42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an official in his official capacity to allege an official policy that caused the deprivation.

Stone-El v. Fairman · filed 1994-09-28

For Fairman to be liable in his official capacity, Stone-El must allege the existence of an official policy which resulted in the deprivation alleged.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Singer v. State of Maine · filed 1994-10-04

The State of Maine and the individual Defendants, sued in their official capacities, are immune from Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Westmoreland v. Brown · filed 1995-03-21

The state cannot be liable because state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity damages claim against local officials to link the alleged deprivation of a federal right to a governmental policy or custom.

Askew v. Fairman · filed 1995-03-22

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action taken under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability for a county official is another way of imposing liability on the county and does not support additional damages against the official.

Winters v. Mowery · filed 1995-04-19

We note initially that our holding today does not assess additional damages against Mowery, since Mowery’s liability in her official capacity is merely another way of naming the responsible entity’s (Marion County) liability.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require a deprivation of a federal right linked to the government entity’s policy or custom.

Ware v. Fairman · filed 1995-04-24

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action taken under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against a local government to link the alleged deprivation of a federal right to the entity’s policy or custom.

Summers v. Sheahan · filed 1995-04-25

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action alleged to be under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits liability for unequal prison opportunities caused by a corrections department policy decision.

Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-08-14

The Court holds that the Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) for not providing equal opportunities in the areas of recreation, work details and work training at the Annex because this inequality results from the implementation of a policy decision of the Department of Corrections to provide unequal opportunity in these areas.

Section 1983 excludes states and state officials sued in their official capacities as defendants in damages actions.

Abordo v. State of Hawaii · filed 1995-08-25

The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excludes States as parties defendant in § 1983 actions. Moreover, because an official-capacity suit is simply another way of pleading an action against a legal entity of which the officer is an agent, and is thus treated as a suit against the entity, Defendants in their official capacities are also excluded from actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against local government officers to allege that a government policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation.

Stone-El v. Sheahan · filed 1995-09-20

Indeed, Stone-El’s complaint does not at all mention any policy, custom, or practice of any government entity. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a § 1983 cause of action against the defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability requires evidence of a policy or custom behind the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Pyka v. Village of Orland Park · filed 1995-11-08

The plaintiffs have not offered any evidence of a policy or custom behind the alleged deprivations of Pyka’s constitutional rights. The defendants are therefore entitled to immunity in their official capacity on all counts.

Section 1983 requires officials sued in their official capacities to be at fault for the alleged wrongdoing.

Lucero v. Hensley · filed 1996-03-18

Even in their official capacities, however, defendants must somehow be at fault to be liable under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity is nonfrivolous when the existence and use of unconstitutional jail facilities suggest a prison custom or policy.

McCormick v. West · filed 1996-04-18

Moreover, the existence and use of such facilities clearly suggest a custom or policy of the prison implicating the sheriff in his official capacity. As such, McCormick has stated a nonfrivolous claim that must be remanded for further development.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state or its employees acting in their official capacity.

Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Board · filed 1996-07-10

We nevertheless believe that summary judgment was properly granted on this claim because neither a state nor its employees acting in their official capacity may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires direct participation by a state agency, such as through a policy, for the agency to be liable for a constitutional violation.

Salas v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2006-04-25

Section 1983’s “personal participation” requirement extends to state agencies. Unless an agency can be shown to have participated directly in the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights, through the promulgation of a policy, or in some other formal fashion, the agency is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a state liable for its employee’s conduct under respondeat superior.

State v. Hall · filed 1980-09-24

Nor can states be sued under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute, and it does not authorize recovery against the state under respondeat superior principles.

Carlson v. State · filed 2011-09-08

The State is not a “person” amenable to suit within the meaning of section 1983 (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 [1989]), and recovery against the State under respondeat superior principles is not authorized under that statute (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 691-694 [1978] [municipality not vicariously liable as employer for section 1983 violation by employees]).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state.

Robison v. Touchette · filed 2021-01-06

The State is not subject to damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An involuntarily committed patient challenging forced antipsychotic medication under Section 1983 must show that treating professionals failed actually to exercise professional judgment.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Stuart Silvers, Dr. Dr. Blomberg Leo Brown · filed 1988-01-12

Johnson has failed to demonstrate that the defendants did not exercise professional judgment in fact when they required that Johnson take antipsychotic medication over Johnson's objections.

Forcing an involuntarily-committed mental patient to take antipsychotic drugs against his will, by a defendant acting under color of state law and without exercising professional judgment, establishes a deprivation of liberty actionable under Section 1983.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Silvers · filed 1984-08-28

If it is determined in those proceedings that a properly identified defendant, acting under color of state law, has effectively caused Johnson to take anti-psychotic drugs against Johnson’s will, this will establish a deprivation of liberty within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation has standing to assert First and Fourteenth Amendment violations through § 1983.

Advocates for the Arts v. Meldrim Thomson, Jr., Etc. · filed 1976-03-31

That Granite Publications is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Since we thus find a justiciable controversy between Granite Publications and the defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we find it unnecessary to consider either whether there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with its “amount in controversy” requirement, or whether any of the other plaintiffs besides the publisher have standing.

Section 1983 claims must be adjudicated by a court or magistrate, not by a special master or monitors.

William Johnson, Jr. v. Dan v. McKaskle Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1984-03-23

In accordance with our prior mandate, any adjudication of § 1983 claims must be by the court or magistrate and not by the special master or monitors.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law under color of state law.

Medical Society of New Jersey v. Mottola · filed 2004-06-08

Plaintiff may only maintain a Section 1983 action where the rights sought to be vindicated are unambiguously conferred.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to state a claim, and a parent or guardian cannot bring a minor child's action without a lawyer.

Peters v. Guajome Park Academy Charter School · filed 2008-08-07

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice the § 1983 claims that Peters attempted to bring on behalf of her son. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1997) (“[A] parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.”).

Section 1983 does not allow a family member to bring a claim for a relative's civil-rights violation.

Rios v. Castillo · filed 2007-08-28

While true that a family member cannot raise claims under section 1983 for the violation of a relative’s civil rights, see Garcia v. Royal Bank of Canada, 178 F.Supp.2d 74, 76 (D.P.R.2001), Torres’ claims are cognizable under the Puerto Rico general tort statute, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141, which plaintiff has raised under the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Torres’ claims.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, but an emergency commitment without a prior hearing does not by itself state a § 1983 claim when due process permits the hearing to be delayed.

Mignone v. Vincent · filed 1976-04-13

Consequently, Mignone’s commitment without benefit of a prior hearing does not violate his Due Process rights and, therefore, does not state a claim under § 1983.

An involuntarily committed patient may have a § 1983 damages claim when forced medication in a nonemergency substantially departs from accepted professional judgment or mandatory treatment procedures.

Jarvis v. Levine · filed 1987-07-02

If the substantive and procedural criteria are not adhered to by mental health professionals, or if a decision to medicate substantially departs from accepted “professional judgment, practice, or standards” in nonemer-gency cases, an institutionalized mental patient might have a claim for damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for denial of counsel at a prison disciplinary hearing when inmates have no constitutional right to retained or appointed counsel, even when the charges involve conduct punishable as a crime under state law.

Frankos v. J. Edwin Lavallee, Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility · filed 1976-05-25

In the opinion of this court on March 23, 1976, slip op. 2747, we held that the complaint stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellees LaVallee and Czarnetsky on the basis that it alleged they had deprived appellant of counsel’s assistance at prison disciplinary proceedings involving serious criminal conduct which culminated in a state murder charge against appellant. ... The Court has thus apparently extended Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), to the situation where the disciplinary charges involve conduct punishable as a crime under state law. Accordingly, our holding, in reliance on the court of appeals cases reversed in Baxter, supra, has been negated and the original judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint must be affirmed.

There is no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action, although a court may appoint counsel in exceptional circumstances.

Gomez v. Myers · filed 1985-11-12

No right to counsel exists in § 1983 actions. ... A district court has the discretion to appoint counsel in a civil rights action if the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Allegations that a prison misconduct report lacked seized physical evidence and that subsequent administrative segregation involved dirty cells without cleaning materials are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Rickey Rimmer-Bey Ervin Mayer v. Gary Barker M. Michael David Jamrog A.D. Palmer · filed 1988-07-22

The basic argument advanced by the two prisoners is that a misconduct report was written without seizing the evidence. As a result, at the hearing on this report involving a knife, there was no physical evidence to be introduced. Both prisoners were found to have violated prison regulations at the hearing and both were reclassified to administrative segregation. They claim that this area where they were confined was dirty and they were not given the necessary materials to clean the cells. Accepting the facts as true we believe them to be insufficient to raise a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary proceedings that impose significant sanctions beyond lost sentence credits when restoring those credits would not directly affect the prisoner's sentence.

Hemphill v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1993-08-02

Nonetheless, a prisoner may bring a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having "only a speculative or incidental effect" on the length of his sentence. Sisk v. CSO Branch, 974 F.2d 116, 117 (9th Cir.1992) (quotations omitted). Thus, a prisoner who loses sentence credits at a prison disciplinary hearing need not first pursue habeas relief if (1) significant sanctions, such as an increased security classification, were imposed in addition to the loss of the credits, and (2) restoration of the credits would not directly impact the prisoner's sentence. Id. at 118 (no direct impact on sentence because prisoner received indeterminate term).

A litigant in a Section 1983 case has no right to counsel and cannot obtain appellate relief based on counsel’s alleged deficiencies.

Cole v. Mel Rouf Jane Doe, Nurse D. Wagner Lynn Wright Brad Hansen · filed 1995-12-07

Finally, Cole is not entitled to any appellate relief based on his counsel's alleged deficiencies. See Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir.1988) (in section 1983 cases there is no right to counsel).

Section 1983 permits damages claims challenging the procedures used to deprive prisoners of good-time credits when those claims do not question the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Armento-Bey v. Harper · filed 1996-01-19

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not "call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement," and again recognized that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," are cognizable.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages for procedural defects in a disciplinary hearing when success would not imply the invalidity of his confinement.

Armstrong v. McGinnis · filed 1996-04-30

Consequently, because the success of Armstrong's claim did not impugn the validity of his confinement, his claim remains cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations in prison disciplinary hearings when success would not necessarily invalidate the disciplinary outcome.

Umar v. Johnson · filed 1997-06-09

In sum, this Court finds in light of Heck and Edwards that Umar’s damages action for procedural due process errors in the Adjustment Committee hearing is cognizable under Section 1983. Both of those decisions carry forward the Wolff recognition that due process deprivations that do not necessarily connote the invalidity of the prison’s disciplinary outcome are independently actionable.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily imply that a loss of good-time credits was invalid.

Gary v. Jernigan v. Jack Regan D.W. Nelson E.S. Alamedia, Jr. B.L. Jackson B.O. Daniels Ray Brown M.H. Tristan R. Mejia · filed 1997-09-24

The determination whether a cause of action based on allegedly unconstitutional prison hearing procedures may be cognizable under § 1983 must be based upon whether "the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards, 117 S.Ct. at 1587.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of revoked good-time credits.

Lusz v. Scott · filed 1997-10-07

These two contentions, like Lusz’s drug test contention, cannot go forward because, if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of Lusz’s conviction, i.e., his revocation of good-time credit.

Section 1983 does not permit review of a prison disciplinary board’s credibility determinations when no procedural due process violation is implicated.

Reed v. Jago · filed 1986-02-25

Although issues of credibility are not normally resolvable on summary judgment motions, the district court here never had to reach that issue, since where no procedural due process violations are implicated, the credibility determinations made by a prison disciplinary review board are not reviewable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to people deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law, but does not extend a federal forum to another plaintiff asserting only a related state tort claim.

Washco v. Darby Borough Police Department · filed 1988-04-14

Despite these differences in posture, however, it is fair to conclude that Congress did not authorize the federal courts to hear claims like Mrs. Washco’s. The remedy provided by § 1983 is available to a specific class of plaintiffs — those who have suffered deprivations of their constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support pendent party jurisdiction over private defendants facing only related state-law claims.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1988-04-19

Here, as in the cases cited immediately above, plaintiffs with section 1983 claims against various state actors, seek to have the court exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ purely state-law claims against different parties who are merely private individuals or entities. I will follow the clearly established trend of case law in this circuit and in others. “[Ujnder § 1983, Congress intended the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only when the defendants have acted under color of law_ The inference is clear: Congress intended to negate the exercise of jurisdiction over all parties who have not acted under color of law.”

Section 1983’s municipal policy or custom requirement precludes pendent party jurisdiction over a municipality when that requirement is unmet.

Phipps v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-08-14

The court finds that this custom or policy requirement implicitly negates the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over municipalities in § 1983 cases where the requirement is not met.

Section 1983 does not grant pendent-party jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a party with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners ex rel. Avery · filed 1991-08-28

However, our task is an easy one because the Aldinger court resolved for us in the negative the issue of whether section 1983 grants pendent-party jurisdiction.

Section 1983 itself does not authorize pendent party jurisdiction over defendants against whom no federal claims are asserted.

Gibson v. City of Glendale Police Department · filed 1992-03-10

It has long been settled that no such jurisdictional authorization exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not affirmatively grant pendent party jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties.

Meyers v. Trinity Medical Center · filed 1993-01-14

We agree with the district court that neither the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contains an affirmative grant of pendent party jurisdiction as required by Finley.

A state university sufficiently distinct from the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, along with its governing board, is a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Kovats v. Rutgers · filed 1986-04-24

Both the University and the Board of Governors are “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipal departments are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Landon v. County of Daviess · filed 2020-06-03

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants must be dismissed because municipal departments are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on the wrongful disposition of personal property.

Kircheis v. Long · filed 1976-12-06

Initially, the claim of a wrongful disposition of personal property can be heard under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims arising in the Trust Territory because the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within the statute.

Thompson v. Kleppe · filed 1976-12-15

However, the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within § 1983 and, therefore, this action may not be brought under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 applies in American Samoa and does not require filing an administrative claim under territorial tort law before suit.

Tuivai v. Pele · filed 1984-06-05

Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 et seq. apply in the Territory of American Samoa. In order to proceed under those statutes it is not necessary to file administrative claims under the government tort liability act.

A civil rights damages claim can survive a prisoner’s transfer even when the transfer moots requests for prospective relief.

Boatman v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2006-03-23

The order under review is affirmed as to the disposition of those claims for which the appellant sought only declaratory or injunctive relief. But because the trial court erred in concluding that the claims for which the appellant sought money damages were inappropriately raised in a civil rights complaint and also erred in failing to address these claims, the order is otherwise reversed and this case is remanded.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for injuries caused by an unconstitutional ordinance even after the ordinance is amended, so the amendment does not moot the claim.

George Phillips Philip Vitale v. Borough of Keyport Victor Rhodes Board of Adjustment · filed 1997-02-21

Contrary to the defendants' suggestion, the issue of the constitutionality of this version of the Ordinance is not moot. Phillips and Vitale have a § 1983 damage claim based on the 500 foot version of the Ordinance. They seek damages for defendants' refusal to permit them to operate an adult bookstore on Lot 61 from July 28, 1992, when Ordinance 31-92 was first adopted, to the date in the fall of 1993 on which the 300 foot version of the Ordinance was adopted. If the 500 foot Ordinance is unconstitutional, Phillips and Vitale are entitled to any damages they can establish to have been occasioned by it.

Section 1983 personal-liability claims against individual defendants are not mooted by a plaintiff's graduation, while individual injunctive-relief claims under it are.

Zentgraf v. TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY · filed 1981-03-02

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s individual claim under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and her individual claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court will not dismiss as moot Plaintiff's claim for personal liability against the individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A Section 1983 claim seeking to undo a state-court child-custody judgment is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel after the constitutional issues were fully litigated in state court.

Yow v. Crater · filed 1981-11-18

Were the Court able to overcome its reluctance to rule on domestic relations matters, it would still be unable to grant the requested relief, since plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for the alleged denial of law-library access, work assignments to a state prisoner held at a county jail, or minor property loss where state remedies exist.

Falzerano v. Collier · filed 1982-01-08

The facts alleged on this count, taken in their most favorable and lenient reading, fall far short of a § 1983 claim. ... This claim raises no federal claim under § 1983. ... But whatever the imperfections may be, they do not rise to § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 damages request remains a live controversy after the challenged disciplinary proceedings have ended, even if injunctive relief becomes moot.

Henson v. The Honor Committee of U. Va., the Rector and Visitors of U. Va. · filed 1983-12-05

Henson sought both injunctive and monetary relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the University. Thus, his request for damages remained a live controversy even after the disciplinary proceedings were dropped.

Ordinary tort-law principles of causation, including the rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, govern claims for constitutional torts brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parrett v. City of Connersville, Indiana · filed 1984-08-22

These are general principles of causation in tort law but they are applicable to constitutional torts litigated under section 1983.

A section 1983 claim for damages is not mooted merely because the defendant later remedies the underlying deprivation, since the damages claim survives independent of any request for injunctive relief.

Delancy v. Terry Caldwell, Official Court Reporter, Tulsa, Ok · filed 1984-08-29

The district court’s holding that plaintiff’s action is moot is correct to the extent that plaintiff sought injunctive relief. However, plaintiff also sought damages for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights flowing from the delay in receiving the transcript. If plaintiff can establish a deprivation of his rights and damages as a result thereof, his claim is not mooted merely because he is supplied a copy of the requested transcript.

A reviewing court may sever a Section 1983 claim into a separate proceeding when resolving it requires evidence beyond the limited record permitted in administrative review.

Jahn v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1986-03-11

To the extent that a resolution of Jahn’s § 1983 claim would require the judge to hear further evidence, the judge properly concluded that this cause of action should be maintained in a separate proceeding.

A defendant's promise not to repeat challenged conduct does not moot a viable Section 1983 claim for damages already sustained.

Stokes v. Village of Wurtsboro · filed 1987-05-08

The Village’s stipulation, that it would not apply Local Law 5-1983 to the Sullivan Street property in the future, did not address and therefore does not preclude an action for damages allegedly sustained by the Stokes when water service was terminated. Thus, the section 1983 cause of action was not mooted when the Village entered into the stipulation.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging how prison officials handled a furlough decision.

Jackson v. Walters · filed 1989-10-25

Plaintiff’s claim is, as the Magistrate held, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 may provide a claim for conversion of property by municipal employees when the underlying conversion claim is maintainable.

Hahn v. City of Rensselaer · filed 1990-10-18

While plaintiffs arguments on this point are not entirely clear, it appears that, insofar as plaintiffs cause of action for conversion is maintainable, it is also a claim cognizable under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Gomez v Toledo, 446 US 635, 640).

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a claim seeking to remedy denial of access to state courts.

Stephens v. Muncy · filed 1991-02-20

However, because Stephens seeks to remedy a denial of access to state courts, we consider his filing as a complaint filed more appropriately pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against state officials, but declaratory and injunctive claims become moot when repeal of the challenged law leaves no prospective relief available.

Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Felix · filed 1991-05-16

The stockholders still seek declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983. Will recognizes that state officials can be sued for prospective relief under § 1983. 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2811 n. 10. No prospective relief is attainable in this case, however. The intangibles tax was repealed retroactively to November 10, 1988, by Pub.L. No. 80-1989, §§ 18-19, 1989 Ind.Acts 912, 919 (April 26, 1989). Any claim for declaratory or injunctive relief is moot.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims that a sheriff assaulted a person or that the person was improperly placed in segregation.

United States v. Horton · filed 1991-05-28

We note that Horton's claims that he was assaulted by a sheriff and that he was inappropriately placed in segregation should be asserted in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 is the required cause of action for a litigant alleging a violation of a constitutional right.

Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1992-07-23

Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution. We have previously held that a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a pendent state law fraud claim.

Harris v. Welch · filed 1992-11-13

More importantly, the district court correctly determined that once Count One had been dismissed, the district court could dismiss Count Two because it was a pendent state claim not covered under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to state court judgment preclusion for issues previously litigated and claims that could have been raised in the earlier state court proceeding.

Hardin v. Harshbarger · filed 1993-01-14

This rule is applicable to actions brought under § 1983 respecting both issues actually litigated (issue preclusion), ... and issues which could have been raised in the earlier state-court proceeding but were not (claim preclusion).

A claim for money damages under Section 1983 is not mooted by an inmate’s release from confinement.

Curtis Leon Taylor, Sr. v. P. L. Huffman Stateof Georgia · filed 1994-09-28

Claims for money damages under Sec. 1983 are not mooted by an inmate's release from confinement.

A Section 1983 claim for monetary damages remains live even when the claim for injunctive relief is moot.

Allen v. Deland · filed 1994-10-26

A section 1983 claim for monetary damages, however, cannot be dismissed on mootness grounds.

Section 1983 allows a damages claim challenging the procedures used to obtain a conviction when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Evans v. City of Columbia · filed 1996-03-27

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck Court explicitly stated that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result," are cognizable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of the Supremacy Clause based on federal preemption.

Gustafson v. City Of Lake Angelus · filed 1996-04-03

In regard to attorneys fees, a claim premised on a violation of the Supremacy Clause through preemption is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claimant who seeks damages from an Ohio state agency in the Ohio Court of Claims waives a § 1983 claim against state employees based on the same acts.

Gibson v. The University of Cincinnati Nancy Talbott Tina Whalen · filed 1996-05-13

This court has twice held that foreclosure of a claimant's right to sue in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has sought damages from a state agency or institution in the Ohio Court of Claims does not deny the claimant any right guaranteed by a federal statute or the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 permits a claim for denial of equal protection of the laws.

Henry v. Milonas · filed 1996-07-12

Because plaintiffs have successfully contended that they have been denied their rights to equal protection of the laws, a claim cognizable under 42 USC § 1983, the action is remitted to Supreme Court to determine the amount of counsel fees, if any, to be awarded pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 (see, Wilson v Crosson, supra; Davis v Rosenblatt, supra, at 173).

Constitutional claims against local governments must be brought under § 1983 and satisfy its requirements.

Orozco v. County of Monterey · filed 1996-09-20

Thus, the second and third causes of action must be and hereby are deemed to be asserted under § 1983 and subject to the requirements of that statute.

A claim for compensatory damages under Section 1983 for a past deprivation of federal rights under color of state law is not moot merely because the challenged conduct has ended.

Spencer v. Gonzalez · filed 1999-04-16

If, as Mr. Spencer alleges, Mr. Gonzalez deprived him of visitation with his children for over a year under color of state law in violation of federal constitutional rights, the question of entitlement to compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not moot.

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside an ADA claim when the Section 1983 claim rests on an independent federally protected right.

Kruger v. Jenne · filed 2000-06-19

The Court in Holbrook did not hold that a plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain causes of action under § 1983 and the ADA, but rather that the litigant may do so as long as the § 1983 claims are based on independent causes of action, i.e. claims based on violation of federally protected rights, whether constitutional or statutory. In this case, the plaintiff alleges independent claims that the defendant, under color of state law, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 is not limited to tortious actions.

South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. South Dakota · filed 2000-09-15

There is nothing in the text or the legislative history of § 1983 that supports a limitation of § 1983 only to “tortious actions.”

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a prisoner’s claims challenging forced, uncompensated prison labor.

Valderas v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-14

The district court correctly treated the former claims as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the latter claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. ... § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's due process challenge to a classification hearing when success would not necessarily result in release or create an entitlement to early release.

Reyna v. Johnson · filed 2001-03-14

Because Reyna’s assertions that he was denied due process at his classification hearing would not necessarily win his release from custody and would not create an entitlement of early release, these claims should have been construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for seeking money damages for constitutional violations, and a court may construe constitutional claims as Section 1983 claims even when they are not expressly labeled that way.

T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead · filed 2002-03-26

Indeed, for the plaintiff to recover money damages for the violations he alleges, Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle by which he must assert his claims. Accordingly, the Court views the plaintiffs first three claims as: (1) a Section 1983 equal protection claim; (2) a Section 1983 substantive due process claim; and (3) a Section 1983 procedural due process claim.

Section 1983 provides the statutory mechanism for bringing First Amendment political patronage claims and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims.

Coffey v. Cox · filed 2002-08-20

On the other hand, in order to bring a Rutan patronage claim under the First Amendment, a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, or an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a would-be plaintiff must use the statutory mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, the Heck bar depends on both the civil claim and the specific offense of conviction.

Hughes v. Lott · filed 2003-11-14

Thus, the court must look both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest under color of state law, including a government employee's stigma-plus claim when defamation accompanies dismissal.

Patterson v. City of Utica · filed 2004-06-02

For a government employee, a cause of action under § 1983 for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law may arise when an alleged government defamation occurs in the course of dismissal from government employment.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action in which a claim for inadequate medical care may properly be brought.

Baez v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement · filed 2004-06-03

Baez’s claim is not cognizable is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition; rather, it is properly brought in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not govern a claim seeking a state tort remedy rather than relief for a constitutional violation.

Barrett v. Miller · filed 1992-04-22

The judge erred by characterizing this as a § 1983 action. The Barretts filed an excessive-force action seeking a state remedy provided within the ambit of traditional tort law. The Barretts did not allege a constitutional violation of their civil rights; they did not seek a remedy under federal or state constitutional law.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply an invalid conviction are barred until the conviction has been invalidated.

Higgins v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma · filed 2004-06-29

When a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of plaintiff necessarily would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate the conviction or sentence already has been invalidated.

An unpleaded § 1983 claim cannot support a judgment on an alternative ground when the failure to plead it deprived the defendant of the opportunity to raise defenses available under the statute.

Graham v. Springfield Vermont School District · filed 2005-03-15

By failing to plead § 1983, Graham prevented the District from raising any defenses that may have been available because of § 1983’s limitations. Thus, whatever potential defenses the District may have had were not considered at trial.- We will not presume that Graham could have overcome those defenses in the event he had pled the statutory remedy.

A § 1983 claim may fail when a defendant is immune or the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim.

Cooper v. Finley · filed 2007-02-20

With respect to all appellees, either the appellees are immune, Cooper has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, or the Younger doctrine applies.

A preprinted § 1983 complaint form does not make a complaint a § 1983 action when the pleaded claims arise under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

O'GUINN v. Lovelock Correctional Center · filed 2007-09-05

The district court mischaracterized O’Guinn’s complaint as arising under § 1983. O’Guinn’s complaint clearly-pleaded ADA and Rehabilitation Act statutory violations.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would invalidate an unrevoked conviction.

Bessent v. Clark · filed 2007-09-25

Bessent's conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Accordingly, Bessent cannot sue the various named governmental officials based on the constitutionality of his arrest pursuant to section 1983. See Ott v. Mitchell, 792 So.2d 332, 334(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2001). As in Ott, this Court affirmed Bessent's conviction on direct appeal. As such, Bessent's claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s current sentence; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus or a criminal appeal.

Thigpen v. McDonnell · filed 2008-04-11

We agree that Thigpen’s double jeopardy claim is barred by Heck. ... If Thigpen were successful on this challenge, the invalidation of his current sentence would necessarily result. Therefore, the appropriate vehicle for relief on Thigpen’s double jeopardy claim is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a criminal appeal.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for violating constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law.

Blaylock v. Borden · filed 2008-04-16

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 covers claims against local officers for excessive force during arrest and deliberate indifference to medical needs during incarceration.

Goodman v. Lewis · filed 2009-01-12

The complaint also alleges facts in support of a claim that individual officers employed by the Waycross Police Department and the Ware County Sheriffs Department used excessive force in arresting plaintiff and then showed deliberate indifference to plaintiff s medical needs upon incarceration. These claims will be construed as ones brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law who deprives the person of a federal right.

Harris v. CITY OF VALDOSTA, GA. · filed 2009-04-15

To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a person, (2) acting under color of state law, (3) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including claims based on equal protection and substantive due process.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-02-19

To state a defamation-plus claim, Buckey must join a defamation claim to a recognizable section 1983 wrong such as the denial of equal protection and substantive due process here hypothesized.

Section 1983 provides damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies that act under color of law to deprive a person of protected rights.

Peterson v. Ward · filed 2002-08-16

His action is best characterized as a claim typically brought in federal court under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates an action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies that act under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage to deprive a person of any rights, privileges or immunities secure by the Constitution and law.

Section 1983 claims must be pleaded in the complaint.

Aviles v. Department of the Army · filed 2009-09-08

All plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are also dismissed as they are nowhere pled in the complaint.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations caused by state actors and requires more than a de minimis use of force for an excessive-force claim.

PARLIN v. Cumberland County · filed 2009-09-11

Thus, to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for excessive force by prison officials, a plaintiff must allege wrongdoing amounting to more than a de minimis use of force.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.

Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free School District · filed 2009-09-30

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.

Section 1983 concerns constitutional violations rather than violations of local laws or regulations.

Christmas v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-02-11

The defendants correctly argue that violations under local laws and regulations have no bearing on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which involve violations under the constitution.

Title VI does not preclude a claim under Section 1983.

TC v. Valley Central School District · filed 2011-03-30

In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Fitzgerald and its citations to Alvarado, Nashville I-k0 and Bossier Parish, the Court now concludes that Title VI does not preclude a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials.

Myers v. Simpson · filed 2011-12-09

Section 1983, which prohibits a person acting “under color of’ state law from depriving individuals of their federal rights, provides a cause of action to a plaintiff who must show that a government official actually violated the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of ADA Title I because Title I has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Okwu v. McKim · filed 2012-06-12

Accordingly, we must affirm the district court’s conclusion that Okwu cannot state a § 1983 claim predicated on violations of Title I of the ADA.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without naming the statute if its allegations give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its grounds.

Deron King v. Butts County Georgia · filed 2014-08-13

Thus, because King gave Butts County fair and sufficient notice of the nature of and grounds for his § 1983 claims of discrimination and retaliation such that he may proceed under § 1983, the district court’s granting of Butts County’s motion for summary judgment was error.

Section 1983 provides a private action for deprivation of federal rights and requires state action plus deprivation of constitutional or federal rights.

Montañez v. State Insurance Fund · filed 2015-03-17

Section 1983 “creates a private right of action for redressing abridgments or deprivations of federally assured rights.” ... A claim pursuant to section 1983 must satisfy two essential elements: “the defendant must have acted under color of state law, and his or her conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law.” ... Finally, “while plaintiffs are not held to higher pleading standards in § 1983 actions, they must plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for the alleged taking of unidentified property.

Sanchez v. Allen · filed 2015-04-23

In addition, Sanchez’s claim that certain (unidentified) property was taken from him does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge a city ordinance that allegedly deprives a person of federal constitutional rights.

ATM Exp., Inc. v. City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 2005-07-08

Section 1983 authorizes the court to redress “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” committed by any “person” who acts “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”.

Section 1983 does not provide greater remedies for an IDEA claim whose essence is denial of FAPE when the claim is recast under that section.

David T. Ex Rel. Kaitlyn T. v. City of Chicopee · filed 2007-02-15

While the complaint asserts, as noted above, a claim pursuant to § 1983 and offers in its six counts other causes of action with a constitutional or common law flavor, the First Circuit has recently determined that “[w]here the essence of the claim is one stated under the IDEA for denial of FAPE, no greater remedies than those authorized under the IDEA are made available by recasting the claim as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights and requires personal involvement by the defendant.

Schwarm v. Craighead · filed 2008-05-05

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights that are conferred elsewhere. ... Section 1983 imposes personal liability and requires that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily may be amended unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

Beckerman v. Weber · filed 2008-08-12

A plaintiff who has a § 1983 claim dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily given an opportunity to amend the claim, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. ... Here, amending the claim would have been futile. Beckerman has clearly provided the facts underlying his First Amendment claim but an essential element of a viable claim, an official act, is lacking. This deficiency is a legal inadequacy that amending the complaint cannot cure.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Vierria v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2009-06-23

Thus, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. ... Thus, SCIF’s and Devereux’s motion to dismiss this claim on the basis that SCIF and Devereux were not acting under color of law is DENIED.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action subject to substantive due process causation and danger creation rules.

Rhoten v. Dickson · filed 2010-01-29

But the Tenth Circuit employs distinct tests to determine causation for acts or omissions in a § 1983 substantive due process claim, so Rhoten’s two negligence theories must be examined separately. ... Generally, federal liability does not attach if state actors do nothing when suspicious circumstances require action unless the state actor recklessly created the danger through some affirmative conduct on the state’s part that placed plaintiff in danger. This is called the “danger creation” theory. ... The federal district court relied upon Rhoten’s failure to establish that Pase created the danger when granting summary judgment under the omission theory of liability. It held there was no § 1983 liability, reasoning that Pase did not change the status quo or place Rhoten in a worse position by following Dickson. But this additional showing is not required under Kansas negligence law, and the issue decided by the federal district is not identical to the causation analysis in Kansas.

A court must resolve a §1983 refund claim rather than deny it and direct the defendant to provide administrative review.

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., R. Blount and D. Bell v. PPA · filed 2018-04-13

By simply denying all refund claims and directing an administrative review, the trial court abdicated its duty to resolve Licensees’ claims under §1983 and sought to transfer that responsibility to the Authority. In so doing, the trial court committed an error of law.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed on absolute prosecutorial immunity and Heck v. Humphrey grounds.

Davis v. Daniel · filed 2018-10-12

Arkansas inmate Larry Davis appeals the district court’s1 dismissal without prejudice of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Upon de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we conclude that dismissal was proper.

A plaintiff asserting a constitutional claim under § 1983 need not expressly cite the section in the complaint.

Domineque Hakim Marcelle Ray v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2019-02-06

Although Ray did not mention Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the method by which he was asserting his Establishment Clause claim, the Supreme Court has made it clear that he need not expressly invoke that provision.

Section 1983 does not govern a due process challenge to a tax sale raised as a jurisdictional defect in a quiet title action.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Trust · filed 2019-12-18

At the outset, we reject the Game Commission’s contentions that the Proctor Trusts’ due process claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or is barred by the statute of limitations in the Act of 1815.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the Heck bar and to defendants’ immunity.

Gober v. Niman · filed 2020-12-28

However, she recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s case because his claims are Heck-barred, and the named Defendants are otherwise entitled to immunity. ... The Court agrees with Judge Baldwin. Having reviewed the R&R and the record in this case, the Court will adopt the R&R in full.

Section 1983 provides a civil claim for a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Thorne v. Hammer · filed 2020-07-09

As stated by Judge Arbuckle, Plaintiff’s claims are properly construed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 as Plaintiff: (1) indicated on his original complaint that he intended to bring his claims under § 1983 (see Doc. 1, at 1), (2) alleged a violation of his ... person acting under color of state law (see id. at 2-8).

An ADA claim raised under Section 1983 can survive screening only if the alleged conduct also violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Fontaine v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2021-03-26

To recap, an ADA claim raised in a § 1983 action can only survive screening if the conduct alleged to violate the ADA also violates the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection age discrimination claim despite the availability of an ADEA claim.

Pejovic v. State University of New York at Albany · filed 2021-07-06

They repeat an argument that Plaintiff must use the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., to address this alleged discrimination. The Court has already rejected that position, and will rely on those earlier conclusions to deny the motion on that basis.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for allegations of false arrest and confiscation of property without due process.

Jones v. Dunbar · filed 2021-11-04

Liberally construed, however, Petitioner’s habeas petition includes allegations that would be more properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for claims that state actors violated the Fifth Amendment’s takings and due process protections.

Zeyen v. Boise District 1 · filed 2021-11-29

Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants violated the Fifth Amendment takings and due process clauses must be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for an alleged conspiracy to violate federal civil rights.

Rice v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives · filed 2022-02-17

Although Plaintiff attempts to camouflage the federal question in his Petition, the Court construes that Plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy to violate his civil rights must be based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle through which he could allege such violations of his civil rights.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for a claim that prison officials violated a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Velez v. Turco · filed 2021-08-10

“‘[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action under the United States Constitution but [rather] must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” ... Liberally construing the pro se complaint, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), it therefore raises a failure to protect claim in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself confer a right, so a standalone claim alleging only a violation of the section cannot survive.

CONFORTI v. HANLON · filed 2022-05-31

As a final matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Count V, baldly alleging a § 1983 claim cannot survive because the section itself does not confer aright.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for an allegedly illegal search even when the related parole revocation was lawful.

Bodeker v. Frank Dyson, Chief of Police of the City of Dallas · filed 1977-01-03

Although Bodeker’s parole revocation was lawful, his complaint for damages as a result of the allegedly illegal May 14, 1974 search states a cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages resulting from an unconstitutional search and seizure.

Keller v. Hilgendorf · filed 1978-09-18

A claim for damages which resulted from an unconstitutional search and seizure falls squarely within the cause of action provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim can fall within an exception to the Heck bar on § 1983 claims.

Sellers v. Waring · filed 2005-08-03

Although we find that Sellers’s excessive force claim falls under the Fourth Amendment exception to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), we nonetheless affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim on the ground that Sellers fails to allege that he suffered more than de minimis injury.

Section 1983 does not permit an illegal-search damages claim when success would necessarily undermine an element of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Chester Weaver, Sr. v. Geiger · filed 2008-09-24

His allegation of an invalid basis for the search warrant thus amounts to the kind of attack on the factual basis for a conviction that we have deemed impermissible under Heck.

Section 1983 provides the proper civil action for a constitutional claim seeking to compel a state court to process an appeal when the claim does not necessarily imply the conviction's invalidity.

Blair v. Martel · filed 2011-07-20

We therefore conclude that a request for an order directing a state court to hasten its consideration of an appeal belongs in a § 1983 complaint, not a habeas petition.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Howard Mosby, Jr. v. O'Brie · filed 2013-07-29

Because success in his § 1983 action would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction, Heck bars his suit, absent favorable determination.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Gause v. Conway Police Department, City of · filed 2020-10-21

Thus, while Younger abstention is no longer warranted, Heck v. Humphrey6 bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims because he “plead[s] facts inconsistent with guilt.”

A § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence that challenges a prosecution requires favorable termination; an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not qualify.

Corso v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-26

In short, the Court concludes that in light of McDonough, Corso’s acceptance of an ACD bars his fair trial claim.

For a § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence, dismissal in the interest of justice satisfies any favorable termination requirement when a civil judgment would not conflict with the criminal disposition.

Simon v. Cruz · filed 2020-03-19

Therefore, Plaintiff’s dismissal in the interest of justice is a favorable termination for the purposes of his § 1983 fair trial claim.

A plaintiff who accepts an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal cannot bring a § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence underlying that charge.

Daniels v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-11

Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff's acceptance of an ACD bars his fair trial claim.

Section 1983 fair trial claims alleging that fabricated evidence founded a prosecution require favorable termination; accepting an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not satisfy that requirement.

Miller v. Terrillion · filed 2020-02-04

Just the same, a comparison of those two claims through the lens of McDonough leads to the inevitable conclusion that Miller’s fair trial claim is barred by his acceptance of an ACD.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages based on a mandatory-supervision eligibility determination that has not been invalidated.

Mendenhall v. Valdez · filed 2010-04-22

Because Mendenhall cannot show that the TDCJ’s determination regarding his eligibility for release on mandatory supervision has been invalidated, under the principles of Heck he ... cannot maintain a suit for damages under § 1983 based on those determinations.

Section 1983 bars a civil rights claim that would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Sanders v. Carnley · filed 2004-05-24

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his civil rights challenges to these actions as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). His allegations implicate the invalidity of his parole revocation, and Sanders has not demonstrated that his revocation has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims challenging a federal conviction may be barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Finnell v. Virginia · filed 2002-10-21

Insofar as Finnell is attempting to challenge his federal conviction, we find it barred by the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 claim challenging a federal conviction is barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Finnell v. Commonwealth of VA · filed 2002-10-21

Insofar as Finnell is attempting to challenge his federal conviction, we find it barred by the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A § 1983 damages claim cannot proceed when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Brown v. City of Detroit · filed 2002-09-23

A ruling in Brown’s favor on his excessive use of force claim would undermine the validity of his conviction for assault with intent to murder Allen. Since Brown did not contend that his state court conviction for assault with intent to murder Allen has been reversed, overturned, or otherwise invalidated, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, his § 1983 excessive use of force claim seeking monetary damages cannot be maintained.

A § 1983 detention claim is not barred by Heck when success on the claim would not affect the plaintiff’s conviction.

Fritz v. City of Corrigan · filed 2001-06-25

That claim is not proscribed by Heck. Whether his detention was constitutionally reasonable will not affect his conviction for speeding.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge removal from work release without first invalidating the sanction when the removal does not affect the length of confinement.

Weller v. Grant County Sheriff · filed 1999-11-22

Given the lack of any clear authority to the contrary, this Court is of the view that the weight of authority supports the proposition that Heck and Edwards do not bar plaintiffs present claim.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment are barred unless the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Hinton v. Moritz · filed 1998-07-31

In any event, § 1983 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment are barred unless the underlying criminal proceedings, in this case the revocation of parole, was terminated in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to seek damages for alleged deprivations arising from a prison disciplinary hearing unless the hearing result has already been invalidated.

Burnell v. Coughlin · filed 1997-09-03

As I read these decisions, the Supreme Court is sending a loud message: an inmate cannot seek money damages for alleged deprivations arising out of a prison disciplinary hearing by commencing an action under § 1983 unless the results of that hearing already have been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Mendenhall v. State of Idaho County of Lewis City of Kamiah, Transportation Department John Does, 1-10 · filed 1997-08-28

Heck precludes a claim under § 1983 if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," unless the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims based on police interrogation when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Anderson v. Magno, No. Cv 88-0351446-S (Nov. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-11-20

Any allegations the defendant now makes about the impropriety of interrogation would necessarily "imply the invalidity" of his conviction; on the basis of this record I cannot come to the same conclusion as to the allegations concerning the search and seizure conducted by the defendants. ... I conclude as to this count and as to the claims in any counts alleging the impropriety of the interrogation or interrogation procedures or training a § 1983 claim does not lie.

Section 1983 claims that implicate the validity of a plaintiff’s incarceration are premature until that incarceration has been invalidated.

Morris v. City of Suffolk, Va. · filed 1995-11-20

Morris's complaint raised Sec. 1983 claims that implicated the validity of his incarceration, which has not yet been invalidated. The claims are not yet ripe for a Sec. 1983 action.