42 U.S.C. § 1983

A state official’s status as a person under § 1983 in an official-capacity suit depends on the relief sought; a claim for injunctive relief may proceed.

Avery v. Benson · filed 2020-12-16

But we have held repeatedly, in reliance on footnote ten in Will, that the “personhood” of official capacity defendants under § 1983 turns on the relief a plaintiff seeks.

Section 1983 provides a right to sue state and local officials for alleged violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Giddens v. Lawson · filed 2020-12-16

Section 1983, on the other hand, specifically provides a right to sue state and local officials for the alleged violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Livingston v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-18

Plaintiff's official capacity claims against defendants Casey, Borton, Baker, and Sachse will be dismissed because they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Pratt v. Director of Prisons · filed 2020-12-18

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state agency employees in their official capacities cannot proceed because of state sovereign immunity.

Kerr v. McKay · filed 2020-12-29

Specifically, as relevant to Kerr’s subsequent objections, the magistrate judge determined that insofar as the plaintiff asserts §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims against Whaley in his official capacity, she cannot do so inasmuch as the defendant works for the Department of Health and Human Resources, an agency of the sovereign State of West Virginia. ... The magistrate judge’s August 17, 2020 PF&R (ECF No. 18) be, and it hereby is, ADOPTED and INCORPORATED in full except that, ... the defamation claim alleged against the Department of Health and Human Resources will not be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against a state through a claim against a state official in an official capacity.

Coronado v. Paralta · filed 2021-01-06

The Court concluded that any claims against Brewster in his official capacity were claims against the State, and there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983.

Derby v. Wiskus · filed 2021-01-21

However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. As such, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state official because the official is not a person under the statute.

Horton v. Holloway · filed 2021-01-25

Accordingly, Horton's official-capacity claim against Parole Officer Foreman is subject to dismissal, either because Parole Officer Foreman is not considered a person under § 1983 or because the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Kohl v. Davis · filed 2021-02-10

A suit against a state employee in his official capacity is a suit against the office itself—here, the state of Illinois—so Ukena in his official capacity is not a person who can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official in his official capacity because the claim is against the state, which is not a “person” under the section.

Kucinsky v. Pfister · filed 2021-02-11

Therefore, a suit against Pfister, in his official capacity as the warden of Pontiac, was a suit against IDOC, a state entity, and thus, a suit against the state. Consequently, the circuit court could not entertain a section 1983 action for damages against Pfister in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Smith v. Harlan · filed 2021-03-15

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Saleem v. COI Doe · filed 2021-03-17

Moreover, Laurel, as a state official sued in his official capacity, is not a “person” capable of being sued for civil rights violations under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money-damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Keim v. Mazza · filed 2021-03-31

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Murphy v. Calvdo · filed 2021-04-08

However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. ... Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the defendants, his official-capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued for money damages.

Morris v. Washington · filed 2021-04-09

In addition, state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983.

A state official sued in an official capacity is not a person under § 1983.

Green v. Gulick · filed 2021-04-12

Thus, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant Gulick are subject to dismissal, either because he is not considered a person under § 1983 or because the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims.

Section 1983 does not treat state police officers sued in their official capacities for monetary damages as persons subject to suit.

Albert v. Unknown Individual Kentucky State Police Officers · filed 2021-04-15

Unknown KSP Officers when sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not considered “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 for claims seeking money damages.

Calhoun v. Washington · filed 2021-04-19

State officials obviously are persons, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), but state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983 when sued for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit.

Walker v. Mazza · filed 2021-05-06

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officers sued in their official capacities because the state is not a person subject to liability.

Kreilein v. Horth · filed 2021-05-07

A suit against an officer of a state agency in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the state, and the state is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against municipal officers in their official capacities duplicate claims against the municipality itself and may be dismissed when the municipality is also sued.

Villarreal v. Schmaderer · filed 2021-06-15

Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Omaha and Defendants Schmaderer and Matuza in their official capacities are actually claims against the City of Omaha itself. ... Therefore, such claims will be dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Omaha.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Dudley v. Strough · filed 2021-06-18

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Hamilton v. Ishee · filed 2021-06-30

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

A state prison officer sued in his official capacity is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

GARCIA v. ROBINSON · filed 2021-07-16

In his official capacity, therefore, Defendant Robinson is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state official sued in an official capacity as a person subject to a claim for money damages.

Smith v. Monti · filed 2021-07-19

And, because a state official sued in his official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983, an official capacity claim against an individual is really a suite for money damages against the State, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

A complaint against state officials sued only in their official capacities fails to state a Section 1983 claim because the officials are not persons under the section.

Canterbury v. Lewis · filed 2021-07-26

“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Estate of Daniel Morris v. Jeffreys · filed 2021-07-28

But state officials sued in their official capacity are not “persons” under §1983, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and official capacity suits for damages against state officials in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Blake v. N.C. Dept of Public Safety / Mountain View CI · filed 2021-08-02

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Kovach v. Precythe · filed 2021-08-13

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for damages against Anne Precythe are barred. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a § 1983 damages claim against a state official acting in his official capacity is barred, either by the Eleventh Amendment or because, in such capacity, he is not a “person” capable of being sued).

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy against a state through claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Kurtz v. Young · filed 2021-08-24

While “[§] 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, . . . it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Rhodes v. Cunningham · filed 2021-08-30

Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from state officers or employees in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims under § 1983.

A state correctional officer sued for damages in an official capacity is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Cottengim v. Bacon · filed 2021-09-07

Additionally, “[s]tate officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). ... Therefore, plaintiff's official capacity claims will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Alvarez v. Davis · filed 2021-09-13

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state governor in his official capacity.

Wilson v. B&B Properties · filed 2021-10-05

The court further denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint as futile on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff did not show, to a legal certainty, that she would recover the amount claimed in damages; (2) Plaintiff’s claims that putative Defendant Henry McMaster, in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina and former Attorney General of South Carolina, violated her civil rights are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit in federal court by a private party seeking monetary damages from a state official. ... With respect to Plaintiff’s motions to amend her complaint or to have the proposed amended complaint construed to comprise a new civil action, Plaintiff’s motions are denied for the reasons stated in its July 2, 2021 order.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state official in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to stop an ongoing violation of federal law.

Rogers v. Department of Children Youth and Families · filed 2021-10-12

Under Ex parte Young, a state official in his or her official capacity is considered a “person” for § 1983 purposes and thus the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a federal court from granting a claim for prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.

Section 1983 does not allow an official-capacity claim against state officials because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Islam v. Phegley · filed 2021-10-18

“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Because plaintiff cannot state a claim against defendants Phegley and Jackson acting in their official capacities, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a municipal employee when a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Guarneri v. Schenectady City Police · filed 2021-10-20

Thus, Section 1983 claims may properly be brought against a municipal employee in their official capacity; a plaintiff need only plead that a deprivation of rights was caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for money damages against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” subject to suit under the section.

Spurlin v. Kromer · filed 2021-10-22

First, state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities generally are not persons subject to § 1983 damages claims.

Blumenkron v. Multnomah County · filed 2021-10-25

Generally, suits against state officials in their official capacities cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such state officials are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Blackburn v. Teague · filed 2021-10-28

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Arnett v. Hopkins County Attorney · filed 2021-11-08

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 because a state is not a person under the section.

Fuller v. Sheppard · filed 2021-11-08

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 for damages claims.

Hensley v. Dobbs · filed 2021-11-22

However, neither the state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary claims against state corrections officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Williams v. Payne · filed 2021-12-21

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, Defendants are not considered “persons” under § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Moore v. Church · filed 2022-01-26

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Howell v. Henderson · filed 2022-02-01

In the instant action, all named defendants appear to be employed by the ERDCC and are, therefore, employees of the State of Missouri. ... As a result, the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all defendant ERDCC employees in their official capacities.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages suits under Section 1983.

Villagrana v. Loving · filed 2022-02-10

In a suit for damages, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ [subject to suit] under § 1983.” ... As a result, the Amended Complaint fails to state a colorable claim for damages under Section 1983 against the Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 monetary damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Montgomery v. Onuoha · filed 2022-02-14

Accordingly, § 1983 claims for monetary damages against a state official in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Wright v. Hamilton · filed 2022-02-14

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff sought to name Defendant Hamilton in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Trimble v. Gibson · filed 2022-02-18

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against states or state officials sued in their official capacities.

WEATHERSPOON v. KHOURY · filed 2021-06-11

In tandem, the Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 suits that seek damages against states and individual state officials acting in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Johnson v. Aramark Corporation · filed 2022-02-22

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against municipal employees may be dismissed as duplicative of claims against the municipality.

Batianis v. Dundee, Village of · filed 2022-03-10

Plaintiff conceded that the employees “should be dismissed as they are duplicative to the actions of the Village.” ECF 18, PgID 242. The Court agrees, and given the concession, the Court will dismiss Defendants David Uhl and Timothy Garbo.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Griffin v. Hollar · filed 2022-03-10

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Blackwell v. Corizon Health Care · filed 2022-03-21

However, to the extent plaintiff can be understood to sue the defendants in their official capacities for injunctive or prospective relief, such claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages claims against a state official in an official capacity when the claim is effectively against the state, which is not a person under the statute.

Hood v. Lawrence · filed 2022-03-25

Brown is also correct to say that Hood’s official capacity claims against him are not authorized by § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim against a state official in his official capacity for a past failure to investigate is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Ervin v. Woodfin · filed 2022-04-05

It appears from Mr. Ervin’s allegations that he asserts his claims against the state defendant, Attorney General Marshall, in his official capacity for his failure to investigate the BPD. Official capacity suits against state employees essentially are suits against the State of Alabama. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits suits against a state by the state’s citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 (1974). Therefore, Mr. Ervin cannot sue Attorney General Marshall in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Tyler v. City of Henderson, KY · filed 2022-04-13

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, but permits prospective injunctive relief against them.

Stibbe v. Evers · filed 2022-04-26

Because he has sued the defendants in their official capacities, he cannot recover damages for these alleged violations. But if the court determines that the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the plaintiff may pursue his request for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials, but sovereign immunity bars damages claims against them in that capacity.

Doe v. Frakes · filed 2022-05-25

Thus, a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official in his or her official capacity is barred by sovereign immunity. ... However, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity for declaratory or injunctive relief is permissible, “because those claims are treated as an action against the official personally and not against the State.” Id.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to know that the defendant was a state actor at the time of the conduct.

Thaje R. Padgett, and Shauna D. Parks v. Thomas A. Wilson, and Paul White James Ruff Mool Sekhawat South Carolina State · filed 1995-10-18

Regarding Wilson's claim that Padgett failed to state a cause of action because she was unaware that Wilson was a state actor at the time of the incident, there is no requirement under Sec. 1983 that the plaintiff be aware that the defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to maintain a separate suit for equitable relief while a class action addressing the same alleged discrimination is pending.

Dayse v. Alford · filed 1995-10-25

A class action lawsuit against T.D.C.J.- I.D involving discrimination against African- American inmates is currently pending in the Southern District of Texas. 3 Dayse cannot maintain a separate suit for equitable relief.

A failure to follow Miranda procedures alone does not state a § 1983 claim because it does not establish a violation of a substantive constitutional right.

Parris v. Officer Hillary Taft · filed 2015-10-27

Under this precedent, we must conclude that Mr. Parris failed to state a claim under § 1983 because his allegation that the officers failed to follow Miranda procedures was insufficient to assert that the officers violated his substantive constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide civil damages for a failure to give Miranda warnings.

Locke v. James Greer, C.T. Caraway, Russell Ticer · filed 1992-05-29

The failure to give Miranda warnings is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Failure to give Miranda warnings cannot form the basis of a civil rights claim under Section 1983.

Termunde v. Mr. Scovell, Head of M.I.S., 1 · filed 1993-08-19

However, Miranda warnings are not a constitutional right, and a failure to issue Miranda warnings cannot form the basis of a civil rights claim.

Failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, create liability under § 1983.

Neighbour v. Patrolman Michael Covert Patrolman Joseph Kenny and the Village of Cooperstown · filed 1995-10-27

However, this seeming inconsistency is of no consequence in this case, since we hold that the failure to give Miranda warnings does not create liability under § 1983.

A failure to give Miranda warnings does not itself support damages under § 1983; the remedy is exclusion of compelled statements.

Veilleux v. Perschau · filed 1995-11-15

"the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a Section 1983 action."

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action for a Miranda violation; the remedy is exclusion of compelled self-incrimination.

Lemons v. Lewis · filed 1997-04-22

Even if the facts could be said to violate plaintiffs Miranda rights, the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an officer failed to give Miranda warnings.

Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir · filed 1998-09-16

The Squad’s failure to inform plaintiffs of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not, without more, result in § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a law enforcement officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Gradisher v. County of Muskegon · filed 2003-02-24

Regardless of whether such warnings were required, which the Court doubts to be the case, Plaintiffs have no claim under § 1983 based solely upon a law enforcement officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Chavez v. Martinez · filed 2003-05-27

Accordingly, Chavez’s failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on custodial questioning without Miranda warnings when the plaintiff’s statements were not used against her at trial.

Renda v. King · filed 2003-10-16

However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chavez, it is clear that Giuffre still is good law following Dickerson, and that the District Court properly ruled that questioning a plaintiff in custody without providing Miranda warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the plaintiff ’s statements are not used against her at trial.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a failure to give Miranda warnings; the remedy is exclusion of evidence obtained through compelled self-incrimination.

Sutherland v. Mizer · filed 2008-05-06

Thus, the remedy for a Miranda violation is to exclude the evidence of any unlawfully compelled self-incrimination tactics. Significantly, it does not constitute a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against law enforcement officials solely for failing to give Miranda warnings.

O'HAGAN v. Soto · filed 1981-04-08

There is no reason or support for subjecting law enforcement officials to civil liability for failure to give Miranda warnings.

Section 1983 does not provide money damages for a failure to give a Miranda warning because that failure does not violate a substantive Fifth Amendment right.

Lloyd v. Marshall · filed 2013-07-29

Even if we were to assume that Lloyd had been entitled to a Miranda warning, “failing to follow Miranda procedures . . . does not violate any substantive Fifth Amendment right such that a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 is created.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer merely for failing to give Miranda warnings.

Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha · filed 2015-06-25

Second, the mere failure to provide Miranda warnings does not subject an officer to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for failure to give Miranda warnings.

Fortson v. Los Angeles City Attorney's Office · filed 2017-04-07

Miranda claims, however, are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officers who obtain unwarned custodial statements used in a criminal case, even if those officers testify to the statements themselves.

Johnson v. Winstead · filed 2019-12-04

To be sure, and as discussed above, the statements had to be used in Johnson’s criminal case to subject Winstead and Las Cola to § 1983 liability, but that it was the interrogating officers who testified does not shield them from liability.

A failure to give Miranda warnings alone does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Cox v. Aversa · filed 2020-02-19

To the extent Plaintiff’s claim is based only on Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Miranda warning, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an alleged failure to give Miranda warnings when the plaintiff does not allege that an unwarned statement was admitted against him at trial.

Baez v. Duggan · filed 2020-04-08

In any event, he has no remedy under Section 1983 for any alleged Miranda violation in this action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Bell v. Drakeford · filed 2020-04-10

However, “[t]he remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any ensuing self-incriminating statements . . . . The remedy is not a § 1983 action.” Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Accordingly, any claim based on an alleged failure to read Bell his Miranda rights is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to give Miranda warnings.

Griffin-Robinson v. Salov · filed 2020-05-06

Plaintiff’s claim premised on the police officers’ failure to provide her with Miranda warnings until several hours after her arrest must be dismissed because such a claim cannot proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no damages action for failure to give Miranda warnings.

(PC) Dixon v. Navarro · filed 2020-08-27

Plaintiff’s claim that prison officials did not provide him with Miranda warnings prior to assessing him a SHU term fails because there is no action for damages under § 1983 for failure to provide such warnings.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim based solely on officers’ failure to give Miranda warnings.

Essani v. Earley · filed 2021-04-22

Second, even if the Officers were required to read Plaintiff his Miranda warnings and failed to do so, that failure cannot form the basis for an action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Sewell v. City of Odessa, DC Oris, Jesse Duarte, Daryl Smith, Leslie Goodson, Joe Barrera and Bill Carpenter · filed 2021-04-30

Appellant’s claim that Goodson failed to read him his Miranda warnings is not cognizable as a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action for failure to give Miranda warnings; the remedy is exclusion of the resulting evidence.

Wilson v. Richmond Heights Police Department · filed 2022-01-21

As explained above, plaintiff cannot bring an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on law enforcement’s purported failure to read him his Miranda warnings. Rather, his remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on an officer’s failure to give a Miranda warning.

Lynch v. City of Little Falls · filed 2022-03-14

Trooper Defendants are correct that a failure to provide a Miranda warning is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204.

Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven · filed 2011-05-04

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's (1) conclusion that 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204 may not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... We adopt the district court's carefully considered and thorough discussion of these issues.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of agency regulations beyond the rights conferred by the governing statute.

Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF NEW HAVEN · filed 2011-05-04

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's (1) conclusion that 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204 may not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... In other words, a right of action "can extend no further than" the personal right conferred by the plain language of the statute. ... We adopt the district court's carefully considered and thorough discussion of these issues.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to enforce a right supplied only by an agency regulation; the right must come from a federal statute.

Guzman v. Shewry · filed 2008-09-22

Thus, whatever the effect of HHS’s decision to retain the implementing regula- tion after the repeal of the statute, Guzman cannot contend that such regulation entitles him to a right enforceable in the § 1983 claim he has brought here.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a right created solely by an agency regulation; the right must come from a statute.

Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit · filed 2003-07-10

But because of controlling Supreme Court precedent, we hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal Medicaid regulations that have the force of law, including the requirement that states ensure transportation for recipients.

Boatman v. Hammons · filed 1998-12-18

This Circuit has held to the contrary that because federal regulations have the force of law, they must be characterized as “law” under § 1983. ... The content of the federal regulation at issue here is clear — states must ensure that Medicaid recipients have transportation to and from medical service providers. It is therefore necessary to provide applicants with written notice of a denial of assistance, including some explanation of the reasons therefor and the availability of review of the decision.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31 when the plaintiff has not shown that the regulation benefits a class including him.

Backlund v. Hessen · filed 1995-11-06

The Court finds no basis to conclude that Plaintiff is a member of the class intended to benefit from the regulation and therefore Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first requirement in Cort. Accordingly the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown he has a claim under § 1983 based upon an alleged violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce rights created by a Medicaid state-plan provision and an accompanying procurement regulation.

Value Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Mental Health · filed 1997-05-30

The Court therefore concludes that the plaintiff has met its burden under Wilder, and that 42 U.S.C. § 1936a(a)(4) and 45 C.F.R. § 74.43 create federal rights upon which the plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action under both § 1983 and Ex parte Young.

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of a requirement that arises only from a regulation rather than a federal statute.

Florida Pharmacy Ass'n v. Cook · filed 1998-09-04

First, the source of this alleged requirement is a regulation, not the statute itself, precluding enforcement of the requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of rights under the Telecommunications Act.

E. Spire Communications, Inc. v. Baca · filed 2003-06-12

Because none of e.spire’s federal Constitutional claims are viable, and the Telecommunications Act cannot support a claim under § 1983, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Cause of Action.

Section 1983 claims cannot be based on violations of state law.

Baker v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-06-01

A Section 1983 claim may not be based on a violation of state law. See Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim fails to extent that it is based on state housing laws.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police officer based on allegations of assault and battery.

Corcoran v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-29

Contrary to defendants' contention, a party may allege assault and battery as the basis for a suit under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie , 90 AD3d 841, 846-847 [2d Dept 2011]).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for every violation of federal law by a state actor; the alleged record-retention violations here did not support a claim.

Bunt v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System · filed 2021-04-06

The Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that the plaintiff fails to articulate a cognizable basis for relief under § 1983. As stated in the R&R, Section1983 “does not provide an avenue for relief every time a state actor violates a federal law.”

Section 1983 permits a separate damages action for alleged federal constitutional violations even when the plaintiff did not timely seek state judicial review of the challenged zoning decision.

Sundheim v. Board of Cty. Com'rs of Douglas Cty. · filed 1995-11-14

If, however, monetary damages are sought, because C.R.C.P. 106 does not provide for a remedy in damages, a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon alleged violations of federal constitutional rights may be maintained.

Section 1983 allows a property owner to seek relief for alleged constitutional violations arising from municipal land-use action without being confined to the four-month limitations period for a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

C & D Design, Build, Dev., LLC v. Village of Alexander, N.Y. · filed 2020-08-20

That relief is [*2]appropriately sought via an action based on 42 USC § 1983, and therefore the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings does not apply here ( see Sonne , 67 AD3d at 202-203; see also Matter of Karamalla v Devine , 159 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2018]; Mulcahy v New York City Dept. of Educ ., 99 AD3d 535, 536 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 1983 does not give prison officials qualified immunity for punishing an inmate who puts both his committed name and legal religious name on outgoing mail when that right was clearly established.

Malik v. Brown · filed 1995-11-28

A reasonable officer would not believe that it was proper to punish an inmate for mailing out correspondence with both his committed name and his religious name on it. Consequently, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity regarding the outgoing-mail issue.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison operating procedures that do not implicate constitutional rights.

Via v. Cabell · filed 2022-01-26

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated some right purportedly bestowed upon him by some institutional policy, violations of prison operating procedures do not implicate constitutional rights and are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a jail superintendent when the pleaded facts adequately support a claim against him as the person responsible for administering the facility.

Picard v. Pennsylvania Institutional · filed 1995-12-06

Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts which give rise to cognizable claims against Mr. O'Mara in his individual capacity, as the person responsible for the administration of the correctional facility (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) .

A sheriff or warden who controls jail policies and conditions may be a proper § 1983 defendant at the pleading stage when personal involvement remains in dispute.

Robinson v. Corriveau · filed 1995-12-07

The sheriff and the warden, who, on the pleadings, are in control of the jail in question, are the obvious defendants in a suit of this kind, and it is premature to dismiss them.

Section 1983 requires evidence that supervisory officials knew of or implemented an allegedly discriminatory practice before they can be held individually liable for it.

Lucien v. Peters III · filed 1997-02-06

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants Welborn and Page on this issue on the basis that these defendants, as wardens, only had "control over prison policy in general, [but] there is no evidence that either of them were personally involved in or aware of any practice of racial discrimination." Also, the court found that Welborn and Page had no "direct responsibility for assigning the plaintiff to particular cells at Menard." We agree that plaintiff failed to show that these officials were aware of or implementing racial criteria for making cell assignments.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only for a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Foote v. Spiegel · filed 1997-07-08

Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that an individual defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct.

Dewick v. Village of Penn Yan · filed 1997-07-14

Further, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating that the individual defendants were personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking personal liability to show that each defendant official caused the deprivation of a right.

Merritt v. M.D. Reed Charles Lanehart, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1997-07-15

Merritt presented no evidence to establish that either defendant Reed or Lanehart made the reasons for his termination public. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (to establish personal liability in section 1983 action, plaintiff must show that defendant official caused deprivation of right).

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by a defendant in the challenged conduct; a prison superintendent who did not participate in medical treatment decisions is not liable for those decisions.

Beaven v. Daniel R. McBride Teofilo Bautista, and Stephen Kaski · filed 1997-07-15

Finally, Beaven does not establish the personal involvement of McBride in the treatment decisions made by Drs. Bautista and Kaski. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in his favor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing each defendant’s personal participation in an alleged constitutional violation.

Swan v. James Gomez B.J. Bunnell R. Scaggs R.W. Knowles, J. Moor, M.D. L. Murcavitch R. Bird · filed 1997-07-17

With respect to his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims and his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims, Swan failed to allege facts establishing the personal participation of defendant Scaggs or Bird. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on an official for a subordinate’s allegedly improper employment decision when the official did not personally participate in that decision.

Largo v. Vacco · filed 1997-07-18

Defendant Page merely signed a letter, and the only discretionary function which Defendant Vacco performed is that he directed a re-evaluation of the employees to be conducted by his subordinates, and ordered the termination of those whom the subordinates did not find sufficiently well qualified. This is not a civil rights violation on his part, even if it were to be shown that Flynn or Buscaglia, in discharging their mission had allowed allegedly improper political motivations to intrude upon their judgment.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.

Pressley v. Brownfield · filed 1997-07-21

"To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish defendants' personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right."

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between an individual defendant’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.

Bedford v. J.D. Sharp · filed 1997-07-23

Bedford has not alleged an affirmative link between the alleged mail tampering and the actions of defendant Sharp. Therefore, the suit cannot lie against Sharp in his individual capacity, either.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded against that defendant.

White-Ruiz v. City of New York · filed 1997-08-05

In addressing the question of the individual defendants’ responsibility for any constitutional violations, I note first that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged unlawful conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Davis v. Kelly · filed 1997-08-07

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s personal involvement in the purported unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers for failing to prevent another officer’s use of force when they were not in a position to prevent it and did not contribute to the injury.

Macias v. City of Las Vegas · filed 1997-08-13

The plaintiffs' argument that Officers Siwy and Kavon are liable under section 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to protect Macias is unavailing for the same reasons. Although they were present, the evidence shows that they were not in a position to prevent the "shoot situation." At the critical moment, Officers Siwy and Kavon were scurrying for cover. There is no evidence that they took any actions prior to the shooting that unreasonably "escalated the circumstances" or otherwise contributed to Macias's death.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Kalonji Rad Jihad v. Charles E. Wright, Step Huckins, Dawn MacMillan and M. Levenhagen, 1 · filed 1997-08-14

Notably, he did not allege how any of the defendants were personally responsible for making him suffer this alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. Hence, the defendants cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued individually to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Olivieri v. Matt L. Rodriguez · filed 1997-08-15

Even then he had no case against the only defendant whom he has named, the superintendent of the police department, unless the superintendent himself participated in publicizing the grounds of the discharge.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded.

Doyle v. Coombe · filed 1997-08-26

It is well settled that “[p]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Bartlett v. Correctional Medical · filed 1997-09-16

As for these claims, Mr. Bartlett’s complaint fails adequately to show personal participation by most of the defendants, see Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (personal participation is an essential allegation of a § 1983 claim) and Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (conclusory allegations are insufficient); or, the requisite culpable state of mind.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence that the defendant bore responsibility for the harm alleged.

J.R. Ewing Carrell v. James Rowland, Robert E. Borg, C. Hess, Correctional Officer, and Nancy Reid, Correctional Officer · filed 1997-09-24

Because the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Carrell, failed to establish that the defendant bore any responsibility for the attack on Carrell by Fonville, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to connect the defendant personally to the alleged constitutional harm.

Taylor v. Dennis Clark, Clothing Supervisor, Calipatria State Prison · filed 1997-09-24

Taylor, however, did not allege that defendant Clark was responsible for Taylor's discharge despite the fact that the district court specifically notified him of this deficiency in its dismissal of his first amended complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s direct personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Casaburro v. Giuliani · filed 1997-09-29

It is well settled in this Circuit that in a Section 1983 action a plaintiff must allege direct and personal involvement on the part of a defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a damages plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Fischl v. David Armitage, Corrections Sergeant, and S.A. Marshall, Corrections Officer, in Their Individual Capaci · filed 1997-10-09

In order to succeed on a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 liability requires proof that the defendant actually engaged in the conduct alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s federal rights.

DeVaughn v. City of Clanton, Ala. · filed 1997-10-22

Defendants correctly note that, in order to hold a state actor hable under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants actually engaged in the conduct she alleges violated her federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation for individual liability.

Allen v. Brown · filed 1997-10-23

We also conclude that because Allen conceded that defendant Daniels did not personally participate in the alleged violation of Allen's Eighth Amendment rights while he was confined in the Violent Control Unit, the district court did not err by dismissing this claim against defendant Daniels.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence that the defendant personally caused the constitutional deprivation; speculation about responsibility for lost legal mail does not suffice.

Bishop v. Daughtery · filed 1997-10-24

We agree with the district court that Bishop failed to raise a genuine material fact as to whether Daughtery was personally responsible for the loss of his mail. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (stating that to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show defendant's acts or omissions caused a constitutional deprivation); see also Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) ("mere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment").

Section 1983 requires an allegation of the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation to support a claim against that defendant in an individual capacity.

Horton v. Belinda D. Stewart, Superintendent Micc · filed 1997-10-24

Moreover, Horton's contention that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to sue Stewart in her individual capacity is meritless because he failed to allege Stewart's personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires a named defendant to have personally participated in the alleged violation of a right.

Canell v. Ted Ficken, Director of Cornerstone Drug Program Stan Mazur-Hart David Cook, Debbie Rios Rick Hul · filed 1997-10-27

Because Canell did not name the counselor as a defendant, and neither alleged nor submitted evidence that any named defendant monitored these conversations or knew about his counselor's conduct, Canell failed to establish that any of the defendants personally participated in the alleged violation of his right to confer with counsel.

Section 1983 requires a prison official to know of a constitutional deprivation and approve it, turn a blind eye to it, fail to remedy it, or otherwise personally participate in it.

Eddie King v. William O'sullivan, Owen Murray, and Debbie Fuqua · filed 1997-10-31

King must show that O'Sullivan and Fuqua knew of a constitutional deprivation and approved it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way personally participated in it.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials for medical care in which they played no role.

Allison v. Gomez · filed 1997-11-06

First, because Dr. Johnson was the only defendant who played any role in Allison's medical care, there is no basis for liability against the other defendants. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978) (recognizing that respondeat superior theory of liability cannot support claim under section 1983).

Section 1983 requires specific facts linking each defendant to the alleged deprivation of rights.

Maahs v. P.L. Kernan E. Baskerville G. Nakagawa Bonnie Garibay · filed 1997-11-06

We affirm that dismissal, because Maahs failed to allege specific facts to link each defendant to the purported due process violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, including when liability is sought against a supervisor.

Thomas v. Irvin · filed 1997-11-10

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s personal involvement in the purported unlawful conduct. ... In the absence of any proof of unconstitutional conduct on the part of defendants Irvin and Wolff in either a direct or supervisory capacity, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 damages require a defendant to be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Luttrell v. Nickel · filed 1997-11-19

Luttrell did not explain his delay in filing the motion nor did the amended complaint include any allegations of personal responsibility by the proposed additional defendants. ... “To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged rights violation; merely reporting another judge’s failure to report for an assignment to a state court does not state a claim.

Avellino v. Herron · filed 1997-12-16

Merely alleging that Judge Bonavitacola brought Judge Avellino’s failure to report to his assignment of presiding over felony waiver proceedings to the attention of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an arrest on an officer whose role was limited to serving a warrant obtained by another officer.

White v. Town of Marblehead · filed 1997-12-17

The problem is that the Plaintiff has sued the wrong officer. White has sued Hitchcock rather than King or Hazel, the officers who were more directly responsible for the arrest. Hitchcock’s role in this investigation was entirely ministerial. He simply served the arrest warrant obtained by King.

A § 1983 claim against an individual defendant requires evidence of that defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Johnny Lacy, Jr. v. Berge · filed 1997-12-17

Summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant Laura Flood, apparently a prison employee whom Lacy contacted about referring Lutzow for criminal prosecution, for failure to show any personal involvement in the relevant claims. ... Lacy failed to identify any role played by Flood, or even her occupation, in his pleadings or summary judgment motion papers.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence that a defendant individually participated in the alleged violation.

Brady v. Persingey · filed 1997-12-17

With respect to Brady's claim of racial discrimination, we conclude that the record contains no evidence that any of the defendants engaged in intentional acts of racial discrimination. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (establishing that violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires evidence of discriminatory intent); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-744 (9th Cir.1978) (establishing that liability under § 1983 requires evidence of individual participation in the alleged violation).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in a constitutional violation.

Adame v. K.W. Prunty S.H. Garcia, Assistant Warden P.D. Washington, Program Administrator T.L. Wells W.J. Davis, T. · filed 1997-12-19

To the extent Adame appeals the dismissal of defendants Prunty, Garcia, and Washington, we affirm the dismissal because Adame failed to show the defendants personally participated in a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims against supervisory defendants require allegations that they personally participated in or directed the alleged violations.

Cunningham v. Oregon Department of Correction David Cook, Individually and Director Al Chandler, Individually and · filed 1997-12-19

Cunningham's remaining claims were properly dismissed on the grounds that Cunningham failed to allege defendants personally participated in or directed the alleged violations.

Section 1983 individual-capacity liability for a supervisory official requires involvement in, knowledge of, or personal deliberate indifference to the alleged deprivation.

Henderson v. Sheahan · filed 1997-12-29

Henderson's claim against Sheahan in his individual capacity likewise fails: Henderson does not contend that Sheahan was involved in, knew of, or personally acted with deliberate indifference to CCDOC's failure to properly record his change of plea.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant was personally responsible for the claimed deprivation of rights.

Donelli v. Foster · filed 1998-01-06

By failing to allege that any of the defendants were responsible for Donelli’s alleged denial of continued, necessary medical treatment for his psychological condition, Donelli has failed to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged denial of constitutional rights to recover damages.

McNary v. Norman · filed 1998-01-06

Their conduct does not give rise to liability because they were not personally involved in the alleged denial of Mr. McNary's constitutional rights as is required to recover damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation before monetary damages may be imposed on that defendant.

Davis v. Goode · filed 1998-01-09

It is well-established that a prerequisite to imposing monetary damages upon an individual in a Section 1983 action is proof that the individual is personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials require facts connecting their own acts to the alleged constitutional violation.

Gann v. N. Miner: Gregory Moreno J.P. Rempel · filed 1998-01-28

The district court correctly dismissed the § 1983 claims against appellees Leatherman and Dizmon under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint did not allege a constitutional violation against these two defendants. The district court concluded that Gann did not state facts showing a causal connection between the acts of Leatherman and Dizmon and the alleged constitutional violations. Leatherman's postponement of the hearing does not demonstrate her complicity in the allegedly retaliatory acts of officers Miner, Rempel, and Moreno. Nor does Dizmon's ruling indicate that he condoned the acts of the other officers.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Paul v. Rugh · filed 1998-01-29

Accordingly, because plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his case, i.e., that defendant Rugh personally participated in the injurious conduct, see Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (no liability under § 1983 unless defendant was personally involved in deprivation of plaintiff’s rights), summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation before damages may be awarded.

Sundbye v. Ogunleye · filed 1998-02-03

Accordingly, a defendant’s “personal involvement” is “a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged unlawful conduct.

Wilson v. Johnson · filed 1998-02-17

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s personal involvement in the purported unlawful conduct.