction or sentence has not been invalidated, claims seeking damages for a wrongful conviction or sentence are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages or equitable relief for conduct during revocation proceedings unless the revocation and sentence have been invalidated or expunged.

Murphy v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2021-04-20

Unless and until the plaintiff shows that his revocation and sentence have been invalidated or expunged, he may not bring a complaint under §1983 seeking damages or equitable relief from conduct that allegedly occurred during those proceedings.

Section 1983 bars claims that would undo a conviction, sentence, or the fact, duration, or conditions of probation or parole unless the relevant decision has been invalidated.

Henry, Curtis v. Whiteaker, Caelee · filed 2021-04-28

In other words, to the extent plaintiff is effectively attempting by this lawsuit to undo the effects of his state court conviction or sentence or the fact, duration or conditions of his probation or parole, he cannot bring such claims unless the relevant decision has already been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Because plaintiff has not made such a showing, any claims challenging the fact, duration or conditions of his probation or parole are barred.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily invalidate a revocation of conditional release unless the revocation has first been invalidated.

Stevens v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · filed 2021-04-28

Under Heck, “[a] claim is not cognizable under section 1983 where a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply invalidity of the plaintiff’s state conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” ... Stevens’s success on his retaliation claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his conditional release and resulting confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Atwater v. Manne · filed 2021-04-29

Unless and until the plaintiff successfully invalidates his disciplinary conviction, he may not pursue damages (or any relief) under §1983 on claims related to his disciplinary proceedings.

Section 1983 permits damages for harm that would invalidate a conviction or sentence only after that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Owens v. Menlo Park Police Department · filed 2021-04-30

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars a claim when success would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction affecting the duration of confinement, unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Salmen v. Barrientos · filed 2021-05-11

In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that a section 1983 claim cannot proceed when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. ... Here, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction and his subsequent credit loss. ... Therefore, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims because he failed to allege that his disciplinary conviction has already been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 relief is barred when a judgment for the plaintiff would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Kearney v. Fix · filed 2021-05-17

Where, as here, judgment in favor of Kearney would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, Heck’s favorable termination doctrine applies to bar Plaintiffs action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Diaz v. State of Rhode Island · filed 2021-05-19

Therefore, under Heck, the Court may not award monetary damages of any kind.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily call into question a probation revocation order unless that order has been invalidated.

Travis v. Monnier · filed 2021-05-21

If Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were successful, it would necessarily call into question the validity of the Placer County Superior Court’s order granting the First Amended Petition for Revocation of Probation. This state court order has not been “reversed, expunged, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging disciplinary proceedings that forfeited good time credits when success would imply the disciplinary finding was invalid and that finding has not been invalidated.

(PC) Sherrod v. Unknown · filed 2021-05-24

Thus, Plaintiff is barred by Heck and Edwards from pursuing any claims under § 1983 concerning the process he was provided which resulted in the forfeiture of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Johnson v. Jeffreys · filed 2021-05-26

The Heck rule holds that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in [his] favor ... would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1117 (7th Cir. 2019). If so, then the complaint must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Rios v. Parole and Probation · filed 2021-05-27

In this case, success on Rios’ § 1983 claims—wrongful imprisonment, failure to train, and substantiative due process violations—would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying 2015 conviction. However, Rios has yet to provide the Court with a direct order or formal declaration indicating that the 2015 conviction is void. Under Heck and its progeny, it is normally not within the province of a federal court, in a § 1983 suit, to retroactively declare a state conviction void. Accordingly, Heck is directly on point and requires the dismissal of Rios’ complaint.

A Section 1983 damages claim attacking the validity of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until the underlying decision has been invalidated.

Barrientos v. Davis · filed 2021-06-02

To any extent Plaintiff is requesting monetary damages for due process violations during his disciplinary hearing (such as any claim that a Defendant provided false testimony or that his punishment was imposed before his appeal was perfected), such claims are frivolous until the Heck conditions are met. The Supreme Court has held that a Section 1983 claim which attacks the constitutionality of a conviction (or imprisonment, as the case may be) does not accrue until that conviction (or sentence) has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim for lost good time if success would necessarily show that the duration of confinement is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Martinez v. Gore · filed 2021-06-03

Plaintiff’s allegation about his lost good time fails to state a § 1983 claim. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims based on lost good time must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Bramscher v. Newsom · filed 2021-06-07

Even if plaintiff had stated a claim, this action is barred by Heck. Plaintiff seeks money damages and to have custody credits changed that would have him released from prison, yet his conviction that led to his imprisonment has not been reversed or expunged.

Section 1983 allows a claim for detention beyond a scheduled release date when success would not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Peterson v. James · filed 2021-06-22

Presently, the Court does not believe a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor in this matter would serve in any manner to invalidate his conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a criminal charge resolved through pretrial diversion are barred by Heck unless the criminal proceedings are invalidated.

Garig v. Travis · filed 2021-06-30

Because Plaintiff through this proceeding challenges the probable cause for her arrest and ultimately her conviction, her claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction resulting in lost time credits are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

(PC) Alem v. Barton · filed 2021-07-02

A finding that defendants Hernandez and Camarillo filed a false rules violation report in retaliation for plaintiff filing the grievance would result in the invalidity of plaintiff’s prison disciplinary conviction. A finding that defendant Turner violated plaintiff’s due process rights by finding plaintiff guilty of the rules violation report based on insufficient evidence also would result in the invalidity of plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction. Therefore, these claims are barred by Heck unless the disciplinary conviction has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would undermine a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Daniels v. Aponte · filed 2021-07-13

Plaintiff cannot obtain money damages unless the charges were dropped, or the conviction expunged. If the prosecution is ongoing, this case must be stayed until the criminal case concludes. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information about the status of the criminal case and the reason plaintiff is currently in custody.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction affecting the length of confinement unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Grady v. Alonzo · filed 2021-07-16

Accordingly, the favorable termination doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence claim.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred if success would call a conviction or sentence into question and the conviction or sentence has not been invalidated.

Garcia v. Long · filed 2021-07-19

However, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus, his malicious prosecution is barred by Heck. Indeed, a judgment in favor of the malicious prosecution claim will certainly call into question Plaintiff’s purportedly unconstitutional conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 bars damages claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Ramos v. United States Bureau of Prison · filed 2021-07-26

Because success on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, and because Plaintiff has not alleged that his convictions were overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars these claims for money damages.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply a conviction is invalid cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated, even if the plaintiff has been released from custody.

Starofsky v. O'Brien · filed 2021-08-02

As such, his claims are not cognizable unless he can show “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see also Savory, 947 F.3d at 430–31 (concluding that Heck applies to § 1983 claims which imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence even after the plaintiff is released from custody). Although Plaintiff has moved for expungement, a certificate of innocence, and habeas corpus relief, he has not been granted such relief. Thus, his claims must be dismissed.

A prisoner may bring a § 1983 challenge to a disciplinary hearing without first overturning the disciplinary ruling when the punishment does not affect the fact or duration of confinement.

Campbell v. Annucci · filed 2021-08-06

Therefore, because the fact and duration of Campbell’s overall confinement was not affected by the challenged Tier III hearing disposition, Heck is not relevant to this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a supervised release revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Courtney v. Godinez · filed 2021-08-16

A judgment in favor of Courtney would mean the revocation of his supervised release was invalid and he, indeed, was wrongfully detained. Thus, his claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Bruno v. Conroy · filed 2021-08-23

Because success on Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and because Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated, Heck’s favorable termination rule bars his claims.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement unless the conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated.

(PC) Swafford v. Neuschmid · filed 2021-08-25

Logically, an award of damages based on Plaintiff’s allegations that he remains unlawfully imprisoned would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement. See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 480–87. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages under § 1983 on his current allegations.

Section 1983 damages for false imprisonment are premature until the underlying criminal charges are reversed.

Mayes v. Acree · filed 2021-09-02

And he may not sue for damages asserting that his arrest amounted to false imprisonment until he has obtained the reversal of the underlying criminal charges.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction when a state court has vacated that conviction.

Glenn v. Hammond City of · filed 2021-09-07

The Hammond Defendants, Finnerty, and Kasper argue that the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 civil rights claims are barred under Heck. However, the doctrine is inapplicable because the Plaintiffs satisfy Heck’s favorable termination requirement. The Plaintiffs’ criminal convictions were vacated by the state court orders that granted their successive postconviction motions and dismissed the charges against them.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging withheld good-time credits while the decision withholding them remains valid.

Smalls v. Coveny · filed 2021-09-14

Plaintiff’s present action challenging the decision to deprive him of good-time credits is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... His challenge, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement and, as long the TAC decision stands, Plaintiff cannot pursue money damages for any alleged defect in the TAC proceeding.

Section 1983 bars a prison disciplinary due process claim that would necessarily imply the punishment’s invalidity unless the sanction has been overturned.

Pena v. Clark · filed 2021-09-29

However, such due process claims cannot be brought in an action where the claims “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed” unless the plaintiff shows that the sanctions have been overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a prison disciplinary finding when reversing it would restore good-time credits and affect the duration of confinement.

(PC) Diaz v. Lynch · filed 2021-10-07

Because reversal of the rules violation report finding would necessarily result in a restoration of good time credits, it would also necessarily affect the duration of plaintiff’s confinement. Therefore, the challenge to the rules violation report for indecent exposure is not cognizable in a section 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim challenging the validity of criminal proceedings requires a prior declaration that the conviction is invalid.

Redmon v. Noel · filed 2021-10-13

For the reasons stated more fully below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 7). ... Relatedly, the R&R found that Redmon’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was a non-starter because, in order to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, he must have first demonstrated that his conviction was “declared invalid by either an Ohio state court or a federal habeas corpus decision,” neither of which he had done.

A § 1983 claim that would call into question a conviction or sentence requires favorable termination of the available state or federal habeas remedies first.

Brown v. Witham, Jr. · filed 2021-10-26

Where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction through a suit for damages or equitable relief when success would invalidate the conviction, unless it has already been invalidated.

Washington v. Sanchez · filed 2021-10-27

Under Heck, a state prisoner may not file a § 1983 suit for damages or equitable relief challenging his conviction or sentence if a ruling on the claim would render the conviction or sentence invalid, until and unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 requires favorable termination before a prisoner may seek damages when success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid.

Garrett v. Murphy · filed 2021-10-29

Suits dismissed for failure to meet Heck’s favorable-termination requirement are dismissed because the plaintiff lacks a valid “cause of action” under § 1983, and a cause of action in this context is synonymous with a “claim” under the PLRA.

A dismissal of a conviction under California Penal Code section 1203.4 does not satisfy Heck’s favorable termination requirement for a § 1983 damages claim.

Folke v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2021-11-04

Remaining consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, this Court finds that Folke’s section 1203.4 conviction dismissal does not constitute the favorable termination required by Heck. Accordingly, Folke’s conviction continues to bar his § 1983 claims insofar as they pertain to the Fourth Arrest.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

McKnight v. Cuyahoga County Justice System Center · filed 2021-11-08

A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim requires favorable termination of the criminal prosecution; a claim filed while the criminal case is pending must be dismissed without prejudice.

Hernandez v. Holden · filed 2021-11-16

“Under both Connecticut law and Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the prosecution terminated in his or her favor to state a claim of false arrest/false imprisonment.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for false arrest, and this matter is DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) (ii).

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would invalidate a criminal conviction unless that conviction has been reversed or called into question by an authorized court.

Shutsha v. Gonzalez · filed 2021-11-16

As there is no indication that Plaintiff’s conviction has been reversed or called into question in any way by a court authorized to do so, Plaintiff’s claim is barred under Heck, and is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction are not cognizable until the conviction has been invalidated.

Marshall Cobb, Sr. v. Judge Benjamin · filed 2021-11-18

Because Cobb’s convictions have not been invalidated—and he remains incarcerated—his claims for damages under § 1983 are not yet cognizable.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the Heck and Edwards favorable termination rule.

(PC) Sherrod v. Unknown · filed 2021-11-22

In particular, the magistrate judge found that plaintiff’s claim is barred by the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–47 (1997). ... Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

A § 1983 damages claim arising from an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Waliezer v. Sutton · filed 2021-11-22

A § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner seeking damages for a disciplinary decision that cost time credits to have that decision reversed or expunged first.

Lopez v. Thomas · filed 2021-11-30

In addition, to obtain money damages for the alleged violations at the RVR hearing that resulted in the loss of time credits, plaintiff must first challenge the hearing and have it reversed or expunged pursuant to Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine a parole revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Pendleton v. Cohen · filed 2021-12-01

Pendleton does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the sanction regarding his parole violation has been vacated on appeal, set aside, or otherwise called into question. Unless and until that occurs, Pendleton cannot pursue a claim that would undermine the validity of his July 2019, parole revocation hearing.

Section 1983 bars a malicious prosecution claim under Heck when the underlying case ended in probation before judgment that has not been invalidated.

Daulatzai v. State of Maryland · filed 2021-12-06

In dismissing Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the Court concluded that the probation before judgment entered against Plaintiff barred her claims for malicious prosecution under the common law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (collectively, the “malicious prosecution claims”). ... Thus, analogizing Plaintiff's probation before judgment to an Alford plea only confirms this Court’s conclusion that it bars her claim for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner serving an indeterminate life term to challenge lost good-conduct credits when success would not necessarily shorten the sentence.

(PC) Richson-Bey v. Watrous · filed 2021-12-07

Plaintiff is correct that as a life-term prisoner the loss of good-conduct credits will have no effect on his maximum sentence and thus the favorable termination rule is inapplicable to his due process claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary sanction that affects only conditions of confinement when a loss of earned credit time remains suspended.

Fleming v. Galipeau · filed 2021-12-15

Rather, his sanction didn’t implicate the fact or duration of his sentence and, unless and until the suspended portion of his sentence is imposed, it simply does not trigger Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Medina v. Krueger · filed 2021-12-20

A claim for damages related to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim arising from a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Harris v. Beach · filed 2022-01-03

Plaintiff does not allege that the underlying conviction has been vacated, overturned, or otherwise invalidated. Accordingly, Heck still bars his claim for money damages arising from the conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for a disciplinary finding that cost time credits until the finding has been overturned.

Harris v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) · filed 2022-01-05

Plaintiff may seek money damages once he has successfully overturned the disciplinary finding.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Lake v. Hammond Police Department · filed 2022-01-25

Mr. Lake does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that his murder conviction has been vacated on appeal, set aside, or otherwise called into question. Indeed, Mr. Lake’s habeas petition was dismissed by this court. Unless and until that occurs, Mr. Lake cannot pursue a claim that would undermine the validity of his 2011 murder conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Toomer v. Robinson · filed 2022-01-31

This § 1983 claim will therefore be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, until such time as Toomer has the revocation invalidated via appeal, post-conviction relief, habeas corpus relief, or otherwise.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

LAWRENCE v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2022-01-31

Because Lawrence’s conviction and sentence have not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, his damages claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 damages claim for confinement past a maximum release date is barred unless the confinement has first been invalidated.

Jackson v. Cuomo · filed 2022-02-02

Here, although Plaintiff alleged that he was confined past his maximum release date, he has not alleged that his confinement was a deemed excessive by a state court or by a successful habeas petition. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Collins v. Carroll · filed 2022-02-02

Therefore, an individual may not raise claims in a civil rights action if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect the validity of his conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Lampley v. McCurry · filed 2022-02-07

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his criminal proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Court, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless he alleges and can show that conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated; a general Kentucky pardon did not invalidate West’s conviction.

West v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2022-02-15

Absent invalidation of that conviction, he cannot pursue his Section 1983 claims, which will therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 damages claims attacking a prison disciplinary conviction are barred by Heck until the conviction is invalidated.

Thompson v. Jeter · filed 2022-02-16

Here, Plaintiff argues he was falsely accused and is innocent of the disciplinary charges. Heck bars these claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid must first show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Towery v. Miller Jr · filed 2022-02-17

As noted in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, and as is set forth in Heck, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions which would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must show the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the loss of parole eligibility when the claim does not challenge the validity of the conviction.

Ricker v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2022-02-22

Because Ricker is not challenging the validity of his conviction, his claims are not barred by Heck and he may pursue his claims in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Ward v. City of Middletown Police Department · filed 2022-02-24

With that in mind, the Court concludes that pro se Plaintiff’s § 1983 damages claims arising from the alleged unreasonable search based on the purportedly illegal warrant are barred by Heck and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement unless that confinement has been favorably invalidated.

Todd v. Silverman · filed 2022-02-25

The rule articulated in Heck—also known as the “favorable termination rule”—therefore precludes the use of § 1983 to seek damages if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a prior state or federal criminal conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages claims arising from a vacated conviction when success would not necessarily invalidate a later conviction.

GLADDEN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2022-02-28

He may seek damages under section 1983 related to the constitutional violations leading to his 1999 conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has been overturned or invalidated.

McGhee v. Nottingham · filed 2022-03-01

Therefore, Mcghee cannot proceed with a Section 1983 claim for money damages against the defendants until the Prison Review Board’s decision is overturned or invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would imply his conviction is invalid unless the conviction has previously been invalidated.

Jones v. Floyd · filed 2022-03-07

To the extent that Mr. Jones is seeking monetary damages, “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” ... In short, Mr. Jones’ claim for monetary damages is not yet ripe.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily undermine a prison disciplinary sanction unless the sanction has been invalidated.

SMITH v. WEDDELL · filed 2022-03-07

Any claims pertaining to Mr. Smith's allegation that Officer Weddle falsified a conduct report must be dismissed because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when the plaintiff was never convicted and success on the claims would not invalidate a pretrial diversion agreement.

Mitchell v. Kirchmeier · filed 2022-03-14

The success of Mitchell’s § 1983 claims would imply nothing at all about whether his pretrial diversion agreement with the state was a valid contract. Therefore, the favorable-termination requirement does not come into play, and Mitchell’s § 1983 claims are not Heck-barred.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside.

Ahmadi v. Lumpkin · filed 2022-03-14

Moreover, Ahmadi’s proposed arguments do not establish that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. His § 1983 claims are therefore barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims challenging continued incarceration after a conditional-release date are barred by the Heck favorable-termination rule unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Crawford v. Iccari · filed 2022-03-14

The Court understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants arising from their alleged failure to release Plaintiff into postrelease supervision status on his conditional-release date. These claims are barred at this time, however, by the favorable-termination rule first articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed under Heck when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Garig v. Travis · filed 2022-03-22

Importantly, Plaintiff has not alleged or identified any facts suggesting that her conviction—that is, her participation in the Pre-Trial Intervention program—was reversed on direct appeal, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question in a habeas proceeding. Thus, for the same reasons outlined in the Court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court is compelled to conclude that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims may not proceed because a judgment in her favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply that a revocation of supervision is invalid unless the revocation has been overturned.

Woodland v. Ross · filed 2022-03-25

In this instance, the court must dismiss Woodland’s § 1983 complaint. ... If he successfully gets his revocation overturned at the state level, he may refile his § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary proceeding when success would imply the invalidity of a loss of good-time credits, even if the proceeding also imposed other sanctions.

Hebrard v. Nofziger · filed 2022-03-25

Allowing plaintiff to abandon any claims affecting the duration of his imprisonment is no solution because, where both causes of action arise from the same disciplinary process, success in a § 1983 action targeting the former sanction “would implicitly question the validity” of the latter.

A § 1983 action barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement is subject to dismissal without prejudice.

(PC) Guzman v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange · filed 2022-03-29

The assigned magistrate judge found Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the magistrate judge determined the action was barred by the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). ... The Findings and Recommendations issued on January 31, 2022 (Doc. 16), are ADOPTED in full.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would imply that a conviction is invalid until the conviction has been set aside.

Jackson v. Gantner · filed 2022-03-30

Accordingly, because Jackson can prevail on her access-to-the-courts claim only if she shows that her challenge to her conviction has merit and that her conviction is therefore invalid, she may not pursue such a claim until after her conviction is set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction extending a prisoner’s sentence unless the conviction or sentence increase has already been invalidated.

Scally v. Flores · filed 2022-03-30

Because Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims are based on allegations that Defendants’ actions in falsely charging him with possession of a deadly weapon have required him to serve an additional year in custody, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 with those claims unless and until the increase in his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Fraly v. Phillips · filed 2022-04-21

If successful, Plaintiff’s claims that he was falsely charged with criminal sexual conduct would imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. His claims against defendants Nessel, CPS employees, and John Doe Traverse City police officers are therefore barred by Heck and will be dismissed on that basis.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Herndon v. Maher · filed 2022-04-22

Because plaintiff's complaint for damages fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 under the rationale of Heck, it must be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred until the conviction is invalidated; such claims must be dismissed without prejudice.

Podlucky v. Commissioner of Internal Reven · filed 2022-05-02

“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a [42 U.S.] § ... 1983 suit should be dismissed when ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.’” ... Because his criminal judgments have not been vacated, these claims are barred by Heck. However, the District Court erred in dismissing these claims with prejudice as he may bring them later if his convictions are invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Bryant 463608 v. Michigan, State of · filed 2022-05-03

Therefore, unless Plaintiffs show that their convictions or sentences have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” their claims “[are] not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor shown that their sentences have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question. Accordingly, under Heck, Plaintiffs’ complaint is properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly invalid conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Goodwin v. United States · filed 2022-05-03

Because plaintiff does not allege, nor does it appear, that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question, his claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck, and this action will be dismissed accordingly.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence to pursue a due process claim over lost good-time credits when success would not necessarily shorten confinement.

(PC) Richson-Bey v. Moreno · filed 2022-05-09

Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is indeterminately sentenced and the loss of good-time credits will not necessarily lead to a shorter confinement. Thus, based on the information presented for the time in the objections, the Court will vacate the Findings and Recommendations and allow Plaintiff to proceed on his due process challenge against Defendant Saucedo as well as the retaliation claim against Defendant Moreno.

Heck does not bar a prisoner’s § 1983 challenge to a disciplinary sentence that does not affect the fact or duration of imprisonment.

Atwater v. Nickels · filed 2022-05-10

Because Heck does not apply when a prisoner challenges a disciplinary sentence that does not affect the fact or duration of his imprisonment, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary loss of custody credits that extends confinement unless the loss has been invalidated.

Scally v. Flores · filed 2022-05-12

The Heck favorable termination rule applies to prison disciplinary action which results in the loss of custody credits or otherwise extends a prisoner’s sentence.

A Section 1983 suit may be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Ealy v. Evans · filed 2022-05-26

It is therefore ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice as malicious and until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 damages claims require a favorable termination under Heck only when they challenge a conviction or imprisonment or would invalidate a conviction or sentence.

Doyle L. Heard v. Governor of Florida · filed 2022-05-31

But this requirement only applies to claims seeking damages “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” or for harm caused by actions that would invalidate a conviction or sentence. Id. at 486. Some of Heard’s remaining claims may fall under this category, but without specific factual allegations, that is far from certain. As the complaint currently stands, we find that the district court erred in denying Heard’s claims for damages based on Heck.

A plaintiff cannot bring a Section 1983 claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence without first showing that the criminal judgment has been invalidated.

Williams v. Sheahan · filed 2022-05-31

If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for slander.

Scott v. McMinn County Sheriffs Office · filed 2022-04-15

Also, Plaintiff’s claim for slander is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for injury to reputation alone without deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Marner v. City of Aurora · filed 2015-12-02

Finally, Mr. Marner complains of the dismissal of his § 1983 claim based on alleged defamation when various defendants published an article incorrectly stating that he was part of a criminal enterprise. But, as pointed out by the district court, injury to reputation is not a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for slander or libel, which are matters of state law.

Waddleton v. Blalock · filed 2001-11-19

Rather, the magistrate judge correctly dismissed the claim because, under the law of this circuit, claims involving slander and libel are state law matters which are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a defamation-plus claim for statements connected to an unconstitutional arrest even when the statements follow the constitutional deprivation.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2001-06-27

However, when Stephan spoke to 48 Hours in 1998-1999, it was clearly established that defamatory statements made “in connection” with an unconstitutional arrest was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if the statements were made after the constitutional deprivation.

Defamation alone does not state a Section 1983 claim unless it also prevents the plaintiff from enjoying or exercising a constitutionally protected right or interest.

Burden v. Counselor Pollack · filed 1987-06-23

Unless coupled with an averment that the purportedly defamatory communication also prevented plaintiff's enjoyment or exercise of a right or interest of a constitutional magnitude, it is insufficient to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation by a state official, even when the defamation is malicious.

Cook v. Brockway · filed 1977-01-17

it is well established that libel or slander by a state official — even if malicious— does not generate a cause of action under the federal civil rights statutes, for the right to be free of defamation and to secure the redress for its infliction is within the province of state law and is not an incident of federal citizenship.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally secured right, and harm to reputation alone is insufficient to state a claim.

Reilly v. Leonard · filed 1978-10-23

The plaintiff’s allegation of harm to his reputation is insufficient by itself to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone without more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States · filed 1983-03-25

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under § 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone absent more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States of America · filed 1983-04-29

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under Sec. 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone.

Barlau v. City of Northfield · filed 1983-06-22

This claim states a cause of action in defamation, if anything, and claims sounding in defamation are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defamation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Anthony Miner and Eric Simmons v. Rick Brackney · filed 1983-10-28

Miner’s contention that Brackney’s report falsely labeled him an informant among his peers is not actionable; claims for defamation and slander are not cognizable under § 1983.

Defamatory statements by state officials do not state a § 1983 claim unless accompanied by deprivation of another constitutionally protected interest.

Stephens v. James E. Word, Michael T. Brunner, Wayne K. Scharber, Joe A. Covington, Earl C. Leming, and Jame · filed 1985-12-10

Mere defamatory statements by state officials, absent the deprivation of other constitutionally protected interests, will not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim for deprivation of a liberty interest through reputational stigma must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement was false.

Rice v. Vigil · filed 1986-07-16

“In order to state a claim for a deprivation of a liberty interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement is false.”

A municipal official's allegedly libelous or slanderous statements, without an accompanying federal-right deprivation, do not create a § 1983 claim.

LaBate v. Butts · filed 1987-10-30

Thus, plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983 against Mayor Young for his statements.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation that harms reputation alone without depriving the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest.

Thomas v. Kippermann · filed 1988-06-09

Such allegations merely implicate Thomas’s reputation and are insufficient to establish a cause of action under § 1983. Damage to one’s reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employment, does not implicate any “property” or “liberty” interest sufficient to invoke the due process clause. More must be involved than defamation to establish a § 1983 claim under the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone by a state official.

Peace v. Baker · filed 1988-06-21

Nevertheless, even assuming that Defendants Baker and Hurta would be liable for Green’s statements, the Supreme Court has held that defamation alone is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for conduct that amounts at most to defamation.

Parate v. Isibor · filed 1989-03-16

As the district court correctly noted, the defendants' actions on October 4, 1985, rise at most to the level of a tort of defamation which is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for libel or slander absent further injury.

Ernest Ralph Ellis, Sr., Jean Ellen Ellis v. Jeffersonian Newspaper · filed 1989-11-13

Torts such as libel and slander do not give rise to a cause of action under the civil rights act absent further injury.

A defamation-plus claim under § 1983 requires a cognizable constitutional wrong in addition to defamation.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-07-01

To state a defamation-plus claim, Buckey must join a defamation claim to a recognizable section 1983 wrong such as the denial of equal protection and substantive due process here hypothesized.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert a claim of defamation.

Wildauer v. Frederick County · filed 1993-05-05

However, § 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle for asserting a claim of defamation.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable; reputational injury must be accompanied by injury to another interest.

Malmin v. Kay Manweiler, Boise State Bar, Individuals: Does I - X, Inclusive, Roes I - X, Inclusive · filed 1995-08-15

Defamation by itself is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 may cover a defamation claim that alleges injury to a constitutionally protected right.

Goodall v. Hodges · filed 1996-12-19

We write separately only to note that although claims of defamation may sometimes be cognizable under § 1983 by alleging in- jury to a constitutionally protected right, Appellant's defamation claim was nonetheless properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable.

Jackson v. Caton · filed 1997-04-23

Defamation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 defamation claim requires stigma plus infringement of another interest.

Price v. Cty Ct Clk Hill Cty · filed 2003-06-25

Price cannot avoid the Heck bar by arguing that his cause of action is based solely on the dissemination of the allegedly false information because, to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defamation claim, Price must demonstrate “a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest.”

Section 1983 does not provide an independent action for defamation by a state official.

Schulte v. Schmetzer · filed 1985-12-24

No independent action for defamation by a state official is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Muhammad v. Weikel · filed 2019-09-26

Moreover, Defendants are protected from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; Wicker v. Shannon, No. 3:CV-09-1629, 2010 WL 3812351, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2010) (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522), and such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Harris v. The City of Texarkana, Arkansas · filed 2019-10-17

Judge Bryant recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim because defamation is not actionable under section 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation and harm to reputation alone.

Muhammad v. Henesh · filed 2020-02-26

Plaintiff again asserts that Defendants have defamed him and caused harm to his reputation. As the Court has previously informed Plaintiff, ... such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone; the plaintiff must allege deprivation of a federal right.

(PC) Boddie v. Martel · filed 2020-03-09

Defamation itself does not support a cause of action under Section 1983.

An alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Fishbourne v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2020-05-28

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a claim for defamation, the magistrate judge correctly found that an alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for slander or defamation alone.

Bower v. Village of Marblehead, Ohio · filed 2020-06-26

Most obviously, slander and defamation are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a libel claim based solely on harm to reputation.

Gorawara v. Caprio · filed 2020-08-28

In addition, insofar as Gorawara seeks to assert a libel claim under Section 1983, see ECF No. at ¶ 57, such a claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a remedy for defamation unless the reputational injury is connected to the denial of a federally protected right.

Kanahele v. Gawlik · filed 2021-03-09

As the Court explained in the previous screening Order, defamation is generally not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone, even when the conduct occurs under color of state law.

Terry v. Dorsey · filed 2021-03-19

Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim of defamation of character is not cognizable under § 1983. Defamation alone does not state a constitutional claim, even when done under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based on defamation allegations alone.

Jackson v. Twin Falls City Idaho · filed 2021-04-14

Defamation-type allegations cannot support a civil rights claim under § 1983.

In a Section 1983 political retaliation claim, once the plaintiff shows that political conduct motivated the termination, the defendants must show they would have made the same decision regardless of that conduct.

Siwek v. Farley · filed 1988-03-21

Once she has shown this, the defendants must show that the decision would have been the same irrespective of her political conduct.

A public employer violates section 1983 by refusing reappointment because employees supported and campaigned for the employer’s political opponent.

Kyle v. City of Oak Forest · filed 1986-06-20

This Court finds that Mayor Malecky’s decision not to reappoint plaintiffs was politically motivated in violation of plaintiffs’ rights granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

An assistant prosecutor may not obtain Section 1983 relief for politically motivated dismissal when political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for effectively carrying out the prosecutor’s policies.

Livas v. Petka · filed 1983-08-05

For this reason, Petka was entitled to demand absolute loyalty from his assistants, including Livas. That Petka lost confidence in Livas, for whatever reason, is therefore sufficient justification for Livas’ dismissal.

Section 1983 reaches arbitrary, politically motivated dismissal of a public employee when carried out under color of state law and depriving the employee of First Amendment association rights.

Matta v. De Choudens · filed 1977-02-25

This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants’ actions were performed under color of the Personnel Law of Puerto Rico, 3 L.P. R.A. 641 et seq. Said actions subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. ... Accordingly, an employee of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not be dismissed solely on the grounds of political affiliation. ... In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that defendants José Alvarez de Choudens and José E. Soler-Zapata violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to free association under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

A newly elected sheriff may decline to reappoint deputies in a small rural office for political disloyalty when loyalty is necessary to carry out the personnel and policy change voters elected the sheriff to make.

Dove v. Fletcher · filed 1983-11-09

We hold that Fletcher is in reasonable compliance with those principles when he reappointed 14 of the 31 employees of his predecessor. The interest of the voting public demands that he enjoy the privilege of replacing the employees who might be disloyal to him.

A nonpolicymaking public employee may prevail under § 1983 when political affiliation substantially motivated dismissal and party loyalty was not a legitimate job qualification.

Paradise v. O'LAUGHLIN · filed 1984-05-04

As City Clerk, Mrs. Paradise performed non-policy-making tasks. She has also demonstrated that her political affiliation was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind dismissal.

In a mixed-motive § 1983 political-discharge claim, proof that political affiliation motivated the dismissal shifts the burden to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision anyway.

Barnes v. Bosley · filed 1984-12-14

In the instant case, therefore, once the plaintiffs established that their political affiliation was a motivating factor in their dismissals, the burden shifted to the defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs would have been discharged in any event.

A Section 1983 political-discharge plaintiff must prove that the impermissible motive was a but-for cause of dismissal.

Wagner v. Hawkins · filed 1986-04-28

In other words, the court must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiffs would not have been discharged except for the operation of the impermissible motive.

Section 1983 permits an at-will public employee to seek damages for a hiring decision based solely on political belief or association without justification by a vital government interest.

Epps v. Clarendon County · filed 1991-05-06

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) allows a civil action for damages against a government official who deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected right. A public employee, even one employed at-will, may state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights by alleging damages from hiring decisions that are based solely upon political belief or association and are unjustified by a vital government interest.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action to be brought in state court under concurrent jurisdiction, but a state court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction when another available forum exists.

Kish v. Wright · filed 1977-03-30

It seems obvious that the federal statute gives original, but not exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts; therefore, it should be concluded that there exists concurrent jurisdiction under the federal statute. ... We hold, therefore, that civil rights actions arising under Sec. 1983 of the United States Code can be properly brought within the jurisdiction of this state. ... While we find that the trial court does have concurrent jurisdiction and the power of discretion as to whether or not it will invoke that jurisdiction in a particular case, we are here confronted with a motion which was granted with prejudice. ... The court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to assure that the appellant’s right to seek relief in the federal court under Sec. 1983 was protected.

Actions arising under § 1983 may be brought in either state or federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.

DiAntonio v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 1978-08-30

Concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists in the state and federal courts.

Section 1983 claims may be heard by Illinois state courts concurrently with federal courts.

Holmes v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1981-01-12

In this case, careful review of relevant case law reveals that the Illinois state court does indeed have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s civil rights claims concurrent with the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1983 permits Maryland state courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil-rights actions brought under it.

De Bleecker v. Montgomery County · filed 1981-04-13

We align ourselves with the above-cited cases and hold that Maryland courts have jurisdiction to try actions based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits an action in state court for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester · filed 1981-09-01

Claims under § 1983 are fully cognizable in our State courts. ... Without commenting on the merits of the contention, we cannot say that the plaintiffs’ allegation of the defendants’ systematic and wilful violation of two election laws, resulting in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ right to vote, fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts, which exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil-rights actions.

Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Department · filed 1981-11-13

The action is comparable to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is a well-accepted rule of law that state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil rights actions.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court, where state courts are proper forums for vindicating the civil rights those claims enforce.

Royer v. Adams · filed 1981-11-20

We continue to believe that our State courts should have the opportunity to address the crucial civil rights issues which § 1983 cases raise rather than require all of our State governmental units to have to defend their actions only in front of our two federal judges.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state as well as federal courts, and state courts may grant relief under federal standards.

Miller v. Carr · filed 1982-04-08

There is nothing which would bar that Court from resolving the § 1983 questions at issue here, and, if appropriate, granting relief under federal standards.