42 U.S.C. § 1983

A detention facility is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Dixon v. Baltimore County Detention Center · filed 2021-08-19

A number of courts have held that a detention facility is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the claims against BCDC will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Whiting v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2021-08-19

We will accordingly grant summary judgment to DOC and SCI-Mahanoy medical department because they are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.

A county jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

YOUNG v. MONMOUTH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE · filed 2021-08-25

The Court, therefore, dismisses with prejudice the § 1983 claims against MCCI because it is not a “person” under § 1983.

A detention facility is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Waldron v. Ojo · filed 2021-08-27

A number of courts have held that a detention facility is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. ... Therefore, the claims against MCCF will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against an unnamed group of people such as “Jail administration”; a plaintiff must identify the individuals involved.

Free v. Bonner · filed 2021-08-30

A group of people is not a “person” subject to suit pursuant to § 1983.

A county sheriff’s department is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Barrios v. San Diego County Sheriff's Dept · filed 2021-08-31

The San Diego County Sheriff Department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 and Barrios cannot pursue a § 1983 civil rights claims against the Department.

A prison or state corrections department is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Simmons 776979 v. Oaks Correctional Facility · filed 2021-08-31

Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

A sheriff’s office is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Fennell v. Bonner · filed 2021-08-31

As the Screening Order explained, the SCSO is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit direct claims against Maryland county school boards because they are not persons under the statute.

Gandy v. Howard County Board Of Education · filed 2021-09-01

First, as to the Gandys’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, it is well established in Maryland that county school boards as not considered “persons” under § 1983 and therefore cannot be subject to liability under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state or local correctional facility because it is not a person under the statute.

Dellinger v. Downs · filed 2021-09-02

It is well settled that a state or local correctional facility is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a county jail as a person subject to liability.

SMITH v. CAPE MAY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2021-09-10

County Jails are not “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against Maryland county school boards or their officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Lancaster v. Baltimore County Maryland · filed 2021-09-13

Board Defendants argue as an initial matter that the Board and the Individual Board Defendants in their official capacities are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court agrees.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a person; a group identified only as mental health staff does not qualify.

Hamilton v. Mental Health Staff at JTVCC · filed 2021-09-17

The named defendant is not a person as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against persons; a state prison department is not a person under the section.

Robinson v. Bureau of Health Care Services · filed 2021-09-22

Accordingly, the Bureau of Health Care Services is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county prisons because they are not persons under the statute.

Heizman v. Dauphin County Prison · filed 2021-09-23

County prisons are not persons subject to liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state correctional facility; a private prison medical contractor may be liable when its policy, custom, or practice causes a rights violation.

Ray v. MECC · filed 2021-09-28

Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because MECC is not suable for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because the Complaint does not allege that any Corizon policy, custom, or practice violated Plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 permits suit against the Baltimore Police Department as a person because it lacks Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Earl v. Taylor · filed 2021-09-29

Therefore, the court determines BPD does not retain Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Pennsylvania magisterial district courts are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

SZERENSCI v. MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 14-3-02 · filed 2021-09-30

Before proceeding to this analysis, however, the Court first observes that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Magisterial District Court 14-3-02 in an individual capacity are barred because Magisterial district courts, which are a part of Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system, are not “persons” who may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county court system because it is not a person under the statute.

Graham v. State of South Carolina · filed 2021-09-30

Additionally, the magistrate judge found that Defendant Florence County Court Systems does not constitute a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and is, therefore, also subject to dismissal. ... Thus, having thoroughly reviewed the Report and the record in this case, the court, finding no clear error, agrees with and wholly ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report (ECF No. 26), which are incorporated herein by reference.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency because it is not a person subject to suit.

Sosa v. Richeson · filed 2021-10-01

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff has, but cannot, assert his section 1983 claims againt the DOC, a state agency that is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because an arm of the state is not a person under the statute.

Hranek v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville · filed 2021-10-01

Moreover, the FDOC is considered an “arm[] of the state,” not a “person” under § 1983.

Municipal police departments and sheriff’s offices are generally not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Thomas v. Mattingly · filed 2021-10-01

In addition, “it is well settled that municipal police departments, sheriff's offices, and jails are not generally considered persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus not amenable to suit.”

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state, a state prison, or a state prison medical department because they are not persons subject to liability under the statute.

CORREA-MARTINEZ v. PEREYRA · filed 2021-10-01

Here, Plaintiff's claims against the State of New Jersey, Northern State Prison, and the Mental Health Department fail because they are not “persons” subject to liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons, but a correctional facility is not a person subject to suit.

Andretta v. City of New York · filed 2021-10-01

E.M.T.C. is not a “person” within the meaning of ... §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state corrections department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Dennison v. State of Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2021-10-05

Briefly, the MDOC is an entity of the State of Missouri, and as such is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state correctional agencies because they are not persons subject to suit.

Howard v. MECC · filed 2021-10-06

Claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections and the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because they are not “persons” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and plaintiff’s claims against them would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a collective designation such as jail staff because it is not a person.

Wright v. Riverside Jail Staff · filed 2021-10-07

Nevertheless, the Court has already explained to Wright that Riverside Jail Staff is not a person amenable to suit in § 1983. ... Accordingly, any claim against Riverside Jail Staff will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person; Michigan state courts are not persons within its meaning.

MacArthur 524290 v. Eaton County 56A District Court · filed 2021-10-07

Furthermore, civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only be brought against a “person,” and states and their subdivisions are clearly not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county jails or county departments because they are not persons under the statute.

HEARNS v. LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS AND MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE · filed 2021-10-07

Neither a county jail nor a county department are “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county probation department or county prison because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Davenport v. Cumberland County Public Defender Office · filed 2021-10-07

Additionally, the Cumberland County Probation Department and the Cumberland County Prison are not proper Defendants as they are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison facility or department because it is not a person or legal entity subject to suit.

Taylor v. Hull · filed 2021-10-08

A prison facility or department is not a “person” or legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Kansas sheriff’s office is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Walker v. Douglas County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-10-12

Therefore, this Court and others have held that a sheriff’s office is not a “person” who is subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Rigsby v. Corder · filed 2021-10-13

However, the Department of Corrections is subject to dismissal because as an arm of the State it is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state department of corrections is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Rigsby v. Quater · filed 2021-10-13

However, the Department of Corrections is subject to dismissal because as an arm of the State it is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A sheriff’s office is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sowah v. Guy · filed 2021-10-13

With these principles in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot sustain this claim against the McMinn County Sheriff’s Office, as it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to suit.

Johnson v. Vanzant · filed 2021-10-19

Illinois Department of Corrections Vandalia must be dismissed as a Defendant because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a police department as a person subject to suit.

Weldon v. Cahokia Police Department · filed 2021-10-20

Cahokia Police Department is not a “person” who is subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a city justice center that is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Johnson v. Saint Louis City Justice Department · filed 2021-10-21

The St. Louis City Justice Center is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the New Jersey State Parole Board because it is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

NORMAN v. N.J. STATE PAROLE BOARD · filed 2021-11-02

As the New Jersey State Parole Board is not a “person” subject to liability under Section 1983 or the NJCRA, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it with prejudice.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person; state prisons and hospitals are not persons subject to liability under it.

CORREA-MARTINEZ v. RAHWAY HOSPITAL · filed 2021-11-08

To be liable under Section 1983, therefore, a defendant must be a “person.”

Section 1983 does not treat Pennsylvania state courts, the Pennsylvania State Police, or county jails as persons amenable to suit.

Smith, Jr. v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas · filed 2021-11-16

The state courts in Pennsylvania, the PSP, and the Franklin County Jail are not considered “persons” for the purpose of § 1983 and therefore are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against prisons because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Harris v. Mack · filed 2021-11-22

Prisons are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services or Patuxent Institution because they are not persons under the statute.

Fitriya'ohniya v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 2021-11-24

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person, and DPSCS and Patuxent are not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on foreign government officials or foreign entities.

TABAKA v. LEYRE · filed 2021-11-24

However, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims do not apply to foreign government officials or foreign entities.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI-Waymart, or the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole because they are not persons under the statute.

Endrikat v. Ransom · filed 2021-11-29

To begin, the amended complaint names as defendants the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), SCI-Waymart, and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, none of which may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because it is not a person subject to suit.

Hochschild v. Horton · filed 2021-11-30

The only named defendant in this case is the DOC. Hochschild has not identified any “persons,” in their individual or official capacities, as defendants in this case. Thus, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department as a separate entity.

Pina v. Sacuan Security and Police · filed 2021-12-03

The SDPD is managed by and/or a department of the City of San Diego, but it is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A state corrections department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Duke v. Parker · filed 2021-12-06

TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee and not a “person” as contemplated by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against the Virginia Department of Corrections or a probation and parole district because those agencies are not persons under the statute.

Cowles v. Department of Corrections and Probation and Parole District 34 · filed 2021-12-28

The named Defendants in this action, the “Department of Corrections” and “Probation and Parole District 34,” are not considered to be “persons amenable to suit under § 1983.” ... Because Plaintiff chose not to file an Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s initial Complaint remains the operative Complaint in this action and, as explained above, it does not sufficiently state a claim against any Defendant upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state correctional facilities because they are not persons under the statute.

Lotharp-Crawford v. Mountain View Correctional Institute · filed 2022-01-03

Thus, NCDPS facilities are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Fuller v. Honeycutt · filed 2022-01-03

Neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court administration because it is not a person under the statute.

McChester v. Hemingway · filed 2022-01-04

The court administration, however, is not a “person” within the meaning of 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state correctional facility because the state is not a person subject to suit.

Williams 394751 v. Ionia Correctional Facility · filed 2022-01-07

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC and ICF) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

A prison is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

ALI v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2022-01-11

George W. Hill Prison is also not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 and is, accordingly, dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Philadelphia Department of Prisons because it is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

ORTIZ v. AMAZON · filed 2022-01-11

Because the Philadelphia Department of Prisons is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983, ... Ortiz’s claim against it is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person, and a detention center does not qualify.

Hand v. Allen · filed 2022-01-14

Conduct amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be conduct undertaken by a person, and Cecil County Detention Center does not qualify.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

CRUZ v. WARREN · filed 2022-01-18

Assuming that he does intend to sue the jail, under § 1983, the Cumberland County Jail, like other county jails, is not a “person” amendable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state court because an arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

FIGUEROA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2022-01-21

The Superior Court of New Jersey, as an arm of the state, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state or a state agency because neither is a person under the statute.

Owen, Brenda v. CDPU · filed 2022-01-24

Yet neither the State of Wisconsin nor the CDPU is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Philadelphia Department of Prisons because the department is not a person subject to suit.

LUCAS v. PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT OF PRISONS · filed 2022-01-25

Because the Philadelphia Department of Prisons is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983, Durham, 2018 WL 3105589 at *2 (citing Peele v. Philadelphia Prison Sys., Civ. A. No. 12-4877, 2015 WL 1579214, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 8, 2015)), Lucas’s claim against it is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the University of Texas Medical Branch because it is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Birdow v. Chapa · filed 2022-01-28

(3) Birdow’s claims against UTMB are DISMISSED because UTMB is not a “person” subject to claims under § 1983; ... ORDERED on January 28, 2022.

Police departments are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Johnson v. Illinois State Police · filed 2022-01-31

These two entities are not considered “persons” who are subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a correctional facility because the facility is not a person under the statute.

Labossiere v. Downstate Correctional Facility · filed 2022-02-07

Downstate Correctional Facility is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

A police department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Swann v. District Attorney of Kingsport · filed 2022-02-07

As an initial matter, the Kingsport Police Department is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a county jail, sheriff’s office, or medical department because those entities are not persons under the statute.

Gudger v. Frazer · filed 2022-02-08

Additionally, neither the Sullivan County Jail, the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office, nor the Sullivan County Medical Department are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and therefore, they are non-suable entities in this action.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or arms of state government because they are not persons under the statute.

Farmer v. Parker · filed 2022-02-14

However, neither a state nor an arm of its government is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail building because it is not a person.

Spangler v. Eschette · filed 2022-02-15

While Plaintiff has named the Meigs County Jail as a Defendant in this suit, a jail is a building and not a “person” within the understanding of § 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983.

Zab v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections Jose R. Rivera v. State of Rhode Island Department of Correctio · filed 2022-03-02

This Court has recognized that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 868 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Because Zab sued the DOC and the DOC Director in her official capacity, that portion of his complaint based upon § 1983 was properly denied by summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Zendian v. Indiana Department of Child Services · filed 2022-03-08

Thus, DCS, an agency of the State of Indiana, and Defendants Stigdon and Rich in their official capacities are not persons within the meaning of § 1983, and the § 1983 the claim for damages against them is barred.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a correctional institution because it is not a person under the statute.

Porter v. Mountain View Correctional · filed 2022-03-09

A correctional institution is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a detention center because it is not a legal entity or a person.

Johnson v. Salmon · filed 2022-03-14

Because a detention center is not a legal entity, it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 and Johnson cannot maintain this action against the defendant ACADC.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s office because it is not a person subject to suit under the statute.

Leslie v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Office (PSLC1) · filed 2022-03-15

Additionally, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

An arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Henderson v. Board of Supervisors of Southern University · filed 2022-03-23

Southern University’s Board of Supervisors is considered an arm of the State of Louisiana and, therefore, is not a “person” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Coffey v. State of Vermont · filed 2022-03-24

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded Plaintiffs claim against the HPD must be dismissed because the HPD is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A county jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

ZIGLER v. WARREN · filed 2022-03-28

Next, the Cumberland County Jail, like other county jails, is not a “person” amendable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to liability.

Brown v. Yates · filed 2022-03-29

Therefore, they are not “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state university’s board of regents or a university hearing officer in his official capacity because they are not persons under the section.

Clarkson v. Board of Regents of New Mexico · filed 2022-03-31

It concluded that neither the NMSU Board of Regents nor Pontelli, in his official capacity, were “persons” amenable to suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To the extent Clarkson re-asserts arguments he presented to the district court, we affirm for substantially the reasons cited by the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against a county jail because the jail is not a person subject to suit.

NELSON v. CAPE MAY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2022-04-01

The jail, however, is not a proper defendant in a prisoner civil rights matter, and must be dismissed as such.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county correctional facility because it is not a person under the statute.

PUMBA v. LEHIGH COUNTY JAIL · filed 2022-04-05

A county correctional facility, such as the LCJ, is not a “person” under section 1983.

An arm of the state is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

WESTERN FUNDING, INC. v. SOUTH SHORE TOWING, INC. · filed 2022-04-11

Accordingly, NJTA is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and, for that reason, NJTA also does not qualify as a “person” that is subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against detention centers because they are not persons subject to suit.

Whitehead v. Garcia · filed 2022-04-15

It is well settled that detention centers are not “persons” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against governmental agencies or prison facilities because they are not persons or legal entities subject to suit.

Artis v. Delpaz · filed 2022-04-18

It is well-settled that governmental agencies, such as the MDOC, and prison facilities, such as Duane Waters, are not person or legal entities subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a detention center building because it is not a person capable of being sued.

Szpila v. Love · filed 2022-04-19

Plaintiff cannot sue the Jerome Combs Detention Center because it is a building and not a person capable of being sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections because the department is not a suable person.

Childress v. Louisville Metro Department of Corrections · filed 2022-04-20

Accordingly, because LMDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, all of Childress’s claims against LMDC are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a correctional institution because it is not a person subject to suit.

Jordan v. Buncombe County Jail Doctor · filed 2022-04-25

A correctional institution is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A New Jersey county prosecutor’s office acting as an arm of the State in its law enforcement and investigative functions is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

CRISAFULLI v. TOWNSHIP OF BRANCHBURG · filed 2022-04-29

For these reasons, the Court finds that the SCPO was acting as an arm of the State and was therefore not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to the offending conduct at issue.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states, their agencies, or officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Howell v. Department of Housing and Community Development · filed 2022-05-02

To the extent Howell brings a claim under Section 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, such claims must be dismissed because the named defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail or sheriff’s office because neither is a person subject to suit.

Nelson v. Sullivan County Jail · filed 2022-05-10

Additionally, neither the Sullivan County Jail nor the SCSO is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state corrections department or a county jail because neither is a person under the statute.

Swann v. Hinkle · filed 2022-05-16

The Court finds that neither the TDOC nor the Sullivan County Jail are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and therefore they are not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 permits suit against a person acting under color of law; a county sheriff’s department is not a person under the section.

Hotvedt v. Waukesha County Sheriff Department · filed 2022-05-20

The Waukesha County Sheriff’s Department is not a person.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Terry v. Randolph County Jail · filed 2022-05-20

A jail is not a considered a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983 and is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for money damages against a state correctional center because it is not a person under the statute.

Van Vleet v. Menard Correctional Center · filed 2022-05-20

The only named defendant is Menard Correctional Center, which is not a “person” subject to suit for money damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a county sheriff’s department or its subdivisions because they are not persons under the statute.

Saxton v. San Diego County Sheriff's Department · filed 2022-05-23

Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim against the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department or its subdivisions because those entities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against the Rhode Island Superior Court because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Munir v. The Rhode Island Superior Court Corporation · filed 2022-06-01

Instead, the Complaint sues the Superior Court of Rhode Island, an entity that is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be sued for damages.

A sheriff’s department is not a person that may be sued under § 1983.

Beard v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Department · filed 2022-06-01

The sole Defendant named in this action is the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department, which is not a “person” that may be sued under § 1983.

A sheriff’s office is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

Moon v. Roanoke City Sheriff Office · filed 2022-06-03

The Roanoke City Sheriff’s Office is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

State agencies and state prison facilities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

MEHMETI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2022-06-03

It is well established that that the state and state entities, such as NJDOC and Edna Mahan, are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an award of damages against board members sued in their individual capacities.

Newborn v. Morrison · filed 1977-11-25

Since this suit is seeking damages against the members of the Board in their individual capacities, an award of damages under § 1983 is appropriate.

Section 1983 permits state officials to be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

Kenneth T. Rainey, Cross v. Jackson State College, Etc., Cross · filed 1979-03-20

The individual appellees, the President of Jackson State . College and the President, Executive Secretary and members of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi, were properly sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity actions against state officers are limited to prospective relief, while retrospective monetary relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Harrison v. Pyle · filed 1985-06-24

When against an individual in an official capacity, these actions are limited to suits for prospective relief and do not include actions for retrospective monetary damages which ultimately would have to be paid out of state treasuries. ... Therefore, Harrison’s suit against Pyle acting in his official capacity for monetary relief is barred in this court by the Eleventh Amendment.

A Section 1983 complaint against a public official solely in his individual capacity does not allege the governmental action required for constitutional liability.

Moss v. Robertson · filed 1986-03-28

However, all the alleged constitutional restrictions barring the appellee from firing appellants are down the drain and of no avail since neither appellant has sued ap-pellee in any manner except in his individual capacity. ... The constitutional constraints under which the appellants here seek protection ... prohibit governmental action, not individual or private action.

The Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 claims against state employees in their official capacities, but does not bar individual-capacity claims.

York v. Lamantia · filed 1987-11-18

The 11th Amendment, however, does not preclude suits against state officers or employees in their individual capacity. ... Immunity, therefore, bars action against Defendants in their official capacity, but not individually.

Plaintiffs state a § 1983 claim by adequately alleging constitutional violations, but state officials may not be sued for damages in their official capacities.

E & E Construction Co. v. Illinois · filed 1987-11-26

Individual Plaintiffs have stated claims under the Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and they have hence advanced a cause of action under Section 1983. ... Individual Defendants may not be sued for damages in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a Florida sheriff in his individual capacity despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, but bars a claim against him in his official capacity.

Majette v. Butterworth · filed 1988-04-25

Accordingly, Majette’s § 1983 action against Butterworth in his official capacity as sheriff must fail. ... Thus, Majette’s § 1983 action against Butterworth in his individual capacity will survive despite the Eleventh Amendment’s protections and prohibitions.

Section 1983 permits damages against state officials in their individual capacities despite a state law providing for their indemnification.

Blaylock v. Schwindon · filed 1988-09-07

The court may properly order the officials to pay damages under Sec. 1983, but if the officials desire indemnification under the state statute, they must bring their own action in state court.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against state officials in their individual capacities; a complaint that does not expressly sue them in that capacity is treated as suing them only in their official capacities.

Komutanon v. Coler · filed 1988-12-29

In addition, federal courts have jurisdiction over actions for violations of the United States Constitution against state officials acting in their individual capacities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because the Complaint does not explicitly state that plaintiff is suing the officials in their individual capacities, the court assumes that plaintiff is only suing the officials in their official capacitites.

When a Section 1983 complaint does not make clear whether defendants are sued in their individual or official capacities, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

Abdul-Wadood v. Jack Duckworth and Edward Cohn · filed 1989-01-09

When the nature of a section 1983 suit is unclear from the face of the complaint, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

A § 1983 complaint may give sufficient notice that an officer is sued in his individual capacity through its language, even when the caption does not expressly state that capacity.

Jackson v. Gary R. Crews, a Fayetteville City Policeman, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, a Municipal Corpo · filed 1989-07-13

We agree that the language of the complaint is sufficiently clear in this case to have given Crews notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity. We caution future § 1983 litigants, however, that it would be much better for them to clearly indicate both the parties being sued and their capacity in the caption.

Section 1983 permits claims against officials in their individual capacities as well as their official capacities for actions under color of state law.

Goodwin v. Debekker · filed 1989-07-18

Defendants also take the position that the plaintiff may not file this § 1983 action against them as individuals but only in their official capacities as sheriff and un-dersheriff acting under “color of state law.” They have not cited any legal authority in support of their argument. To the extent that this argument applies to the plaintiff’s seven claims for relief, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against state officials acting under color of state law, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar those claims.

Evans v. Celeste · filed 1989-08-24

Finally, he can be sued in his “personal” or “individual” capacity, that is, when he is acting under color of state law but not in his “official” capacity. ... Therefore, to the extent that the remaining individual defendants were acting in their “personal” or “individual” capacities, the claims against them are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Court has no reason to await a determination by the Ohio Court of Claims.

Section 1983 permits claims against state board members in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Konijnendijk v. Deyoe · filed 1989-12-11

The court, however, does find that plaintiffs second argument has merit and precludes the entry of summary judgment for the individual members of the Board of Regents. These defendants are sued in their official capacities solely for the purpose of prospective injunctive relief. This is proper.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a state official for acts during employment when the official acted outside the scope of office or grossly abused its lawful powers.

Gallipeau v. Berard · filed 1990-03-30

Official capacity suits do not, as defendants here suggest, encompass every suit involving acts performed during the course of a state actor’s employment. Defendants have confused “during the course of employment” with “within the scope of employment.” Courts must analyze whether the complaint alleges that the state official “acted either outside the scope of his respective office or, if within the scope, acted in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of office.”

Section 1983 permits monetary relief against prison officials sued in their individual capacities for an alleged assault outside the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties.

Travier v. L. Putnam, Inspector Everett Elkins Paul Deleeuw Maynard, Sgt. C/o Hart C/) Fath, Ian McDonald · filed 1990-04-24

In addition, we also conclude that plaintiff is properly suing the defendants in their individual capacity for monetary relief because the alleged assault does not fall within the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a governor who was not named in his individual capacity.

See v. Wallace Wilkinson, Governor Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1990-05-11

Likewise, Governor Wilkinson is not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983 because he was not named in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officers require suing them in their individual capacities.

George T. Haynie, Jr. v. Tennessee State Penitentiary and Hospital James Vandever, Assoc. Warden Lyle Craft, Hosp. Admin · filed 1990-06-19

As for Messers Vandever and Craft, not only is there no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), but the plaintiff failed to sue them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 provides no basis to sue officials individually when the only relief sought is equitable relief they can provide solely in their official capacities.

James M. Scott, Jr. v. Flowers · filed 1990-08-20

The commissioners can expunge the subject language from the reprimand only while acting in their official capacity. Hence, there is no basis for suit against them as individuals.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity action against a state official for prospective injunctive relief allowed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Hazel Sutton, Kenneth Holland, Edith Odom, and Kevin Qualls v. Jimmy M. Evans, John H. Burke, Jr., Jimmy P. Rice, and Wi · filed 1990-11-08

However, the Court recognized that “a State official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would he a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.’ ” Id. at 2311 n. 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Will leaves ample room for an action against state officials insofar as it seeks prospective relief allowed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities, but not against them in their official capacities.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1990-12-12

Defendants are not subject to suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in their official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (1989). However, the defendants are subject to suit to the extent plaintiff sought monetary damages from them in their individual capacity.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action are sued in their official capacities unless the complaint explicitly states otherwise.

Gongolewski v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, John P. McFadden Michael Delaney, Michael Sweeney, Terry · filed 1990-12-12

Individual defendants in a section 1983 action are sued in their official capacities unless the complaint explicitly states otherwise.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state officer individually for wrongs committed while performing official duties.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1991-03-21

Clearly, under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an individual capacity suit against a state official when the complaint alleges that official’s own tortious conduct under color of state law, even without an express capacity designation.

Hill v. Shelander · filed 1991-03-26

The reasoning of Kolar and Akins thus suggests a corollary — namely, that in a suit where the complaint alleges the tortious conduct of an individual acting under color of state law, an individual capacity suit plainly lies, even if the plaintiff failed to spell out the defendant’s capacity in the complaint.

Section 1983 permits personal liability suits against state officials without requiring an allegation that they acted outside their official authority.

Harrington v. Grayson · filed 1991-04-30

However, the requirement that the plaintiff must somehow allege an aberration of authority to establish personal liability under § 1983 is absent in the jurisprudence to date.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Folse v. Delgado Community College · filed 1991-10-29

Lest there be any mistake, it is here reiterated that plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983 against the individual defendants in their official capacity remains the subject of these proceedings.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Johnson v. Wefald · filed 1991-11-15

However, this does not affect the court’s ruling that the individual defendants in their official capacities may be sued for prospective relief.

Section 1983 permits prospective equitable relief against a state official sued in an official capacity and monetary damages against the official sued in an individual capacity, but not monetary damages against the official in an official capacity.

Corum v. University of North Carolina · filed 1992-01-31

Thus, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff can only obtain prospective equitable relief against Durham sued in his official capacity and monetary damages against Durham sued in his individual capacity. Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages under section 1983 against Durham sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits damages actions against state officials in their individual capacities, and a complaint seeking damages for their alleged misconduct may be construed as an individual-capacity suit even without an express designation.

Krause v. Finch · filed 1992-01-31

Neither Will nor the eleventh amendment, however, bars actions for damages against officials in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362-65 (1991). Although Krause did not specify in his complaint that he was suing the defendants in their individual capacities, he sought damages for the alleged misconduct, which we construe as an action against the defendants in their individual capacities. See Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828-29 (9th Cir.1991).

In a Section 1983 suit against state officials, a complaint describing only their official roles does not assert individual-capacity claims, and raising that intent in a response to a motion to dismiss does not cure the complaint.

Mays v. Richards · filed 1992-06-04

Moreover, the conduct described in the complaint can only relate to the prison superintendent and the hospital administrator in their official roles as the supervisors of the employees who Mays claims caused his injuries. ... As a result, Mays's argument in his response to the motion to dismiss that he meant to include an individual-capacity claim came too late in the day to correct his faulty complaint.

Section 1983 permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota · filed 1992-06-16

Similarly, section 1983 claims may not be asserted against states, state entities, and state officials acting in their official capacities, because such defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Because plaintiff seeks prospective relief from state officials acting in their official capacities, defendants are subject to suit.

A § 1983 complaint may sue a public official in an individual capacity even without expressly naming that capacity if the complaint as a whole and the course of proceedings show that intent.

Heideman v. Wirsing · filed 1992-06-23

The general rule of this circuit, then, appears to be that a complaint should be read in its entirety to determine whether the alleged wrongful conduct was carried out in an individual or an official capacity. Also relevant is the course of proceedings.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities because they are persons for that remedy.

Akers v. Caperton · filed 1992-07-30

State officials in their official capacity are “persons” under Section 1983 for purposes of Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief since “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.”

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities, including expungement of unconstitutional prison discipline from inmate records.

Wolfel v. Morris · filed 1992-09-23

The district court in this case ordered that the records of the punished inmates be cleared of any mention of the discipline imposed for circulating these petitions. As such, the district court awarded only prospective relief against the defendants. As a practical matter, the district court's order merely prevents the prison system from considering the discipline imposed in this case as part of the inmates' records in the future. As such, the district court's action is permitted pursuant to § 1983.

State officers sued in their individual capacities may be liable for damages under § 1983 even when they acted in an official capacity.

Jones v. Peter W. Vidor Gerald Stiffler R. Parteet R. Montalvo Meinke, Lt. · filed 1992-10-05

As an initial matter, we note that the complaint clearly indicates that the defendants were sued in their individual capacity. Thus, the defendants are amenable to damages under § 1983, even though their affidavits indicate that they were acting in an official capacity.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officers for actions taken in their official capacities.

Mayberry v. Robert N. Clement Everett Perry, Jr. · filed 1993-01-28

To the contrary, the defendants can be sued in their individual capacities, as alleged, for actions taken in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal-court suit against a State, but permits prospective injunctive relief against state agents sued in their official capacities.

Corrigan v. Rhode Island, Department of Business Regulation · filed 1993-04-14

The State is not susceptible to suit in federal court under 1983 claims, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), however, state agents can be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, id. at 491 U.S. 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2311 n. 10.

Section 1983 permits prospective declaratory relief against a state official without treating the claim as an action against the state.

Pechiney Corp. v. Crystal · filed 1994-01-13

I conclude that a declaratory action for prospective relief should not be treated as an action against the state for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary relief.

McGee v. Wilkinson · filed 1994-04-29

It is also noted that to the extent McGee sued the defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages, the state officials sued are not subject to suit for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 & n. 10 (1989).

Section 1983 allows claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Williams v. Commonwealth Of Kentucky · filed 1994-05-26

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Sec. 1983 actions brought against state officials in their official capacities seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster · filed 1994-07-15

A State official may be sued in his or her official capacity in a 42 USC § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief "because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State’ ” (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 71, n 10, quoting Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 167, n 14).

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho · filed 1994-12-09

Injunctive relief is available against state officials in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not subject state officials sued in their official capacities to monetary relief.

Sanders v. Bradley · filed 1995-01-24

We also note that to the extent Sanders sued the defendants in their official capacity for monetary relief, the defendants are not subject to suit in that capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in the official’s official capacity.

Kirsch v. Smith · filed 1995-07-14

Unlike a claim for damages, a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official is properly asserted against that official in his official capacity.

In a § 1983 action, a defendant may be treated as sued in her individual capacity when the district court denies her qualified immunity while granting summary judgment to the county, even if the substitution order does not specify capacity.

Sanderfer v. Nichols · filed 1995-08-08

However, because the district court ordered Jansen substituted as a party defendant but denied her summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds while granting summary judgment to the county, we will assume, for purposes of this action, that the district court's intent was to substitute Jansen in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to expressly plead whether a state official is sued in an individual or official capacity.

Biggs v. William C. Meadows Nurse Cartwright Superintendent Barnes Mr. Weeks · filed 1995-09-18

Because we find the majority view to be more persuasive, we hold today that a plaintiff need not plead expressly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a territorial police officer even when the officer acted within the scope of employment.

Jarvis v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1996-03-05

Appellant's assertion that a 1983 suit cannot be sustained against a police officer in his individual capacity if he was acting within the scope of his employment is summarily rejected since "an employee of the Territory who inflicts injury while acting in his official capacity may only be sued under section 1983 in his 'individual capacity.'" Nibbs v. Roberts, 31 V.I. 196, 208 (D.V.I. APP. 1995) (emphasis added).

A § 1983 damages complaint against state employees should not be dismissed as an official-capacity suit when the complaint clearly names them in their individual capacities.

Steven Charles Brigida, Aka: Steven C. Brigida v. Otis Thurman, Warden, California State Department of Corrections D.B. · filed 1996-04-29

The second document, which Brigida appears to have attached as an addendum to question 3, contains a caption which unambiguously states that Brigida is seeking damages against the named defendants in their individual capacity. Because a pro se complaint should be liberally construed, the district court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant's complaint.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Kelley v. Troy State University · filed 1996-05-02

State agents in their official capacities, however, may be properly subject to prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 because such actions are not treated as actions against the State.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a state caseworker when the complaint and course of proceedings give sufficient notice of potential personal liability, even if the complaint does not expressly name that capacity.

Lesley v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1996-08-26

Here, the complaint requests punitive damages and attorney fees and thus indicates that the plaintiffs intended to sue the caseworkers in their individual capacity. Furthermore, Maurer argued at trial and on appeal that she is entitled to qualified immunity, indicating that she had notice that she was being sued individually. Finally, the lower court’s ruling on summary judgment was based on qualified immunity, not the Eleventh Amendment. We thus construe the pleadings to permit individual suit against Maurer.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against state officials when the plaintiff’s filings indicate that they are sued in that capacity.

Hall v. Artuz · filed 1997-02-11

Thus, the Complaint and the Response to Answer together suggest that Hall is suing the officials in their individual capacities. Accordingly, I treat this action as one against the defendants in their individual capacities.