42 U.S.C. § 1983

A public employee states no Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when she voluntarily resigns and fails to use adequate available state grievance or judicial-review procedures to challenge the employer’s refusal to allow withdrawal of the resignation.

Teague v. Weinstein · filed 1986-10-17

The procedures Teague had available are not facially inadequate. Consequently, since Teague did not seek review of Weinstein’s decision, she has made out no constitutional violation.

A random and unauthorized property deprivation does not support a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when its unexpected nature makes a predeprivation hearing impracticable and state court provides a remedy for the resulting loss.

Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Percy · filed 1986-08-27

Cameo was placed on the list without a prior hearing to which it was entitled under state law. Any damages to which Cameo is entitled are limited to the referrals Cameo lost as a result of placement on the list. ... The evidence shows that the unexpected nature of the deprivation made a pre-deprivation hearing impracticable; that the deprivation was random and unauthorized, due to a clerical mistake; and that whatever loss Cameo sustained by being improperly listed on SORL was directly addressable in state court.

Parratt does not bar a § 1983 procedural due process claim that attacks the adequacy of an established state hearing system rather than a random, unauthorized act.

Dunbar v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 1986-04-21

Since plaintiff is attacking the state system, i.e., the adequacy of the hearing provided, and not a random and unauthorized act where no pre-deprivation hearing was afforded, Parratt and Vicory are inapplicable.

Adequate state remedies defeat a § 1983 procedural due process claim based on a random deprivation.

Taylor v. Watters · filed 1986-05-02

Since the state remedies appear adequate, plaintiffs have not stated a procedural due process claim.

Even when a § 1983 procedural due process challenge attacks an established state procedure, adequate post-deprivation procedures can satisfy due process in circumstances requiring quick state action.

D.A. Delahoussaye v. Seale · filed 1986-05-02

Nevertheless, even where the procedural due process challenge is to “established state procedure,” postdeprivation procedures provided by the state can, in some instances, satisfy the requirements of due process.

A random but authorized emergency deprivation that does not implement an established state procedure may be satisfied by adequate post-deprivation remedies when pre-deprivation process is impracticable.

Tavarez v. O'Malley · filed 1986-08-08

Accordingly, we hold that the availability of post-deprivation remedies in the present case affords the Tavarezes all the process that was due under the circumstances. The Schiller Park defendants merely responded to a type of emergency situation which they had not previously confronted.

An intentional property deprivation by a state employee is not actionable under Section 1983 when the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Freddie Stokes v. Correctional Officer Brisson · filed 1986-11-04

Even intentional deprivations of a prisoner's property by state employees acting within the scope of their employment are not actionable under Sec. 1983 if adequate post-deprivation state remedies are available.

An adequate state post-deprivation remedy defeats a Section 1983 due-process claim based on an unauthorized police seizure of property.

Junior Wilnon Byrd v. Larry Stewart, So. Cid, Thomas County, Georgia, Lenord Harris, Deputy Sheriff, Madison County, Flo · filed 1986-11-10

The state therefore has provided an adequate post deprivation remedy; Byrd was not deprived of property without due process law.

A meaningful postdeprivation remedy defeats a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim for a random, unauthorized departure from state procedure but not for deprivation caused by established state procedure.

Morris v. McKeever · filed 1987-03-10

However, the availability of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy bars a procedural due process claim only when the alleged state action is a negligent act or a random intentional act. When the plaintiff’s loss is caused by an exercise of established state procedure, for example, by the enforcement of a statute, then even the most meaningful post-deprivation remedial process will not prevent the allegation of a procedural due process violation.

A plaintiff has no § 1983 liberty-deprivation due-process claim when state law supplies a remedy and the complaint does not plead that state processes are inadequate.

Harper v. Edgewood Board of Education · filed 1987-03-18

Clearly, Ohio common law provides a remedy for false arrest and/or false imprisonment if such claims can be proved. Moreover, plaintiffs have failed even to plead the inadequacy of state processes. Therefore, plaintiffs have no cause of action under section 1983 against the Edgewood defendants, Officer Banks or Miami University for deprivation of liberty without due process.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may proceed directly to federal court without exhausting state remedies, but cannot skip an available state remedy and then claim that the constitutional deprivation was the inadequacy or absence of that remedy.

Myrick v. City of Dallas · filed 1987-03-30

Of course, she was free to skip state remedies and proceed directly to federal court to vindicate state deprivation of her constitutional rights; exhaustion of remedies is not ordinarily required. But she cannot skip an available state remedy and then argue that the deprivation by the state was the inadequacy or lack of the skipped remedy.

An adequate state tort remedy does not bar a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when officials deliberately deprive property under an established state procedure and practicable pre-deprivation notice was not provided.

Messick v. Leavins · filed 1987-04-23

However, as will be seen, the availability of a state tort action is irrelevant to a claim for deprivation of a protected interest which is carried out by persons acting under color of state law pursuant to an established procedure where predeprivation process is feasible. ... This failure to provide any predeprivation process is actionable.

A § 1983 property-deprivation plaintiff must plead and prove that available state postdeprivation remedies are inadequate.

Moore v. Selweign · filed 1987-04-24

Plaintiff has failed to plead and prove that the post-deprivation remedies provided by T.C.A. Sec. 9-8-307 (Supp. 1985) are inadequate.

An available state remedy does not bar a Section 1983 claim challenging an established assessment procedure when that remedy cannot prevent or cure the unconstitutional taking.

Allison v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs · filed 1987-05-01

Here, plaintiffs are challenging an established state procedure that deprived them of their land without according them proper procedural due process safeguards. ... No administrative remedy existing at that time provided a landowner the opportunity to discontinue the project when additional areas were added to the district, or when the cost had exceeded the original estimate and no longer provided a benefit to the district.

When an alleged due-process deprivation results from a state pattern or practice, an available post-loss state remedy does not bar the § 1983 claim.

Brower v. County of Inyo · filed 1987-05-15

Thus, if the deprivation of due process rights is alleged to result from application of a state pattern or practice, the availability, after the loss, of a state remedy is immaterial to the federal cause of action.

The intentional, random, and unauthorized use of excessive force by a public official remains actionable under § 1983 despite available postdeprivation remedies.

Robison v. Susan R. Via and Harold Harrison · filed 1987-06-17

Accordingly, the victim of the intentional, albeit random and unauthorized, use of excessive force by a public official continues to have a claim under § 1983.

A procedural-due-process § 1983 claim based on an established state procedure remains maintainable regardless of available state judicial remedies.

Farris v. Moeckel · filed 1987-07-02

A § 1983 action based upon a denial of procedural due process pursuant to an established state procedure may be maintained in federal court regardless of the availability of state judicial remedies.

An adequate state post-deprivation remedy defeats a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized property taking, even if the taking was intentional and pre-deprivation procedures were not followed.

Theresa Lynn Brewer Owens v. Michael G. Crawford, ("Mike") · filed 1987-11-19

As a result, with the provision of an adequate post-deprivation remedy for an unauthorized taking, there is no constitutional violation notwithstanding the fact that a pre-deprivation remedy was not followed.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random property deprivation fails unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that available state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate.

Vincent Scott (87-5660) Russell Graham (87-5683) John Jagoe (87-5718) Larry Riggsbee (87-5719) v. Billy Adams and Warden · filed 1987-11-19

Plaintiffs, however, assert a random deprivation of their property in violation of procedural due process yet they have failed to plead and prove that available state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. ... Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for deprivation of property without procedural due process because Kentucky has provided adequate remedies.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of an available predeprivation remedy even when a postdeprivation remedy is also available.

Hroch v. City of Omaha, a Municipal Corporation Anderson Excavating and Wrecking Company, a Nebraska Corporation · filed 1993-09-15

Here, the State could and in fact did afford Hroch a predeprivation remedy designed to protect his interest as the owner of property sought to be condemned as a nuisance. After ... we think it clear that the constitutional adequacy of this predeprivation remedy may be challenged under § 1983, regardless of whether a postdeprivation remedy is also available.

Section 1983 relief for a procedural due process deprivation is not barred by post-deprivation remedies when officials authorized to cause the deprivation made it foreseeable.

Honey v. John Distelrath, Chief of Police West Covina Police Department James E. Starbird, City Manager City of Wes · filed 1999-11-09

The parties’ fundamental disagreement rests on whether Parratt v. Taylor bars Honey’s § 1983 suit. We hold that it does not. ... We hold that the acts at issue in this case were not random and unauthorized because the defendants in this case had the authority to effect the very deprivation complained of, and the duty to afford Honey procedural due process.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for destruction of a prisoner’s property when a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available.

Castro v. Terhune · filed 2002-01-09

Destruction of a prisoner’s property is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available.

Section 1983 allows a due process claim for a property deprivation caused by an established state procedure despite the availability of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.

Sahagian v. Dickey · filed 1986-11-05

Since there is no question that the alleged deprivation of property in this case was the result of an established state procedure, the specific holding in Hudson v. Palmer, that a § 1983 action for an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property would be barred by the existence of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, is not applicable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for a random and unauthorized deprivation of property when state law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies.

Patten v. County of Lake · filed 2012-07-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Patten’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against the individual County defendants because the random and unauthorized deprivation of property for which state law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies is not cognizable under § 1983.

A municipality’s continued failure to correct a known pattern of excessive force may constitute an informal policy or custom actionable under Section 1983.

Depew v. City of St. Marys, Georgia, Charles Earl Fowler v. City of St. Marys, Georgia · filed 1986-04-28

The continued failure of the city to prevent known constitutional violations by its police force is precisely, the type of informal policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to report another person's misconduct when the defendant had no legal control over that person's behavior.

Jennings v. UNIVERSITY OF N. CAR AT CHAPEL HILL · filed 2002-11-13

In the absence of legal control over Defendant Dorrance, these Defendants' reporting omissions cannot be said to have affirmatively caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Therefore, the § 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state limitations and tolling rules; for putative class members under Pennsylvania law, tolling ends when class certification is denied, leaving only the unexpired portion of the limitations period.

Nelson v. County of Allegheny · filed 1994-08-15

Although plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are federal law claims, it is settled that there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims, and both the limitations period and the applicable tolling period, if any, must be derived from state law. ... We hold that, pursuant to American Pipe, the tolling period merely suspended the running of the limitations period during the pendency of this class action, and upon decertification of the class, class members had only eighteen days to intervene or join in the action, or to bring separate actions.

Police officers are not liable under Section 1983 merely for conducting an improper lineup; liability requires their actions to be directly linked to a constitutional violation.

Hensley v. Carey · filed 1986-04-29

Because their actions were not directly linked with any violation of plaintiff’s civil rights, Williams and Stanley cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on an unduly suggestive lineup only if it violates the right to a fair trial.

Elmer Pace and Linda Pace v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, and Brian Danner · filed 2000-01-13

In the context of unduly suggestive lineups, only a violation of the core right — the right to a fair trial — is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be decided using preclusive findings of fact from a state administrative agency.

Pugh v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources · filed 1990-10-29

Thus, this court concludes that for the purpose of deciding Pugh’s § 1983 claim the WPC’s findings of fact must be given preclusive effect.

A state court's prior probable-cause determination may collaterally estop a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating whether officials unlawfully seized a child or acted in bad faith.

Donald v. Polk County · filed 1988-01-13

The Donalds cannot relitigate the issue of probable cause in federal court after it has been conclusively determined in state court. ... Likewise, the state court determination of probable cause precludes the Donalds from showing that Stewart or any of the other defendants acted in bad faith in taking Dana into custody.

A prior state-court determination that due process was afforded may collaterally estop a later § 1983 claim raising the identical due process issue.

Myers v. Daubert · filed 1986-04-29

They now seek to have this Court reconsider at least one of the issues already determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. We conclude that collateral estoppel precludes our further inquiry into this matter.

A state administrative adjudication receives the same issue-preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action as it would receive in state court when the agency acted judicially and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

Yancy v. Mcdevitt · filed 1986-10-02

We hold, therefore, that Yancy's termination hearing was adjudicatory in nature. As such, the school board's factfindings are entitled to preclusive effect under Elliott, assuming the requirements for issue preclusion articulated by the Iowa court in Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 123, are otherwise met.

A state guilty plea can preclude factual relitigation in a later Section 1983 action when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to contest the facts and no special circumstances justify an exception.

Rodriguez v. David W. Schweiger and Roger D. Terry · filed 1986-10-16

Absent special circumstances or any material benefit a delay in the proceedings would have given plaintiff in defending his contentions, plaintiff was properly estopped from collaterally attacking his guilty plea.

Findings made in denying federal habeas relief may collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a Section 1983 action.

Smith v. City of Chesapeake · filed 1987-04-07

Recognizing, despite Smith's failure to introduce this evidence in the district court, that Smith has exhausted his state remedies, we also take notice of the fact that Smith has recently been denied federal habeas relief on essentially the same claims which form the basis of his civil rights complaint. ... These findings would be entitled to collateral estoppel effect in this civil rights action.

A § 1983 plaintiff who had a full and fair state proceeding resolving the same constitutional issue is collaterally estopped from relitigating it in federal court.

Fish v. Charter Tp. of Shelby · filed 1987-04-14

Having had a fair state hearing to resolve these conflicting contentions, plaintiff is now barred from reasserting them in federal proceedings.

Issue preclusion may bar a § 1983 plaintiff from relitigating a city's past intentional discrimination when that precise issue was previously litigated by an adequately representative class.

Detroit Police Officers Association v. Young · filed 1987-07-29

Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, we hold that it was proper for the District Court to collaterally estop the plaintiffs from relitigating the general question of whether the City's past intentional discrimination constituted a sufficient basis for the institution of some affirmative action.

In a § 1983 action, a state administrative agency's factual findings may receive preclusive effect, but its legal conclusions do not control the federal court.

Cook v. Board of Educ. for Logan County · filed 1987-10-19

The Court agrees that in this Section 1983 action it must give preclusive effect to findings of fact made by a state administrative agency. ... As to conclusions of law, however, the Court disagrees.

A § 1983 claim may be barred from relitigating a constitutional issue decided in a municipal administrative hearing when state law gives that decision collateral estoppel effect.

Eilrich v. Remas · filed 1988-02-17

The district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding relitigation of Eilrich’s first amendment issue in the § 1983 action because the municipal administrative proceeding would have been given collateral estoppel effect under California law.

A § 1983 claim challenging probable cause for a stop is barred when a state administrative hearing acting in a judicial capacity necessarily decided that issue after a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Terrones v. Allen · filed 1988-03-02

Thus the issue of probable cause no longer presents a question of fact for this court. Rather the hearing officer’s decision is binding. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot assert a claim for relief under § 1983 against the defendant Doe.

A Section 1983 claim is precluded when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity has already decided the same issues and state law gives its decision preclusive effect.

Nelson v. Jefferson County, Kentucky · filed 1989-03-14

Appellant seeks to relitigate in federal court issues that have already been decided by the Merit Board. Kentucky law afforded appellant the right to judicial review of the Merit Board’s decision while acting in a judicial capacity. Elliott precludes him from pursuing relief in federal court.

Section 1983 suits give a state agency’s factual findings the preclusive effect they receive under state law when the agency acted judicially, the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate, and the issues were properly before it.

Nix v. Hardison · filed 1989-04-06

Three conditions must be met before this court affords an agency’s decision preclusive effect: (1) the agency must be performing a judicial function, (2) the parties must have had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues and (3) the issues must be properly before the agency. If all three factors are met, then the federal court must determine what preclusive effect would be afforded the agency decision under state law.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the same issue preclusion from a prior state court judgment that the judgment would receive in that state’s courts.

Dwyer v. City of Middletown · filed 1989-08-04

Issues that were actually litigated in a state court proceeding are given the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as they would be given in the courts of the state where the first decision was rendered.

A state agency’s judicial resolution of an issue can preclude relitigation of that issue in a Section 1983 action when the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate it.

Jones v. Doria · filed 1991-06-10

Commission’s decision that Jones’ termination — the result of his resignation — was legally effective cannot be reexamined by this Court. ... Thus Jones has no right to bring those issues before this Court anew. Accordingly the entire portion of the Complaint relating to Jones’ termination must be and is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation of the constitutionality of a search already litigated in a state criminal prosecution.

Ledbetter v. West Sacramento Police · filed 1991-08-30

Because the constitutionality of the search of Ledbetter's motel room already has been litigated in state court during Ledbetter's criminal prosecution, he is precluded from relitigating it in a civil rights action.

A prior federal habeas decision may have issue-preclusive effect in a § 1983 action.

Hawkins v. Henry Risley, Warden, Montana State Prison · filed 1993-01-25

We agree with the analysis in Williams v. Ward and hold that a prior federal habeas decision may have preclusive effect in a § 1983 action.

In a § 1983 action, a federal court gives state agency fact-finding the same preclusive effect it would receive in state court when the agency acted judicially, resolved properly presented factual disputes, and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

Atiya v. Salt Lake County · filed 1993-03-12

To summarize the holding in Elliott, a federal district court in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must give a state agency’s fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the state’s court if the state agency: (1) was acting in a judicial capacity; (2) resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues in dispute. We believe the instant case meets the Elliott test.

In § 1983 actions, unreviewed state administrative factfinding receives the preclusive effect state courts would give it, but a lay civil service commission’s constitutional ruling does not preclude federal adjudication.

unempl.ins.rep. Cch 22,077 Harry T. Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square Robert F. Goddu Kenneth Roberts Herbert L. Wa · filed 1993-09-23

As noted earlier, in section 1983 cases, in the absence of state court review, federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to the factfinding of administrative agencies as would the state courts. ... We conclude that the district court should not have, given issue preclusive effect to the ruling of the Civil Service Commission that pertained to the First Amendment.

In a § 1983 action, an administrative law judge’s factual finding on an issue actually and necessarily litigated with a full and fair opportunity to litigate receives the same preclusive effect it would receive under state law.

Spencer v. Rice · filed 1993-10-08

The record indicates that Spencer squarely presented the issue of his alleged final discharge from parole to the administrative law judge and that the issue was actually and necessarily litigated. The record also indicates that Spencer was represented by counsel and that Spencer was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Further, he had every incentive to litigate the issue. In such an instance, a federal court, in a Sec. 1983 action, must give the same preclusive effect as the state would to an administrative law judge's fact finding. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). Because it appears that this finding of fact would be given preclusive effect in Kentucky, see Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400 (Ky.App.1991), we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Spencer's claims as barred by issue preclusion.

A criminal conviction alone does not bar a § 1983 damages action challenging a search, but issues already decided by a state court are precluded when state law bars their relitigation.

Long v. Bill Jenkins, Trooper, Kentucky State Police Morris Kisselbough Fred Browning, Jailer · filed 1993-11-18

In short, a criminal conviction does not, by itself, operate to bar a subsequent civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 contesting the legality of a search that produced evidence supporting the conviction. ... Thus, as these issues could not now be relitigated in Kentucky state courts, the district court correctly found that Long is estopped from pursuing his Fourth Amendment claims for damages in a federal civil rights action.

Section 1983 claims are not precluded by findings from Pennsylvania unemployment compensation proceedings because the two laws serve different policies.

Swineford v. Snyder County · filed 1994-02-04

Accordingly, we reaffirm our ruling in Kelley and hold Pennsylvania courts would not apply issue preclusion here because the policies underlying section 1983 and the Unemployment Compensation Law are sufficiently different.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by issue preclusion based on unreviewed state agency factfinding when the agency adjudicated a properly presented disputed fact, the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate, and state law gives the findings preclusive effect.

Lindas v. Cady · filed 1994-05-17

When deciding whether to give preclusive effect to the unreviewed factfindings of state agencies in sec. 1983 cases, courts must first determine a) whether the agency was adjudicating a disputed issue of fact properly before it and b) whether the agency's proceedings provided the parties an adequate opportunity to litigate. Only if both of these conditions are satisfied can the court advance to the second stage of analysis, that being whether under state law, do the agency's findings have preclusive effect.

In a Section 1983 action, federal courts give state agency factual findings the same preclusive effect they would receive in state court.

White v. A.C. Gilless A. Ray Mills Shelby County Government, Jack Sheriff · filed 1995-02-01

In actions filed under Sec. 1983, federal courts must give a state agency's factual findings the same preclusive effect that the state courts would give them.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by issue preclusion when an administrative agency resolves the same factual issue after procedures giving the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Reubens v. New York City Department of Juvenile Justice · filed 1996-06-17

Accordingly, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the Commission’s finding of no probable cause would bar the plaintiff from litigating a claim for denial of equal protection under § 1983 and the New York State Constitution.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by issue preclusion in Alabama when a claimant fails to seek available judicial review of an administrative decision on the underlying constitutional issue.

Ex Parte Smith · filed 1996-06-28

His § 1983 claims are nevertheless barred, because he had a right to appeal the ruling of the review panel to the appropriate circuit court, under § 41-22-20(k)(1), Ala.Code 1975, but did not do so.

In Alabama state courts, a § 1983 claim may be barred by issue preclusion when the plaintiff fails to seek available judicial review of an administrative ruling on the same constitutional issues.

Smith v. Alabama Aviation & Technical College · filed 1996-06-28

His § 1983 claims are nevertheless barred, because he had a right to appeal the ruling of the review panel to the appropriate circuit court, under § 41-22-20(k)(l), Ala.Code 1975, but did not do so.

State-court determinations can preclude relitigation of issues in a § 1983 action when the issues were necessarily decided in a final judgment and the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Berger v. City of Cleveland · filed 1997-03-25

State court litigation has a collateral effect in subsequent § 1983 litigation, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), as long as (1) the precise issue raised in the § 1983 action was actually litigated in state court; (2) the determination of the issue was necessary to the outcome in state court; (3) a final judgment on the merits was reached in state court; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 824 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir.1987); LaBonte v. LaBonte, 572 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ohio Ct.App.1988). In determining whether preclusion applies in federal court, the appropriate inquiry is whether the state court would give collateral effect to the prior state court decision.

Section 1983 claims are subject to issue preclusion for facts previously litigated and adjudicated in state administrative proceedings.

Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio · filed 1997-03-26

The Supreme Court has expressly held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in § 1983 actions. ... Upon review of this doctrine, this Court finds that the doctrine of issue preclusion is applicable to the present case.

An unreviewed administrative board’s findings do not preclude a § 1983 claimant from litigating constitutional claims that the board did not consider.

Carroll v. City of Westminster · filed 1999-03-22

The Board considered only whether Carroll should be disciplined given the results presented to them. ... Therefore, Plaintiff is not precluded form litigating his constitutional deprivation claims in this Court.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by issue preclusion when a state court has already decided the same essential issue.

Haberer v. Woodbury Cty. · filed 1999-08-27

Federal courts are obligated to give preclusive effect to issues decided by state courts even where the subsequent federal case is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).

An unreviewed state administrative determination of law does not preclude a plaintiff from litigating that issue in a § 1983 action.

Pappas v. Giuliani · filed 2000-10-26

Accordingly, we will not apply issue preclusion to Commissioner Martinez’s determination that Mr. Pappas’ speech was not protected by the First Amendment and we now consider his claim on its merits.

A § 1983 plaintiff may be barred by issue preclusion from relitigating a Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Robinson v. Walter · filed 2001-11-07

Issue preclusion can be used to bar a § 1983 plaintiff ... from relitigating a Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim that he lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Section 1983 suits are subject to issue preclusion.

Dean v. Parker · filed 2002-08-30

Issue preclusion applies to suits brought under § 1983.

A state court's probable-cause determination can preclude relitigation of that issue in a § 1983 action, even if the plaintiff was later acquitted.

Crumley v. City of St. Paul · filed 2003-04-07

Therefore, the Minnesota state court conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest Crumley collaterally estopped a contrary ruling in Crumley's § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a litigant to bring a federal action without exhausting state administrative remedies, subject to applicable abstention and preclusion doctrines.

Peery v. Brakke · filed 1987-08-12

Patsy held that litigants need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action in federal court. ... We hold the district court did not err in refusing to abstain from adjudicating Peery’s § 1983 claim.

An unreviewed state administrative ruling that speech lacks First Amendment protection does not preclude a § 1983 claim.

Levich v. Liberty Central School District · filed 2004-12-22

Accordingly, we will not apply issue preclusion to the hearing officer’s determination that plaintiffs September 4th letter was not protected by the First Amendment and will now consider the merits of plaintiffs retaliation claims.

In a § 1983 action, state administrative fact-finding receives the preclusive effect it would receive in state court when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Burkybile v. Board of Education · filed 2005-06-15

Nonetheless, in federal actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state administrative fact-finding is given the same preclusive effect as it would receive in courts of the same state. ... Instead, we hold that because the Section 3020-a hearing was an administrative adjudication, we must give its findings preclusive effect.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by issue preclusion when the same issue was actually litigated, resolved, and necessary to a prior judgment.

Willis v. Bell · filed 1988-05-27

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-21, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) confirmed the applicability of the common-law doctrine of issue preclusion to Section 1983 actions. Four requirements must be met for that purpose (Bailey v. Andrews, 811 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.1987)): ... The issue must be the same as that involved in the prior judicial proceeding; the issue must actually have been litigated; the issue must have been resolved; and the issue’s determination must have been necessary to the judgment in the prior proceeding.

Section 1983 bars relitigation of probable cause when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to contest it at a state preliminary hearing.

Smith v. Thornburg · filed 1998-02-13

Thus, because plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether probable cause existed to maintain an assault charge against him,... he is barred from relit-igating that issue in this § 1983 action.

Unreviewed state agency findings may preclude a § 1983 action when the requirements for issue preclusion are met.

Jones v. Hamic · filed 2012-07-13

Elliott made clear that unreviewed state agency findings can preclude § 1983 actions if the final two steps of the inquiry are satisfied. ... Accordingly, the defendants’ argument that summary judgment is due to be granted on collateral estoppel grounds fails.

A state habeas decision can preclude relitigation of the same issues in a § 1983 action.

Morales v. Pelican Bay State Prison · filed 2012-09-25

Dismissal was proper because the state court’s denial of Morales’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his prison disciplinary proceedings and placement in the Security Housing Unit precluded Morales from relitigating the same issues in a § 1983 action.

In a § 1983 action, a factual finding necessary to a Michigan prison misconduct decision can preclude relitigation when the prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to contest it and Michigan law gives it preclusive effect.

Peterson v. Johnson · filed 2013-04-12

His appeal turns on a single question: Where a disputed issue of fact is resolved at a Michigan major misconduct hearing as a necessary part of the hearing’s judgment, does that factfinding have preclusive effect in collateral litigation brought by the prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Because we are persuaded that, in this case, it does, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by issue preclusion when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the same issues in state court.

Cook v. Aagard · filed 2013-10-25

A federal civil rights plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from litigating a § 1983 claim by a state court criminal judgment, so long as he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at the state criminal proceedings.

A state administrative decision can preclude a Section 1983 claim if the proceeding met minimum federal due process requirements and the state's rules for preclusion.

Hafter v. Clark · filed 2014-01-20

A state administrative decision can have preclusive effect in a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as it meets these requirements.

A § 1983 plaintiff may be barred by issue preclusion from relitigating a Fourth Amendment claim lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Harris v. Huston · filed 2014-02-10

Accordingly, a § 1983 plaintiff can be collaterally es-topped from relitigating fourth amendment claims that were lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Administrative agency findings have preclusive effect in a Section 1983 action when the requirements of collateral estoppel are met.

Ogaldez v. Dep't of Corr. · filed 2019-01-08

Thus, so long as the requirements of collateral estoppel are met, the findings of an administrative agency are entitled to preclusive effect in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 action, an unreviewed state agency’s factual findings receive the preclusive effect they would receive in state court, but a finding does not bar the claim when the two proceedings apply materially different causation frameworks.

McLaughlin v. Fisher · filed 2008-05-05

Although § 1738 does not apply to unreviewed state administrative decisions, under federal common-law principles of preclusion, in § 1983 cases, “when a state agency ‘acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,’ . . . federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.” Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)); see also Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 189 (“[I]n section 1983 cases, only state administrative factfinding is entitled to preclusive effect in the federal courts when the agency ruling remains unreviewed by state courts.”). ... Thus, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that this suit was not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

A § 1983 claim can be barred by issue preclusion when an administrative proceeding gave the plaintiff a full opportunity to litigate and judicial review was available.

Bahra v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2019-12-30

We therefore conclude that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is precluded by the ... Commission’s order, and we affirm the district court’s ruling on this claim.

Issue preclusion may bar a Section 1983 claim when a state court has decided the same issues after the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Julien v. Venditty · filed 2020-02-25

It is “well-settled” that issue preclusion may bar a plaintiff from bringing a Section 1983 action in federal court.

A prisoner's transfer from the facility where an alleged constitutional violation occurred does not moot a Section 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages arising from the past violation.

Beyah v. Coughlin · filed 1986-05-02

Although this fact may well moot Beyah’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, ... the complaint also sought compensatory and punitive damages for the period in which the alleged deprivation occurred. These requests were ... not mooted by Beyah’s transfer from Attica.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 claim for equitable relief becomes moot upon transfer from the facility where the claim arose, but a claim for money damages survives.

Vaughn v. United States · filed 1990-07-31

It is well-settled that a prisoner’s § 1983 claims for equitable relief become moot upon his transfer from the place where the cause of action arose, although any claims for money damages survive the transfer.

An inmate’s Section 1983 claim for injunctive or declaratory relief becomes moot after transfer to another facility absent class certification, but the transfer does not moot a damages claim.

Black v. Rouse · filed 1991-09-25

Absent class certification, an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.1985). As a result, we hold that appellant's prayers for such relief are now moot. Appellant's transfer to other prison facilities does not render moot his claim for damages, however.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s damages claim for a due process violation to remain available after the prisoner leaves the jail.

Nathaniel Dudley, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Stewart · filed 1984-02-13

The district court erred in viewing the controversy as moot, at least as to Dudley’s claim for money damages. The Supreme Court has held that a damages claim by a prisoner whose due process rights have been violated is cognizable under section 1983. ... The claim remains valid and a remedy is available whether or not the inmate is still incarcerated.

Section 1983 permits a landowner to seek damages for governmental overregulation of land.

Bruno Martino and Eugenia Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District · filed 1983-04-14

While “the contours of municipal liability under § 1983 ... are currently in a state of evolving definition and uncertainty” (see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2754, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)), an action for damages under section 1983 for the overregulation of land was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). The district court improperly denied the Martinos an opportunity to try to prove such a claim.

Section 1983 claims need not be joined with a petition challenging a land use decision and may be brought in a separate action.

Gig Harbor Marina, Inc. v. City of Gig Harbor · filed 1999-03-26

But a land use applicant is not required to join any potential § 1983 and § 1988 claims with a petition to review a governmental land use decision. Such claims may be brought in a separate action not subject to the fees provision of RCW 4.84.370.

A local official's bad-faith refusal to follow state law in administering a permit does not itself violate due process under Section 1983 when state courts are available to correct the error.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. Town of West Newbury, Thomas E. Pulkkinen, and Patricia Wells Knowles · filed 1987-12-16

“[a] mere bad faith refusal to follow state law in such local administration matters [here, building permit proceedings] simply does not amount to a deprivation of due process where the state courts are available to correct the error.”

Section 1983 does not provide federal review of local land-use disputes unless the challenged action abridges a recognized fundamental constitutional right.

Carter v. Rollins Cablevision of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1986-05-19

The only exception to the rule that litigants may not obtain federal court review of local land use disputes by means of Section 1983 is where a litigant can show that its “recognized fundamental constitutional rights [have been] abridged.”

Section 1983 land-use claims must satisfy finality requirements even though plaintiffs generally need not exhaust administrative remedies.

Kaiser Development Co. v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 1986-09-25

Thus, claims under § 1983 must also meet the Court’s finality requirements.

Section 1983 does not convert ordinary zoning review into a federal due-process claim when the zoning board acts within its lawful authority to review a permit decision.

Hynes v. Pasco County, Florida, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida · filed 1986-10-14

Hynes has suffered no constitutionally prohibited deprivation of property without due process. The federal courts will not sit as a zoning review board. Challenges to the county’s action are the province of the state courts.

A landowner must obtain a final land-use decision, including seeking an available variance, before bringing a ripe § 1983 challenge to an ordinance as applied, even though § 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Shelter Creek Development Corporation Leo A. O'Hearn Margaret E. O'Hearn v. City of Oxnard · filed 1988-02-02

A landowner, therefore, can be required to seek a variance from the terms of the challenged ordinance before instituting a section 1983 action attacking application of that ordinance.

Section 1983 land-use claims alleging substantive due process and equal protection violations are subject to a final-decision ripeness requirement.

Herrington v. County of Sonoma · filed 1988-02-10

Thus, we conclude that the Kinzli final decision requirement is applicable to the Herringtons' substantive due process and equal protection claims.

Section 1983 affords no claim for a municipality’s refusal to approve a higher-density subdivision plat when the record shows the city exercised its authority to control development for public health, safety, or morals.

Woodson Lumber Co. v. City of College Station · filed 1988-06-23

Appellant also claims deprivation of substantive due process and violation of its rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The record dispels any basis for a cause of action under that section. The courts have recognized the authority of a municipality, through zoning or other ordinances, to control development within the municipality and to disapprove such development if it would adversely affect the public health, safety, or morals.

Section 1983 land use claims do not all require proof of a regulatory taking.

Grader v. City of Lynnwood · filed 1989-02-13

We reject the City's premise that all § 1983 claims involving land use must show a regulatory taking.

Section 1983 substantive due process challenges to zoning decisions require a final municipal decision before judicial review.

Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster · filed 1989-09-01

Having determined that the City decision to refuse to rezone plaintiff’s parcel was final for the purposes of § 1983 analysis, and thus that a claim of substantive due process is properly presented, we now consider whether the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment have been met.

A landowner challenging the application of a zoning ordinance under § 1983 can be required to seek a variance before filing suit so the agency reaches a final decision.

Martinez v. Junta De Planificacion De Puerto Rico · filed 1990-04-30

A landowner, therefore, can be required to seek a variance from the terms of a challenged ordinance before instituting a § 1983 action attacking the application of the same.

Section 1983 does not provide an additional route to review a land-use decision merely because the decision was overturned under state law.

Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley · filed 2003-05-12

42 USC § 1983 is not simply an additional vehicle for judicial review of land-use determinations (see Honess 52 Corp. v Town of Fishkill, 1 F Supp 2d 294, 300 [1998]).

Section 1983 land use claims may be premature when plaintiffs have not pursued available zoning procedures or applied for a conditional use permit.

Hatch v. Boulder Town Council · filed 2006-12-19

These claim s should be exhausted administratively and/or pursued through appropriate zoning appeals and other m easures, rather than being brought initially as § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs also failed to show that they attem pted to apply for a conditional use perm it. Thus, their claim s appear to be unripe and/or premature.

Section 1983 land-use due-process claims are unripe when plaintiffs have not pursued available state remedies, despite the general rule that § 1983 does not require administrative exhaustion.

Trustees of Marion Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Marion · filed 2007-12-26

As a general rule, of course, there is no requirement that a plaintiff asserting a deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, in the context of constitutional challenges to local land use regulation, the ripeness doctrine imposes on litigants a duty to pursue state remedies before seeking recourse to federal court.

Section 1983 land-use challenges may proceed only after the local authority has had an opportunity to make a final decision.

Harris v. Township of O'Hara · filed 2008-06-03

Constitutional challenges to land-use decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not proceed unless the local authority has been given the opportunity to render a final decision regarding the challenged zoning ordinance.

Section 1983 permits liability for an inmate’s suicide only when an officer subjectively knew of a serious suicide risk and disregarded it.

Jackson v. Preston West · filed 2015-06-03

... liable under § 1983 for the suicide of an inmate only if he had subjective knowledge of a serious risk that the inmate would commit suicide and he disregarded that known risk. Because we find no genuine factual dispute about the subjective knowledge of these seven defendants, we cannot sustain the District Court’s ruling.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Jones v. McKenzie, et al. · filed 2011-12-16

An officer violates the due process rights of a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment3 if the officer is deliberately indifferent “to the unusually strong risk that a detainee will commit suicide.” Bowen v . City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 1 3 , 16 (1st Cir. 1992). This standard demands more than negligence. Id. at 1 7 . Rather, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unusually serious risk of self-inflicted harm, (2) the defendant’s actual knowledge o f , or at least willful blindness t o , that elevated risk, and (3) the defendant’s failure to take obvious steps to address that known, serious risk. Manarite v . City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992). ... In light of this authority, Jones cannot show, as a matter of law, that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to whatever risk of suicide Vieara exhibited. They are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim for that reason as well.

Section 1983 liability may arise from deliberate indifference to a detainee's need for protection and medical care even when the detainee dies by suicide rather than another person's hand.

Ralph Partridge and Betty Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas · filed 1986-06-13

We believe this statement is applicable to the state’s duty to provide reasonable medical care for pretrial detainees and that liability under § 1983 will lie under some circumstances even if the detainee or prisoner died by his own hand rather than the hand of another.

A city is not deliberately indifferent to a detainee's suicide risk under § 1983 when the detainee's behavior gives it neither actual nor constructive notice of that medical danger.

Gagne v. City of Galveston · filed 1987-10-19

In the absence of some sort of behavior that would impute notice of a medical problem, the City cannot be said to have been deliberately indifferent to Gagne’s medical needs.

Section 1983 permits a detainee-suicide claim when custodial officials knew or should have known of the detainee’s particular vulnerability to suicide and acted with reckless indifference to it.

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township · filed 1988-01-26

We cannot accept the defendants’ argument that a prisoner’s suicide can never give rise to a section 1983 violation. ... Of course we agree that custodial officials cannot be placed in the position of guaranteeing that inmates will not commit suicide. On the other hand, if such officials know or should know of the particular vulnerability to suicide of an inmate, then the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on them an obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim when custodial officials recklessly disregard a detainee's vulnerability to suicide that they know or should know about.

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township · filed 1988-02-22

We see no reason not to apply a similar construction of section 1983 when the acts causing the injury are those of the prisoner herself. ... On the other hand, if such officials know or should know of the particular vulnerability to suicide of an inmate, then the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on them an obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.

Section 1983 does not support a jail suicide claim based solely on officers’ negligent failure to recognize visible scars as signs of suicide risk.

Freedman v. City Of Allentown · filed 1988-08-10

Because we must view the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs we will assume that a reasonably competent prison official should have known and identified these marks as "suicide hesitation cuts," as described by the forensic pathologist. Even if so, the failure to recognize them as such, without more, amounts only to negligence and therefore fails to support a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a jail suicide claim against officers based only on their negligent failure to recognize suicidal tendencies from visible scars.

Freedman v. City of Allentown · filed 1988-08-10

In the absence of any allegations suggesting more than mere negligence by the individual police officers in failing to recognize Freedman’s suicidal tendencies from the scars that were readily apparent, we conclude that plaintiffs have not alleged a viable section 1983 claim against those officers.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a jail suicide to prove deliberate indifference to a strong likelihood of self inflicted harm.

Hazelton v. DeKalb County, Georgia · filed 2012-11-09

To prevail on a § 1983 action arising from a jail suicide, the plaintiffs must prove that the jail officers “displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). To prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs must show that the officers “had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Id. (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Under our precedents, “deliberate indifference requires that the defendant deliberately disregard a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility ... that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

A Section 1983 personal injury claim sounds in tort and cannot be assigned under California law.

Pony v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2006-01-10

Just as plaintiff cannot assign her Section 1983 action, she cannot assign an action, such as Section 1988, that is derivative of it.

A plaintiff cannot assign a Section 1983 claim under California law because it sounds in tort.

Pony v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2006-01-11

Just as plaintiff cannot assign her Section 1983 action, she cannot assign an action, such as Section 1988, that is derivative of it.

A § 1983 survival action, using state survival law through § 1988, asserts the claim the decedent could have brought for violation of the decedent’s rights.

Cossio v. City and County of Denver, Colo. · filed 1997-03-19

Thus, a § 1983 survival action, relying on the incorporation of state survival law through § 1988, amounts to the assertion of the cause of action that the deceased would have had she lived, requesting damages for violation of the decedent’s rights.

A § 1983 action against a defendant survives the defendant’s death under Puerto Rico law, allowing substitution of the estate and heirs.

Ferrer Encarnación v. Y Lebron · filed 1994-06-03

We now turn to Puerto Rico law to determine if the civil rights action against co-defendant Luyando survives his death. ... Based on the discussion above, we find that plaintiffs cause of action against co-defendant Luyando survives the co-defendant’s death. The motion to dismiss him as a co-defendant in this case is denied. In addition, we grant the plaintiffs motion, docket #79, to amend the complaint in order to include co-defendant Luyando’s estate and heirs as defendants in substitution of co-defendant Luyando.

A § 1983 claim against a deceased defendant’s estate is governed by the forum state’s survival law.

Wilson v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1994-05-18

In determining whether Wilson’s § 1983 claim against Martin’s estate survives, I apply the law of the forum state.

The survival of a Section 1983 claim after a defendant’s death is determined under the law of the state where the action arose, and New York law permits such a claim to survive against the defendant’s estate.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1986-09-09

A court, in determining whether a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the United States Constitution survives the death of a defendant, must consider the law of the state in which the action arose. ... Thus, controlling precedent indicates that a section 1983 claim would survive a defendant’s death under New York law.

A section 1983 claim for injury to a business or property is fully assignable under Texas law.

Bay Ridge Utility District v. 4M Laundry · filed 1986-06-19

A cause of action subject to a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 is fully assignable if it arises in connection with an injury to the plaintiff's business or property.

A personal-capacity Section 1983 action against a New York correction officer survives his death and may be pursued against his estate.

Young v. Patrice · filed 1993-09-14

The action is not moot, first because Young’s § 1983 action is brought against Patrice in his personal capacity and therefore survives against his estate, and second because for reasons given below the Artuz Affidavit is insufficient to suggest death upon the record under Rule 25(a).

A prisoner placed in involuntary protective custody receives the procedural due process required for a Section 1983 claim if given notice of the charges and an opportunity, ordinarily in writing, to present his views to the deciding official.

Hilliard v. Scully · filed 1986-12-04

Nonetheless, in the context of involuntary protective custody the Due Process Clause only requires that the inmate “receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views [ordinarily only in writing] to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.”

Prison rules create a liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 only when they combine specific substantive predicates with explicitly mandatory language limiting officials' discretion.

Stephany v. Wagner · filed 1987-02-04

The description of the prison’s policy with respect to administrative segregation contained in the Resident’s Handbook does not rise to the level found by the Supreme Court to create a liberty interest in that the section of the Residents Handbook which deals with administrative segregation does not combine “specific substantive predicates” with “explicitly mandatory language” so that the discretion of prison officials is limited.

A 24-hour administrative segregation satisfies due process for § 1983 purposes when the inmate receives notice, an investigation, and a disciplinary hearing.

Dumas v. Thomas Stickrath Ken D. Bucey Laurie Danis · filed 1987-03-24

Plaintiff was only held in administrative segregation for 24 hours, he received notice of the reasons for his segregation, an investigation of the charges was conducted, and at a hearing with the Rules Infractions Board plaintiff was acquitted of the misconduct charges. Thus, the minimum requirements of the due process clause were met and plaintiff's constitutional claim must fail.

A state prison-segregation statute creates a protected liberty interest enforceable through Section 1983 when it uses mandatory hearing language and permits segregation only upon specified substantive predicates.

Howard v. Armontrout · filed 1987-03-24

Applying the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in ... Hewitt, ... we find that § 217.375 creates a protected liberty interest. Under subsection 1, confinement in an adjustment unit requires a prior hearing and an order. Under subsection 2, administrative segregation may not take place unless the chief administrative officer determines that an emergency exists based on four specified situations. In subsections 2 and 3, the statute employs mandatory language by stating that hearings “shall be held” after an inmate’s transfer to an administrative segregation unit.

Temporary involuntary segregation may be imposed for institutional order and security without charging a specific rule violation.

Johnson v. Bruce McDonald Warden · filed 1987-04-02

Involuntary segregation can be ordered for the general purpose of maintaining institutional order and security when no specific rule infraction is charged.

A prisoner’s § 1983 segregation claim requires a protected liberty interest created by state law when the Due Process Clause itself creates no interest in remaining in the general population.

Lane v. Keeter · filed 1987-05-27

We note that the due process clause does not create an interest in being confined to a general population cell. ... Thus, for Lane to state a constitutional violation, he must demonstrate that the North Carolina Administrative Code created a protected liberty interest in being free from administrative lock-up and in being free from maximum security segregation.

Section 1983 is a proper civil action for challenging placement in administrative segregation.

Murray v. Wright · filed 2002-12-20

The district court did not err in construing appellant’s challenge to his placement in administrative segregation as a civil action. See Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168-69 (D.C.Cir.1997) (challenge to administrative segregation placement properly brought as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).

A state political subdivision cannot bring a § 1983 claim against its own state to assert the subdivision’s federal constitutional rights.

Heimbach v. Regan · filed 1983-12-21

Under this standard, plaintiff Orange County, a political subdivision of the State of New York, lacks standing to assert federal constitutional claims against that state.

A municipality cannot bring a Section 1983 claim against state action based on its own Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because it is not a person protected by those amendments.

City Of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court For The Twentieth Judicial Circuit · filed 1993-03-02

Municipalities cannot challenge state action on federal constitutional grounds because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Because East St. Louis is not a "person," it cannot invoke the protection of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Village of Arlington Heights v. Regional Transp. Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir.1981), and therefore cannot bring a section 1983 claim.

A county has no federally protected right against its state taking public property without compensation and therefore cannot maintain a § 1983 claim on that basis.

Randolph County v. Alabama Power Company · filed 1986-07-28

The district court granted APCo’s motion for summary judgment on November 10, 1983, finding that the county does not have any federally protected right against a state that takes public property without paying compensation. We agree.

A municipality is a person entitled to bring suit under § 1983.

Collazo v. Acosta · filed 1989-08-28

Since it did not do so, this Court holds that the Municipality of Vieques is an “other person” within § 1983, entitled to bring suit under that statute.

New Mexico local school boards are persons subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Daddow v. Carlsbad Municipal School District · filed 1995-05-02

Our local school boards are indeed “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a county welfare department that is a local government unit rather than an arm of the state.

JAW v. State · filed 1995-05-15

Because DPW is not an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and is rather a unit of local government, it is a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit governmental entities to sue to vindicate due process or equal protection rights they do not possess.

Spence v. Boston Edison Co. · filed 1983-12-15

Recognition of the basic principle that governmental entities do not enjoy the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection leads one to the inevitable conclusion that they cannot assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) or G. L. c. 12, § 11I.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipality to sue another municipality for damages to vindicate its sovereign rights.

City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck · filed 2000-08-24

I agree with the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and hold that New Rochelle may not bring suit under Section 1983. Congress intended Section 1983 to provide private citizens with a remedy against state action. It would run counter to that intent to allow a governmental subdivision to sue another governmental subdivision for damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a tribe to sue to vindicate its claimed sovereign immunity from a state search warrant.

Inyo County, California v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony · filed 2003-05-19

Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.

Section 1983 does not protect a state's own rights, but a state may sue to prevent violations of the rights of people the statute protects.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Porter · filed 1981-08-05

They arise only if we accept the defendants' basic premise that the Commonwealth is an improper plaintiff. We do not. ... The question is not whether either the fourteenth amendment or section 1983 protects the Commonwealth neither does 10 but whether the Commonwealth is an appropriate plaintiff in an action seeking to prevent the infliction of constitutional violations on the persons the amendment and the statute do protect.

Section 1983 permits suits against the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and its agencies.

Fleming v. Department of Public Safety · filed 1985-06-17

This Court has previously held that the Commonwealth and its agencies are proper defendants in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Cities and municipalities may not seek damages under § 1983.

City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern · filed 2006-11-20

Cities and municipalities may not seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 150 F.3d 686 (7th Cir.1998); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.1976).

Section 1983 treats the Georgia Ports Authority as a municipal person subject to suit because it is not an arm of the state.

Pattee v. Georgia Ports Authority · filed 2006-12-18

Therefore, the Court will treat the GPA like a municipality — a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a public corporation that is a political subdivision rather than an arm of the state.

Orria-Medina v. Metropolitan Bus Authority · filed 2007-09-06

Applying the case law cited above to the case at hand leads the Court to conclude that the MBA is a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

A municipal authority may be a person subject to suit under Section 1983; its status depends chiefly on whether it is an arm of the State.

Independent Entr Inc v. Pittsburgh Water · filed 1997-01-09

We hold only that the Authority may be a person within the meaning of § 1983 and that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary on the present record.

Whether a drug task force is a person suable under § 1983 depends on its status as an arm of the state and its separate legal existence.

Lamb v. Tenth Judicial District Drug Task Force · filed 2013-05-03

In order to determine whether the DTF is a “person” under § 1983 the Court must consider whether it is a state entity. ... Without resort to the agreement, the Court simply cannot answer the questions posed by Defendants’ motion. The Court must therefore DENY Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the DTF.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Knussman v. Maryland · filed 1999-09-03

Consequently, states and their officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not waive federal sovereign immunity, so the United States, its agencies, and federal officers in their official capacities cannot be sued under it for damages.

Behre v. United States · filed 1987-05-01

The civil rights statutes create causes of action only against individuals and municipalities and do not themselves contain a waiver of sovereign immunity. ... There is no express waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity so as to permit these claims to be maintained.

An interstate compact can preserve sovereign immunity from § 1983 suits challenging a transit authority’s discretionary governmental policy decisions.

Sanders v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1987-05-29

It necessarily follows that WMATA is immune from suit on all of appellants’ constitutional and § 1983 grounds (Counts I, III, IV of the complaint). ... These challenges to the testing plan all invoke judicial “second-guessing,” through a tort suit, of “administrative [WMATA] decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy” — and therefore invoke “governmental” and “regulatory” functions.

Florida has not waived sovereign immunity or consented to § 1983 suits against the state and its agencies.

Spooner v. Department of Corrections · filed 1987-09-24

We answer the question in the negative for the reasons expressed in our recent decision in Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1987). We approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Spooner and that of the Third District Court of Appeal in Skoblow, holding the state immune under the eleventh amendment and the common law from suits arising under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from federal suits alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations.

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville · filed 1988-03-15

It might once have been arguable that Congress abrogated the states' immunity from suit for Fourteenth Amendment violations when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the precursor to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, but the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that Congress intended, by the general language of Sec. 1983, to override the states' traditional sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education · filed 1988-03-15

It might once have been arguable that Congress abrogated the states’ immunity from suit for Fourteenth Amendment violations when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that Congress intended, by the general language of § 1983, to override the states’ traditional sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Robert E. Meadows and Cecil Smith v. The State of Indiana · filed 1988-08-23

For example, Congress may statutorily abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states. Congress, however, did not do so when it enacted section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against Commonwealth departments and their officers acting in their official capacities are not barred by eleventh amendment or common law sovereign immunity.

Sablan v. Department Of Finance Of The Commonwealth Of The Northern Mariana Islands · filed 1988-09-02

Hence, the Department of Public Works and the Department of Finance, and their officers acting in their official capacities, cannot hide behind the shield of either eleventh amendment or common law sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 claims against WMATA arising from operation of its police force are barred by sovereign immunity under the WMATA Compact because police operations are governmental functions.

Hawthorne v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1988-10-31

By the same token, Hawthorne’s allegations of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, negligence and deprivation of constitutional rights — all of which are generated from the operation of WMATA’s police force — are immune from tort liability because they relate to a governmental function.

State officers sued individually under § 1983 for intentional constitutional violations cannot claim absolute sovereign immunity.

Corr v. Mazur · filed 1988-11-22

Aside from the jurisdictional issue, defendants’ real argument seems to be that they are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and it is true that state officials acting within the color of their office are generally immune from suit. ... Moreover, our own Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth of Virginia affords no absolute sovereign immunity to state officers sued in their individual capacities under state law for intentional torts. ... Surely, state officials sued for intentional acts under federal law can enjoy no greater immunity.

Section 1983 allows an official-capacity suit for injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials despite Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Thomas v. Fiedler · filed 1988-12-06

Since plaintiffs have requested only equitable relief in the form of an injunction and declaratory judgment, without monetary damages, the eleventh amendment does not present a viable defense to this lawsuit.