42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Padilla v. Enzor · filed 2008-05-13

Thus, Padilla’s public defenders are not state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional functions as defense counsel as acting under color of state law.

Calhoun v. Young · filed 2008-08-01

Accordingly, Calhoun’s claims against Young regarding his ineffective representation were properly dismissed because it is well established that a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant is not acting under color of state law.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Martin v. Lori Adkins Edie Freeman Roger Bourne George Parham August Cahill · filed 1994-01-10

A public defender, although paid by the state, does not act under color of state law for Sec. 1983 purposes when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A public defender is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Thomas v. Pugh · filed 2001-05-09

The Supreme Court has determined that a public defender is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Therefore, defendant Johnson is simply not subject to suit at all under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for actions taken while representing a defendant because those actions are not under color of state law.

Burns v. Jorandby · filed 2009-08-25

Therefore, taking the allegations in his complaint as true, neither defendant was acting under color of state law, and neither may be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Nelson v. Dauphin County Public Defender · filed 2010-05-24

As noted by the District Court, criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, do not act “under color of state law” and are not liable under section 1983 when performing traditional functions as defense counsel.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Santos v. State of NJ · filed 2010-08-31

Finally, the District Court properly held that Santos fails to state a claim against his public defender, who is not a state actor for ... purposes of § 1983 when performing his traditional functions.

A public defender representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Townsend v. Jacks · filed 2011-06-03

After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Townsend failed to state a claim because ... the public defender was not acting under color of state law when representing Townsend, see Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A court-appointed public defender is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983 for representing a criminal defendant.

McDonald v. White · filed 2012-02-15

In any case, it is frivolous because a court-appointed public defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions are not state actors subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ceasar v. Public Defender Service for Dc · filed 2012-06-11

The complaint does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction because PDS and its attorneys are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

Public defenders are not state actors subject to damages liability under Section 1983 for their defense work.

Smith v. Leibovitz · filed 2012-06-22

Second, the named public defenders are not subject to suit for constitutional violations because they are not state or federal actors who may be held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or its federal analogue established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions because they are not state actors.

Rodriguez v. Creed · filed 2012-07-11

The district court properly dismissed Rodriguez’s § 1983 claim against defendants Bratty and Brinkley because public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions are not state actors.

A public defender does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Rogers v. Denecke · filed 2012-10-23

The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because, as set forth in Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), Defendant, as a public defender, was not acting under color of state law when he represented Plaintiff in the criminal proceeding. ... Nothing in Plaintiff’s brief or the appellate record persuades us there was any error in the magistrate judge’s analysis or the district court’s order. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons given by the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender who was not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Dove · filed 2013-04-17

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for conduct arising from their representation of a client in parole revocation proceedings.

Harris v. Fulwood · filed 2013-05-30

Since plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Edmonson and Douglass is predicated on their representation of him during the revocation proceedings, it fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for actions taken while representing a defendant in court because they do not act under color of state law in that role.

Grider v. Cook · filed 2013-06-17

Consequently Cook and Azfal may not be sued under § 1983 for their actions taken in connection with representing Grider before the state trial and mental health courts.

A § 1983 claim against a public defender requires facts showing that the defender acted under color of state law or participated in a conspiracy.

Hall v. Tallie · filed 2015-01-15

The dismissal of Hall’s claim against the Public Defender was appropriate because Hall’s allegations that the Public Defender inappropriately hindered his trial through mental health assessments are fleeting and conclusory. Hall failed to illustrate facts sufficient to show that the Public Defender either acted under color of state law or participated in a conspiracy.

A public defender performing traditional legal representation for a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.

Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2015-06-03

Third, the district court also correctly concluded that Wusiya failed to state a claim against Public Defender Martinez: in representing Wusiya, the Public Defender’s office was not acting under color of state law for purposes of secion 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender or public defender’s office for traditional criminal defense work because neither acts under color of state law.

Dorn v. Aguilar · filed 2016-03-30

As explained by the District Court, Dorn did not ... state a claim for relief against his public defender and the public defender’s office because neither is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders acting as defense counsel because they are not state actors.

Rolle v. Glenn · filed 2017-10-19

Further, the district court properly determined, as to the public defenders, that they are not liable because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for inadequate representation while performing traditional defense counsel functions.

Smith v. McElveen · filed 2017-12-14

Thus, when the claim is merely that the public defender failed to adequately represent the client in his criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s work as counsel to a criminal defendant because that work is not under color of state law.

Logan v. Ramsey · filed 2018-02-09

Second, the public defender, Robert Allen, is not subject to suit under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal right.

A public defender representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Rudolph v. Hanson · filed 2018-09-12

It dismissed defendant Karen Stam on the ground that public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing clients. ... The district court’s decision is soundly based on legal precedent and principles, and Plaintiff’s brief on appeal offers no authority or argument that calls the decision into question. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment below.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because they are not acting under color of state law.

Kaylor v. Stevens · filed 2018-10-05

Defendants Stevens, Mitchell and Woods were not acting under color of state law while representing Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings.

A public defender does not act under color of state law while performing ordinary representation of a criminal defendant.

John M. Terry, Jr. v. Oby T. Rogers, PLLC · filed 2018-11-15

As the trial court noted, a public defender does not act under color of state law in the normal course of his or her representation of a criminal defendant, even if counsel is liable for malpractice under state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense counsel duties as a state actor.

Byerly v. Idaho Board of Correction · filed 2019-08-14

Finally, Plaintiff’s public defender is not a state actor under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for representing defendants in criminal proceedings because they do not act under color of state law.

Pretty v. Efird · filed 2019-09-26

Private attorneys and public defenders do not act under color of state or federal authority when they represent defendants in criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for performing traditional attorney functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Schlosser v. Elzia · filed 2019-10-22

It is well-established that claims against public defenders are not cognizable in a section 1983 action because public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing their clients and performing traditional attorney functions.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not permit a claim against a public defender because the defender does not act under color of state law when representing a client.

Rembold v. Lettau · filed 2019-10-23

An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, ordinarily does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Hinton v. Atkins · filed 2019-11-26

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing traditional defense counsel functions because those acts are not under color of state law.

Moment v. Iowa, State of · filed 2019-12-04

For purposes of § 1983, the Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... That is a traditional attorney function. Accordingly, Moment’s state public defender, Scott Nelson, is immune and he is dismissed from this case.

A state-appointed defense attorney representing a criminal defendant is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Wallace v. Marshall · filed 2019-12-04

Marshall is not a state actor. This was undoubtedly correct. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against criminal defense attorneys for representing clients because they are not government actors.

West v. Huvelle · filed 2019-12-03

Criminal defense attorneys, like defendant Johnson, are not government actors and ... as such are not proper defendants in either § 1983 or Bivens actions.

A court-appointed defense attorney does not act under color of state law when representing a criminal defendant, so that representation cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Tadgerson 714794 v. Rahilly · filed 2020-01-16

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court-appointed attorney, Defendant Rahilly, does not act under color of state law. For the same reason, Defendant France does not act under color of law by taking an unspecified part in Plaintiff’s criminal defense. As a result, no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defense attorneys for traditional lawyer functions, such as choosing which motions to file, because they do not act under color of state law.

Gregory v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2020-05-11

Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against these Defendants regarding any performance of a traditional lawyer function, such as determining what motions to file.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense attorneys absent facts showing they acted with state actors.

Romero v. Brown · filed 2021-05-28

The magistrate judge then recommended dismissal of Romero’s § 1983 claims against his court-appointed defense attorneys because such attorneys are not state actors and because Romero advanced no factual support for his conclusory allegations that they conspired with state actors. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments in each case for substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s recommendations, as adopted by the district court in its orders of dismissal, and we affirm the denial of Romero’s Rule 59(e) motions for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s orders denying them.

Court-appointed lawyers ordinarily are not state actors under § 1983, and conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish their liability.

Gossett v. Helphinstine · filed 2021-06-08

Court-appointed lawyers usually are not considered state actors for section 1983 purposes. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). Public defenders, however, are not immune from liability with regard to alleged conspiratorial action with state officials to deprive a criminal defendant of his federal constitutional rights. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-21 (1984). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not demonstrate § 1983 liability for his appointed counsel.

A criminal defense attorney is not subject to suit under Section 1983 without plausible, specific facts showing that the attorney acted with state officials to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Ayers v. Gabis · filed 2021-09-23

But without some plausible and specific factual showing that the person acted in concert with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of some constitutional right, a criminal defense attorney is not a “state actor” and is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a criminal defendant’s attorney as a state actor merely because the attorney was appointed by the court.

Waldrup v. Maginnis · filed 2021-09-29

A criminal defendant’s attorney, whether retained or appointed, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed criminal defense attorney acting as counsel because the attorney is not a state actor.

Kameroff v. Leaders · filed 2021-11-02

Mr. Taylor, as court appointed counsel to the indigent, is not a state actor as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Criminal defense attorneys do not act under color of state law when performing traditional legal duties and cannot be sued under § 1983 for those actions.

ABREU v. CARTER · filed 2021-11-03

Criminal defense attorneys, however, are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which Plaintiff seeks to proceed, for actions they take within the scope of their professional duties as criminal counsel as they do “not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a criminal defense attorney who did not act under color of state law.

Puckett v. Haley · filed 2021-11-17

Consistent with the foregoing authority, there is no section 1983 liability for the only named defendant in this case because she did not act under color of state law.

A defense attorney is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Paratore v. Unger · filed 2022-02-15

Paratore’s claims against his defense counsel are also frivolous because a defense. attorney is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a criminal defense attorney for legal representation absent special circumstances indicating concerted action with the state.

Nieves v. Turchi · filed 2022-03-02

Defendant Turchi is a private party, and his representation of Plaintiff does not render him a state actor. The allegations of the complaint also do not suggest any special circumstances. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Turchi under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on appointed or retained defense counsel performing traditional defense functions because they do not act under color of state law.

McChester v. Behm · filed 2022-03-11

But it is well-settled that appointed and retained attorneys performing traditional functions as defense counsel do not act “under color of state law” and are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

A criminal defense attorney, whether retained or court-appointed, does not act under color of state law when representing a client and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Lawson v. Curn · filed 2022-03-14

Accordingly, Lawson cannot pursue this § 1983 action against his defense attorney and the court will dismiss Lawson’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an appointed or retained defense attorney for performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Clark v. Borowiak · filed 2022-03-30

As the cases cited above demonstrate, an attorney, whether appointed or retained, does not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing these functions. Because Clark fails to allege any state action, an essential element of a § 1983 claim, the Court dismisses Clark’s complaint.

A defense attorney representing a criminal defendant is not a state actor under Section 1983 unless the attorney engages in concerted action with a state representative.

Wilkins v. Willner · filed 2022-04-04

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Willner took certain actions that Plaintiff viewed as collaborating with the prosecutor (e.g., waiving Plaintiff’s right to appear before the Grand Jury, and urging Plaintiff to accept prosecutor’s plea offer), but Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendant Willner conspired to violate his rights or took “concerted action” of the type that would render defense counsel a state actor. Because Defendant Willner is not a state actor, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him under section 1983, and the Court dismisses these claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on appointed defense counsel for conduct that is not fairly attributable to the state.

Tsuma v. Costello · filed 2022-04-06

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Costello fail to state a claim because Costello is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense counsel for acts undertaken in representing a criminal defendant because counsel is not a state actor.

Miller v. Peterson · filed 2022-06-03

Defendant Lockwood, as court appointed counsel to an indigent defendant, is not a state actor as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a criminal defense attorney performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not a state actor.

Marchant v. Richardson · filed 2022-06-03

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s defense attorney is not a state actor under § 1983, and Plaintiff should omit Attorney Smethers from any amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against federal officials acting under federal rather than state authority.

Sebastian v. United States of America · filed 1976-03-08

Sebastian seeks redress against employees of the Fort Roots Veterans Administration Hospital for actions taken under federal, and not state, authority.

Section 1983 provides relief only for injuries inflicted under color of state law, not federal law.

Jihaad v. Carlson · filed 1976-03-30

The actual difficulty with plaintiff’s action is that § 1983 relief is available only to those injured under color of state — not federal-law.

Section 1983 does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law.

McNally v. The Pulitzer Publishing Company and Ted Gest · filed 1976-03-30

In the instant case, the alleged unlawful official conduct is that of a ... federal ... official and private parties and is thus not subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires federal law, rather than state law, to determine the adequacy of defenses in a civil-rights action.

Carl Qualls, Administrator of the Estate of Billy Don Trull and Manual Daniel Bunch v. Parrish · filed 1976-04-19

We begin our legal analysis by observing that federal, not state, law applies and determines the adequacy of defenses asserted in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not extend to the Federal Government itself.

Hill v. McMartin · filed 1977-05-09

To the extent that the Amended Complaint seeks to rely on the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, such provisions do not extend to the Federal Government itself, against whom the present equitable relief is sought.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against private parties acting under color of state law but creates no analogous cause of action for private parties acting under color of federal law.

Cohen v. President and Fellows of Harvard College · filed 1983-08-04

Although a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights may be made against private parties acting under color of ... state ... law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no analogous cause of action against private parties acting under color of ... federal ... law.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against federal officers or private persons acting under color of federal law.

Betlyon v. Shy · filed 1983-10-25

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims, therefore, must fail.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law and does not govern federal tax-collection procedures.

Richcreek v. Grecu · filed 1985-06-17

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law; it does not govern federal tax collection procedures.

Private employers following IRS withholding instructions act under color of federal, not state, law and therefore are not liable under § 1983 for those actions.

Wise v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service · filed 1986-01-09

Any actions taken by the defendants in compliance with the instructions of the IRS were done under color of ... law, and thus are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 applies to state actors rather than federal actors.

Schmidt v. Hardman · filed 2006-07-18

As the district court held, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to state rather than federal actors, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to claims of racial discrimination, the Fourth Amendment to searches and seizures, the Sixth Amendment to the rights of the accused in a criminal case, the Eighth Amendment to cruel and unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment to state action. The complaint raises no issues relevant to these legal provisions.

Section 1983 permits a student to sue a school official acting under color of state law for sexual harassment that violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Parks v. Wilson · filed 1995-01-11

A plaintiff may bring an action, pursuant to § 1983, against a school official, acting under color of state law, for sexual harassment that violates rights protected by the equal protection clause.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional sex discrimination in a public school system.

Vorchheimer v. School District Of Philadelphia · filed 1976-03-16

We need look no further than this legislative finding in order to find a violation for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy.

Section 1983 actions may receive the same equitable remedies, including retroactive seniority relief, as Title VII suits.

Gurmankin v. Costanzo · filed 1977-04-25

There is no distinction in the law of equitable remedies between suits brought under Title VII and suits brought in reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or directly on the fourteenth amendment. ... The equitable relief of an award of a retroactive seniority date was, on the record before us, entirely appropriate.

Section 1983 is unavailable to enforce a governing statute when that statute provides an exclusive remedy for its violations.

Garrity v. Gallen · filed 1981-08-17

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available where the “governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of the Act”, ... and as review of the enforcement mechanisms incorporated into the DD Act reveals that the remedies therein provided are exclusive, we conclude that plaintiffs herein are precluded from proceeding with a § 1983 suit against the defendants herein named.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by federal law, but it cannot be used to obtain damages or attorneys’ fees when the EAHCA supplies an exclusive remedy.

Calhoun v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF EDUC., ETC. · filed 1982-07-07

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own, but rather is a remedial statute imposing liability upon those who, under color of state law, work a deprivation upon a person’s rights, privileges or immunities otherwise granted by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Therefore, plaintiffs may not recover damages or attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1983 for the alleged violations of the EAHCA. ... Since the EAHCA is an exclusive remedy for violations of its provisions, the section 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Title VI and its implementing regulation do not foreclose a § 1983 suit.

Powell et.al v. Ridge · filed 1999-08-25

Instead, we hold that a § 1983 suit is not incompatible with Title VI and the Title VI regulation.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act’s remedial scheme forecloses it.

Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Easttown Township · filed 1999-11-02

The Board’s violation of the TCA does not give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. The TCA’s remedial scheme is “sufficiently comprehensive to infer Congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act’s wireless facility siting provisions because the Act’s remedial scheme impliedly forecloses it.

PRIMECO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. City of Mequon · filed 2003-01-27

Thus, I also conclude that the TCA contains a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate that Congress impliedly foreclosed resort to § 1983.

Section 1983 remedies are available for Telecommunications Act violations because the Act does not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme that forecloses them.

Abrams v. City Of Rancho Palos Verdes · filed 2004-01-15

Thus, in this case, where the TCA contains no remedies at all, we must conclude that Congress did not intend to foreclose § 1983 remedies.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory relief against officials sued in their official capacities, while damages claims require individual-capacity liability and are subject to qualified immunity.

Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford, Inc. v. Chaucer · filed 1978-05-08

The defendant city is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As such, they are subject to jurisdiction in an action for injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983, ... but only if sued in their individual capacities can they be held to respond in damages, ... As public officials they enjoy a qualified immunity to actions for damages under § 1983.

A state-administered and initially state-funded Medicaid program acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes even though federal matching funds and requirements are involved.

Mitson by and Through Jones v. Coler · filed 1987-12-01

The Court also affirms its previous determination that the actions of HRS are properly characterized as "under color of state law” so as to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Florida’s ICP Program is entirely state-administered and is, in the first instance, state-funded. The only federal involvement in the state Medicaid program is triggered by the state’s request to receive matching funds.

Members of a parole board are absolutely immune from damages suits under § 1983.

Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles · filed 1976-03-23

It is the judgment of this Court that Defendants Robinson, Ussery, Lambert and the Board of Pardons and Paroles are absolutely immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 suits against parole board officials are barred by absolute immunity when the officials are processing prisoners' parole applications.

Sellars v. Procunier · filed 1981-04-09

The question remains whether parole board officials are entitled to the greater immunity afforded judges, and those performing judge-like roles within federal agencies. In our view, parole board officials are entitled to absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken when processing parole applications.

Parole officials have absolute immunity under Section 1983 for adjudicatory acts, but only qualified executive immunity for disseminating information outside the parole board’s immediate sphere.

Anderson v. Boyd · filed 1983-08-30

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of those counts in the Andersons’ section 1983 complaint relating to the imposition of parole conditions, the revocation of parole, and the dissemination of information to parole board officials and the governor. We reverse the dismissal of those portions of the Andersons’ complaint alleging knowing dissemination of false information to the Idaho Racing Commission and local law enforcement officials and remand the cause to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Cogswell and Boyd acted in good faith and are thus entitled to a more limited executive immunity.

Parole-board members are immune from § 1983 damages for a later crime committed by a released parolee when the injury is too remote from the parole decision to constitute state action.

Sellers v. Thompson · filed 1984-05-11

It was therefore error for the trial court to deny summary judgment in their behalf on the § 1983 claim also.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole officials are barred by absolute immunity for official actions taken in an adjudicatory proceeding.

Walker v. Prisoner Review Board · filed 1984-09-27

The Board argues that “Illinois Prisoner Review Board officials are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their official activities in processing parole applications.” ... Within the context of an adjudicatory proceeding parole officials enjoy absolute immunity for official actions. ... Therefore, Irving is immune from damages.

Parole-board members are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for official actions taken while processing parole applications, including denying access to a parole file.

Walker v. Prisoner Review Board, James R. Irving, Chairman · filed 1985-07-26

It is clear that the Board’s decision to deny plaintiff access to his parole file was an official action made in the course of processing plaintiff’s parole application. Therefore, the Board members are absolutely immune from suit for this decision, and we affirm the ruling of the district court so holding.

State parole-board officials have absolute immunity from section 1983 money-damages claims based on actions taken in their official adjudicatory role.

Vinson v. Barkley · filed 1986-06-30

I find this reasoning compelling, and therefore hold that Mr. Rodriguez is entitled to absolute immunity in his role as Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole from claims for money damages based on actions taken in his official capacity.

State parole-board members have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for actions within the proper scope of their official duties.

Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Board Members · filed 1987-03-31

Given the small degree of contrary thought, we join those circuit courts which have addressed this issue and conclude that the defendant parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983 action for actions taken within the proper scope of their official duties.

Parole commission officials are immune from damages liability in a Section 1983 action challenging their parole decision.

Blunt v. Dantes · filed 1987-05-21

Ernest Blunt, a Maryland inmate, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Here, the district court's dismissal was entirely justified. First, the officials from whom Blunt sought damages were immune from liability for damages.

Parole officers performing administrative and investigative supervision receive only qualified immunity under § 1983, unlike parole-board members performing quasi-judicial functions.

Doe v. United Social & Mental Health Services, Inc. · filed 1987-10-09

The connection of these defendants to the Parole Board does not extend the Board’s absolute immunity to them. ... Thus, as with a police officer’s decision, public policy requires only qualified immunity for the parole officer’s function.

Parole-board members have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages liability for official actions concerning the grant or denial of parole.

Knoll v. Gary L. Webster, in His Private and Personal Capacity, (Chairman Utah Parole Board) · filed 1988-02-02

We conclude that as a member of the Board of Pardons, the defendant is absolutely immune from damages liability for actions taken in performance of the Board’s official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole.

State parole officers who prepare reports for parole boards have qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, from Section 1983 suits over those reports.

LaFrance v. Rampone · filed 1988-02-05

For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the defendant parole officers are entitled to a qualified, not an absolute, immunity from suit for the actions alleged by plaintiff.

Parole board members acting pursuant to their official duties are immune from damages suits under § 1983.

James C. Judge, Jr. v. Gloria J. Richardson, Thomas L. Patten, Jacqueline E. Moss, and Sandra J. Johnson · filed 1988-05-18

In a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiff alleged that defendants, members of the Michigan Parole Board, improperly revoked his parole without first establishing that he had violated the conditions of his parole. ... The district court determined that parole board members acting pursuant to their official duties are immune from suit for damages. ... Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal, filed November 23, 1987, is hereby affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board members for decisions to revoke parole are barred by absolute immunity.

Miller v. Edward Murray, Virginia Department of Corrections, Robert Vassar, Virginia Parole Board · filed 1988-07-25

Michael Eugene Miller, a Virginia inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 seeking dismissal of his parole violation conviction and damages for his incarceration as a parole violator. ... Parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from damage claims arising out of the decision to revoke parole.

State parole board members are immune from damages suits under § 1983.

Jasper Buchanan v. Carroll Campbell, Grady A. Wallace, Frank Burke · filed 1988-11-04

We agree with the district court that the parole board members are immune from suits for damages under Sec. 1983.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for judicial acts involving the issuance or recommendation of parole warrants.

Conner v. Alston · filed 1988-11-23

Applying the Butz factors to this claim, the court concludes that the actions of which plaintiff complains were judicial in nature and entitled to absolute immunity: ... State parole officers must be able to issue or recommend issuance of parole warrants without fear of harassment or intimidation.

State parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from damages suits under Section 1983.

Howard v. Helan Hughes, Parole Board Members Dr. John Runda, Chairman Parole Board Members Wallace Wilkinson, · filed 1989-06-14

First, members of state parole boards have been found to enjoy absolute immunity from suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

Members of state parole boards are immune from suits for damages under § 1983.

Murray v. Linda Miller, Charles Traughber, Ron Bishop, Donna Blackburn, Tom Biggs · filed 1989-12-12

The district court correctly concluded that the defendants are immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit, parole board members have absolute immunity for decisions in individual parole cases but only qualified immunity when enacting parole rules under their statutory rule making authority.

Walter v. Torres · filed 1990-11-29

Relying on the distinction between administrative and adjudicative functions for immunity purposes drawn in Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.1988), we hold that parole board members have absolute immunity when acting in specific cases under their rules in parole cases but only qualified immunity when enacting rules pursuant to their rule making authority granted by the state legislature.

Parole board members are immune from § 1983 damages for issuing a parole violation warrant within their authority even if they mistakenly conclude that parole has not expired.

Garner v. Ray Justek, Member, Indiana Parole Board · filed 1990-12-12

If as Garner says his parole expired before the Board issued its warrant, and this terminated the Board's authority over him, a mistaken contrary decision is at most a grave error. ... Immunity is designed to deal with the errors inevitable in the operation of a complex system; errors accordingly are not sufficient grounds on which to overcome the immunity. Whether to issue a warrant was a question properly before these defendants, and their mistakes should be dealt with by requests for release rather than by demands for damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against parole board members for acts or omissions within their official parole eligibility duties because they have absolute immunity.

Swisher v. Joan Hamilton and Elwaine F. Pomeroy · filed 1992-04-24

Actions or inactions of members of the parole board in connection with their official duties to determine eligibility for parole do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. They have absolute immunity for their actions within the scope of their state law duties.

A parole officer who decides to hold a parolee pending a revocation hearing has qualified, rather than absolute, immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Mee v. Ortega · filed 1992-06-18

We hold only that Mr. Ortega's decision to hold Mr. Mee pending the parole revocation hearing is protected by qualified rather than absolute immunity.

A parole officer has only qualified immunity for at least some actions connected to revoking parole.

Russ v. Paul Uppah, Rod Cozzetto, and John R. Enright · filed 1992-07-29

Thus, Upah is entitled to only qualified immunity for at least some of his actions.

Section 1983 damages are barred by sovereign immunity for a state parole board and officers sued in their official capacities, and by absolute immunity for parole board members acting in their official duties and a governor performing judge-like functions.

Williams v. Governor Robert D. Orr, Indiana Parole Board, Gregory Lewis, Patricia A. Ravinet, Harlan C. Hicks, J · filed 1992-09-16

Even if Williams had raised a viable claim, he could not collect monetary relief from any of the named defendants because each defendant is immune from damages. The Parole Board and the officers in their official capacities are protected by sovereign immunity. See Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 846 (1987). The officers in their individual capacities possess absolute immunity 1 : the Parole Board members for "all actions taken in the course of their official duties" Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 790 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir.1985) and the governor for any judge-like functions. Mother Goose, 770 F.2d at 668; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1976). Governor Orr exercised such judge-like functions when he ruled on the merits of Williams' criminal case.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for official duties, including parole hearings and revocations.

Swisher v. Stovall · filed 1992-10-13

Similarly, the defendants in this action are shielded by immunity while performing their official duties. Parole hearings and revocations are official duties, and therefore no alleged facts regarding this revocation can state a claim.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from claims under § 1983 for decisions to revoke parole.

Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole · filed 1993-07-06

The district court correctly concluded that members of the parole board were entitled to absolute immunity in deciding to revoke Cole’s parole.

Parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 when deciding to revoke parole.

Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole · filed 1993-08-12

The district court correctly concluded that members of the parole board were entitled to absolute immunity in deciding to revoke Cole's parole.

Under § 1983, parole board members have absolute immunity for adjudicatory conduct and share a parole officer’s qualified immunity when they participate in or authorize conduct protected by that immunity.

Kaufhold v. Bright · filed 1993-09-30

It is equally clear that the board is either qualifiedly or absolutely immune under the circumstances presented here. If the plaintiff is asserting that the conduct of the “unknown” Board members was adjudicatory, which plaintiff does not appear to be asserting, absolute immunity attaches. If, on the other hand, plaintiff seeks to recover on the basis of supervisory liability under § 1983, i.e., that these defendants either participated in or authorized the conduct, the same protection extended Bright should attach to these unknown defendants.

Parole board members are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for their actions when processing parole applications.

Kato v. Faatz · filed 1993-10-01

The district court, however, reasoned that the claim for money damages under § 1983 should not be stayed because the defendants, as parole board members, were absolutely immune from suit for money damages. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (parole board members are absolutely immune from liability for damages for their actions when processing parole applications). Therefore, Kato cannot allege a § 1983 claim against the defendants, and the claim lacks an arguable basis in law. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. The claim for money damages was therefore properly dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Parole officials have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for actions taken in granting, denying, or revoking parole.

Drapeau v. Vernon · filed 1994-03-02

Parole officials are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability for actions taken in granting, denying or revoking parole. ... Thus, they are entitled to absolute immunity regarding Drapeau's civil rights claim that they wrongfully denied his parole.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages suits for adjudicative conduct in parole revocations, while their administrative conduct receives only qualified immunity.

Hulsey v. Owens · filed 1995-08-17

Since then, we have repeatedly held that parole board members are absolutely immune when performing their adjudicative functions, distinguishing such decision-making activities from administrative functions for which parole board members are entitled to only qualified immunity. ... The conduct of which Hulsey complains is conduct for which the Board members are absolutely immune from suit.

Parole board officers have absolute immunity from damages under Section 1983 for their quasi-judicial acts.

Smith v. Illinois Parole Bd. · filed 1995-11-15

We have carefully reviewed the record and briefs in this matter and affirm the judgment for the reasons detailed by the district court in its September 12, 1994 Order, attached hereto. ... Parole board officers, as quasi-judicial officials, enjoy absolute immunity from damages.

Section 1983 affords parole board members absolute immunity from damages liability for decisions made in the parole decision process.

Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board · filed 1996-03-15

Officials whose responsibilities are functionally comparable to those of a judge are absolutely immune from damage liability in a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. ... Thus, we conclude that the Board and its members were performing a quasi-judicial function when they denied Belcher parole following his November 17, 1993, hearing; consequently, they are accorded absolute immunity from civil liability.

Parole board officials deciding whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims and, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable, claims for injunctive relief.

Montero v. Brion Travis, Commissioner Kenneth Graber, Commissioner · filed 1999-03-26

For the reasons set forth above, parole board officials, like Graber, are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 for their decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole. Parole board officials performing such functions are also entitled to absolute immunity against claims for injunctive relief in circumstances where there is no allegation that the defendant violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Members of administrative boards performing judicial functions are immune from § 1983 damages claims for acts in their judicial capacities.

Vakas v. Rodriguez · filed 1984-03-07

However, it is well established that members of administrative boards who perform judicial functions are immune from damages in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action when acting in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 suits cannot proceed against parole board members for actions taken in their adjudicative functions because they are absolutely immune.

Rogers v. Dept of Corrections · filed 2001-06-13

Members of the Louisiana Board of Parole are absolutely immune from suit when performing adjudicative functions.

State parole board members are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for acts performed in their official duties.

Gillette v. New Mexico Parole Board · filed 2002-06-24

The court found that the individual defendants were absolutely immune from damages liability for actions taken in performance of their official duties as members of Board, and that plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Board were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Having conducted a de novo review, we agree with the district court’s analysis with respect to plaintiff’s claims for damages.

Judicial immunity protects a parole board official from a § 1983 suit for recommending a parole set-off date as part of her official duties.

Hammond v. Quick · filed 2003-07-31

In short, we hold that Ms. Quick’s action in recommending a set-off date for Mr. Hammond, which was accepted by the Board, was part and parcel of her official duties in deciding whether to revoke, grant, or deny him parole, and that she is protected from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 shields parole authorities and related state officials from damages claims absent a showing that they acted in bad faith when denying parole.

Bennett v. Gilligan · filed 1974-10-21

In Joyce v. Gilligan, et al., 383 F.Supp. 1028 (1974), a case almost factually identical to this one, this Court held that absent a showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the parole authority by acting in bad faith in denying an inmate parole, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and various state officials connected with it, have immunity from damage suits brought under § 1983. ... This Court concludes that there is no showing or allegation of bad faith in the present case such as to reach behind the shield of immunity held by the parole authority.

In a § 1983 suit, parole board members have absolute immunity for decisions to grant parole, while a parole officer performing an arrest-like function has only qualified immunity.

Linda A. Nelson, Paul R. Nelson, Evelyn Philbert, Laura Moore, and Charles Moore v. Denise Balazic, Dick Moore, and Bill · filed 1986-10-10

Since Duncan and Moore performed a quasi-judicial function when they paroled Nave, they are entitled to absolute immunity. ... Since Balazic’s actions were functionally equivalent to those of a police officer she is only entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board members are barred by absolute immunity for actions taken in their official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole.

Giese v. Scafe · filed 2005-06-07

It is also well-established that parole board members have absolute immunity “for actions taken in performance of the [b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole." Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988)).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for challenges to the manner in which a parole board decides parole and executive clemency requests.

Davis v. Clarence L. Jackson Edward Murray, Director David Smith Virginia Parole Board · filed 1995-12-27

He also seeks relief under Sec. 1983 because he challenges the Board's manner of decision-making in denying him parole and not recommending that he be granted executive clemency.

A psychologist who evaluates a parole applicant and prepares a report at a parole board’s request to aid its decision is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.

Williams v. Consovoy · filed 2006-06-29

We also conclude that Gibbons is entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability because his actions of evaluating Williams and preparing a report of that evaluation were performed at the Parole Board’s request to assist in its adjudicative function of evaluating Williams’s eligibility for parole.

Section 1983 claims against these parole board defendants are barred by absolute immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Payton v. Owens · filed 2006-10-24

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Payton’s complaint on the bases (1) that all defendants were immune from liability based on absolute immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) that Payton has no liberty interest in parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause.

Section 1983 does not immunize parole board members from suit for failing to perform a mandatory duty to verify information pertinent to a parolee’s record.

Jones v. Johnson · filed 1975-10-29

The failure to perform this duty, as explicitly and specifically mandated in the laws of Pennsylvania, is not protected from civil rights suits by any form of governmental immunity which has been suggested to us.

Absolute immunity and the Eleventh Amendment can bar punitive damages and injunctive relief sought under § 1983 against a state parole board chairman.

Davis v. Dennison · filed 2007-03-02

Upon a review of the record, and substantially for the reasons set forth in the portions of Magistrate Judge Treeee’s ruling that were adopted by the District Court, we conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages and injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, defendant’s absolute immunity from suit, and § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against parole board members are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged decision is part of their discretionary parole function.

Reed v. Iranon · filed 1996-09-13

Accordingly, the court finds that the HPA Defendants are shielded from Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Parole Board members are immune from damages claims under § 1983, but that immunity does not bar claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning parole review.

Cheatham v. Muse · filed 2015-07-06

Accordingly, while Cheatham’s claims against Muse for damages were properly dismissed as barred by Muse’s immunity, the district court erred in dismissing Cheatham’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief which sought rulings requiring his eligibility for parole review.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board officials for actions taken in processing parole applications are barred by absolute immunity.

Brisken v. Whiteing · filed 2020-09-25

Officials of the Hawaii Paroling Authority enjoy absolutely immunity for actions taken in processing Plaintiff’s parole application.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against parole board members for actions taken in their quasi-judicial role in parole decisions.

Nordlund v. Beesley · filed 2021-06-29

Thus, like judges, they are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken with respect to parole decisions,31 such as the actions challenged by Mr. Nordlund.

A § 1983 claim against a state official requires purposeful discrimination or at least knowing or reckless misconduct when the official’s judgment and discretion are at issue.

Williams v. Patton · filed 1976-03-25

Where a state official’s judgment and discretion are of vital concern, we require a showing of purposeful discrimination or at least an allegation that his misdeeds were knowing or reckless.

Federal law, rather than state law, determines who may be held liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1977-05-18

The question as to who is liable is determined by federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for actions under color of state law and therefore does not apply to federal agencies or federal officials acting under federal authority.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Elm Medical Laboratories Inc. · filed 1981-08-11

Federal agencies are not sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that section imposes liability for actions "under color of state law”. It therefore excludes Federal officials acting under color of their authority.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on the merits on a state that intervenes solely to defend a statute when no state official acted to deprive the plaintiffs of federal rights.

Nash v. Delbert Chandler, the City of Tyler, Texas, and Willie Hardy, Chief of Police, Etc., and the State of Texas · filed 1988-06-30

There was no “action” by state officials which deprived the plaintiffs of rights guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The action with respect to the State of Texas consisted solely of defending the constitutionality of state statutes. This is not sufficient to subject the state to liability on the merits.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that an official policy, custom, or practice caused the injury.

Johnson v. Carroll · filed 1988-09-01

To maintain an official-capacity suit under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from the execution of an official policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 permits suits against local officials in their official capacity for actions implementing an official policy that allegedly violates federal rights.

Capodagli v. Wilson · filed 1989-03-10

Local governing bodies and local officials in their official capacity may be sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for monetary damage, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief where the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” under § 1983.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police · filed 1989-06-15

We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official when the complaint alleges that the official used delegated authority or governmental approval to discharge an employee for constitutionally protected speech.

Nix v. Bobby Norman, Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training and the State of Arkansas · filed 1989-07-19

Thus, in an official-capacity suit, a plaintiff states a legally cognizable claim under section 1983 if she alleges that a state official, acting pursuant to his delegated authority or with the tacit or implied approval of the governmental entity, discharged her because of an exercise of constitutionally protected speech.

Section 1983 liability of state prison officials for alleged constitutional violations in a county jail must be assessed with guidance from state law governing their responsibilities.

In Re William P. Clements · filed 1989-08-11

It is evident that in order to decide the merits of the third-party complaint, the district court will have to first decide ... whether the Harris County inmates’ rights under the United States Constitution are being violated and then whether, and if so to what extent and in what respect, the third-party defendants are legally responsible for such violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In making this latter determination, the district court, though it does not enforce state-created ... rights, must nevertheless look to and at least to a large extent be guided by state law.

A § 1983 judgment against a school principal in his official capacity is a judgment against the school district.

Barter v. Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District · filed 1989-10-03

Any judgment against the High School principal in his official capacity is in fact a judgment against the School District.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state official acting in an official capacity.

Swigert v. Arthur Tate, Jr., Supt. · filed 1989-10-04

And in any event, a state official acting in his official capacity is not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing city employees in their official capacities to establish a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Morton v. City of Little Rock · filed 1989-12-26

In order to recover against city employees in their official capacities, plaintiff must establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom that was the “ ‘moving force’ behind,” or caused the alleged constitutional violation.

A Section 1983 suit against government employees in their official capacities is a suit against the governmental entity they represent.

Farred v. J.M. Hicks, Officer, Dekalb County Police Department, A.B. Blaisdell · filed 1990-10-31

Where, as here, a section 1983 plaintiff sues government employees (such as police officers) in their official capacities, the suit is in actuality against the governmental entity that the individuals represent.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a jail supervisor only where an unconstitutional policy or practice is in effect at the jail.

Bryant v. Winston · filed 1990-11-26

Furthermore, Sergeant Winston may be held liable in his official capacity as Sergeant at the Richmond City Jail only where an unconstitutional policy or practice is in effect at the jail.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons within the statute.

Roby v. Mr. James G. Strieby and Mr. Jenkins · filed 1991-03-01

They are not subject to an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because they are not "persons" within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability requires a link between the alleged deprivation and an official policy or custom.

Griffin v. Fairman · filed 1991-07-23

Griffin has not offered any argument, much less evidence, that any arguable denial of procedural due process was linked to an official policy or custom.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a county treasurer requires evidence that the county implemented, executed, or acquiesced in a policy or custom intended to deprive constitutional rights, or knew or should have known its action or inaction would do so.

Mooney v. Smith · filed 1991-09-16

Inasmuch as Mooney failed to present any evidence that Hughes County implemented, executed, or acquiesced in any policy or custom with the intention of depriving others of their constitutional rights or that the county knew or should have known that such action or inaction would violate or deprive others of their constitutional rights, the court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of Smith in his official capacity as the Hughes County Treasurer.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against South Carolina sheriffs or deputies in their official capacities because they are state officials.

Cone v. Nettles · filed 1992-04-27

Given this authority, we hold that Deputy Frier is a state official and, pursuant to Will, supra, is not liable in his official capacity for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official-capacity section 1983 judgment is not the public official’s personal liability, so the official’s individual bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish the official-capacity claim.

Pelkoffer v. Deer · filed 1992-08-31

In sum, this court rules that Deer’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge does not absolve him of any liability incurred in his official capacity, because Deer would not be personally liable for such a section 1983 judgment and because he is not considered to be the same legal entity when acting in his official capacity as opposed to his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability only when the alleged deprivation is connected to an official policy or custom.

Laws v. Dewey White, in His Official Capacity as Trustee of the Town Board of Rockville, as Chief of Police, an · filed 1992-09-29

With regard to Laws' official-capacity suit, since there is no evidence connecting White to the alleged harassment, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the alleged harassment was part of an official "policy or custom." Thus, there can be no official-capacity liability.

Section 1983 claims may not be maintained against a state or state agents acting in their official capacities.

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo · filed 1992-10-20

Defendants have also moved to dismiss all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 1983 claims may not be maintained against a state or against agents of the state acting in their official capacity. ... Defendants are correct on both counts.

Section 1983 claims against state government defendants must seek prospective or injunctive relief.

Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Employees' Retirement System · filed 1993-01-05

For the plaintiffs to make a valid section 1983 claim against these government defendants, the remedy sought must be prospective or injunctive.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a sheriff only when an unconstitutional jail policy or practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.

McNeal v. Harper · filed 1993-03-31

Sheriff Harper may be held liable in his official capacity only if the implementation of an unconstitutional policy or practice at the jail caused McNeal’s injury.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity judgment against a county treasurer’s office when the treasurer set policy for that office; the judgment does not make the county itself liable.

Manns v. Julie Curry, in Her Official Capacity as Treasurer of MacOn County · filed 1993-04-12

Only the "Macon County Treasurer's Office", not Macon County itself, is liable on the judgments. ... Curry, as the incumbent Treasurer, has no legitimate objection to requiring the "Macon County Treasurer's Office" to satisfy the judgment; Edgcomb plainly set policy for the Office within the meaning of Jett v. Dallas, 491 U.S. 701 (1989), and Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.1992).

Section 1983 permits government liability through an official-capacity claim only when an official with final policymaking authority causes the deprivation of federal rights.

James v. Jones · filed 1993-05-05

Only those officials who possess “final poli-cymaking authority” may subject the government to Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a police chief in his official capacity to show that a policy or practice maintained by the chief deprived the plaintiff of a specified constitutional right.

Johnson v. Ft. Pierce Police Department · filed 1994-02-25

In order for Chief Kerlikowske to be hable to the Plaintiff, when sued in his official capacity, the Plaintiff must show that the Chief of Police established and/or maintained a pattern, practice or policy, the enforcement of which deprived the Plaintiff of a specified constitutional right.

Section 1983 claims against police officers in their official capacities require an allegation of a municipal policy or custom.

Woodard v. Hardenfelder · filed 1994-03-15

As pointed out in the Order, plaintiff sued the Police Defendants in their official capacity and because of the absence of an allegation of municipal custom or policy the complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not subject the State to liability in the New York Court of Claims.

White v. State · filed 1994-07-01

The State is not subject to liability in this court under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1988 (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58; Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn., 83 AD2d 723, affd 56 NY2d 656), and this court lacks jurisdiction to award money damages against an individual.