42 U.S.C. § 1983

When Younger abstention applies, a court may dismiss requests for injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983 while staying a damages claim pending state proceedings.

Dandar v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. · filed 2013-02-15

Similarly, the Court finds that Younger abstention is appropriate with regard to Dandar’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983. The Court thus grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that Dandar seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under count II. However, to the extent that Dandar’s Second Amended Complaint states a claim for damages against Defendants under Section 1983, Defendants’ motion to Dismiss is denied, and Dandar’s claim for damages under Section 1983 is stayed pending the outcome of the state court proceedings.

A federal court that abstains under Younger from hearing a Section 1983 damages claim should stay the action instead of dismissing it.

Malaer v. Kirkpatrick · filed 2020-04-01

A federal district court that abstains under Younger from hearing a federal plaintiff's § 1983 claim should stay the federal proceedings, not dismiss them. ... Plaintiff seeks only damages (which are not available to Plaintiff in defense of his criminal charges in the state proceeding); therefore, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to stay this action.

Section 1983 claims remain subject to Younger abstention when the state proceeding can hear the federal claims and is not conducted in bad faith.

California Ins. Co. v. Lara · filed 2021-07-07

As the following analysis shows, CIC II has failed to establish that the ongoing state proceeding is inadequate to hear its federal constitutional claims, whether because it will bar presentation of the claims or because the court is proceeding in bad faith. Accordingly, the court rejects CIC II’s contention that abstention is inappropriate given the nature of its claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits monetary-damages claims against public officials only for wilful or wanton conduct.

Weiland v. Byrne · filed 1975-04-09

Nor does he have any cause of action against public officials for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of wilful or wanton conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on private persons who follow a statutory scheme assumed to be constitutional absent an indication of improper motive.

Hagopian v. Consolidated Equities Corp. · filed 1975-04-14

The Court holds that, absent some indication of improper motive, private persons acting pursuant to a statutory scheme assumed to be constitutional cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983.

A private party is not liable in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely for having complied in good faith with a facially valid state statute that is later held unconstitutional.

Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown · filed 1984-07-20

We therefore conclude that private entities who regulate their behavior in good faith compliance with a validly enacted law cannot by the fact of their compliance be held legally responsible for constitutional defects in the law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for compensation for time spent confined under a subsequently voided conviction.

Logan v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary · filed 1975-03-05

Compensation for time spent confined pursuant to subsequently voided conviction is unavailable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 racial-discrimination claims may be proved with numerical comparisons, but the statistics must show substantial discrepancies indicating unequal employment practices.

Roche v. Foulger · filed 1975-04-21

With regard to the statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff, it is clear* that actions under § 1983 for racial discrimination contemplate the possibility of proving such discrimination by numerical comparisons. However, the inferences to be drawn from such statistics must result from substantial discrepancies, either from comparing employment totals with population totals or by other statistically demonstrable unequal employment practices, such as promotions or dismissals.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging racially selective enforcement to allege and prove deliberate enforcement based on race or another arbitrary classification; a bare disparity in arrest statistics is insufficient.

Butler v. Cooper · filed 1977-05-16

Before a claim of unlawful discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws can be established, the plaintiff must allege and prove a deliberate selective process of enforcement based upon race (or other arbitrary classification). ... Given these liberal standards in favor of the plaintiff, the record as viewed on appeal is totally devoid of a meritorious claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. ... Nothing in the record supports a theory of conspiracy to racially discriminate in the enforcement of these laws, least of all, not a naked allegation of percentage of black arrests.

Section 1983 reaches intentional racial discrimination by state actors that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Armstrong v. O'CONNELL · filed 1978-06-01

The Court hereby finds, for the reasons stated below, that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs with segregative intent, as further specified below, and in so doing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires intentional racial discrimination for an employee's discrimination claim.

United States v. City of Buffalo · filed 1978-08-01

I do not, however, find sufficient evidence to establish the discriminatory intent required under § 1981 or § 1983.

In a § 1983 racial-discrimination action, the plaintiff normally must prove discriminatory intent, but sufficient evidence may establish a prima facie case that shifts a rebuttable presumption and requires the defendant to show by clear and convincing proof that it did not unlawfully discriminate.

Maudie L. THOMPSON, Appellant v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF OMAHA · filed 1980-05-21

Normally, the burden of proving intent to discriminate rests with the plaintiff in a section 1983 action, Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1288 (8th Cir. 1979); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 1977), and intent will have to be found by "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). In some instances, however, evidence of discriminatory intent may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, triggering a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief. Williams v. Anderson, supra at 1087. The defendant must then show by clear and convincing proof that it did not unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiff.

Statistical proof may be used in Section 1983 actions, with Title VII cases and regulations serving as useful interpretive guides.

44 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1858, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,518 Garrick Black v. City of Akron, Ohio · filed 1987-10-15

In the interest of considering all of the probative evidence, we hold today that statistical proof may be used in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and furthermore, that cases and regulations promulgated under Title VII furnish useful guides to the interpretation of this statute.

A prisoner states a nonfrivolous Section 1983 equal-protection claim by alleging that officials imposed undesirable work based on race while assigning white inmates office work.

Bell v. Robert E. English, Librarian, D. Graham, Assistant Warden of Brunswick Correctional Center · filed 1987-12-23

We find that the dismissal was premature. The complaint states a racial discrimination claim, see Henry v. Van Cleve, 469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.1972), and is not legally frivolous, see Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir.1979).

A plaintiff alleging religious discrimination under § 1983 may prove discriminatory intent directly or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Helland v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 1996-08-15

Helland can prevail on his Title VII and § 1983 claims in one of two ways. He can offer direct proof of discriminatory intent, Sample v. Aldi Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir.1995), or he can rely on the indirect, burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 1983 racial-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Burks v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-01-31

The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to claims alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2377-78, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 n. 1, 113 S.Ct. at 2746 n. 1 (1993); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 825 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994).

Section 1983 race and gender discrimination claims are analyzed under the Title VII proof scheme.

Middlebrooks v. University of MD · filed 1999-01-11

Thus, to evaluate the appropriateness of summary judgment, the Court must evaluate the elements of Appellant's Title IX, Title VI, § 1981, and § 1983 claims. Such claims are appropriately analyzed under the Title VII proof scheme, first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

A § 1983 claim alleging intentional discrimination must satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework when there is no direct evidence.

Mower v. Westfall · filed 2001-12-20

Plaintiffs also sue Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216, et seq. All of these claims involve intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs must therefore be able to make out a claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework for these counts as well.

Section 1983 discrimination claims based on § 1981 use the Title VII circumstantial evidence approach to proving intentional discrimination.

Williams v. Alabama Dep't of Transportation · filed 2007-06-28

The Tille VII circumstantial evidence approach to proving intentional discrimination also applies to discrimination claims brought pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims require proof of intentional discrimination, but courts need not use Title VII’s formal burden shifting framework.

Lily Keyser Maria Sofia Robledo Richard M. Cisneros v. Sacramento City Unified School District, a Public Entity and Jame · filed 2001-02-07

Although courts in the Ninth Circuit are not bound by the formal Title VII disparate treatment burden shifting framework when trying § 1983 claims, id. at 471-72, because both disparate treatment and § 1983 claims require a showing of intentional discrimination, it is unsurprising that summary judgment decisions with regard to § 1983 claims are remarkably similar to their Title VII counterparts.

Section 1983 requires a racial discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, qualification, adverse employment action, discriminatory circumstances, and discriminatory purpose.

Middleton v. Deblasis · filed 2011-12-30

Equal protection discrimination claims under § 1983 are evaluated under the same framework as Title VII claims. ... To state a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII or § 1983, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) that plaintiff belonged to a protected class, (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the position, (3) that plaintiff was subject to an “adverse employment action” despite her qualifications, and (4) that circumstances exist from which a court can infer discriminatory action. ... Further, under § 1983, a plaintiff must show discriminatory purpose on the part of defendants.

Section 1983 race and gender discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Anthony v. Bickley · filed 2014-08-08

Claims of race and gender based discrimination under §§1983 and 1985 claims must be evaluated according to the McDonnell-Douglas 27 framework, which is a ... three-step burden-shifting analysis.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for unconstitutional state arrests, measured by federal constitutional standards rather than state arrest law, and probable cause and good-faith belief defeat liability.

Diamond v. Marland · filed 1975-05-28

Diamond’s action is based on infringement of federally guaranteed rights. The criteria for valid arrest in felony as well as misdemeanor offenses are those recognized by the Constitution of the United States. It does not heed the vagaries and variations of the common law and state statutes involving power to arrest in misdemeanor cases. ... Where an unlawful state arrest is the basis of an action for violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, federal constitutional standards are the appropriate measure of the conduct of the arresting officer. The vindication of federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determinable by federal law. ... Even if a police officer violates a state arrest statute, he would not be liable under the civil rights act unless he also violated federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests. ... An arrest without probable cause to believe that the accused has violated a criminal statute confers a right of action for deprivation of federal constitutional privileges under § 1983. ... Federal constitutional standards as to warrantless arrests control in the instant case. Under them, no distinction exists between felony and misdemeanor in respect to probable cause and good faith belief. Where an arrest is made by an officer for a misdemeanor committed out of his presence, probable cause therefor may be established by the possession of knowledge and facts justifying the belief on the part of one of reasonable prudence that the person arrested was guilty of the crime charged. ... I conclude that the existence of probable cause for warrantless arrest is a question of fact for a jury in a § 1983 action against the arresting officer for unconstitutional restraint of liberty. If the evidence presents, however, no genuine issue as to reasonable grounds for good-faith belief that the defendant had committed the offense for which he was arrested, existence of probable cause becomes a question for the court. ... In either case the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to defendants in actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a retaliatory eviction of a tenant under color of state law actionable.

Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc. · filed 1975-05-30

The law is now clear that a retaliatory eviction of a tenant under color of state law is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Government officials are immune from a § 1983 suit alleging constitutional-rights violations when established facts show they reasonably and in good faith believed their conduct was lawful.

Hamilton v. Edell · filed 1975-05-30

It is well settled that government officials are immune from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights when facts are established which show that the official was acting with a reasonable good faith belief that his conduct was legal.

Section 1983 gives a law enforcement officer a defense to a damages action by proving that the officer acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of the conduct.

Boscarino v. Nelson · filed 1975-07-14

We concluded that it is a defense to an action for damages under Section 1983 or the Fourth Amendment “for a law enforcement officer to prove that he-acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of his conduct.”

A school-board official is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages merely because the official acted without actual malice; the official must also know the basic constitutional rights involved.

Martin v. University of Louisville · filed 1976-08-30

To be entitled to a special exemption from the categorical remedial language of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a student’s constitutional rights, a school board member, who has voluntarily undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school and the activities of the students, must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against municipalities and officials acting in official capacities, but qualified good-faith immunity bars damages when they reasonably implement a policy they believe is constitutional and act without malice.

Ohland v. City of Montpelier · filed 1979-02-26

Nevertheless, in the circumstances presented here, we cannot hold the defendants liable for monetary damages under § 1983 due to their failure to accord plaintiff his due process rights, because they are entitled to a qualified good faith immunity ... This qualified good faith immunity applies to the individual defendants in their personal and representative capacities, and to the City of Montpelier as a corporate “person” subject to § 1983 liability. ... This authority and strong reasons of policy persuade us that the § 1983 liability of local governmental entities should be limited by a qualified good faith immunity parallel to that applicable to individual government employees. ... Consequently, the city as an entity is not liable in damages for deprivation of the plaintiffs due process rights.

Section 1983 gives municipalities a qualified good-faith immunity from damages, even though that immunity is judicially developed rather than stated in the statute.

Huemmer v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL, ETC. · filed 1979-07-09

In finding that a qualified good faith immunity is available to municipalities under section 1983, the Court recognizes that the creation of the immunities structure under section 1983 does not find direct statutory support.

Section 1983 makes good-faith immunity an affirmative defense for individual police officers, which the defendant must prove; whether the defense applies can be a jury question.

Logan v. Shealy · filed 1981-10-07

In this type § 1983 action, the good faith immunity of individual police officers is an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980), under the test of police officer immunity to monetary liability expressed, for example, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218-19, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Therefore verdicts properly could have been directed for these two defendants on that basis only if the evidence established as a matter of law that each acted, the one in promulgating and maintaining, the other in carrying out, a policy that each, at the critical time, "reasonably believed (was) valid, (though it) was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. We hold that the evidence did not conclusively establish this defense as to either Clements or Sachtleben, but that on the evidence adduced the issue of the good faith of each, in the special § 1983 sense, was one of fact for the jury under appropriate instructions as to the burden of proof and the substantive elements of the defense.

Section 1983 allows public officials to claim good-faith immunity unless they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions would violate constitutional rights or acted with malicious intent to deprive such rights or cause other injury.

Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia · filed 1981-12-14

Public officials acting in their official capacity may be immune from liability under section 1983, but not if they “knew or reasonably should have known” that their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the party affected, or if they took the action “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” ... I find that Messrs. Ruetz and Granger are entitled to good faith immunity. ... I also find that given the difficult issues presented by the actions of the town board prior to the election of Messrs. Dandeneau and Horvath, neither reasonably could have known that altering the conditions or refusing to renew the approval would constitute a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ... To summarize, I find that the plaintiffs had no cognizable property interest. I also find that even if an entitlement were present there was no infringement of any due process right. I further find that Cal-Oaks Corp. is not a proper party in interest to this suit, that the defendants did not meet their burden to establish waiver or estoppel, and that all of the individual defendants are entitled to immunity because of their good faith.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against correctional officials subject to qualified immunity: officials are immune when they reasonably and in good faith believe their conduct is lawful, but not when the violated constitutional right is clearly established and they should have known the conduct was illegal.

Martin v. Foti · filed 1983-03-31

The Court must now turn to the question of remedies. As regards damages, it is well-established that correctional officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damage claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if they reasonably believe in good faith that their conduct is lawful, even though it was not. Such immunity is not available, however, where the constitutional right in question is clearly established and the offenders should have known their conduct was illegal.

Private parties sued under § 1983 for invoking a state seizure statute have good faith immunity from damages when their reliance on the statute was reasonable, even if it is later held unconstitutional.

Howard L. Wyatt, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Bill Cole, and Lloyd S. Jones, Wiley Magee & Mike Moore, Defendan · filed 1991-05-30

In sum, the question is close, but on balance we are persuaded that reliance upon the statute by the private actors was not an act of unreasonable ignorance.

Section 1983 shields a public official from liability when the official acts in good faith within the scope of official duties.

Ago · filed 1974-08-29

The conclusion that can be drawn from cases construing s. 1983 is that a public official acting in good faith and within the scope of his or her official duties will be immune from liability under the section.

Section 1983 claims for damages against government officials may be barred by absolute or qualified immunity.

Jerry Young A/K/A Ramadan v. Donald Selsky, P. Orengo, R. Althouse, R.J. Cunningham, D. Schaller, L. Jewett · filed 1994-11-21

In sum, taking into account the presumption against absolute immunity, Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87, 111 S.Ct. at 1939, and a defendant’s corresponding burden in seeking to justify it, Butz, 438 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 2910, we believe that the scale tips against defendant’s claim of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 contains no express immunities, but courts recognize immunities that can shield government officials from personal liability for damages.

Sluman v. State of Washington · filed 2018-05-22

42 U.S.C. § 1983 admits no immunities. The United States Supreme Court, however, has, based on common law and policy grounds, crafted immunities shielding government officials and employees from personal liability for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or an arm of the state because neither is a “person” covered by the statute.

Sebesta v. Davis · filed 2017-12-21

The University is an arm of the state, and states are not among the “persons” ... covered by the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Aholelei v. Hawaii · filed 2007-02-14

Because “[a] state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983,” they cannot be held liable under the statute for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Lewis v. Mikesic · filed 2006-07-25

The district court properly dismissed the claims for monetary damages asserted against the State of Kansas and against Judge M ikesic while acting in his official capacity because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’” against whom a claim for damages can be brought pursuant to § 1983.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to § 1983 claims for retrospective damages.

Hughes v. New Hampshire Division of Aeronautics · filed 2005-03-22

However, in a suit for retrospective relief, i.e., such as money damages for past conduct, as alleged here, neither the State nor its officials when acting in their official capacity are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Weinberger v. State of Wis. · filed 1995-09-28

Moreover, neither the state nor its officials acting in their official capacities can be sued under § 1983 in any court, state or federal, because they are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit in state court against a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Chauncy Wright v. White · filed 1994-02-09

In Will , the United States Supreme Court held as a matter of federal law that a federal Section 1983 suit for damages may not be brought in state court against states, state agencies, and state officials (as opposed to local political subdivisions). Under Will, even if the state civil service statute could be bypassed, a Section 1983 suit against the state defendants in state court could not be brought.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for retrospective monetary relief against a state or its official sued in an official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Williams v. State · filed 1990-11-09

However, § 1983 may not be used to make a claim for relief against a state, as states are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief against the State or Commissioner Conway under § 1983.

A state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Ospina v. Department of Corrections, State of Del. · filed 1990-10-31

The defendant in a § 1983 action must, of course, be a “person” within the meaning of the statute. Unfortunately for the plaintiff in the present case, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

State Ex Rel. Division of Workers' Compensation v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District · filed 1990-10-22

With respect to defendants’ appeal regarding the effect of res judicata on plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and whether this section provides a remedy under the due process clause for gross negligence, we note that it is now settled that states and their agents are not “persons” for the purposes of § 1983: ... The plaintiffs have no § 1983 claim against the defendants in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rico v. State · filed 1990-10-05

We are also compelled to agree that a state and its officers acting in their official capacity may not be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state court because a state court is not a person under the statute.

Arthur v. Supreme Court of Iowa · filed 1989-03-29

State courts are not persons and, therefore, are not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state agency because it is not a person, and a nominal action against state officials also fails when it is in fact an action against the state.

Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company v. State Of Illinois · filed 1984-09-26

This court has held that "[s]tate agencies are not 'persons' for purposes of the Civil Rights Act." ... This section 1983 action against IDOT, a state agency, fails for lack of federal court jurisdiction. ... A state official acting under color of state authority may be treated as a "person" under section 1983. ... We hold that this action nominally against the IDOT officials but in fact against the state also fails for lack of federal court jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against a state for its agents' acts depriving a person of civil rights; any such remedy must be pursued against the individuals who committed the acts.

Edgar v. State · filed 1979-05-24

Inasmuch as the State is not suable under section 1983 for acts of its agents subjecting the plaintiff to deprivation of his civil rights, the remedy for such deprivation, if such there was, must be pursued against those individuals who committed the acts.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a "person" subject to liability under the statute.

Lynward James Daye, Jr. v. Lee v. Bounds, Commissioner · filed 1975-06-02

We are in agreement with the conclusion of the district court that the State of North Carolina is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to a § 1983 damages claim, including when the claim is brought against an arm of state government.

Arney v. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES · filed 1984-04-11

Florida is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, is not subject to a § 1983 claim for damages by way of a suit against DNR, an arm of state government.

A state is not a "person" subject to suit under Section 1983, so Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity.

St. Louis County, Mo. v. CITY OF TOWN · filed 1984-06-29

Neither does 42 U.S.C. § 1983, another statute under which this suit is brought. ... Only "person[s]" may be sued under § 1983 and a state is not a "person".

A State and its agencies are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1985-09-11

It is well settled that a state and its agencies are not “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rosen Ex Rel. Estate of Souza v. Chang · filed 1991-02-15

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), forecloses suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ... for damages against states and state officials acting in their official capacities; both the state itself and its officials are simply not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Patterson v. Webster · filed 1991-04-03

Neither states nor their officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under Section 1983.

Fort Wayne National Corp. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue · filed 1993-09-08

Even if Dennis had overruled Carter, however, Fort Wayne National would still not prevail because the company has brought this action against the Department and its Commissioner acting in his official capacity. "When sued for damages, states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under ... § 1983." Felix, 571 N.E.2d at 295 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58).

Section 1983 does not permit suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity.

Harris v. Terry A. Wallace, Director · filed 1993-10-06

State officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state officials acting in their official capacities.

State Board of Education v. Drury · filed 1993-10-12

Accordingly, the Board is not a “person” against whom a § 1983 claim for damages will lie. ... Such a claim for damages against the individual Board members in their official capacities is not viable under § 1983.

A State and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages suits under § 1983.

Gross v. Capital Electric Line Builders, Inc. · filed 1993-10-29

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that neither a State nor officials of the State while acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... We conclude that relief is not available to the appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fifth Amendment.

A State is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ferrick v. State · filed 1993-11-19

Similarly, the State is not a "person” subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58).

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Levey v. State Developmental Center · filed 1995-06-27

But, a section 1983 action may not he against the State because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a State in state court because a State is not a person under the statute.

People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co. · filed 1995-07-11

Although Brown did not receive immunity for the alleged violations made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, section 1983 actions against the State are not permitted in state court, and section 1981 claims are similarly barred because damages under section 1981 must have been sought through section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Stephenson v. State of Washington Kitsap County Warren Sharpe Danny Clem Leonard W. Costello Leonard W. Kruse G · filed 1995-09-08

Because states are not "persons" for purposes of section 1983, the district court properly dismissed Stephenson's claim against the State of Washington.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Salman v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline · filed 2000-07-05

Therefore, State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983.

A state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for a Rehabilitation Act claim does not make it a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sanders Ex Rel. Rayl v. KANSAS DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND REHABIL. SERVICES · filed 2004-04-29

The state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a § 504 action does not transform it into a "person" under § 1983, because the scope of eleventh amendment immunity and the scope of § 1983 are different issues.

A state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for a Rehabilitation Act claim does not make the state a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sanders ex rel. Rayl v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2004-04-29

The state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a § 504 action does not transform it into a “person” under § 1983, because the scope of eleventh amendment immunity and the scope of § 1983 are different issues.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a “person” amenable to suit.

Mierzwa v. United States · filed 2008-06-26

Moreover, the State was properly dismissed from the Mierzwas’ suit because New Jersey is not recognized as a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Kinney v. Connecticut · filed 2009-06-05

As the Defendants point out, however, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Thus, the Plaintiffs allegations ... as to the workers’ compensation proceedings also fail for this reason.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

McNiece v. Town of Yankeetown · filed 2020-06-16

McNiece’s complaint also failed to state a claim against the State of Florida, which is not a person under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person, and a state is not a person under the statute.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-06-30

Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the state of Idaho.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Ross v. Shelby Co. Criminal Court · filed 2020-09-09

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Reo v. Lindstedt · filed 2021-03-25

Defendant cannot maintain 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State of Ohio because Ohio is not a “person.”

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Robinson v. Michigan, State of · filed 2021-04-13

Additionally, Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the State of Michigan must be dismissed, because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against a state because a state is not a person under the section.

Woodall v. United States of America · filed 2022-04-19

Rather, Bivens ... creates a cause of action against federal officers, and § 1983 creates a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law. The United States of America is not a ... federal officer, and the State of Arizona is not a person.

Section 1983 requires courts to judge local officials' policies and acts against federal constitutional standards, rather than state law alone.

Doe v. Poelker · filed 1975-06-02

The city's policies and acts must be judged against the federal Constitution in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The very purpose of section 1983 would be completely obliterated if local officials were to have their actions judged only in the light of state law and not under constitutional standards.

Section 1983 is not a substitute forum for local administration of a noise ordinance when the city's decision rationally advances legitimate revenue and recreational interests and is not arbitrary or capricious.

Citizen's Association Of Portland v. International Raceways, Inc. · filed 1987-12-01

A Sec. 1983 action is not a substitute forum for the City's administration of the noise ordinance. So long as the City's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, the guarantee of due process has been met.

Section 1983 permits a Brady due process claim against police officers who withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.

Bermudez v. City of New York · filed 2015-06-15

Police officers can be held liable for Brady due process violations under § 1983 if they withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an investigator for failing to disclose evidence to the defense when the prosecutor knew of the evidence and had the duty to disclose it.

Spencer v. Peters · filed 2013-08-21

Finding that Krause could have section 1983 liability for failure to disclose the videotaped interview was manifest error. Based on the facts of this case, she did not have such a duty. Reconsideration is granted as to this issue, and thus Krause’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy when state officials deprive a person of due process by suppressing exculpatory evidence or permitting misleading testimony that causes an unfair criminal trial.

Lilly Mae Onie Lee Whitelaw Hilliard v. John L. Williams and Donn Clark, Appeal of John L. Williams. Appeal of Donn Clar · filed 1975-05-28

It follows that this defendant’s conduct also amounted to an actionable violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold that the conduct of Clark also amounted to an actionable violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a police officer liable for withheld exculpatory evidence to prove the officer acted in bad faith, intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights, or was deliberately indifferent to them.

Reid v. Simmons, et al. · filed 2001-03-30

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that a police officer deprived him of his constitutionally protected right to due process merely by demonstrating that a Brady violation occurred during the course of the plaintiff’s underlying criminal trial. Instead, the plaintiff must also show that the officer acted in bad faith, or with the intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or with deliberate indifference to those rights.

Police officers may face § 1983 liability for concealing material evidence from a prosecutor, but have qualified immunity if that duty was not clearly established at the time.

Gibson v. Superintendent of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety-Division of State Police · filed 2005-06-14

Although Brady places the ultimate duty of disclosure on the prosecutor, it would be anomalous to' say that police officers are not liable when they affirmatively conceal material evidence from the prosecutor. ... We think that Gibson states an actionable § 1983 claim against the Troopers for interference with his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. ... Because such a right was not clearly established in this Circuit at the time of Gibson’s conviction, Troopers Pen-nypacker and Reilly are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to their failure to inform the prosecutor of Brady material.

A constitutional claim against state actors must proceed through Section 1983 rather than as an independent constitutional tort.

Houk v. Village of Oak Lawn · filed 1986-10-31

First, plaintiffs must look only to Section 1983 and not to some misguided notion of constitutional tort. Consequently any "First Amendment" reference in the Complaint cannot be viewed as independently viable.

Section 1983 provides a proper federal vehicle for a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials' use of pre-Gates disciplinary records, rather than immediate or speedier release.

Walter Leonard, Jr. v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board · filed 1975-06-10

At least insofar as Leonard brings this action on behalf of the class, we hold that it is properly brought as a Section 1983 action.

A prisoner's pro se habeas petition alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be treated as a Section 1983 complaint, with leave to amend granted liberally.

Young v. Bill Armontrout, Warden · filed 1986-07-08

We therefore instruct the district court on remand to treat Young’s petition as a complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Leave to amend the complaint shall be granted liberally as justice requires.

Damages under § 1983 cannot be awarded on a motion for a writ of prohibition; that relief requires a plenary action.

Renzulli v. McElrath · filed 2000-05-31

Since there is no finding of bad faith or maliciousness or recklessness on the part of the respondent Family Court Judge, there is no basis for damages or counsel fees under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988. Moreover, such relief can only be granted in a plenary action and not in a motion for a writ of prohibition.

Section 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for challenging how a prison department collects a monetary sanction.

Bout v. Bolden · filed 2001-09-11

The appropriate vehicle for pursuing such claims would be a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of Corrections.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for an equal protection claim, making a parallel claim brought directly under the Equal Protection Clause duplicative.

Priolo v. Town of Kingston · filed 2012-03-20

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, the Priolos assert a claim directly under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As previously noted, this claim is duplicative of the one more properly brought in Count V under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to dismiss pending state criminal charges.

Brunt v. Busshardt · filed 2020-08-31

Even aside from Younger, Plaintiff’s request that the charges against him be dismissed is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against police officers who, under color of state law, suppress peaceful communication protected by the First Amendment without a reasonable and good-faith justification.

Glasson v. City of Louisville · filed 1975-06-13

Accordingly, we hold that these police officers are required to respond in damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act because they suppressed appellant’s peaceful communication of ideas protected by the First Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against detention facilities because they are not persons subject to suit.

Lucero v. Core Civic C.C.A. · filed 2020-07-31

It is well settled that detention facilities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against individual state-college officials acting under color of law when they deprive a person of federal constitutional rights, regardless of whether their conduct was within the scope of their employment.

Smyth v. Lubbers · filed 1975-06-27

It is elementary that a party stating a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and its implementing statutes, including 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, must allege official or state action, as distinguished from purely private action. Here, the plaintiffs complain of actions taken by the College officers and employees under color of law in their representative capacities. Such allegations are necessary to, and do, state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Sec. 1983. ... The court concludes that the defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and that the pleadings and stipulations establish that they were acting under color of law within the meaning of Sec. 1983 in performing the actions complained of by the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not treat a police department as a suable person.

Britton v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 1975-10-14

A police department is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, thus, is not a suable entity under that statute.

Section 1983 does not treat the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or its Civil Service Division as persons subject to suit.

Anthony v. Com. of Mass. · filed 1976-03-29

neither the Commonwealth of Massachusetts nor the Division of Civil Service are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, are not proper parties to any lawsuit brought under that section.

Section 1983 does not treat a government agency such as the New York Port Authority as a person, but it does treat the responsible individual enforcement official as a person.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New York Port Authority · filed 1977-01-14

The Authority clearly performs an essential governmental function for New York and New Jersey, ... Thus, the New York Port Authority must be deemed a government agency for purposes of the Civil Rights Act and not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Plaintiffs, as indicated, have also sued Walter Lee, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Port Authority Police Force; he is certainly a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize relief against the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners because the Board is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Murphy v. State Bd. of Law Exam. for Com. of Pa. · filed 1977-03-29

The plaintiff has invoked this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, 2281, 2284,1343(3), 1331; also 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although the State Board is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute and no relief could be granted pursuant to it.

Section 1983 does not allow suit against the Pennsylvania Parole Board because the Board is not a statutory person.

Thompson v. Parole Supervisor Burke, Pennsylvania Parole Board Member Jefferson, and Parole Agent Strickler · filed 1977-06-01

The Board, of course, cannot be sued for it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency such as the North Carolina Board of Medical Examiners as a person subject to a damages suit.

Hoke v. Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1978-02-23

Defendants correctly contend, therefore, that the Board is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be subject to a suit for damages.

State agencies are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Atchison v. Nelson · filed 1978-11-17

It would be incongruous, as the Plaintiff suggests, to find that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983 but that state agencies are not, and this Court shall not so hold.

Section 1983 treats a state agency such as Michigan State University and its Board of Trustees as a person subject to suit.

Weisbord v. Michigan State University · filed 1980-08-26

This Court is of the opinion that these defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats state officials acting in their official capacities and state administrative agencies as persons subject to suit.

RI Affiliate Am. Civ. Liberties v. RI LOTTERY · filed 1982-12-16

This Court holds that in light of the acknowledged purpose of § 1983 to provide a broad civil remedy for violations of federally protected rights, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408 n. 17, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), and the plain meaning of the statutory language, state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Once it is accepted that Rhode Island is a "person" under § 1983, it follows that the various agencies of Rhode Island are similarly subject to suit.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives someone of a constitutional or federal right.

Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment · filed 2005-10-28

One consequence of Brown's possession of this authority, the authority to make arrests at one's discretion and for any offenses, is clear: at all times relevant to this case, Brown was a state actor as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who act jointly with the state and qualify as state actors.

Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc. · filed 2007-12-03

Prison Fellowship and InnerChange acted jointly with the DOC and can be classified as state actors under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats states as persons who may be sued for constitutional violations.

Smith v. State · filed 1983-01-10

As such, we conclude that Congress must have intended that states be included as "persons”.

A bounty hunter who attempts to arrest a fugitive on a bondsman’s behalf without law enforcement assistance is not a state actor under § 1983 on these facts.

McCoy v. Johnson · filed 1997-03-31

As a result, under the facts of Plaintiffs complaint, the court believes that Defendant Johnson was not a state actor when he attempted to arrest Plaintiff and applied unnecessary force. Consequently, Plaintiff has not pled a legally sufficient claim for recovery from Defendant Johnson under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations, including the imposition of summary punishment without due process by state officials.

Dillard v. Pitchess · filed 1975-08-26

The plaintiff charges that the detention of unconvieted prisoners in the Hall of Justice jail under the conditions herein-above described constitutes summary punishment without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This court agrees and so holds.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to challenge a deprivation of liberty without due process when the deprivation lacks a legitimate security or substantial administrative justification.

Norris v. Frame · filed 1978-10-31

We conclude that under the circumstances here the refusal to allow Norris to continue to receive methadone operates to deprive him of a liberty interest without due process of law, unless the state can demonstrate that a legitimate security concern, or a genuine fear of substantial administrative disruption, warrants this interference with plaintiff’s medical care.

Section 1983 provides no due-process or equal-protection claim when chaining a pretrial detainee to a hospital bed is reasonably related and not excessive in relation to legitimate jail-security concerns.

Guerrero v. Cain · filed 1983-11-21

I find that his chaining did not constitute punishment because it was reasonably related to jail security and as administered was not excessively restrictive. Plaintiff was not chained because of his race. Defendant’s action violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.

A pretrial detainee need not allege deliberate indifference to state a § 1983 due-process claim for denial of medical care.

Gibson v. Babcox · filed 1984-12-03

Although a pretrial detainee need not allege facts demonstrating deliberate indifference in order to state a claim for denial of medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient even under this more rigorous standard.

A pretrial detainee's brief segregation without a hearing may support a § 1983 due-process claim when the record permits an inference that officers imposed it arbitrarily as intentional punishment.

Hawkins v. Sgt. Frederick T. Poole and Sgt. Donald L. Cleiman · filed 1985-12-16

This record is sufficient, considering all its elements, to raise the issue of whether the segregation, as brief and limited as it was, constituted intentional punishment inflicted by the officers in bad faith. This record is devoid of any suggested justification whatsoever for the segregation. Nor at oral argument was defendants’ counsel able to suggest any justification. It is not enough merely to say that the court should not interfere in the administration of the jail, and that the segregation was not as severe as it might have been.

A pretrial detainee may enforce through § 1983 both the constitutional protections enjoyed by convicted prisoners and the additional right to be free from restrictions imposed as punishment.

Ryan v. Burlington County · filed 1987-11-09

Thus, Ryan enjoyed two tiers of rights on October 4,1983 while detained at the county jail: he was entitled to the rights granted convicted persons as well as the right to be free of any practice or restriction placed on him as punishment.

A prison disciplinary rule violates due process as applied when it fails to give an inmate adequate notice that the conduct is prohibited, and officials lack qualified immunity when that particularized notice right was clearly established.

Rios v. Lane · filed 1987-02-13

We believe that as applied to Rios, Rule 205 failed to approximate the parameters of fairness. ... However, we believe that an inmate’s right to adequate notice of prohibited conduct prior to the imposition of serious disciplinary sanction was sufficiently particularized in 1983 to put the defendants on notice that their conduct was probably unlawful.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek relief for prison disciplinary actions that violate federal constitutional rights, with review focused on whether the actions were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Smith v. Fulton Rabalais, Jr. · filed 1981-10-15

In reviewing administrative- findings under a federal habeas corpus or a section 1983 complaint, the standard to be applied is whether or not actions of the disciplinary committee were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 requires a prison disciplinary claim based on denied witnesses or written statements to allege a denial unrelated to institutional security or correctional goals and a clear abuse of officials’ discretion, supported by facts.

Hurney v. Carver · filed 1979-07-05

To state a valid claim, it must be alleged that the inmate’s requests were denied for reasons not having to do with institutional security or correctional goals, and that the prison officials, in ruling as they did, clearly abused their considerable discretion in such matters.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a federal prisoner’s claim challenging the racial composition of a federal disciplinary committee.

Douglas v. U. S. Attorney General · filed 1975-08-26

The complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and jurisdiction is not established under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 as claimed by the plaintiff.

Prison adjustment-committee members have only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from damages liability under Section 1983.

Redding v. Fairman · filed 1983-09-13

Adjustment Committee members enjoy only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from damages liability.

A prison disciplinary hearing examiner who is not an independent adjudicator receives qualified rather than absolute immunity in a § 1983 action.

Vines v. Howard · filed 1987-10-05

In light of the above, I conclude that Howard, Sr. was not an independent factfinder. ... Howard, Sr. shall be accorded qualified immunity.

A prisoner has no due-process right to learn confidential informants' identities or statements and no unlimited right to call or question witnesses or request documents in a disciplinary proceeding.

Julian v. Rush · filed 1987-10-21

A prisoner does not have a due process right to the identity of confidential informants, a copy of their confidential statements, nor an unlimited right to call or question witnesses and request documents.

A prison disciplinary proceeding satisfies § 1983 due-process requirements when an uninvolved alternate hearing officer presides and the prisoner receives adequate notice and a formal hearing.

Craddock v. Mark Rhodes, Glen Cunningham · filed 1987-11-13

Since Rhodes was a witness in the case and Cunningham signed the findings after the hearing as alternate hearing officer, the record of the proceeding shows no irregularity and no reasonable contention that Rhodes was both the hearing officer and the investigating officer and a witness. ... in this particular case no irregularity has been shown, and the plaintiff received adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged and a formal hearing on the same.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary finding that revoked good conduct credit until the finding is revoked or otherwise voided.

Harris v. Terry Gabel, Thomas P. Roth, Evertt Davis · filed 1996-03-19

Plaintiff was sentenced to two months in segregation, two months of demotion to "C" grade, and two months revocation of good conduct credit. Until the finding of guilty is revoked or otherwise voided, he cannot raise this challenge in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is the proper remedy for a prisoner seeking expungement of a disciplinary charge when expungement would have only a speculative or incidental effect on the length of the sentence.

Lauranzano v. George Ingle, Warden Attorney General of the State of California · filed 1996-04-29

Although the expungement may allegedly affect Lauranzano's chances for parole, it will not automatically shorten his sentence, see Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281 (1995) (parole criteria for life prisoners), thereby having only "a speculative or incidental effect" on Lauranzano's indeterminate sentence. See Sisk, 974 F.2d at 117; Georgevich, 772 F.2d at 1087. Therefore, Lauranzano's proper remedy lies in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for prison disciplinary sanctions when success on the claim would imply that a related loss of good-time credits unlawfully lengthened the prisoner’s confinement.

Jones v. Watkins · filed 1996-11-19

Therefore, under Heck, Jones cannot maintain a lawsuit for damages for either the loss of good-time credits or for the other punishment.

Section 1983 permits damages for time served under a procedurally defective disciplinary sentence even if the hearing is later reversed administratively, but a credit for that time against a new sentence leaves no damages from the initial hearing.

Murray v. Dixon · filed 1997-02-20

A plaintiff may state a claim under section 1983 for damages for the portion of a sentence already served that resulted from a procedurally defective hearing, even if that hearing was reversed administratively. See Mays v. Mahoney, 23 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2608 (1995); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658-59 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2608 (1995). But because Murray's new sentence credited the time he had already served from the original sentence, he did not suffer damage from the initial hearing.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a damages claim that could justify habeas relief before satisfying the procedural prerequisites for habeas relief.

Norton v. Garro · filed 1997-03-20

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a prisoner to recover damages for a constitutional violation and has no requirement of exhausting state remedies, a prisoner cannot bring a claim that could justify habeas corpus relief, unless the prisoner has complied with procedural prerequisites for a habeas case.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 damages claim whose necessary factual findings would invalidate a prison disciplinary decision or punishment until the prerequisites for habeas relief are met.

Austin v. Ellerd · filed 1997-03-21

In other words, if the factual findings necessary for a successful § 1983 claim would, if made by a state court, vacate or reverse the disciplinary decision or punishment, this court may not hear the § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim that calls into question a prison disciplinary decision revoking good-time credits unless that decision has already been set aside.

Diaz v. McBride · filed 1997-05-21

All of these theories call into question the validity of the board's decision, and under Edwards and Heck any line of argument with that effect fails to state a claim--unless the decision of the court or board has already been set aside on direct appeal, on collateral attack, or by executive clemency, which this decision has not.

Section 1983 bars a prison retaliation claim that would undermine a disciplinary finding unless the disciplinary action has been expunged or overturned.

Stewart v. Smith · filed 1997-08-22

He also claims that the disciplinary charge was false, and brought in retaliation for his jailhouse lawyer activities. Proof of false allegations would undermine the validity of the disciplinary finding, much like Edwards ' deceit claims. Thus, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the disciplinary action has been expunged or overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a compensatory claim for a prison disciplinary challenge when Edwards v. Balisok forecloses that claim.

Norman Gotcher, Jr. v. Wood · filed 1997-09-11

We agree with Wood that Edwards forecloses Gotcher’s entire compensatory claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a claim that witnesses were improperly excluded from his disciplinary hearing.

Eaglin v. Clarence Faust, Ronnie Williams, and Karen Schau, 2 · filed 1997-10-15

An improper exclusion of witnesses in the inmate's defense is "an obvious procedural defect, and state and federal courts have reinstated good-time credits (absent a new hearing) when it is established." Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1588 (1997). Such a claim is cognizable under § 1983.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 retaliation claim whose success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding prison disciplinary finding.

Jackson-El v. Winsor · filed 1997-11-18

If a jury were to find that the misconduct ticket had been falsified by Winsor, it would necessarily have to determine that plaintiff did not possess the knife. Such a determination would directly contradict the hearing officer’s determination that plaintiff did in fact possess the knife. Because plaintiffs retaliation claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the hearing officer’s determination, the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary punishment through a claim that would necessarily imply its invalidity unless the underlying determination has been invalidated.

Klein v. Coblentz · filed 1997-11-19

Klein’s disciplinary determination has not been reversed, and he has apparently not pursued a state habeas action to obtain a judgment that the prison ruling was invalid. Klein’s claim, therefore, is similarly noncognizable under § 1983. His claim that he was framed by prison authorities is indistinguishable from Balisok’s and would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim challenging disciplinary hearing procedures when the alleged violations would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary disposition that has not been invalidated.

Shabazz v. Pico · filed 1998-02-11

Because plaintiffs allegations necessarily im-' ply the invalidity of the dispositions of these two disciplinary hearings, plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are precluded by Edwards.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for this challenge to prison disciplinary infractions; dismissal is without prejudice.

Yarborough v. Robinson · filed 1998-12-17

As to Yarborough's challenge to his disciplinary infractions, the district court properly held that the claim is not cognizable under § 1983 and dismissed them without prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of confinement; Heck and Edwards do not bar that claim.

Jenkins v. Haubert · filed 1999-06-11

Accordingly, we hold that a § 1983 suit by a prisoner, such as Jenkins, challenging the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement is not barred by Heck and Edwards.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary hearing that attacks the fact or duration of confinement; the challenge must proceed in habeas corpus.

Moore v. Booker · filed 1999-09-03

Moore’s contention that he was denied due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is a challenge to the fact and duration of his confinement, and it must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit claims whose success would invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction.

Rivera v. Johnson · filed 1999-10-20

Rivera’s arguments concerning the constitutionality of the prison disciplinary proceeding are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because favorable action on his claims would render his disciplinary conviction invalid.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a condition of confinement resulting from prison discipline when federal habeas relief is unavailable.

DeWalt, Anthony v. Carter, Lamark · filed 2000-08-11

To summarize, we hold today that the unavailability of federal habeas relief does not preclude a prisoner from bringing a sec. 1983 action to challenge a condition of his confinement that results from a prison disciplinary action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a prison disciplinary conviction involving lost good-time credits until that conviction is expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Chapman v. Scott · filed 2000-08-21

Even assuming that she lost good time, however, she is not entitled to seek damages under § 1983 until she has shown that her conviction in the disciplinary proceeding has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when a challenge to prison discipline implicates the validity of the punishment imposed.

Burns v. State of Texas · filed 2001-02-14

Because ... Burns's remaining claims, involving disciplinary case numbers 990206487, 990080635, 20000111138, and 20000219322, implicate the validity of the punishment imposed for the disciplinary violations, they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary punishment that has not been overturned.

Bates v. Sullivan · filed 2001-04-24

A finding that the defendants discriminated against Bates in punishing him, however, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his punishment, and therefore Bates’s equal protection claim is barred under Balisok and Heck.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary decision that has not been overturned.

Simmons v. Howard · filed 2001-06-14

A prisoner seeking damages based on a prison disciplinary decision that has not been overturned may not proceed under § 1983 if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim for monetary or equitable relief based solely on procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing when success would imply that the punishment was invalid.

Abdul-Mateen v. Martin · filed 2001-09-17

A claim for monetary and equitable relief complaining only of procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing which, if established, would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.