42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Denham v. Shroad · filed 2003-01-28

Since granting Denham his requested relief would call into question the validity of his disciplinary conviction, his Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable under § 1983. A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for challenging prison discipline that affects conditions of custody but not its duration, including segregation and loss of phone privileges.

Smith, Eric D. v. Wilson, Bill · filed 2008-02-06

Other forms of discipline that affect the condition but not the duration of custody—including disciplinary segregation and loss of phone privileges—must be challenged under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a due process claim alleging exclusion from a disciplinary hearing, even when the hearing resulted in lost good-time credits.

Randle v. Pratt · filed 2008-11-19

In alleging his exclusion from the hearing, Randle has stated a cognizable claim under §1983, and the district court’s dismissal of the claim is improper.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of disciplinary actions that deprived him of good-time credits unless those actions have been invalidated.

Richards v. Dickens · filed 2011-01-31

Because Richards’ § 1983 excessive force and conspiracy claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary actions that deprived him of good-time credits, he cannot pursue those claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge punishment imposed for a disciplinary infraction unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated.

Garcia (ID 105180) v. Schnurr · filed 2019-12-23

Furthermore, § 1983 is not applicable to “challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions,” unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims may proceed despite prison disciplinary findings when a judgment for the plaintiff would not necessarily contradict those findings.

Ford v. LeBowitz · filed 2020-07-23

Notably, none of these findings are incompatible with a determination in Ford’s § ... 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge prison disciplinary sanctions that do not affect the duration of custody, such as a temporary loss of privileges.

Cole v. Warden · filed 2021-01-11

The temporary loss of privileges didn’t affect the duration of Mr. Cole’s custody, and if he wants to challenge them, he must do so in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers an off-duty police officer’s conduct when the nature of the act shows he was performing official duties, even if he exceeded his authority.

Stengel v. Raymond L. Belcher, Individually and as a Police Officer of the Policedepartment of the City of Colu · filed 1975-09-16

The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. ... There was other evidence which permitted an inference that Belcher, although he overstepped the bounds, intervened in the dispute pursuant to a duty imposed by police department regulations. ... The plaintiffs-appellees contend that the District Court should have decided, as a matter of law, that Officer Belcher was acting at the time under color of state law, in view of an admission by his counsel in open court to that effect and the undisputed testimony. We agree. ... We see no objection to this procedure and hold that the evidence abundantly supports the jury’s verdict.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal agent acting solely under federal law.

Jeffery Antoine, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., Shanna Ruggenberg, Defendants-Appellees-C · filed 1991-12-13

A federal agent acting under authority of purely federal law cannot he held liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 can reach privately employed special police officers who exercise police powers delegated by the state.

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, Rick Freeman, Anthony Murray and William Blair · filed 1999-07-01

We conclude that for purposes of determining whether Freeman and Murray could be state actors in this case, no legal difference exists between a privately employed special officer with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer.

Section 1983 requires state action; an off-duty police officer acts under color of law when invoking police authority in private conduct or performing an official duty.

Pickard v. City of Girard · filed 1999-09-30

In summary, there appear to be two circumstances where an off-duty police officer’s actions are “state action”: (1) when a police officer undertakes purely private action while invoking his authority as a police officer, or as a result of his role as a police officer; and (2) when an off-duty police officer undertakes an official duty. ... Consequently, when Estes assaulted Pickard, he was not “acting under color of state law.”

An off-duty officer’s lack of uniform does not by itself resolve whether the officer acted under color of state law for a § 1983 claim.

Ott v. City of Mobile · filed 2001-03-28

Thus, the mere fact that an officer is off duty and out of uniform does not resolve the color-of-state-law issue.

A prisoner alleging an inadequate law library under Section 1983 must plead an actual denial of access to the courts, not merely inadequate library resources.

Favors v. Theodore Koehler Joe Mullen and Mr. Britton · filed 1986-02-12

However, to state a claim under section 1983, the prisoner must allege that he was actually denied adequate access to the courts, not to the prison law library.

Section 1983 may provide a claim when negligence by a defendant prevents a plaintiff’s access to the courts.

Welch v. Evans · filed 1975-09-17

Even negligence on the part of the defendant which prevented the plaintiff’s access to the courts may give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for unreasonable interference with a prisoner's outgoing legal correspondence, particularly when the interference limits access to the courts.

Martin v. Wainwright · filed 1976-02-06

This circuit has held that unreasonable interference with a prisoner’s outgoing legal correspondence, particularly when it limits his access to the courts, creates a cause of action cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right, and taking a prisoner’s legal papers is actionable when it interferes with the prisoner’s access to the courts.

Tyler v. "Ron" Deputy Sheriff or Jailor/Custodian of Prisoners, Div. 15 · filed 1978-04-18

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985, one must allege deprivation of a constitutional right. ... The taking of a prisoner’s legal papers states a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 if the taking results in interference with or infringement of the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits an action challenging denial of access to the courts because of an inadequate law library.

Bradenburg v. William C. Beaman, Richard Charles Bradenburg v. Duane Shillinger, Warden · filed 1980-10-16

An action challenging denial of access to the courts because of an inadequate law library may be brought pursuant to this statute.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a constitutional claim that prison officials transferred a prisoner to obstruct access to the courts.

Hilliard v. Scully · filed 1982-04-28

In making this argument, defendants plainly disregard plaintiff’s claim that he was transferred to obstruct his right to petition the courts, a claim which clearly is cognizable in a § 1983 suit for relief.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging denial of prison copying privileges to show that the denial impeded the plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts.

Lacarttle Jones, Fred Lauriano, Paul W. Tedder, Alvin F. Toney-El, Plaintiffs v. Gayle M. Franzen, James W. Fairman, and · filed 1983-01-18

Jones cannot prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without showing that the state has deprived him of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and broad as the constitutional concept of liberty is, it does not include the right to xerox. To make out a claim under section 1983 based on denial of copying privileges Jones has to show that the denial prevented him from exercising his constitutional right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits relief for a prisoner denied access to the courts by threats or intimidation without requiring a particular mental state or that the prisoner succumb to the threats.

Allen L. Lamar, Cross-Appellant v. L.A. Steele, Cross-Appellee · filed 1983-02-28

The interrogatories submitted by the magistrate permitted the jury’s consideration of damages only if it found that the defendant acted both intentionally and wantonly. Since neither mental state is required to establish a violation of the right of judicial access, these interrogatories imposed on Lamar an inappropriate burden. ... The prisoner’s reaction to the threats is likewise immaterial. It is not necessary to show that the prisoner succumbed to the threats as a predicate for securing § 1983 relief.

State interference with adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts gives rise to a claim under Section 1983.

Hardy W. Ryland and Alma Odessa Ryland v. Alfred B. Shapiro, Edwin O. Ware and Edward E. Roberts, Jr. · filed 1983-07-05

A mere formal right of access to the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Courts have required that the access be “adequate, effective, and meaningful." ... Interference with the right of access to the courts gives rise to a claim for relief under section 1983.

A prisoner’s § 1983 access-to-courts claim fails when he received all of his legal materials and access to the law library, and his appointed counsel’s access was unimpaired.

Holloway v. Dobbs · filed 1983-08-12

First, Holloway did receive his legal materials. Holloway’s complaint conceded that all of his legal materials were located and that he was given complete access to them, as well as access to the prison law library. Second, Holloway was represented by court-appointed counsel during the complained-of period, and there is no claim that his counsel was impaired in her access to the courts on his behalf. Therefore, accepting the allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that Holloway’s complaint does not state a claim for infringement of his right of access to the courts.

An isolated negligent delay in mailing a prisoner’s legal letter does not rise to a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Guffey v. Trago · filed 1983-10-07

Here, the court is not confronted with an intentional restriction of a prisoner’s right of access to the courts, but a merely negligent delay in the mailing of a letter. Such an isolated incident cannot rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.

A deliberate impediment to a prisoner's access to court, including delay of legal mail, may support relief under section 1983.

Jackson v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1986-05-09

as well as a potential deprivation of property without due process, and may give rise to a claim for relief under § 1983. ... Any deliberate impediment to access, even a delay of access, may constitute a constitutional deprivation.

A prisoner states a section 1983 access-to-courts claim by alleging total denial of both a prison law library and legally trained assistance.

Privett v. Ernest Pellegrin, Odie Jones Orey Rice, Gary J. Livesay, and Nancy Chewning · filed 1986-06-27

We find that this allegation is not conclusory, ... that it states a cause of action, and that it may not, therefore, be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d).

A prisoner states no § 1983 denial-of-access claim merely by alleging inadequate access to a prison library or free copying; the prisoner must allege denial of access to the courts.

Bell-Bey v. Heather Bur, Lajewski Pearson · filed 1986-08-12

To state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that he was denied access to the courts, not to the prison library. ... Access to the courts is not equated with the adequacy of a prison law library; Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d at 932, quoting with approval Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978); nor is meaningful access equated with free supplies and copying of legal material.

An inmate does not state a Section 1983 access-to-courts claim merely by alleging that officials prevented him from acting as a jailhouse lawyer for other inmates, absent an allegation that he or those inmates were denied access to the courts.

Brooks v. Otie Jones, Warden · filed 1986-08-14

Because the plaintiff did not allege in the district court nor argue in his appellate brief that he or other inmates are being denied access to the courts, as opposed to being denied access to legal advice from this particular plaintiff, it is clear that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

A prisoner alleging a retaliatory transfer under Section 1983 must prove that the transfer would not have occurred but for his litigation activity; at summary judgment, unrebutted legitimate penological reasons defeat the claim.

Hall v. Evans · filed 1986-09-09

Restated simply then, the appropriate standard in a case such as this is that plaintiff must prove that he would not have been transferred “but for” his litigation activities. This standard is not to interfere, however, with the operation of the-proper burdens on summary judgment. ... Under a “but for” standard, this means if defendant has contested plaintiff's allegations with specific facts, plaintiff must rebut these facts with specific facts of his own. ... Thus, there is unrebutted evidence of a valid reason for the transfer, and therefore, no jury question remains as to whether plaintiff’s litigation activity were the “but for” cause of the transfer.

Intentional destruction of a prisoner's property is not actionable under § 1983 when it is not systematic and the state supplies a meaningful postdeprivation remedy; an access-to-courts theory also requires alleging actual interference with litigation.

Hikel v. King · filed 1987-02-13

Unless part of a systematic practice, the intentional deprivation of personal property is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the State provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. ... To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment, when the claim is for destruction of property, plaintiff must allege how defendant’s conduct interfered with his right of access to the courts.

A Section 1983 access-to-courts claim requires injury; receiving requested court documents through appointed counsel defeats the claim.

McCoy v. Marvin I. Lawson, Clerk of Court for Darlington County · filed 1987-07-17

We affirm the judgment below on the grounds that McCoy received the documents from his court-appointed attorney, and that McCoy did not show any injury.

State officials violate Section 1983 when they withhold a principal witness's recantation and thereby deny the affected person meaningful access to judicial relief.

Germany v. Vance · filed 1987-12-01

In light of preexisting law, the contours of the right of access were sufficiently clear in 1980 that a reasonable official would have understood that withholding the evidence of the recantation in this case would have unconstitutionally denied plaintiff her right of access to the courts. Defendants Vance and Paladino, by withholding evidence of the recantation, violated plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, they are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when they allegedly increase rent because plaintiffs exercised their clearly established right of access to the courts.

Craft v. Wipf · filed 1987-12-30

It is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable ..., even if the act when taken for a different reason, would have been proper. ... This principle is so deeply embedded in the legal and social fabric of our society that no government official could fail to know of it. We thus hold that the district court correctly held that the state officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claim.

Section 1983 is the proper framework for an inmate’s claim that denial of in forma pauperis status in a state civil appeal deprived him of access to the courts, but it does not authorize federal review of the state court’s final order.

Tyrone C. Cooper v. James A. Youngblood, Individually and in His Official Capacity Attorney General of South Carolina · filed 1988-03-03

Cooper complained that by denying him in forma pauperis status, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied him access to the courts. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 because Cooper was not attacking the length or constitutionality of his sentence. While we find that Cooper's suit is more properly construed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the necessary jurisdiction for federal court review is still lacking. 2 United States district courts and appellate courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide an access-to-courts claim for a prison mail delay that caused no legal prejudice.

Richardson v. McDonnell · filed 1988-03-31

The isolated incident complained of by Richardson does not give rise to a constitutional violation because the prison’s error was noted in time to permit appellant to re-prepare and timely file his writ application.

Section 1983 does not support a denial-of-access-to-courts claim based on seized legal documents when the plaintiff alleges no actual prejudice and has retained counsel.

Steelman v. Captain John Burns, R.E. Smiley, James Ferrell and Randy Brown, Defendants · filed 1988-05-04

Likewise, plaintiff's allegations that defendants took various legal documents which he needed to prepare a defense to the criminal charges pending against him do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for denial of access to the courts. In particular, review of the record fails to disclose any allegation by plaintiff that he was ever actually prejudiced in any legal proceeding by the unavailability of the documents in question. More importantly, the record discloses that at all times plaintiff was represented by retained counsel capable of serving his interests. Under such circumstances plaintiff can not maintain a cause of action for denial of access to the courts.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights; a state court order restricting related state court proceedings does not deprive a plaintiff of access to federal court.

Cornett v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1988-06-06

First, Justice McCooe’s order does not encompass proceedings in federal court, but is instead directed to any future state court proceedings plaintiff might bring relating to plaintiff’s allegations against Manufacturers. Accordingly, he has failed to show a deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his claim is dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 permits an inmate to bring a retaliation claim when prison officials bring false disciplinary charges because the inmate exercised the right of access to courts or other legal procedures.

No. 91-1252 · filed 1992-06-25

However, allegations that false charges were brought in retaliation for exercise of an inmate's right of access to the courts or to other legal procedures are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an access-to-courts conspiracy claim for preventing a person from filing suit, but not for merely interfering with discovery in a pending civil action.

Mick v. Brewer · filed 1996-04-24

The Tenth Circuit has clearly indicated in Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1557 (10th Cir.1995), an agreement with the narrower view — that such a conspiracy action is permissible only for preventing ... right of access to the courts. Here, even assuming as true all of Mick’s allegations, the actions of defendants do not represent a denial of her right of access to the courts, but a failure to comply with discovery requirements.

Section 1983 permits recovery for an intentional cover-up that prevents a plaintiff from identifying who committed a proven constitutional violation and thereby deprives the plaintiff of damages.

Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford · filed 1996-08-01

I find, once again, on further study and reflection, that there is a viable claim to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an intentional cover-up if the cover-up caused the jury’s inability to decide who is responsible for the constitutional violations which were proven and, therefore, injured the plaintiff by depriving her of the damage award she would have otherwise received.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim alleging a cover-up intended to impede access to courts without proof that the cover-up succeeded; filing suit does not itself bar the claim.

McGarty v. Town of Carmel · filed 1998-03-10

However, the fact that plaintiff was able to bring this action does not automatically bar her conspiracy claim. ... Thus, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show the effectiveness of the conspiracy in concealing constitutional violations before she can assert a claim for it.

Section 1983 permits an injunction to clear unlawful barriers to state postconviction review, but Heck bars damages for those barriers while the conviction stands and that injunction is available.

Hoard v. Reddy · filed 1999-04-23

He could not argue this, because if the defendants are illegally blocking his access to state post-conviction remedies, he can obtain an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to clear away the blockage. ... As he is not seeking such relief, he has no basis for complaining that no route is open to him other than this damages action for challenging the validity of his conviction. His claim for damages is therefore barred by Heck even if there is the exception we indicated for cases in which there is no way to get the conviction undone.

Section 1983 does not give inmates a cause of action for prison officials’ negligent interference with their access to the courts.

Hill v. Corcoran · filed 1999-06-23

Inmates do not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligent interference by prison officials with their right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for access-to-courts claims that do not challenge the validity of a prisoner’s confinement.

Zamora v. Pierson · filed 2001-03-30

Hence, it is not a claim under habeas corpus; rather, “access to courts” claims are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of constitutional rights, including the right of access to the courts.

Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Commission · filed 1986-01-07

A review of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that the Harrisons have sufficiently stated a cause of action under section 1983 for infringement of their constitutional right of access to the courts, in violation of their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner's denial-of-access-to-courts claim.

Holloway v. Garcia · filed 2002-06-13

We do not reach Holloway’s apparent contention that he was denied access to the courts because it is more appropriately raised in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue for interference with court access only when the interference causes actual injury.

Perry v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2008-04-15

Interference with the right is actionable under § 1983 only where the inmate demonstrates “actual injury stemming from defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.”

Section 1983 does not support a denial-of-access-to-courts claim based on negligence.

Tucker v. I'Jama · filed 2010-01-20

Section 1983 claims also cannot be initiated based on negligent denials of access.

A prisoner’s access-to-the-courts claim is cognizable under § 1983, even if the prisoner labels the pleading as a habeas petition.

Cruitt v. State of Alabama · filed 2016-04-07

The district court erred in dismissing Cruitt’s pleading as a § 2254 petition. As the court found, the pleading appeared to raise an access-to-the-courts claim, which is a cognizable claim under § 1983, and he did not challenge the facts of his underlying conviction, which is required in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 provides a separate action for a prisoner’s claim that limited access to legal materials impedes access to the courts.

Logan v. Haslam · filed 2019-08-30

Rather, this claim concerns access to the Mississippi courts and must be raised, if at all, in a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue for denial of meaningful access to the courts.

Taylor v. NYC · filed 2021-02-08

Although “[n]early all . . . access-to-court cases” arise in “direct appeals from . . . convictions” and “habeas petitions,” the Supreme Court has “extended this universe of . . . claims” to “actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ‘basic constitutional rights.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (quoting Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). Thus, Plaintiff can maintain an action in federal court for a violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts based on the denial of access to “law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law” necessary for meaningful participation in litigation.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligent denials of access to court.

Dizzley v. Chiles · filed 2021-08-30

Moreover, given the Fourth Circuit in Pink’s conclusion that the Supreme Court in Daniels removed negligent denials of access from the reach of § 1983, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Chiles lacks merit because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, rather than whether Chiles was entitled to judicial immunity as recommended in the Report.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against purely private defendants.

Slawter v. Morton · filed 1993-02-16

Further, to the extent that Slawter raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the private Defendants are not amenable to action, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and the allegations as to all of the Defendants are frivolous.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private homeowners for petitioning township officials and failing to give personal notice of a road vacation hearing, even when the conduct is alleged to be a conspiracy to deprive a developer of due process.

Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan · filed 1990-09-04

As noted by the court, “Plaintiff’s entire complaint against the defendants [was] based upon nothing more than defendants’ exercise of their right, under the first amendment, to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Order of June 19, 1990. Plaintiff’s allegations of “conspiracy”, even taken as true, fail to show any basis for § 1983 liability against the defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a private entity for alleged civil rights violations.

Poorman v. Quality Inn · filed 1989-08-25

Poorman's allegations are indeed frivolous under this standard as his suit was filed against a private entity which is simply not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, which was the basis of his complaint notwithstanding his argument to the contrary on appeal.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovering from prison inmates absent an allegation that they acted under correctional officers' specific orders or authority enabling them to harm the plaintiff.

Grillo v. Sielaff · filed 1976-05-05

Moreover, without an allegation that defendants Bradshaw, Jackson, Bell and Childress were carrying out specific orders of the correctional officers, or that they had been granted authority that enabled them to harm the plaintiff, Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovery from prison inmates.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for adjudicating claims against a single private individual, and a conspiracy claim under it cannot survive without genuine and material factual support against the other alleged conspirators.

Hahn v. Sargent · filed 1975-09-18

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for the adjudication of claims against a single private individual. Nor can appellant’s complaint under § 1983 that appellees conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights survive the determination that no genuine and material fact persists with respect to the allegations against the appellees other than Berman.

Private persons may be sued under § 1983 when they act in conspiracy or collusion with state officials, and alleged medical mistreatment may amount to an Eighth Amendment deprivation rather than mere malpractice.

Taylor v. M. M. (Hoot) Gibson · filed 1976-04-01

It is now well established that private persons may be sued under Section 1983 when they are acting in conspiracy or collusion with state officials. ... Taylor alleged facts which if true are supportive of a finding of conspiracy authorizing recovery under Section 1983. While characterized by the defense as “mere malpractice”, the acts alleged imply a deprivation of medical care to an extent that sufficiently developed may reach the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

A complaint may state a § 1983 cause of action against individual defendants when its allegations support the required constitutional deprivation.

Lawrence University Bicentennial Commission v. City of Appleton · filed 1976-04-02

For purposes of the motion for a preliminary injunction, it will suffice for the Court to hold that the complaint by the plaintiffs Lawrence University Bicentennial Commission, Weiss, and Moody amply states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the eight named individual defendants ... pursuant to the jurisdictional provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A Section 1983 claim against a private firm requires allegations that it acted under color of state law or agreed to act jointly with state defendants.

Betances v. Quiros · filed 1985-02-19

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Price Waterhouse intended to have its report serve as basis for the alleged conspiracy; that Price Waterhouse entered into any agreement or acted jointly in concert with the other co-defendants to perform the alleged conspiracy; or, that Price Waterhouse acted under color of state law with the other co-defendants in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

Private complainants and witnesses in state criminal proceedings do not act under color of state law merely by invoking those proceedings.

Spencer v. Slone · filed 1986-01-10

Private parties are not acting under color of state law merely by acting as complainants or witnesses in state criminal actions.

Private medical providers are not liable under § 1983 when the complaint alleges no state action.

Griggs v. Lexington Police Department · filed 1987-10-23

Plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the HCHP defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — no state action exists nor is any state action alleged.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a claim against a state seeking a remedy for an alleged deprivation of civil liberties.

Pieri v. Dammasch State Hospital · filed 1996-02-20

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a state for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.

Section 1983 is the avenue for Fourteenth Amendment claims against a municipality; a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle · filed 1980-10-29

Plaintiff’s allegations under Count II against the county defendants are cognizable, if at all, only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A cause of action may not be asserted against a municipality directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A § 1983 claim against a prison health provider based on its policies must allege specific facts showing how those policies were deficient.

Joseph Chester Parzyck, III v. Prison Health · filed 2008-08-21

The district court did not err in dismissing Parzyck’s claims against Dr. Nunez, Dr. Suarez, and Prison Health Services for failure to state a claim. With respect to PHS, Parzyck fails to make any specific factual allegations; he alleges only that their unwritten policies, practices, and protocols were deliberately indifferent without specifying in what manner the policies were deficient.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a former attorney based on allegedly erroneous advice in a previous federal civil action.

Hinton v. Wampler · filed 1996-03-07

Rothen R. Hinton appeals the district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his pro se, in forma pauperis (IFP) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The district court did not err by dismissing Hinton’s action against his former attorney Gregory N. Wampler for alleged erroneous advice in a previous federal civil action.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against the EEOC for its handling of an employment discrimination charge.

Martin v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2014-02-24

Notwithstanding his dissatisfaction with the way the EEOC handled his claim, Martin has failed to identify any viable cause of action against the EEOC. Hence, his claim for declaratory relief, purportedly brought under Section 1983 based on an alleged First Amendment violation, must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not reach conduct by private parties.

Nieves v. City of Cleveland · filed 2005-08-24

We find the filing of two § 1983 claims against a private individual to be particularly egregious. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful”) (internal quotations omitted); Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 590 (“A Plaintiff may not proceed under § 1983 against a private party”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing an official-capacity claim against an employee of a contracted medical provider to show that the provider’s policy, custom, or official action caused the injury.

Lockett v. Smith · filed 2018-12-17

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts or provide evidence of any policy, custom, or practice of Southern Health Partners, Inc. that contributed to the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a Monell claim against a defendant in an individual capacity.

Boykins v. City of Syracuse · filed 2020-03-30

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert a Monell claim against Chief Fowler, in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim against individual defendants for a Takings Clause violation.

JERMC LTD. v. Town of Redington Shores · filed 2020-04-24

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to and cannot state a cognizable claim for relief in Count VII. See Coles v. Board of Park Commr’s, No. 3:08CV2968, 2009 WL 2922036, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that because plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for violation of the Takings Clause against an individual defendant, there is no cognizable cause of action under § 1983 for conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause).

Section 1983 treats official capacity claims against employees of a contracted medical provider as claims against the provider, requiring evidence that its policy or custom caused the injury.

Pritchett v. Griffie · filed 2020-05-07

When a government contracts with a third-party to fulfill a constitutional duty—such as providing medical care—official capacity claims against the third-party’s employees are treated as claims against the third-party itself.

Section 1983 cannot be used to impose individual liability on school officials for an alleged Title IX violation when Title IX limits liability to funding recipients.

Day v. Career Building Academy, The · filed 2021-09-20

Thus, to allow Ms. Day to use § 1983 based on a violation of Title IX against Ms. Cress and Mr. Johnson “would permit an end run around Title IX’s explicit language limiting liability to funding recipients.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing an official-capacity claim against a private prison contractor to allege that the contractor’s policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Glenn v. Walker · filed 2021-09-20

However, Glenn does not allege the Defendants’ actions were taken pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom of CoreCivic that was the “moving force” behind any violation of his constitutional rights. He therefore does not state a claim against the Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity through official-capacity claims to allege that the entity’s policy or custom directly caused a constitutional violation.

Brown v. Medical Staff at Core Civic · filed 2021-10-20

To state a claim against a private entity like CoreCivic, however, Plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of CoreCivic directly caused him to suffer a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims, including civil-conspiracy claims, may be resolved on summary judgment when differences in the evidence are not material and the record shows no unlawful act or means.

Vickie Singer v. Robert Wadman, Vickie Singer v. Walter D. Talbot · filed 1984-09-27

But summary judgment is not always inappropriate, even in a § 1983 suit. The Supreme Court has declared that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial. ... Applying the definition of a civil conspiracy to the instant case, the record indicates beyond any doubt that though the defendants, or some of them, were acting in concert, they were not committing an unlawful act.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires proof that the conspirators actually violated the claimant's constitutional rights.

Dells, Inc. v. Mundt · filed 1975-09-04

A claim for conspiracy under the Civil Rights Acts must show that the conspirators did in fact violate the constitutional rights of the claimant. ... If success of the conspiracy is an essential element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), then logic would require the same element for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution, but not for a mere common-law tort committed under color of state law.

Sanchez v. Marquez · filed 1978-09-20

However, Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a mere common law tort even when committed under color of state law. The section provides a remedy for violation of rights secured by the constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide recovery for mere negligence unless the negligence results in a violation of federally protected constitutional rights.

LeBlanc v. Foti · filed 1980-01-31

Without proof of a violation of plaintiff’s federally protected rights, there can be no recovery against Sheriff Foti on the grounds of mere negligence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to show both the conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Landrigan v. City of Warwick · filed 1980-08-27

While conspiracies may be actionable under section 1983, it is necessary that there have been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.

A conspiracy creates no section 1983 liability unless it results in an actual deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Joseph Davis Farrar and Dale Lawson Farrar v. Cain · filed 1985-04-08

Without a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege, [the defendant] has no liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no freestanding cause of action for conspiracy or conspiracy to deny due process; the plaintiff must prove deprivation of a specifically protected constitutional right.

Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander · filed 1987-01-13

This cause of action as set forth in the complaint is founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the jurisdictional base upon which the claim stands or falls. There is, however, no cause of action for conspiracy ... per se ... under section 1983. Nor is there a cause of action for "conspiracy to deny due process.” ... Plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a specifically-protected constitutional right to sustain the conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy to violate § 1983 is not itself actionable without an actual deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Collin County v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN) · filed 1987-01-30

A conspiracy to violate § 1983, of course, does not state a claim. It remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Without such a deprivation a defendant has no liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy alone is insufficient.

Gillum v. City of Kerrville · filed 1993-09-16

As we have noted, "it remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive is insufficient."

Section 1983 is the statutory mechanism plaintiffs must invoke for constitutional claims when it is available.

Berger v. City of New Orleans · filed 2001-09-07

When a statutory mechanism is available, § 1983 being a prime example, plaintiffs must invoke its protection.

In a § 1983 suit against state officials, asserting qualified good-faith immunity creates a narrow exception to attorney-client privilege for legal advice relevant to malice or knowledge of constitutional rights.

Hearn v. Rhay · filed 1975-09-26

Based on the holding in that case, this court is compelled to recognize a new and narrowly limited exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies to civil rights suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of good faith immunity.

For a § 1983 qualified-immunity defense, state officials are charged with their litigation attorney's knowledge of a court order affecting the legality of their conduct.

Salahuddin v. Coughlin, III · filed 1986-01-08

Therefore, we hold that defendants are charged with their attorney's knowledge of the state court judge’s oral order converting the state action into a habeas corpus proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to reverse a parole violation conviction and obtain release from prison; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Burnett v. Ohio State Adult Parole Authority · filed 2022-03-15

This Court cannot reverse a parole violation conviction and order his release from prison through a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide relief in the form of dismissal of criminal charges or immediate release from custody.

Brewer v. Holland · filed 2022-03-09

“[R]elease from custody and dismissal of charges are not available forms of relief under § 1983.” ... This law requires the Court to deny Brewer’s request for relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a prisoner with release from custody; a complaint seeking that relief should be dismissed without prejudice to a habeas petition.

Mwasi v. Taira · filed 2022-02-23

A civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief should be dismissed without prejudice to bringing it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue claims that fundamentally seek habeas relief.

MPawinayo v. Rothwell · filed 2022-02-14

Regardless of any future proceedings, however, Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 to assert what are fundamentally habeas claims, so he fails to state a claim on this basis.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy ordering a prisoner’s release from custody.

(PC) Ryles v. California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation at (SATF) Corcoran State Prison · filed 2021-12-27

The only forms of relief requested (release from custody and damages for mental or emotional injury) are unavailable to plaintiff under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as a remedy.

Simon Jr. v. Burtlow · filed 2021-09-07

The Court agrees with Judge Tafoya that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are barred pursuant to Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d at 1161 n.5, and that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is barred because “release from custody is not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.”

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to seek early release or a shorter sentence; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Hanson v. Lehigh County District Attorney Office · filed 2021-09-01

Hanson’s request for early release by means of a shorter sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy that shortens a prisoner's time in custody.

Curtis v. Perry · filed 2020-07-13

Plaintiffs request to spend less time in custody is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from a criminal judgment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Barcus v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-13

However, a § 1983 lawsuit is not the vehicle by which an inmate may seek relief from a criminal judgment. Such relief, if granted, must be granted through a habeas action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking dismissal of state criminal charges.

Hurt v. Kuehnert · filed 2020-04-13

Plaintiff’s claim for dismissal of the state criminal charges is not cognizable under § 1983 and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek accelerated release from prison; that remedy must be pursued through habeas corpus.

VanDyke v. Corrections · filed 2020-04-13

A § 1983 claim challenges the conditions of confinement, rather the execution or duration of a sentence. In this case, VanDyke indeed challenges the general prison conditions, but he seeks an accelerated release from prison, which is properly asserted as a habeas action, not as a civil rights action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the length of a term of custody; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Detlaff v. Boss · filed 2020-03-09

More to the point, a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is not the appropriate way to challenge the length of a term of custody.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a sentence; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Harrell v. Jones · filed 2020-01-08

The Court also found that to the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence in his state criminal case, his federal claim must be presented in habeas corpus and is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge their conditions of confinement and seek damages, but a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release must use habeas corpus.

McGiboney v. Corizon · filed 2019-07-11

A civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenges the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement and may seek damages. By contrast, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner seeking an immediate or speedier release from prison.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge ongoing incarceration by seeking release on mandatory parole; that claim must be brought under the habeas corpus statute.

Patrick v. Raemisch · filed 2008-04-29

Because petitioner may not challenge his right to release under mandatory parole under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because respondents’ failure to allow petitioner access to sex offender treatment programs or fair discretionary parole hearings does not violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment or the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner will be denied leave to proceed informa pauperis in this action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from imprisonment as a remedy.

Shabazz v. Franklin · filed 2005-03-28

Release from imprisonment, however, is an inappropriate remedy in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a due process claim that, if proved, would necessarily affect the length of a prisoner's incarceration.

Cervantes v. Newland · filed 2001-05-30

Because Cervantes’ due process claim is based on allegations that, if proved, would necessarily affect the length of his incarceration, the district court correctly determined the claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking immediate release from imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Anthony v. Schuppel · filed 2000-01-20

No such claim lies under federal law. "[Wjhen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” ... Thus, Ms. Anthony's claim under § 1983 is patently untenable and shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide immediate release from allegedly unconstitutional physical confinement; a plaintiff seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Washington v. White · filed 1992-10-27

Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to that relief under Section 1983 because where a plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of his physical confinement and the relief he seeks is immediate release, his sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to obtain relief from illegal confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Marquez v. Emery County Justice Court and J.P. Stan Truman · filed 1992-08-06

42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits are not the appropriate method for seeking relief from illegal confinement. That role is reserved for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims seeking release or a shortened sentence; those claims belong in habeas corpus.

Grenemyer v. Romer · filed 1991-09-26

Because these claims are claims for release or shortened sentence, they are appropriate only in a habeas action, and the district court correctly dismissed them as inappropriate for a civil action for monetary damages.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the duration of confinement; that claim must be brought by habeas petition after exhaustion of state remedies.

Norton v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, Bill Kelling, David Mills, Charles Butturini · filed 1991-02-04

Norton is precluded from filing a civil rights action on this claim, as it challenges the duration of his confinement and thus may only be raised by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus following the exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide reversal of a conviction or release from confinement; a prisoner seeking that relief must pursue habeas corpus.

Spencer v. Sheriff of Knox County · filed 1990-02-09

First, Spencer's claims for injunctive relief, i.e., reversal of his convictions and release from confinement, lacked an arguable basis in law because Spencer is not entitled to such relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Spencer's sole remedy is through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A prisoner cannot use Section 1983 to obtain release from confinement and must pursue that relief through federal habeas corpus.

Long v. George Hancock, Michael Wayne Long v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Mr. Hancock · filed 1986-11-11

That portion of the civil rights action seeking release from confinement cannot be maintained.

Section 1983 is not the proper federal remedy when a prisoner challenges the fact of confinement and seeks immediate release; habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy.

Robertson v. Riddle · filed 1975-10-03

Petitioner attempts to style his action as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, he challenges the fact of his confinement, and for relief, asks immediate release from such confinement. Since we must liberally construe his petition, we find it one for a writ of habeas corpus, the sole federal remedy for petitioner’s demands.

Section 1983 is not the federal remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release from confinement; that relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Robertson v. Riddle · filed 1975-11-19

Petitioner attempts to style his action as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, he challenges the fact of his confinement, and for relief asks immediate release from such confinement. Since we must liberally construe his pe-' tition, we find it one for a writ of habeas corpus, the sole federal remedy for petitioner’s demands.

Section 1983 is not the proper federal remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact of physical confinement and seeking conditional release; habeas corpus is the proper remedy and requires exhaustion of available state remedies.

Parson v. Keve · filed 1976-04-26

Clearly then, plaintiff’s suit falls within the “core of habeas corpus.” He alleges that the denial of the right to participate in activities outside of the prison amounts to illegal physical confinement from which he seeks immediate conditional release in order to spend his days outside of prison for the purpose of attending school, working in private employment, and visiting his family. Since this suit challenges the validity of the fact of plaintiff’s current confinement, it is, under federal law, properly one for habeas corpus relief which requires an exhaustion of state provided remedies as a condition precedent to the invocation of federal judicial relief. To permit this suit to proceed under § 1983 would frustrate the explicit Congressional exhaustion requirement of the federal habeas corpus statute.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to seek declaratory, injunctive, or damages relief, but a claim seeking release from confinement must proceed in habeas corpus; if both types of relief are sought, the court may dismiss the release claim while retaining the others.

Smallwood v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole · filed 1978-11-03

A prisoner may, however, seek declaratory or injunctive relief or damages in an action under section 1983. ... If a prisoner seeks both release from confinement and damages or injunctive relief in an action under section 1983, the court may properly dismiss the former claim while retaining the latter.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner’s challenge to the constitutionality or duration of confinement; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Williams v. Dallas County Commissioners · filed 1982-10-25

Our consideration whether Williams presents a claim cognizable under § 1983 must be prefaced with the reminder that a state prisoner’s complaint attacking the constitutionality of his incarceration or its duration is not maintainable under § 1983. Habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy in those situations, despite the fact that the complaint might otherwise state a viable § 1983 claim.

A prisoner challenging the duration of confinement must use habeas corpus rather than § 1983.

Brookins v. State of Missouri Board of Probation & Parole · filed 1984-04-10

Furthermore, the plaintiff is challenging the duration of his confinement, therefore, his sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ... Thus, this action may not be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner cannot obtain release from confinement through Section 1983.

McKinley Brown v. Herman C. Davis, Warden · filed 1986-03-05

Plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to release from confinement cannot be maintained under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A state prisoner attacking the validity of confinement and seeking release must proceed in habeas corpus rather than under Section 1983.

Leonard v. Hammond · filed 1986-11-10

If a state prisoner, in his complaint, is attacking the validity of his confinement and seeking release, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

A prisoner cannot use § 1983 for declaratory or injunctive relief that challenges the fact or duration of confinement and seeks a determination entitling the prisoner to earlier release; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Milton Dale Feeney, and David Charles Sells, A/K/A Steven Mark Baker v. Calvin Auger, Warden · filed 1986-12-31

The language of this holding certainly includes declaratory relief, because the essence of that remedy is a judicial determination that a legally enforceable entitlement or duty exists in a given case. ... Thus we conclude that the District Court was correct to construe the § 1983 complaint as a habeas petition.

A plaintiff cannot convert a habeas challenge to the fact or duration of confinement into a § 1983 claim merely by requesting money damages.

Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood · filed 1987-08-21

A plaintiff, by-alleging money damages, does not convert a ... challenge into a claim under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.

A state prisoner's challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus and satisfy exhaustion requirements even if the allegations might otherwise state a § 1983 claim.

Wilson v. Foti · filed 1987-11-25

“When a state prisoner attacks the fact or length of his confinement, the appropriate cause of action is a petition for habeas corpus, even though the facts of the complaint might otherwise be sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.” ... The prisoner must therefore meet the section 2254 exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 does not provide the vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the validity of his guilty plea; that claim sounds in habeas corpus.

McCoy v. James Doe Charlie Stephens J. Neil McDonald Glenn Campbell Robert Kilgo, Sr. Louis Cook John Doe, and Cl · filed 1988-10-20

We agree with the district court that, as McCoy's complaint attacked the validity of his guilty plea, it was properly construed as a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to challenge confinement imposed by allegedly unconstitutional bond conditions; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

Redner v. Citrus County, Fla. · filed 1989-02-13

Regarding Count III, Dean suggests the exclusive remedy for unconstitutional bond conditions is habeas corpus process, so no cause of action pursuant to § 1983 can be stated. ... The Court already has accepted this argument in its rationale for refusing to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the bond conditions. ... The Court reaffirms its conclusion reached then and will grant the motion to dismiss as to Count III.

A claim for credit toward a sentence for time spent on parole must be brought through habeas corpus rather than under Section 1983.

Harris v. Marjory Jennings Arnold J. Hopkins, James S. Harris v. Marjory Jennings Arnold J. Hopkins · filed 1989-08-16

Harris's claim concerning credit for time on parole should have been filed as a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 cannot be used to litigate claims whose favorable resolution would undermine a state conviction and current parole; those claims must be brought in habeas corpus.

Frank Marvin Phillips, Jr. v. Thomas Jenkins, Brian Riley · filed 1989-12-08

Because favorable resolution of these claims would undermine Phillips' state court conviction and current parole, the claims should have been included in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily require a finding that a prisoner's current incarceration is unconstitutional must proceed through habeas corpus.

Vannest v. Riveland · filed 1989-12-15

Vannest, a state prisoner, seeks damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, alleging that defendants acted improperly in various proceedings related to his sentencing and potential parole. These claims all necessitate a determination that Vannest's current incarceration is unconstitutional. The exclusive federal remedy for such a complaint is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking immediate or speedier release; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Rather v. Romer · filed 1991-04-08

Perhaps more to the point, at its core, the action asserted here is in reality one for habeas corpus relief. Thus, even if the district court abused its discretion (and we do not believe that it did) in denying leave to amend the complaint to add Tom Luther as a plaintiff, the complaint, which seeks relief under Sec. 1983, would still be defective.

Section 1983 does not provide a state prisoner with a remedy to restore good time credits and shorten confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus relief.

Mallory v. David Baker, Vance York, Ed Murphy · filed 1991-04-12

Like plaintiffs in Preiser, Mallory alleges that prison officials deprived him of good time credits without due process of law and seeks equitable relief--the restoration of credits--instead of monetary damages. Even though Mallory's procedural due process claim seems to fit within the broad language of Sec. 1983, "Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the ... length of their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of Sec. 1983." Id. at 490. Accordingly, we will treat Mallory's complaint as a habeas petition seeking to reduce the term of his incarceration through the restoration of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of physical imprisonment when the relief sought is reserved for habeas corpus.

Tingle v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, Tennessee Parole Bd., Warden, West Tennessee High Security Facilit · filed 1991-05-13

Tingle initiated this action by filing the form complaint that is often used by prisoners in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, the district court correctly construed Tingle's complaint as a habeas petition because it challenged "the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Tingle argues that the district court failed to address his civil rights claim. However, this argument is misplaced because Tingle sought only the type of relief that is reserved for habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241.

Section 1983 is not the proper route to obtain a free trial transcript when the relief sought ultimately concerns a challenge to the constitutionality of a conviction; the claim belongs in habeas corpus.

Groseclose v. Cletus McWilliams Executive Secretary of the Tennessee Supreme Court · filed 1991-09-05

Since the primary relief sought by plaintiff, a free transcript of closing arguments, ultimately affects his ability to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction, it is clear that plaintiff's claim is more properly brought as a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A section 1983 complaint seeking to overturn a criminal conviction generally should be construed as a habeas petition because habeas is the exclusive federal remedy for that relief.

Smiley v. Concha · filed 1991-12-19

Generally, a district court should construe a section 1983 complaint that seeks habeas relief as a habeas petition.

Section 1983 cannot substitute for habeas corpus when a claimant challenges the judgment authorizing imprisonment and seeks relief from that custody.

Kirsh v. Michetti · filed 1992-03-24

As an initial matter Kirsh’s assertion that she states a valid claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be rejected. ... Instead, she seeks to challenge the judgment under which the city seeks to imprison her. ... Thus Kirsh cannot avoid the numerous requirements that accompany a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by invoking section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or length of a prisoner’s confinement; the prisoner must pursue habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.

Milton v. Sieve · filed 1992-03-31

Section 1983 is not a substitute for a habeas action. When a prisoner seeks to challenge the length or fact of his confinement, he must pursue his claim through writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after first exhausting state court remedies on his allegations of constitutional error.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek eligibility for sentence credits that would shorten confinement; the prisoner must pursue habeas corpus.

Gockley v. Kevin Lemmond, James Wallace, Mike Taylor, and Dolores Ramsey · filed 1992-04-22

We agree with the district court's finding that this contention cannot be considered in this proceeding: ... Since cap credits are applied to reduce the length of the sentence, plaintiff is in effect challenging the duration of physical imprisonment and seeks as relief the determination that he is entitled to a speedier release. However, the plaintiff's sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 is not a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release from confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus relief.

Camardo v. Walker · filed 1992-06-17

To the extent that the Plaintiff is seeking his release, his remedial vehicle must be a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than via the remedial provisions of § 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint seeking relief available only through habeas corpus must be treated as a habeas petition.

Marts v. Swinney · filed 1992-11-10

A complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that seeks relief available only under habeas corpus must be construed as a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement; a claimant seeking release must pursue habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies.

Jurasek v. Utah State Hospital Adam Ozuna, Psych. Tech. Joe Couey, Recreational Therapist · filed 1992-12-11

To the extent that jurisdiction may arguably lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), with respect to the motion for release, we hold, alternatively, that the district court correctly concluded that Jurasek must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, after exhausting his claim in the state courts, in order to raise the issue of release from the hospital.

A Section 1983 complaint alleging deprivation of the right to appeal and seeking release from imprisonment is properly construed as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Tyrone Hiawatha Lee v. Donald S. Caldwell Robert Q. Harris Clifford R. Weckstein · filed 1993-08-05

The district court properly construed Lee's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) filing as a petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988) because Lee's complaint alleged deprivation of his right to appeal and requested release from imprisonment.

A claim under Section 1983 seeking release from custody is properly construed as a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Bruce v. Odom · filed 1993-10-26

To the extent that Bruce seeks release from custody his claim is properly construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) action. Because he provided no evidence of exhaustion his complaint is properly dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 cannot provide relief that requires a determination that a prisoner’s current sentence is invalid or unconstitutionally long; habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Long v. Healy · filed 1994-02-11

When a plaintiff's section 1983 action seeks relief available only under habeas corpus, the district court should construe the complaint to that extent as a habeas corpus petition. ... Therefore, a habeas corpus proceeding is Long's exclusive federal remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a prisoner’s claim that inaccurate prison records caused denial of parole or good time credits; the claim must be raised through habeas corpus.

Smith v. Maass · filed 1994-05-04

To the extent that Smith contends that inaccurate information in his prison files was relied on to deny him parole or good time credits, we note that this claim must be raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or length of confinement and seeks speedier release; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Slatton v. Reginald Wilkinson Raymond Capots · filed 1994-08-17

The district court properly dismissed Slatton's civil rights complaint as legally frivolous because Slatton sought an immediate or speedier release from prison. If a state prisoner attacks the fact or length of his confinement and seeks a speedier release, the prisoner must seek relief by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A claim styled under § 1983 belongs in habeas if proving it would undermine the state conviction leading to confinement, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests damages.

Jones v. State · filed 1995-07-26

In determin ing whether an action purportedly brought under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should have been filed as a writ of habeas corpus, a request for monetary damages is not controlling. The question is whether the claim, if proved, would undermine or conflict with the state court conviction leading to plaintiffs confinement. If the claim itself goes to the constitutionality of the conviction, then the exclusive remedy is habeas corpus, subject to the essential requirement of exhaustion of remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to obtain good time credits that would shorten a prisoner’s sentence; the prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Pantoja v. Howard A. Peters and Daniel Bosse · filed 1995-12-20

When a prisoner wants a "quantum change" in his confinement, he must utilize a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims challenging the fact or duration of prison confinement must proceed under habeas corpus.

Broussard v. Johnson · filed 1996-03-12

Although this action has proceeded to this point under § 1983, it must be treated as an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, because it challenges the fact and duration of confinement, rather than the conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide equitable relief that would effectively attack the validity of a state conviction or sentence; such a challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Palmer v. Nebraska Supreme Court · filed 1996-06-06

When the effect of granting equitable relief under the civil rights statutes would be to “substitute] section 1983 for federal habeas corpus to attack a state court conviction,” the prisoner has failed to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an alternative to habeas corpus for a state prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement.

Vasquez v. Neal · filed 1996-07-03

A § 1983 action is not “a permissible alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking release based on entitlement to parole; the exclusive remedy is habeas corpus.

Faile v. Gunderson · filed 1996-08-16

Faile specifically seeks release from prison, based on his claim that he is entitled to parole. His exclusive remedy is through habeas corpus.