42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 cannot provide relief to a state prisoner when a favorable judgment would necessarily invalidate his conviction and entitle him to immediate release; such a claim must be brought in habeas.

Rendall v. Peter Wilson, Individually and as Governor of the State of California · filed 1997-04-23

When a state prisoner challenges the validity of the fact or length of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Rendall's 1983 action, but remand for the district court to dismiss without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a state prisoner who challenges the constitutionality of his conviction and seeks immediate release; habeas corpus is his sole federal remedy.

Bagley v. Tolle · filed 1997-06-02

Finding that Bagley’s allegations implicate the constitutionality of his conviction, and because it is apparent that he seeks an immediate release from imprisonment, we must conclude that his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim attacking the legality of imprisonment; the claimant must seek relief under § 2254 after exhausting state remedies.

Profit v. County of Hennepin · filed 1997-06-06

After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we agree with the district court that Profit essentially attacks the legality of his imprisonment, and that his claim thus must be brought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, after he exhausts his state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release by challenging the fact or duration of confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Woods v. Mary Keenan, Douglas Tyler Woods v. Aristedes W. Zavaras, Bill Wilson, Attorney General of the St · filed 1997-06-23

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether any portion of Woods' action is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether the action falls exclusively under the habeas corpus provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In making our determination, we do not rely upon the plaintiff's characterization, but, rather, we consider the nature of the relief sought. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Woods' complaint essentially seeks relief which challenges "the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90). Therefore, habeas corpus is his exclusive remedy. Id.; Leacock v. Henman, 996 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir.1993).

Section 1983 cannot be used to set aside a state prisoner’s conviction or obtain release; a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Mapp v. Wyoming · filed 1997-08-06

Mr. Mapp’s pleading alleges that his counsel was ineffective and that his conviction must therefore be set aside. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Thus the magistrate judge did not err in concluding that Mr. Mapp’s action was in effect a petition for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking sentence credit when the claim calls the sentence’s validity into question; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Parnell v. Scott · filed 1997-08-20

This complaint calls into question the validity of his sentence. His only remedy lies in a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a state prisoner challenging parole board procedures to obtain a new hearing aimed at release; the prisoner must seek habeas relief and exhaust available state remedies.

Baskins v. Moore · filed 1973-06-19

Prisoners who have had their parole applications denied and then seek a determination that the procedures employed by the reviewing board are constitutionally defective seek new proceedings consonant with their concept of due process; the goal of obtaining a new hearing, of course, is to seek release from confinement. ... In sum, petitioner’s remedy lies in habeas corpus; he must, therefore, exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that seeks to modify a death sentence and is, in substance, a habeas petition.

Buchanan v. Gilmore · filed 1998-03-26

In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court held that habeas corpus was the sole remedy for a prisoner seeking a release from punishment. Buchanan's § 1983 action is in essence a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He seeks to have the Governor reconsider error attributed to the trial court.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a judgment or continued confinement; the claim must be brought in habeas.

Longnecker v. Yvonne A. Walters, Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms Board of Prison Terms · filed 1998-05-26

Because Longnecker's complaint "would necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment or continuing confinement," it must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 is unavailable when a prisoner’s claims must be brought through habeas corpus.

Sellers v. Pierce · filed 1998-06-19

We conclude that Sellers’ sole federal remedy is through the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

Moore v. Speybroeck · filed 1999-11-12

Under Preiser v. Rodriguez, a habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the exclusive federal remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release. The court may not convert a § 1983 action into a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge parole hearings when success would automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release; that claim must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Woodkins v. Collins · filed 2001-05-18

Because Woodkins’s equal protection claim challenges the results of specific allegedly defective parole hearings and resolution would automatically entitle him to accelerated release, this claim must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to his conviction; that challenge must be brought through a habeas corpus petition.

Banks v. McFarland · filed 2001-06-13

This assertion of injury in fact merely serves to demonstrate the district court’s conclusion that Banks’ sole remedy lies in a § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state court conviction when habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Daniels v. People · filed 2001-09-21

The district court did not err in denying Daniels leave to proceed in forma pauperis because, in his complaint, Daniels seeks to challenge his state court convic...tion, for which his exclusive federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from imprisonment; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Garcia v. Garrett · filed 2001-10-26

When a state prisoner such as Garcia is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to seek immediate or speedier release from confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Blackshear v. Hatfield · filed 2002-01-24

Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide early release from prison as a remedy.

Woodruff v. Wyoming Department of Corrections · filed 2002-03-26

We note that the relief sought by Woodruff is not available in a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for claims challenging the fact or duration of custody; habeas corpus is the sole remedy.

McCoy v. Jones · filed 2002-04-10

All of McCoy’s claims are challenges to the fact or duration of his custody, and his sole relief is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory or injunctive claims intertwined with a requested stay of execution when a favorable ruling would likely determine the validity of the death sentences.

Martinez v. the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2002-05-21

However, we find, pursuant to our decision in Clarke v. Stalder, that these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are "so intertwined" with the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief from their impending executions that a favorable ruling on the Plaintiffs' challenges to Texas's system for appointing state habeas counsel is likely to effectively determine the validity of their death sentences. Accordingly, these claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for early discharge from a state sentence; that request must be brought through habeas corpus.

Belt v. Indiana Parole Department · filed 2003-01-16

To the extent Mr. Belt seeks an early discharge from his state sentence, his claim should have been brought as a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254.

A prisoner challenging parole decisions affecting the duration of confinement must seek habeas relief rather than bring a § 1983 action.

Pagel v. Utah State Prison · filed 2003-09-26

Finally, as the defendant prison officials have noted, to the extent that Mr. Pagel seeks to challenge decisions affecting his parole, he must pursue a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for state prisoners seeking release from custody; their exclusive federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Maria Mercado, A/K/A Crespo v. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York,respondents-Appellees · filed 1974-08-15

Subsequent to the inception of the action, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), in which the Court foreclosed the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits as vehicles for circumventing the requirement that a state prisoner must exhaust all available state remedies before petitioning a federal court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Inasmuch as they were seeking release from that custody, and not merely challenging the conditions of that custody, appellants wisely concluded that, under Preiser, their exclusive remedy resided in the second half of their bifurcated complaint which thereupon became solely a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and the case was conducted as such below.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the constitutionality of a state court conviction; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy, subject to exhaustion of state remedies.

Lacey v. Washington County, State of Tennessee · filed 1985-01-21

If the basis of the Sec. 1983 claims goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction, the exclusive remedy is habeas corpus relief with the comity inspired prerequisite of exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to challenge the validity of confinement and seek release when habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Leonard v. Hammond · filed 1986-11-10

At the outset, we find that plaintiffs’ claim should not have been viewed as a § 1983 action. Their claim is cognizable only in habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim challenging continued incarceration after parole revocation; that claim belongs in habeas.

Sanders v. Smith · filed 2004-10-27

To the extent that he argues that his grant of parole was revoked and he remains incarcerated due to his refusal to participate in the SOTP, the claim should have been brought in habeas.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek relief that must be pursued through a successive habeas petition.

Green v. Harris County, District Attorney's Office · filed 2004-10-27

The district court, lacking jurisdiction over Green’s claimed § 1983 action (successive habeas petition), lacked jurisdiction to grant the stay.

Section 1983 does not provide relief available only through a § 2254 petition.

Williams v. Vance County Judicial System · filed 2004-11-10

McDonald Williams appeals the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing without prejudice his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The district court properly noted that Williams was seeking relief only available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).

A prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release must pursue habeas relief rather than a § 1983 action.

Kennedy v. Texas Pardons & Paroles · filed 2005-06-29

Because Kennedy is requesting immediate or speedier release to mandatory supervision, his claims are properly presented in habeas. ... The judgment of the district court dismissing Kennedy’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prisoner seeking release from custody; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Hansborough v. Reickhoff · filed 2005-11-18

To the extent Mr. Hansborough asks the court to order his release from custody, he states no claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for prisoners seeking good time credits, reduced sentences, or early release when those claims concern the length of imprisonment.

Remsen v. Alameida · filed 2007-06-13

After giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims concerning good time credits, reduced sentences, and entitlement to early release because they fail to state civil rights claims upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenges to the fact or duration of a conviction or sentence; those challenges must proceed through habeas corpus.

Bricker v. Pennsylvania · filed 2007-06-20

The District Court correctly concluded that to the extent Appellant was challenging the fact or duration of his conviction or sentence, his remedy is in the form of habeas, not 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional or federal statutory rights, but it cannot be used when success would require invalidating the plaintiff’s confinement.

Cordell v. Tilton · filed 2007-09-17

A prisoner’s Section 1983 action is barred if the prisoner has to demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement in order to be granted relief.

Section 1983 is not the proper avenue to challenge a period of mandatory parole or its revocation; such a claim must be pursued through a timely habeas petition.

Noland v. Ortiz · filed 2007-10-15

To the extent that Noland raises either challenge, we note simply that the appropriate avenue to pursue such a claim was a timely petition for habeas relief, rather than a long- belated § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a claim concerning good time credits that belongs in habeas corpus.

Herman v. Hicks · filed 1993-06-04

Here, the district court correctly held that Herman's claim was best brought as a habeas action because the issue of good time credits sounds exclusively in habeas.

A Section 1983 claim seeking expungement of prison discipline that would restore good-time credits must be dismissed without prejudice because habeas is the exclusive remedy.

Allen v. J. Figueroa, Correctional Officer · filed 1995-05-23

On remand, the district court should dismiss the Sec. 1983 claim without prejudice because Allen's claim for injunctive relief expunging his prison files may only be addressed in a habeas petition.

A § 1983 claim challenging the legality of continued confinement must be treated as a habeas corpus petition.

Robinson v. Wade · filed 1982-09-20

Robinson does not challenge the propriety of the district court’s construction of his § 1983 claim as a petition in habeas corpus invoking the protections of the double jeopardy clause. Insofar as the gravamen of his complaint lies in the legality of his continued confinement, that construction was, of course, dictated under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980); compare Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), aff’d en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (1977).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to stay an execution based on an allegedly defective clemency proceeding; that request is for habeas relief.

Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2001-11-15

The action was filed in district court not as a habeas proceeding (Mr. Gilreath had pursued habeas corpus relief previously and unsuccessfully), but as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We look at the kind of relief Appellant seeks from the federal courts and conclude that, however the Appellant described it, the motion was for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 does not provide relief dismissing pending criminal charges for alleged constitutional violations; that relief is available through habeas corpus.

Duran v. Weeks · filed 2010-10-29

Furthermore, to the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for relief only available through habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction by someone who remains in custody and whose remedy lies in habeas corpus.

Hartmann v. O'Connor · filed 2011-02-28

Consequently, his remedy, if he has one at all, lies with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not with § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of confinement; that challenge must be brought in a habeas petition.

Brown v. Gov of New Jersey · filed 2011-06-17

Brown‟s allegations are not entirely clear, but what is clear is that he has not raised any challenge to the legality of any procedure or its application that might arguably be cognizable under § 1983. ... Thus, they “lie „within the core of habeas corpus‟” and must be raised in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for claims seeking release or calling a conviction or sentence into question; the remedy is a habeas petition.

Church v. Oklahoma Correctional Industries · filed 2012-03-29

And even if he had, to the extent he seeks release or calls into question his conviction and sentence, Mr. Church’s lawful remedy isn’t a § 1983 damages action but a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim that, if successful, would shorten his confinement; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Tillman v. Bigelow · filed 2012-08-07

Thus, as we have indicated, Tillman’s claims are cognizable only in a § 2241 habeas action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek injunctive or declaratory relief challenging the fact or duration of a state prison sentence; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Jones v. Edmund Brown, Jr. · filed 2014-12-04

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Jones’ action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief because it challenged the fact and duration of his state criminal sentence. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983).

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain release from prison or a change to a sentence; those claims must be pursued through habeas corpus and dismissed without prejudice.

Starr v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2015-09-04

To the extent that Starr seeks release from prison, or modification or commutation of his sentence, dismissal was proper because his “exclusive remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” ... However, because the district court dismissed the action with prejudice, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss these claims without prejudice.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to seek immediate or speedier release from confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Pittman v. Pennsylvania General Assembly · filed 2016-03-03

First, to the extent that Pittman challenges his conviction or sentence, “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary hearing when success would imply the invalidity of a loss of good-time credits, even if the prisoner also seeks damages.

Thompson v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons · filed 2016-04-04

As the relief Thompson seeks would unquestionably have at least a “probabilistic impact” on the duration of his custody, habeas is the necessary vehicle.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from state confinement; a claim seeking that relief must proceed as a habeas petition under § 2254.

Starkey v. United States Department of the Treasury · filed 2017-10-06

In his complaint, Starkey purports to bring constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act. But a review of the relief sought indicates that Starkey is challenging his conviction and incarceration. ... Given Starkey’s demands for his release from incarceration, the district court correctly construed his complaint as a § 2254 ... petition and applied AEDPA’s procedural requirements.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a pretrial detainee’s bail; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus, even when the detainee seeks damages.

Stone v. Massachusetts Trial Courts · filed 2018-05-11

Here, Stone’s claim for “Excessive Bail” must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even though he seeks damages rather than release.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking immediate or speedier release; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Riddle v. Vandermosten · filed 2019-09-23

habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms ... of § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 24).

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Gyetvai v. Moran · filed 2019-09-27

Magistrate Judge Schwab correctly concludes that Mr. Gyetvai’s request for release from custody is properly raised in a habeas corpus action. ... Mr. Gyetvai cannot bring both a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action in one case.

Section 1983 cannot be used to recover lost earned time credits or to seek damages when success would necessarily imply invalid confinement; the prisoner must first obtain habeas relief.

Tedder v. Banks · filed 2019-10-07

Section 1983 is an inappropriate vehicle for an inmate to seek recovery of lost earned time credits, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), and it is likewise improper for an inmate to sue for damages under § 1983 where success on the merits of the inmate’s claim would “necessarily imply” invalidity of confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenges to his conviction that seek release from custody; those claims must be pursued through habeas corpus.

WILLIAMS v. LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2019-10-11

In other words, Williams’s claims based on alleged constitutional violations that occurred in connection with his extradition, prosecution, and trial are not cognizable in a section 1983 action because Williams must pursue those claims by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the legality of confinement when the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Johnson v. Lorain County · filed 2020-03-11

Thus, if a prisoner challenges the legality of his confinement, he may not use a civil rights action as an alternative to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which requires that he exhaust his state remedies.

A § 1983 complaint that clearly seeks release by challenging the fact or duration of confinement is construed as a habeas petition.

(HC)Griffin v. Sacramento County · filed 2020-03-20

Where a complaint shows a clear intent to state a habeas claim, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to construe § 1983 claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement as a petition for habeas corpus. ... Accordingly, the court must construe the complaint as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a way for a prisoner to seek immediate release from custody; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Cook v. Scioto County Jail · filed 2020-03-20

Turning to Plaintiff’s request for his immediate release from custody (Doc. 10, PageID 107), the Magistrate Judge correctly explained that “to the extent that [he] seeks immediate release from custody, the proper mechanism for [him] to challenge his present physical custody is a petition for writ of habeas corpus” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and not this prisoner civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 8, PageID 97).

Section 1983 permits challenges to prison conditions, but a prisoner seeking accelerated release must pursue habeas relief.

Newman v. Corrections · filed 2020-04-13

A § 1983 claim challenges the conditions of confinement, rather the execution or duration of a sentence. In this case, Newton indeed challenges the general prison conditions, but he seeks an accelerated release from prison, which is properly asserted as a habeas action, not as a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim that, if successful, would entitle the prisoner to earlier release; that claim must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Vernacchio v. Davis · filed 2020-05-19

Plaintiff’s claim that prison officials’ actions deprived him of milestone time credits to which he otherwise was entitled would, if successful, entitle him to be released from prison or parole sooner than would otherwise occur, must be pursued in a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 rather than a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if he pursues it at all in federal court.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a state sentence when the relief sought is release; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Pierce v. Yost · filed 2020-07-17

He cannot obtain relief by way of a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is not the remedy for a detainee seeking relief from pending criminal charges; that request is treated as a habeas petition.

Taylor v. Effler · filed 2020-07-22

Christopher D. Taylor is a detainee confined in the Fentress County Jail who has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the burglary and theft charges pending against him in Fentress County, Tennessee. (Doc. 2.) Because Petitioner ultimately seeks to be “relieved of all charges” against him, the Court construes the filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for reinstatement of parole; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Johnny Lee v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director · filed 2020-10-09

Finally, to the extent Lee asks this Court to reinstate his release on parole, “his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus” rather than a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek early release from custody; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Valenzuela v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2020-10-30

A civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief is subject to dismissal without prejudice to the prisoner’s bringing his claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Boone v. Texas Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2020-11-12

To the extent Plaintiff requests the Court to order that his incarceration is unlawful his request is not proper in a civil-rights complaint. The exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement is habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 cannot be used to invalidate a prisoner’s sentence or obtain immediate or speedier release; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Henson v. Corizon Health LLC · filed 2020-12-03

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the invalidation of his sentence, or any relief which would result in his immediate or speedier release, his exclusive remedy is a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for release from pretrial detention; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

ANDERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2021-01-12

His claim, accordingly, is one seeking habeas corpus relief and cannot be raised as a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits detainees to seek individualized bail procedures when the requested relief would not necessarily secure their immediate release or shorten their detention.

Dixon v. City of St. Louis · filed 2021-02-17

The Court considered this theory in the Judges’ motion to dismiss and rejected it because Plaintiffs do not seek wholesale release; rather, they seek individualized process. ... Accordingly, the Court again concludes that Plaintiffs are not relegated to seeking habeas relief.

Section 1983 cannot provide relief that depends on a determination that a detainee is entitled to immediate or speedier release; that determination must be sought through habeas corpus.

ANDERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2021-04-05

As such, granting that relief would have constituted “a determination that [Anderson was] entitled to immediate release or a speedier release,” a determination only available upon consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ... As noted in the Court’s Memorandum, this claim could not properly be raised under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from custody; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas corpus.

Young 753683 v. Horton · filed 2021-05-28

The Court notes that a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement and seek release from custody.

Hailey 575198 v. Cieply · filed 2021-07-14

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide immediate release from detention or dismissal of pending criminal charges; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Lawson v. Trejo · filed 2021-07-20

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks his immediate release through the dismissal of his pending charges, “such remedies are not available in a § 1983 suit.” See, e.g., Slaughter v. Christie, No. 15-8327, 2016 WL 6804877, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2016).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenging the length or validity of a civil commitment; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Johnson v. Clark · filed 2021-09-21

Second, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ habeas claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state prisoner seeking release from or a reduction in confinement.

Oliver v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2021-09-28

Though Respondents suggest that Petitioner’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the pleading does not present a colorable § 1983 claim because Petitioner’s requested relief is a reduction in the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s claim to earned-time credits affecting the length of confinement; the claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Henley v. Kallis · filed 2021-10-15

After reviewing Henley’s complaint, the magistrate judge determined that Henley’s allegations were improperly raised because those claims must be advanced in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than in a civil rights complaint. ... Having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds no clear error and adopts the R&R as modified.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Briggs v. City of Wadsworth, Ohio · filed 2021-10-27

In addition, “habeas corpus is the exclusive [federal] remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement. . . even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” ... For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983 over which this Court has jurisdiction and is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

Section 1983 does not provide relief from custody or pending criminal charges; those requests belong in habeas corpus.

Davis v. State of Florida · filed 2021-10-28

Release from custody and relief related to pending criminal charges are “not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to confinement that seeks release or a shorter period of custody.

Kitmanyen v. Johnston · filed 2021-11-03

When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement.

Section 1983 does not provide immediate release when a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of confinement; habeas is the exclusive remedy.

Henson v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2022-02-11

Habeas review and a § 1983 action are “independent and mutually exclusive” paths for prisoners who seek relief. ... If the “claim challenges the fact or duration of the . . . sentence,” then habeas is the only available remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide relief that would invalidate a prisoner’s sentence or result in immediate or speedier release; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Reeder v. Ducey · filed 2022-04-07

Further, to the extent Plaintiff ... seeks the invalidation of his sentences, or any relief which would result in immediate or ... speedier release, his exclusive remedy is a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from custody; a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement belongs in habeas corpus.

Hardin v. Cottrell · filed 2022-04-07

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek restoration of good-time credits through a challenge to a disciplinary conviction when success would shorten the prisoner's sentence.

Shortt v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2022-04-12

A claim like the one raised by Shortt—that a prison disciplinary conviction resulted in the loss of earned good time credits, accompanied by a request that the credits be restored—is a claim that, if successful, would necessarily affect the length of the prisoner’s sentence. As such, it sounds in habeas and can be brought only in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for immediate or speedier release from custody; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Jackson v. Knetzer · filed 2022-05-17

To the extent that this is a request for immediate or speedier release from custody, the claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; instead, the plaintiff’s sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 applies generally to all persons and does not specifically provide for racial equality as required for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).

William Claus, IV v. George Trammell, III · filed 2019-07-12

Further, the federal rights invoked in appellants’ filings under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 do not specifically provide for racial equality, as required by § 1443(1), but rather provide for rights generally applicable to all persons.

Section 1983 confers generally applicable rights rather than specific rights stated in terms of racial equality, so it does not itself support removal under § 1443.

Board of Ed. of Atlanta v. AMERICAN FED. OF S., C. & ME · filed 1975-10-24

Without need for further elaboration, it is apparent that, under the controlling authority, defendants’ reliance on broad assertions of first and fourteenth amendment rights, either directly or through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is misplaced, and no petition for removal may be predicated thereupon.

Section 1983 is not phrased in the specific language of racial equality required to support removal under § 1443(1).

Sanchez v. Sanchez · filed 1977-01-04

Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor 42 U.S.C. § 1994, nor the Thirteenth Amendment, is phrased in the specific language of racial equality that § 1443(1) demands.

Section 1983 does not provide equal civil rights stated in terms of racial equality and cannot support removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).

Denson v. Williams · filed 1972-03-18

The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. is such a law; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not and the Court can find no case in which it has supported a removal.

Section 1983 provides a way to assert violations of federal rights but does not supply a separate substantive right.

Bel-Air Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc. v. Town of Goffstown, New Hampshire & Goffstown Zoning Board of Adjustment · filed 2018-01-02

The court first notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a separate cause of action, but is instead a statutory vehicle through which a plaintiff can assert a violation of a federal right.

Section 1983 supplies a procedural basis for an action but does not create the underlying rights being vindicated.

Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U Inc. · filed 1978-01-26

Moreover, despite the fact that Section 1983 might provide a jurisdictional basis for this Court to consider the injury done to the named plaintiffs, that statute is in this respect procedural rather than substantive: that is, Section 1983 does not create the rights which plaintiffs seek to vindicate, but merely allows this federal tribunal to entertain the action.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights through a civil action, and Title IX does not displace that remedy.

Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n · filed 1978-01-19

It does not displace the plaintiffs’ right to enforce the commands of the fourteenth amendment through an action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.

Section 1983 provides a procedural vehicle for asserting substantive rights secured by other statutes and does not itself provide for the protection of civil rights.

Andrews v. Edward W. Maher, Successor to Nicholas Norton, Individually and as Commissioner of Welfare, State of · filed 1975-10-24

In this sense, section 1983 “merely provides a procedure by which substantive rights secured by other statutes can be asserted, and does not itself provide for the protection of civil rights.”

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to vindicate rights established by the Rehabilitation Act when that Act does not provide an exclusive remedy.

Sanders Ex Rel. Sanders v. Marquette Public Schools · filed 1983-04-14

For these reasons, suit may be brought to vindicate the rights established by the Rehabilitation Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief for deprivation of statutory rights as well as constitutional rights, and the kind of right infringed is not controlling.

Mathes v. Nugent · filed 1976-04-07

There is no question that the plaintiffs have stated a proper claim for relief against the individual defendants under § 1983. As is seen clearly from the wording of the statute, it protects individuals deprived of statutory rights as well as constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to pursue a § 504 claim without relying on an implied private right of action under § 504.

Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado · filed 1981-01-14

Whether there is an implied right of action under § 504 does not pose a problem here as the claim is brought pursuant to § 1983.

A procedural-due-process § 1983 property claim requires the plaintiff to show that state corrective remedies are inadequate or systemically defective.

Chester Wheeler Campbell v. Shearer · filed 1984-04-24

Plaintiff's remedies under Michigan law are clearly adequate.. He is therefore unable to satisfy the “due process” element of his 1983 claim, the requirement that he show the existence of a procedural deficiency in state law or a systemic problem with the state’s corrective process.

A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim against a state actor for violating rights created by a federal statute, not only for constitutional violations.

Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1984-06-26

However, because the policies of the Authority constitute state action for purposes of section 1983, ...plaintiffs' claim that the Authority contravened the maximum rent limitations established by section 1437a presents a cause of action actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an action against state officials to enforce the Housing Act and the URA when their regulatory scheme lacks a comprehensive means to address the plaintiff's claim.

Pietroniro v. Borough of Oceanport · filed 1985-07-18

In the absence of a comprehensive enforcement scheme within the regulatory scheme which encompasses the plaintiff's complaint there exists a private cause of action against state officials for violations of the Housing Act and the URA.

The EAHCA cannot itself support a § 1983 action when its comprehensive enforcement scheme supplies the remedy and the plaintiff alleges no independent constitutional claim.

James Edward Jackson, a Minor Joined by His Mother, Lillie R. Thompson v. Franklin County School Board · filed 1985-07-18

EAHCA may not be claimed as a basis for a section 1983 action and Jackson has asserted no constitutional claims independent of EAHCA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme.

FIFRA's comprehensive enforcement scheme forecloses using § 1983 to enforce that statute.

Almond Hill School v. United States Department Of Agriculture · filed 1985-08-12

We conclude that FIFRA's enforcement scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose the use of section 1983 as a means to enforce the Act.

Private actions based on Title VI cannot be brought under § 1983 because Title VI provides its own remedial scheme.

38 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1685, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,604 Silas J. Alexander v. Chicago Park District · filed 1985-11-13

Since Title VI provides its own remedial scheme, we hold that private actions based on Title VI may not be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere rather than creating substantive rights itself.

Schreiner v. City of Gresham · filed 2010-01-15

[S]ection 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.

Section 1983 does not provide an additional remedy for violations of the IDEA, the ADA, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when those statutes provide comprehensive enforcement schemes.

D.A. Ex Rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Independent School District · filed 2010-12-28

D.A. cannot assert an IDEA claim through § 1983. ... Appellant cannot pursue his ADA and § 504 claims through § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional and statutory rights, and qualified immunity shields officials unless they violate a clearly established right.

Jones v. Chandrasuwan · filed 2016-04-28

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional and statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citation omitted). Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense to liability under § 1983, protects all government officials except those who violate a “statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).

Section 1983 provides the procedural vehicle for constitutional claims against state actors; it is not a separate claim for relief.

Isabella A. v. Arrowhead Union High Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-07-16

Section 1983 is the procedural vehicle for bringing an action against a state actor for constitutional violations, and temporary and permanent injunctions are types of relief that can be awarded, not legal claims.

Claims against individuals for violating a person's rights must be brought, if at all, in a separate Section 1983 action rather than a habeas petition.

Leek v. Sheriff · filed 2019-09-11

These claims must be raised, if at all, in a separate action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by the ADA or FMLA because those statutes provide their own enforcement schemes.

Dr. Wendi H. Anderson v. The School Board of Gloucester County, Virginia · filed 2020-05-29

This Court finds compelling the majority view that a § 1983 cause of action cannot go forward alongside an ADA action. ... The Court finds that the FMLA “precludes resort to § 1983” as a means to enforce its substantive rights.

Section 1983 does not permit individual-capacity claims against state officials to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

(PC) Adams v. California Prison Industry Authority · filed 2020-10-09

As an initial matter,plaintiff’s individual capacity claims fail becausethere is no individual liability under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”).

Section 1983 cannot be used as an alternative remedy for disability discrimination rights granted by the Rehabilitation Act or ADA.

Cox v. Scott County School District · filed 2021-03-30

This ruling extends to any allegations of disability discrimination asserted against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights conferred by other law; it does not create a stand-alone claim.

Abbott v. City of Bellevue · filed 2021-12-03

There is no such thing as a stand-alone § 1983 claim. Section 1983 is a vehicle “for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

State-university officials are liable under Section 1983 when campus disciplinary proceedings deprive a student of constitutional due process under color of state law.

Gorman v. University of Rhode Island · filed 1986-10-14

The defendants, University of Rhode Island, Ronald Weisinger, A. Robert Rain-ville, and Edward Eddy, have rendered verdicts and issued sanctions against the plaintiff, Raymond J. Gorman, III, through a series of campus disciplinary proceedings that violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for depriving him, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum to relitigate evidentiary issues or the proper construction of school regulations in disciplinary proceedings.

Ouimette v. Babbie · filed 1975-12-03

§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.

Section 1983 does not allow federal courts to relitigate evidentiary questions or regulatory interpretations in school discipline cases, or correct reasonable discretionary errors absent a specific constitutional violation.

Fenton v. Stear · filed 1976-11-29

Therefore, since it appears that plaintiff’s constitutional rights to property and liberty were not violated and due process was accorded to him, § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in high school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of high school regulations. Section 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the reasonable exercise of high school officials’ discretion that does not rise to the level of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum to relitigate state-law procedural, evidentiary, or regulatory errors that do not rise to a specific constitutional violation.

Atencio v. Board Of Education Of Penasco Independent School District No. 4 · filed 1981-09-08

But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for federal correction of school-administrator errors that do not rise to a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee.

Atencio v. Board of Education of Penasco Independent School District No. 4 · filed 1981-09-08

This court has likewise held that “§ 1983 is not a vehicle for federal court correction of errors, committed by school administrators in the exercise of their discretion, not rising to the level of violation of specific constitutional guarantees.”

Section 1983 does not give a litigant a right to relitigate evidentiary questions or the proper construction of school regulations in federal court.

Board of Education v. McCluskey Ex Rel. McCluskey · filed 1982-09-09

“§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.”

By the time of the challenged conduct, it was clearly established that excessive corporal punishment in public school could violate substantive due process, defeating qualified immunity.

Teresa Garcia, a Minor, by Her Next Friends Max and Sandra Garcia v. Theresa Miera, J.D. Sanchez, Edward Leyba, Judi Mes · filed 1987-04-28

Applying this standard to the instant case, we hold that, at least by the time of the second beating, the law was clearly established that excessive corporal punishment could deny substantive due process.

Section 1983 does not provide federal court review of evidentiary questions in school disciplinary proceedings, the construction of school regulations, or a superintendent’s disciplinary determination and punishment.

Snyder on Behalf of Snyder v. Farnsworth · filed 1995-09-01

"[Section] 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1003, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). To the extent plaintiffs seek review of the Superintendent's determination or the punishment imposed, this court is not the appropriate forum in which to proceed.

Section 1983 does not permit a party to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions from school disciplinary proceedings.

Wagner Ex Rel. Wagner-Garay v. Fort Wayne Community Schools · filed 2003-03-19

But “ § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings.”

Section 1983 does not allow federal courts to relitigate evidentiary questions or the construction of school regulations in disciplinary proceedings.

Brown v. Plainfield Community Consolidated District 202 · filed 2007-11-27

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at school ... But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 does not allow a student to relitigate evidentiary questions from school discipline proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations in federal court.

Piekosz-Murphy v. Board of Education · filed 2012-03-12

“[Section] 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.” ... Thus, the court will defer to the school’s classification of alcohol-related offenses, even if the classification may be fairly characterized as an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 permits a false-arrest suit against state and local officers, subject to a defense when the officer proves good faith and a reasonable belief that the arrest was valid and necessary.

Isaac Jaroslawicz and Joseph Jaroslawicz v. Seedman · filed 1975-12-19

This test applies to state and local officers sued for false arrest under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions based on false imprisonment permit a defense of reasonable good faith.

Bryan v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Henry Wade, District Attorney, Fidelity & Deposit Co.& Lena Giddens · filed 1976-04-30

We granted an en banc hearing of this case to reconsider the issue of good faith defenses in § 1983 actions based on false imprisonment. Concluding that a defense of reasonable good faith may be raised, we reverse.

In a § 1983 false-imprisonment claim, a jailer is entitled to a jury instruction on a reasonable-good-faith defense.

Warren C. Miller, Jr. v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff · filed 1976-07-12

We construe the Sheriff’s claim of action pursuant to a facially valid warrant and entitlement to use the date of arrest rather than the date the charges were dismissed as a contention that he acted in reasonable good faith so as to have entitled him to have the jury instructed on this defense to the federal tort claim.

Section 1983 affords police a qualified immunity from false-arrest and false-imprisonment liability when they acted in good faith and reasonably believed that probable cause existed and that the detention and verification procedure were lawful.

Pritz v. Hackett · filed 1977-11-17

Therefore, I hold that the defendants will be protected from liability for the § 1983 claim of false imprisonment if they prove a good faith and reasonable belief concerning the legality of both the detention and the verification procedure used to [identify the plaintiffs.

Judicial approval of a warrant does not absolutely bar Section 1983 liability for the officer who obtained it, though a later finding of no probable cause does not by itself establish liability.

James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs v. Malley · filed 1984-11-19

We now rule that judicial approval of a warrant cannot serve as an absolute bar to the § 1983 liability of the officer who obtained the warrant. We emphasize, however, that liability does not attach simply because there is a later determination of no probable cause.

Judicial approval of a warrant affidavit does not bar § 1983 liability when the officer supplied information known to be false or recklessly disregarded its truth.

Olson v. Robert Tyler and O.J. Foster · filed 1985-08-21

We hold therefore that judicial approval of a warrant affidavit cannot serve as an absolute bar to the section 1983 liability of the officer who submitted it. Where the judicial finding of probable cause is based solely on information the officer knew to be false or would have known was false had he not recklessly disregarded the truth, not only does the arrest violate the fourth amendment, but the officer will not be entitled to good faith immunity.

A facially valid arrest warrant does not itself shield an officer from § 1983 false-arrest liability when the officer intentionally supplies false or misleading facts to obtain it.

LoSacco v. City of Middletown · filed 1990-08-21

Thus, if a police officer in his affidavit applying for an arrest warrant intentionally supplies the judicial authorities with untrue or deliberately misleading facts, the warrant, although facially valid, would lack probable cause. The existence of a facially valid warrant is not necessarily sufficient to find that the officer acted in good faith.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to state a claim.

Fournerat v. Wisconsin Law Review · filed 2011-04-12

And his conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Conclusory, vague, and general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Diederich v. Nyack Hospital · filed 2008-03-04

Finally, the Supreme Court properly found that the conclusory, vague, and general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights were insufficient to support claims under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and, in effect, granted those branches of the respective motions of the Orangetown defendants and the Hospital defendants which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for violations of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and 42 USC § 1985, insofar as asserted against them, respectively (see Williams v Maddi, 306 AD2d 852 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 516 [2003], cert denied 541 US 960 [2004]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 644 [2000]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 244 AD2d 606 [1997]).

A § 1983 claim based on a race-based conspiracy requires more than conclusory allegations.

Propes v. City Manager · filed 2006-02-23

Propes’s conclusory allegations of a race-based conspiracy are insufficient to support a viable § 1983 claim.

Conclusions alone are insufficient to plead a conspiracy claim under Section 1983.

McVay v. Lehman · filed 2005-12-16

The district court properly dismissed MeVay’s conspiracy claims because conelusory allegations are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim for relief.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting a claimed civil rights conspiracy; conclusory assertions of conspiracy and bad faith do not state a claim.

Ellis v. Cassidy · filed 1980-08-26

Appellant has also failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite appellant's sweeping assertions of conspiracy and bad faith on the part of all involved, he has failed to allege facts which would permit the court to conclude that these assertions had substantive validity.

A plaintiff bringing a conspiracy claim under Section 1983 must allege facts sufficient to support the conspiracy.

Henderson v. Torres · filed 2002-04-17

Thomas Henderson appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his third amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that defendants conspired against him to fabricate charges resulting in his arrest and trial for stalking. ... The district court correctly concluded that Henderson failed to allege facts sufficient to support his conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy to support an action.

Garrett v. Raines · filed 2002-04-19

Moreover, Garrett’s allegations of a conspiracy are merely conclusional and hence insufficient to support his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Unsubstantiated allegations of a race-based conspiracy do not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Bagley v. Vance · filed 2000-12-13

Bagley’s unsubstantiated allegations of a race-based conspiracy among the defendants fail to give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations to support a conspiracy claim.

Brewer v. Montgomery · filed 2000-10-19

Brewer’s assertion of a conspiracy among the named defendants to deny him his right of access to the courts is not supported by anything other than his own conclusional allegations, an insufficient showing under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss on conclusory, vague, or general allegations alone.

Sommer v. Correctional Officer R. Dixon, Sergeant Miner, Lt. McCasland · filed 1983-06-08

These allegations as to a conspiracy are, however, vague and unsupported by description of particular overt acts. A complaint containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 claim alleging that a private defendant conspired with state actors must plead facts about the alleged joint conduct; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Querry v. Messar · filed 1998-07-27

However, “in order to survive a motion to dismiss [a § 1983 .claim alleging a conspiracy], the complaint must contain more than mere conelusory allegations.” ... Such allegation is conelusory and cannot withstand a motion to dismiss, because Quer-ry does not specify who, on behalf of Oracle, took part in the conspiracy, where the conspiracy occurred, nor what was done in furtherance of the conspiracy nor when, where or how it was done. Querry’s allegations are therefore insufficient to state a claim against Oracle, a private entity, under the Equal Protection Clause.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Ivester v. Lee · filed 1998-01-26

In order to sufficiently plead a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a meeting of the minds among the defendants alleged to have conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not support an action under § 1983.

Roberson v. Wexford Health · filed 1998-01-06

Roberson’s conclusional allegations ... that the defendants conspired to use him for medical experimentation do not support an action under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations to state a conspiracy claim; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Ledesma v. Swartz · filed 1997-12-24

Mere conclusionary allegations of conspiracy do not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy to retaliate require more than conclusional allegations to state a claim.

Tyler v. Scott · filed 1997-08-18

Tyler’s conclusional allegations that the defendants conspired to retaliate against him fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a factual basis for a conspiracy claim; conclusional allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Chandler v. Haney · filed 1996-08-23

We have examined Chandler's arguments and the record and affirm the district court’s decision on the grounds that Chandler’s conclusional allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim is without merit when the allegation of conspiracy is wholly conclusory.

Arthur Lee Gooden, II v. R.L. Boyers Lieutenant Cook Sergeant Day · filed 1994-03-11

To the extent Appellant is claiming a conspiracy, we find the claim wholly conclusory and therefore without merit.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim based only on conclusory allegations.

Wilson v. Al Budney, Sr. · filed 1992-11-09

Wilson’s allegations of a conspiracy are merely conclusional and do not support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement among the defendants; conclusory allegations of conspiracy fail to state a claim.

Tate v. Bondurant · filed 1992-06-17

Similarly, Tate's contention that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim unders 1983 or § 1985(3) is meritless. ... The district court correctly noted that the complaint contained no allegation of any facts showing agreement between or among any of the Defendants, but merely made conclusory allegations of conspiracy. ... Because Tate's amended complaint contained no supporting facts of even the most general nature, the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy to state a valid claim.

Kinnell v. Debra Hutches Dr. Grimes Raymond Roberts Virginia Russell Governor Finney Linden G. Appel · filed 1992-04-29

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than conclusory allegations; the plaintiff must plead a factual basis and overt acts supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Polur v. Raffe · filed 1990-08-22

Polur relies on vague, prolix allegations of a conspiracy without pleading any overt acts or providing a basis in fact for his claim. It is incumbent on a plaintiff to state more than conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal of a claim predicated on a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require factual support; broad, conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not state a claim.

Fuller v. Harding · filed 1988-09-06

Broad and conclusory allegations, without some form of factual support, will not state a claim based on a conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3).

Section 1983 conspiracy plaintiffs must allege and prove that each defendant committed an action constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitations period, unless the limitations period was tolled.

Morales v. Pedro Hernandez Vega, Etc. · filed 1978-07-06

In fact, unless the statute of limitations somehow was tolled, plaintiff must allege and prove that each defendant to be charged committed an action constituting a civil rights violation in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitation period.

Section 1983 conspiracy claimants must allege specific facts showing either the existence or execution of the claimed conspiracy.

Croy v. Skinner · filed 1976-02-12

In considering the allegations of the instant complaint, this court agrees that even under the liberal federal pleading rules, a complainant under § 1985(3) and/or § 1983 must allege specific facts showing “either the existence or the execution of the claimed conspiracy.”

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require at least minimum factual support of the existence of a conspiracy.

Mildred E. FRANCIS-SOBEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, Everett O. Ware, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1979-05-03

Pleading conspiracy under sections 1983 & 1985(3) requires at least minimum factual support of the existence of a conspiracy.