42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 imposes no constitutional duty on a state to protect a child from parental abuse when the state neither created nor materially increased the danger and did not have custody of the child.

Joshua Deshaney, a Minor, by His Guardian Ad Litem, Curry First, Esq. And Melody Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department · filed 1987-04-21

The state does not have a duty enforceable by the federal courts to maintain a police force or a fire department, or to protect children from their parents. ... That the state’s inaction may have brought about a trivial increase in the probability that Joshua would be severely injured by his father does not enable a conclusion that the state deprived Joshua of his right to bodily integrity.

Section 1983 imposes no duty on the state to protect a person from a private actor absent a special custodial or other relationship creating such a duty.

PATEL BY PATEL v. McIntyre · filed 1987-08-24

Having alleged no special relationship between the Patels and the state from which a duty to protect could have arisen, the plaintiffs have failed to make out a cognizable claim under section 1983.

State officials do not satisfy § 1983's state-action requirement merely by releasing a dangerous prisoner who later harms a private citizen after leaving state custody.

Wells v. Walker · filed 1987-10-16

Because Robertson was acting only as a private individual, and the defendants were under no constitutional duty to protect others from his actions, the court must find that the “state action” or “under color of state law” requirement of § 1983 was not satisfied and that, therefore, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim should be, and is hereby dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against state officials for failing to protect a member of the public from a private assailant when their conduct deprived the victim of no constitutional right.

Igartua-Olivieri v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 1988-08-10

A Section 1983 claim requires two essential elements: (1) the conduct that harms the victim must be committed under color of state law (i.e. state action), and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right. ... Stating that “[njothing in the fourteenth amendment or its history ... suggests that it was written to provide an expansive guarantee of state protective services,” the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state from being murdered by criminals or mad men. ... Analyzing the facts of the case before us in light of the applicable case law, we find that the plaintiffs have failed to state an actionable cause under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Garcia v. Superior Court · filed 1990-05-03

The State’s failure to prevent harm inflicted by a private actor does not give rise to a cause of action under section 1983.

Wilson v. Garcia’s personal-injury limitations rule does not retroactively bar a Section 1983 claim when, during the otherwise applicable shorter period, clear circuit precedent established a longer filing period on which the plaintiff could rely.

Pratt v. Thornburgh · filed 1986-12-15

Our conclusion in the present case is in accord with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Ridgway v. Wapello County, Iowa, 795 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.1986), which held that Wilson v. Garcia should not be applied retroactively to bar a public employee's suit under Sec. 1983 where it appeared that, within the two-year period after the plaintiff's cause of action arose, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held that the Iowa general five-year statute of limitations governed actions under Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 plaintiff whose claim accrued before Wilson v. Garcia receives a reasonable period after Wilson to file under the newly shortened limitations rule.

Fasanelle v. Elrod · filed 1986-04-08

Following this array of Illinois authority, we hold that Fasanelle filed his case within a reasonable time after ... was decided. Thus, the two-year period of ¶ 13-202 does not bar his suit, and defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied.

An Indiana Section 1983 claim against police or sheriffs that accrued before Wilson v. Garcia must be filed by the earlier of five years after accrual or two years after Wilson.

Ross v. Summers · filed 1986-04-09

Thus as to that class of Section 1983 cases ... against sheriffs or police officers, a plaintiff, whose Section 1983 cause of action accrued before April 17, 1985 must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date such action accrued or two years after the date of the ... decision, April 17, 1985.

In Minnesota, § 1983 claims are characterized as personal-injury actions subject to a two-year limitations period, but plaintiffs who justifiably relied on prior longer-period precedent must receive a reasonable time to sue after the change.

Chris N. v. Burnsville, Minn. · filed 1986-05-13

Accordingly, in this district it is settled law that the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) applies to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. ... A necessary corollary of prospective application of a new rule of law is the proposition that parties who may justifiably have relied upon the displaced rule must be allowed a reasonable period of time following the change in law in which to file suit.

Wilson v. Garcia's personal-injury limitations rule does not apply retroactively when clear preexisting circuit precedent supplied a longer limitations period and retroactivity would be inequitable.

Brown v. Foley · filed 1987-01-26

This statute was, thus, clear authority for the District Court for the District of New Jersey to regard six years as the appropriate limitation on such suits prior to the decision in Wilson v. Garcia. ... We conclude that it should have been applied in the present case and that the application to this case of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to state actions for personal injuries was erroneous.

Wilson v. Garcia’s personal-injury limitations rule does not retroactively bar a Section 1983 claim that remained viable when circuit precedent permitted reliance on a longer state limitations period and was filed within that longer period.

No. 86-5084 · filed 1987-03-13

If the statute of limitations was in fact tolled during this period, William H.'s claim had not yet expired (even under Minnesota's shorter personal injury limitations period) when Garmon was decided. Assuming William H. then held a viable claim, the effect of Garmon was to permit him to rely on our statement, reconfirmed in Occhino, that where a period of limitations for statutory claims is specified under state law, that period would apply to section 1983 cases. See Garmon, 668 F.2d at 406 n. 11; Occhino, 686 F.2d at 1308. Thus, under the six-year Minnesota statute which he had reason to believe applied, William H. had approximately four additional years in which to file his claim. William H. started his lawsuit within that four years and, under Ridgway, his claim is not barred by the applicable Minnesota statute of limitations.

Wilson v. Garcia’s personal-injury limitations rule does not retroactively bar a Section 1983 claim that remained viable when circuit precedent permitted reliance on a longer state limitations period and was filed within that longer period.

Jane Does 1-100 v. Omodt · filed 1987-03-13

Thus, under the six-year Minnesota statute which he had reason to believe applied, William H. had approximately four additional years in which to file his claim. William H. started his lawsuit within that four years and, under ... Ridgway, ... his claim is not barred by the applicable Minnesota statute of limitations.

Wilson v. Garcia’s personal-injury limitations rule does not apply retroactively when a Section 1983 plaintiff reasonably relied on clear prior law treating the claim as contractual and timely under a longer contract period.

Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie · filed 1987-04-15

Here, the Court holds that prior to the time ... Wilson v. Garcia ... was decided, ETI was entitled to reasonably rely on the paradigmatic construction that a contract claim would be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to contract claims. Based upon existing clear precedent, ETI’s delay in filing suit must be categorized as reasonable. Thus, this Court refuses to bar ETI’s § 1983 claims as being precluded by retroactive application of the ... Wilson v. Garcia ... decision.

Section 1983 claims based on constitutional rights require an alleged predicate constitutional violation.

Psychas v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-09-24

Because the Court has found that plaintiffs have failed to state a due process violation, and the complaint sets forth no other constitutional violations committed by any of the defendants, plaintiffs have failed to state a predicate constitutional violation and so their § 1983 claims fail.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a federal right; a mere threat of infringement is not actionable.

Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County Council · filed 1986-06-27

In view of our holding that no legal rights of the parties were affected by the adoption of the 1985 Amendments, we need not address appellants’ claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as that section provides relief only to deprivation of ... rights.

A Section 1983 claim fails when the defendants acted lawfully and no underlying federal right was violated.

Wilmac Corp. v. Heckler · filed 1986-04-08

With all of plaintiff’s substantive claims thus eliminated, there is no longer any basis for its § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action to vindicate substantive federal rights but does not itself create those rights.

Morales v. Gaztambide · filed 1986-04-10

These rights are not created by the federal statute which only grants a right of action to vindicate said violated right.

A claim seeking only interpretation of an uncertain treaty right does not state a Section 1983 claim absent a state violation of the right once it is known and defined.

United States v. State Of Washington · filed 1987-03-31

If the State of Washington violates these now known and well-delineated rights, there would be an actual conflict between state and federal law which might give rise to a Sec. 1983 action. ... That, however, has not yet happened and is not the situation here. ... We therefore hold that the Tribes' treaty interpretation claims do not give rise to a claim cognizable under Sec. 1983.

A claim seeking only interpretation of an uncertain treaty right does not state a Section 1983 claim absent a state violation of the defined right.

United States v. Washington · filed 1987-03-31

We therefore hold that the Tribes’ treaty interpretation claims do not give rise to a claim cognizable under § 1983. Accordingly, we conclude that such claims do not support an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988.

A student’s § 1983 claim against school officials based on constitutional violations requires an underlying violation of the student’s constitutional rights.

Palmer v. Merluzzi · filed 1988-05-02

A student’s § 1983 claim against school officials can survive only if his underlying constitutional rights are abridged.

Section 1983 provides no civil rights claim for denial of a town meeting when voters had no right to call that meeting.

Kirchner v. Giebink · filed 1988-05-13

The same conclusion applies to plaintiffs’ claim that their federal civil rights were violated (42 U.S.C. § 1983) when they were deprived of their right to vote in a town meeting. Because there was no right to call a meeting for the purpose of considering the agreement in question, there was no deprivation of such right under the color of law and consequently no cognizable federal civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not make emotional distress or conspiracy claims cognizable without a violation of federal law.

Naliielua v. Bekins Moving and Storage of Hawaii, Inc. · filed 1992-05-15

As for the balance of the appellants' claims (e.g., infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy), they are not cognizable under federal civil rights law in the absence of some violation of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish an underlying federal constitutional or statutory violation.

Ricker v. Edmisten · filed 1994-02-07

To prevail on a section 1983 cause of action, a plaintiff must establish an underlying federal constitutional or statutory violation.

Section 1983 claims require a violation of a right protected by the United States Constitution or federal law; alleged state torts or injuries by state officials alone do not suffice.

Quillian v. Evatt · filed 1994-04-13

Cl4ims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not available for all alleged, torts of state officials or injuries allegedly suffered at the hands of state officials. Rather, such claims are limited to violations of rights protected by the United States Constitution and federal law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim that prison officials improperly enacted a state regulation when the claim alleges no violation of federal law.

Newman v. James H. Gomez, Director, Department of Corrections · filed 1995-05-22

Newman contends that the district court erred by determining that his challenge to the enactment of OMA Section 62010 was not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Newman argues that the defendants did not enact OMA Section 62010 pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of the California Government Code ("APA"), California Government Code Sec. 11347.5. The district court properly held that he alleged no violation of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of independently created federal rights by persons acting under color of law; it creates no substantive rights itself.

Reynolds v. School District No. 1 · filed 1995-11-13

Section 1983 itself does not create any substantive rights, but merely provides relief against those who, acting under color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for vindicating other federal rights, so a claim rejected on its underlying constitutional merits cannot be asserted through it.

Benedict v. City of Smyrna · filed 1995-12-13

Defendant correctly states that § 1983 is merely a vehicle by which other federal rights are vindicated. ... Given that this court has granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim and procedural due process claim, plaintiff may not assert these claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 relief requires a violation of federal rights; success on a state habeas petition alone does not establish entitlement to relief.

Bohanon v. Nelson · filed 1998-04-15

Plaintiff appears to assume that because the state habeas petition was granted, he is automatically entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree. In order to prevail, Plaintiff must show that his federal rights were violated, and he has failed to do so.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own and requires a violation of a federal statute or the Constitution.

Smrcka Ex Rel. Smrcka v. Ambach · filed 1983-01-24

We need not consider this question, however, because § 1983, in creating no new substantive rights, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), depends for its existence upon the violation of a federal statutory or constitutional provision. Neither is present here.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights; a claim based on federal statutory violations fails when the underlying statutory claims fail.

Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration · filed 1999-07-19

Additionally, if the amended complaint is read to assert § 1983 remedies based on direct violations of the federal statutory counts, those § 1983 remedies fail as a result of our decision to affirm the dismissal of the predicate federal law counts.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Skadegaard v. Farrell · filed 1984-01-19

It is settled law that neither § 1983 nor § 1985(3) provide a plaintiff with substantive rights in themselves. They merely provide a remedy for violation of the designated federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal constitutional injuries but creates no substantive rights of its own; a damages claim requires a viable underlying federal injury.

Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board · filed 2001-01-17

Section 1983 is a remedial statute designed to vindicate a federal constitutional injury. ... It does not create any substantive rights. ... Having concluded appellants’ pleadings failed to allege a viable federal constitutional injury, their section 1983 damage claims necessarily fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants fail without an underlying constitutional or statutory violation.

Redmond v. MS Dept of Corr · filed 2002-10-30

Further, to the extent that Redmond sued the defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the absence of an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is fatal to such claims.

Section 1983 relief depends on a viable claim under another federal constitutional or statutory provision.

Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City Of Wilkes-Barre · filed 2003-03-06

It is well established that the success of a Section 1983 claim is dependent on the plaintiff's ability to state a cause of action under some other federal constitutional or statutory provision See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ("Although [Section 1983] provides the citizen with an effective remedy against those abuses of state power that violate federal law, it does not provide a remedy for abuses that do not violate federal law.").

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Goldberg v. Cablevision Systems Corp. · filed 2003-08-29

Section 1983 does not, in and of itself, create any substantive rights but rather provides a remedy for violations of Constitutional rights or laws of the United States. ... Because NYPSC and the Town have not violated the Cable Act or any other laws of the United States or the Constitution the Court grants summary judgment to NYPSC and the Town as to the plaintiffs fourth cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of independently established federal rights; a claim identifying no such right fails.

Lassiter v. Topeka Unified School District No. 501 · filed 2004-12-17

“Section 1983 itself does not create any substantive rights, but merely provides relief against those who, acting under color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere.” ... Standing alone, plaintiffs § 1983 claim would fail.

Section 1983 claims must rest on facts that would establish a violation of federal law.

Jonathan v. Nally · filed 2005-07-22

Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be grounded on facts that would establish a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a violation of state law alone does not establish a claim.

Galen v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2006-11-07

Section 1983 requires Galen to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Galen v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2007-01-19

Section 1983 requires Galen to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 claims fail when the asserted constitutional violations fail.

St. Joseph Hospital v. Novello · filed 2007-02-02

Since the constitutional claims to the Enabling Act are dismissed, all section 1983 claims must also fail.

Section 1983 requires a violation of an enforceable federal right; a claim fails without a violation even if the underlying statute might create such a right.

Level 3 Communications, L.L.C. v. City of St. Louis · filed 2007-02-05

However, Arkansas Medical Society makes clear that the claim must involve not only an enforceable right, but also a violation of that right. 6 F.3d at 523. We refrain from joining the fray over whether section 253 creates a private right of action because, as we held above, Level 3 has shown no violation of section 253, whether or not that section creates an enforceable right. Thus, the district court did not err by denying summary judgment on the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Gagliardi v. Fisher · filed 2007-03-16

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. Instead, it provides a remedy to redress violations of federal law grounded in distinct federal constitutional provisions or statutes.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights established elsewhere; it creates no substantive rights of its own.

Thomas v. City of Saint Paul · filed 2007-12-13

The statute, itself, creates no substantive rights; it simply provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides liability for deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights; a separate claim cannot proceed when the constitutional claims have been resolved and no independent federal statutory right is asserted.

Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter · filed 2008-03-13

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant’s denial of its application for rezoning, together with the zoning ordinance, violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (creating liability for deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States) by effectively excluding persons of low and moderate income from living in town. We have dealt in this opinion with each of the plaintiffs’ claims of “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,” and the plaintiffs do not make any claim of right under a federal statute creating independent rights. Therefore, the summary judgment entered by the district court on this point is affirmed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for abuses that violate federal law.

Glover v. Mabrey · filed 2010-06-04

Allegations of policy violations are irrelevant because Section 1983 “does not provide a remedy for abuses that do not violate federal laws.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a constitutional or statutory violation; a claim dependent on failed Title VI and Title VII claims also fails.

Subbiah v. Kiel · filed 2011-05-10

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a cause of action in itself-instead it is merely a remedy for some other constitutional or statutory violation. ... Because the Court has already found that Plaintiff cannot possibly state a claim under either Title VII or Title VI, his § 1983 claims based on those purported violations necessarily fail as well.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights and cannot be used to enforce gender discrimination claims under § 1981 or Title VII.

Pate v. Chilton County Board of Education · filed 2012-01-04

Because there is no source of federal constitutional rights alleged in the complaint on which to base the § 1983 claims, all of Teachers’ claims under § 1983 against the individual defendants are due to be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose stand-alone liability for failing to protect someone from private harm without an underlying constitutional duty to protect that person.

Estate of Brown v. Cypress Fairbanks Independent School District · filed 2012-05-23

For CFISD to be liable under § 1983, CFISD must first have a constitutional duty to protect Asher from non-state actors. As the Fifth Circuit has underscored in Covington, CFISD had no such duty in the absence of a special relationship. Because Plaintiff has not — and cannot — allege such a special relationship, there is no foundation for stand-alone statutory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim to rest on the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws; it does not create an independent claim for violating the section itself.

Cooke v. Town of Colorado City · filed 2013-02-13

However, there is no independent legal action for a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. ' Such action must be premised on some deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 provides no relief when the plaintiff has no surviving underlying federal rights claim.

Hall v. Louisiana · filed 2015-06-09

With no remaining constitutional claims against Defendants after the Court’s rulings supra, Plaintiffs thus have no available relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own, so a claim must identify the right allegedly infringed.

Porter-Moore v. Volpe · filed 2016-04-01

"Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citation omitted). Thus a court must identify a specific constitutional right infringed, and here, Plaintiff claims he was unlawfully seized.

Section 1983 provides no standalone basis for relief without a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Egli v. Strimel · filed 2017-04-27

Finally, § 1983 does not provide a standalone basis for relief in the absence of a violation of Plaintiffs constitutional or federal statutory rights, and as Plaintiff has alleged none here, his claim fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify an underlying federal right that the defendants allegedly violated.

Fuller v. State of Kansas, Department of Children & Families · filed 2019-07-24

Neither filing identifies the substantive right plaintiff seeks to vindicate through § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

King v. Marion Arkansas, City of · filed 2020-02-03

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state law alone.

Powell v. Basto · filed 2020-05-04

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s newly alleged state law causes of action also fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted, and must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a right secured by federal law; an alleged violation of state regulations or agency procedures alone does not state a claim.

Cox v. Carter · filed 2020-05-12

They do not establish the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere, so a claim must identify the underlying right.

Miranda v. South Country Central School District · filed 2020-05-21

Section 1983 “creates no substantive right; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” ... Thus, plaintiff’s stand-alone § 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own, so a plaintiff must identify the federal right allegedly violated.

Steed v. Missouri State Highway Patrol · filed 2020-05-22

The statute does not create any substantive rights; rather, it provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” ... Thus, a plaintiff must identify the federally guaranteed right the defendant violated.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere but creates no substantive rights of its own.

DOAN v. DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2020-08-13

As discussed supra, § 1983 does not independently create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a specific constitutional or federal statutory right allegedly violated; it does not support a standalone civil rights claim.

Chavez v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2021-01-25

As a result, Mr. Chavez cannot assert a standalone “civil rights” cause of action, absent specification of the underlying right that was allegedly violated.

Child protective services caseworkers are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for acts connected with ongoing child dependency proceedings, including monitoring foster placement after adjudication.

Thomas F. Miller, Personal Representative of the Estate of China Marie Davis, Deceased v. Dorothy Jane Livingston James · filed 1996-10-16

Here, as in Babcock, the child dependency proceedings did not end with the adjudication of child dependency but rather continued until after the dependent child returned home. A.R.S. § 8-246(A). Houser and Galindo also had statutory duties to perform throughout the process, and had the same need as the caseworkers in Babcock to exercise their independent judgment without fear of litigation. They are, therefore, absolutely immune.

Section 1983 gives child protective services caseworkers only qualified immunity for actions outside an ongoing dependency proceeding.

Waller v. State · filed 1992-02-18

The case before us is distinguishable because no dependency action was ever initiated. Therefore, only a qualified immunity would apply.

Social workers do not enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability because their duties are not integral parts of the judicial process.

Pinkney v. Clay County · filed 1986-04-11

Unlike prosecutors, social workers do not enjoy absolute immunity.

Social workers sued under Section 1983 for removing children receive qualified good-faith immunity, not absolute immunity.

Czikalla v. Malloy · filed 1986-12-08

As I have ruled above with respect to the motion to reconsider, there is no absolute immunity for social workers. Defendants are, however, entitled to good faith immunity.

Social workers receive absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for quasiprosecutorial functions connected with initiating and pursuing child-dependency proceedings, but not for unilateral conduct before proceedings begin.

Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department of Social Services, Defendants · filed 1987-03-16

We therefore hold that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings. ... We do not agree, however, that all of Haaland’s alleged conduct falls within the scope of quasi-proseeutorial activities. On October 23, Haaland allegedly ordered Meyers to stay away from his home until after the hearing before the juvenile court. At that time, Haaland had not yet initiated dependency proceedings. Haaland is not entitled to absolute immunity for this act.

Child-protection workers have only qualified, not absolute, § 1983 immunity for filing an allegedly false verified complaint that functions as a factual affidavit supporting removal of children.

Karen Kelly Austin, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of Minors, Renee Chevelle Henry and Raenell Lynn Henry v. Ronald · filed 1987-12-21

Given the function of a verified complaint under Louisiana law, we conclude that such workers are entitled to only qualified immunity from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for damages.

Section 1983 affords family service workers absolute immunity for filing a juvenile abuse petition as part of their quasi-prosecutorial function.

Salyer v. Patrick · filed 1989-05-12

It appears to this court that the family service workers were absolutely immune from liability in filing the juvenile abuse petition, due to their quasi-prosecutorial function in the initiation of child abuse proceedings.

Section 1983 gives child protection workers absolute immunity for testimony in juvenile court and at most qualified immunity for investigating abuse and taking a child into protective custody.

Tennyson v. Children's Services Division · filed 1989-06-13

We summarize our disposition of this case: (1) Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under section 1983 in respect of testifying in juvenile court and to no more than qualified immunity in respect of investigation, taking Shannon into custody, and keeping plaintiffs from visiting Shannon; and (2) defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under the OTCA for their discretionary acts as provided by ORS 30.265(3)(c).

Section 1983 affords social caseworkers absolute immunity for duties incident to child dependency proceedings even when they are accused of conspiring with a party to affect the outcome.

Babcock v. Tyler · filed 1989-09-06

A social caseworker's entitlement to the defense of absolute immunity in the performance of her duties incident to child dependency proceedings cannot be defeated by allegations that the caseworker conspired with one of the parties to affect the outcome of the case.

Social workers acting outside court supervision in child welfare matters receive qualified rather than absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims.

Caldwell v. LeFaver · filed 1991-03-20

Because the defendants were not acting under the supervision of a court, it is the qualified immunity standard, rather than the absolute immunity standard, which must govern their conduct.

Section 1983 gives social workers absolute immunity for testimony and other steps taken to present a child custody case to a court, but only qualified immunity when they take initial custody of children.

Lois Millspaugh and Tina Dyson v. County Department of Public Welfare of Wabash County · filed 1991-07-15

We therefore agree with decisions holding that social workers and like public officials are entitled to absolute immunity in child custody cases on account of testimony and other steps taken to present the case for decision by the court. ... Social workers must settle for qualified immunity when taking initial custody of children.

Social workers have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for invoking a child-protection statute and testifying to obtain an ex parte order blocking a parent's visitation.

Hoffman v. Tammy D. Harris, Colleen West, Melisa Hoffman, Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources · filed 1993-09-21

The complaint alleges only that the social workers harmed Hoffman when they "invoked" the Kentucky statute and when they "testified" against him to receive the ex parte order to block his visitation. J.A. at 10, 11. These clearly are the sort of actions that Sayler countenanced when granting absolute immunity in filing a child abuse petition. ... Sayler requires us to grant absolute immunity to the social workers here.

Child care workers performing discretionary, nonprosecutorial functions have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

John Doe, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Two Children v. State of Louisiana, Paula Bennett and Sheryl George · filed 1993-11-12

Child care workers are entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary, nonprosecutorial functions. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that George and Bennett are entitled to qualified immunity from liability in this case.

Social workers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for actions involving the initiation, prosecution, and resolution of child dependency and custody proceedings.

David Rowland Gertrude Rowland v. Renagene Brady, Supervisor, Children's Welfare Services, Washington State Department o · filed 1994-09-27

Social workers are entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 damages for their action involving the initiation, prosecution, and resolution of child dependency and custody proceedings.

Section 1983 does not give a social worker absolute immunity for investigative acts that are not analogous to a prosecutor’s court-related functions.

Miller v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-04-26

Scheer made no presentations or recommendations to the court. As a result, Scheer's acts were not analogous to those court-related functions normally performed by a prosecutor, and at times performed by social workers, and he cannot receive absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a social worker for conduct intimately associated with a child protection proceeding, even if the conduct was malicious or corrupt.

Holloway v. State of Ohio Ohio Department of Human Services Sally Brush Clermont County, Ohio · filed 1999-06-03

However, because Brush was entitled to absolute immunity for the actions of which Plaintiff complained, even if her conduct was motivated by malice or corruption, and she deliberately controlled the presentation, or lack thereof, of Plaintiff to the court by providing Plaintiff with misinformation, and deliberately withheld Plaintiffs surfacing from the court, she cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Social workers sued under § 1983 have absolute immunity for acts performed as legal advocates, but not for administrative or investigative acts.

Holloway v. Sally Brush Clermont County, Ohio · filed 2000-07-31

By analogy, social workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity as legal advocates — initiating court actions or testifying under oath — not when they are performing administrative, investigative, or other functions.

Section 1983 does not give social workers absolute immunity for investigative work that is not intimately associated with the judicial process.

Edwards v. Williams · filed 2001-10-31

All of the defendants’ actions may have an impact on the pending divorce proceedings, as suggested by the plaintiff, but they are not “intimately associated with the judicial process,” as is required for a finding that absolute immunity would apply. ... As a result of the above, the Court determines that the defendants in this case are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 affords social workers absolute immunity for claims arising from investigations and recommendations concerning a child’s return to parental custody when those functions are closely tied to judicial proceedings.

Rippy v. Hattaway · filed 2001-11-02

Social workers involved in the investigation or recommendation are, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity with respect to claims arising from such recommendations and investigations. Appellants Bryant and Bartlett are immune from liability for their alleged failure to investigate and effect Travis’ return to his parents’ custody after the Juvenile Court ordered his removal in May 1995.

A social worker sued under § 1983 has only qualified immunity for investigating and advising on a child neglect case, but absolute immunity for sworn testimony submitted in the judicial proceeding.

Gray, William T. v. Poole, Theisha · filed 2002-01-08

Accordingly, Poole is entitled to only qualified, not absolute, immunity for those functions. She also submitted a statement to the court in connection with the neglect action. That activity was "intimately associated" with the judicial process and, therefore, Poole is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for what she said in the statement.

Section 1983 claims against a child protective services caseworker are barred by absolute immunity for actions connected with and incident to child dependency proceedings, even if intentional wrongdoing is alleged.

Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee · filed 2002-07-10

Defendant Reiman is absolutely immune for all of his actions alleged by Plaintiff in his § 1983 claim as they were taken in connection with and incident to the investigation, initiation, adjudication and post-adjudication of the dependency action, regardless of intentional wrongdoing.

Social workers sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Roe v. Texas Department Of Protective And Regulatory Services · filed 2002-08-13

Social workers may assert a qualified immunity defense when sued under § 1983. ... We answer the first prong of the Siegert test by concluding that Strickland did violate Jackie's Fourth Amendment rights, but, moving to the second part of that test, we determine that those rights were not clearly established on July 10, 1999, so Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides social workers only qualified immunity for discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions.

Miller v. Gammie · filed 2003-07-09

To the extent, however, that social workers also make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only qualified, not absolute immunity, is available.

Social workers have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for investigating and presenting evidence as part of child dependency proceedings, but only qualified immunity for maintaining temporary custody and referring a child for a medical examination.

Doe v. Lebbos · filed 2003-11-04

Instead, we hold that Herrera's actions in allegedly failing to investigate adequately the allegations of abuse and neglect against George and in allegedly fabricating evidence in the dependency petitions she prepared for the court were part of the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings, for which Herrera was entitled to absolute immunity. She is entitled only to qualified immunity, however, for her actions in maintaining Lacey outside of George's custody pending the November 5, 1999, detention hearing and in referring Lacey for a sexual abuse examination without parental consent or a court order.

A later court order does not give a social worker absolute immunity from a § 1983 suit for actions taken before the judge became involved.

Brown v. Montana · filed 2006-06-12

In sum, while the general outline of the procedure' — that is, taking custody of the child first and asking Judge Macek for an order later — is not necessarily unlawful, it does not reach backward to provide Wills with absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 based on functions she performed before Judge Macek became involved.

Section 1983 affords social workers absolute immunity for preparing, filing, signing, and verifying dependency and custody petitions as part of child dependency proceedings.

Beltran Ex Rel. Beltran v. Santa Clara County · filed 2007-06-25

Accordingly, we hold that, under Lebbos, social workers have absolute immunity for preparing and filing custody petitions, just as they do for preparing and filing dependency petitions. We also hold that, in light of the relationship we have just described between the two types of petitions, the acts of signing and verifying custody petitions are covered by absolute immunity for the same reasons that signing and verifying dependency petitions are.

Social workers have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for preparing, verifying, and filing dependency and custody petitions.

Beltran v. Santa Clara County · filed 2007-06-25

We are bound by Lebbos and, accordingly, affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on grounds of absolute immunity as to both Suarez and Tjhin for their actions in preparing, verifying, and filing the dependency and custody petitions.

Section 1983 does not give social workers absolute immunity for fabricating evidence during an investigation or making false statements in a sworn dependency petition affidavit.

Beltran v. Santa Clara County · filed 2008-01-23

But they are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false statements in a depen- dency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of per- jury, because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute.

Section 1983 gives social workers absolute immunity for referring a child protection case for prosecution and for ordinary witness testimony, but not for investigative acts or affidavits filed as complaining witnesses.

Vania Minor, Individually and as Mother, Natural Guardian and Next Best Friend of D.A. v. State of Iowa, Becky Grabe, In · filed 2012-06-15

We conclude Grabe is entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her involvement in causing the county attorney to file the CINA petition and when she acted as an ordinary witness in filing an affidavit requesting the court grant temporary custody to DHS. Grabe is not entitled to absolute immunity for her investigatory acts or the act of filing of the affidavit as a complaining witness.

Social workers lack absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on fabricating evidence or making false statements to secure a child’s removal.

Hardwick v. Vreeken · filed 2017-01-03

Preslie’s complaint targets conduct well outside of the social workers’ legitimate role as quasi-prosecutorial ... advocates in presenting the case. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial to these defendants of absolute immunity.

A social worker has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from an affidavit submitted as a legal advocate to initiate a child-custody proceeding.

Bauch v. Richland Cty. Children Servs. · filed 2018-05-23

Like the social worker’s petition in Barber, Hartman’s affidavit offered her factual assessment as a legal advocate initiating a child-custody proceeding. ... Accordingly, Hartman is entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to her affidavit in support of emergency custody.

Social workers have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims arising from their prosecution of a Family Court case.

Livingston v. Luberoff · filed 2019-09-20

As to Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of due process against Defendant Scott, social workers have absolute immunity for damages under Section 1983.

Social workers have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims based on their advocacy in child-removal proceedings, including investigations undertaken to prepare that advocacy.

Turner v. Lowen · filed 2019-10-01

All of the allegations pertaining to Duncan’s conduct involve either her representations (or lack thereof) to the juvenile court, or her inadequate investigation in preparing to make those representations. In light of the Sixth Circuit’s holdings in Pittman and Rippy, the Court finds that Duncan is absolutely immune from suit for these alleged actions.

In § 1983 damages suits, DCF workers have absolute immunity for initiating care and protection proceedings and testifying in them, but only qualified immunity for investigations and sworn factual assertions in supporting affidavits.

C.M. v. Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families · filed 2020-04-22

In sum, DCF workers are protected by absolute immunity in their decisions to initiate care and protection proceedings and in testifying at the subsequent hearings or trials on the petitions. They are protected by qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, (1) in investigations they conduct and (2) regarding factual assertions they make on personal knowledge and under oath when they are acting as a complaining witness by executing an affidavit in support of a petition for care and protection of a child.

Social workers have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on investigations underlying their custody recommendations to a juvenile court.

Keshia Turner v. Lowen · filed 2020-07-24

RBT and CT thus cannot hold Duncan liable for her investigation or assessment of the facts underlying her custody recommendations to the juvenile court.

Section 1983 claims against social workers are barred by absolute immunity when based on filing child abuse petitions, preparing supporting statements, or testifying under oath.

Clark v. Stone · filed 2020-07-28

But, to the extent that any claim is premised upon Defendants’ above conduct—the filing of the three abuse petitions, the preparation of the statement in support thereof, and testimony under oath—the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.

A public employee discharged for constitutionally impermissible reasons is presumptively entitled to reinstatement under Section 1983, although reinstatement is not absolute.

Banks v. Burkich · filed 1986-04-18

An unconstitutionally discharged employee does not have an absolute right to reinstatement. ... However, “[u]nder the Mt. Healthy analysis, once the plaintiff establishes that his discharge resulted from constitutionally impermissible motives, he is presumed to be entitled to reinstatement.”

A federal court may order reinstatement as a Section 1983 remedy for a public employee wrongfully denied a position because of protected activity.

Banks v. Burkich · filed 1986-04-18

Contrary to the district court’s view, federal courts possess the power to order reinstatement ... in a case such as this.

Section 1983 permits denial of reinstatement when animosity between the parties and a jury award that accounts for front pay support that decision.

J.D. Hickman, Cross-Appellee v. City of Kingsport, a Municipal Corporation, Cross-Appellant · filed 1989-05-05

Plaintiff has not established that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for reinstatement, based on its findings of animosity between the parties and the jury's consideration of front pay in fashioning the award.

In a § 1983 First Amendment discharge action, ordinary burdens on a public employer generally do not, by themselves, justify denying reinstatement.

Rosario-Torres v. Rafael Hernandez-Colon, Etc., Appeal of Franklin Martinez-Monge, Miguel A. Rosario-Torres v. · filed 1989-11-08

Be that as it may, we agree with those courts which have ruled that such routinely “incidental” burdens, in their accustomed manifestations, are foreseeable sequelae of defendant’s wrongdoing, and usually insufficient, without more, to tip the scales against reinstatement when first amendment rights are at stake in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement as a remedy for wrongful discharge, and actual or expected workplace ill-feeling alone does not justify denying it.

51 Fair empl.prac.cas. 669, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,489 Carl Jackson, Cross v. City of Albuquerque, Orlando Sedillo, an · filed 1989-11-21

Actual or expected ill-feeling cannot justify denial of reinstatement here.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement as a remedy for a public employee wrongfully discharged for protected speech.

Williams v. William Lee Roberts, of Fulton County, Individually and in His Official Capacity · filed 1990-06-28

Roberts contends that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that Williams be reinstated to her former position. We do not agree. ... This is not an extraordinary case.

In a § 1983 action, an employee’s ineligibility for appointment does not defeat legal relief but bears on whether reinstatement is appropriate.

Norma Iris Hiraldo-Cancel v. Jose E. Aponte, Etc. · filed 1991-02-04

Although plaintiffs’ ineligibility for appointment would neither suspend their first amendment rights nor undercut their entitlement to legal relief under section 1983, ineligibility considerations do bear on the appropriateness of the equitable relief of reinstatement.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement after a First Amendment political discharge, but courts may deny it when equitable factors weigh against the remedy.

Velazquez v. Edna J. Figueroa-Gomez, (Two Cases). Agapita Rosa Velazquez v. Edna J. Figueroa · filed 1993-06-09

In fact, we have cautioned that the incidental burdens on a public employer accompanying reinstatement — i.e., “tension (or even hostility) between parties when forcibly reunited” — are “usually insufficient, without more,, to tip the scales against reinstatement when first amendment rights are at stake in a section 1983 action.” ... The scant evidence supporting the first amendment claims, the amount of the damage awards, and the fact that these employees were hired illegally in violation of Puerto Rico’s personnel laws provided sufficient justification for denying reinstatement.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement only against a liable municipality or an official liable in an official capacity.

Rao v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. · filed 1995-04-07

An order of reinstatement is an equitable remedy that may be directed only at hable individuals in their official capacities or at municipal entities themselves.

Section 1983 makes reinstatement the preferred remedy for an unconstitutional discharge absent special circumstances, even when money damages are available.

Squires v. Bonser · filed 1995-05-08

Thus, while the availability of money damages may have significance in the district court's consideration of remedies, reinstatement is the preferred remedy in the absence of special circumstances militating against it.

Section 1983 favors reinstatement after an unconstitutional employment discharge unless special circumstances justify withholding it, guided by make-whole relief and deterrence.

Joseph Squires, Sr. v. Thomas Bonser Jay E. Huffman Middle Smithfield Township · filed 1995-06-22

Because of this consonance of the underlying policy considerations, the framework of analysis governing reinstatement in Title VII actions also governs in § 1983 actions implicating First Amendment concerns; that is, a denial of reinstatement is unwarranted unless grounded in a rationale which is harmonious with the legislative goals of providing plaintiffs make-whole relief and deterring employers from unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement as a make-whole remedy for unconstitutional political discharge, and the ADEA rightful-place theory does not limit that remedy.

Chester v. Wise Cnty Electoral · filed 1997-07-11

Spagnuolo was an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case in which the court's recognition of the "rightful place" theory rested on Title VII legislative history. We do not believe it circumscribes the court's determination of a make-whole remedy in a § 1983 political discharge case.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement as a discretionary equitable remedy for an unconstitutional employment discharge, but does not make it a presumptive entitlement.

Tejada-Batista v. Fuentes-Agostini · filed 2003-05-22

After all, although not a presumptive entitlement under section 1983, reinstatement may offer significant deterrent and curative value in appropriate cases.

Section 1983 allows instatement as a preferred equitable remedy for lost future earnings caused by unlawful employment actions, when appropriate in the circumstances.

Bullen v. Chaffinch · filed 2004-09-24

Thus, like reinstatement, instatement is considered the preferred remedy to compensate an aggrieved party for loss of future earnings as a result of illegal, adverse employment actions, including actions that violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement against school officials sued in their official capacities when the plaintiffs prove unconstitutional employment discrimination.

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District · filed 1977-07-26

Plaintiffs' case having been proven on the merits, reinstatement under a § 1983 cause of action against the individual defendants in their official capacities is available.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement as an equitable remedy for a First Amendment violation when the Eleventh Amendment bars monetary damages.

Moore v. Watson · filed 2012-03-13

Reinstatement may be awarded less often in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute affords greater monetary compensation. ... In this case, however, where monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reinstatement appears to be the only remedy available to Moore. The court therefore concludes that reinstatement is appropriate to remedy the First Amendment violation occasioned by Moore’s termination.

Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for wrongful discharge under § 1983.

Hunter v. Town of Mocksville · filed 2017-02-21

As the court acknowledged earlier, reinstatement is the preferred remedy.

Section 1983 damages for an inmate assault require proof that each prison official’s deliberate indifference actually and proximately caused the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment deprivation.

William Leer Robert Larry Emerhiser v. Al Murphy Darrell Gardner Arvin Arave · filed 1988-04-04

The foregoing teaches that in order to prevail and recover damages against any of the named prison officials, the inmates in this case must prove (1) that the specific prison official, in acting or failing to act, was deliberately indifferent to the mandates of the eighth amendment and (2) that this indifference was the actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of the inmates’ eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner safety claim against corrections officials to proceed when supported allegations could show deliberate indifference to a known risk of fatal harm from another inmate.

Harris v. Maynard · filed 1988-03-30

We conclude that wanton or obdurate disregard of or deliberate indifference to the prisoner's right to life as a condition of confinement is a substantive constitutional deprivation whether it falls under the due process clause or the Eighth Amendment. ... The unique facts alleged and the supporting affidavits in this case warrant denial of the motions for summary judgment and protection from discovery.

A prisoner's allegations that guards intentionally stood aside during assaults and intentionally struck him state a § 1983 claim; the rule excluding negligent conduct does not defeat allegations of intentional acts.

Benny v. Danny Pipes and Charles Payne · filed 1986-09-05

Benny alleged that the guards deliberately stood aside while he was assaulted by other prisoners, and that Pipes struck him once. Because the guards’ actions were intentional, not negligent, the guards’ argument must fail. Benny must be taken to have shown a violation of a substantive due process.

A section 1983 failure-to-protect claim against prison officials requires conscious or callous indifference that elevates the conduct from tortious negligence to a constitutional violation.

Davis v. Pringle · filed 1986-06-30

In order to state a section 1983 cause of action against prison officials based on a constitutional deprivation resulting from cruel and unusual punishment, there must be at least some allegation of a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner’s rights, thus raising the tort to constitutional stature.

Section 1983 liability for prison officials' failure to protect inmates requires deliberate or callous indifference rather than negligence and an affirmative causal connection between the official's conduct and the constitutional deprivation.

LaMarca v. Turner · filed 1987-06-04

To hold a prison official liable in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) based on cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiffs must show that the official’s conduct constitutes an intentional or callous indifference to the prisoner’s right to reasonable protection from violence. ... Plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant official rather than simple negligence. Section 1983 further requires “proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 liability for failure to protect a prisoner from assault requires more than lack of due care, but deliberate indifference may be inferred from pervasive assaults or a serious risk to an identifiable group of prisoners.

Meriwether v. Faulkner · filed 1987-06-04

A mere lack of due care on the part of prison officials is insufficient to justify liability under § 1983. ... But if the assaults occurred so frequently as to be “pervasive,” or if the plaintiff belonged to an “identifiable group of prisoners” for whom the risk of assault was “a serious problem of substantial dimensions,” a court may infer deliberate indifference.

Prison officials' merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from another inmate does not support a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment.

Setzer v. Wingo · filed 1987-08-18

The eighth amendment, however, does not provide the basis for a Sec. 1983 action if the prison officials were merely negligent in failing to protect an inmate.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim against prison officials whose deliberate indifference to a known threat from another inmate causes injury; mere negligence is insufficient.

Morales v. New York State Department Of Corrections · filed 1988-03-16

The law is settled that a prisoner cannot base a federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 on claims of a negligent failure of state prison officials to protect him from injury at the hands of another inmate. ... In addition, although the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence on the part of prison officials or others, is enough to trigger the protections of the due process clause, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667, n. 3; Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1987), this circuit has continued to adhere to the position that a state prison guard's deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent upon him may support a claim under Sec. 1983. Bass, 790 F.2d at 262-63 (citing Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.1985)).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner injured by a prison official’s deliberate indifference to his safety to seek damages for the resulting deprivation of constitutional rights.

Stubbs v. Dudley · filed 1988-06-13

An inmate who is injured as a result of a prison official's deliberate indifference to his safety may maintain a damage action for the deprivation of his civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 requires a showing of deliberate indifference or wantonness for a prisoner to state a claim against prison guards and officials for failing to protect him from assault.

Underhill v. Abshire · filed 1988-07-28

Under the circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff did not make the requisite showing of deliberate indifference or "wantonness" necessary to state an actionable civil rights claim against prison guards and officials.

Section 1983 requires an inmate alleging a jailer’s failure to protect him to prove more than negligence and a bad faith oppressive motive.

Vun Cannon v. Breed · filed 1975-03-28

In order to make a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an inmate must prove not only that his jailer's actions or omissions were more than negligent, but that the jailer acted with “a bad faith oppressive motive” in an attempt to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims by prisoners alleging that prison officials failed to protect them are governed by the federal deliberate-indifference standard.

Early v. Crockett · filed 2014-06-19

We therefore take this opportunity to establish that the deliberate-indifference standard is the applicable standard to § 1983 individual-capacity claims by prisoners asserting a failure to protect by prison officials in this state’s courts.

A prisoner's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim alleging a body-cavity search without any justification is not frivolous at the pleading stage.

Levoy v. Richard Mills, Herb Maschner, Dale R. Bohannon and Thomas Harvey · filed 1986-04-21

Since the complaint alleges that Mr. Levoy was subjected to a body cavity search without any justification whatsoever, it is possible that Mr. Levoy can make a rational argument on the law and facts to support his Fourth Amendment claim.

A blanket policy of strip-searching minor traffic offenders solely because they will enter the general jail population violates the Fourth Amendment in a Section 1983 action.

Cruz v. Finney County, Kan. · filed 1987-03-19

The Tenth Circuit has held that this sole factor — intermingling with general jail population — does not constitute an adequate reason for subjecting those arrested on minor traffic violations to a strip search. ... This blanket policy on strip searches is unconstitutional under the balancing test of ... Wolfish ... as applied by the Tenth Circuit.

A prisoner cannot state a Section 1983 claim for a prison-cell search because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists there, and a property-deprivation claim also requires pleading and proving that available state tort remedies are inadequate.

Rodman v. Aeh · filed 1987-03-31

Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional violation, however, because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984). Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to plead and prove that the post-deprivation tort remedies available to him under Ohio law are inadequate as required by Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).

Section 1983 can reach a federal actor who conspires with state defendants, but cooperation between federal and state agencies alone does not establish an improper motive.

Beechwood Restorative Care Center v. Leeds · filed 2006-01-31

A federal actor may be subject to section 1983 liability where there is evidence that the federal actor was engaged in a “conspiracy” with state defendants, see, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448-49 (2d Cir.1969).

Claims against federal employees are treated as Bivens claims rather than actions under § 1983.

John Hathorn Lawrence J. Bowman Mike Parisi Carl Banks and Norman Flick, Paul E. Kane v. Ross M. Creviston Cynthia Stowe · filed 1986-04-21

Since the appellants were suing federal employees, the district court was correct in characterizing this case as a Bivens, supra action.

A constitutional suit against federal officials lacks jurisdiction under § 1983 but may fall within federal jurisdiction under Bivens.

Kondrat v. Ann Aldrich Byron & Cantor Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley · filed 1986-05-01

The district court correctly held that jurisdiction was lacking under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Jurisdiction clearly exists under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides that suits against federal officials can be brought directly under the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal official acting under color of federal law.

Sorrells v. Gattison · filed 1986-08-25

Clearly, defendant Gattison was acting under color of federal law at the time in question. Accordingly, a § 1983 action cannot be maintained against him.

Federal officials acting pursuant to federal law are not state actors acting under color of state law and therefore cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Lyons v. Sheetz · filed 1987-12-16

The Lyonses have failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983 because the defendants are federal employees and officials acting pursuant to federal law and are not state actors acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against federal employees.

Owens v. J.J. Clark, Warden · filed 1988-03-07

As an initial matter, we note that the district court erred in characterizing the action as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The defendants in this case are all federal employees and as such may not be sued under Sec. 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). Owens' cause of action, therefore, stems not from Sec. 1983 but rather from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for constitutional claims against federal officials.

Spradley v. Spaniol · filed 1988-05-04

This cause of action arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), not 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) as stated in the complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against a federal parole officer for acts taken under federal authority.

Weekly v. U.S. Parole Commission · filed 1988-12-02

Since the petitioner names only one individual, Benjamin Baer, who is an officer of the United States Parole Commission, his claim for monetary damages for wrongful incarceration cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but, instead, can be brought under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 under the Bivens doctrine.

Section 1983 applies to actions against state officials, not federal officials.

BROWN v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR the DISTRICT OF MARYLAND CLERKS OFFICE · filed 1989-01-06

Brian Brown appeals from the district court's order denying relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. This statute does not apply to actions against federal officials, only state officials.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a federal official.

Merton Bond v. Grider · filed 1989-12-20

The district court dismissed the case because a federal official is not subject to suit under § 1983. See Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 249 n. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983). This holding is correct; however, pro se civil rights complaints are held to a less stringent standard than the formal pleadings drafted by a lawyer.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against federal officials.

Merton Bond v. Eugene Siler, Jr. · filed 1990-01-30

Federal officials are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not govern claims arising from the conduct of federal officials; those claims proceed under Bivens.

Meckley v. Federal Correctional Institute · filed 1990-05-21

Meckley submitted her complaint on a standard form for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims, but because her claims concern only the actions of federal officials, her action is necessarily pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 2 Meckley's original claim for relief suggested she was seeking compensatory damages but was not explicit.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for lawsuits against federal officials.

Keener v. Department of Army · filed 1991-02-08

It was also well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a vehicle for lawsuits against federal officials.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal officials.

Jackson v. Eliason · filed 1991-06-03

We note that suits against federal officials are impermissible under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide the basis for a civil rights suit against federal officials.

Watkins v. Veterans Admin. Medical Center · filed 1992-06-24

Beverly Joyce Watkins, a pro se litigant, appeals the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. Because the defendants are federal officials, the correct basis for her suit is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for deprivations of rights by federal officials acting under color of federal law.

State of Oregon v. Thomas J. Martin v. Robert J. Wright, Third-Party v. United States of America Third-Party · filed 1992-09-11

Wright also argues that his civil rights were violated by the failure of the I.R.S. to remove the tax lien on his property, but 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for deprivation of rights by federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against a federal judge acting under color of federal law.

Stephens v. Herring · filed 1993-07-02

Unlike Pulliam, the present action involves a claim asserted against a federal judge acting under color of federal law, and is therefore properly brought, if at all, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), not § 1983.

Section 1983 is limited to state actors and does not authorize damages claims against federal officials acting under federal authority.

Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp. · filed 1993-07-15

Robinson erroneously seeks damages against the individual defendants in their individual capacities for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which, as. the federal defendants properly note, is limited to state actors and does not apply to them.

Section 1983 does not support an action against the federal government or its employees acting in their capacities as federal employees.

Oscar KELLOM, Sr. v. SHELLEY · filed 1993-08-18

Section 1983 does not, however, support an action against the federal government or its employees. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1973). Any actions taken by these defendants occurred in their capacities as federal employees. For that reason, the district court properly dismissed the claims against them.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal parole officer who is not a state official.

Noll v. McCarthy · filed 1993-12-23

Section 1983 is limited to claims involving state officials. ... Because USPO McCarthy is not a state official, the district court properly determined that Noll failed to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 affords no relief on claims against federal veterans officials acting in their federal roles.

Marozsan v. United States · filed 1994-02-22

It has already been stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982, § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 do not provide any basis -for relief to this plaintiff in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal officials.

Pardo v. Federal Correctional Institution--Petersburg Carolyn Rickards William Stuby Les Ruth Cal Weaver · filed 1994-03-23

Although the district court characterized this action as a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint, suits against federal officials may not be brought under Sec. 1983.