42 U.S.C. § 1983

Municipal departments are not proper defendants in a § 1983 action when the city itself is the suable entity; the city remains answerable for their actions or omissions.

Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1990-11-15

That being the case, this Court will follow the cases discussed above and grant the motion to dismiss. ... The Fort Lauderdale Police Department and the Fort Lauderdale Building and Zoning Department are DISMISSED as defendants to this action. The City of Fort Lauderdale shall remain as a party defendant to answer for the actions or omissions of the now dismissed departments.

City pension officials and boards are amenable to suit under § 1983 for actions taken under color of state law.

Mcdarby v. Dinkins · filed 1990-07-02

Further, these defendants are amenable to suit under section 1983, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889, 109 S.Ct. 220, 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988); Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 986 (2d Cir.1983), and acted under color of state law, see Campo, 843 F.2d at 99; Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir.1983); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 22 n. 8 (2d Cir.1979).

Section 1983 does not treat a governmental instrumentality of Puerto Rico as a person, and it does not protect a union’s derivative interest in dues when employees have no enforceable right to continued employment.

Union Insular de Trabajadores Industriales y Construcciones Electricas v. Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales de Puerto R · filed 1975-08-18

First of all it is clear that the Authority, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, in view of our disposition of this case, we need not discuss this issue further. ... Lastly, we must deal with the contention of Plaintiff Unions to the effect that they have a property interest, separate and apart from Individual Plaintiffs, which is protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Considering that we have already ruled that Individual Plaintiffs’ are subject to layoffs, and that Plaintiff Unions’ “rights” are dependent upon such individuals being employed, this far-fetched contention falls of its own weight.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county board of ethics that is merely a subunit of the county and lacks a separate legal identity.

Umhey v. County of Orange, NY · filed 1997-03-27

However, to the extent that the County requests that the Orange County Board of Ethics be dismissed, we grant their motion, finding that they are not a separate legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983, but are merely a subunit of the County of Orange.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not a suable entity.

Tatum v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-26

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the HRA because an agency of the City of New York, like the HRA, is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a suable entity.

Washington-Steele v. Perez · filed 2019-05-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Corrections/Mental Health and Hygiene must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be brought against the City because the agency cannot be sued.

Williams v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Corrections · filed 2019-07-24

Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Corrections must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A § 1983 claim against the New York City Department of Correction must be brought against the City of New York because the department cannot be sued in its own name.

Lucas v. Brann · filed 2019-11-22

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because claims against the DOC must be brought against the City of New York.

Section 1983 claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because the department cannot be sued as a separate entity.

McDaniel v. Department of Correction · filed 2019-11-22

Plaintiff's claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

The NYPD cannot be sued under Section 1983 because it is a New York City agency that lacks capacity to be sued.

Martinez v. New York Police Department · filed 2019-11-26

The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. ... The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD because an agency of the City of New York, like the NYPD, is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency such as the NYPD cannot be sued under § 1983; the City of New York is the proper defendant.

Staboleski v. New York Police Department · filed 2019-12-04

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD because an agency of the City of New York, like the NYPD, is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Syville v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-05

Plaintiff’s claims are also construed as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. ... Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Services (DHS) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is a non-suable entity.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-20

But DOC cannot be sued because an agency of the City of New York is a non-suable entity.

City agencies without a separate legal existence cannot be sued under § 1983.

GRACE v. JUDGE IDEE C. FOX · filed 2020-01-02

City agencies like the Tax Revenue Bureau are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

A New York City agency cannot be sued in its own name under § 1983.

Paloma v. New York City Department Of Corrections · filed 2020-03-23

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under Section 1983; claims against it must be brought against the City.

Genao v. City Of New York · filed 2020-04-08

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against New York City’s Department of Correction must be brought against the City because the department cannot be sued.

Trail v. New York City Dept. of Corrections · filed 2020-05-18

As an agency of the City of New York, the DOC is not an entity that can be sued. ... Claims against the DOC must be brought against the City of New York.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a city agency that has no legal existence separate from the city.

GRACE v. JUDGE IDEE C. FOX · filed 2020-05-27

As I determined previously, City agencies like the Tax Revenue Bureau are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency such as the Department of Correction must be brought against the City, because the agency cannot be sued.

Massey v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 2020-08-13

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Karelefsky v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-17

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Gil-Cabrera v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-21

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. ... The Court dismisses the “Department of Corrections” from the action for failure to state a claim.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Espinal v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-07

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Miata v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-08

Whether Plaintiff Miata intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 treats a municipal agency that is merely an administrative arm of a municipality as the same entity, so the agency cannot be sued separately alongside the municipality.

GAJAROV v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES · filed 2021-01-15

For purposes of § 1983 liability, a municipality and a municipal agency are a single entity. ... Because the Allegheny County CYF is an administrative arm of Allegheny County, the Court will dismiss CYF as a defendant from this action.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a suable entity.

Henley v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-18

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency such as the Department of Correction cannot be sued as a defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Paloma v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency that lacks capacity to be sued in its own name cannot be a defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Massey v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-21

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because as an agency of the City of New York, DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

A Section 1983 claim cannot be brought against the New York City Department of Correction because the agency lacks capacity to be sued in its own name.

Massey v. Michele · filed 2020-10-08

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because as an agency of the City of New York, DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency cannot be sued.

Graves v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-02-03

Whether Plaintiff Graves intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a Section 1983 action because it lacks capacity to be sued.

Morales v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-02-09

Whether Plaintiff Morales intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a Section 1983 action; the claim must be brought against the City.

Galliego v. Doe · filed 2021-02-11

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against New York City agencies that lack capacity to be sued.

Johnson v. Ramos · filed 2021-02-25

Plaintiff’s claims against the RMSC and the DOCmust be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be dismissed because the agency cannot be sued.

Molina v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-03-02

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency such as the Department of Correction lacks capacity to be sued under Section 1983.

Boone v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-03-30

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against “NYC Department of Correction” because it lacks the capacity to be sued and directs the Clerk of Court, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, to add the City of New York as a defendant.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be dismissed because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

DeJesus v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-14

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

The New York City Department of Correction cannot be sued in its own name in a Section 1983 action.

David v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-12-16

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) must be dismissed. As an agency of the City of New York, the DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

Section 1983 claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because a city agency cannot be sued.

Forrest v. Warden Renee · filed 2021-12-27

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a local government department that lacks independent legal status.

Page v. Warren County Police Department · filed 2022-01-05

However, as this Court previously explained, a department or subdivision of local government (like the Warren County Jail) is not an independent legal entity that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against city agencies that lack a legal existence separate from the city.

WILLIAM-WHITFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH PPS SYSTEM · filed 2022-01-05

City agencies are not suable entities under section 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence apart from the city itself.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against city agencies that lack a separate legal existence.

GROCE v. CITY OF PHILA. LAW DEPT. · filed 2022-02-17

Moreover, city agencies are not entities subject to suit under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency cannot proceed because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 2021-06-17

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be brought against the City because the agency cannot be sued.

Atadzhanov v. The New York City Department of Correction · filed 2021-07-06

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A city agency that cannot be sued in its own name is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Murray v. City of New York · filed 2021-08-17

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because, as an agency of the City of New York, DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a Section 1983 action; claims against it may be asserted against the City.

Broadnax v. Hallet · filed 2021-09-20

Such claims, however, must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against New York City agencies must be brought against the City because the agencies cannot be sued as separate entities.

Vega v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-09-20

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the New York City “Department of Medical Services” must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against New York City agencies because those agencies cannot be sued as separate entities.

Murray v. Department of Law · filed 2022-02-22

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Law Department, the New York City Police Department, and the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because agencies of the City of New York are not entities that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against NYPD divisions must be brought against New York City because the divisions cannot be sued directly.

Reed v. Cummo · filed 2022-02-25

Pursuant to the New York City Charter, claims against the NYPD and its subdivisions should be brought against the city.

A New York City agency cannot be sued separately under § 1983; claims against it must be brought against the City.

Garnes v. City of New York · filed 2022-03-07

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Police Department must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed against the New York City Department of Correction because it is a city agency that cannot be sued.

Traore v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 2022-03-10

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the NYCDOC because an agency of the City of New York, such as the NYCDOC, is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be brought against the City of New York because the agency lacks capacity to be sued in its own name.

Osias v. Department of Correction · filed 2022-03-15

As an agency of the City of New York, the DOC lacks the capacity to be sued in its own name and must instead be sued in the name of the City of New York.

City agencies cannot be sued under § 1983 when they lack a legal existence separate from the city.

CHRISTIAN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2022-03-28

City agencies are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be brought against the City because the agency cannot be sued separately.

Osias v. Department of Correction · filed 2022-04-20

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency such as the NYPD cannot be sued as a defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Flowers v. Sehl · filed 2022-05-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 reaches informal, behind-the-scenes use of state authority that interferes with an established private employment relationship and deprives a person of federal rights.

Stokes v. Lecce · filed 1974-11-11

Here there was no flagrant open threat, but there was, as discussed above, sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that by veiled threat, “for the sake of harmony,” Lecce had used the power of his office to cause the Association to remove plaintiff’s name, that he had used the power of his office to terminate an employer-employee relationship which had already been established between plaintiff and the Association, notwithstanding that the time for performance was not to commence until sometime in the future. “This informal, behind the scenes exertion of state authority is as much within the scope of § 1983 as the more usual examples of formal and open action leading to the denial of federal rights.” Kletscha v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 1969).

Section 1983 permits a private person to be held liable when he willfully participates in joint activity with state officials, even if the officials are exonerated from liability.

Vance v. Billingsly · filed 1980-03-20

The precise issue before the Court is whether, where the under-color-of-law prong is based solely on concert of action between the private defendant and the public defendants, and the public defendants are exonerated from liability by a jury, the private defendant can nevertheless be held liable under § 1983. ... We hold that he can.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for conduct under color of state law, and a private hospital's employment decision is not covered without a sufficient state nexus.

Thompson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1982-05-27

Accordingly, because the particular acts complained of were not performed at the state’s specific behest and because CAMC does not act either in an exclusively state capacity or for the state’s direct benefit, the court finds that CAMC’s actions were not committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging state action through a conspiracy between state officials and private defendants to plead specific facts showing agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Sooner Products Co. v. McBride · filed 1983-05-16

When a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary “state action” by implicating state officials or judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere eonclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 requires prison officials who are put on notice of a life endangering situation by an inmate's repeated requests for help to take reasonable measures to ensure the inmate's safety.

West v. Rowe · filed 1978-02-23

Accordingly, we hold that when an inmate’s repeated requests for help place the appropriate officials on notice of a life endangering situation, a constitutional duty of care arises, binding such officials to take reasonable measures to ensure that inmate’s safety.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an injury inflicted by another inmate after the plaintiff provoked the incident.

Herring v. Superintendent, Danville City Jail · filed 1974-11-19

The fact that plaintiff was hit by another inmate after provocation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the remainder of plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to constitutional proportions.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for abuse of extradition power caused by officials' noncompliance with applicable law.

Sanders v. H. J. Conine, Sheriff, Laramie County, Wyoming, 1968 · filed 1974-12-02

A complaint which charges abuse of the extradition power by noncompliance with applicable law states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may not be dismissed summarily as frivolous.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on an allegedly unlawful, arbitrary traffic stop; a brief stop is not too trivial to support the claim.

Richardson v. City of Newark · filed 1978-03-29

In the interim, the Court cannot conclude that the stop of plaintiff is so incidental to his constitutional rights as to fail to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a bona fide civil rights claim for a controversy concerning only the administrative application of state statutes and regulations.

Rozier v. Perales · filed 1989-04-24

Such a controversy concerns the administrative application of State statutes and regulations (see, Social Services Law § 22 [9] [a]; § 34 [3] [e]; 18 NYCRR 358.18 [a]; 358.22). Accordingly, there is no bona fide civil rights claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Williams v D’Elia, 119 AD2d 678; Matter of Patterson v Blum, 86 AD2d 893).

Section 1983 does not allow an individual to claim an indirect civil rights injury from the termination of a contract held by his corporation.

Diaz v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. · filed 1989-11-01

In the case at bar, plaintiff claims that defendants deprived him of his civil rights when they allegedly terminated the contract that plaintiff's corporation had with PRTC. Even assuming the allegations to be true, however, this type of indirect claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

A claim concerning the administrative application of state statutes and regulations may fail to qualify as a bona fide civil rights claim under § 1983.

Kross v. Perales · filed 1989-12-11

We find that under the facts of this case, the petitioner has not established that his claim, which concerns the administrative application of State statutes and regulations (see, Social Services Law §§ 363, 22 [9] [a]; § 106-b; 18 NYCRR 358.22), is a bona fide civil rights claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 so as to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710; see also, Matter of Zellweger v New York State Dept, of Social Servs., 74 NY2d 404).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of the Ruiz decree without more.

Neal v. Williams · filed 1996-11-13

Violations of the Ruiz decree, without more, are not cognizable in a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Jacob Todd, etc. v. Smith · filed 1997-01-10

We find that they stated a sufficient section 1983 claim based on the substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 is a derivative cause of action; a claim for compensatory or punitive damages based on violations of the IDEA or Rehabilitation Act § 504 must state a claim under the underlying statute.

Sellers v. School Bd. of the City of Manassas, Virginia · filed 1997-04-30

In other words, to state a claim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA and § 504, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, state such a claim under the IDEA and § 504.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations even when the same conduct violates the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII, but it cannot be used to enforce rights based solely on those statutes.

Bryant v. City of Blackfoot · filed 2002-05-31

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Bryant’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act, and we reverse the dismissal of her § 1983 claims insofar as they are based upon rights secured by the United States Constitution. We uphold the dismissal of the § 1983 claims insofar as they sought to enforce rights based solely upon the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim based solely on a State statute.

Jiles v. Department of Correction · filed 2002-08-26

files’s remaining § 1983 claim, pleaded in count IX, is defective because the claim is based on a State statute, G. L. c. 127, 36A.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.

Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. McCoy · filed 1997-09-17

However, as conceded by the environmental defendants, _ dormant commerce clause claims are viable under § 1983.

Section 1983 redresses claims based on federal law, including the Constitution, but does not provide a claim for violations of state laws or regulations.

Lilly, Warren G. v. Jess, Cathy · filed 2006-07-21

None of the argu- ments concerning state laws and regulations states a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which is limited to redressing claims based on federal law (including the Constitu- tion).

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek compensatory damages for claims that are, in substance, IDEA claims.

Burke v. Brookline · filed 2007-01-29

As is stated above, plaintiffs may not invoke § 1983 to bring claims for compensatory damages that are in essence IDEA claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert claims based on the IDEA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or Pennsylvania Public School Code against a school district or school board.

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District · filed 2008-06-06

Under this court’s February 15, 2008 Memorandum and Order, Griffin and Muse must plead exhaustion to bring claims under the IDEA, ADA, RA and Public School Code and are prohibited from bringing a § 1983 claim based on those statutes against the School District defendants.

Invoking a federal regulation rather than the statute itself does not defeat a colorable § 1983 claim.

Hill v. John F. Richardson, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Human Services · filed 1993-10-18

Defendant’s further argument that plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 because they invoke a regulation rather than § 1437f itself is unavailing. ... Plaintiffs thus had a colorable claim under § 1983 and are entitled to attorneys’ fees — the $16,000 they originally requested, plus full compensation for the time devoted to establishing that entitlement in the district court and this court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to insurance rates based only on arbitrariness or a violation of state law.

Coors & Birdsong v. Tennessee Temporary Joint Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1977-07-26

Recent decisions by appellate tribunals, moreover, have indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits should be viewed more cautiously; § 1983 is not a “catch-all statute” intended to solve myriads of problems and disputes that may well lie best in state court. ... The claim that the rate charge was arbitrary, capricious and involved violation of the state law should properly be presented to a state court if any cause of action whatever is stated in that claim.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of federal statutes even when those statutes do not provide a private right of action.

Mejia v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1981-06-29

The City defendants also moved to dismiss the counts against them based on four arguments: 1) violation of a federal statute for which a private right of action does not exist cannot constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) plaintiffs have suffered no injury or deprivation of rights; 3) plaintiffs’ claims do not present a constitutional question; and 4) there is no reason for fashioning an independent remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the APA protects plaintiffs’ rights. However, the first, third and fourth arguments are directly contrary to the teaching of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on federal criminal statutes that provide no private right of action.

Jihad v. Fabian · filed 2010-01-21

Therefore, finding that none of the Federal criminal statutes, which are relied upon by the Plaintiff, provide for a private right of action, we conclude that the Plaintiff has no chance of success as to the merits of those claims under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a governor’s alleged failure to follow mandatory parole procedures after the parole board recommends release.

Ellis v. Brown · filed 2010-03-15

Mr. Easterwood also alleged that the Governor of Oklahoma violated mandatory parole procedures in denying him parole after the Parole Board recommended his release. This claim, however, “is not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a consent decree, without more.

Haines v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2010-07-27

The district court considered construing Haines’s petition as a civil-rights complaint but correctly determined that violations of the Ruiz decree, without more, are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of District of Columbia law alone.

Potomac Development Corp. v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-15

District law is not the basis of the cause of action pled in the complaint, which invokes only § 1983, and § 1983, by its explicit terms, creates a cause of action only for a deprivation of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for contractual salary and benefit claims that can be addressed through an ordinary state breach of contract action.

Russo v. School Board · filed 2011-12-15

The Court FINDS that Dr. Russo’s asserted claims to his salary and benefits, stemming from the Salary Deferral Agreement and Transition Agreement, do not give rise to an action under Section 1983, as they properly can be addressed by an ordinary breach of contract action in state court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim resting entirely on state substantive law.

Simmons v. Gillespie · filed 2013-03-19

The district judge should not have used a §1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the AAIA or ANCA.

Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton · filed 2015-06-26

Nor is a claim available for violations of the AAIA or ANCA Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on an underlying violation of Title IX.

Wilkerson v. University of North Texas ex rel. Board of Regents · filed 2016-11-30

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under § 1983 based on an underlying violation of Title IX.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law, including a state constitution.

Doe v. The University of South Alabama · filed 2020-02-14

Thus, the claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim based on a violation of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law.

Saal v. City of Wooster · filed 2020-02-20

Therefore, to the extent Saal is relying on a violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112 to support his § 1983 claim, it is both redundant of Count I and insufficient to support such a claim; and defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Interstate Corrections Compact because the compact is not federal law.

Archy v. Troxler · filed 2021-01-08

The Interstate Corrections Compact is not a federal law and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert a claim based upon an alleged violation of the Interstate Corrections Compact.

Section 1983 cannot support a claim based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.

Gates v. Briones · filed 2021-01-29

Judge Theiler found that Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory with respect to the statutory violations because 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 do not establish causes of action for private citizens, nor can they form the basis of a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 11 at 3–5.) The Court agrees.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on violations of CDC guidelines.

Weinert v. Whitman · filed 2021-05-11

Alleged violations of CDC guidelines do not state a federal or constitutional claim under §1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes.

Minnich v. Northeastern School District · filed 2021-07-27

The Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants violated various provisions of the RTKL does not alter the court’s conclusion, as “Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes.”

Section 1983 permits a federal action for constitutional injuries arising from juvenile arrest, detention, and trial procedures to proceed before the related state prosecution is complete when the action does not seek to enjoin or disrupt that prosecution.

Cox v. Turley · filed 1974-11-22

Consequently, the action is maintainable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 before the state prosecution has been completed (a) because the action is not intended as one to enjoin or disrupt the state prosecution, and (b) because the relief sought is essentially to redress the alleged violations of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and the class he represents, arising from the procedures alleged to be employed in Madison County, Kentucky, in connection with the arrest, detention and trial of juveniles on criminal charges.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of pending charges until the state proceedings resolve in the claimant’s favor.

Gorenc v. City of Westland · filed 2003-07-31

Plaintiffs claim is therefore not cognizable under § 1983 until the state traffic proceedings are resolved in his favor.

Section 1983 provides no claim against prison officials for an escaped inmate’s assault on nearby residents when the residents have no special relationship with the state or federal right to protection.

Henderson v. Bradford · filed 1988-03-31

Thus, the initial inquiry into a section 1983 action is whether the conduct complained of deprived the plaintiffs of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. We find that plaintiffs were not deprived of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... In the instant case, no such special relationship is created by virtue of plaintiffs’ residence in the same municipality in which the Pontiac Correctional Center is located. ... Hence, plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

The state has no federal constitutional duty to protect the public from a discharged mental patient, so an attack by that person does not itself support a § 1983 claim.

Howard v. Doe · filed 1987-06-17

Although this appeal involves an attack by a discharged mental patient, the principles underlying our decision in Carlson are equally applicable to the circumstances before us and, accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court for the reasons stated in the Carlson opinion.

A state or local government generally is not liable under § 1983’s Due Process Clause merely for failing to provide adequate police protection.

Dudosh v. City of Allentown · filed 1987-05-18

Concomitant with this theme is the general rule of law that a state, or a political subdivision thereof, cannot be held liable under the Due Process Clause, through § 1983, for its failure to provide such protection.

A Section 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires conscious or callous indifference to the prisoner's rights, not merely negligent conduct.

Johnston v. Lucas · filed 1986-04-11

There must be at least a conscious or callous indifference to the prisoner's rights.

A Section 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires at least deliberate indifference, not a lower standard of conduct.

Johnston v. Lucas · filed 1986-04-11

We do not believe that the Court would accept a standard of conduct any lower than deliberate indifference.

A Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim requires deliberate indifference, such as reckless disregard of a substantial danger; negligent failure to protect is insufficient.

El v. O'LEARY · filed 1986-02-19

It is now definitively established that while a correctional official who recklessly disregards a substantial risk of danger to an inmate may be liable under the Eighth Amendment, one who negligently fails to take reasonable steps to protect an inmate is not.

Mere inadvertence or negligence by prison officials in failing to protect a prisoner from assault does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Barnett v. Bell · filed 1985-09-30

Mere inadvertence or negligence on the part of prison officials in failing to protect a prisoner from assault does not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim when jail officials are deliberately indifferent to detainees' constitutional right to be free from attacks by other inmates.

Doe v. McFaul · filed 1984-12-26

With respect to Count 1 of the amended complaints, this Court holds that plaintiffs state a cause of action under § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference to their right to be free from attack by other inmates.

Section 1983 liability for police nonfeasance requires deliberate indifference rather than mere negligence, even when a special relationship creates a duty.

Gilchrist v. City of Livonia · filed 1984-12-11

However, a police officer’s duty resulting from a “special relationship” is not necessarily sufficient to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff must also show that the police acted with “deliberate indifference”; there is no liability for merely negligent nonfeasance.

Section 1983 liability for an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires callous indifference to inmate danger; mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient.

Estate of Clyde Davis, Deceased, William H. Davis, Administrator v. Johnson · filed 1984-09-27

Rather, as the jury was instructed, state officials must act in callous indifference to the dangers faced by a prisoner before they will incur liability under Section 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim when state officials responsible for a confined person’s care and safekeeping knowingly fail to protect him from repeated assaults by fellow inmates.

Pearl Spence, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Jerome W. Spence, Deceased v. Staras · filed 1974-12-16

The present complaint, moreover, contains sufficient allegations regarding the defendant’s knowledge of the beatings of the decedent to make the claim actionable under § 1983. Although the complaint does not allege direct participation by the defendants in the beatings, the complaint does allege more than an “isolated incident” or mere negligent supervision. The complaint here expressly alleges that the defendants knew that the decedent was the target of assaults by fellow inmates, knew that he had been beaten on at least twenty prior occasions, and knew that he was nonverbal and unable to call for help or defend himself when attacked, and yet the defendants failed to protect the deceased. Assuming, as we must on a motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff can prove these allegations, the defendants’ inaction was of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to state a claim against correctional officers who witness and fail to intervene in an assault by fellow inmates.

Gordon v. William D. Leeke, Commissioner Joe Martin, Warden, Wayne Stephen Young v. George H. Collins, Warden · filed 1978-05-02

From the additional pleadings, affidavits and exhibits, it appears that Gordon is asserting that he was brutalized on January 29, 1976 by fellow inmates, that the correctional officers, Ne-ville Riley and another, were present and saw what was transpiring, but, nevertheless, that Riley and the other unknown guard declined to intervene and permitted the assault to continue. In our view, Gordon has thus alleged a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes protective relief requiring transfer outside a state prison system when continued incarceration there exposes a prisoner to an unusually high risk of physical danger.

Walker v. A.L. Lockhart, Superintendent of the Arkansas Department of Corrections · filed 1983-10-04

We hold that Walker’s life is put in danger by his incarceration in the Arkansas general prison population and that Walker has established the right to serve the remainder of his sentence in an institution outside of Arkansas where he will have the same privileges and obligations as other prisoners, but without facing undue risks and fears for his safety. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court denying Walker’s section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for a state actor's own deprivation of a constitutional right, not for a state actor's negligent failure to protect a person from harm inflicted by a private third party outside the official's control.

Ellsworth v. City of Racine · filed 1984-09-12

These cases indicate that state officials are not liable under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations caused by third parties outside their control.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for government inaction that fails to protect a voluntary victim from third-party harm; the state must have placed an involuntary victim in foreseeable peril.

Williams v. City of Boston · filed 1984-12-28

The common thread in all these cases is that the state placed an involuntary victim in peril and that injury by third persons or forces was forseeable. In other words, a civil rights remedy is available only where the injury is caused by government action, and not where it is caused by mere government inaction.

A failure-to-protect claim under § 1983 requires more than negligence; officials must intentionally deprive the inmate of a right or recklessly disregard the inmate’s right to be free from violent attacks.

Porm v. White · filed 1985-05-16

To sustain his claim that White and Tindle failed to take sufficient precautions to protect him from assault, Porm "must show something more than mere inadvertence or negligence. He must show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights, either because they actually intended to deprive him of some right, or because they acted with reckless disregard of his right to be free from violent attacks by fellow inmates."

A prisoner states a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim against a guard by alleging that the guard knew an attack was occurring and did nothing to protect the prisoner.

Serrano v. Jorge L. Collazo Torres · filed 1985-06-14

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellant, we believe that as to this defendant, appellant stated a valid claim for relief. It is alleged that the guard had knowledge of the attack on appellant and that the guard did nothing at the time to protect appellant from harm.

Prison guards may face § 1983 liability when evidence shows that they refused a prisoner's request to escape danger and stood by while other inmates attacked him.

Anderson v. Taylor · filed 1985-06-14

In view, then, of the allegations in plaintiff's affidavit (even if inconsistent in some respects with his statement to Captain Chambliss) wherein he stated that he requested the guards to let him out of the day room 10 to 15 minutes before the attack, that the guards refused and stood idly by while he was attacked by these two inmates with knives and stabbed 11 times, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the guard defendants' liability.

Prison officials may face § 1983 liability for specific acts or omissions that, if committed with gross negligence or deliberate indifference, violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to protection from assault.

Gibralter v. City of New York · filed 1985-06-18

Because plaintiff has alleged specific acts and omissions by Captain Rock, John Doe I and John Doe II which, if committed with gross negligence or deliberate indifference, would constitute a violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, it is respectfully recommended that Captain Rock’s, John Doe Ps and John Doe IPs motion for summary judgment be denied.

Section 1983 supports a due-process failure-to-protect claim when a special relationship gives a specific victim a right to adequate police protection.

Dudosh v. City of Allentown · filed 1985-12-18

For these reasons, based upon the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, we conclude that a special relationship did exist between the deceased and the defendants such that would vest in Ms. Dudosh a right to adequate police protection. We, therefore, also conclude that the plaintiff has set forth causes of action against the defendants pursuant to § 1983 for the deceased’s alleged deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Prison officials’ gross negligence or deliberate indifference can support § 1983 liability for failure to protect an inmate, but ordinary negligence cannot.

Swarts v. Johnson · filed 1987-08-21

This court has held that prison officials' gross negligence or deliberate indifference is sufficient to support a claim against the officials, but ordinary negligence is not.

Government generally has no constitutional duty enforceable under § 1983 to provide protective services to an individual absent a custodial or other special relationship.

Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove · filed 1987-09-08

In the case at bar, the State bore no special relationship to plaintiffs or plaintiff’s decedent and hence had no obligation under the Constitution to provide them with protective services.

A Section 1983 prisoner-safety claim requires evidence beyond conclusory allegations that officials were deliberately indifferent to a specific known risk of harm from another inmate.

Joyner v. Ken McKellar Warden, K.C.I. Gerald S. Gaskin, Chief of Security, Kirkland Correctional Institution · filed 1988-02-10

We affirm its judgment on the ground that Joyner failed to show beyond mere conclusory allegations that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a specific known risk of harm posed by the other inmate.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that officials knew a victim faced special danger from a released prisoner and that their failure to protect or warn causally connected their conduct to the resulting harm for a due process claim based on that harm.

Massey Ex Rel. Yackle v. Grant · filed 1988-02-19

To use the label “special relationship,” without more — without allegations that the relationship created special danger — is insufficient. For only upon the basis of allegations that defendants knew of such special danger could defendants’ failure to protect or warn be construed as grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent or as an arbitrary abuse of power establishing a causal connection between such failure and the ultimate harm actually inflicted by another. Absent such a causal connection, there can be no due process violation, because plaintiffs’ injuries are too remote a consequence of defendants’ actions.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state official’s failure to protect someone from violence absent a special custodial or other relationship created or assumed by the state.

Williams v. Horace M. Kimel, Jr. · filed 1988-07-27

Absent "some special custodial or other relationship[] created or assumed by the state in respect of particular persons," a failure to provide protection from violence is not actionable under Sec. 1983. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir.1983). As Kimel does not stand in a special custodial relationship to plaintiff, his alleged failure to respond to plaintiff's complaints of danger does not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A private contractor acts under color of state law when it carries out a publicly owned and government-funded project with significant municipal involvement and deprives a minority subcontractor of federally protected benefits.

Brant Construction Co. v. Lumen Construction Inc. · filed 1987-11-23

The trial court's finding was ... supported by evidence that the project was built on land owned by the City of Valparaiso and funded by federal, state and city monies. That evidence and the testimony of John Hardwick, the City Engineer for Valparaiso, regarding the involvement of the City and the Board of Public Works and Safety in the project and the MBE requirements for the project set out by the E.P.A. not only supported a § 1983 claim but also supported the trial court's finding that Brant had carried out a governmentally-supported project in such a way as to deprive Lumen of its right to make and enforce contracts and to the benefits of the MBE program set up by the E.P.A.

A private service provider's receipt of public funds and contractual relationship with a city do not alone create the state action required by Section 1983.

Gilmer v. City of Cleveland · filed 1985-09-19

The undisputed facts demonstrate that this relationship is merely that of a contractor providing services for a governmental entity. Therefore, the relationship alone does not create the requisite state action necessary for a claim under 42 U.S.C. sl983.

Section 1983 reaches private institutions whose custodial actions are sufficiently entwined with the State to constitute action under color of state law.

Perez v. Jule M. Sugarman, and New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill · filed 1974-12-03

In this case the appellee institutions, concededly private in nature, contend that their actions in detaining the appellant’s children do not constitute “state action” but rather the action of private parties wholly without the purview of Section 1983. For the reasons developed below, we disagree, and we conclude that under the circumstances here the actions of the institutional defendants did constitute “state action” and therefore the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations of constitutional rights carried out through a custom or usage, and a private organization acting as a municipality’s agent in performing a public function is subject to its obligations.

North Shore Right to Life Committee v. Manhasset American Legion Post No. 304 · filed 1978-06-09

The Civil Rights Act itself prohibits deprivation of constitutional rights by “custom or usage” as well as by statute, ordinance, or regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As the organizer of a public function on public property, the American Legion is acting as the agent or fiduciary of the municipality. It is subject to obligations and responsibilities under the Constitution and Civil Rights Act. ... In organizing this parade, the American Legion stood in the place of the Town of North Hempstead, clothed with its authority. Its denial of plaintiffs’ request constituted state action.

Extensive state regulation of a privately owned public utility does not alone make the utility's credit and service-termination decisions state action under Section 1983.

Moenning v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1985-12-18

Extensive, detailed regulation of a public utility by the State does not, by itself, convert the utility’s action into State action. ... Illinois Bell’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s service was motivated by purely private economic interests. The State receives no direct benefit from enforcement of Illinois Bell’s credit policies. ... We hold that the nexus between the State and Illinois Bell’s conduct was not sufficient to maintain an action under section 1983.

A private athletic association does not act under color of state law merely because public universities fund and belong to it or state law classifies it as a governmental body, absent state involvement in the challenged action.

Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1986-05-16

The Plaintiffs have made no showing that the State of Texas or the state universities which are members of the Defendant associations, acted in any manner which caused the Defendants to deny the Plaintiffs’ request for information. Further, this Court’s ruling that Defendants are governmental bodies under the Act does not compel a finding that Defendants’ action amounted to state action.

A private laboratory does not act under color of state law merely by scientifically testing physical evidence for a government investigation.

Nygren v. Predovich · filed 1986-06-25

I cannot find, however, that scientific testing of physical evidence constitutes a traditional state function.

A private institution acts under color of state law when it assumes the state's delegated responsibility to provide residential care to mentally disabled persons.

Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc. · filed 1987-12-30

Where the state chooses to delegate these responsibilities, and an institution or other private entity chooses to assume them, neither the state nor the private entity may assert that the entity’s acts and omissions do not occur under color of state law.

Under § 1983, whether a private fire company is a state actor under the public-function doctrine requires a fact-intensive inquiry into how the state views firefighting, and disputed facts cannot be resolved through unsupported judicial notice on summary judgment.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Company Of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-10-04

The cases inform the analysis in two ways: first, the determination is a factually intense analysis; and second, its outcome hinges on how a given state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity. ... Haavistola and the Fire Company should be allowed to introduce evidence as to the function of fire protection in Maryland rather than be bound by the district court's own unexplained conclusions. ... A dispute such as this cannot be resolved based on unsubstantiated judicial notice on summary judgment.

Under section 1983, whether a private volunteer fire company performs an exclusively public function requires a fact-specific inquiry into the state's treatment of fire protection, and summary judgment is inappropriate when material facts remain disputed.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun · filed 1993-10-04

Review of the preceding precedents and decisions does little to simplify the issue of when a private entity assumes the role of state actor due to its involvement or provision of an exclusive public function. The cases inform the analysis in two ways: first, the determination is a factually intense analysis; and second, its outcome hinges on how a given state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity. ... The district court’s analysis is flawed in that it draws factual conclusions inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment and that it makes a determination about the status of fire protection as a public function in Maryland without any direct evidence as to how fire protection is conducted throughout the State. ... Without establishing these facts as undisputed in the record, the district court erred by granting summary judgment as there remains a genuine issue of material fact.

Section 1983 does not treat private participants in involuntary commitments in Puerto Rico as state actors under the public function test because involuntary commitment is not exclusively a state function there.

Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hospital San Juan Capestrano · filed 2005-05-31

Because involuntary commitment is a function that is and has been routinely performed by private parties in Puerto Rico, Estades' public function argument as it relates to involuntary commitment fails.

Section 1983 does not treat private participation in involuntary commitment in Puerto Rico as state action under the public function test because involuntary commitment has not been reserved exclusively to the state there.

No. 04-1792 · filed 2005-05-31

There can be no finding of state action under the public function test in connection with Estades' involuntary commitment. This is because involuntary commitment is not a function that is or has been reserved exclusively to the state in Puerto Rico, and therefore, Appellees, in pursuing or otherwise participating in Estades' commitment, could not have performed a public function within the meaning of this test.

Section 1983 does not treat a private animal shelter’s volunteer program as state action under the public function test because operating it is not a function exclusively reserved to the state.

Lynch v. Southampton Animal Shelter Foundation Inc. · filed 2013-09-19

The Court finds that the operation of an animal shelter, including its volunteer program, is not a function exclusively-reserved to the state. ... In sum, the Plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 civil rights claim under the public function test. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants summary judgment with respect to this issue.

Under the public function test, § 1983 liability requires a private adoption agency to perform a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state.

Dahn v. Adoption Alliance · filed 2016-02-17

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that these Defendants acted under color of state law through the public function test.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities when a past disciplinary action has continuing effects.

Gomes v. University of Maine System · filed 2004-02-23

In the Court’s view, taking the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the request for injunctive relief to expunge the adverse actions from their academic records would meet applicable standards for the granting of injunc-tive relief, since the University’s record of discipline, though recorded in the past, has an ongoing and prospective effect.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against a state official who has no immunity from such relief.

Jackson v. Millstone · filed 2002-06-21

Furthermore, regarding Taurus’s action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that the defendant-respondent Director of the Medical Care Financing and Compliance Administration has no immunity from prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state, but allows an official-capacity claim against state officials for declaratory relief while barring a claim for refunds of previously collected fees.

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPEN. DRIVERS v. Anthony · filed 1994-07-05

Dismissal was properly granted as to the State of Oklahoma. Likewise, dismissal was proper as to the remaining Defendants/Appellees to the extent Appellants' § 1983 claims sought anything other than declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for monetary relief.

Buford v. Holladay · filed 1992-02-20

State officials, therefore, may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief under Section 1983, and may be sued in their individual capacities for monetary relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against a state officer seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees without damages.

Lucchesi v. State · filed 1990-09-06

In addition, a state officer may be sued in his official capacity under § 1983 if, as here, a plaintiff seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees and does not seek any damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against a state or its officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 1990-08-02

Monetary compensation is thus not available to the plaintiff because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 is violated when state officials, acting in their official capacities, deprive people of constitutional rights.

Wade v. Kane · filed 1978-03-29

By depriving plaintiffs and others of their constitutional rights by acts done in their official capacity, defendants’ actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement relief against individual state officials sued in their official capacities for proven constitutional employment discrimination.

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District · filed 1977-07-01

Plaintiffs’ case having been proven on the merits, reinstatement under a § 1983 cause of action against the individual defendants in their official capacities is available.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against higher public officials who supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Farber v. Rochford · filed 1975-11-25

Injunctive relief against higher public officials is available in situations where they have been found to supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages from state officials in their individual capacities for unconstitutional deprivations caused by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

West v. Keve · filed 1978-02-15

On February 6, 1976, plaintiff filed a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 alleging that defendants, acting under color of state law, had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in denying him medical treatment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the complaint, as supplemented by docket entry 9, supra, states a claim for damages against the defendants in their individual capacities. ... Therefore, the damage claim was improperly dismissed.

Section 1983 authorizes judgment and a permanent injunction against a state official who enforces an unconstitutional state statute.

General Foods Corp. v. Priddle · filed 1983-08-09

Judgment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, shall therefore be entered for the plaintiff in this case. Defendant Brace Rowley is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the Kansas filled dairy products act.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 damages and retroactive monetary relief against a state agency and state officials in their official capacities, while prospective injunctive claims may proceed.

Elliott v. Hinds · filed 1983-10-24

Accordingly, and based on the above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED as to all claims for damages and retroactive monetary relief. This matter will go forward on the regular court docket on those injunctive claims of a solely prospective nature. SO ORDERED.

Section 1983 permits suits against public officials to vindicate constitutional rights, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar declaratory relief against officials sued in their individual capacities.

Bennett v. Lopeman · filed 1984-12-04

and embraces its theory: without a means to sue public officials, individuals would be denied the very mechanism contemplated under § 1983 to vindicate their rights. (Since the instant action seeks only declaratory relief and the state defendants are named only in their individual capacities, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action.

A section 1983 claim cannot obtain retroactive compensation or equitable restitution from a state's treasury, although a federal court may prospectively enjoin state officials to correct an ongoing constitutional deficiency.

B.H. Papasan, Superintendent of Education v. United States of America · filed 1985-05-21

Such relief was retroactive in character and satisfiable only from the Mississippi treasury. ... A federal court can enjoin state officials to correct a constitutional deficiency or eliminate an unconstitutional status even though expenditures incident to that order will expend themselves on the public treasury.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 suit seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials for enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional law.

Nordgren v. Hafter · filed 1985-08-27

However, because the instant case presents only claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against individual state officials, the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity is unavailable.