42 U.S.C. § 1983

A charter school’s possible inability to sue its school district as a political subdivision does not bar a § 1983 suit against district officials in their individual capacities.

Promise Public Schools, Inc. v. San Jose Unified School District · filed 2021-03-10

This argument fails. Even assuming that the doctrine foreclosing a political subdivision from invoking the Constitution “in opposition to the will of its creator” would bar Promise from suing SJUSD under § 1983, see Ysura, 555 U.S. at 363, it would not bar Promise from suing Albarran and McMahon in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Gentry - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Indiana State of · filed 2021-03-10

But the court has previously explained that Gentry cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 unless he demonstrates that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him (not his nieces) of a right, privilege or immunity that is secured by federal law or the United States Constitution. ... All of these legal doctrines defeat Gentry’s fifth attempt to bring suit concerning the alleged rape of his nieces.

Section 1983 permits a provider with individual standing to bring an action that also asserts its patients’ rights.

Reproductive Health Svcs v. Parson · filed 2021-06-09

Missouri’s argument that RHS may not file a § 1983 action is premised on its position that RHS merely asserts the rights of third parties. Given our ruling on standing, this argument also fails.

Section 1983 claims may be brought only by the person whose rights were violated.

Hill v. Middleburg Heights Police Department · filed 2021-06-30

Claims asserted in a § 1983 action are personal to the injured party, and therefore can only be brought by the person whose rights were violated.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to bring claims on behalf of other prisoners.

Stanko v. Jeff Brewer · filed 2021-07-12

The amendment would have been futile in any event because an inmate cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim on behalf of a decedent for a cover-up that occurred after the decedent’s death.

Perez v. City of Hialeah · filed 2021-07-14

A decedent like Lester Machado has no §1983 claim for an after-the-fact ‘cover-up’ conspiracy because the decedent is, by definition, deceased, and thus has no constitutional right that can be violated in order to give rise to a cause of action under §1983.

Section 1983 permits an unincorporated association to sue as a person.

Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 2021-08-31

We hold that FLFNB is a person that may bring suit under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim on behalf of an Arizona decedent may be brought only by a personal representative authorized under state law.

Harris v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2021-10-22

In Arizona, only the PR of a decedent’s estate may bring a civil rights action on behalf of the decedent. A.R.S. § 14-3110. The complaint does not allege that any Plaintiff is acting in a representative capacity or has been appointed PR. (Doc. 5.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a § 1983 claim on behalf of Decedent, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Claim Two.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that he personally suffered the claimed deprivation.

Bridges v. Mental Health Officer · filed 2021-12-07

Plaintiff has not alleged that he is one of the prisoners who is or was required to participate in a sex-offender treatment program against his will, as required to state a §1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a parent to bring a claim on behalf of an unborn child.

Figures v. Donahue · filed 2022-01-11

Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action on behalf of her unborn child.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to assert violations of another person’s constitutional rights.

Locke v. McMinn County Jail · filed 2022-01-24

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff Billy Locke cannot assert the constitutional rights of Ms. Locke or Ms. Thomas.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to seek relief for a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights, rather than for harm caused by a violation of someone else’s rights.

Anderson v. Elmbrook School District · filed 2022-02-02

And the children could not bring a claim under § 1983 to recover damages that they may have suffered because of the District’s unconstitutional conduct towards their mother.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to bring claims on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients.

Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Noem · filed 2022-02-08

Here, the court finds the state defendants’ analysis of § 1983 ignores multiple instances where the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized a cause of action under § 1983 brought by abortion providers on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to assert his own claims rather than claims on behalf of other prisoners.

Pate v. White · filed 2022-02-11

In addition, it appears that plaintiff is attempting to bring claims on behalf of others, which he cannot do. That is, plaintiff has no standing to bring claims on behalf of other prisoners.

For § 1983 wrongful death and survival claims, state law determines who may sue; an ineligible plaintiff’s lack of standing does not defeat Article III jurisdiction.

Abraugh v. Altimus · filed 2022-02-14

In fact, our unpublished opinions are divided over the very question presented in this appeal: Does lack of “standing” to bring a § 1983 claim under a state’s wrongful death or survival statute implicate subject matter jurisdiction? ... The defect here, by contrast, is one of prudential standing. And prudential standing does not present a jurisdictional question, but “a merits question: who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right?” Id. at 367 (quotations omitted).

Section 1983 does not give a victim’s family member a claim for personal emotional distress caused by the victim’s death.

Ross 744657 v. Washington · filed 2022-02-17

As explained above, Plaintiff may not proceed under Section 1983 for the emotional distress he suffered personally as a result of his father’s death.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff sue over a violation of another person's constitutional rights, even if that person is his brother.

Gonzalez v. Collier · filed 2022-02-18

Plaintiff lacks standing to ... pursue a claim on behalf of another person — even his brother.

For a Section 1983 wrongful death claim in Mississippi, Section 1988 directs courts to state law to determine who may pursue it.

Ivy v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2022-02-24

For constitutional claims pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged wrongful death in Mississippi, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs the court to look to state law for guidance on matters such who may pursue the claim.

A tribe proceeding in its sovereign capacity is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence · filed 2022-02-28

The court finds that the Tribe cannot “prevail[]” on its § 1983 claim because it “[proceeded] in its sovereign capacity, not as a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Becker, 868 F.3d at 1206.

Section 1983 claims are personal to the person whose constitutional rights were allegedly violated.

Benson v. Human Resource Department, State of Ohio · filed 2022-03-03

And a Section 1983 cause of action is “‘entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.’” ... Ms. Benson does not allege that her constitutional rights were violated. She therefore lacks standing to pursue this action, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Benson’s purported claims.

Section 1983 provides a personal cause of action to the injured party; a parent cannot bring a personal claim based solely on actions against the child.

B.A.P. v. Overton County Board of Education · filed 2022-04-27

Plaintiffs seek to vindicate constitutional rights through Section 1983. “[S]ection 1983 provides a cause of action which is personal to the injured party.” LeFever v. Ferguson, 645 F. App’x 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 n.6 (6th Cir.1991)) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against Melton and Henson are premised entirely on actions allegedly taken against B.A.P., not Penkoski.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue for violations of the plaintiff’s own rights, but not for violations of another person’s rights.

Jordan v. City of Toledo · filed 2022-05-12

Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are, in essence claims based on someone else’s rights; they are therefore legally implausible and subject to dismissal under Apple v. Glenn.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for deprivation of a benefit when the plaintiff lacks a legitimate property entitlement to it.

Smith v. Cooper · filed 1978-04-27

Plaintiffs assert a property interest in the federal funds withheld by the Board. ... To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. ... Since we find that plaintiffs' alleged interest in the federal funds withheld by the Board is non-existent, it follows necessarily that no cause of action has been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a property deprivation only when the deprivation is without due process of law, and the claim must plead the constitutional deprivation with specificity.

Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n · filed 1978-01-11

Although the complaint only states in broad, conclusory language that Miller had been deprived “rights, privileges and immunities under law", the gravamen of the § 1983 claim is apparently that plaintiff has a property interest in its quarry operation and that the defendants have deprived Miller of the full use of that property. Because the property interest is protected by the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff asserts that the complaint states a cause of action under § 1983. The fallacy of this argument is that not every deprivation of property is a constitutional violation. Only when an individual has been deprived of property without due process of law has he been injured in a constitutional sense. U.S.Const. Amend. XIV. The complaint does not specify what due process rights Miller has been denied or even that there was a denial of due process. The complaint is, therefore, defective since Civil Rights actions in this circuit must be pled with specificity.

Section 1983 protects personal civil rights, not natural rights arising from ownership of personal property; enforcing a valid ordinance in strict compliance with its abatement provision falls outside the statute's scope.

Martin v. George J. King, Marshal of the Town of Buena Vista · filed 1969-11-05

The ordinance is valid, and the execution thereof by King in strict compliance with its abatement provision is not within the ambit of the Civil Rights Acts. Such acts protect personal civil rights and not natural rights stemming from the ownership of personal property.

Section 1983 does not support a claim whose gist is damage or injury to property or independent impairment of a business venture, although a properly proven political vendetta that burdens constitutional rights may state a claim.

National Land & Investment Company v. Arlen Specter · filed 1970-07-20

Without professing absolute certainty about the matter, we, too, are inclined toward the Stone view that the Civil Rights Act was not designed to support a cause of action, the "gist" of which is damage or injury to property. Hague v. C.I.O., supra, 307 U.S. at 531, 59 S.Ct. 954 (Stone, J.). We doubt that Congress ever intended that a corporation and its stockholders should be able to invoke § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart to enjoin state investigative and criminal proceedings, based on the independent and separate allegation that the success of a business venture is being threatened or impaired. Of course, this is not to say that an allegation of a personal vendetta by an elected public official to stifle his political opponents by injuring their business enterprises would not, under proper proof, state a claim under the Civil Rights Act. But even viewing appellants' apparently separate claim of injury to property as part of a wider charge that this injury was intended to, and did, burden them in the exercise of their constitutional rights, such claim as not been substantiated. See the discussion and disposition of appellants' First Amendment allegations, supra.

Section 1983 is available for a civil-rights action alleging deprivation of property rights; the court rejected a personal-liberty/property-right distinction as a basis for dismissing the action.

Monell v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF CITY OF NY · filed 1972-04-12

In Eisen v. Eastman, the Second Circuit had held that jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Acts, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), could not be predicated on a claim of infringement of property rights. However, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1115, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) ruled that it “has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietory rights as a guide to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction” and expressly rejected the distinction. The complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not support a civil-rights action whose gist is the deprivation of a property right rather than a personal right.

Grissom v. Branch & Associates, Inc. · filed 1972-03-27

This action cannot be sustained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) 1, for reasons which shall become apparent. ... Blume notwithstanding, it is the opinion of this court that upon the facts of this case the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), as alleged, since the gist of the suit is an alleged deprivation of a property *897right. ... For these purposes, the interpretation of the “right, privilege or immunity” language of § 1343(3) shall also apply to the identical words (in the plural) in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations of property rights under color of state law and does not limit that remedy to personal liberties.

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. · filed 1972-04-24

The “cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored," Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503; Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U. S., at 437, thus counsels a refusal to pare down § 1343 (3) jurisdiction— and the substantive scope of § 1983 — by means of the distinction between personal liberties and property rights, or in any other way.

Section 1983 permits federal civil-rights suits seeking redress for deprivation of property rights; jurisdiction is not limited to claims involving personal rights.

Rosen v. Hursh · filed 1972-07-26

The jurisdictional issue is controlled, of course, by Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., supra. Whether the questions sought by Mrs. Rosen to be resolved involved rights properly characterized as "personal" or as "property," they are subject to federal adjudication.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a claim seeking redress for an infringement of property rights.

Picking v. STATE FINANCE CORPORATION · filed 1971-05-06

Because plaintiff’s complaint seeks redress for an “infringement of property rights,” Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1940), no cause of action is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 protects property rights, and applies when government action adversely affects the property right or its peaceful enjoyment even without completely destroying the property.

Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon · filed 1974-01-30

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, does not only protect personal liberties but property rights as well. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). It is not necessary, however, that the property involved be completely destroyed in order for the law to apply; it is only necessary that the property right or its peaceful enjoyment be affected adversely.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional claims involving property rights as well as personal rights.

Miranda v. Hicks · filed 1974-09-30

The Supreme Court has expressly held that a federal court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not diminished by any distinction between personal and property rights. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972).

A § 1983 claim belongs to the claimant asserting a personal right, not to the deceased person's estate.

Smialek v. Begay · filed 1986-07-25

The Wrongful Death Act (NMSA 1978, §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl.Pamp.1982)) and Section 45-3-902 of the Probate Code (NMSA 1978, §§ 45-1-101 through 45-7-401), discuss the order of priorities of those claiming benefits for or assets of a deceased’s estate, but a Section 1983 claim deals with the claimant’s personal right, not the right of the deceased’s estate.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for violations of that person’s own rights, not another person’s rights.

Brumfield v. Don Jones, Mayor, in His Official Capacity · filed 1988-06-24

The right to sue under the Civil Rights Act is personal in nature.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of property without due process as well as deprivations of personal liberties.

Gillihan v. Duane Shillinger Tom Shanyfelt and John Bunch · filed 1989-04-12

Section 1983 does not distinguish between personal liberties and property rights, and a deprivation of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 protects property rights, including riparian rights, as well as personal rights.

Bentley v. Ellam · filed 1991-05-15

We also reject the defendant’s reliance upon Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140 (N.D.Ala.1971), for the proposition that riparian rights, being “property” rights rather than “personal” ones, are not protectible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of property without due process as well as deprivations of personal liberty.

ABBOTT v. McCOTTER · filed 1994-01-18

Turning from plaintiff's transfer to the confiscation of his property, we note that "[s]ection 1983 does not distinguish between personal liberties and property rights, and a deprivation of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under Sec. 1983." Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 1120, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972)).

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of personal property without due process regardless of the property's value.

Ferranti v. Moran · filed 1980-04-18

It is well-established that a civil rights action under .section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), will lie for a claimed deprivation of personal property without due process, ... irrespective of the value of such property.

Section 1983 claims must rest on violations of the plaintiff’s own rights, not a relative’s rights.

Van Deelen v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District 512 · filed 2004-02-18

As such, the court must keep firmly in mind the well-settled principle that a § 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

Section 1983 protects property rights as well as personal liberties.

Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co. · filed 1975-02-04

Cameron-Brown also argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deals only with a deprivation of personal liberties rather than a protection of property rights. However, this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972).

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that a sheriff, acting under color of state law, deprived a person of property in violation of constitutional rights.

Cruz v. Lyman Cardwell, Sheriff of Taney County, Missouri · filed 1973-10-31

We conclude from our examination of the complaint in this case that it states a claim for relief under 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating federal rights, but liability requires personal involvement in the violation.

Brannum v. Overton Cnty Sch Bd · filed 2008-02-20

The decision as to the location of the cameras and how and when they would be used was beyond their personal involvement and their role in the matters giving rise to this suit are too indirect to subject them to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits claims for deprivations of constitutionally protected property rights; it is not limited to personal liberties.

Hofferber v. First Nat. Bank of Guymon, Oklahoma · filed 1977-08-04

Therefore, Defendants’ argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deals only with personal liberties is without merit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to claim a violation of their own rights, rather than someone else’s.

Jones v. Rainey · filed 2019-06-28

It is well settled that “a section 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of plaintiff’s personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.” Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1990). ... Jones’s claims based on wrongs done allegedly to anyone other than himself are dismissed with prejudice—as to him—as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 claims alleging police harassment that implicates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are substantial enough to confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and overlapping state-law claims do not justify abandoning that federal jurisdiction.

Estella Brown v. Commander Knox · filed 1977-03-23

First, the federal § 1983 claim is substantial. The allegations of police harassment certainly suffice to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. ... No abstention doctrine requires federal courts to relinquish their jurisdiction over federal claims simply because the same facts would state a claim under state law. Indeed, in the § 1983 context such “abstention” would be peculiarly inappropriate.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for specific relief but does not itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Conover v. Montemuro · filed 1969-09-24

Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is a jurisdictional statute: these enactments merely create forms of action for specific relief, available in the federal courts only when subject-matter jurisdiction is properly grounded on a jurisdictional statute.

Section 1983 gives federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief alongside state-court jurisdiction over the same subject.

Carothers v. Follette · filed 1970-07-15

Our jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supplements, and is concurrent with, such jurisdiction as has been granted by New York State to its courts in the same area.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil-rights action without a jurisdictional amount in controversy or exhaustion of available state remedies.

Anderson v. Solomon · filed 1970-08-11

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No jurisdictional amount in controversy is required. ... Plaintiffs do not lack standing because they have not exhausted available state remedies, including Sections 1 and 21 of old Article 59 and new Sections 14 and 15 of Article 59 as now in effect.

Section 1983 creates a federal claim when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, and an action within its terms may be heard in federal court.

Jerald Gere, a Minor by His Father and Next Friend, Paul Gere v. Emory R. Stanley, as Superintendent of Blue Ridge School District · filed 1971-12-27

Thus, without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case. ... Section § 1983 gives rise to a federal claim when any “person [acting under color of State law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ” ... We cannot say that these allegations are so “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” that we are thereby divested of jurisdiction. ... Although it might be tempting to disclaim jurisdiction in controversies such as this one, a careful consideration of the statutes and cases impels the conclusion that we have the power to adjudicate the issues presented here.

Section 1983 gives a federal court jurisdiction to hear an action brought within the statute's terms, regardless of the case's ultimate merits.

Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver Junior-Senior High School · filed 1972-04-13

Part of the controversy surrounding long hair cases is the threshold question whether the federal courts even have the power to adjudicate the issue. ... This Court has addressed this question and had decided that federal courts do have jurisdiction. ... without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

An action that falls within § 1983's terms may be heard by a federal court.

Stull v. School Board of the Western Beaver Junior-Senior High School · filed 1972-04-13

This Court lias addressed this question and had decided that federal courts do have jurisdiction. In Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971), the Court said: “ . without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case.”

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction where the court finds no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Portner v. Franck · filed 1972-10-11

The Order and the manner in which the special counsel and his staff have conducted the investigation have not violated any of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... Since there is no violation of Mr. Portner’s constitutional rights, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 supports a federal civil-rights action for claimed constitutional discrimination and related injunctive relief.

Morris v. Michigan State Board of Education · filed 1973-01-25

On the basis of the pleadings and such record as has been developed thus far in this proceeding in the District Court, we believe that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to consider the claimed discrimination involved in the exclusion of girls from interscholastic competition in noncontact sports and to enter a temporary injunction in relation thereto.

Section 1983 permits federal jurisdiction over claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants involved in allegedly peaceable repossessions.

Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp. · filed 1971-03-17

Insofar as the complaints seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants Wolke and Krause, we believe there is jurisdiction in this court under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). This is true notwithstanding the contention that the repossessions were peaceable in the case at bar. The motions for dismissal by Wolke and Krause must be denied.

Section 1983 actions may be brought in state courts because the statute does not make federal-court jurisdiction exclusive.

Brown v. Pitchess · filed 1975-02-19

The majority of courts considering the question concur in our conclusion that state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in federal court under the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Husbands v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1975-03-31

1. We have jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 covers Puerto Rico as a Territory or State, allowing redress for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of Puerto Rican law.

Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. De Otero · filed 1976-06-17

Finally, § 1983, by its terms, applies to Territories; Puerto Rico, but not the District of Columbia, obviously was one of these. Whether Puerto Rico is now considered a Territory or a State, for purposes of the specific question before us, makes little difference because each is included within § 1983 and, therefore, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).

Section 1983 supports a federal civil-rights action alleging that defendants acting under color of state law violated federal rights, and the court found jurisdiction proper under that provision.

Sovereign News Co. v. Falke · filed 1977-10-31

The complaint alleges an excess of 10,000 dollars in controversy, and charges that the defendants violated Sovereign’s federal civil rights while acting under color of state law. Thus paragraphs two and three of Sovereign’s complaint allege original federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(1), 1343(3), 1343(4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sovereign also seeks a declaratory judgment and therefore alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The court finds that jurisdiction is proper under each statutory provision cited in Sovereign’s complaint.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of the Constitution, not for violations of state law or regulations alone.

Durkin v. Taylor · filed 1977-11-10

This Court’s function under Section 1983 is to determine not whether defendants violated State law or regulation, but whether they violated the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a remedial cause of action but does not itself confer federal-court jurisdiction.

Margarette CURTIS et al. v. TAYLOR · filed 1980-09-11

While the plaintiffs predicate their cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is only remedial; it recognizes a cause of action but it does not of itself bestow jurisdiction of the action on federal courts.

Section 1983 permits constitutional challenges to generally applicable state bar-admission rules.

Bailey v. Board of Law Examiners of State of Tex. · filed 1980-12-22

This Court does have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to determine whether generally applicable rules and procedures for admission to the Bar impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to forgo federal relief merely because a state judicial remedy exists.

Moton v. Lambert · filed 1981-03-06

The existence of a state judicial remedy is, of course, totally irrelevant to federal court § 1983 jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not itself confer federal jurisdiction when a complaint alleges no tortious violation of a federally protected right.

Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Division · filed 1981-12-07

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these complaints because none alleges the tortious violation of any federally protected rights. The denomination of these complaints as § 1983 actions does not alone give the district court jurisdiction to hear them.

When a Section 1983 cause of action and federal-question jurisdiction are intertwined, the court must take jurisdiction and decide the merits unless the federal claim is immaterial, jurisdictionally contrived, wholly insubstantial, or frivolous.

Eubanks v. O.L. McCotter Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Defendants · filed 1986-10-17

Because the federal causes of action in appellants’ complaint were neither immaterial nor frivolous, the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by a federal regulation when the regulation is sufficiently specific for judicial enforcement.

Ermler v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 1992-01-16

However, Howard, is distinguishable from the instant case because, unlike 47 C.F.R. § 97.111, the regulation here at issue is sufficiently specific for easy judicial enforcement.

Section 1983 is a remedial statute and does not independently confer federal jurisdiction.

Ernst & Young v. Depositors Economic Protection Corp. · filed 1994-06-03

Similarly, 42 U,S,C. § 1983, as a remedial statute, does not confer federal jurisdiction independently.

A § 1983 claim supports federal jurisdiction if its underlying federal claim is neither frivolous nor insubstantial.

Henn v. City of Highland Heights · filed 2001-02-08

The standard for jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, however, requires only that the underlying federal claim not be “either frivolous or ... insubstantial.”

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action but does not itself give federal district courts jurisdiction over the claim.

Goldsmith v. Mayor of Baltimore · filed 1988-01-19

Section 1983 does embrace Goldsmith’s claims that Ordinance Number 625 enacted by the City Council and Mayor of Baltimore deprives her of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws,” to wit, due process protection before discharge from employment. However, the federal cause of action created by this section does not itself confer jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to adjudicate these claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a catch-all route to federal court for matters within state courts' exclusive jurisdiction.

Tonti v. James C. Petropoulous and Richard B. Metcalf · filed 1981-07-27

This litigation represents yet another misuse of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an attempt to obtain federal jurisdiction. This civil rights statute was never intended as a catch-all under which a myriad of suits, traditionally within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, can be brought in the federal courts.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations of joint action with a state actor to support a conspiracy claim against private attorneys.

Walker v. Family Court Judge Catherine Cholakis · filed 2020-06-29

Therefore, the allegation should be dismissed under 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff fails to state a claim under §1983 against Drescher and Foley.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an agreement and overt, concerted acts to hold a private party liable for conspiring with state actors.

Markham v. Rosenbaum · filed 2020-06-18

Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory and he fails to set forth any agreement or any overt, concerted acts to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

A private actor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory without evidence of a conspiracy with state actors.

Warne Young v. County of Hawaii · filed 2014-06-16

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ostendorp on Young’s § 1983 claim. Ostendorp, a private actor, told HIHS that Roberta Young had legal authority to transfer the dogs. The agency verified these representations by speaking to Roberta Young and obtaining a copy of the notarized POA. Even assuming that Ostendorp and Roberta Young conspired to obtain the POA fraudulently, Young presented no evidence of a conspiracy between the HIHS defendants and Ostendorp.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires an agreement with a state actor to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act causing damages.

Pacicca v. Stead · filed 2011-11-14

To support a claim against a private party on a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must show “(1) an agreement between a state actor ... and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002). Pacicca presents no evidence that Stead entered a conspiracy with White Plains police.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires evidence of an agreement with a government actor to violate constitutional rights.

Mertens v. Shensky · filed 2009-12-08

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against defendant Barker because Mertens did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barker entered into a conspiracy with any government actor.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who conspires with arresting officers only if a preconceived plan prevents the officers from independently determining whether there is cause to arrest; merely reporting alleged misconduct is insufficient.

Gonzales v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. · filed 2007-03-14

To hold a private party liable for a conspiracy with arresting officers to violate a plaintiff’s civil rights, the plaintiff must show “that the arresting officer did not make an independent determination whether there was cause to arrest” because of a “preconceived plan” between the private party and the arresting officers; it is insufficient to merely show that the defendant informed the police of alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 can reach a private person who conspires with a state official acting under color of law to deprive someone of federal rights, even if the official is immune from damages.

Norton v. Liddel · filed 1980-03-06

However, we believe that the better reasoned view is that where a private individual actively conspires with an immune State official (acting under color of law) with the intent to purposely and knowingly deprive an individual of his rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the fact that the State official is immune from suit in damages should not provide a windfall defense to the private conspirator.

Section 1983 does not impose conspiracy liability on a private person merely for requesting a judge’s ruling or acting on the judge’s approval.

Sparkman v. Mcfarlin · filed 1979-05-02

Our holding is necessarily only that a claim under § 1983 is not made out by the allegations of fact in the complaint with respect to a conspiracy between Judge Stump and the other parties. ... A private person does not conspire with a judge merely by invoking an exercise of the judge's judicial authority or merely by taking action which a judge exercising such authority has purported to "approve."

A § 1983 claim against a private defendant based on a conspiracy with police requires facts supporting an inference of that conspiracy.

Burns v. Walker · filed 2002-09-16

The facts from the complaint, taken to be true and read in the light most favorable to Burns, see id., do not support an inference that Walker conspired with police to violate Burns’ constitutional rights, see United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights to establish a conspiracy between private parties and government actors.

Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, Etc., Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York and City National Bank, Defendants · filed 1983-06-03

To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights must be shown.

A private actor may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state actor, but a conclusory allegation of conspiracy does not state a claim.

Dunbar v. Lorence · filed 1996-08-22

Here, plaintiff alleged only in a conclusory manner that defendant conspired with a state court judge. Plaintiff's allegation is a mere conclusion which need not be accepted as true. See Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against private citizens when they conspire with state or local officials who acted under color of state law.

Gillibeau v. City of Richmond · filed 1969-10-13

Suit may be brought against private citizens under section 1983 if a conspiracy is established between them and the state or local officials who clearly acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches private persons only when they act under color of state law, including by conspiring with state actors to consummate a constitutional deprivation; unlawful arrest and detention without probable cause can support a claim.

Luker v. Nelson · filed 1972-03-29

In his § 1983 suit, the plaintiff will be required to prove as to the defendant police officers that they deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable arrest and detention without probable cause. As to Clark Oil and Refining Company and its agent, the plaintiff must prove that they conspired with the police officers to achieve this alleged constitutional deprivation and succeeded in consummating the object of their conspiracy. Without this proof of conspiracy, Clark Oil and its agents, no matter what other actions they may have taken (such as procuring plaintiff’s false arrest under a void process), cannot be deemed to have acted under color of state law so as to render them liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 covers private persons who act in concert with state officials.

Undergraduate Student Association v. Peltason · filed 1973-01-10

The motion will be denied in light of the cases which have held private persons acting in concert with state officials to be within the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has been invoked here.

Calling conduct a conspiracy does not move the claim out of § 1983; ordinary agency principles can make persons accountable for others’ acts under the statute.

Abraham v. Beatrice Foods Co. · filed 1976-09-17

It warrants emphasis again that the use of the magic word ‘conspiracy’ does not necessarily take it out of § 1983 and throw it into § 1985. On usual principles of agency persons may be held accountable for the acts of others under § 1983. Most times such a combination, concerted action, etc. would constitute ‘conspiracy’, too.

Section 1983 reaches otherwise private acts when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials, because such acts are performed under color of state law.

Goadby, Albert T. v. Philadelphia Electric Company · filed 1981-03-26

Goadby has alleged a conspiracy between PECO and PUC and it is settled that otherwise private acts are performed under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials.

A private creditor acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when it jointly participates with state officials in using state procedures to seize disputed property.

Jordan v. Dorsey · filed 1984-05-14

The conclusion that ACC is a state actor for purposes of this § 1983 action is amply supported by the line of garnishment and prejudgment attachment cases in which the Supreme Court entertained and adjudicated debtor claims that private creditors had violated constitutional standards of due process.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party must plead specific facts linking the private party’s conduct to state officials.

McGillicuddy v. John A. Clements, Etc., Ernst & Whinney, Etc. · filed 1984-10-11

We conclude that the allegations do not reach the level of specificity required to state a § 1983 claim against a private party, and so we reverse. ... Because plaintiff makes virtually no factual showing to support his allegation of a conspiracy, it was improper for the district court to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement may be satisfied when a judge’s official act results from a corrupt conspiracy with private parties.

Dykes v. Hosemann · filed 1984-10-11

The “color of state law” component of § 1983 may be satisfied by showing that an official act of a defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge and other private parties. ... We conclude that Diana has at least stated a § 1983 procedural due process claim.

A bare allegation that private defendants conspired with a state judge, without supporting operative facts, is insufficient to establish the state-action nexus for a § 1983 claim.

Phillips v. Mashburn · filed 1984-11-15

The naked assertion of a conspiracy between a state judge and private defendants without supporting operative facts provides an insufficient state action nexus for a section 1983 action.

Private citizens who conspire with public officials to violate a constitutional right may be liable under Section 1983.

James v. Price · filed 1985-02-21

This allegation states a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. The ability to bring a conspiracy claim under § 1983 against private citizens acting in concert with public officials is well-recognized.

A § 1983 complaint against a private entity must plead specific facts showing how it acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials; a bare assertion of concerted action is insufficient.

Carr v. the Times Picayune Publishing Corp. · filed 1985-03-22

Because plaintiff has failed to allege with any specificity how the newspaper, clearly a private entity, acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials to violate her civil rights, the Complaint fails to state a claim under either § 1983 or § 1985.

A private party who does not independently act under color of state law may be liable under § 1983 only by conspiring and acting jointly with a state actor.

Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine · filed 1985-06-18

However, Dr. Crabtree was employed solely by Horsham, a private clinic, that admittedly received no federal funds, so neither he nor any Horsham employees were acting under color of state law. But if a private party acts in conspiracy with a state actor, he can be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who conspire with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Skepton v. County of Bucks, Pa. · filed 1985-07-18

Although defendants correctly point out that some of the named defendants are not state actors, § 1983 imposes liability upon private parties who conspire with state actors to deprive an individual of constitutional rights.

A private person may be liable under § 1983 as a willing participant in joint action with the state, but a complaint must plead facts supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Reginald R. Brinkmann, Jr. v. Rick Johnston, Don T. Cates, Caroline Berthelot, A/K/A Carolyn B. Brinkmann, and Judge Her · filed 1986-06-30

Although private acts may support an action for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the individual is “a willing participant in a joint action with the state or its agents,” Mr. Brinkmann’s complaint in the present case does not state any factual basis to support his conspiracy charges.

A private bail bondsman acts under color of state law under § 1983 when a police officer significantly assists and jointly participates in the challenged home entry and search.

Betty Jackson, and Frank Ray Jackson v. Nicholas Pantazes Officer Allan Goldberg and Montgomery County, Md · filed 1987-01-30

This participation by a state official suffices to render Pantazes a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Since we hold that Pantazes was a state actor who could be sued under § 1983, we turn to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s proof to withstand the motions for summary judgment.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 through joint participation with police officers, but not merely because it employed the participating manager or off-duty officers.

Barton v. Gulf States Entertainment · filed 1987-02-19

Section 1983 reaches private entities only where they conspire with or act in concert with state officials. ... Such respondeat superior liability is not allowed under § 1983. ... Cooper could be found liable under § 1983 for joint participation with the police officers.

A private party who conspires with a state official may act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Allen v. Trounday · filed 1987-02-23

If Trounday conspired with Goebel, then he may be found to have acted under color of law; that finding is necessary to plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983.

A private party acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it jointly acts with officials whose significant participation places the state’s authority behind the private deprivation.

Fraser v. Schultze · filed 1987-06-11

where a private party acts jointly with a state official who abuses his or her authority, that party also acts “under color of state law” within- the meaning of § 1983. ... Taken as a whole, along with all reasonable inferences from the complaint, these facts indicate that the level of involvement by Morgan and Price was significant enough to convert what would otherwise be a private matter into a federal casé.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private persons fails without evidence that they acted in concert with state officers and intended to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Adams v. Thomas E. Campsey Kim L. Thurston William Eatherly City of Brentwood in Williamson County, Tennessee Ja · filed 1987-07-09

Thus, having concluded that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was the object of any concerted actions on the part of the Saxtons and the officers, that there was no evidence to suggest that she was the object of any conspiracy, and that there was no evidence of any intent on the part of the Saxtons to violate plaintiff's rights under the federal constitution, the district court properly dismissed the Saxtons.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires proof of an agreement involving state officials; shared opposition to a plaintiff’s activities is insufficient.

Montgomery v. Hughes · filed 1988-12-29

However, in the absence of proof that defendants Fisher or Hogue agreed to procure that injury or acquiesced in a plan directed toward that end, there can be no finding of a conspiracy for purposes of section 1983 liability. A common aversion to the plaintiff’s investigation is too weak a strand with which to link the defendants in this case.

A § 1983 claim that private defendants conspired with state officials requires specific factual allegations showing an agreement and concerted action.

Arney v. Davies · filed 1991-03-18

Further, to the extent plaintiff seeks to allege a conspiracy by implicating state legislators and officials with private defendants, he must present specific factual allegations which tend to show an agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 does not provide relief against private individuals absent a showing that they conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Olson v. Anderson · filed 1992-05-20

Olson also failed to show the remaining appellees conspired with state officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and thus, Olson is not entitled to relief against these appellees under sections 1983, 1985, or 1986.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a federal agent for conspiring with city police when evidence supports an inference that they acted together to interfere with constitutional rights.

Wahad v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1993-01-29

Finally, Defendant Lott seeks summary judgment on the issue of his alleged conspiring with members of the NYCPD in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). ... This Court, however, does find evidence sufficient to create an inference of such a conspiracy, and will allow Plaintiff to proceed to trial on this issue.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires factual allegations of concerted action with a state actor causing a constitutional deprivation.

Scheiner v. Wallace · filed 1993-09-13

“To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” ... Here, the Plaintiffs do not state how the District Attorney’s office contacted them or “caused” the Plaintiffs’ attorney to return the alleged photos. A fact-driven causal link is never established between Mr. Wade’s alleged phone call and the Plaintiffs’ alleged civil rights harms. ... As a result, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Under § 1983, private parties who conspire with a state official may be liable without direct contact with that official if each knows the shared plan's essential nature and general scope.

Jackson v. Faber · filed 1993-10-04

It is well established, however, that private parties who conspire with state officials may be sued under section 1983. ... It is not necessary that Plaintiff allege that each coconspirator deal directly with the state actor. ... What Plaintiff must allege is “that there was a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [was] known to each person who [he seeks to hold] responsible for its consequences.”

Section 1983 permits claims against private citizens who conspire with public officers to deprive a person of federally protected rights.

Ferran v. Town Of Nassau · filed 1993-12-01

However, there is also alleged a conspiracy between private citizens and public officers. The allegations are therefore technically sufficient, because that type of joint conduct is actionable under Sec. 1983, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604-1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354-55, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1103-1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), so that plaintiffs' alleged Sec. 1985 claim merely duplicates part of their claim under Sec. 1983.

A private attorney acts under color of state law under § 1983 by conspiring with state officials, but a conspiracy requires an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Tysch v. David Michael Homsy Gary Hal Amsterdam Morton Gantman Gantman & Gantman · filed 1993-12-22

An attorney acts under color of state law if he conspires with state officials such as judges. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). To prove conspiracy under Sec. 1983, an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be shown. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989). ... The district court did not err by finding that Tysch could not show a meeting of the minds among the defendant attorneys in connection with the municipal court case, let alone a conspiracy involving a state court judge.

A private defense provider may satisfy § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement by conspiring with state officials, but a conspiracy claim requires specific allegations of collusion.

Respass v. New York City Police Department · filed 1994-05-19

Pursuant to Tower, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the “under color of state law” requirement of § 1983. However, plaintiff has failed to detail instances of collusion sufficient to support the conspiracy claim, and his claim under § 1983 therefore cannot survive Legal Aid’s motion to dismiss.

A sheriff’s classification under state law does not determine whether the sheriff is a state or local official for Section 1983; the classification depends on the function the sheriff performed.

Penland v. Long · filed 1996-02-26

Although the Defendant contends that a sheriff is a state official under North Carolina law, the state law classification is not dispositive for purposes of Section 1983. ... Instead, a sheriff may sometimes be treated as a state official and sometimes as a local official, depending upon the particular function which the sheriff was performing.

Section 1983 subjects a private citizen to liability only if the citizen willfully collaborates with a state official to deprive someone of a federal right.

Pravda v. City of Albany, NY · filed 1997-02-11

It is well settled that a private citizen may be subject to liability under § 1983 only if he “willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the deprivation of a federal right.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim can satisfy the color-of-state-law requirement when alleged facts permit an inference that a private person and state officers agreed to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights.

Delew v. Wagner · filed 1998-05-11

The district court additionally erred by holding that the Delews’ conspiracy coverup claim failed to state a plaim for relief. In support of their conspiracy claim, the Delews allege that Janet Kathleen Wagner left the accident scene during the investigation and that the LVMPD and NHP officers permitted Wagner to do so. Construing these facts in a light most favorable to the Delews, it is reasonable to infer an understanding between Wagner and the officers to cover-up the true facts of Erin Rae Delew’s death and thereby deprive the Delews of their right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor who conspires with state actors to deprive someone of civil rights, but the complaint must meaningfully allege the private actor’s participation.

Hanania v. Loren-Maltese · filed 1999-05-12

The parties agree, as they must, that private actors can be liable for violations of § 1983 by participating with state actors in a conspiracy to deprive another of her civil rights. But plaintiffs must allege, in a meaningful way, that the Torshen defendants participated in such a conspiracy, and the complaint does not so allege.

A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under section 1983 must plead specific facts supporting the conspiracy and may be allowed to amend the complaint to do so.

Johnson v. McDonald · filed 1999-12-09

Given our holding precluding immunity, the trial court should allow appellants to amend their civil rights complaint to plead the necessary facts to support the claimed conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private individuals requires allegations that they reached an understanding with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights and willingly participated in joint activity with the state.

Evers v. Reak · filed 2001-09-20

To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Evers needed to allege that 1) state officials and private individuals reached an understanding to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and 2) those individuals were willful participants in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who participates in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the conspiracy requires evidence of an agreement.

Williams v. Seniff · filed 2003-08-20

Moreover, Mr. Lauck and Mr. Toth are alleged to have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; but they were not in a position to fire Mr. Williams, so any liability must be based on the theory that their participation in the alleged conspiracy violated § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires an agreement with government officials to violate constitutional rights.

Ducey v. Meyers · filed 2005-08-04

“To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights must be shown.”

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim alleging a conspiracy between private and public actors.

Daryl A. Schultz and Norita J. Schultz v. Diversified Financial Planners Incorporated · filed 1994-04-01

Such a claim of a violation of the fourth amendment, and implicitly of conspiracy between public and private actors, actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, cannot immediately be lumped with the bankruptcy case--at least, not on the face of the complaint, which, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 allows, is skeletal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private individual to allege a conspiracy with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally protected interests.

McGaney v. Scully · filed 1987-07-15

In order to state a claim for relief against a private individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a conspiracy between a private individual and state officials to deprive plaintiff of his constitutionally protected interests.

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors who conspire with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the conspiracy must be supported by evidence beyond speculation.

Gomez v. Garda CL Great Lakes, Inc. · filed 2014-12-29

In order to hold private actors liable under § 1983, Plaintiffs must produce evidence of a conspiracy that rises above mere speculation. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a conspiracy and, as explained above, Counts I, II, and III cannot survive absent a conspiracy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private individual who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the complaint must allege facts supporting that conspiracy.

Morresi v. Berg · filed 2021-10-22

A § 1983 claim may be brought against a private individual if he conspires with a state actor to deprive a person of his constitutional rights. DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 1999). The inmate with whom Defendant allegedly is conspiring is not a state actor. Plaintiff alleges a general belief that Defendant is also conspiring with staff members at DCCC, but no particulars are given which would support a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

A private person may face a § 1983 conspiracy claim for agreeing with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights and taking overt acts that cause the deprivation.

Chmielowicz v. Miller · filed 2022-04-27

They acted overtly on this conspiracy by Miller providing misinformation to Officer Madrigal, after which Officer Madrigal filed a false traffic crash report implicating Chmielowicz. In short, Miller and Officer Madrigal attempted to cover-up Miller’s culpability in causing the accident. Under these facts, Chmielowicz alleges that his Equal Protection rights were violated. He has thus plausibly alleged a conspiracy claim under § 1983.

A city acts under color of state law when it delegates state-created housing-standard and eminent-domain powers to a private redevelopment corporation.

Williams v. City of St. Louis · filed 1986-03-06

Pursuant to state law, the City delegated its authority to set housing standards for residential properties and its power of eminent domain to MMCRC. This delegation under state law of powers possessed by virtue of state law and traditionally exercised by the City satisfies us that the City's action here is under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives a citizen of constitutional or statutory rights, and pervasive state licensing may supply the required state involvement.

Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc. · filed 1969-12-09

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, provides, in part, that any person who, under color of any state statute or regulation, subjects any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured. ... Our inquiry must thus return to a determination of whether defendant may be found under any state of facts which could be proved to be acting under color of state law in its continued practice of refusing service to women, and whether such practice has denied plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws as prescribed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. ... While considerable question exists as to whether defendant’s activities herein may properly be deemed governmental in nature, when a significantly restricted and regulated license is granted by the State to exercise a privilege of serving the public where that privilege would be impermissible without such license, there may well exist sufficient State involvement to make the acts of the licensee those of the State itself. ... Here, I find a great deal more than a scintilla of State action, but such action which may be considered ubiquitous and pervasive. ... Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is in all respects denied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private utility merely because it is state regulated; the challenged conduct must have a sufficiently close nexus to the State to constitute state action.

McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co. · filed 1976-02-05

A private corporate utility company is not brought within the purview of state action merely because it is state regulated. ... We see no close nexus between the state and the discharge of McLellan from his employment with MPL. Absent state action, there is no cause of action under § 1983.

Federal regulation alone does not create state action under § 1983 when the challenged company conduct has only an attenuated connection to state regulation.

Molinar v. Western Electric Company · filed 1976-03-22

the focus here is rather on federal involvement that is irrelevant under § 1983.

A heavily regulated and subsidized political party is subject to Fourteenth Amendment limits when allocating public funds, supporting a § 1983 claim.

McKenna v. Reilly · filed 1976-09-13

In light of the extensive regulation and subsidization of the Democratic party in the case at bar, the court finds that the party is under the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it allocates public funds directly to certain of its candidates. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is denied.

Detailed regulation or public funding alone does not make private hospital conduct state action under § 1983; the regulatory scheme must encourage, aid, or assist the alleged rights violation.

Hobbins v. Methodist Hospital · filed 1976-09-14

The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that in order for the regulating scheme, adopted by the state and implemented by the defendant, to convert the private action into state action that scheme must somehow encourage, aid, or assist the private entity to violate the rights of the plaintiff.

A private hospital’s restriction on a chiropractor’s laboratory access is not a § 1983 violation when the alleged state involvement and classification do not establish a constitutional deprivation.

Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 1976-09-27

The restriction of the use of its clinical laboratory is therefore not a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A private university’s receipt of public funds and regulation does not establish state action under § 1983 without sufficient state interdependence.

Melanson v. Rantoul · filed 1976-10-19

This Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to show that Rhode Island has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with RISD as to make it a joint participant in RISD’s alleged discrimination.

A private nursing home’s receipt of benefits, financial assistance, and extensive regulation does not by itself establish state action for § 1983.

Mills v. Fox · filed 1976-10-21

If anything, there is even less reason to find state action by a nursing home than by a public utility.

A de facto licensing theory can state a valid Section 1983 claim independently of a stigma-plus claim that requires false defamatory statements.

Phillips v. Vandygriff · filed 1983-08-15

This ruling was correct under a “stigma-plus” section 1983 claim. However, as we have discussed at length, Phillips also put forth a valid de facto licensing section 1983 claim.

A private business does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because state law or agencies regulate it.

Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1984-04-23

However, plaintiffs do suggest that USG, as a regulated business, acted under color of state law so as to make 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applicable to this case. To accept this erroneous assertion would impose virtually limitless liability upon nearly every member of this regulated society.

A person is subject to Section 1983 suit only when the alleged federal-rights infringement is fairly attributable to the state; public funding and regulation alone do not make a private health agency’s employment decisions state action.

Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems Agency · filed 1984-06-18

[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights “fairly attributable to the State?” ... The requisite federal or state action is not shown by the record.

Extensive government regulation of a private hospital, plus its receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and its tax-exempt status, do not transform the hospital into a state actor for purposes of the "under color of state law" requirement of Section 1983.

Dr. Eileen T. MENDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Dr. Robert BELTON, Presbyterian Hospital, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1984-07-18

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Mendez has failed to prove that the hospital acted “under color of state law” in deciding to suspend her staff privileges. Every circuit that has addressed the issue has decided that extensive government regulation and the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and tax-exempt status do not transform an otherwise private hospital into a governmental actor.

A private hospital's compliance with a general state requirement to adopt bylaws does not make actions under those bylaws state action for Section 1983 purposes when the state neither approves the bylaws nor monitors the actions.

Garst v. Stoco, Inc. · filed 1985-01-09

The state does not approve the bylaws adopted by a hospital, nor does the state monitor any actions taken by a hospital pursuant to its bylaws. Actions taken pursuant to such bylaws cannot then be fairly said to be that of the state. Therefore, plaintiff cannot prevail on a section 1983 claim.

State regulation of a bank does not convert its private lending activity into state action for Section 1983 purposes.

Rynearson v. First Nat. Bank of Rochester · filed 1985-02-20

Even though the bank is an entity subject to regulation by the state, such regulation does not convert the bank’s private loan actions to state action.

A private employer’s notice to the state of a personnel decision, without state participation in or control over that decision, does not satisfy § 1983’s state-action requirement.

Edwards v. Lutheran Senior Services of Dover, Inc. · filed 1985-02-21

Mere notification given to the state of a decision made by a private party, without more, is inadequate to show a nexus between the state and the decision.

Extensive public funding, regulation, certification, and referrals do not by themselves make a private nonprofit drug-treatment provider and its employees state actors subject to § 1983.

Graves v. Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc. · filed 1985-04-04

In view of the facts before the Court, plaintiff has not presented sufficient information to establish that the actions of the above-named defendants were under color of law. ... Therefore, Nasco, along with its employees, Maliaka Horne, Judy Miller and John Washington are dismissed from the action because there are insufficient facts to establish that these defendants acted under color of law.

A utility regulator acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when it applies its own acceptability standard to charitable contributions during ratemaking.

Cahill v. Public Service Commission · filed 1985-05-14

State action is present in each instance where the PSC applies its “relevant civic responsibility” test during the rate-making process.

A privately owned telephone company's termination of service for nonpayment is not state action under section 1983, even when the company is regulated and holds a local monopoly.

Kearson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, a Georgia Corp., and American Telephone and Telegraph Comp · filed 1985-06-12

we hold that there is no state action involved when a privately-owned telephone company ... terminates service to a customer for nonpayment of bills. Kearson therefore fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Private hospitals do not act under color of state law in denying staff privileges merely because they receive public funds, enjoy tax and licensing benefits, or have educational ties to a state university, absent a nexus between the state and the challenged decision.

Kaczanowski v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont · filed 1985-06-19

The record at hand fails to achieve the essential link between the MCHV staff privileges decision and the State of Vermont to meet the demands of state action within the sense and purpose of the Civil Rights Act. This aspect of the plaintiffs’ complaints against MCHV and FAH must be dismissed for lack of state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A private corporation's receipt of substantial public funding does not alone make it a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Wright v. No Skiter Incorporated · filed 1985-10-02

That defendant's receipt of substantial amounts of public funding is not adequate to convert its status to that of a public corporation for purposes of this Section 1983 action. ... We agree. Plaintiff has not established his claim under Sec. 1983.

Extensive state regulation and a state-granted charter do not by themselves convert a private law school’s conduct into state action for § 1983.

Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University · filed 1985-12-23

Also, neither the presence of extensive state regulation, nor the existence of a state-granted charter can show the type of pervasive interdependence required to convert private action to state action.

State authority supporting a private involuntary commitment does not make a private treatment facility's specific conduct state action under § 1983 without a nexus between that authority and the challenged conduct.

William "Billy" Jarrell, Jr. v. Chemical Dependency Unit of Acadiana · filed 1986-06-09

Although the state may have forced Jar-rell’s confinement and treatment, he has not alleged, and the record is barren of evidence to show, that the state’s authority was linked to the specific conduct of CDUA’s private employees complained of here. There is no nexus between the state’s authority and the conduct alleged to be unconstitutional.

A private medical-accreditation body acts under color of state law when the state delegates to it an essential part of the state's physician-licensing function.

St. Agnes Hospital of the City of Baltimore, Inc. v. Riddick · filed 1987-08-31

The nexus between the state’s delegation of authority to the defendant, and the claims of the plaintiff, is direct. ... Taking these factors into account, the court finds that “state action” exists in this case.

A state's threat to prosecute a utility unless it terminates a customer's service converts the utility's termination into state action under § 1983.

Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1987-09-14

The county attorney’s threat of prosecution provided the requisite “nexus” between the state and the challenged action.