42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for requests for state court transcripts.

Franklin v. Sherrill G. Allen Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, Lacy Thornburg · filed 1989-07-10

Requests for state court transcripts, such as that brought in the instant petition, should be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

State courts hearing § 1983 claims must apply federal law and may not recast those claims as state administrative review requests.

Harris v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges · filed 1989-08-08

Although the judge’s review of the State law claims under G. L. c. 30A was proper, his reformulation of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims into a c. 30A review request was erroneous. ... The plaintiff’s decision to sue in State court does not deprive him of the Federal law which governs § 1983 actions. While State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in § 1983 actions, Federal law applies.

Section 1983 permits a separate claim in state court alongside a petition for judicial review under Indiana’s Administrative Adjudication Act.

Magnant v. Lane · filed 1991-12-12

Lane was entitled to her separate claim under § 1983 and to pursue attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 in state court.

State law applies in § 1983 actions brought in state courts unless it conflicts with federal law.

Roseborough v. Scott · filed 1994-03-22

State law applies in § 1983 actions brought in state courts unless state law conflicts with federal law.

In a state-court action under § 1983, federal law governs the discoverability of documents sought for the claim.

Svaigsen v. City of New York · filed 1994-04-05

Thus, it is appropriate that the court follow Federal law when assessing the discoverability of documents sought by plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to follow state procedural rules or regulations.

Batista v. Kelly · filed 1994-06-07

However, a due process claim premised upon a prison official’s failure to follow state procedural rules or regulations, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 action may be brought in state court.

Cooper v. Franchise Tax Board · filed 1987-06-02

Moreover, plaintiff can bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in state court.

Section 1983 claims brought in state court are subject to state rules of evidence and procedure unless those rules affect substantive federal rights.

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court · filed 2006-05-01

Although federal law controls the substantive aspects of plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claim, state rules of evidence and procedure apply unless application of those rules would affect plaintiffs’ substantive federal rights.

Section 1983 claims filed by inmates in Texas state court are subject to Chapter 14’s procedural requirements because those requirements do not conflict with section 1983.

Vaughn v. Hicks · filed 2009-04-16

Accordingly, the requirements of chapter 14 do not conflict with section 1983.

Section 1983 actions brought in state court are governed by federal law on the substantive merits and state law on procedure.

Jae v. Good · filed 2008-04-21

Thus, federal law governs the substantive merits of a Section 1983 action brought in state court, but state law governs the procedures by which that action will be litigated.

A Texas court may use a plea to the jurisdiction to challenge whether pleadings allege a valid section 1983 claim.

City of Dallas v. Saucedo-Falls · filed 2008-11-18

But the City contends that ap-pellees’ pleadings were not sufficient to allege a valid section 1983 claim and that, because it is not a valid claim, the pleadings do not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction over that claim. It argues that a plea to the jurisdiction is the proper procedure for such a challenge. We agree with the City.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to New York’s municipal examination requirement under General Municipal Law § 50-h.

Palmieri v. Town of Babylon · filed 2016-05-18

Accordingly, we reach this issue and determine that the branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the 42 USC § 1983 cause of action for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-h should have been denied.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought in Colorado’s summary election proceedings under section 1-1-113 and must be filed in a separate action.

Frazier v. Williams · filed 2017-09-11

Squarely addressing the issue for the first time, we conclude, for the reasons stated above, that section 1983 claims cannot be brought in section 1-1-113 proceedings.

Section 1983 does not preempt a state procedure that allows a court to hear a related civil rights claim after an appeal from a local board.

MEC, Incorporated v. Lowndes County Board of Supr · filed 2019-01-11

Accordingly, § 11- 51-75 does not ... place preempted restrictions on § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against medical board members, prosecutorial staff, and legal advisors are barred by immunity for conduct performed in judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 1989-09-20

We find that the functions of the Board are sufficiently analogous to those of a judge and prosecutor to justify application of the protections of immunity to Board members, the prosecutorial staff and the Board’s legal advisors.

Members of a state medical board lack absolute immunity from section 1983 damages but may assert qualified immunity for discretionary licensing duties.

Manion v. Michigan Board of Medicine · filed 1985-06-24

Members of the Board of Medicine are not entitled to claim the defense of absolute immunity. We find their duties do not rise to that level of governmental responsibility justifying the protection of absolute immunity. However, we hold Board members are entitled to claim the defense of qualified immunity.

Judges and delegated bar-admission officials have absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for considering bar-admission applications.

Sparks v. Character & Fitness Committee · filed 1987-05-11

We hold that the act of considering an application for admission to the bar, particularly when that duty is imposed upon the judiciary by constitution, is a judicial act. When it is performed by a judge, he or she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. ... Therefore, those who perform this duty on behalf of the judiciary are entitled to the same judicial immunity as would be enjoyed by judicial officers performing the same act.

Judges and delegated bar-admission officials have absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for considering bar-admission applications.

Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky · filed 1987-06-16

We hold that the act of considering an application for admission to the bar, particularly when that duty is imposed upon the judiciary by constitution, is a judicial act. When it is performed by a judge, he or she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. ... Therefore, those who perform this duty on behalf of the judiciary are entitled to the same judicial immunity as would be enjoyed by judicial officers performing the same act.

Gaming-control-board members acting within their adjudicative and prosecutorial authority are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages.

Kraft v. Jacka · filed 1987-09-08

The claims against the defendants in this case are based on acts taken in the scope of their authority. ... The defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for such acts.

Members of a state medical-licensing board have absolute § 1983 damages immunity for adjudicatory and prosecutorial decisions performed as part of their statutory duties.

Robertson v. BD. OF MED. EXAM. OF STATE OF COLO. · filed 1987-12-28

Members of the Board are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability on decisions rendered in the performance of their duties for the Board.

Members of a state medical licensing board have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for decisions made in performing their board duties.

Robertson v. State Board of Medical Examiners of Colorado · filed 1987-12-28

Members of the Board are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability on decisions rendered in the performance of their duties for the Board. ... A suit against the individual members under § 1983 is not actionable.

A § 1983 challenge to a state employment-classification plan must join the state agency legally responsible for establishing and maintaining that plan when complete relief cannot otherwise be determined.

STATE, DEPT. OF H. & R. SERV. v. State · filed 1985-07-02

The Department of Administration is thus an indispensable party with regard to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, and appellees' equal protection claim was therefore subject to dismissal upon their failure to join an indispensable party.

A § 1983 challenge to a state employment-classification plan must join the state agency legally responsible for establishing and maintaining that plan when complete relief cannot otherwise be determined.

State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. State · filed 1985-07-02

The Department of Administration is thus an indispensable party with regard to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, and appellees’ equal protection claim was therefore subject to dismissal upon their failure to join an indispensable party.

Section 1983 authorizes review of actions by persons operating under color of state law but does not authorize a federal court to determine plaintiffs’ immigration status de novo.

Esparza v. Valdez · filed 1985-07-05

This court under § 1983 has jurisdiction to review actions of persons operating under color of state law; it has no power to conduct a de novo review of the immigration status of the individual plaintiffs.

Section 1983 limits federal court review of prison management to whether a prison system violates a constitutional provision.

Young v. Saunders · filed 2001-10-09

The inquiry of federal courts into prison management is limited under § 1983 to whether a particular system violates any constitutional provision. Outside this inquiry, courts must leave judgment calls to the expertise of prison officials.

In a Section 1983 action challenging a state court’s disqualification of criminal defense counsel, federal review is limited to whether the state court acted arbitrarily.

Davis v. Stamler · filed 1981-04-14

We stress that in a section 1983 action alleging that disqualification of a state criminal defendant’s attorney deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to counsel of his choice, the district court’s scope of review is narrow because it is examining the state court decision only to determine if that court acted arbitrarily.

Joint representation in a section 1983 action creates an inherent conflict when the codefendants are a municipality and police officers sued individually because they face differing liability theories and defenses.

Manganella v. Keyes · filed 1985-07-05

An inherent conflict of interest arises in a § 1983 action when co-defendants in a suit are a local government and police officers or other employees in their individual capacity, as differing theories of liability and differing defenses are applicable to each defendant.

Section 1983 is an available vehicle for an inmate seeking to prevent a prison transfer.

Beletsky v. Borgen · filed 2001-10-17

Beletsky could have resorted to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to the ADA to pursue his objections to transfer, see Moran, 218 F.3d at 651, but neither § 2241 nor § 2254 was an appropriate vehicle for the relief he sought.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for prisoners’ challenges to transfers to out-of-state prisons.

Doty v. Litscher · filed 2002-07-11

The district court treated Doty’s petition as arising under § 2254, but objections to transfers to out-of-state prisons are really challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to order defendants to resign from their jobs.

Brannon v. Williams · filed 2020-04-22

The Court further notes that although Plaintiff also asks the Court to force Defendants to resign, the Court does not have the authority to grant this type of relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates liability for state actors who deprive people of constitutional rights, but it does not provide a remedy to invalidate an election or order a new one.

Gutierrez v. The Guam Election Commission · filed 2010-12-23

But the only federal law Plaintiffs mention is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which merely creates liability for state actors who deprive people of their constitutional rights. Federal law cannot provide the remedy that Plaintiffs seek.

Section 1983 does not authorize courts to require correctional officials to adopt one prison-control policy over another unless the Constitution compels that choice.

Norris v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-07-26

The Court does not have the power to require correction officials to adopt one policy as preferable over another unless it is compelled by the constitutional guarantees which § 1983 is designed to protect.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to order a state prison to remove a correctional officer from his position.

Wesson v. Moore · filed 1973-10-25

In addition, plaintiff seeks an order which is beyond the Court’s authority discharging the defendant correctional officer, Moore, from his position at the institution where plaintiff is incarcerated. The Court’s remedial powers are not so broad as to include supervisory authority over the personnel policies of the state penal administration.

Section 1983 does not provide job termination as a remedy in a civil rights action.

Williams v. Sipes · filed 2019-09-16

Plaintiff is advised that job termination is not available as a remedy in a civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits parents of a married adult child to seek recovery for the complete deprivation of their constitutional right to companionship with the child.

Agresta v. Sambor · filed 1988-01-28

In conclusion, I hold that parents of an adult, married child may bring an action for the complete deprivation of their right to companionship.

Section 1983 permits a mother to recover for loss of society and companionship when the unconstitutional killing of her son deprives her of a protected liberty interest in their relationship.

Sharpe v. City of Lewisburg, Tenn. · filed 1988-01-26

This case presents a question of first impression in the Sixth Circuit. That question is: Is the loss of society and companionship by a mother of her unconstitutionally killed son compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? This Court finds that it is.

A Section 1983 claim for interference with a protected intimate relationship requires an allegation that the defendant intended to interfere with that particular relationship.

Trujillo v. Board Of County Commissioners Of Santa Fe · filed 1985-07-26

For these reasons, we conclude that an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association is required to state a claim under section 1983.

A Section 1983 familial-association claim requires an allegation that the defendant intended to interfere with the protected relationship.

White v. Talboys · filed 1986-03-19

It is well-established that the complaint must include “an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association ... to state a claim under section 1983.”

A Section 1983 claim for deprivation of intimate familial association requires an allegation that the defendant intended to interfere with the protected relationship.

Apodaca v. RIO ARRIBA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT. · filed 1986-11-03

In Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir.1985), the court held that "an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association is required to state a claim under section 1983." Because plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite intentional conduct, their claim based on intimate familial association will be dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim for deprivation of intimate familial association requires intentional interference with the protected relationship.

Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department · filed 1986-11-03

Because plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite intentional conduct, their claim based on intimate familial association will be dismissed.

A § 1983 familial-association claim requires conduct more than merely negligent but does not additionally require an allegation that the official specifically intended to break up the family.

Smith v. City of Fontana · filed 1987-01-06

We therefore decline to follow ... Trujillo. As ... long as the state official’s ... action ... which deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty was more than merely negligent, the plaintiffs can state a section 1983 claim without further alleging that the official was trying to break up their family.

Section 1983 does not permit parents to bring a derivative loss-of-association claim for harm directed at their child.

Helleloid v. Independent School District No. 361 · filed 2001-06-19

Were the Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim viable, then every Section 1983 claim, which involved a minor, or a spouse, would have an attendant claim by the parents, or spouse, in the nature of a loss of consortium, or a denial of a parental relationship. Section 1983 does not go so far as to envelope such derivative claims.

Section 1983 permits a parent’s own claim for loss of familial association only when government action is directly aimed at the relationship between the parent and young child.

Cortes-Quinones v. Charles Jimenez-Nettleship, Etc. · filed 1988-04-22

Subsequently, in a different case, this court of appeals held that a parent cannot maintain a claim for loss of familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the government action in question is directly aimed at the relationship between a parent and young child. ... We must, however, apply the law in effect when we hear the case, namely, Valdi-vieso, “unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is a statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”

A disappointed public-contract bidder has no Section 1983 due-process claim when state law creates no property entitlement to the contract award.

Sowell's Meats and Services, Inc. v. McSwain · filed 1985-08-08

For the foregoing reasons and based on the cited authorities, the court is constrained to conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to establish any due process property interest or a violation of equal protection rights in the instant cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of South Carolina.

A § 1983 claim alleging racial discrimination in municipal contracting requires proof that the city intentionally treated the claimant less favorably because of race.

Williams v. City of Sioux Falls · filed 1988-05-16

The first, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 and 2000d, alleges that the City and certain city officials discriminated against Williams during the bidding process on a demolition contract known as the "Beadle Project," which project contract was awarded by the City in November of 1980. ... The district court correctly recognized that under plaintiff's individual claim, each theory of recovery is viable only if the City intentionally treated the plaintiff less favorably because of his race.

Section 1983 does not make an ordinary public employment contract dispute actionable when the employee remains employed and no substantive constitutional right is implicated.

Brown v. Brienen · filed 1983-12-08

A breach of contract that does not terminate the employment relationship is different. ... But the Constitution must not be trivialized by being dragged into every personnel dispute in state and local government. Disputes over overtime, over work assignments, over lunch and coffee breaks do not implicate the great objects of the Fourteenth Amendment. A public employer who harassed an employee in order to induce him to give up a substantive constitutional right, such as freedom of speech, would be violating the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983. ... A public employer who drove an employee having a contract of employment to resign by making life unbearable for him, through excessive demands for overtime or other breaches of the employment contract, might be violating the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983. ... But no one has resigned in this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased person for events occurring after death.

Riley v. St. Louis County · filed 1998-09-30

We note that, to the extent that Riley's complaint alleged that Appellees' actions violated her deceased son's constitutional rights, those claims were properly dismissed because section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased for events occurring after death.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased person for alleged violations of that person’s civil rights occurring after death.

ESTATE OF CONNER BY CONNER v. Ambrose · filed 1997-12-23

It is clear that § 1983 does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased based upon alleged violations of the deceased's civil rights which occurred after his death.

Section 1983 does not make the scope of a post-death investigation actionable as a violation of the decedent's civil rights, because those rights cannot be violated after death.

Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal. · filed 1985-08-19

Those authorities are persuasive that the civil rights of a person cannot be violated after death, and therefore the scope of an investigation after death is not actionable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a benefits denial that occurred only after the claimant’s death.

Hudak v. D'Elia · filed 1986-05-19

Here, the alleged wrongful act, consisting of the denial of Michael Hudak’s application for Medicaid benefits, did not occur until after the death of the petitioner’s decedent. Consequently, the petitioner could not prevail in an action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, which is a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988.

Section 1983 applies in the Northern Mariana Islands as it does in Guam.

Fleming v. Department of Public Safety · filed 1985-09-11

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 502(c)(2) of the Covenant, § 1983 applies as well to the Northern Mariana Islands.

Aliens are persons who may assert rights under § 1983.

Medvid by Jeziersky v. New Orleans Police Dept. · filed 1985-11-06

The cases teach that aliens have Section 1983 rights.

Section 1983 treats a county as a person that may be sued for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief.

Wilson v. County of Orange · filed 2004-08-06

A county falls within the definition of "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may therefore be sued for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Nillson-Borrill v. Burnheimer · filed 2007-08-31

The State of Maine is also not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 5 M.R.S.A. § 4682. The plaintiff does not contest this legal principle, Opp’n at 4. Since MMC is a state institution, that is an alternate ground for granting the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits a state to be treated as a person potentially liable for constitutional deprivations caused by official custom and policy when the state consents.

Marrapese v. Rhode Island · filed 1980-10-10

Therefore, this Court holds that Rhode Island is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a county as a person that may be sued under the statute.

Elder v. HIGHLAND CTY. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS. · filed 1986-11-26

Accordingly, the County is a "person" subject to a section 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a Monell claim against an Ohio county despite state law limiting the county’s capacity to be sued and providing it immunity.

Stack v. Karnes · filed 2010-10-29

Thus, pursuant to Plaintiffs Monell claim, Franklin County is considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and the immunity afforded under Sections 301.22 and 2743.01, respectively, is inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Chiat v. State of Washington · filed 2020-04-03

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against DSHS fails because a state is not a “person” for purposes of the statute and plaintiff has not alleged, much less shown, that a policy or practice of DSHS caused the constitutional violations of which she complains.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to raise a claim that psychological reports contain erroneous facts.

Crowell v. Edward W. Murray, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1988-09-06

Crowell's claim that there are erroneous facts in his psychological reports may be raised under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; however, Crowell must first comply with the procedures outlined in Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 202-203 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action merely to contest every item in an inmate’s file that the inmate believes is inaccurate.

Claude Frizzell Bloodgood, III v. David A. Garraghty, Warden Attorney General of Delaware · filed 1986-02-14

Nor is there any cause of action under § 1983 to contest every piece of information an inmate believes is incorrect.

Section 1983 does not make a prison disciplinary-record expungement claim cognizable when there is no constitutional right to that relief.

Joseph Drake Hill v. Richard P. Seiter, Supr. Mr. Jackson · filed 1988-01-26

Even construing his pro se complaints liberally, as we must, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), it is clear that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiff had failed to make out any claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Plaintiff's claim, not addressed to the district court, seeking expungment of a disciplinary conviction from his prison record is not cognizable because there is no constitutional right to the relief he requested.

A prisoner seeking correction of false information in a prison file under § 1983 must first ask the defendant or prison authorities to correct it, because a refusal to correct is necessary to state the claimed deprivation.

McCrery v. Mark · filed 1993-05-28

Necessarily, a party can not have refused to correct the inmate’s files if he has not first been asked to do so. It is in this way that I agree with the court’s holding in Paine that an inmate must ask the defendants) or prison authorities for the appropriate modification of his prison files before bringing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not let inmates challenge the validity of materials considered in deciding whether to release them on parole.

Sumner v. Tucker · filed 1998-06-25

Finally, inmates may not invoke section 1983 as a basis to attack the validity of materials considered in determining whether they should be released on parole.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim based on speculation that information in a prisoner's file may later cause parole to be denied.

Aintablian v. Madding · filed 2001-10-23

To the extent that Aintablian is speculating that he may be denied parole on the basis of the information in his prison file, this does not state a cognizable claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner seeking correction of allegedly false prison records to first ask prison officials to expunge or disregard the information and receive a denial.

Bukhari v. Hutto · filed 1980-04-04

For this Court to enforce plaintiff’s due process right, however, there must be a denial by the prison authorities to expunge or to disregard the allegedly false information concerning her Black Liberation Army activities.

Section 1983 can support a cause of action when state officials threaten to assert an unlawful legal position that causes a person to forgo federal rights.

Ashmus v. Calderon · filed 1996-06-14

Thus, it is clear that in appropriate circumstances, the threats of state officials to assert an unlawful legal position can give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

A nonspeculative threat to enforce an unconstitutional law gives rise to a Section 1983 cause of action before enforcement occurs.

EWAP, INC. v. City of Ontario · filed 1986-02-25

Nevertheless, it is easily determined that the threatened enforcement of unconstitutional laws gives rise to a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 imposes procedural-due-process liability when fair-share union fees are deducted using notice and appeal procedures that fail constitutional standards.

Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees · filed 1986-07-30

The Court finds that liability rests with the Defendants who have denied the Plaintiffs their rights to procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The procedure which Defendant AFSCME instituted in the fall of 1985 fails both the notice and appeal criteria outlined by the Supreme Court.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public employer that agrees to collect agency fees from employees and deducts them from paychecks; the employer cannot avoid liability merely by passively complying with the agreement.

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified School District · filed 1990-05-31

Courts have consistently rejected arguments, urged by the school district, that the duty to implement the necessary notice and procedures falls entirely on the union, — that if the public employer merely passively complies, it is immune from section 1983 liability. Indeed, it is the public employer’s involvement in the agreement authorizing the seizure of the agency fees that gives rise to a claim by plaintiffs for deprivation of federally secured constitutional rights. And the public employer is the one that deducts the fee from its employees’ paychecks.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge clemency procedures when success would not necessarily invalidate the sentence or speed release.

Valle v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2011-09-08

His complaint about Florida’s clemency procedures may only be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is a proper vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of state clemency proceedings.

Perry v. Brownlee · filed 1997-07-31

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for Perry to raise his claim challenging the constitutionality of the clemency proceeding.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a prisoner to seek an injunction challenging clemency procedures without claiming entitlement to clemency or immediate relief from the sentence.

Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority · filed 1997-03-03

This gives rise to the question whether an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the appropriate vehicle for raising this type of due process claim. In our opinion, it does — more so than a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge clemency procedures when the prisoner accepts the sentence as lawful and does not seek an entitlement to commutation.

Otey v. Frank X. Hopkins, Warden of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex · filed 1994-01-03

Preiser does not preclude Otey from bringing his claim in a § 1983 action because he admits his sentence is lawful and is not seeking a determination that he has an entitlement to commutation.

Section 1983 provides no claim for denial of a pardon when the refusal infringes no constitutionally protected right.

Shears v. Rockefeller · filed 1986-02-28

Accordingly, Shears states no claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct resulting in denial of Shears’ pardon by Bailes and Rockefeller.

Section 1983 requires an injury caused by the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right, and a state law procedural violation alone is insufficient.

Franciotti v. Reynolds · filed 1982-11-03

That the regulations and rules proscribing the conduct were not posted or published does not alter this conclusion. A failure to follow the “procedural provisions of state law, without more, does not aver a cause of action under § 1983.”

Private family members do not become state actors under Section 1983 merely by petitioning a state court and obtaining conservatorship relief when the judge independently exercises judicial authority rather than substituting the family’s judgment for his own.

Smith v. Wood · filed 1986-09-17

Thus, a successful claim of “joint action” must be more than state officials acting at the request of private individuals. ... Liability of a private party under § 1983 must arise from government officials substituting “the judgment of private citizens for their own official authority.” ... It cannot be disputed that Judge Wood has not allowed the defendants to substitute their judgment for his own.

A private party does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes merely by using available statutory procedures to execute a valid judgment.

Martin v. Supreme Court of State of NY · filed 1986-10-07

Additionally, there is absolutely nothing in the complaint which would support a finding that defendant Martin acted under color of state law making her actions redressable in a civil rights action by the plaintiffs. It is well established that a private actor’s employment of available statutory remedies does not convert such private action into action of the state.

A private party’s misuse of a state statute, without more, is not action under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes.

Schroder v. Volcker · filed 1986-10-15

A private party’s misuse of a state statute, standing alone, does not constitute conduct that can be attributed to the state.

A private party’s misuse of a valid state replevin rule does not constitute state action supporting a damages claim under section 1983.

Ross v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1993-10-12

Ford Motor Credit’s failure to comply with the requirements of the replevin rule gives the Rosses no section 1983 claim for damages. Ford Motor Credit’s action was not state action, but was private action, with which section 1983 has nothing to do.

Private litigants' use of state courts does not constitute state action under § 1983 unless they corrupt judicial power.

Eidson v. Arenas · filed 1993-11-10

If a state merely allows private litigants to use its court, there is no “state action” within the meaning of section 1983 unless there is some corruption of judicial power by the private litigant.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for termination of utility service over a billing dispute when state procedures adequately protect procedural due process.

Martinez v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica · filed 1986-09-30

When the allegedly breached federal constitutional or civil right is properly safeguarded by state procedures that satisfy federal due process minima, the action is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state’s failure to follow its own procedures and regulations.

Shirley v. Hostetter · filed 2020-05-07

A state’s failure to adhere to its own procedures and regulations is not a federal due process issue nor is it actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to contact defense counsel or take other prefiling steps before filing suit.

Henderson v. Crimmins · filed 2015-12-01

Although Kellum did not have a duty to contact defense counsel, he still has an obligation to spend billable hours reasonably, which he did not do, because he did not contact defense counsel sooner to see if an efficient resolution could be reached.

For a § 1983 claim, filing the complaint commences the action for statute of limitations purposes.

Hayes Through Hayes v. Unified School Dist. 377 · filed 1987-06-12

The court therefore finds that plaintiff’s federal claims under section 1983 and 1988 are not barred by the statute of limitations as the action is deemed commenced at the time he filed his complaint.

For limitations purposes, a Section 1983 complaint is filed when lodged with the court even if it is technically deficient under local filing rules.

Lyons v. Lt. Jackie Goodson, North Little Rock Police Dept., North Little Rock, Ar · filed 1986-03-27

We hold that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, a complaint is “filed” when it is lodged with the court even though it is technically deficient under local rules.

A pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison officials for forwarding to the district court.

GARVEY v. VAUGHN · filed 1993-04-08

Therefore, we now hold that this circuit extends Houston to pro se prisoners filing complaints in section 1983 cases and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In these cases, the date of filing shall be that of delivery to prison officials of a complaint or other papers destined for district court for the purpose of ascertaining timeliness.

A Section 1983 jury deciding whether a private entity acted under color of state law must receive clear and informative instructions on the factual factors governing that determination.

Adams v. Mary Ann Vandemark, Executive Director, and Human Development Commission, a Michigan Not-For-Profit Corpo · filed 1986-03-27

A vital aspect of this case, as in every action brought under section 1983, is whether there was 'state action' or action taken 'under color of state law' that deprived the plaintiff Adams of some claimed constitutional right. ... To the extent a jury is to decide upon the proper factual predicates for this essentially legal determination, it must be given instructions that are clear, precise and informative as to the factors involved and the factual issues to be determined.

Section 1983 does not treat private hospitals or their doctors as state actors merely because of their affiliations with universities that have been deemed state actors.

Untracht v. Fikri · filed 2006-08-30

The relationship between the Commonwealth and Lee, Conemaugh, or the Individual Doctor Defendants existing because of affiliations with the University of Pittsburgh or Temple is far too attenuated to hold state action on the part of Lee, Conemaugh or the individual Defendants.

Failure to instruct the jury on a § 1983 claim is harmless when the jury rejects parallel Title VII claims governed by the same legal standards.

Reyna v. City of Portland · filed 2008-03-20

Reyna, however, admits that the legal standards for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII are the same as for liability under § 1983. We conclude, in light of the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendants on all of Reyna’s claims, that the district court’s ruling as to her claim of back pay, and its failure to instruct the jury on her § 1983 claim, if properly preserved errors, were harmless.

Section 1983 jury instructions may list all four requirements for liability even when two are already established, if the instructions make clear which issues remain for the jury.

Cruz v. Safford · filed 2009-08-28

We disagree; the instruction, as given, is not error. It correctly states the facts that must be proved to establish a § 1983 case. ... And while the reiteration of the four necessary facts may seem somewhat confusing, they are not misleading.

Section 1983 does not require a jury instruction identifying constitutional rights the plaintiff lacks.

Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz · filed 2013-01-28

Moreover, section 1983 does not require an instruction as to the absence of constitutional rights-to have instructed the jury that Mr. Caceres “did not ha[ve] a constitutional right to resist arrest and that there is no constitutional right to be informed of the reason of the arrest” would have been irrelevant to the elements of a section 1983 claim, and, thus, improper.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Telecommunications Act’s local zoning provision because that provision supplies its own judicial remedy.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams · filed 2005-03-22

We therefore hold that the TCA — by providing a judicial remedy different from § 1983 in § 332(c)(7) itself — precluded resort to § 1983.

Title VII is the exclusive remedy when a Section 1983 claim rests only on a violation of Title VII, so additional Section 1983 relief is unavailable.

Williams v. Hevi-Duty Electric Co. · filed 1986-03-28

Because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy when the only § 1983 cause of action is based on a violation of Title VII, ... no additional relief shall be awarded for the § 1983 violation.

Title VII’s right against retaliatory discharge does not independently support Section 1983 relief, because Section 1983 supplies a remedy rather than substantive rights.

Tafoya v. Adams · filed 1987-04-21

The right to be free of retaliatory discharge provided for by Title VII does not entitle one to relief under 1983 or 1985(3). ... Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather, it creates only a remedy for violations of rights secured by federal statutory and constitutional law.

Section 1983 cannot enforce NLRA collective-bargaining rights because the NLRA’s detailed enforcement scheme shows Congress intended National Labor Relations Board procedures to be exclusive.

Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1987-04-23

The comprehensive enforcement scheme created by Congress in enacting the NLRA evidences a clear Congressional intent to preclude enforcement of collective bargaining rights in a damage action under Section 1983. ... Golden State’s allegations that the City somehow “violated” Section 8(d) of the NLRA do not give rise to a cause of action for damages cognizable under Section 1983.

When § 1983 supplies a remedy against state or local actors for an alleged constitutional violation, it is the exclusive remedy and no redundant direct constitutional cause of action may proceed under § 1331.

Thomas v. Walter Shipka, in His Capacity as Clerk of the Parma Municipal Court · filed 1987-05-01

Today we resolve this question by holding that in cases where a plaintiff states a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is the exclusive remedy for the alleged constitutional violations.

A comprehensive federal statutory enforcement scheme does not foreclose an independent constitutional claim under § 1983 when the plaintiff is not using § 1983 to enforce rights created by that statute.

Jetstream Aero Services, Inc. v. New Hanover County · filed 1987-08-13

... to require the foreclosure of a constitutional claim if in fact the court were to conclude that the FAA provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for alleged violations of federal rights covered by comprehensive remedial schemes, including the IDEA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act § 504.

Alston v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-19

Relief under § 1983, however, may not be available if the statute that creates the right also provides a comprehensive remedial scheme. ... Because the plaintiff has alleged no violations of federal rights for which there is not an existing, comprehensive remedial scheme, the court dismisses her § 1983 claims against the individual defendants.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to intervene in state condemnation proceedings without compelling evidence of a genuine civil rights violation.

City of Oak Creek v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District · filed 1983-12-14

Quite the contrary, federal courts have no business meddling in state condemnation proceedings under Section 1983 in the absence of some compelling evidence of a genuine civil rights violation.

A Section 1983 just-compensation claim is premature when the state provides an adequate compensation procedure and the property owner has not used that procedure and been denied compensation.

Plakas v. Middlesex County, Va. · filed 1986-10-06

Where, as here, the "State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation."

A Section 1983 just-compensation claim is premature when the property owner has not first used available state compensation procedures, and a public taking creates no separate predeprivation-hearing claim.

Muscarello v. Village of Hampshire · filed 1986-10-01

Muscarellos’ claim must be addressed in the first instance to the Illinois courts. As Muscarellos have failed to allege a ripe claim for just compensation (and as they cannot claim an independent due-process violation), this action is dismissed as premature — a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A § 1983 takings claim is premature when state law provides an adequate inverse-condemnation remedy that the property owner has not used and been denied.

Anthony v. Franklin County and Willis "Bill" Collins · filed 1986-09-15

Appellants have not shown that the Florida procedures were unavailable or inadequate; until they have utilized those procedures, their taking claim is premature.

Section 1983 provides no takings or due-process claim when landowners received and used an adequate state process to determine compensation for condemned property.

Murray v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 1986-03-28

Clearly, plaintiff-landowners had an adequate remedy at law for determination of compensation for the taking of their property and availed themselves of it. There is, accordingly, no taking of property without payment of just compensation or without having been afforded rights of due process. There is no violation of the only two constitutional rights possibly involved herein, and thus no § 1983 cause of action is stated.

A section 1983 taking claim cannot proceed merely because available state remedies offer less relief than section 1983.

Brown Harris Ii v. Missouri Conservation Commission · filed 1986-05-08

Even if the state remedies do not provide plaintiffs with the same amount of relief which they might receive under a Sec. 1983 action, this does not mean that the state remedies are inadequate.

A section 1983 taking claim cannot proceed merely because available state remedies offer less relief than section 1983.

Harris v. Missouri Conservation Commission · filed 1986-05-08

Even if the state remedies do not provide plaintiffs with the same amount of relief which they might receive under a § 1983 action, this does not mean that the state remedies are inadequate.

A section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized property deprivation requires the absence of an adequate state postdeprivation remedy.

Tavarez v. O'MALLEY · filed 1986-05-22

Based on our findings that defendants O’Malley and Mole would not be protected by the Tort Immunity Act in a state suit by the Tavarezes for damage to their store and its inventory, this Court holds that an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available to the Tavarezes, thus removing their case from the ambit of the § 1983 procedural due process action.

A § 1983 property-deprivation claim fails when adequate state-court remedies were available to redress the deprivation.

Carpenter v. Board of Allen County Commissioners · filed 1986-07-24

Plaintiff's claim of deprivation of property in violation of due process asserted under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 also is unavailing because he had available to him Ohio state court remedies which were adequate to redress his claimed deprivations.

An unauthorized failure by state employees to follow established procedures does not support § 1983 procedural-due-process relief when adequate state postdeprivation proceedings cure the alleged deprivation.

Goolsby v. City Of Montgomery · filed 1986-12-31

The legacy of Parratt and its progeny is that such unauthorized conduct, as the plaintiff complains of in this case, can be cured by various post deprivation remedies which can be provided by the State. ... We find that plaintiff was provided with an adequate postdeprivation hearing.

A Section 1983 due-process claim over a proposed condemnation is premature when no taking has occurred and the owner can obtain independent state-court review before the property is taken.

Vartan v. Harristown Development Corp. · filed 1987-03-13

The Corporation may have been biased in its decision to obtain Vartan’s property but the property cannot be taken until Vartan’s objections are heard in state court. Until that time, there simply has been no due process injury.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when the state provided a full and fair hearing before issuing the process that caused the deprivation, even if later conduct may support state tort remedies.

Rheuport v. Ferguson · filed 1987-05-28

The writ of eviction was obtained through normal channels, and Rheuport and Saddoris even éxer-cised their right to challenge the action in the state courts before termination. The state thus afforded the plaintiffs due process; the plaintiffs received a full and fair hearing before the writ of removal was issued. ... We affirm the district court’s finding of no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A property owner must use available procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 claim under the Just Compensation Clause.

Ross v. City of Berkeley · filed 1987-06-11

The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.

A property owner alleging an uncompensated taking cannot state a § 1983 claim until the owner uses an available state compensation procedure and is denied just compensation.

Cassettari v. County of Nevada · filed 1987-08-10

Until he has availed himself of the state procedure, and has been denied just compensation, he has not been deprived of any right secured by the Constitution or federal statutes and he cannot state a claim for which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 takings or procedural-due-process claim fails when the property owner has not pursued available state remedies.

Wallager v. Harvey Silvers, Richard I. Cooper, and Robert Anderson · filed 1987-10-06

In addition, plaintiff's failure to pursue his state court remedies defeats his fifth amendment claim of taking without just compensation, ... as well as his fourteenth amendment procedural due process claim.

A § 1983 takings claim is unripe until the property owner attempts to obtain compensation through available and adequate state-law remedies.

Mitchell v. Mills County, Iowa · filed 1987-10-26

Therefore, no claim that the defendants took the plaintiffs' property without just compensation in violation of the U.S. Constitution will be ripe until the plaintiffs attempt to use this remedy and any other adequate remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a simple breach of a public employment contract when an adequate state breach of contract action can redress the loss of an employment benefit.

Ramsey v. Board of Education of Whitley County · filed 1988-04-25

However, a state breach of contract action may also provide an adequate remedy for some deprivations of a contractually created property interest. Therefore, the reasoning of those cases should also bar a section 1983 action when the deprivation is a simple breach of contract and there is adequate state breach of contract action available as a remedy.

Section 1983 bars a substantive due process claim for a random, unauthorized property deprivation when adequate state postdeprivation remedies bar a procedural due process claim based on the same acts.

Weimer v. Amen · filed 1989-03-23

Moreover, we do not believe that under these circumstances Weimer could state a valid section 1983 claim based on denial of substantive due process even if he were to allege something more than Amen's illegal activity. In situations where procedural due process claims alleging property deprivation are prohibited in section 1983 actions by Parratt, claims based on the same actions but alleging denial of substantive due process should be barred as well.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a procedural due process claim over property damage when state law offers an adequate remedy.

Morgan v. City of Phoenix · filed 1989-12-28

Plaintiffs’ claim is one for tortious property damage. Because they had an adequate remedial opportunity under state law, they are precluded from proceeding under § 1983.

For a prisoner’s property deprivation claim, a state remedy can be adequate under § 1983 even if it offers no money damages.

Lewis v. Sullivan · filed 1994-12-07

A state remedy does not have to afford a prisoner an opportunity to receive money damages in order to be considered adequate under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a property tax assessment claim when state law provides an adequate remedy that allows a full hearing, judicial determination, and constitutional objections.

Brian Realty Corp. v. DeKalb County · filed 1997-11-05

The superior court correctly granted summary judgment to the county on Brian Realty’s 42 USC § 1983 claim, as there was an adequate remedy under Georgia law. See Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Network Publications, 208 Ga. App. 15, 17 (1) (429 SE2d 696) (1993). The procedures of either OCGA § 48-5-311 or § 48-5-380 provide Brian Realty with a full hearing and a judicial determination at which it could raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.

Section 1983 relief for a challenge to municipal parking fines is unavailable when the claimants have an adequate state legal remedy.

O'NEILL v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-04-17

Appellants here are seeking relief under § 1983 in the form of refunds and declaratory and injunctive relief, not only for themselves but for all others similarly situated, i.e., 2,713,975 persons with regard to over 3,000,000 undisposed of parking tickets, and are also seeking substantial attorneys’ fees for legal services since 1991 under § 1988. Such relief is not available where Appellants have an adequate legal remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal procedural due process claim for an alleged breach of a public employment contract when an adequate state court remedy is available.

Warfield v. Adams · filed 1984-03-05

Thus, and even assuming the existence of a protected interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the availability of an adequate state remedy precludes this court’s addressing plaintiff’s § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claims under the facts of this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a viable claim challenging state tax assessments when adequate state remedies are available.

Jordan v. Fayette County Board of Assessment Appeals · filed 2001-08-20

We conclude that these statutory remedies adequately address taxpayers’ interest in obtaining redress for the payment of excess taxes, and therefore, that the trial court properly sustained the preliminary objection to taxpayers’ Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for property damage when state law supplies an adequate post deprivation remedy.

Lowerison v. County of San Diego · filed 2002-01-17

In any event, if California has an “adequate post deprivation remedy,” Lowerison is barred from bringing a § 1983 claim. ... California law does provide such a remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for premature termination of a fixed-term public employment contract when an ordinary breach-of-contract action can adequately compensate the employee.

Sharp v. Lindsey · filed 2002-03-28

Where, as here, the employee's livelihood has not been jeopardized by his allegedly premature dismissal from a fixed-term position, it is even clearer than it might otherwise be that the deprivation of the employee's finite interest is something that "can be compensated adequately by an ordinary breach of contract action." We see no justification for turning Mr. Sharp's ordinary breach of contract action into a federal constitutional case.

An adequate state remedy may limit a Section 1983 procedural due process claim, but it does not bar a Section 1983 equal protection claim.

Abdur-Rahman v. Settles · filed 1988-05-16

Parratt and Wilson indicate that the "adequate-state remedy" question is applicable only to cases wherein the plaintiff is alleging, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the deprivation of a property or liberty interest in violation of his procedural due process rights. Parratt is not applicable to claims based on a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws other than the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for civil rights violations where state remedies are inadequate.

Application of Roberts · filed 1981-05-19

Insofar as this case is concerned, the state remedy was procedurally and substantively adequate, and the federal enactment of § 1983 filled no void.

A § 1983 due process claim is frivolous when the plaintiff bypasses adequate state court procedures before seeking federal relief.

Efron v. Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority · filed 2009-06-30

Although neither party objected to the finding of frivolity, after an independent review, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s determination that plaintiffs section 1983 claim was frivolous. As carefully analyzed by the magistrate judge, plaintiff failed to seek relief in state court before pursuing federal remedies; in fact plaintiff refused to participate in state court proceedings concerning the disputed property. (Docket No. 143 at 4) The magistrate judge therefore appropriately found plaintiffs section 1983 claim frivolous.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim is barred when adequate state procedures are available to remedy the deprivation.

Gardner v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-08-20

On the other hand, Defendants have shown that the process available to Plaintiff under the City’s ordinance and state law is sufficient for the purposes of the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff declined to pursue the post-deprivation process offered under state law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983 procedural due process claim is barred.

Section 1983 permits federal relief for constitutional deprivations, but adequate state remedies can preclude federal relief for a procedural due process claim.

Allman v. Garcia-Padilla · filed 2015-04-01

We have previously held that, in determining entitlement to federal relief for due process violations, a relevant consideration is the adequacy of "existing state remedies."4 ... "Simply because an ... equitable remedy may be available does not necessarily mean that it must automatically issue." ... Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction within thirty days of the date of this opinion (to provide time to file suit in Commonwealth court), to dismiss without prejudice Montañez-Allman's due process claim, to resolve Montañez-Allman's First Amendment claim, and, if dismissed, to decline pendent jurisdiction over the remaining Commonwealth claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for loss of a specific employment benefit when a state breach of contract action adequately protects that interest.

Trout v. Knox County Board of Education · filed 2016-02-17

Because Plaintiffs’ property interest in APEX bonuses are adequately protected by state breach of contract actions, Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action for violations of procedural Due Process fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging state tax action when state law provides an adequate remedy.

Berry v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. · filed 2018-06-28

Nor can plaintiff press a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, as state law provides an adequate remedy ( see National Private Truck Council, Inc. v Oklahoma Tax Commn. , 515 US 582, 586, 588 [1995]).

An adequate state remedy for a local property tax dispute bars a taxpayer's claim under § 1983.

CHABAD OLD TAPPAN, INC. VS. BOROUGH OF OLD TAPPAN (L-8946-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-27

As Judge Farrington correctly concluded, Chabad's claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the holding in General Motors. Chabad successfully exercised its adequate state law remedies to challenge the denial of its parsonage exemption application.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to sue for a violation of someone else’s rights.

Gabriel v. County of Herkimer · filed 2012-09-06

Section 1983 does not recognize a claim on behalf of one person arising from a violation of another person’s rights.

Section 1983 does not let stockholders sue individually for an injury suffered only by the corporation, even when that injury reduces the value of their stock.

Gregory v. Mitchell · filed 1978-09-05

It is well established that neither officers nor stockholders, even controlling stockholders, can maintain an action to redress an injury to the corporation even though the value of their stock is impaired as a result of the injury. ... Since only the bank has allegedly suffered any injury in this case, all of the individual plaintiffs must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not give a spouse standing to claim a violation of her civil rights based on her husband's threatened removal from his job.

Rodriguez v. Calderon · filed 2001-11-07

Therefore, the real issue is whether or not a Plaintiff has standing to assert the particular claim in question. In this case, the question is whether Mrs. Quiles has standing to claim a violation of her civil rights when it is her husband who might possibly be removed from his job. The Court finds that she does not, and therefore also DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Mrs. Quiles’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse to bring a derivative claim based on alleged discrimination directed at the other spouse.

Torres v. Pueblo Bd. Comm'r · filed 2000-09-19

Moreover, the law is well settled Mr. Torres cannot utilize § 1983 as a vehicle for derivative liability stemming from alleged discrimination directed at Mrs. Torres.

Section 1983 does not allow a relative to sue in her individual capacity for a decedent’s injuries.

Naumoff v. Old · filed 2001-03-26

In the instant case, Plaintiff sued Defendant in her individual capacity, not as the representative of the estate of her son. The pretrial order portrays her claim as a wrongful death action, which is not recognized as a federal remedy un4er § 1983 in the Tenth Circuit.

A parent cannot bring an individual § 1983 claim based on a deprivation of her child’s constitutional rights.

Morgan v. City of New York · filed 2001-04-19

First, Angela Morgan lacks standing to bring individual claims under § 1983 based upon a deprivation of her daughter’s constitutional rights.

Stockholders may bring a § 1983 action only for an injury distinct from the corporation’s injury.

Colon-Pratts v. Municipality of San Sebastian · filed 2002-03-26

Stockholders may bring § 1983 actions only if they have suffered some injury which is distinct from that suffered by the corporation, i.e., not an indirect, derivative injury.

A § 1983 claim belonging to a corporation cannot be brought by stockholders whose injury is only derivative of the corporation’s injury.

Harvey v. Snow · filed 2003-09-11

At most, they have been injured as stockholders of HarMel since the § 1983 cause of action belonged solely to HarMel as a corporation.

Section 1983 does not give an individual standing to sue for injuries that are not distinct from those of a corporation.

Caravella v. City of New York · filed 2003-10-27

Plaintiff has no individual standing to bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The injuries to plaintiff as alleged were indirectly caused by harm to DVS and therefore are not “distinct” from those of the corporation.

Section 1983’s state-created-danger doctrine does not let someone sue for an injury resulting from the government’s violation of another person’s constitutional rights.

Barber v. Overton · filed 2007-08-02

The state-created-danger doctrine does not create a constitutional right that Barber may employ in a § 1983 action; instead, it permits plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional harms inflicted by third parties who were facilitated by the government’s affirmative acts to satisfy the state-action requirement of § 1983. The doctrine does not confer standing on anyone injured as a result of the government’s violation of another person’s rights, no matter how interrelated the harms suffered.

Section 1983 does not allow a victim’s family members to recover for their own collateral injuries arising from a violation of the victim’s rights.

Love Ex Rel. Love v. Riverhead Central School District · filed 2011-11-09

The Defendants are correct that it is well-settled that a cause of action may not be asserted pursuant to Section 1983 for emotional distress, loss of society, loss of services, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by a victim’s family members.

Section 1983 does not let an LLC owner sue individually for an injury suffered only through the LLC.

Lemminger v. Village of Johnson Creek · filed 2020-06-23

Johnson Creek also argues that plaintiff Lemminger, the owner of Bases Loaded Corner Bar, LLC, lacks standing to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson Creek is correct. ... Therefore, Lemminger lacks standing to bring this claim in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 imposes no duty on the state to protect a person from a private third party absent a special relationship created by custody, control, or affirmative placement in danger.

Estate of Patricia E. Gilmore, Joseph P. Gilmore v. Buckley · filed 1986-03-31

Because there was no special relationship of constitutional dimension between Gilmore and the state, we hold that the plaintiff has failed to make out a violation of the fourteenth amendment and a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 imposes no affirmative duty to protect a person from private harm absent a government-created custodial or other special relationship.

Atchley v. County of Du Page · filed 1986-07-15

The initial inquiry in § 1983 suits is whether the conduct complained of deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... There can be no deprivation of these rights unless the government has a constitutionally recognized duty to protect plaintiff. ... But where no special relationship exists, the government has no obligation under the Constitution to protect an individual from harm.

Absent a special relationship with the victim, government officials are generally not liable under § 1983 for failing to protect a citizen from danger they neither created nor worsened.

Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana · filed 1986-07-31

A guiding principle which flows from these decisions is that in the absence of some special relationship to the victim, government officials generally are not liable under section 1983 for their failure to protect citizens from dangerous situations which state officials neither created nor exacerbated.

A state’s failure to protect the general public from a convicted criminal in a halfway house is not actionable under Section 1983 absent a constitutional duty of protection.

Carlson v. Raymond Henry Conklin, Perry Johnson · filed 1987-03-12

While one purpose of incarceration is to protect the public, the various, sometimes conflicting, responsibilities state law places upon the Department of Corrections do not create any responsibility under the Federal Constitution to protect the public from convicted criminals. Because the State of Michigan has no “constitutional duty to provide such protection its failure to do so is not actionable under section 1983.”

Section 1983 provides no claim for a state’s failure to protect a person from private violence absent a special relationship based on custody, control, or affirmative placement in danger.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department · filed 1987-03-16

Here, plaintiff has not alleged that the state had custody or control over her. Defendants’ awareness of the husband’s dangerous propensities alone does not create a special relationship between plaintiff and the state. Thus, since no special relationship exists between the state and plaintiff, plaintiff has no constitutional right to police protection from the criminal activities of third parties. ... Since plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of her constitutional rights, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.