42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action against a federal official; a claim against such an official must be brought under Bivens.

Stempleski v. United States of America Secretary of Health and Human Services, Louis Sullivan, and Others to Be · filed 1994-04-27

Furthermore, because the Secretary is a federal, rather than a state official, any civil rights action against the Secretary would have to be brought under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971).

A claim against defendants acting under color of federal law is treated as a Bivens action rather than a Section 1983 action.

Anderson v. Montague · filed 1994-05-16

Although Anderson designated his action as brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because the defendants were all allegedly acting under color of federal law Anderson's action is more properly characterized as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal inmate an action to recover lost-time wages under the Inmate Accident Compensation Plan.

Drummond v. U.S. Attorney General U.S. Attorney U.S. Agency Peter M. Carlson, Warden L. Else, Safety Manager · filed 1994-10-11

We agree with the district court's conclusion that Drummond could not bring this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or as a petition for a writ of mandamus.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Motta v. District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1994-11-29

It is settled law, however, that Section 1983 does not apply to actions by federal officials, such as Respondent, acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal agency acting as a federal actor because it concerns state actors.

Anderson v. Mile High Child Care, Civil Rights Commission of Colorado, Equal Employment Opportunity Commissi · filed 1995-05-11

The district court correctly held Mr. Anderson cannot maintain a Sec. 1983 claim nor a claim of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, because both Sec. 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment pertain to state, rather than federal, actors.

Section 1983 permits personal damages liability for state officials, but that rule does not apply to federal officials acting as agents of the United States.

Roland S. Weaver v. United States · filed 1996-10-16

Hafer, however, was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 holding that state officials could be personally liable for damages based on actions taken in their official capacities; it does not apply in this case.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a federal military official for alleged misconduct incident to ROTC service.

Morse v. West · filed 1997-09-18

Finally, to the extent the third and fourth claims rely on Section 1983, dismissal is also appropriate.

Section 1983 generally does not apply to federal officials.

Shayesteh v. Dotson · filed 1998-08-14

Absent circumstances not present in this case, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials, like the defendant, so we only consider the Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal agencies or against federal officials alleged to have acted only under federal law.

Breyer v. Meissner · filed 1998-08-28

Plaintiffs proposed amendment names only federal officials, and federal agencies as defendants, and makes no allegation that they acted under color of any law other than federal immigration law. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against the federal agencies, which are not deemed to be “persons” under § 1983, or against the individual officers in either their official or individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against federal officials acting under color of federal rather than state law.

Broadway v. John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture · filed 1982-12-15

The individual defendants in this suit are federal officials, acting under color of federal law rather than state law, and are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover constitutional claims against federal prison personnel who are not acting under color of state authority; individual-capacity damages claims against them proceed under Bivens.

Rodriguez v. Woods · filed 1999-03-18

Contrary to the allegations in the complaint, this case does not involve 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... Such a claim, however, is properly handled as a Bivens action, not as a §1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides no right of action against federal officials acting under federal authority.

Russell v. United States Department of the Army · filed 1999-09-14

Section 1983, however, provides no right of action against federal (rather than state) officials.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the federal government or its officials.

Franklin v. Henderson · filed 2001-06-20

The federal government and its officials are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A civil-rights complaint filed under Section 1983 against federal officials may be construed as a Bivens claim.

West v. US Marshall · filed 2001-10-26

Although West filed his instant complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court properly construed such complaint as alleging claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to alleged torts committed by federal officials acting under federal law.

Luster v. United States · filed 2002-11-13

It is beyond question that § 1983 has no applicability to alleged torts committed by federal officials acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not cover acts performed by federal officials in their official capacities.

Rockefeller v. United States Court of Appeals Office, for the Tenth Circuit Judges · filed 2003-02-07

Thus, because all the acts the plaintiff is challenging were being performed by individuals who were acting in there official capacities as federal government officials, the defendants’ acts are exempt from suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not apply to federal officials.

Shayesteh v. Daniel C. Dotson, United States Marshal, District of Utah · filed 1998-08-14

Absent circumstances not present in this case, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials, like the defendant, so we only consider the Bivens claim...

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal prison officials for challenges to a Federal Bureau of Prisons program statement.

Washington v. Mallisham · filed 2004-04-06

As her arguments fail to raise a cognizable issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the dismissal of her instant complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted was proper.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against the federal government or officials acting under color of federal law.

Conner v. Greef · filed 2004-04-26

The federal government and its officials are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal official for administering a federal penitentiary.

Walker v. Blackwell · filed 1966-04-07

Since these complaints relate to the administration of a United States penitentiary by a federal official, we agree with the district court that they could not be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal authority.

Mohamed v. Tattum · filed 2005-08-04

But Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials.

Section 1983 claims against federal defendants are construed as Bivens claims when they allege violations of federal constitutional rights by federal officials.

Charles Nelson, Jr. v. Matt Barden · filed 2005-08-10

Although Nelson cited in his complaint to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his pro se claims against federal defendants should, instead, be construed as filed pursuant to Bivens, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392-97, 91 S.Ct. at 2002-05 (making available a cause of action for monetary damages against federal officials in their individual capacities for a violation of a federal constitutional right).

Section 1983 generally does not provide a claim against federal officials acting under federal law.

Redondo-Borges v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2005-08-26

The plaintiffs try to shoehorn their constitutional claims against the federal defendants into the contours of section 1983. That endeavor has all the hallmarks of a futile gesture: after all, a section 1983 claim normally does not lie against a federal official.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a federal court clerk acting as a federal employee rather than an agent of the state.

Jenkins v. Clerk of Court · filed 2005-10-21

Appellants based their complaint on a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged the Clerk is an entity acting as an agent of the state. The Clerk, however, is the clerk in a federal court and is a federal employee, not a state employee.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Kenny v. Easley · filed 2006-01-04

Federal officials who act under color of federal law are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Meuse v. Freeh · filed 2006-03-23

It should be noted at the outset that the federal defendants cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law; constitutional claims against federal officials are treated as Bivens claims.

Kapoor v. Walker · filed 1997-12-08

We construe Kapoor’s constitutional claims related to travel and equal protection as Bivens-type claims. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Jones v. United States, 16 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law).

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against federal prison officials acting as federal officials.

Kaba, Karamo v. Stepp, E.A. · filed 2006-08-16

Kaba filed his initial and amended pro se complaints citing both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (plainly not applicable here) against four officials at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois, in both their individ- ual and official capacities.

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against federal prison officials acting in their federal roles.

Kaba v. E.A. Stepp, Mickal E. Laird, Dave Benson, and Joseph Yonkman · filed 2006-08-16

Kaba filed his initial and amended pro se complaints citing both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (plainly not applicable here) against four officials at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois, in both their individual and official capacities.

A damages claim pleaded under § 1983 against federal officials may be construed as a Bivens claim.

Jackson v. Bush · filed 2006-09-11

Thus, though plaintiff brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is presumed that plaintiff intended to allege a Bivens claim against the defendant federal officials.

Section 1983 does not govern a constitutional claim against a federal official; such a claim arises under Bivens.

Baxter v. Washington · filed 2006-09-11

Although Baxter claims that the complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he alleges the deprivation of a constitutional right by a federal official, it actually was based upon Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A claim against a federal official is analyzed under Bivens rather than Section 1983.

Quintana-Martinez v. Rodriguez-Velez · filed 2007-08-08

Plaintiff Quintana brought this action under Section 1983, alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The appropriate basis for suit, however, is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), because Defendant Rodriguez is a federal official and Bivens is the applicable case for analysis when federal officials are parties.

Section 1983 does not authorize a direct cause of action against federal officials.

Morgovsky v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-10-18

As the Federal Civil Rights Act does not authorize a direct cause of action against federal officials, Morgovsky agreed to dismiss the section 1983 Count.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Boulware v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2007-10-29

By its terms, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Marshall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2007-10-30

By its terms, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting in that capacity.

Thibeaux v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2008-04-30

Because Thibeaux was suing federal officials, as opposed to state officials, Thibeaux’s complaint asserted a Bivens action, not a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions against federal officials because they are not state actors acting under color of state law.

Halter v. Eichenlaub · filed 2008-07-25

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to actions against Federal officials, because they are not state actors acting under color of state law, See e.g. Benson v. United States, 969 F.Supp. 1129, 1135 (N.D.Ill.1997), a prisoner may file suit in federal court for damages arising from a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal law.

Federal officials may be liable under § 1983 if they act in concert with state officials.

Lewis v. Bayh · filed 2008-09-09

Although the defendant is a federal official and § 1983 ostensibly applies to state officials, even federal officials may be liable under § 1983 provided they acted in concert with state officials.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights and does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Jackman v. United States · filed 2009-03-30

Plaintiffs cause of action under § 1983 cannot be maintained against the United States or its officers because “[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.” ... Accordingly, the § 1983 claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 applies to state actors and does not provide a claim against federal officials.

Nghiem v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2009-03-31

With respect to Nghiem’s §§ 1981 and 1983 claims, the district court properly dismissed them because the statutes apply only to state actors, and not federal officials.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the United States or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Jones v. Delaney · filed 2009-04-20

Plaintiffs cause of action under § 1983 cannot be maintained against the United States or its officers because “[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials acting under federal law when they are not alleged to have acted under color of state law.

Soldevila v. Secretary of Agriculture of the United States of America, Etc. · filed 1975-03-13

In an effort to get to the root of this case we note at the outset what the government fails to point out in its brief on appeal and failed to note in its presentation to the district court: no action under § 1983 lies against federal officials acting pursuant to federal law; and the appellants were not alleged to have acted “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law, but does not reach persons acting under color of federal law.

Williams v. Wright · filed 1976-08-10

That statute, by its own term, applies to persons acting under color of state law. It does not extend to persons acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide a private cause of action against federal officials.

Micklus, Gregory Bernard v. Carlson, Norman, Director, U. S. Bureau of Prisons Fenton, Charles, Warden, U.S.P. Lewisburg · filed 1980-09-03

Though Micklus does not have a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants are federal officials, he does have “a cause of action and a damages remedy [which] can also be implied directly under the Constitution” because the “Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated,” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2269, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), by reason of the liberty interest created in 18 U.S.C. § 5011.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal warden acting under color of federal law.

Eddie L. Franklin and Thomas L. Bates v. Warden Page True · filed 1996-01-30

Plaintiffs continue to insist they have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on grounds that Warden True was a state actor by virtue of the Tenth Amendment. This argument is nonsense.

Section 1983 permits a claim against federal officials when they allegedly conspire with state officials who play a significant role, supplying the required state action.

Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction, Inc. · filed 1983-04-22

The federal defendants claim that § 1983 does not apply to them is incorrect. ... Where there is a conspiracy alleged with state officials as in Count IV of Lightner’s complaint, and those state officials play a significant role in the conspiracy, “the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the conspiracy actionable under Section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide the basis for a claim against federal officials; such a claim proceeds under Bivens.

Gartner v. Securities & Exchange Commission · filed 1995-11-27

Plaintiff mistakenly states in his complaint that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Because plaintiff names federal officials as defendants, however, jurisdiction is proper under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, ... 403 ... U.S. 388, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials.

Butcher v. Guthrie · filed 2009-05-07

However, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials, see Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005), and the defendant judges were immune under Bivens because their handling of Butcher’s earlier lawsuit was a judicial act “not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against the United States or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Partovi v. Matuszewski · filed 2009-08-21

It is settled that a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action against the United States or its officers because the provision “does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.”

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials.

Young v. Martinez · filed 2009-08-31

Because the defendants are federal officials and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to federal officials, the complaint will be liberally construed to assert a so-called Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal agents acting under federal authority.

Sash v. United States · filed 2009-12-15

Thus, Sash cannot assert claims under sections 1983, 1985, or 1986 against the individual defendants since they are federal agents.

Section 1983 claims against federal officials are construed as Bivens claims.

Jackson v. Bop Fci Loretto · filed 2009-12-30

Because the defendants named are federal officials, the claim will be construed as one brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents 0/ Federal Bureau o/Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not support claims against federal officials in their official capacities.

Gross v. Holder · filed 2010-06-01

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 claims against federal officials in their official capacities fall outside the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Gross v. United States Attorney General · filed 2010-06-01

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not make federal prosecutors individually liable on the claims alleged here.

Eldridge v. Hall · filed 2010-09-21

Plaintiff has stated no claim for which the federal defendants may be held liable in their individual capacities under § 1983 or its federal analog, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents oj ... Federal Bureau o/Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the remedy for which "is damages or nothing." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,245 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 generally does not permit suits against the federal government or federal officials acting under federal law.

Lasmer Industries, Inc. v. Am General, LLC · filed 2010-09-30

The federal government and its officials are not generally subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not provide damages against federal officials acting under federal law.

Mala v. Palmer · filed 2010-12-16

This Court first notes that damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “normally does not lie against a federal official.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials acting as such; claims involving federal officials are construed under Bivens.

Bevan vs Steele · filed 2011-03-07

Although Bevan purported to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court appropriately construed his complaint under Bivens because the claims involve federal officials.

Section 1983 applies to claims against state actors; the court construed a claim against federal officials as a Bivens action.

Lewis v. U.S. Parole Commission · filed 2011-03-18

Because a § 1983 claim is more appropriately brought against state as opposed to federal officials, the court construes the plaintiff's claim as a Bivens action, "the federal analog to suits brought against state actors under ... § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Johnson v. GOVERNMENT OF DIST. OF COLUMBIA · filed 2011-04-21

At oral argument on September 24, 2010, the Court reaffirmed its finding that Marshal Dillard had acted under color of federal law as the United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for the same reasons outlined in its prior Order, ... and dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against Marshal Dillard.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court · filed 2011-05-23

First, “[b]y its terms, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.”

Section 1983 claims against federal prison officials are more properly considered under Bivens.

Graham v. Rosario · filed 2011-05-23

As correctly noted by the magistrate judge, these claims are more properly considered under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Sibley v. United States Supreme Court · filed 2011-05-23

These arguments are unavailing. First, "[b]y its terms, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal employees acting as federal officials.

Roseboro v. Gillespie · filed 2011-05-24

Thus, Roseboro cannot assert claims under sec tion 1983 against defendants since they are federal employees.

Section 1983 is the analogue for claims against state actors; claims against federal officials instead arise under Bivens.

Young v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2011-11-21

Plaintiff originally brought his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the state-law analogue to Bivens. The Complaint and briefing on the Motion to Dismiss make clear, however, that Plaintiff's claims sound in Bivens, and not in Section 1983.

Constitutional claims against federal officials are analyzed under Bivens rather than Section 1983.

Shue v. United States · filed 2012-04-03

Here, Shue’s constitutional claims against federal officials are properly analyzed as claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim against federal officials is a Bivens claim rather than a § 1983 claim.

Salazar v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-05-07

The district court was also correct that Salazar has actually asserted a Bivens claim, not a § 1983 claim, because Salazar sued federal, not state, officials.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials, but not federal officials.

Ashbourne v. US Department of the Treasury · filed 2012-07-12

However, § 1983 allows for suits against state officials, not federal officials.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Talley v. Shah · filed 2012-07-23

However, even assuming counterfactually that Talley had asserted a Section 1983 claim in his Complaint, Talley cannot recover against USAID’s Administrator under Section 1983 because “Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.”

Section 1983 does not apply to federal government entities or federal officials acting under federal law.

Way v. Johnson · filed 2012-09-26

By its terms, § 1983 does not apply to any federal government entity or to federal officials acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials.

Ciacci v. Obama · filed 2012-12-14

Plaintiff purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute, by its terms, does not apply to federal officials Plaintiff also claims that he has exhausted his remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346. 2671-80.

Constitutional claims against federal officials filed on § 1983 forms may be construed as a Bivens action.

Walker v. Schult · filed 2013-05-23

Although Walker used the forms associated with civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to file his complaint, the district court properly construed his claims -- asserted against federal officials -- pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal agencies or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Halim v. Donovan · filed 2013-07-01

By its terms, Section 1983 does not apply to any federal government entity or to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 claims against federal prison officials may be construed as Bivens claims.

King v. United States · filed 2013-07-31

Although King pleaded his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we, like the district court, construe his allegations as asserting Bivens claims.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against federal agencies or officials acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

D'Addabbo v. President Barack Obama · filed 2013-08-07

Furthermore, § 1983 does ... not allow claims against federal agencies or officials who act under color of federal (and not state) law; ... Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. D’Addabbo’s claims for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum Decision and Order.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal agencies or officials acting under color of federal law.

Goodyear v. Department of Justice · filed 2013-12-02

All ofthe named defendants, however, are federal agencies or officials to whom § 1983 does not apply.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting in their federal capacities.

Cofield v. United States of America · filed 2014-08-20

Turning to the individual defendants named in the complaint, President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker (who assumed office on June 26, 2013) cannot be held personally liable under Section 1983, because, by its terms, that statute does not apply to federal officials.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief against the United States for acts of federal officials under color of federal law.

White v. Vilsack · filed 2015-02-19

The complaint also cites Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and USDA’s regulations implementing that statute, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process protected by the Fifth Amendment. See Compl. at 1. But as USDA points out, none of these provisions could serve as the basis for the monetary relief sought from the United States by Mr. White.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors; a claim arising from a federal official’s conduct is instead treated as a Bivens action.

Jarvis v. D'Andrea · filed 2015-03-13

As the Magistrate Judge explained, a Bivens action is the “federal equivalent” of the section 1983 cause of action against state actors, and will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s rights under color of federal law. ... Here, Jarvis’s allegations arose in the context of D’Andrea’s position as a federal official; accordingly, his complaint was properly classified as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal government officials.

Shipman v. United States · filed 2015-05-29

The statutes he mentions in passing are 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not even apply to federal government officials; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.

Section 1983 applies to state officials acting under color of state law, but not to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Davidson v. United States Department of State · filed 2015-07-07

As Defendants correctly point out, however, section 1983 applies only to state officials acting under color of state law. ... Here, Defendants are federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not authorize official-capacity claims against federal officials because it covers action under color of state or territorial law.

Peterson v. Timme · filed 2015-07-30

Because § 1983 only authorizes suits alleging wrongful action under color of state or territorial law, it cannot be invoked to bring official-capacity claims against federal defendants.

A § 1983 claim alleging that a federal official violated constitutional rights is treated as a Bivens claim.

Camerano v. United States · filed 2016-07-07

A purported claim under § 1983 claim for violation of an individual's constitutional rights should be interpreted as a Bivens claim when the accused official is a federal official.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal officials acting under federal law; it covers officials acting under color of state, local, or District of Columbia law.

Norington v. United States · filed 2016-11-22

Thus, section 1983 imposes liability on state and local officials only, as those are the people Who act under color of state, local, or District of Columbia laW.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal judge acting under federal law.

Corbitt v. Wood · filed 2017-01-27

Because Plaintiff asserts a claim against a federal judge and not a state actor, his claim is more properly brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), not § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under federal law.

Every v. Department of Veterans Affairs, et al. · filed 2017-03-06

Section 1983, however, “authorizes actions against ‘state’ actors, not federal agents.”

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal officials acting in their federal capacity; such claims may instead be construed as Bivens actions.

Rusk v. Tymkovich · filed 2018-03-14

The opening section of Rusk’s pro se complaint—labeled “JURISDICTIONAL BASIS”—cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged “violations of certain protections guaranteed to [Rusk] by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.” ROA, Vol. I at 4. We conclude, given Chief Judge Tymkovich’s status as a federal rather than state official, that Rusk’s complaint can be construed as a Bivens action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 applies to constitutional rights violations by state officials, not federal officials.

Gonzalez v. Berg · filed 2018-03-28

But § 1983 only applies where a state official violates an injured person’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Beck v. United States Government · filed 2018-07-09

“Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law,” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the United States, the Smithsonian and Secretary Skorton in his official capacity under § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations under color of state or District of Columbia law; it does not apply to federal officials acting under federal law.

Beck v. U.S. Gov't · filed 2018-07-09

Section 1983 provides a remedy where a person acting under color of state or District of Columbia law deprives a plaintiff of his Constitutional rights. ... Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the United States, the Smithsonian and Secretary Skorton in his official capacity under § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a suit against a federal agency or its officials.

Washington v. Shulkin · filed 2018-08-02

In his form complaint, Washington asserts the following bases for federal jurisdiction: PL 105 270 § 5; 5 U.S.C. § 558; 5 U.S.C. Chapter 7; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and 41 U.S.C. § 1707; Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 1.603-4); VA Acquisition Regulation (VAAR 801.690-7). None of the cited statutes and regulations confer jurisdiction on this Court.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Jones v. Hurwitz · filed 2018-08-24

He brings his claim against the BOP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Framed in that manner, Jones's claim fails as a matter of law because " Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n , 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce civil rights against state officials, not federal officials.

Staples v. United States · filed 2019-02-01

More important, § 1983 provides a mechanism to enforce civil rights against state officials and not federal officials such as Gonzalez.

Section 1983 generally does not apply to federal officials.

Carr v. Sessions · filed 2019-02-25

With minor exceptions not present here, § 1983 is inapplicable to federal officials.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state officials; constitutional damages claims against federal officials proceed under Bivens.

Walker v. Schult · filed 2019-03-13

Walker filed this lawsuit using a form complaint for civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but Bivens provides for damages actions when a federal official violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal agents acting under federal authority.

Scruggs v. United States of America · filed 2019-03-27

The unknown TSA agents, as best as I can infer from Scruggs’s complaint, were federal agents too, so no § 1983 claim exists against them either.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials.

Mynor Tun-Cos v. Perrotte · filed 2019-04-26

But § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials, and there is no analogous statute imposing damages liability on federal officials.

Section 1983 claims brought against federal judges are construed as Bivens claims.

Asensio, the Parent of E.A., a Minor v. Roberts · filed 2019-04-26

The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that he brings on his own behalf against Defendants — all federal judges — as claims of violations of his federal constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 covers claims against state officials; the court construed claims against federal employees as Bivens claims.

Williams v. United States of America · filed 2019-07-03

Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by federal employees, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s amended complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A pro se plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against federal defendants may be construed as Bivens claims.

Pondexter v. Secretary United States Depart · filed 2019-09-17

Pondexter brought these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and we liberally construe his § 1983 claims against the federal defendants as claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not govern a constitutional damages claim against a federal official; such a claim is governed by Bivens.

Shade v. Mehalchick · filed 2019-09-17

When the Court entered the dismissal order, it mistakenly referred to Plaintiff's claim as a “civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983” rather than a Bivens civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Xu v. Chan · filed 2019-09-23

First, plaintiff cannot state a claim against any of the defendants under Section 1983, and granting leave to amend to afford plaintiff an opportunity to do so would be futile, as all of the defendants are alleged to be federal officials acting under color of federal law and Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, but does not provide that remedy against federal officials acting under federal authority.

Mejia-Mejia v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement · filed 2019-09-26

There is no statutory basis for the money damages Ms. Mejia-Mejia seeks. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a damages remedy to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials, but “Congress has provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by agents of the Federal Government.” See Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Edwards v. Cauthron · filed 1997-09-18

We first note 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable to federal officials acting under color of federal law, Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1986), and Judge Cauthron was acting under color of federal law in granting additional time for filing a report.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action against state officials; claims against federal officials proceed under Bivens.

Allah v. Ramos · filed 2019-12-03

An action under Bivens is similar to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 except that a Bivens action is maintained against federal officials while a § 1983 case is against state officials.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting pursuant to federal law.

Graves v. Bernhardt · filed 2019-12-11

All of the individual defendants named in this action are federal officials to whom § 1983 does not apply.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Jones v. Kaine · filed 2020-02-28

Because, as Defendants rightly point out, Dkt. 34 at 8, “Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law,” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005), Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 is not the vehicle for civil rights claims against federal prison officials; such claims may be construed as Bivens actions.

Klein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2020-03-03

While Plaintiff has used the form for a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court construes his action as one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by state and local officials, but not federal officials or entities.

Knight v. Nugent · filed 2020-04-02

Congress provided 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights committed by state and local officials. It did not extend that cause of action to federal government officials or entities.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for this immigration detainee’s claims against ICE officials.

Sacal-Micha v. Longoria · filed 2020-04-09

Sacal correctly notes that he cannot avail himself of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the statute on which the pretrial detainee in Shepherd relied.

Section 1983 provides relief against state and local officials for violations of constitutional rights, not against a federal deputy marshal.

Jefferson v. Wheeler · filed 2020-04-09

Although Jefferson cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as his cause of action, that statue provides for relief against state and local officials for violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides relief against a state or its instrumentalities, not the United States or its officials.

Flynn v. United States · filed 2020-04-24

In any case, this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983, which only provides for relief against a state or its instrumentalities, and not the United States or its officials.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against federal officials.

Hulsey v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2020-06-11

Although Hulsey brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because Section 1983 does not authorize suits against federal officials, Hulsey’s claims are treated as if they were brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 applies to civil rights claims against state officials, not federal officials.

McKissic 124902 v. Barr · filed 2020-06-29

Section 1983 pertains only to civil rights claims against state officials.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials or waive the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Stone v. U.S. Embassy Tokyo · filed 2020-07-24

As a result, § 1983 is inapplicable in this case because Defendants are federal entities and Mr. Ogier, whom Plaintiff seeks to name as a defendant, was a federal official at the time of the alleged incident.

A claim filed under § 1983 against a federal employee may be construed as a Bivens action.

Behling v. Chambers · filed 2020-07-29

Consequently, although Plaintiff has filed his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claim is best interpreted as a Bivens action against a federal employee for denial of access-to-the-courts.

Section 1983 does not govern civil rights claims against federal officials; those claims are assessed under Bivens.

Anguiano v. United States of America · filed 2020-08-11

Through Grounds One through Three, Petitioner seeks to pursue civil rights claims – apparently pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which applies when claims are asserted against federal officials rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – based on conditions of his confinement that are alleged to violate the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state officials, not federal prison officials.

Gonzalez v. Bendt · filed 2020-08-19

Gonzalez filed the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute applies only to constitutional violations by state officials.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional claims against federal officials; those claims proceed under Bivens.

Youngblood v. Williams · filed 2020-08-20

Plaintiff brings Counts 1 and 2 pursuant to Bivens and Section 1983. Because he has named federal officials in connection with these claims, Bivens governs Counts 1 and 2.

Section 1983 applies to state actors and does not provide a claim against federal officials.

Seeley v. Edge · filed 2020-10-06

As I explained in my earlier Order, the plaintiff cannot bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the statute applies to state actors, not federal officials; as a result, I liberally construed the plaintiff’s complaint to raise claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”).

Section 1983 authorizes suits against state officials but does not apply to federal officials or waive federal sovereign immunity.

FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES · filed 2020-12-16

Section § 1983, the statute under which plaintiff sues, is not a waiver of that immunity; indeed, it authorizes a suit only against state official, and it does not apply to federal officials at all.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions against federal officials because they do not act under color of state law.

Mescall v. Department of Justice · filed 2021-01-19

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to actions against federal officials, because they are not state actors acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against federal officers for actions taken in their official federal capacity because they do not act under color of state law.

Millen v. Wray · filed 2021-01-21

Both the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI obtain their authority from the federal government, not any state. Thus, they cannot be sued under § 1983 for actions performed in their official capacity as federal officers.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal prison officials; a federal inmate may instead pursue a Bivens action.

Edwards v. Cox · filed 2021-01-26

Edwards’ remaining claims are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A federal official who pressures state officials to violate federal rights acts under color of state law and may be liable under § 1983.

Savage v. Toan · filed 1986-04-22

Here, the federal defendant similarly acted “under color of state law” by pressuring the State defendants to violate plaintiffs’ Medicaid rights.

Tribal action is not state or territorial action for Section 1983 purposes, so it cannot convert a federal official's conduct into action under color of state law.

Chapoose v. Hodel · filed 1987-10-22

Thus, appellants' attempt to equate tribal action to state or territorial action in order to characterize the Secretary's act is misplaced. Accordingly, the Sec. 1983 claim must fail.

Tribal action is not state or territorial action for Section 1983 purposes, so it cannot convert a federal official's conduct into action under color of state law.

Chapoose v. Hodel · filed 1987-10-22

“Indian tribes are not states of the union within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations on states do not apply to tribes.” ... Accordingly, the § 1983 claim must fail.

Section 1983 joint-action liability requires the private and public actors to share a common unconstitutional goal.

Cunningham v. Southlake Center For Mental Health · filed 1991-01-25

A requirement of the joint action charge therefore is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.

Section 1983 permits a joint-action claim against private and public actors only when both share a common unconstitutional goal.

Cunningham v. Southlake Center for Mental Health, Inc. · filed 1991-01-25

A requirement of the joint action charge therefore is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.

Section 1983’s color-of-law pleading requirement is satisfied by allegations that private employees acted in concert with police during surveillance and arrest.

Gilbert v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1993-07-14

While Mr. Gilbert does not clearly and specifically state in his complaint that the Sears employees were acting under color of state law, the complaint is riddled with instances where Mr. Gilbert alleges that Sears and their agents acted in concert with the police during the course of the surveillance and arrest of Mr. Gilbert. ... and thus the plaintiff has met his pleading burden as to the first element of his civil rights claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants under a joint action theory to allege a concerted effort with a state official.

Starnes v. Capital Cities Media, Incorporated, Doing Business as Belleville News-Democrat, Marilyn Vise, Greg · filed 1994-11-18

To maintain a valid § 1983 claim against these private defendants then, Starnes must allege the existence of some concerted effort between Judge Kardis and them.

Section 1983 imposes joint-action liability on a private person only when the challenged action is inextricably intertwined with government action.

Mathis v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. · filed 1996-01-24

A private person is liable under this theory, however, only if the particular actions challenged are inextricably intertwined with those of the government.

A private litigant’s alleged conspiracy with a judge does not establish state action under § 1983 without specific facts showing an agreement to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Spencer v. Steinman · filed 1997-06-24

Here, given that plaintiffs claim of a conspiracy between Mr. Crumlish and Judge Maier is not supported by specific facts pointing to an agreement between Mr. Crumlish and Judge Maier to violate plaintiffs civil rights, the Court concludes that the allegations set forth in the amended complaint are insufficient to show state action on the part of the defendant under a conspiracy theory. ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 based upon a conspiracy theory.

Section 1983 requires a substantial degree of cooperation between a private actor and government officials to impose liability based on joint action.

Meade v. Dillard Dept Stores · filed 2001-10-09

The joint action required to impose § 1983 liability on a private actor requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between the private actor and government officials.

A Section 1983 claim based on alleged joint action between private defendants and the state requires facts supporting a meeting of the minds to violate civil rights.

Addams-More v. Chung San Holdings USA Ltd. · filed 2004-03-08

The district court properly dismissed Count 7 (alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) because Appellant did not allege facts to support the allegation that there was a “meeting of the minds” between the hotel defendants and the state to violate her civil rights.

Section 1983 does not require a defendant to have authority over a plaintiff’s employment status if the defendant willfully participates in joint action with the State or its agents.

Nesathurai v. University at Buffalo · filed 2005-11-10

Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the federal constitutional cause of action is not defeated by defendant’s lack of authority over plaintiffs employment status. Rather, “[i]t is enough that [defendant] is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents” (Dennis v Sparks, 449 US 24, 27 [1980]; see Adickes v S. H. Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 152 [1970]).

Section 1983 joint-action liability requires proof of a single plan whose essential nature and general scope were known to each person held responsible.

Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 2006-08-29

Abreu must demonstrate “a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences.”

Section 1983 joint-action liability requires a shared unconstitutional goal between public and private actors; a shared goal of taking polygraphs alone is insufficient.

Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Electric Co-Operative · filed 2006-08-29

"When a plaintiff seeks to prove state action based on a conspiracy theory, a requirement of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal." ... The evidence might establish a common goal of taking polygraphs, but not necessarily of taking polygraphs for the Co-op in violation of the EPPA.

A federal officer may be treated as a state actor under § 1983 when he willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-11-14

A person, including a federal agent, may be considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983 if he is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... The Court concludes that these allegations — which must be treated as true at this stage in the proceedings — raise sufficient questions of contested fact so that it cannot determine, at this time, that former Marshal would not qualify as a “state actor” as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private defendant who willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents, but the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support that claim.

Howard v. Dixie Dunavant Insurance Agency · filed 2007-05-07

The plaintiff can seek liability under § 1983 against a defendant who is not a state actor by showing that the defendant “is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).

Section 1983 permits a claim against federal officers for joint action with state officials, but allegations of prior knowledge and failure to act do not sufficiently allege a joint conspiracy.

Peck v. United States · filed 1979-04-25

Inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a joint conspiracy so as to state a cause of action against the individual federal defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim is dismissed.

A state official’s conduct remains state action under § 1983 when the official is sued for prospective relief in an individual capacity for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Sagan v. Pennsylvania · filed 1982-07-07

For eleventh amendment purposes, the suit is against the officer as an individual, although his action is still “state action” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 can reach private individuals who conspire with state officials, but the complaint must allege facts showing they reached an understanding to deny federal rights.

Allaben v. Howanitz · filed 2014-08-26

Although private individuals who conspire with state officials can be held liable under § 1983, Allaben’s allegations regarding a conspiracy between the Defendants and the judges were conclusory and failed to demonstrate that they “reached an understanding” to deny Allaben his due process rights.

Section 1983 requires a private party accused of conspiring with a state official to share a common objective; merely responding to the official’s requests is insufficient.

Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. · filed 2016-04-13

Even tipped in Plaintiffs favor, the Amended Complaint presents no fact plausibly portraying Greer’s response to the Deputy’s requests or suggestions as the type of common scheme or plan that would support a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 when they act jointly with state officials, but a conspiracy claim requires facts plausibly showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights.

Barrett v. PAE Government Services, Inc. · filed 2020-09-15

Ordinarily, private actors are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the statute only provides relief for deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors. ... Because Plaintiff’s allegations that Officers Hall and Luzier conspired with Horner and Wilborn to illegally seize Plaintiff and remove her from the workplace for a psychological evaluation is comprised of nothing more than conclusory assertions and rank speculation, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

When a public employee proves denial of procedural rights under Section 1983, the defendant bears the burden of showing the employee would have suffered the same employment loss if proper procedures had been followed.

Alexander v. City of Menlo Park · filed 1986-04-24

Alexander proved the defendants violated his due process rights by failing to inform him he could bump into either of two positions. The burden is on the defendants to show Alexander would not have accepted either position absent their unlawful conduct.

An injury caused by denial of procedural due process is compensable under § 1983 like any other injury, rather than being categorically limited to nominal damages.

D'ACQUISTO v. Washington · filed 1986-06-16

If a plaintiff’s injury arises from the denial of procedural due process, it is compensable like any other injury.

Section 1983 compensatory damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and cannot be recovered when too remote or not proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Cornelius v. La Croix · filed 1986-11-04

I glean two fundamental principles from common-law rules of tort damages which may be applied to this section 1983 case: (1) Damages must be proved to a reasonable certainty, and (2) damages are not recoverable if they are too remote or are not proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.

A public employee alleging politically motivated discharge under Section 1983 must prove that the protected political activity was the but-for cause of the firing.

Simonne Elwood and Cheryl A. Pimental v. Ronald Pina and Lucia Cardoso · filed 1987-03-31

For the plaintiffs to prevail in [this] case, you must expressly find that they could not have been fired ... but for ... their political activity, if they had another ground, an independent ground for their firings then the plaintiffs cannot prevail in this case. ... We affirm our adherence to the “but for” standard.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim for a property deprivation caused by established state procedures despite available state postdeprivation remedies.

Alexandre v. Cortes · filed 1998-03-26

Under these circumstances, a cause of action under § 1983 is not foreclosed by Parratt and Hudson.