42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

CN Ex Rel. JN v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. · filed 2004-06-03

A Section 1983 action has two essential elements: 1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

McClung v. CAMP COUNTY, TEX. · filed 1986-01-27

The two (2) essential elements of any section 1983 action are: 1) the complained of conduct must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) this conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A state administrative proceeding is not part of a § 1983 action merely because the plaintiff was required to attend it.

Leonard J. Brooks, M.D. v. Lamar Alexander, Governor of the State of Tennessee, and William Leech, Attorney General of t · filed 1986-12-09

We reject plaintiff's claim that because he was required to appear before the Board of Medical Advisers the administrative proceeding was required for the section 1983 suit.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right by someone acting under color of state law.

Costello v. Town of Fairfield · filed 1987-02-12

To state a claim under section 1983, a complaint must allege that the defendant deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that such deprivation was committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits an action based on an official's failure to perform an affirmative duty when that failure substantially contributes to a constitutional liberty or property violation and the official acts with deliberate indifference.

Kathy Jo Taylor, a Minor, by and Through David S. Walker, Jr., Attorney at Law as Guardian Ad Litem v. Ledbette · filed 1987-06-09

We address first the requirements for an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For a section 1983 action to arise where an official is charged with failing to exercise an affirmative duty, two requirements must be satisfied. First, the failure to act must have been a substantial factor leading to the violation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). Second, the official having the responsibility to act must display deliberate indifference. Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980). These two requirements have been adequately pleaded in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a person acting under color of state law when that conduct deprives someone of a federal or state constitutional right.

Young v. Wall · filed 2005-03-05

In order to maintain an action under § 1983, the conduct of which Young complains must be committed by a person acting under the color of state law and the conduct must have deprived him of a federal or state constitutional right.

Section 1983 lets a person sue when state actors deprive the person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Drogan v. Ward · filed 1987-12-17

To state a cause of action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, Drogan must allege that acting under color of state law the respondents deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Shaw v. COOSA COUNTY COM'N. · filed 2005-10-26

This statute provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law [10] deprives a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional or federal-rights violation by a defendant acting under color of official authority.

Reichley v. Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture · filed 2005-11-02

Accordingly, there can be no cause of action under § 1983 absent violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The defendant must also act under color of official authority.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of a constitutional right by someone acting under color of state law.

Harmon v. Delaware Secretary of State · filed 2005-11-08

To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege or immunity by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for depriving the person of rights secured by federal law.

Harris v. Olszewski · filed 2006-03-21

We agree that Medicaid's freedom-of-choice provision creates a private right that may be enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a claim when a person acting under color of state law deprives another of rights secured by federal law.

Guajardo v. McAdams · filed 1972-09-25

There is also no question that the instant case fulfills all the qualifications for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the essential elements being, “(1) that the conduct complained of was by a person acting under color of state statutes or local law, custom or usage, and (2) while so acting, deprived another of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 1971).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Shirden v. Cordero · filed 2007-09-21

A plaintiff asserting civil rights violations under § 1983 must establish that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive him or her of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured elsewhere in federal law but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Sanders v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2007-10-02

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a constitutional or federally protected right.

Whitworth v. Regents of University of California · filed 2008-04-18

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the United States Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives another of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws.

Hout v. City of Mansfield · filed 2008-04-23

However, even if properly pled in conjunction, the Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is inadequate because the Plaintiffs have not alleged, nor have they provided evidence, that they were deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United states, a deprivation which was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity.

Bernstein v. New York · filed 2008-08-08

In order to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the conduct complained of was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law, and that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish standing and a constitutional violation to maintain a claim.

Lepley v. Dresser · filed 1988-01-08

In order to maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, plaintiff must have standing to seek relief. ... In order to maintain a Section 1983 claim, plaintiff must first establish that a violation of constitutional dimension occurred. ... Failure to establish a constitutional violation is fatal to plaintiffs claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a federal right was violated by a person acting under color of state law.

Collier v. Austin Peay State University · filed 2009-03-26

The Reports and Recommendations (Docket Nos. 86, 87) are ACCEPTED and made the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this court. ... Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of federally secured rights.

Mayberry v. Spicer · filed 1992-11-24

To maintain a action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two essential elements must be pled and proved. First, the conduct complained of must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and second, the conduct must deprive the person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 creates a private right of action for damages and injunctive relief when state or local actors deprive a person of constitutional or statutory rights.

Williams v. Alabama State University · filed 1994-10-12

Section 1983 creates a private right of action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies whose conduct under the color of state or local law deprives a plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities “secured by the Constitution or laws.”

Section 1983 authorizes relief for violations of federally protected rights by someone acting under color of state law but creates no rights itself.

Perry-Bey v. City of Norfolk, Va. · filed 2010-01-14

The statute, which authorizes a court to grant relief when a party’s federally protected rights have been violated by a state or local official or other person who acted under color of state law, does not itself create any rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere rather than creating substantive rights itself.

Powell v. Nunley · filed 2010-01-14

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but merely provides a remedy for deprivations of rights that are established elsewhere.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Zinnia I. Chen v. Hon. Kenneth R. Lester, Jr. · filed 2010-02-01

In order to prevail on an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not make simple negligence actionable and requires conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner's rights.

Smith v. Regional Director of Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2010-02-10

Thus, simple negligence is not actionable under § 1983, and a plaintiff must allege “a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner’s rights.” Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Rodriguez-Torres v. GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT BANK · filed 2010-02-23

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) creates a remedy for those who are deprived of the rights, privileges, or immunities granted to them by the Constitution or laws of the Unites States. See Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). In order to succeed in a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiffs must prove that someone has deprived them of a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that the perpetrator acted under color of state law. Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montañez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir.2000).

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim based on section 1396a(a)(17) when that provision provides no private right of action.

Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly · filed 2010-02-24

While it is true that Watson precludes Plaintiffs from bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on section 1396a(a)(17), it does not prevent them from stating a claim under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law and permits direct liability for officers who fail to intervene during a constitutional violation.

Terry v. Bailey · filed 2010-04-27

“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law,” that is, a person who “acts with authority possessed by virtue of his employment with the state.” ... Prison correctional officers may be held directly liable under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to intervene when a ... constitutional violation occurs in their presence.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights committed under color of state law.

Baumgardner v. Town of Ruston · filed 2010-04-28

“Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States when the deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants acting under color of state or District of Columbia law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Rice v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-07

To prevail in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendants, acting under color of state or D.C. law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law.

Niarchos v. City of Beverly · filed 2011-07-26

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, Niarchos must show that the individual defendants 1) deprived Danielle of a federally protected right; and 2) were acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Trapp v. Clarke · filed 2012-09-28

An action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 will succeed if the facilities, under color of state law, deprived the inmates of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law. ... Because the tobacco ban and the SBCC sweat lodge closure deprived the inmates of rights secured by the First Amendment and the RLUIPA, the inmates are entitled to prevail on their cause of action under §1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of rights secured by federal law.

Ridge v. Campbell · filed 2013-10-25

Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors. ... To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Peraica v. Riverside-Brookside High School District No. 208 · filed 2013-10-31

Here, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish liability under section 1983 because it fails to allege any recognizable violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. We hold that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under section 1983 and the trial court correctly dismissed their complaint.

Section 1983 lets a plaintiff sue for deprivation of a constitutional or federal right under color of state law.

Logan v. Hall · filed 2015-03-20

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a method to vindicate federal rights against persons acting under color of state law.

Transitional Services of New York for Long Island, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2015-03-20

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, (2) by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a constitutional or federal-law right deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.

Berkery v. Wissahickon School Board · filed 2015-03-27

In general, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a procedure for redress when state actors deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution.

Bartels v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor · filed 2015-03-31

Section 1983 establishes liability for deprivation under the color of state law “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights and requires a defendant's causal responsibility for the deprivation.

Duehning v. Aurora East Unified School School District 131 · filed 2015-04-20

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, “subjects, - or causes to be subjected, any citizen' of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 • U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, “it is a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.” Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). Individual liability under section'-1983 must be based upon a finding that the defendant caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir.2003). In -other words, “[a]n official causes a constitutional violation if he sets in motion a series of events that defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights.” Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 487 (7th. Cir.2011), (internal ¡quotation - marks and citation omitted).

Section 1983 provides a remedy against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Harris v. Goderick · filed 2015-04-22

A claimant is entitled to relief under § 1983 if he can prove that a person acting under color of state law committed an act that deprived him of some right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Accordingly, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Harris, his complaint did not allege facts sufficient to support a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against any named defendant.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Shepard v. Hansford County · filed 2015-05-22

“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir.2005). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Brenda Vera and Hansford County violated Lacy Cuccaro’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide Lacy with adequate protection from her known suicidal tendencies while she was a pretrial detainee at the Hans-ford County jail. Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that (A) Brenda Yera is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity; and (B) Hansford County is not liable for the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons whose actions under color of state law deprive others of rights secured by federal law.

United States v. Washington · filed 1985-12-31

Thus, while neither the United States nor the intervening tribes pleaded these claims specifically under § 1983, ... the allegations satisfy the requirements for pleading claims of deprivation of statutorily-secured rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief for constitutional deprivations by persons acting under color of state law and requires a plaintiff to establish a violated right and the officer’s inability to reasonably believe the conduct was lawful.

Faust v. State · filed 2015-12-09

To obtain relief pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law. ... If a plaintiff shows that he had a clearly established right that was violated, the next inquiry is whether a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue someone acting under color of law who deprives them of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Daniczek v. Spencer · filed 2016-01-11

“Section 1983, which imposes civil liability on any person who, under color of law, deprives another person of federal constitutional or statutory rights, is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a state tort claim absent a constitutional due process interest and conduct that shocks the conscience.

Ramos Piñero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2005-03-02

Foremost, the deceased in this case was never under the “custody” of the Municipality. As such, he did not have a constitutional due process interest at the time of his death. Second, any reckless indifference and/or gross negligence by the Municipality in this case does not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience” necessary to invoke Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Lozano v. City of Hazleton · filed 2007-07-26

Thus, to establish a claim under section 1983, two criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law. Second, the conduct must deprive the complainant of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law, but it does not itself create substantive rights.

Boyd v. TOWN OF RANSOM CANYON, TEX. · filed 2008-04-10

To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... The parties appearing to be in agreement that no § 1983/PRB-l claims are cognizable under the relevant case law, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ claims asserted as § 1983/PRB-l are DISMISSED.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Dennis v. Warden, Ware State Prison · filed 2016-04-22

To succeed on a § 1983 action, “a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that a person acting under state or District of Columbia law deprived the plaintiff of constitutional or federal rights.

Young v. American Legion · filed 2016-04-26

To state a claim under § 1983, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that a person acting under color of State or District of Columbia law committed an action which deprived the plaintiff of rights protected under the United States Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state or District of Columbia law.

Robinson v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-08-02

To state a claim under § 1983, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that a person acting under color of State or District of Columbia law committed an action which deprived the plaintiff of rights protected under the United States Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to show that the challenged conduct was committed under color of state law and deprived the claimant of a constitutional right.

Thomas v. State, Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Environmental Health, Food Safety & Sanitation · filed 2016-08-26

“To sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a claimant] must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 provides no substantive rights; a plaintiff must establish a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Swallow v. Corizon, LLC · filed 2020-06-03

In reply, defendants correctly argue that § 1983 provides no substantive rights, and that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege a violation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Del Campo v. Community of Hope · filed 2020-07-07

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it does not allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States or that Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and the violation of a federally protected right.

Brown v. Winscott · filed 2022-02-18

There is no indication that the defendant acted under color of state law or violated a federally protected constitutional right, such as might support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead that the defendant deprived them of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

Collins v. Wajeh · filed 2022-02-28

Because plaintiff does not allege that defendants deprived him of a federal right while acting under color of state law, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 liability for inadequate prison medical care is not avoided by contracting that care to a private provider.

Toombs v. Bell · filed 1990-09-24

Toombs contends that the district court based its ruling in favor of these defendants on the ground that the defendants had absolved themselves from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by contracting the provision of inmate health care to a private organization. We agree with Toombs that such a holding would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (footnote omitted), in which the Court said: ... Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury.

Cummings v. Roberts · filed 1980-08-01

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury.

Hutchings v. Corum · filed 1980-06-27

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to recover for cruel and unusual punishment when prison authorities act with deliberate or callous indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs.

Fielder v. Bosshard · filed 1979-02-21

In order to establish a prima facie § 1983 case of cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must prove that the prison authorities acted with deliberate or callous indifference to his serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits a claim when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' medical needs, and related incidents may establish a pattern sufficient to proceed to trial.

Jere Bishop v. Kent R. Stoneman, Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Vermont, and Julius v. Moeykens, Warden, Ve · filed 1974-12-04

Taking the factual allegations as true, we think that they state a claim for relief under Section 1983. ... A series of incidents closely related in time, within several months as these are, may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. We hold the cumu-lation of incidents alleged in the complaint entitled plaintiffs to a trial of the underlying allegation of deliberate indifference to their medical needs.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner alleging improper medical treatment by prison authorities to plead an abuse of discretion in providing that treatment.

Freddie Bernard Lawrence, Jr. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida · filed 1971-04-07

In similar suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we have held that in order to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the complaint must allege an abuse of discretion by prison authorities in providing medical treatment for prisoners.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for mere negligence in providing or failing to provide medical care to a state prisoner; the alleged conduct must reach a constitutionally actionable level.

Church v. Hegstrom · filed 1969-10-09

Mere negligence in giving or failing to supply medical treatment alone will not suffice, since all rights existing under state law are not also federal rights carrying a federal remedy. ... But the alleged non-action of a prison doctor who was not claimed to have any role in supervising prisoners outside the jail infirmary and whose attention presumably was never called to Church’s illness, for example, while it might conceivably be negligence, could in no way rise to the level of a § 1983 violation of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue prison officials for inadequate medical care when the alleged conduct rises to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and thus cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; mere negligence or poor medical judgment is insufficient.

Martinez v. Vincent R. Mancusi, Warden, Attica Prison, Dr. Williams, Dr. Stamburg, and Nurse Hoffman, Attica Prison · filed 1970-10-08

An action against prison officials for inadequate medical care may be brought under the Civil Rights Act in the federal district courts when the prisoner’s allegations rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ... Martinez’s allegations in this case meet the criteria of Hegstrum and Hyde for an Eighth Amendment violation and thus a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. ... Clearly, then, the defendants’ conduct, as alleged by Martinez, was more than mere negligence or poor medical judgment; it is charged to have been deliberate indifference to, and defiance of, explicit medical instructions, resulting in serious and obvious injuries. Although we express no opinion on whether appellant should ultimately prevail in his suit, we hold that the facts as alleged are sufficient to constitute a violation of his constitutional rights and thus to state a eause of action under the Civil Rights Act; hence they are sufficient to warrant a hearing on the question.

Section 1983 makes the intentional deprivation of essential medical care actionable, but a disagreement between a physician and patient about the adequacy of treatment actually provided does not by itself create a constitutional claim.

Davis v. Schmidt · filed 1972-11-16

It is well-settled that intentional deprivation of essential medical care is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 985, 85 S.Ct. 1355, 14 L.Ed.2d 277 (1965); Schack v. State of Florida, 391 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 392 U.S. 916, 88 S.Ct. 2080, 20 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1968); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2nd Cir. 1970). However, a difference in opinion between physician and patient concerning the adequacy of medical treatment actually provided does not give rise to a constitutional claim under § 1983. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F. 2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968); Henderson v. Pate, 409 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1969); Fear v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 278, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1969); Roy v. Wainwright, 418 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969).

A prisoner's denial-of-medical-care claim under § 1983 requires alleged intent to harm or an injury or illness so severe or obvious as to require medical attention; mere negligence is insufficient absent conscience-shocking conduct.

Page v. Sharpe · filed 1973-10-29

We are impressed with the rule stated in Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (C.A.2 1969), i. e. that a denial of medical care to a prisoner is actionable under § 1983 only if the complaint alleges: (1) either an intent to harm the inmate, or (2) an injury or illness so severe or obvious as to require medical attention. Mere negligence, in the absence of conduct which shocks the conscience, in giving- or failing to supply medical treatment to prisoners will not suffice.

Section 1983 provides an actionable claim when prison officials are alleged to have totally deprived an inmate of needed medical care; a mere disagreement over the adequacy of treatment does not state a constitutional claim.

Pinon v. State of Wisconsin · filed 1973-11-19

While courts generally refuse to second-guess the professional judgment of physicians who actually treat inmates, it is clear that allegations of what amounts to the total deprivation of needed medical care state an actionable claim under § 1983; such allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and require an answer on the merits.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for medical mistreatment only when the challenged treatment amounts to a constitutional deprivation, characterized here as conduct that shocks the conscience.

Blakey v. Sheriff of Albemarle County · filed 1974-01-04

In order to establish a constitutional deprivation cognizable pursuant to § 1983 the treatment complained of must suggest “conduct that shocks the conscience.” ... The circumstances of this controversy indicate that plaintiff has failed to present a constitutional deprivation, and therefore, it is appropriate to order that his complaint be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a potential remedy for state prisoners deprived of essential medical care, depending on the facts and circumstances.

Ross v. Bounds · filed 1974-03-26

Viewing the authority above and taking the plaintiffs’ contention as true, this Court feels they have recourse under § 1983 only if they were deprived of essential medical care by the State, depending on all the facts and circumstances.

Section 1983 requires egregious acts or omissions for a state prisoner to state a claim based on inadequate medical care.

Williams v. Manson · filed 1974-04-29

Assuming his allegations to be true, petitioner has nevertheless failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This is especially so in view of the egregious acts or omissions required to state a claim for relief from inadequate medical care of a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Here where petitioner was ultimately transported to a medical facility without further harm, no abridgement of petitioner’s civil rights occurred.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to state a claim based on major surgery performed without consent when it was not required by a compelling prison interest, or on prolonged denial of necessary analgesics.

Roosevelt Runnels v. David Rosendale, M.D., and Roland P. Young, M.D. · filed 1974-06-21

Allegations that prison medical personnel performed major surgical procedures upon the body of an inmate, without his consent and over his known objections, that were not required to preserve his life or further a compelling interest of imprisonment or prison security, may foreshadow proof of conduct violative of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to justify judgment under the Civil Rights Act. ... Similarly, the allegations that plaintiff-appellant was left in severe pain for an extended period of time without necessary and available analgesic relief were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a state official to allege a clear violation of constitutional or other federally protected rights; inadequate prisoner medical care must involve obvious neglect or intentional misconduct sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment or endanger life.

Freeman v. A. L. Lockhart, Supt., Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1974-10-09

Any suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official must be based upon a claim arising out of a clear violation of the complainant’s constitutional or other federally protected rights. ... Here, the claimed inadequacy of treatment must be predicated on obvious neglect or intentional misconduct by the prison officials, ... and must be so heinous as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment as that term is used in the Eighth Amendment or so endanger the prisoner’s physical well-being that his Fourteenth Amendment right to life is violated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages based solely on negligence; liability requires a knowing failure or refusal to provide urgently needed medical care that causes preventable residual injury, subject to prison officials' discretion in authorized medical procedures.

Scharfenberger v. Holmes · filed 1974-11-13

The common denominator of the authorities and their applicability to the instant ease is clear. There must have been a knowing failure or refusal to provide urgently needed medical care, the consummate effect of which caused a residual injury which could have been prevented with timely attention. To this criteria must be added the wide discretion allowed prison officials in their treatment of prisoners under authorized medical procedures, and the absolute bar to basing any Section 1983 ease on negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for mere negligence in providing medical care to a prisoner.

Goode v. Hartman · filed 1975-02-03

Accordingly, the Court holds that the allegations of the complaint setting forth conclusory allegations of mere negligence on the part of defendant in making medical care available to plaintiff’s decedent are insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983— the sole federal statute involved here.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a prisoner's claim that state officials provided constitutionally inadequate medical care.

J. W. Gamble v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1975-08-04

We can only conclude that Gamble has stated an actionable claim under Section 1983 for inadequate medical care.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a prisoner's mere difference of opinion with physicians about necessary and proper medical treatment.

Ray v. Parrish · filed 1975-08-05

Based upon the prison medical records, which plaintiff has not contested, the Court finds that this apparent difference of opinion between the plaintiff and the physicians as to what treatment is necessary and proper does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits consideration of constitutional claims about inadequate prison medical care even when a prisoner also seeks release, but the alleged care must amount to a constitutional deprivation to support relief.

Henderson v. The Secretary of Corrections · filed 1975-08-25

Determining that immediate or speedy release is not within the scope of a civil rights action does not preclude or eliminate jurisdiction to consider constitutional issues raised by allegations of inadequate medical care. ... We cannot say that the inadequacy of appellant’s normal shoes or the omission to provide the corrective shoes gives rise to a constitutional deprivation sustaining a § 1983 claim nor that appellant could elaborate this set of facts to support a claim which would entitle him to relief.

Section 1983 does not make disputes over proper medical treatment actionable; only exceptional circumstances support a claim for inadequate medical care.

Patterson v. Riddle · filed 1976-01-23

Disputes between physicians and prisoners as to the proper treatment are not actionable of § 1983. ... It is only exceptional circumstances that give rise to a § 1983 claim for failure to provide adequate medical care.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue when officials deny reasonable medical requests despite an obvious need, exposing the prisoner to undue suffering or a threat of tangible residual injury.

Westlake v. William Lucas, Sheriff of Wayne County · filed 1976-07-29

That does not mean that every malpractice claim involving a prisoner may be automatically transformed into a cause of action under the civil rights statutes, but it does mean that prison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to the suffering of prisoners under their care. ... We believe that a prisoner states a proper cause of action when he alleges that prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury. ... We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a prisoner who is needlessly allowed to suffer pain when relief is readily available does have a cause of action against those whose deliberate indifference is the cause of his suffering.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when prison officials' deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.

Estelle v. Gamble · filed 1976-11-30

Regardess of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs.

Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison · filed 1976-12-30

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

A mere difference of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff over diagnosis or treatment, without deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, does not alone state a claim under § 1983.

Smart v. Romeo Villar, Chief Medical Officer, Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas · filed 1976-12-30

We have consistently held that the existence of such a difference cannot alone give rise to a cause of action, and if the complaint indicates that such is the case, it must be dismissed.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs violates § 1983.

Monroe v. Bombard · filed 1976-10-22

It is now well settled in this circuit that deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a prisoner violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s request for necessary medical treatment, not mere negligence or disagreement over medical judgment, for a medical claim.

Phillips v. Keve · filed 1976-11-24

It is well settled that a medical claim under § 1983 arises only when defendants’ conduct “shocks the conscience” by, for example, a deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s request for necessary medical treatment. ... Furthermore, no § 1983 claim arises from the mere allegation of negligence in the treatment of a prisoner’s condition or when the claim is based on differences over matters of medical judgment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue when prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment despite an obvious need, exposing the prisoner to undue suffering or a risk of tangible residual injury.

Campbell v. Buckles · filed 1977-06-01

“* * * [A] prisoner states a proper cause of action [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] when he alleges that prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury. * * *”

Section 1983 does not support a claim based only on a prisoner’s disagreement with doctors about diagnosis or the availability of treatment and medication.

Coleman v. Crisp · filed 1977-09-26

They evidence rather a difference of opinion between plaintiff and the doctors concerning diagnosis and the availability of treatment and medication. It is well established that this does not establish the violation of a constitutional right or sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoner medical-care claims based on Eighth Amendment or due-process violations, and an Eighth Amendment claim requires deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Brown v. McGowan · filed 1978-03-10

A § 1983 complaint concerning improper medical care can be presented on two constitutional grounds: (1) cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and (2) denial of due process of law. ... In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner's claim to proceed when prison officials' deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment, even when the complaint refers only to a state-law medical-examination duty.

United States v. Fayette County, Pennsylvania · filed 1979-06-15

The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because appellant had alleged only a failure to comply with a state statute and not a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law. ... We conclude that because Pennsylvania law provides that all prisoners shall receive a medical examination within 48 hours after admission to the institution, such inaction as is alleged on the part of defendants, under the specific circumstances of this case, would constitute a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," proscribed by the eighth amendment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on a difference of opinion between prison medical personnel and a prisoner regarding treatment.

Jackson v. Moore · filed 1979-06-18

Similarly, a difference of opinion between prison medical personnel and a prisoner regarding treatment cannot serve as a basis for a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not compensate pain caused by a brief lapse in prescribed diet or medication unless the pain was deliberately inflicted in wanton disregard of the prisoner’s rights.

Russell v. Enser · filed 1979-07-06

If it must be conceded that plaintiff experienced some pain that can be attributed to the lapse in his diet and medication, such pain is not compensable under § 1983 unless he can show it was deliberately inflicted in a wanton disregard for his rights.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to recover for denial of medical care when a defendant acting under color of law unreasonably refuses that care.

Holly v. Rapone · filed 1979-08-31

It is well established that a pretrial detainee is entitled to medical attention and a defendant acting under “color of law” who unreasonably refuses to provide medical care is liable under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner claiming medical mistreatment to allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference of serious medical needs.

Smith v. Thomas · filed 1979-09-07

In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference of serious medical needs.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner alleging inadequate medical care to show a constitutional tort caused by official municipal policy and acts demonstrating deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Martin v. New York City Department of Correction · filed 1981-08-14

To come within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner must show that he suffered a constitutional tort as a result of action taken pursuant to official municipal policy. He must also allege acts which evidence a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

A prisoner states a cognizable § 1983 medical-care claim only by alleging acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Lowrence v. Scully · filed 1983-06-13

[i]n order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

An Eighth Amendment medical-care claim under Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference by the defendant.

Miller v. Schacht · filed 1983-08-02

Where medical claims are presented under the Eighth Amendment, there must be a showing of “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendant to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jailer’s knowing delay of dental care for an inmate suffering severe pain may establish an Eighth Amendment deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Fields v. Gander · filed 1984-05-23

In our view, Fields' allegations could support a finding of an eighth amendment deprivation in violation of section 1983.

A prisoner's deliberate self-injury does not bar a Section 1983 claim for officials' failure to provide adequate medical care.

Ralph Partridge and Betty Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas · filed 1985-02-04

We hold, however, that this distinction is not a bar to a section 1983 cause of action.

Police violate a detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983 by deliberately denying medical assistance they know is needed, but negligence or poor judgment is insufficient.

Brown v. Komidar · filed 1985-05-07

To show deliberate indifference, defendants must deny decedent medical assistance when they know such assistance is needed. Arguably, defendants' conduct in failing to notice the bullet wound in decedent's abdomen was negligent. But since this shows carelessness at worst, there is no element of deliberateness present.

State prison medical personnel are liable under Section 1983 only when their conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs.

Johnson v. Jones · filed 1986-03-19

The trial court was correct in finding that “[m]edical personnel employed in state prisons can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when their actions may be characterized as deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs.”

Negligent medical treatment without deliberate or willful deprivation of serious medical care is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Reeves v. Gary Livesay, Linda Dodson, Virginia Lewis, Willie Grace Angle and Dottie Wyatt · filed 1986-04-09

Even applying these liberal standards, however, plaintiff's claims against defendants are not cognizable under Section 1983. Although defendants' action in dispensing the same allergen to plaintiff twice may be viewed as negligent, there is no evidence of record to show that defendants acted deliberately or willfully to deprive the plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

A private physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under color of state law and may be liable under Section 1983.

Ort v. Dr. Pinchback Correctional Medical Systems Board of Corrections · filed 1986-04-15

Turning to the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Dr. Pinchback, we hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that a physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates does not act under color of state law.

A prisoner states a Section 1983 medical-care claim by showing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs that rises to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Jorden v. Harold Farrier, Paul Loeffelholz and Cripus Nix · filed 1986-04-17

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of medical care, Jorden must establish that defendants’ conduct amounted to “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” ... In order to find an eighth amendment violation, the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need must rise to the level of an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Negligent diagnosis or treatment, without more, does not sustain a section 1983 claim for inadequate prison medical care.

Esnouf v. Matty · filed 1986-05-08

Since the allegations against the defendants sound in negligence only, they fail to meet the standards necessary to sustain a § 1983 action.

A prisoner asserting inadequate medical care under section 1983 must allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; negligence is insufficient.

Jones v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director R. Vanderkolk Pamela Withrow Sam Spade John Wireman Don Wood Mr. Dixon and T · filed 1986-05-09

A prisoner in a section 1983 action claiming that medical treatment violated his civil rights must allege acts or omissions amounting to a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ... An allegation of mere negligence in diagnosis or treatment is not actionable under section 1983.

A detainee need not face a danger of death before a jail official's failure to provide medical treatment may support § 1983 liability for deliberate indifference to a serious illness or injury.

Richards v. Dunbar · filed 1986-06-03

A jail inmate need not be in danger of dying before jail officials must provide or obtain medical treatment for a prisoner.

Prison medical mistreatment is actionable under § 1983 only if it rises to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Smith v. Landon · filed 1986-08-01

Likewise, Smith's claims of --medical mistreatment do not rise to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1977) ,necessary to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner's dissatisfaction that officials did not treat every medical problem is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim when the record shows the prisoner received medical attention.

Hughes v. Paul Smith, Sheriff of Rhea County, Tennessee and Rhea County Sheriff's Department · filed 1986-08-12

The appellant's third contention of lack of adequate medical care fails because the affidavit of Charles O. Swafford, jail administrator and records custodian for the Rhea County Jail, evidences that the appellant did receive medical attention. The failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction is insufficient to support a claim under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; mere disagreement over treatment is insufficient.

Crowder v. Correctional Medical Systems · filed 1986-10-31

In order to sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate medical care, a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. ... The allegation of a mere disagreement with prison physicians as to what is necessary and proper treatment fails to state a claim for relief.

A prisoner's § 1983 inadequate-medical-care claim must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Chapman v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, and Odie Jones · filed 1987-05-04

The plaintiff's claims of inadequate medical care do not show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

A § 1983 medical-care claim fails without deliberate indifference; disagreement with trained medical personnel about hospital selection is insufficient.

Sowells v. Robeson County Sheriff Department Hubert Stone · filed 1987-06-04

It is clear that there was no deliberate indifference to Sowells's serious medical needs. ... Sowells's disagreement with medical personnel about where he was taken is of no consequence.

Repeated medical examination and treatment defeat a § 1983 prisoner-care claim when the complaint cannot show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Carpenter v. P v. Tanedo, M.D. · filed 1987-06-17

It is clear from the plaintiff's complaint that he was examined and treated by the defendant, the prison physician, on several occasions. In addition, the prison inspector arranged to have him examined by a different physician. It will be impossible for the plaintiff to show that he was the victim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need as required by Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Negligence does not state a § 1983 claim, and conclusory allegations of inadequate medical care do not establish deliberate indifference.

Dillon v. George W. Wilson, Secretary of the Bureau of Corrections of the State of Kentucky · filed 1987-06-29

The Supreme Court has established that the mere negligent conduct of prison officials is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Furthermore, the mere conclusory allegation of failure to provide medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs' standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), which interpreted the eighth amendment.

A § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs survives summary judgment when circumstantial evidence permits a jury to find that responding officers failed to attend properly to an injured person.

Tagstrom v. Pottebaum · filed 1987-07-08

However, the Court believes that a jury question exists on the issue of whether Defendant Enockson and the other officers at the scene were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.

Prison officials act with more than mere negligence when they deliberately defy a prisoner's doctors' express instructions.

Gill v. Mooney · filed 1987-07-16

Prison officials are more than merely negligent if they deliberately defy the express instructions of a prisoner's doctors.

A prisoner's § 1983 claim based on medical care fails when the allegations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Stanley v. Kurt Fox, Dr. Jim Saladrigas, Nurse · filed 1987-08-06

Because the dispositive issues recently have been decided authoritatively, we dispense with oral argument and affirm the judgment below on the basis that plaintiff's claims do not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

A pretrial detainee seeking § 1983 damages for inadequate medical care must establish deliberate indifference to a serious illness or injury, with expert evidence when seriousness is not apparent to a layperson.

Boring v. Kozakiewicz · filed 1987-11-16

As laymen, the jury would not be in a position to decide whether any of the conditions described by plaintiffs could be classified as "serious." In these circumstances, the district court properly required expert medical opinion, West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir.1978), Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d at 1081, and in its absence properly withdrew the issue from the jury.

Section 1983 does not support a prisoner’s improper-medical-treatment claim based on mere negligence; the conduct must shock the conscience or constitute a barbarous act.

McCloud v. Delaney · filed 1988-01-25

Mere negligence will not support a claim under § 1983; there must be some conduct that “shocks the conscience” or a “barbarous act.”

A prisoner alleging inadequate medical care under Section 1983 must state facts showing deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Ross v. Dr. Schipper, Dermatologist · filed 1988-02-25

Ross alleges that he received inept treatment for his acne condition between November, 1985 and August 15, 1986, and that the failure to cure or improve his condition constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, he does not state facts which demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need on the part of the doctor, as is necessary to succeed on such a claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s medical care claim to survive summary judgment when a prolonged delay in needed surgery raises a factual dispute about deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Hathaway v. Coughlin · filed 1988-03-09

His complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleges that the appellees unconstitutionally deprived him of necessary medical care by denying him treatment for a hip condition for over a year beginning on July 10, 1981. ... We believe this is a sufficient allegation to survive a motion for summary judgment under Archer because it raises a factual dispute as to whether the appellees showed deliberate indifference to Hathaway's serious medical needs in the period after July 10, 1981.

A prisoner claiming denial of medical treatment under § 1983 must present evidence of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Hardy v. Hamilton · filed 1988-04-12

George T. Hardy, a Virginia prisoner, filed this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need and denied him treatment for a broken arm. ... To the contrary, the materials before the Court suggest that the district court correctly found the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite deliberate indifference.

A prisoner states a Section 1983 claim against prison medical personnel for denied care only if the denial involves deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Washington v. Lisa Miller, the P.A. · filed 1988-04-26

However, prison medical personnel only violate the Eighth Amendment if they show deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Washington admits that his medical needs were not serious, he has failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims for inadequate medical care of pretrial detainees use the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference standard.

Thomas v. Town of Davie · filed 1988-06-21

Although the Supreme Court in City of Revere did not define a city’s due process obligations to a pretrial detainee, we have applied the Estelle v. Gamble “deliberate indifference” standard to claims of improper medical care by plaintiffs like Thomas.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue a claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need; alleged refusal of previously scheduled surgery warranted further development before dismissal as frivolous.

Dace v. Solem · filed 1988-07-19

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner who alleges acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Dace alleges not only that his nasal condition causes pain, but that he was scheduled for surgery to treat the condition before being imprisoned and that penitentiary officials, despite being aware of his condition, have refused to provide him with necessary medical treatment. Because Dace's complaint was dismissed before discovery was had, there is no way to assess the seriousness of Dace's condition or the necessity of treatment. ... We therefore conclude that Dace should be given a "chance to develop his case to the point at which the courts can determine whether it has merit."

Section 1983 can cover a civil rights claim arising in a medical setting rather than a claim for medical malpractice alone.

Jones v. Mental Health Services of Orange County · filed 1989-06-15

Because we are of the opinion that the cause of action alleged by appellants was one under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, albeit in a medical setting, we find it error to have applied section 768.49(1).

Section 1983 provides the avenue for a pretrial detainee to seek relief for inadequate medical treatment.

Rodney v. Romano · filed 1993-03-10

Accordingly, his redress, if any, is by way of a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and not the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

A corrections department can remain liable for constitutional deprivations in a § 1983 medical care claim after contracting with a private provider.

Reaves v. Department of Correction · filed 2016-07-15

I agree that the DOC’s duty to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals is not absolved by contracting with an entity such as MPCH.

A shareholder cannot maintain a § 1983 action for an injury suffered by the corporation, even if that injury reduces the value of the shareholder’s stock.

Gregory v. Mitchell · filed 1981-01-12

The district court was correct in holding that “neither officers nor stockholders . .. can maintain an action to redress an injury to the corporation even though the value of their stock is impaired as a result of the injury.” ... These holdings, that the Civil Rights action by all individual stockholders must be dismissed and that the First Bank of Macon is an improper party-plaintiff, are eminently correct.

A shareholder lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim for injury to the corporation in which the shareholder owns shares.

Forest Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Mercy Ambulance of Richmond, Inc. · filed 1997-01-15

Shareholders lack standing to bring a § 1983 action claiming injury to the corporation in which they own shares.

Section 1983 requires a shareholder suing over injury to a corporation to show an individual, direct injury.

Flynn v. Merrick · filed 1989-08-07

Filing suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not diminish the requirement that the shareholder suffer some individual, direct injury.

Section 1983 allows shareholders to sue for injuries to their own rights that are direct and independent of the corporation, but not on the corporation's behalf.

Soranno's Gasco, Incorporated v. Morgan · filed 1989-05-15

The defendants' argument appears to be derived from the well-established doctrine that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a section 1983 action on behalf of the corporation in which he owns shares. Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1969). Similarly, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to assert a personal economic injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation. Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 537, 78 L.Ed.2d 717 (1983). However, a shareholder does have standing where he or she has been injured directly and independently of the corporation. Id. In this case, there are direct and independent injuries to the individual plaintiffs.

A shareholder may bring a section 1983 action for a direct injury independent of injury to the corporation.

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 1989-05-15

However, a shareholder does have standing where he or she has been injured directly and independently of the corporation. ... In this case, there are direct and independent injuries to the individual plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not permit a shareholder to sue solely for an alleged violation of a corporation’s rights when the corporation can sue on its own behalf.

Guys & Dolls Billboards, Inc. v. McHale · filed 1988-04-18

As an initial matter, the district court properly dismissed Mrs. Champion's claim. Mrs. Champion alleges no violation of her individual rights, but claims only in her capacity as a shareholder of Guys & Dolls. It is a settled principle of corporate law that shareholders in Mrs. Champion's position lack standing to sue. Guys & Dolls, as a corporate entity, is entitled to bring suit in this situation, and Mrs. Champion may not herself sue as a shareholder.

A shareholder bringing a Section 1983 action for injury to a corporation must show a direct and independent injury rather than personal economic harm derived from the corporate injury.

Shell Petroleum v. Graves · filed 1983-06-30

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976), SPNV sought to enjoin the California Franchise Tax Board from assessing taxes based on a "unitary" business formula against two companies in which SPNV was the majority stockholder. The district court dismissed SPNV's complaint for lack of standing and because the controversy was not ripe. ... Generally, a shareholder does not have standing to redress an injury to the corporation. ... A shareholder must be injured directly and independently of the corporation.

A shareholder bringing a § 1983 claim must allege a direct, nonderivative injury; injury to the corporation alone does not give the shareholder standing.

Potthoff v. Morin · filed 2001-04-05

We hold that the shareholder standing rule applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by shareholders claiming injury to their corporations.

Section 1983 allows organizations to sue to enforce voting rights protected by § 1971.

VOTE.ORG v. CALLANEN · filed 2021-12-17

Hughs and Schwier so thoroughly addressed the issues, this Court finds no reason to further elaborate and, in the absence of binding Fifth Circuit precedent, adopts the reasoning in those persuasive opinions, which allowed voter registrant plaintiffs (Schwier) and political party plaintiffs (Hughs) to pursue actions under § 1971 and § 1983.

An Indian tribe cannot sue under § 1983 to vindicate its sovereign immunity from state tax enforcement.

Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Commission · filed 2010-07-09

The district court correctly construed MCN’s § 1983 claim as designed to vindicate MCN’s status as a sovereign immune from Oklahoma’s cigarette tax enforcement scheme, and thus correctly held MCN did not constitute a “person” entitled to bring suit for prospective relief against the Commissioners under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits corporate plaintiffs to bring suit.

California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick · filed 1974-10-25

A corporate plaintiff can assert rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by corporate plaintiffs are permissible, Pierce, supra; Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Los Angeles County, 181 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820, 71 S.Ct. 51, 95 L.Ed. 602 (1950); Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein).

Section 1983 allows a person within United States jurisdiction, including a resident alien, to seek redress for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Jagnandan v. Giles · filed 1974-08-15

Deprivation of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, gives rise to a cause of action in law, equity or other proceeding for redress by any citizen of the United States or other person within its jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Indian tribes are persons entitled to sue under Section 1983.

Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. City of Fallon · filed 2001-08-23

However, Ninth Circuit authority supports the proposition that Tribes are “other persons” entitled to sue under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy to an alien held in Mexico for prosecution there because the person is outside United States jurisdiction.

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-04-21

He correctly eschews a claim under section 1983, because that section does not provide him with a remedy. Section 1983 applies only to United States citizens or aliens within United States jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for a plaintiff's own constitutional rights; it does not permit recovery for a search that violated another person's Fourth Amendment privacy interest.

Lee v. C. M. Gilstrap, Chief of Police, Wayne County Lt. O. N. Weaver Sgt. R. A. Stocks G. W. Bailey Perry Sharp H · filed 1981-11-18

Since Lee had no privacy interest, his claim under § 1983 must be rejected.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to assert the constitutional rights of another.

Graham v. Hutto · filed 1977-09-22

To the extent plaintiff is contending that a ban against passing legal materials infringes the right of other, illiterate inmates to legal assistance, he fails to state a claim cognizable under Section 1983. One may not assert the constitutional rights of another.

Section 1983 does not let an individual shareholder sue in his own name for damages suffered by the corporation.

Erlich v. Glasner · filed 1969-10-28

Simply stated, the claimed damages are those of the corporation, not those of the appellant. We find nothing in the Civil Rights Act which would permit appellant to circumvent the rule of law just stated, completely avoid the corporate entity and thus maintain an action in his own name. Appellant cannot maintain this action.

Section 1983 lets a corporation invoke the statute, like a natural person, to challenge state procedures that allegedly deprive it of due process or equal protection under color of state law.

Mini Cinema 16 Inc. of Fort Dodge v. Habhab · filed 1970-12-22

Thus, a corporate plaintiff has the same right to invoke Section 1983 as a basis for federal jurisdiction to challenge state procedures as does a natural person.

Section 1983 permits claims involving property rights, and corporations are persons entitled to bring suit under the statute.

South Cutler Bay, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla. · filed 1972-10-27

Consequently, It is clear that far from preventing this Court from hearing an action involving property rights, the Civil Rights Act invests us with jurisdiction under § 1343(3) and (4) to hear § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims. ... But defendants object that plaintiff, a corporation, is not a “person” entitled to seek relief under either § 1343(3) or § 1983. If the question was once in doubt, the weight of modern authority favors the view that corporations may bring suit under these sections.

Section 1983 protects corporations as persons and permits them to bring suit for violations of their constitutional rights.

Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Robert A. Miller C. M. Clark Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Robert A. Miller · filed 1973-01-23

At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs are corporations. As such they are deemed to be persons within the meaning of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), ... and persons, as well, whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and who may bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... There is no question, then, of the district court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1983 allows people held in state pretrial detention facilities or penal institutions to seek redress for violations of fundamental constitutional rights.

Poole v. Wolke · filed 1973-01-24

Persons lawfully incarcerated in state pretrial detention facilities or penal institutions are entitled to seek redress for violations of fundamental constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action only for deprivation of the plaintiff's own federally protected right, while a decedent's claim may survive for the estate if state law creates a survival action.

Evain v. Conlisk · filed 1973-07-13

Under the Civil Rights Statutes, this Circuit follows the position that a District Court may not exercise its jurisdiction unless an individual is deprived of a right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution. ... It is quite apparent in Civil Rights litigation that one individual cannot sue for the deprivation of another’s civil rights. ... To this proposition must be added the exception that when the deprivation of an individual’s rights results in his death then a cause of action may survive for the benefit of the estate of the deceased individual under the Civil Rights provisions, if the applicable state law creates such a survival action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to every person whose constitutional or statutory rights are denied under color of state law, without distinguishing between types of civil servants.

Keyer v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York · filed 1975-07-29

Section 1983 by its terms negates any such distinction. It applies to “[ejvery person” whose “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” have been denied him under color of State law.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for individual constitutional-rights violations that may be asserted by individual patients or their guardians, but the United States cannot invoke it to establish authority for executive-branch enforcement absent express statutory authorization.

United States v. Mattson · filed 1979-07-17

The government also asserts that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, which provide a civil remedy for individual constitutional rights violations, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 which allow the executive branch to bring criminal prosecutions for systematic deprivation of constitutional rights, establish the requisite interest. As mentioned later in this opinion, Congress has repeatedly refused to allow executive branch enforcement of the civil provisions. But there appears to be no obstacle to their assertion by individual patients or their guardians.

Section 1983 vindicates individual interests and does not itself protect a state.

Commonwealth v. Porter · filed 1981-07-30

The fourteenth amendment is a limitation upon the states in the interest of individuals, and section 1983 was enacted to facilitate vindication of such individual interests.