42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Billy Worth Fausset v. Masters · filed 1995-08-22

A prisoner civil rights claim for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

Section 1983’s Heck favorable-termination requirement does not apply to a plaintiff who was neither convicted nor sentenced.

Reed v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-10-27

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Since the Plaintiff in the present case has been neither convicted nor sentenced, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heck is inapplicable.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply a conviction’s invalidity require the conviction to have been invalidated.

Harris v. William Henry Donald Dibble · filed 1994-12-09

Because Harris' allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because Harris did not show that his conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court, the district court properly dismissed his claim for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for conduct that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Bowmane v. Vince G. Swinney Justice Court Dorothy Nash Holmes Jo Ann Wilson Judicial District Court · filed 1995-01-19

Thus, Bowmane is seeking to recover damages for conduct which if proven true, would invalidate his conviction. His conviction has not been invalidated. Therefore, he cannot state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim for damages based on the challenged conduct of the district attorney, public defender, and state court judges.

Section 1983 damages claims that would call an outstanding conviction into question are not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Foti v. Graham · filed 1995-02-22

First, Foti's claims for malicious prosecution and denial of due process are not cognizable because Foti has failed to demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim questioning the validity of current incarceration unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Cooper v. Murray · filed 1995-02-28

Because Cooper's claim questions the validity of his current incarceration, he cannot proceed under Sec. 1983 unless his conviction has been overturned. Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S.1994). Because Cooper's conviction has not been found invalid, dismissal of this Sec. 1983 action was proper.

A prisoner may recover damages under § 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Ricky Bell v. Hoskins · filed 1995-03-03

However, during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, a prisoner must establish that the conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. ... A vacated conviction is the obvious consequence of a court's finding that Bell's conviction was unconstitutional. This case therefore attacks the fact of Bell's confinement and falls squarely within Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply a conviction is invalid do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa · filed 1995-03-09

Because Trimble’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because he did not show that his conviction has been invalidated, Trimble’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims have not accrued at this time.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a parole revocation or resulting sentence does not state a cause of action unless the sentence has been invalidated.

McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 1995-03-13

McGrew remains in custody and he has not alleged that the sentence imposed as a result of the revocation proceedings has been invalidated by a state or federal court. Therefore, McGrew's complaint does not state a § 1983 cause of action.

A Section 1983 claim for denial of a fair trial through withheld exculpatory evidence cannot proceed until the charges are dismissed and the accused is discharged.

Smith v. Holtz · filed 1995-03-24

We therefore hold that there can be no civil action under § 1983 for denial of due process during trial for withholding exculpatory evidence unless and until the charges have been dismissed and the defendant discharged.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages based on an allegedly invalid conviction must plead and prove that the conviction has been set aside.

Moore v. Knotts · filed 1995-03-29

In the alternative, we affirm the district court's summary judgment on the grounds that, in order to prevail on the claims for damages, Mr. Moore and Mr. Kirby would be required to plead and prove that their convictions have been set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that exculpatory evidence was withheld at trial until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor or the conviction is reversed or set aside.

Hale v. Fee · filed 1995-04-07

Hale cannot maintain a Sec. 1983 action alleging that exculpatory evidence was withheld at his trial unless and until he can show that the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor, or that his conviction has been reversed or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily calls a conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Stuart v. Whitter · filed 1995-04-19

Under Heck, Stuart cannot assert a claim for section 1983 relief based on this allegation unless and until the duration of the imprisonment about which he complains is "reversed . . . expunged . . . declared invalid . . . or called into question by a federal . . . writ of habeas corpus." 114 S.Ct. at 2372.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for harm that would imply an invalid conviction to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Oliver v. San Francisco Police Department Charles Siani Geoffrey Williams and Marty Lalor · filed 1995-05-19

"In order to recover damages under section 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove the conviction has been invalidated." ... Because Oliver's allegations against the defendants necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and because Oliver failed to show that his conviction has been invalidated, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Oliver's complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on misconduct that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Lombard v. Salisbury Police Department · filed 1995-06-14

The holding of Heck v. Humphrey bars the present Section 1983 in Massachusetts Civil Rights claims. The entire focus of the plaintiffs complaint is indeed to “call into question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement.” ... In these circumstances, the Supreme Court has determined that there is no cognizable claim under Section 1983.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is not cognizable while the underlying conviction remains valid.

Goddard v. Larsen · filed 1995-08-04

Goddard's claim of malicious prosecution fails both on the ground of prosecutorial immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and because such a claim is not cognizable where his conviction has not been reversed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Zankich v. Trebesch · filed 1995-08-07

Because Zankich's allegations of inadequate funding for appropriate representation necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction has been overturned, or otherwise invalidated, Zankich has no damages claim at this time.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Williams v. Lange · filed 1995-08-09

As to the first claim, we conclude the district court's dismissal was proper because success on this claim would have implied the invalidity of Williams's conviction, and Williams failed to show his conviction had been reversed, expunged, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Hamilton v. Vance · filed 1995-08-22

Therefore, Hamilton cannot seek damages under § 1983 because he cannot demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for civil rights allegations intertwined with a challenge to confinement when the conviction and sentence have not been invalidated.

Gardner v. Scott · filed 1995-08-22

Assuming arguendo that he did raise civil rights claims below, any such claims are intertwined with the habeas claims and necessarily implicate the legality of his confinement. It is undisputed that neither Gardner's conviction nor sentence has been invalidated. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), Gardner does not have a claim that is cognizable under 42 U.S.C § 1983 at this time.

A § 1983 damages action that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction must be dismissed with prejudice unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Crowley v. Brown · filed 1995-08-25

If the prisoner cannot make such a showing, his § 1983 action should be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the procedures used to deny good conduct time credits when the claim does not call into question the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Norman GOTCHER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1995-10-04

Wolff, like this case, involved a claim for using the wrong procedure, not for reaching the wrong result (i.e., the denial of good time credits). ... Likewise, Goteher’s case does not call into question the lawfulness of his continuing confinement and is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 permits damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment only if the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Alexander v. State of Texas · filed 1995-10-17

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims require favorable termination of the underlying charges; dismissal in the interest of justice does not qualify.

Nowosad v. English · filed 1995-10-17

The Court finds nothing in the amended complaint that would alter its view that the menacing charges, which were dismissed in the interest of justice under New York Crim.Proc.Law § 170.40, do not form the basis for a Section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.

A prisoner challenging the computation of a sentence under § 1983 must show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Roberts v. Woods · filed 1995-10-18

To proceed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). Heck applies to suits challenging the computation of a prisoner's sentence.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment must first show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bussell v. Mary Martins John Atkins Terry Sanders · filed 1995-10-26

In order to state a cognizable claim for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a Sec. 1983 plaintiff must first show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 plaintiff satisfies the Heck favorable-termination requirement when the challenged conviction was reversed on direct appeal.

Fondren v. Klickitat County · filed 1995-11-21

Second, Mr. Fondren’s criminal conviction was reversed on direct appeal, and he has satisfied the Heck requirement even if it applied to him.

Section 1983 claims for damages caused by an allegedly unconstitutional prosecution and conviction are not cognizable until the conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

Joe Bone-Club v. Whatcom Public Defender's Office Lynden Police Dept. · filed 1995-11-24

Because Bone-Club has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court, his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims for damages caused by the allegedly unconstitutional prosecution and conviction are not yet cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Courtney v. Havard · filed 1995-11-28

A judgment in favor of Courtney would imply that his parole revocation and his subsequent confinement are invalid. Courtney asserts that his state habeas corpus application was denied, but he has not alleged that his parole revocation has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, this claim is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would directly implicate the validity of a conviction or sentence until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated on that ground.

Robert Lee Brock, A/K/A Two Souls Walker v. Raymond Robertson, District Attorney for Staunton Circuit Court · filed 1995-11-30

Because Appellant's claim would directly implicate invalidity in Appellant's conviction and sentence, it may not be the subject of a Sec. 1983 claim until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated on that ground.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim related to criminal charges on which the plaintiff stands convicted unless those charges have been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.

Brown v. United States · filed 1995-12-06

Plaintiff stands convicted of the charges placed against him by the individual Louisville police officers, and plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim related to those offenses absent a resolution of the charges in plaintiff's favor.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner challenging a disciplinary conviction whose invalidity is necessary to the claim to have that conviction set aside first, including when the discipline cost good-time credits.

Richmond v. Duke · filed 1995-12-19

So, it seems clear that, in so far as plaintiff is seeking relief under § 1983 for these alleged due process violations, he must first succeed in having his disciplinary conviction set aside, either in a § 2254 proceeding, or in some other appropriate forum.

A § 1983 damages claim that calls a conviction into question is dismissed without prejudice and may be refiled if the conviction is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court.

Haburn v. Brewer · filed 1996-01-02

We agree that, with respect to Appellant's damages claim, the district court properly dismissed that claim. ... Because Appellant may refile his action if his conviction ever is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court or upon the exhaustion of state remedies, we modify the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim that can be read as challenging acts outside the judicial process is not subject to Heck dismissal merely because the plaintiff also has a conviction or sentence.

William J. Evers and Anita E. Evers v. Outagamie County, John R. Schreiter, George H. Schroeder · filed 1996-01-09

Alternatively, if the Evers were challenging "actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," the district court would instead be required to dismiss these two claims under Heck v. Humphrey, given that the Evers did not allege that their convictions or sentences had been invalidated. Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. However, it is clear that one may interpret each cause of action as challenging not sentences, but actions outside the judicial process.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages cause of action for injuries arising from a conviction or confinement that has not been invalidated when recovery would require proving its invalidity.

Horton v. Marovich · filed 1996-01-19

Therefore, because Horton’s conviction and confinement have not been and will not be invalidated in a manner prescribed by Heck, Horton has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3).

Section 1983 damages claims that would invalidate a parole revocation or the imposition of a suspended sentence require that the revocation or sentence first be invalidated.

Nelson v. State of MS · filed 1996-01-22

Claims alleging "harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" cannot be brought under § 1983 unless that "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." ... This rule clearly applies to the imposition of a suspended sentence, and we have held that it also applies to the revocation of parole.

A Section 1983 claim falls under Heck only if a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid.

Hamilton v. Lyons · filed 1996-02-07

A § 1983 claim falls under the rule in Heck only when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a subsequent conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages for claims concerning an arrest and prosecution until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor or are reversed.

Cole v. Mark Matthews Jim Fracks Lindsay Stewart Gentry E. McCauley Bourbon County Prosecuting Attorney Jim · filed 1996-03-12

To the extent Cole seeks monetary damages, her complaints regarding her arrest and prosecution are simply not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until such time as she can demonstrate that the criminal proceedings terminated in her favor or were reversed.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action challenging the loss of good-time credits until the disciplinary deprivation has been invalidated by the state or through habeas corpus.

Jones v. William Dobie, Officer Peterson and W.M. Lockhart · filed 1996-03-12

Jones challenges the validity of his confinement for the additional 360 days of lost good-time credit. A judgment in favor of Jones would necessarily imply the invalidity of his imprisonment. It follows that Jones has no cause of action under § 1983 until he first proves that the alleged deprivation has been invalidated by the state or by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 requires dismissal of a claim that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless that conviction has first been invalidated.

Cordova v. City of Reno · filed 1996-03-15

Therefore Heck applies: Because Cordova’s conviction has not yet been invalidated, this court must dismiss Cordova’s Section 1983 claim.

Heck does not bar a § 1983 suit challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding that a state court has expunged from the prisoner’s record.

Vances H. Smith v. Gary R. McCaughtry Lynn Oestreich, and Patricia Garro, Vances H. Smith v. Gary R. McCaughtry and Lynn · filed 1996-03-19

Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), has no affect on this § 1983 suit because a Wisconsin state court has expunged the proceeding from Smith's record.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary result lengthening a sentence do not accrue until the disciplinary result is invalidated by a state tribunal or federal habeas court.

Sheldon v. Thomas E. Hundley Grabowski, Sued as Major Grabowski Charles Harper · filed 1996-06-14

Thus, Sheldon cannot bring any § 1983 claims that challenge the disciplinary result before the state or a federal habeas court invalidates the disciplinary ruling.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process claim that directly challenges the validity of a prison disciplinary proceeding without a showing that the proceeding has been invalidated.

Holland v. Indiana Department of Corrections, John Barnes, and Lori Ditmer · filed 1996-08-12

Holland's due process claims are not cognizable under § 1983 and thus were properly dismissed. ... Holland has made no such showing and therefore, because his due process claim reflects directly on the validity of the disciplinary proceeding, his complaint fails to state a cause of action.

A § 1983 damages claim that would invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Brown v. Angelone · filed 1996-08-13

Inasmuch as plaintiff offers no evidence that a court or other appropriate authority has determined that his disciplinary conviction and sentence were wrongfully entered against him, any § 1983 cause of action for damages which he may have against individual(s) responsible for the deprivation has not yet accrued.

A prisoner seeking § 1983 damages for wrongful imprisonment based on an allegedly invalid conviction must allege that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated before the claim is cognizable.

Citizen v. The State of Texas · filed 1996-08-23

Citizen does not suggest that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; thus, he has failed to allege a claim cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief for actions that led to continued civil confinement fail when the confinement has not been invalidated.

Young v. Irwin S. Dreiblatt, Individually and in His Official Capacity Savio Chan · filed 1996-09-13

Accordingly, insofar as Young sought compensatory, declaratory and injunctive relief against the psychiatrists for their allegedly retaliatory actions in recommending his continued civil confinement under the Act in a section 1983 action, and failed to show that his civil confinement had been invalidated, the district court did not err by concluding that Young had failed to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a parole revocation unless the revocation has been declared invalid by a state tribunal or in federal habeas corpus.

Corsetti v. McGinnis · filed 1996-09-24

In addition, we note that plaintiff's claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because plaintiff's parole revocation has not been declared invalid by a state tribunal or in federal habeas corpus.

A prisoner challenging a parole revocation under § 1983 must obtain a favorable result; merely filing a habeas petition does not satisfy that requirement.

Killian v. City of Riverview · filed 1996-10-09

Also, Killian's previous habeas petition is immaterial as Heck does not simply require an inmate to bring a habeas petition before bringing a § 1983 action, but also requires the inmate to prevail.

Section 1983 cannot support a claim that would invalidate a prisoner’s continuing confinement unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Edgar Johnson, Jr. v. Johnston · filed 1996-10-09

Last, Johnson cannot establish a viable cause of action under § 1983 because a favorable ruling on his claim would render his continuing confinement invalid, and his conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Masters v. City of Bellflower Michael J. Eagan Steven King, John & Jane Does 1 Through 10 · filed 1996-10-09

If a judgment in favor of plaintiff on his civil rights damages claims will necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose favorable resolution would necessarily invalidate continuing confinement unless the basis for that confinement has already been invalidated.

Mays v. Don Sundquist, Governor Ned Ray McWherter Former Governor Lamar Alexander, Former Governor · filed 1996-11-25

Even if Mays's allegations were specific enough to support a § 1983 claim, this case must be dismissed, because a favorable ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, and the reason for his confinement has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A § 1983 false arrest claim based on a warrantless arrest without probable cause is ripe upon arrest and need not await a prosecution or its favorable termination when it does not challenge judicial proceedings.

Weyant v. Okst · filed 1996-12-03

In sum, the ruling in Roesch is no impediment to our conclusion here that a person who asserts that he has been arrested without a warrant and without probable cause--a claim that does not seek to cast doubt upon judicial proceedings and is ripe upon arrest--need not insist that a prosecution be brought against him in order that he be allowed to pursue a claim for false arrest.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily call into question the loss of good-time credits until that disciplinary loss has been set aside.

Dixon v. Chrans · filed 1996-12-09

Until he does, a federal court cannot properly adjudicate his § 1983 claim because to do so would call into question the loss of good time and would necessarily implicate the length of his sentence, despite the fact that in his § 1983 case he seeks damages only.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim within Heck’s rule until the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been invalidated through appeal, executive order, an authorized state tribunal, or federal habeas relief.

Johnson v. Wayne F. McElveen Sheriff, in His Official Capacity · filed 1996-12-12

When a claim comes within the parameters of the Heck teachings, it is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until the plaintiff can show that the conviction “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

A § 1983 claim seeking restoration of prison good time credits is subject to Heck’s favorable termination requirement, and dismissal on that ground is without prejudice.

Sheppard v. Hicks · filed 1996-12-17

Because Sheppard has requested restoration of good time credits, Heck applies. See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996) (if success on merits of § 1983 claim would imply invalidity of disciplinary result lengthening plaintiff's time spent in prison, Heck requires favorable termination of action in authorized state tribunal or federal habeas court). Consequently, dismissal should be without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a parole revocation unless the revocation has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

MacNab v. Oregon Bd. of Parole · filed 1996-12-19

Macnab's allegations that the Oregon Board of Parole imposed unconstitutional conditions of parole, that a parole officer and her supervisor conspired to revoke his parole, and that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned by the Oregon Board of Parole, necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement resulting from the parole-revocation proceedings. Therefore, because Macnab has not alleged that his parole revocation has been overturned, or otherwise invalidated, the district court properly dismissed his claims concerning parole revocation as not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim attacking a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

McCartney v. Doe · filed 1997-01-07

Because McCartney’s conviction has not been invalidated, his claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

McCartney v. Terral · filed 1997-01-07

Because McCartney’s conviction has not been invalidated, his claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims that challenge the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail Administrator Mitchell Paige Melissa Day Mike Hill · filed 1997-01-27

To establish that he is entitled to compensation for this injury, plaintiff necessarily must show that the convictions and incarceration are unlawful, based on the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel and the use of coerced confessions and a coerced plea. This is exactly the situation addressed by Heck, in which the Court held that such claims are not cognizable unless the underlying convictions have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 damages claims that would undermine a prison disciplinary finding do not accrue until that finding has been invalidated.

Lewis v. Richards · filed 1997-02-24

For this reason, no claim for damages under § 1983 can accrue until such time as the result of the disciplinary hearing has been invalidated.

The favorable termination requirement for § 1983 claims does not bar a claim for delayed appeal and appellate counsel when success need not undermine the conviction.

Johnson v. Kegans,et al · filed 1997-02-27

It is now beyond debate that § 1983 claims by prisoner-plaintiffs that challenge the validity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been reversed, expunged, invalidated or impugned by a writ of habeas corpus. ... Johnson’s complaint, broadly construed, does not require him to negate any element of the offense of possession of cocaine to support at least nominal damages.

A § 1983 claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction does not arise until the conviction is vacated or otherwise rendered invalid.

Diaz v. Daniel R. McBride 1 · filed 1997-02-27

In any event, a § 1983 claim would not arise until the conviction is vacated or otherwise rendered invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a civil rights claim challenging a disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been vacated or otherwise found invalid.

Euell v. Adams · filed 1997-02-27

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364-70 (1994), Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.1996), and Miller v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 75 F.3d 330 (7th Cir.1996), 2 plaintiff is precluded from bringing a civil rights claim as long as the disciplinary conviction has not been vacated or otherwise found invalid.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated; an unripe claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Brown v. Saunders · filed 1997-03-10

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a prisoner must prove that the conviction or sentence was: (1) reversed on direct appeal; (2) expunged by executive order; (3) declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination; or (4) called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. See Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4597 (U.S. June 24, 1994) (No. 93-6188). Because Appellant has failed to make such a showing, his claim is not ripe and must be dismissed without prejudice.

A § 1983 damages claim arising from prison discipline that deprived an inmate of good-time credits cannot succeed unless the inmate first obtains relief from the disciplinary decision through a collateral attack.

Post v. Gilmore · filed 1997-04-17

So Post’s § 1983 suit cannot succeed unless he first prevails on the very claim the court has dismissed. It is the § 2254 case that must proceed, the § 1983 ease that must wait.

Section 1983 requires prior relief from an underlying conviction in state court or federal habeas corpus before a plaintiff can bring related false arrest and illegal detention claims.

Young v. e.d.knight · filed 1997-06-05

We agree with the district court that petitioner's claims related to false arrest and illegal detention cannot be brought without a prior grant of relief from the underlying conviction either by a state court or in federal habeas corpus.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging the length of confinement are subject to Heck’s favorable termination requirement even when brought by former prisoners.

Rooding v. Peters · filed 1997-07-03

Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the all of the proposed class members are ex-prisoners, Heck still applies to their § 1983 claims. Because the class members, excluding plaintiff, did not initiate and prevail in a state mandamus or habeas action while they were imprisoned at an IDOC facility, their § 1983 claims in the instant case are barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the loss of good time unless that loss has been invalidated through appeal, executive order, state tribunal decision, or federal habeas relief.

Luedtke v. Gudmanson · filed 1997-07-22

The plaintiff must prove that the loss of good time was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before the plaintiff can bring a § 1983 claim.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a disciplinary finding of guilt is barred until that finding has been invalidated.

Stone-Bey v. Barnes · filed 1997-07-22

The “conviction” in the prison disciplinary sense is the finding of guilt on the disciplinary charge, and if success on the plaintiffs section 1983 claim necessarily would imply the invalidity of that finding, then Heck bars the claim until such time as its requirements are satisfied.

A § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implicates the validity of a parole denial and continuing confinement does not accrue until the conviction or sentence is invalidated.

Butterfield v. Bail · filed 1997-07-25

Because Butterfield’s § 1983 claim necessarily implicates the validity of his continuing confinement, it does not accrue unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of writ of habeas corpus.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 claim challenging disciplinary hearing procedures when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a punishment that has not been invalidated.

Wright v. Miller · filed 1997-08-22

Accordingly, any claims based on plaintiffs’ rehearings (and thus all claims against defendant DeBartolo) are barred by Edwards, as those determinations were never invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would call a criminal conviction into question require the plaintiff first to show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Sadlier v. Payne · filed 1997-08-26

Further, because plaintiffs claims for damages are based on several purported constitutional violations that occurred in relation to his underlying state criminal convictions claims that would effectively call into question the lawfulness of his convictions the plaintiff must first show that his convictions or sentences has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Cousin v. Allen · filed 1997-09-03

Because the plaintiffs' claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of their sentences or convictions, and they have not shown that their sentences or convictions have been invalidated, the district court did not err by dismissing the plaintiffs' section 1983 action without prejudice.

A Missouri gubernatorial pardon does not invalidate a conviction for purposes of a § 1983 wrongful-conviction claim under Heck.

Wilson v. Lawrence County, Mo. · filed 1997-09-16

Instead, Wilson chose to apply for a pardon, which is not an appropriate proceeding to invalidate his conviction for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages regarding state criminal proceedings until the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Lewis v. Conston · filed 1997-10-28

Lewis has no cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding his state criminal proceedings until he can show that his conviction has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 plaintiff whose claim would demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction must show that the conviction has been invalidated.

McCurdy v. Sheriff of Madison County · filed 1997-11-03

A convicted criminal who brings a civil rights suit that if successful would demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction must show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or disciplinary loss of good-time credits unless those rulings have been invalidated.

Scott v. Lassen County Sheriff Department, Lassen County District Attorney, and Marvin Benner Karen Dieter D · filed 1997-11-06

Accordingly, Scott's claims are not cognizable under section 1983 unless and until he shows his conviction and disciplinary sanction have been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction must be dismissed without prejudice unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Porm v. Howard A. Peters, Iii, William O'sullivan, Daniel Perry, Cassandra Wright, Steve Ruiz, David Brubaker, · filed 1997-12-16

We do not consider the merits of these claims because the district court should have dismissed them under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). "[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated" Id. at 487. This rule applies to judgments in disciplinary proceedings. ... Therefore, under Heck, Porm's claims should have been dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction fail unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated or impugned.

Anderson v. Stanley · filed 1997-12-18

Because Anderson's claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Anderson did not allege in his complaint that his conviction had been reversed, expunged, invalidated or impugned, the district court did not err by dismissing Anderson's claims as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Simmons v. Debruyn · filed 1998-01-06

Simmons's damages claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because his argument that he failed to receive an impartial decisionmaker, necessarily implies the invalidity of his convictions.

Section 1983 claims challenging a parole revocation cannot proceed unless the revocation has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside.

Martin v. Martin · filed 1998-01-27

The district court did not err in dismissing Martin’s § 1983 claims pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995), because Martin has not demonstrated that the revocation of his parole has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit relief for lost good-time credits until another forum has found their removal invalid.

Brown v. Smith · filed 1998-02-04

Specifically, the relief sought by plaintiff is not available through a § 1983 suit until plaintiff has first obtained a finding in another forum that the removal of good time was invalid.

A § 1983 due process claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction is not actionable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Arroyo v. Rodriguez · filed 1998-03-03

Arroyo’s due process claim is not actionable because the conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by the executive, invalidated by other state means, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas writ.

Section 1983 does not permit a parole claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

Robinson v. California Board of Prison Terms · filed 1998-03-18

Thus, the plaintiffs claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” and they are hot cognizable under Section 1983 until such time as the plaintiff can prove that his convictions have been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary finding cannot proceed unless that finding has already been invalidated.

LeMay v. Dubois · filed 1998-03-23

If a judgment in a §1983 action necessarily would imply the invalidity of the disposition rendered by a prison disciplinary board, such a suit cannot be maintained if the underlying disciplinary board finding has not already been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim challenging a parole revocation when the parole board has terminated the revocation process and released the parolee.

Friedland v. Fauver · filed 1998-03-31

The precondition for a § 1983 damage action mandated by Heck, i.e., the invalidation of the decision to revoke Friedland’s parole, was satisfied when the Parole Board terminated the revocation process and released Fried-larid in August 1996.

A § 1983 damages claim that would invalidate the length of a prisoner’s sentence cannot proceed unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Ross v. Keelings · filed 1998-04-27

Thus, under the instruction of Heck, in order for the Court to consider this claim under § 1983 Ross’ sentence must have been invalidated. Since it has not, this claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a parole revocation are barred under Heck unless the revocation has been determined invalid.

McCone v. Wyoming Attorney Gen · filed 1998-05-08

The district court was correct in determining that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars the present action absent a determination that the parole revocation was invalid.

A prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim challenging the loss of good-time credits is not cognizable while the disciplinary finding remains uninvalidated.

Lopez v. Thompson, et.al. · filed 1998-05-12

Contrary to Mr. Lopez' assertion, the findings in his disciplinary hearing have never been "invalidated" by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, his claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is premature until the conviction is reversed or set aside.

Waters v. Brown · filed 1998-05-12

The court concludes that a finding in .favor of Mr. Waters in this action would inevitably imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and, therefore, the doctrine enunciated in Heck v. Humphrey applies to his case. Accordingly, this ease must be dismissed as premature, with leave to Mr. Waters to refile it if he is able to get his conviction reversed or set aside.

A prisoner whose procedural challenge would necessarily imply that disciplinary punishment was invalid must allege that the punishment was invalidated to maintain a § 1983 action.

Spellmon v. Collins · filed 1998-06-18

Thus, to maintain this section 1983 action, Spellmon had to allege that his punishment has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been independently invalidated.

Moore v. Mitchell Novak, Correctional Officer Craig Schmidt, Correctional Officer · filed 1998-07-01

We agree with the district court that, because Moore did not prove that his state conviction had been independently invalidated, his § 1983 claim for damages is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 484-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

Section 1983 bars a false-imprisonment claim challenging a sentence until that sentence has been invalidated.

Rumph v. City/Killeen Police · filed 1998-08-10

Even if this allegation were true, Rumph may not bring such an action until this sentence for trespassing ... has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction may proceed when a governor's pardon has invalidated that conviction.

Wilson v. Lawrence County · filed 1998-08-17

A claim is not cognizable under section 1983 where a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply invalidity of the plaintiff's state conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... We find that, by virtue of the pardon he received from Missouri's governor, Wilson's conviction was invalidated and "expunged by executive order" within the meaning of Heck.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of prison disciplinary sanctions does not accrue until those sanctions are invalidated.

Becton v. Walker · filed 1998-08-28

Thus, we conclude that a judgment in favor of Becton would necessarily imply the invalidity of the sanctions imposed on him as a consequence of his disciplinary hearing. It follows that his cause of action for damages has not accrued.

Section 1983 bars a damages action challenging a parole revocation unless the revocation has been determined invalid.

McCone v. Wyoming Attorney General Judie L. Chitwood Judy Uphoof · filed 1998-11-04

The district court was correct in determining that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), bars the present action absent a determination that the parole revocation was invalid.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Patrick v. Laskaris · filed 1998-11-19

A plaintiffs claim for money damages on grounds that his state court conviction is unconstitutional, or on the basis that a person acting under color of state law engaged in actions the unlawfulness of which renders his conviction invalid, does not become cognizable as a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until the conviction has been reversed on appeal or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings that alter a release date require a showing that those proceedings have been invalidated.

Wafer v. Johnson · filed 1998-12-09

Because Wafer has not shown that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in the alteration of his mandatory release date have been invalidated, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Wafer’s claims for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a released prisoner to pursue a claim challenging a disciplinary decision affecting good time credits without first showing a favorable termination of that decision.

White v. Phillips · filed 1998-12-28

Heck’s favorable outcome requirement, then, should not render White’s claims frivolous merely because he has been released from prison.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for harm that would render a conviction or sentence invalid must show that it has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Hall v. McDermond · filed 1999-01-27

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Hall did not allege the disciplinary case against him had been reversed, expunged, or called into question. Therefore, his claims were properly dismissed as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for lost work-time credits when success would imply the invalidity of his sentence unless the credit deduction has first been invalidated.

Barela v. Variz · filed 1999-02-19

Under both Heck v. Humphrey and Edwards v. Balisok, either claim challenges the validity of Plaintiffs sentence. At this point, Plaintiff has not obtained a finding that the “deduction” of his work-time credits was reversed by direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim attacking the validity of parole proceedings unless the sentence has first been invalidated.

English v. Bozarth · filed 1999-06-16

English’s suit is not cognizable under § 1983. ... The holding in Heck has also been applied to claims attacking the validity of the parole proceedings. ... English has neither alleged nor proven that his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has first been invalidated.

Barnett v. USSS · filed 1999-06-22

Under Heck, a § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” until he has shown that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary sanction that affects only conditions of confinement without first obtaining a favorable termination of the disciplinary finding.

Shabazz v. Cole · filed 1999-06-25

Inasmuch as the disciplinary sanction only affected the conditions of Shabazz’ confinement, Shabazz has a cognizable section 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 damages claims arising from an alleged ex post facto violation leading to parole revocation are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Tanner v. Rodriguez · filed 1999-06-22

To the extent that Tanner seeks monetary damages for an alleged ex post facto violation leading to the revocation of his parole, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule when the plaintiff is not in custody.

Haddad v. State of Cal. · filed 1999-08-24

The Court will adhere to the reasoning in Justice Souter’s Spencer concurrence that a section 1983 claim is not barred under the rule of Heck unless the section 1983 plaintiff is in custody.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction when success would imply its invalidity and the conviction has not been invalidated.

Ferguson v. MS Dept of Corr · filed 1999-08-27

Ferguson’s claim that he was denied due process during the disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his “conviction” in the disciplinary proceeding, and because Ferguson has not had his “conviction” reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid, his claim of a denial of due process at the disciplinary proceeding is not yet cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages challenging a conviction or sentence without showing it was reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or questioned by a habeas corpus writ.

Knupp v. Hendrickson · filed 1999-09-27

... (3) Mr. Knupp may not recover damages here without proving his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or questioned by a habeas corpus writ, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid must first show that it has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Grady v. State Of Colorado · filed 1999-10-15

The district court correctly concluded that under Heck v. Humphrey, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a ... state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that necessarily implies a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Eppinger v. Patterson · filed 1999-10-21

Eppinger’s allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Eppinger’s claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 because he has not shown that his conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner whose damages claim would undermine a conviction or sentence to show that it has first been invalidated.

Dolney v. Lahammer · filed 1999-11-08

Thus, to comply with the Heck rule, a prisoner, as a condition precedent to maintaining his § 1983 action, must establish that his conviction or sentence has been overturned or invalidated by an administrative board, or by a state or federal court in a habeas proceeding.

A prisoner cannot maintain a § 1983 claim that would necessarily invalidate continuing confinement unless the basis for that confinement has been invalidated.

Helton v. Vermillion, Unpublished Decision (12-10-1999) · filed 1999-12-10

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a write of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 .

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for an allegedly invalid parole revocation to show that the resulting sentence has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

Lutz v. Carlson · filed 1999-12-16

Because an action attacking the validity of a parole proceeding calls into question the fact and duration of confinement, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that a sentence imposed as a result of revocation proceedings has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment must first show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Jones v. State of Texas · filed 1999-12-16

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for harms caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit relief for prison disciplinary procedures that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been overturned.

Franklin v. Sulewski · filed 2000-01-07

Therefore, he may not seek damages, declaratory, or injunctive relief based on the procedures used in the disciplinary hearing in a § 1983 action because such relief, if granted, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Szymanski v. Bufalino · filed 2000-05-17

Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that a judgment in favor of Szymanski on his civil claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his Michigan state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. We further agree that Szymanski has failed to demonstrate that his Michigan state conviction has been invalidated. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Szymanski’s claims without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prison disciplinary due process claim affecting good-time credits unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Villarreal v. Beesler · filed 2000-07-21

Villarreal’s due process claims about his disciplinary hearing are not grounds for § 1983 relief inasmuch as he has not shown that the revocation of his good-time credits has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a prison disciplinary ruling that lengthens confinement until a state or federal habeas court has invalidated the ruling.

Early v. Blankenship · filed 2000-07-21

Thus Early cannot bring a § 1983 action challenging the results of the disciplinary proceeding until a state or a federal habeas court has invalidated the disciplinary ruling.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for prison discipline when success would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that has not been invalidated.

Stone v. Norris · filed 2000-08-10

As to Stone’s request for damages for the punishment imposed following the allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary proceedings, we agree with the district court that such a claim is foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (to recover damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for harm from actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid, § 1983 plaintiff must prove conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question), because judgment for Stone on his claim that the disciplinary hearing officer was biased would imply the invalidity of his disciplinary “conviction.” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-48 (1997) (extending Heck v. Humphrey to prison discipline decisions).

Section 1983 claims by plaintiffs no longer in custody are not barred by Heck’s favorable-termination requirement.

Guerrero v. Gates · filed 2000-08-29

The Court finds, however, that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar the § 1983 claims of a plaintiff who is no longer in custody.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for imprisonment that would render a conviction or sentence invalid must satisfy Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Randell v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-26

Because Randell is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim founded solely on an allegation that a corrections officer falsified a misconduct report is barred by Heck when success would invalidate the disciplinary judgment.

Huey v. Daniel Stine, Correctional Officer, Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility · filed 2000-10-11

We think the rule that can be taken from these cases is that Heck generally does not bar Eighth Amendment claims, but if the claim is founded solely on an allegation that a corrections officer falsified a misconduct report, then Heck applies.

A § 1983 damages claim that would call a conviction into question does not arise until the conviction has been overturned or otherwise called into question.

Mejia v. Herndon · filed 2001-02-13

To the extent that Mejia seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his alleged unconstitutional conviction, his civil rights claim has yet to arise, until he demonstrates that his conviction has been overturned or called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging parole revocation unless the revocation decision has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Mitchell v. Bowman · filed 2001-02-16

Because Mitchell has not shown that the parole revocation decision has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Mitchell’s claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 damages for the loss of earned-time credits require prior invalidation of the revocation.

Williams v. Neet · filed 2001-02-21

Before Williams can seek damages for the alleged unconstitutional deprivation of earned-time credits, he must first establish that the revocation has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

Section 1983 claims challenging parole denials are barred under Heck unless the denials have subsequently been declared invalid.

Rodriguez v. Greenfield · filed 2001-03-23

We affirm the district court’s dismissal Rodriguez’s claims concerning the 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996 parole denials because, as required by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), Rodriguez has not shown that these parole denials have subsequently been declared invalid.

A § 1983 complaint is not barred by Heck when the plaintiff’s conviction has been reversed.

McKinney v. City of Inglewood Police Department · filed 2001-03-28

Because McKinney submitted the California Court of Appeal’s order reversing McKinney’s conviction, the district court should not have concluded that the complaint was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-97, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary case unless that case has been overturned.

Cannon v. Lewis · filed 2001-04-10

Because Cannon has not shown that the disciplinary case has been overturned, he cannot maintain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the defendants for damages.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim challenging a prison classification affecting good time credits when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of continued confinement and the classification has not been set aside.

Diaz v. Terhune · filed 2001-04-26

If he is successful here, the validity of his continued confinement would necessarily be implicated. The Court concludes that the Heck doctrine applies to bar claims such as this.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question.

Woods v. Ohio · filed 2001-05-01

His claim is a direct attack on the methods used to convict him, and a successful civil rights claim based on these allegations would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Because Woods has not shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question, his complaint is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for parole revocation incarceration when the claim would imply that the revocation was invalid and the revocation has not been overturned.

Dallas v. Goldberg · filed 2001-05-07

Even if Plaintiff had pled a cause of action sufficient in focus and scope to form an appropriate legal basis for his claim of damages for the period of his incarceration on the parole violation, Heck v. Humphrey would preclude the assertion of that cause of action in this section 1983 case because the parole revocation decision was never overturned.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim based on imprisonment unless the underlying conviction, sentence, or probation revocation has been invalidated.

O'Bryant v. Taylor · filed 2001-06-13

As O’Bryant has not ... shown that either his conviction, his sentence, or his probation revocation has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, the district court properly dismissed his complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87.

Section 1983 relief for an allegedly illegal search and detention on a criminal charge is unavailable until that charge has been invalidated.

Barrios v. Johnny's Sport Shop · filed 2001-06-14

The district court correctly determined that Barrios could not seek 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief for an allegedly illegal search and detention on the felon-in-possession charge until that charge had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging a criminal sentence that has not been reversed on direct appeal.

Fisher v. Foust · filed 2001-06-20

Fisher is challenging the sentence imposed by the defendant in his criminal trial, but that sentence has not been reversed on direct appeal, and his claim is therefore not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a due process claim that would invalidate a disciplinary sentence affecting confinement unless the disciplinary case has been overturned.

Williams v. Cook · filed 2001-07-03

Because Williams has not shown that the disciplinary case has been overturned, he cannot maintain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the defendants for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of good-time credits unless the underlying disciplinary conviction has previously been invalidated.

Parker v. James · filed 2001-07-19

Parker may not bring a claim under § 1983 that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his good-time credits unless he first shows that the disciplinary conviction has previously been invalidated.

A section 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence must show that it has been reversed or otherwise set aside.

Haulman v. Jefferson County Sheriff Office · filed 2001-07-27

Under Heck, in order to recover damages for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or sentence, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine the validity of confinement until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Miller v. Ghee · filed 2001-08-09

Further, Miller’s claim for damages was not cognizable under § 1983 insofar as a ruling on this claim would affect the validity of his confinement, until Miller shows that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to have a disciplinary proceeding invalidated before suing when the claims do not challenge the conviction or length of incarceration.

Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2001-08-17

The prisoner did not need to show that the disciplinary proceeding had been expunged or invalidated before bringing an action under § 1983 because his claims did not challenge the validity of his conviction for murder or the length of his incarceration.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

McCone v. Wyoming Attorney General · filed 2001-08-14

The district court therefore dismissed the complaint because Mr. McCone did not show “that his conviction or sentence has either been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order or declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus as required by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).” ... Having done so, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, ... and further find that Mr. McCone’s appeal is frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages on a claim that questions the validity of a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Jordan v. Sanders · filed 2001-08-23

A prisoner may not recover damages for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that question the validity of a conviction because such claims are not cognizable until the prisoner has demonstrated that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a damages challenge related to parole revocation when the revocation might have rested on independent lawful grounds, so success on the claim would not necessarily undermine it.

Jones v. Puckett · filed 2001-08-28

Lying about any aspect of supervision supplies an adequate ground for revocation, whether the subject of the lie is a legal or illegal condition. Therefore, I conclude that Heck does not bar plaintiffs challenge.

Section 1983 damages for an alleged officer assault are barred when the related disciplinary conviction affected good-time credits and has not been overturned.

Null v. Sanders · filed 2001-08-31

Consequently, before he could obtain money damages for the alleged assault by Officers Rojas and Valenzuela, Null would have to show that the result of the disciplinary hearing, in which he was charged with striking an officer, had been overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been successfully challenged.

Wappler v. Carniak · filed 2001-10-30

Thus, a successful ruling on his claim would imply the invalidity of both his guilty plea and his sentence in the later case. Because Wappler did not allege or show that he had successfully challenged either conviction on direct appeal, collateral attack, or any other means, he has no § 1983 action.

A § 1983 action that collaterally attacks prison disciplinary convictions is barred unless those convictions have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question.

Williams v. Kinnear · filed 2001-10-30

Williams’s civil rights action is barred because he is attempting to collaterally attack his disciplinary convictions without showing that the charges have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 damages claims that challenge the validity of a conviction or incarceration require a prior favorable decision in state court or federal habeas proceedings.

Anderson v. Bruce · filed 2001-11-01

To bring a damages claim that directly or impliedly challenges the validity of conviction or incarceration under section 1983, a claimant must have first obtained a favorable decision in state court or in federal habeas proceedings on the conviction or incarceration issue he seeks to challenge.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction was previously invalidated.

Rivers v. King · filed 2001-11-21

First, the court found that a judgment in plaintiff’s favor under § 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Because plaintiff failed to show that his conviction was invalidated prior to the filing of his § 1983 claims, the district court dismissed the claims against the detective, the sheriff, and the probation office employees without prejudice. ... Applying these standards, we agree with the district court’s analysis.

Section 1983 claims that question the validity of a conviction or sentence are barred unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Ayala v. Holmes · filed 2002-01-29

We also agree with the district court that Ayala’s claims, to the extent they question the validity of his 1996 Colorado conviction and sentence, are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486- 87 (1994).

A § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim is barred by Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Davis v. Schifone · filed 2002-02-06

Plaintiffs wrongful arrest claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for operating under the influence. ... Plaintiffs wrongful arrest claim is therefore barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Evans v. Nassau County · filed 2002-02-13

A money judgment in Evans’ favor on his Section 1983 false arrest and ineffective assistance of counsel claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the his criminal conviction and sentence. Evans conviction and sentence have not been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. Accordingly, to the extent that it is possible to raise a Section 1983 ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that cause, as well as Evans’ Section 1983 false arrest claim are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383.